A
Kairosfocus Briefing Note:
http://www.angelfire.com/pro/kairosfocus/resources/Selective_Hyperskepticism.htm
On
the Fallacy of Selective Hyperskepticism:
Or,
how to identify and avoid (or if necessary, counter)
a common variety of skeptical
Question-Begging
frequently met with in debates over Christian Evidences
GEM
05:12:17b.3, as u/d 06:02:25 & 07:03:18a, app 1 07:12:24; turnspeech 09:02:15a
SYNOPSIS:
The fallacy of selective hyperskepticism
occurs when one exerts (perhaps inadvertently) a double-standard on the degree
of warrant demanded for accepting testimony, claims or reports on matters of fact;
matters which as Havard's Simon Greenleaf (one of the fathers of the modern theory
of evidence) observed, can only be shown to be so beyond reasonable doubt, i.e.
to moral rather than demonstrative certaintly. Also, given Kurt
Godel's work in the 1930's even mathematical demonstrations fail of absolute certainty,
as -- for sufficiently rich axiomatic mathematical systems -- complete sets of
axioms will be inconsistent and there is no constructive procedure to create sets
of axioms which are known to be consistent. The fallacy is rooted in the problem
that if radical skepticism is universally applied, it ends
in self-referential absurdity, through corroding confidence in ALL claims; thus,
itself as well. That is, subtly, it contradicts and so refutes itself. However,
sometimes, when a claim does not sit well with one's worldview, one is tempted
to dismiss it through selectively -- thus inconsistently -- requiring a degree
of evidence that, by the very nature of the case, a matter
of fact cannot attain; perhaps through the slogan, "extraordinary
claims require extraordiary evidence." (This problem of a double-standard
in assessing evidence, unfortunately, is particularly commonly
met with in discussions on the authenticating
evidential underpinnings of the Christian Faith.) Instead of falling into
such inconsistencies, it is wiser to first examine the comparative
difficulties of the worldview level claims and commitments thus involved,
on factual adequacy, coherence and simplicity/ad hocness, leading to a position
that can be called "reasonable faith." In
so doing, reasonable principles of assessing fact-claims and associated basic
beliefs can be applied, on a fair and balanced
basis. For such a process, Greenleaf, in his Testimony
of the Evangelists, also provides several rules of
thumb for practical reasoning on such matters of fact. Such rules may then
help us avoid unnecessary error and gain reasonable and well-warranted confidence
-- amounting to moral (as opposed to demonstrative) certainty
-- in the truth of well-authenticated records and testimony, such as are encountered
in an examination of the credibility of the New Testament
roots of the Christian Faith.
CONTENTS:
INTRODUCTION
A]
Defining Selective Hyperskepticism
--> What about "Selective Hyper-credulity"?
--> Closed-minded (often, abusive) objectionism --> Turnabout ("he hit back first") turn-speech accusation -->
Authenticity and the C1 NT (vs the C2 Gnostic "Gospels")
B]
The Root Problem -- Radical Skepticism
C]
The Underlying Challenge: Evidentialism
D]
A Better Approach: Reasonable Faith
-->
Thomas Didymus
E]
Some Rules for the Road
CONCLUSION APPENDIX 1: On the Lucy Pevensie School of Epistemology
INTRODUCTION:
In the 19th Century, Law Professor Simon Greenleaf of Harvard, a key founding
father of the modern theory of evidence in Anglophone Jurisprudence, observed
in his Testimony of the Evangelists,
that:
[26] . . . It should be observed that the subject of inquiry [i.e. evidence relating
to the credibility of the New Testament accounts] is a matter of fact, and not
of abstract mathematical proof. The latter alone is susceptible of that high degree
of proof, usually termed demonstration, which excludes the possibility
of error . . . In the ordinary affairs of life we do not require nor expect
demonstrative evidence, because it is inconsistent with the nature of matters
of fact, and to insist on its production would be unreasonable and absurd
. . . The error of the skeptic consists in pretending or supposing that
there is a difference in the nature of things to be proved; and in demanding demonstrative
evidence concerning things which are not susceptible of any other than moral evidence
alone, and of which the utmost that can be said is, that there is no reasonable
doubt about their truth . . . .
[27]
. . . . In proceeding to weigh the evidence of any proposition of fact, the previous
question to be determined is, when may it be said to be proved? The answer to
this question is furnished by another rule of municipal law, which may be thus
stated:
A
proposition of fact is proved, when its truth is established by competent and
satisfactory evidence.
By
competent evidence, is meant such as the nature of the thing to be proved
requires; and by satisfactory evidence, is meant that amount of proof,
which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond any reasonable doubt.
. . . . If, therefore, the subject is a problem in mathematics, its truth is to
be shown by the certainty of demonstrative evidence. But if it is a question
of fact in human affairs, nothing more than moral evidence can be required, for
this is the best evidence which, from the nature of the case, is attainable.
Now as the facts, stated in Scripture History, are not of the former kind, but
are cognizable by the senses, they may be said to be proved when they are established
by that kind and degree of evidence which, as we have just observed, would, in
the affairs of human life, satisfy the mind and conscience of a common man. [Testimony,
Sections 26, 27, emphases added.]
Thus
we see that, over a hundred years ago, Professor Greenleaf anticipated much of
our contemporary discussion over defeatable reasoning on empirical issues and
on inference to best explanation, by distinguishing between discussions on matters
of fact and those on logical demonstration relative to accepted axioms. In so
doing, he highlighted the point that the former can only be warranted to the level
of moral, rather than demonstrative, certaintly. (Of course, he was nearly a century
too old to have the advantagre of knowing from Kurt Godel's seminal work in the
1930's, that no sufficiently rich axiomatic mathematical system can both be "complete"
[entailing all true claims in the field] and self-consistent; also, there is no
constructive procedure for creating an axiomatic system that is known to be internally
consistent -- i.e. there is an irreducible uncertainty in Mathematics as well.
That is, we now credibly know that even demonstrative mathematical proofs are
not absolutely certain.)
Greenleaf
also gave us a useful summary of the practical solution worked out in courts over
the centuries for establishing when a claim has been reasonably shown to be true,
in the teeth of adversaries seeking to undermine it. For, since one way to undermine
the persuasive force of evidence is to inappropriately create doubt that it sufficiently
warrants a conclusion, he also identified a commonly encountered skeptical fallacy,
as noted above -- but which he did not specifically name. Now, the fallacy works
by demanding an inappropriate degree of warrant for ideas or claims one is inclined
to reject [the better to reject them while still seeming "objective"
in one's own eyes]. So, we may profitably and descriptively term the fallacy:
Selective Hyperskepticism.
A]
Defining Selective Hyperskepticism
Selective
Hyperskepticism: that fallacy which seeks to reject otherwise credible
evidence by demanding an inappropriately high type or degree of warrant not applicable
to matters of fact, i.e. the general type of question being discussed. Especially,
where the same standard is not exerted in assessing substantially parallel cases
that make claims that one is inclined to accept.
This
form of question-begging is of course generally applicable -- it is the root of
the oft-heard credo popularised by the late Cornell Professor, Carl Sagan, i.e.
"extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." (For more
on this, see the discussion of evidentialism below.) Here, the underlying problem is that "extraordinary" as a rule means that
the matters in view are claims one wishes to reject, not so much on grounds that
the evidence is inadequate relative to what constitutes adequate warrant for matters
of fact, but instead because
the claims appear to be implausible relative to one's worldview assumptions and
assertions. But plainly, if the real issue is divergence of worldviews, the matter
should be addressed as one for comparative difficulties
analysis across live options for core beliefs about the world, on (1) factual
adequacy, (2) coherence, and (3) elegance/ad hocness -- not by begging the question
through pretending that the evidence brought forward is inadequate for deciding
on matters of fact.
A quick follow-up counter-challenge then gate-crashes the party: what about "selective hyper-credulity"?
We see, here, the perception that there is a "mirror-image"
fallacy, as "believers" -- poor, naive things -- are generally not
skeptical enough to be intellectually credible; at least in "serious"
company. That is, those who openly acknowledge that they walk "by
faith" (especially religious
faith) in today's sceptical climate, invite dismissal as being naively accepting of incredible factual claims
without proper critical inquiry -- and, of course, "extraordinaty claims require extraordinary evidence." Indeed, it would be claimed in many
quarters that this is the "real" problem.
So, let us pause and take a bit of a closer look:
Q: Must we accept that for every "overly skeptical" thinker, there is at least one "overly credulous" believer?
ANS: No.
WHY: So soon as we recognise that we live in a world of many contrary
worldviews and associated fact claims -- which plainly cannot all be true -- we at once see that the
material challenge is to have a coherent, consistent standard by which
we can reasonably decide -- however cautiously, however
provisionally and however potentially fallibly -- which fact claims to
accept; and thus also, which to reject or even just to leave unsettled for now. That is, once we
recognise the challenge of the fallacy of selective hyperskepticism, we
have already brought the main issue into focus, and that in a way that
brings to bear the key point: consistency in critical thought while allowing us to -- however provisionally -- accept some things as credible.(For,
if one reverts to radical absolute skepticism, one dismisses all
knowledge claims. This, of course, immediately must include the
knowledge claim implicit in the radical skeptical assertion that
"knowledge is impossible." This is plainly
self-contradictory and thus self-refuting. We simply cannot live
like that. So, like it or not, in the end we must all live by faith, the real root issue thus being which one, why.)
In
sum, Greenleaf's identification and description of
the fallacy of selective hyperskepticism is all that we need
to competently address the problem. Then, once the problem is
properly addressed, the resulting solution will allow us to reasonably,
critically, consistently and fairly
decide (a) what to believe, (b) what to disbelieve, (c) what to leave
undecided for now. It will also help us
give sensible reasons for why we have done so. Moreover, we
can see that
if someone believes something he should not (i.e. on inadequate or
improper evidence), such -- necessarily -- is so because he already disbelieves something else, that on the evidence he knows or should know, he should believe.
Therefore, we need not multiply fallacies without necessity.
However,
we should also note on a rhetorical tactic that is often associated
with selective hyperskepticism, which we may for convenience label:
closed minded objectionism.
CLOSED-MINDED
OBJECTIONISM: Sadly one far too often encounters those who fire
off barrage after barrage of trivial and/or question-begging objections,
and show no sign of letting up. Indeed, in some cases, after one has
patiently and cogently answered a long string of objections, one may
see a circling back to earlier objections [perhaps on the theory that
onlookers will have forgotten that they were already raised and
adequately anwered, or will be wearied enough to walk away in disgust].
A further characteristic sign of this problem, is the insistent refusal
to engage in balanced assessment of comparative difficulties
on the merits of fact-claim, logic [whether deductive or inductive or
by inference to best explanation] and underlying alternative assumptions.
That is, there is an assumption (or outright assertion), that
the objector's position is somehow superior or privileged, e.g. it is
the "consensus" of the "truly" expert, by whatever prestigious label
is relevant, e.g. "Science" or the like.
Yet
worse, there may be attempts to use a red herring distractor, dragging
attention away from the main issue, then leading out to a strawman
simplistic misrepresentation of the presumed argument in the main being
objected to. The objector then sets out to soak the strawman in attacks
against the credibility or character of those making the case being
caricatured, and he -- almost always the case -- then triumphalistically
lights up the same; all, to distract attention from the main issue,
and also clouding and poisoning the atmosphere with blinding hostility.
(On long experience, the intelligent
design issue is particularly rife with this problem, especially
on the part of evolutionary
materialism advocates. Then, if disciplinary restraints are applied
if such misbehaviour goes beyond all civility, such -- frankly, dishonest
-- advocates will usually cry "censorship" or even -- hypocritically
-- "intolerance." [Given the now multiple cases
of unjustified career-busting and blatant censorship of those professionals
who have questioned aspects of the evolutionary materialistic "consensus,"
this is nothing short of a turnabout, usually false, accusation that
projects blame onto the victim. For shame!]) That itself requires some further definition: TURNABOUT ("HE HIT BACK FIRST") TURN-SPEECH FALSE ACCUSATION:
It is very easy to blame a victim of an ad hominem attack (or worse, an
actual physical attack) if s/he attempts to defend himself. In effect "he hit (back) first!" Blaming the victim,
who is usually more sinned against than sinning [cf the now thankfully
rejected sleazy Courtroom tactic of blaming the victim of a rape for
"provoking" the attack . . .], is a compounded -- and often, compounding
-- form of the atmosphere-poisoning ad hominem attack. It works by trying to drag the victim down to the level of the aggressor. This, by implying or asserting either . . . (a) [im-]moral equivalency through pretended equality of blame for the "cycle of accusations/ attacks/ violence" or else, worse . . . (b) the full-blooded turnabout false accusation: trying to give the false
impression that the victim trying to defend him-/her-self is the one
who started (or, "provoked") the quarrel or fight and should therefore
bear the lion's share of blame for it. Further,
if the defender is getting the better of the argument,
quarrel or fight, resort is too often then made to . . . (c) Ill-founded accusation of "disproportionate response," converting the attacker into the perceived "real" victim. And, once tempers and emotions are so set to flaring out of control, as Aristotle warned in The Rhetoric, Bk I Ch 2: "
Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as
when we are pained and hostile." The track of truth, fairness even on
side-issues, and respect for the reputation of others and for
justice are then easily lost sight of in the verbal or physical
war that follows.
The
issue is how to respond effectively, stopping such a downward spiral
into a confused and destructive mess before it ends up in the
sort of horror that Aristotle had in mind: the transformation of
Athens' Areopagus high court into a kangaroo-court that under false
colours of law, sent the septuagenarian Socrates to his death on
grossly distorted and overblown charges. Aristiotle's hint on the appeals to ethos, pathos and logos reminds us that this is perhaps best done in steps:
1]
Point out the nature
of arguments, their main persuasive appeals (i.e. (a) Pathos:
to emotions, (b) Ethos: to
authority (i.e. I here read "character"/ "credibility" as broadly including what one
knows and what one is willing to acknowledge
that s/he does not know beyond reasonable
doubt or rational dispute; i.e intellectual
virtues vs. vices) and (c) Logos:
to right reason grounded in true fact and valid logic), and the underlying
strengths and limitations. On this, Aristotle, classically,
observed:
Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three
kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker
[ethos]; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame
of mind [pathos]; the third on the proof, or apparent proof,
provided by the words of the speech itself [logos]. Persuasion
is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so
spoken as to make us think him credible . . . Secondly, persuasion may
come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our
judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when
we are pained and hostile . . . Thirdly, persuasion is effected through
the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by
means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question .
. . . [The
Rhetoric, Book
I, Ch. 2]
2]
Then, we may point out that, first and foremost, emotional
appeals may be persuasive but are no better than the accuracy of the
underlying perceptions and judgements. In particular, rage --as
Aristotle so aptly pointed out -- is a notoriously blinding emotion; one
that often leads to irrational and destructive actions. So, first of
all, slander and subtler personal attacks must be put away, if we are
at all concerned to reason with wisdom and basic civility.
3]
Then, we may observe that while it is a necessity for most practical
arguments [starting with the dictionary], no
authority is better than his or her specific facts and reasoning in
any given case. For instance, "science"
is about inference to best current explanation/ model/ theory, and is
therefore inherently provisional -- science is incapable of "proving"
its theories beyond correction based on further research into the material
facts, and discovery of logical or mathematical errors. That means that
there is no proper basis for using "consensus of Scientists" or the
like to answer to an issue in which the "consensus" may well be up against
serious gaps in its explanatory
adequacy.
4]
Thus, in the end it is the facts and reasoning (and the underlying alternative
worldview-level assumptions) that count:
-->
In the case of a deductive argument,
that calls attention to the axioms or assumptions, and the step-by-step
logic involved. Are claimed "facts" so, do they adequately
represent all we need to know to make a good decision, and is the reasoning
from those facts to conclusions valid?
-->
On inductive or explanatory arguments,
this calls for assessment of alternative explanations or hypotheses
across factual adequacy, coherence and explanatory elegance and predictive
power vs after-the-fact ad hocness on the one hand, and vs simplisticness
on the other.
-->
For, paraphrasing Einstein and Occam: explanations
should be as simple as possible, and should rely on as few assumptions
as possible; but they must not be simpler than that.
-->
Last but not least, we should be humble
enough about our finitude, ignorance and fallibility to be open to correction
. . .
5]
We can then assess what types of appeal are being made in the case in
point, and how they are intended to work. Then, we can call for
at least onlookers to assess the case for themselves on the merits --
i.e. fair-mindedly, logically and in light of the material facts.
6]
Persistence in closed-mindedness, refusal to engage on the merits and
insistent resort to distractors and personal attacks will then stand
exposed for the shabby tactics that they are.
Now,
too, a key concrete example is always helpful to make a point
clear.
For that, the context
of New Testament studies is
sufficiently important and of sufficient material interest in its own
right as a special case to now focus on that particular form of the
fallacy. Indeed, it is "one slice of the cake" that, proverbially, "has
in it all the ingredients." So, for instance, we can see how Marx begins
his argument in his key 1844 essay: "For Germany the criticism
of religion [that is, traditional Judaeo-Christian worldview based
faiths] is in the main complete, and criticism of religion is the premise
of all criticism." (Unfortunately for many millions over the past century
and a half, the root of that
claim is of course, precisely the sort of selective hyperskepticism
we are here discussing.) Nor is that brash dismissal of "religion" without consequences -- consequences that were long since foreseen. For, we may read Heinrich Heine in the conclusion to his 1831 Religion and Philosophy in Germany, where he prophesied chillingly as follows: Christianity — and that is its greatest
merit — has somewhat mitigated that brutal German love of war, but it
could not destroy it. Should that subduing talisman, the cross, be
shattered [the Swastika, visually, is a twisted, broken cross . . .],
the frenzied madness of the ancient warriors, that insane Berserk rage
of which Nordic bards have spoken and sung so often, will once more
burst into flame. …
The old stone gods will then rise from
long ruins and rub the dust of a thousand years from their eyes, and
Thor will leap to life with his giant hammer and smash the Gothic
cathedrals. …
… Do not smile at my advice — the advice of a
dreamer who warns you against Kantians, Fichteans, and philosophers of
nature. Do not smile at the visionary who anticipates the same
revolution in the realm of the visible as has taken place in the
spiritual. Thought precedes action as lightning precedes thunder.
German thunder … comes rolling somewhat slowly, but … its crash … will
be unlike anything before in the history of the world. …
At that
uproar the eagles of the air will drop dead, and lions in farthest
Africa will draw in their tails and slink away. … A play will be
performed in Germany which will make the French Revolution look like an
innocent idyll.
By sharpest contrast to Marx, J P
Holding of Tektonics tellingly points
out that those who are inclined to dismiss conservative-supportive evidence
on the dating, authenticity and authorship of the Gospels, Acts and other New Testament documents,
seldom pause to note that, for instance, the authorship, dating and authenticity
of Tacitus' Annals -- generally not challenged -- rests on a far more slender
foundation.
The
situation is so bad, and has been so for so long, that the well-known historian
A N Sherwin-White went on record as follows in the 1960 - 61 Sarum Lectures at
the University of London:
It
is astonishing that while Graeco-Roman historians have been growing in confidence,
the twentieth-century study of the Gospel narratives, starting from the no less
promising material, has taken so gloomy a turn in the development of form-criticism
that the more advanced exponents of it apparently maintain-so far as an amateur
can understand the matter-that the historical Christ is unknowable and the history
of His mission cannot be written. This seems very curious when one compares the
case for the best-known contemporary of Christ, who like Christ is a well-documented
figure-Tiberius Caesar. The story of his reign is known from four sources, the
Annals of Tacitus and the biography of Suetonius, written some eighty or ninety
years later, the brief contemporary record of Velleius Paterculus, and the third
century history of Cassius Dio. These disagree amongst themselves in the wildest
possible fashion, both in major matters of political action or motive and in specific
details of minor events. Everyone would admit that Tacitus is the best of all
the sources, and yet no serious modern historian would accept at face value the
majority of the statements of Tacitus about the motives of Tiberius. But this
does not prevent the belief that the material of Tacitus can be used to write
a history of Tiberius. [Cited, J W Montgomery,
The Jury Returns: A Juridical Defense of Christianity. (NB: This essay
is a contemporary update to Greeneaf's work cited above.)]
The
magisterial New Testament Scholar, John Wenham, in his Christ and the Bible,
gives us an overview of how this happened, and its consequences and conundrums:
H.
E. W. Turner [16] has distinguished two basic approaches to the Gospels: the historical
and the interpretative. The former believes that the Gospels were intended to
be historical records, the latter that
they were essentially propaganda, written to present a particular view of Jesus.
The former assumes that the records are true unless good reason can be showed
to the contrary; the latter assumes the opposite. The attitude of Bultmann
and his school to a Gospel-saying has been summarised as . . . '(1) If it reflects
the faith of the church after the resurrection, it must be regarded as a creation
of the church, rather than an authentic saying of Jesus. (2) If there is a parallel
saying attributed to a Rabbi, it must be held as a Jewish tradition which has
been erroneously attributed to Jesus. But if it is neither -- if it is clearly
distinct both from the faith of the church and from Judaism -- then it may be
safely accepted as authentic.' [17] This means of course that any appeal to Scripture
by Jesus is at once suspect. This approach produces an improbable view of both
Jesus and the early church. Jesus becomes an eccentric who took almost nothing
from his environment. The church becomes inexplicable, since it took almost nothing
from its master. Rather it so altered what it received from him that its teaching
can be seen in sharp contrast to the few sayings which it preserved. [Christ
and the Bible, (Guilford, Surrey, England: Eagle, 1993), pp. 45 - 46. Emphasis
added.]
_______________
16: H. E. W. Turner, Historicity of the Gospels
(London, 1963)
17: R. H. Fuller, Interpreting the Miracles (London,
1963), pp. 26f.
Of
course, the result is a patent absurdity: the Christian church as we have known
it over the past 20 centuries simply could not have come into existence other
than through the impact of the life and ministry of Jesus, and in turn Jesus'
ministry would have never been accepted as messianic-prophetic by a significant
cross-section of the Jewish community -- the critical mass that formed the nucleus
of the church in the 30's AD -- unless he clearly stood within the Hebrew faith-tradition,
ministering as an anointed prophetic/apocalyptic figure. However, through selective
hyperskeptical assumptions, that is what we are being invited to believe: a messianic
movement that failed to follow what its principal teacher taught, and a messianic
religious leader who drew followers into his movement while being radically isolated
from his Jewish environment -- which, especially in its prophetic scriptures [cf.
Lk 4:14 - 21, 9:1 - 36], set up the expectation for such a messiah to emerge.
In short, we can easily see the bankruptcy of such a "guilty unless proved
innocent" approach.
Paul
Barnett, in his Is the New Testament History?, provides a better place
to start, by giving us a resume of the the consensus view of early non-Christian
sources from late C1 to early C2, on the roots of the Christian faith and its
characteristics:
On
the basis of . . . non-Christian sources [i.e. Tacitus (Annals, on the fire in
Rome, AD 64; written ~ AD 115), Rabbi Eliezer (~ 90's AD; cited J. Klausner, Jesus
of Nazareth (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1929), p. 34), Pliny (Letters to Trajan
from Bithynia, ~ AD 112), Josephus
(Antiquities, ~ 90's)] it is possible to draw the following conclusions:
-
Jesus Christ was executed (by crucifixion?) in Judaea during the period where
Tiberius was Emperor (AD 14 - 37) and Pontius Pilate was Governor (AD 26 - 36).
[Tacitus]
-
The movement spread from Judaea to Rome. [Tacitus]
- Jesus
claimed to be God and that he would depart and return. [Eliezer]
- His
followers worshipped him as (a) god. [Pliny]
- He
was called "the Christ." [Josephus]
- His
followers were called "Christians." [Tacitus, Pliny]
- They
were numerous in Bithynia and Rome [Tacitus, Pliny]
-
It was a world-wide movement. [Eliezer]
- His
brother was James. [Josephus]
[Is
the New Testament History? (London, Hodder, 1987), pp. 30 - 31.]
The
pattern in these corroborating sources is instantly familiar; that is, the NT
accounts plainly fit into a recognisable historical pattern of facts credibly
established through a range of quite early non-Christian sources on the C1 origins,
claims and spreading of the Christian movement; though of course the primary Christian
sources give far more details than one would expect from sources that mention
such facts in passing as they go on to make their own points. That corroboration
should not be surprising, given that (as Barnett goes on to observe, pp. 37 -
41) in the very first cluster of writing sub-apostolic church fathers -- Clement
of Rome [c. AD 96], Ignatius [c. 108] and Polycarp [c. 110], 25 of the 27 books
in the New Testament are cited or alluded to, as authentic and authoritative scripture
[only the two rather brief works, 2 Jn and Jude, are not cited or alluded to];
so the subsequent textual history of the NT documents begins in the 90's, i.e.
within living memory of the Apostles, and it continues in an
unbroken chain of custody to the origin of printing.
This
chain of custody and independent corroboration decisively undercut the arguments
of the remaining fringe of radical scholars and skeptical popular writers who
would date these works to ~ 100 - 160, intending to reduce their credit to that
of the C2 Gnostic pseudonymous "Gospels," such as the Thomas
and Peter often used by the
Jesus Seminar, that of Mary referred to in the
Da Vinci Code novel (and soon to be released movie) [also cf here,
and if you wish a more personal and detailed look by JPH of Tektonics, here]
and now Judas
(due to be published Easter 2006). For, there is no good reason to doubt that
the NT documents, considered as a body, are authentically rooted in and accurately
reflect the core message, teachings and general history of the C1 church.
For
instance, once we abandon the hermeneutics of selectively hyperskeptical suspicion,
we can observe how Luke-Acts breaks off its account [which amply fits
in with archaeological discoveries, even on a great many fine points of detail]
in AD 62, with Paul as an appellate prisoner in Rome, and does not address major
subsequent events such as the deaths of James [62 AD], Peter [~ 65], Paul [~ 67],
or the Jewish revolt [66 - ~73]; and thus the resulting final alientation between
the Jewish and Christian communities in Jerusalem as well as the destruction of
the Temple [70]. These are most credibly explained as being due to the completion
date of that document: ~ 62 AD; which immediately suggests a life-situation for
its origin -- being at least in part based on a supportive document for Paul's
appeal to Nero (which makes sense of its rather abrupt end before that appeal
is resolved, and of the way in which Roman figures consistently are portrayed
in a positive light). Luke, in turn, is the "prequel," so the logic
leads to a date for Luke of ~ 60 AD.
Luke,
in its own turn, uses Mark extensively as a trusted source, credibly dating Mark
to the 40's - 50's. Further to this, the Passion narrative in Mark in an offhand
way speaks of "the High Priest" who tried Jesus as being still in office,
suggesting that his part dates to at most 37 AD, when he left office. Similarly,
the summary account of Jesus' death, burial and resurrection and its theological
significance in 1 Cor 15:1 - 11 records the church's official testimony in a form
dating to the 30's [when Paul received the account at the hand of the Jerusalem
community, before which he successfully defended his teachings in 48 - 49]. The
summary was written down c. 55 as a decisive point in common in a controversy
on the general resurrection of the dead, appealing to the common message of the
apostolic circle that the Corinthians knew, dating back to c. 50. But, the Pauline
corpus and Lk-Ac, with Mk, collectively tell us the core message and history of
the early church, and lay out the bulk of its theology [especially concerning
the person and work of Christ], thus defining and dating the origins of the Christian
faith as being in the first generation of the church, i.e. 30 - 70 AD. [In this
context, the commonly held view that the writings of John date to the end of that
Apostle's life, i.e. the 90's, would reinforce our confidence, as the major point
of correction he seemed to have in mind in his Gospel was to scotch the rumour
that he would not die! In this context, since the likely provenance of John is
Ephesus, and since the famous Rylands fragment recovered in Egypt, has been dated
to c. 125, the C1 dating of the NT should be regarded as secure.] (Cf. also, here.)
So,
as British barrister Frank Morison highlights, it is plainly quite tenable --
though obviously not fashionable in radical
skeptical circles -- to hold that a "guilty unless proven innocent"
Bultmann-style proposed model of Christian origins simply fails to account for
the facts and dynamic force behind the rise of the church as a movement that began
in Palestine in the mid-C1, and rapidly spread from there across the Graeco-Roman
world, triumphing over all odds:
[N]ow
the peculiar thing . . . is that not only did [belief in Jesus' resurrection as
in part testified to by the empty tomb] spread to every member of the Party of
Jesus of whom we have any trace, but they brought it to Jerusalem and carried
it with inconceivable audacity into the most keenly intellectual centre of Judaea
. . . and in the face of every impediment which a brilliant and highly organised
camarilla could devise. And they won. Within twenty years the claim of these Galilean
peasants had disrupted the Jewish Church and impressed itself upon every town
on the Eastern littoral of the Mediterranean from Caesarea to Troas. In less than
fifty years it had began to threaten the peace of the Roman Empire . . . . Why
did it win? . . . . We have to account not only for the enthusiasm of its
friends, but for the paralysis of its enemies and for the ever growing stream
of new converts . . . When we remember what certain highly placed personages would
almost certainly have given to have strangled this movement at its birth but could
not - how one desperate expedient after another was adopted to silence the apostles,
until that veritable bow of Ulysses, the Great Persecution, was tried and broke
in pieces in their hands [the chief persecuter became the leading C1 Missionary/Apostle!]
- we begin to realise that behind all these subterfuges and makeshifts there must
have been a silent, unanswerable fact. [Who Moved the Stone, (Faber, 1971;
nb. orig. pub. 1930), pp. 114 - 115.]
B]
The Root Problem -- Radical Skepticism
Plainly,
the fallacy of selective hyperskepticism is sufficiently important that it is
profitable to pause and explore its roots, so that we may see why and how it goes
wrong. Descartes' thinking is the proper place to begin. For, in 1640, Descartes,
in his Meditations
on First Philosophy, noted that:
It
is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had
from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had
since constructed on this basis . . . [So I] must once for all seriously undertake
to rid myself of all the opinions which I formerly accepted, and commence to build
anew from the foundations, if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structures
in the sciences . . . . reason already persuades me that I ought no less carefully
to withhold my assent from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable
than from those which appear to me to be manifestly false, if I am able to find
in each one some reason to doubt, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the
whole.
Of
course, famously, he went on to assert that he doubts his existence, but in so
doing, he is thinking; so, he must exist. However, "I doubt my existence.
But, to doubt is to think, and to think is to exist,” implicitly assumes the continuity
of an I that can think, remember and perceive veridically. Is that indubitably
certain, given the imperfections and uncertainties of our senses, memory, reasoning
process and perceptions? And, . . . ?
That
is, we are here facing an infinite
regress of doubts and challenges, so the Descartes project reduces to absurdity
and thus becomes self-referentially inconsistent. That is, it contradicts and
so refutes itself. A wiser approach is to:
(i)
Implicitly trust the general (as opposed to absolute) reliability of our
common-sense, intuitive mental faculties [as Thomas
Reid championed in C18 in rebuttal to David
Hume's empiricist skepticism];
(ii)
Exert what William James
called the will to believe [replying to W
K Clifford's C19 Evidentialism],
as we make forced, momentous choices among the live options open to us.
(iii)
Use this necessity of trust or faith as a basis for rejecting as implying absurdities
such arguments or worldviews as may
entail the general untrustworthiness of our common-sense mental faculties:
if R then NOT-Q, but Q, so NOT-R, i.e. denying the consequent to reject
the antecedent, is perfectly valid. Symbolically:
R => (NOT-Q); but Q, so NOT-R
(iv)
Resist the temptation to exert such radical skepticism selectively and inconsistently
(i.e. to reject those beliefs we find implausible relative to our worldview preferences
by demanding an inappropriate degree of evidence relative
to what is warranted by the nature of the case). When such worldview-level issues
arise, we should instead entertain comparative
difficulties across the live options.
(v)
Tom Morris also adds the principle of conservation of beliefs (also called
the principle of credulity), as a counter-weight to such unbridled radical
skepticism. In essence, the principle asserts that: it makes good sense to
stick with your current body of beliefs -- and to have confidence that your basic
belief forming mechanisms are generally reliable -- unless there are compelling
reasons to accept a radical alternative (e.g. credibly discovering that you are
living in the modern equivalent of Plato's
Cave). [Philosophy for Dummies (NY: Hungry Minds, 1999), pp. 72
– 80.]
In
short, it is quite rational to open-mindedly hold to certain core beliefs -- and
to generally trust our basic belief-forming mechanisms -- without asking for proof
or evidence: such beliefs are properly
basic.
C]
The Underlying Challenge: Evidentialism
In
1879, W K Clifford (in his influential "Ethics of Belief") proposed
the principle that "it is wrong always, anywhere, and for anyone to believe
anything upon insufficient evidence." Lectures and Essays, (London:
Macmillan, 1886), p. 346.] (This maxim is the root of the commonly encountered
claim today, that "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.")
While
it is superficially appealing, Clifford's Maxim [CM] is actually fatally flawed:
- Self-referentiality:
First, since it is a claim about ALL beliefs, i.e. including itself, why
should we accept CM? What would constitute adequate evidence -- proof based on
indubitable facts and logic -- for it that does not either (a) beg the question
[i.e. by implicitly assuming CM (or some underlying claim)to prove CM (or that
claim)] or (b) contradict itself or (c) fall into an
infinite regress of "why should we accept"(s)? And in fact, it arguably
falls into (c) -- for each successive reason to accept CM, there is plainly a
need for yet further evidence. (Indeed, even if it were argued at some stage,
say Q, that Q is self-evident, that raises the question, since CM is proposed
as a global criterion, on what adequate evidence is that self-evidence
being claimed? And, the chain of challenges begins again . . .) Thus CM also falls
into (b) as it is plainly impossible for finite and fallible mortals such as us
to satisfy the criterion it specifies. It is self-referentially inconsistent.
- The
Common-Sense Test: Historically, the first serious reply to CM was posed by
William James, who argued that, first, the CM fails what we can call the common-sense
test; i.e. there are a great many beliefs that people have a perfect and proper
right to have, without further proof or evidence. For instance, as Ronald Nash
summarises: "We believe in the existence of other minds; we believe that
the world continues to exist even when we are not perceiving it . . . If we followed
Clifford and eliminated from our noetic structure all beliefs for which no proof
or evidence is supplied, we would lose our right to affirm a large number of important
claims that only a fool would question. And so it is clear that we have a right
to believe some things without evidence or proof." [Faith and Reason
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1988), p. 73. Emphasis in original.]
- The
Will to Believe: James' main argument in his essay, The Will to Believe,
considers options on core beliefs: living/dead, forced/avoidable, momentous/trivial.
If a belief is about a matter that is a living, forced, momentous -- i.e. genuine
-- option, then we cannot duck it and so must choose which alternative we
will accept. Thus, "our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must
decide an option between propositions . . . "Do not decide, but leave the
question open," is itself a passional decision, -- just like deciding yes
or no, -- and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth." [p. 11,
cited, K J Clarke, Return to Reason, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990),
p. 105.] So, as Clarke sums up, "One does not have a right to make a passional
decision with just any belief; rather James restricts the right to . . . those
that are living, forced and momentous . . . The best example of nongenuine options
are decisions in science where the choice is not forced; one may withold judgment
indefinitely." So, in James' own words, "Whenever the option between
losing truth and gaining it is not momentous, we can throw the chance of gaining
truth away, and at any rate save ourselves from any chance of believing
falsehood, by not making up our minds at all." [WTB, pp. 19 - 20.]
- Rational
Tentativeness, Provisionality and Eclecticism: James aptly pointed out that
there are situations where reasonable doubt is a defensible option. That is, particularly
in matters of science and technology, there is room for rational tentativeness
about particular fact-claims, theories and models. Indeed, sometimes an eclectic
approach that views such claims as probably true in some cases and as merely useful
but not necessarily true frameworks for modelling the world in other cases, is
wise. For, a false explanatory framework of thought -- i.e. we are seeing science
here as a case of abductive reasoning
-- can often logically imply or predict true consequences in the observed world,
and so scientific reasoning and knowledge claims should be viewed as open-ended
or provisional. That is, the mere fact that a particular theory or model is
practically useful in describing, explaining, predicting and/or influencing events
in the natural and/or human worlds is not at all a demonstration of its ultimate
or even approximate truth. The capital example in point is Newtonian Dynamics,
which gave every sign of being true from the 1680's to the 1880's, but then was
found wanting in dealing with the very small and the very fast between 1880 and
1930, leading to Quantum theory and Relativity. Thus, scientific knowledge claims
should be viewed as provisional -- subject to correction in light of further analysis
or discovery. (In that context, it may be wise to be open to alternatives and
cool
down the rhetoric and resist the temptation to censorship and uncharitable personal
attacks on contentious scientific issues such as Intelligent
Design vs the Neo-Darwinian Theory of Macroevolution.]
- Narrow
vs Broad Foundationalism: Alvin Plantinga extends these themes by considering
the appropriate foundation of our belief systems, i.e. what are properly basic
-- first level -- beliefs; those not held because they are implied by other prior
beliefs? Narrow foundationalists argue that such beliefs must be one of: self-evident,
evident to the senses and/or incorrigible. That is, [I] we have a right to believe
those things which: (a) are plainly true once we understand the concepts and their
relationships and/or for which the denial leads to self-contradiction; or, are
(b) the deliverances of our senses functioning normally and in their proper environment;
or, are (c) of the order of "I seem to see a red ball on the table"
when one is truthfully reporting one's perception. Then, the project is to [II]
only hold such other beliefs as are implied by properly basic beliefs meeting
the criteria (a), (b) or (c). As Clarke summarises, Plantinga does not disagree
that one has a perfect right to such beliefs, but points out that:
First, the narrow foundationalist project is self-referential and the belief
set {[I] and [II]} is neither properly basic relative to (a), (b) or (c) itself;
nor, to date has it been shown to be implied by other such properly basic beliefs.
(Indeed, so narrow is the scope of beliefs under the three criteria that it is
unlikely that this can be done.) That is, we can comfortably hold narrow foundationalism
self-referentially inconsistent, absent such an unlikey proof.
Second,
the critera fail the common-sense test, e.g. they exclude the perfectly rational
and proper memory belief that one had breakfast this morning; as well as a host
of other beliefs that only a fool would find it irrational to hold.
Third,
plainly, there is therefore no
good reason to restrict the scope of properly basic beliefs as (a), (b) and
(c) set out to do. Plantinga proposes that for instance, memory beliefs, beliefs
about the external world, acceptance of testimony [from a trusted source], and
belief in God [perhaps, due to one's encounter with him], among others, can be
recognised as non-inferential and rational to hold (thus, properly basic) on a
case by case basis -- even where, as yet, we have no general criterion.
D]
A Better Approach: Reasonable Faith
Perhaps
the simplest way to pull these threads of thought together, is to start with an
abstract example, say, claim A. Why should we accept it? Generally, because
of B. But, why should we accept B? Thence, C, D, . . . etc. Thus, we face either
an infinite regress of challenges, or else we stop at some point, say F -- our
Faith-Point.
At
F, we may face the challenge of circularity vs proper basicality: are we simply
begging the question, thus inevitably irrational in the end?
In
fact, no:
- Reason
embeds faith: We have seen above, that reason and belief -- indeed, faith
-- are inextricably intertwined in our thought lives. In G K Chesterton's words,
"It is idle to talk always of the alternatives reason and faith. Reason is
itself a matter of faith." [cited, Clarke, p. 123.] For, if we must inevitably
take some things on trust, we cannot escape exerting faith; i.e. the question
is not whether we have faith, but: in what or in whom should we repose our trust?
- Some
beliefs are properly basic: Though of course, our trust in certain things
is provisional, we plainly have a perfect right to believe a great many things
non-inferentially. (Indeed, this is the largest single bloc of our beliefs --
consider for a moment how many sense impressions you had today, and how many of
them you for very good reason took as accurate without even an instant's hesitation.)
And, as James pointed out, in contexts where alternatives are forced, momentous
and live, we not only have a further right to make a passional decision as to
which alternative to accept, but we cannot avoid choosing some option or other.
- We
may compare alternative Worldviews: Worldviews are clusters of core beliefs
about important things concerning ourselves, the world and ultimate reality. Notoriously,
they bristle with difficulties and unresolved challenges. But, if we compare faith-points
F1, F2, F3 . . . Fn, relative to (1) factual adequacy, (2) coherence and (3) simplicty/ad
hocness, we can make a rational choice of our faith-points. Thus, we are not reduced
to vicious circularity.
- We
may recognise appropriate degrees of warrant: When we assess arguments, we
can recognise that there is a gradation in degree of warrant that is possible
for given classes of cases, as Simon Greenleaf has pointed out -- as have many
others all the way back to Aristotle. So, where logical or mathematical demonstration
is possible, we can insit on that. Where only moral evidence is possible, i.e.
on matters of fact, we can respect that. When we come to basic beliefs, we can
evaluate whether or not the belief is properly basic -- at least on a case by
case basis -- by comparing the new belief with others that are already credibly
deemed so. [For instance, Plantinga has argued that believing in God requires
a similar process to that which leads us to believe in other minds.]
This
approach can be properly termed, reasonable faith.
With
this result in hand, we may now also pause to address a small but important puzzle:
why did Jesus mildly rebuke Thomas Didymus when he insisted that except he were
permitted to physically inspect the wounds in Our Lord's body, he would not believe
in the resurrection?
Let
us look at the record:
JN 20:24 Now Thomas (called Didymus), one of the Twelve, was not with the disciples
when Jesus came. 25 So the other disciples told him, "We have seen the Lord!"
But he said to them, "Unless I see the nail marks in his hands and put my finger
where the nails were, and put my hand into his side, I will not believe it."
JN
20:26 A week later his disciples were in the house again, and Thomas was with
them. Though the doors were locked, Jesus came and stood among them and said,
"Peace be with you!" 27 Then he said to Thomas, "Put your finger here; see my
hands. Reach out your hand and put it into my side. Stop doubting and believe."
JN 20:28
Thomas said to him, "My Lord and my God!"
JN
20:29 Then Jesus told him, "Because you have seen me, you have believed; blessed
are those who have not seen and yet have believed."
JN
20:30 Jesus did many other miraculous signs in the presence of his disciples,
which are not recorded in this book. 31 But these are written that you may believe
that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that by believing you may have life
in his name.
Vv.
24 - 25 reveal the key to the puzzle: Thomas, who has been one of the core group
of disciples for several years, and who happened to be absent when Jesus appeared
to the group of disciples that first Easter Sunday evening, refused to believe
their collective testimony (and, we may infer, the implications of the by then
notoriously empty tomb). Instead, he demanded to physically inspect Jesus' wounds.
That is, far from being a paragon of epistemic virtue, he was in the position
of one who refused to believe credible testimony and accessible corroborating
physical evidence -- which is, by dint of the finitude and fallibility of human
nature, the only access to most of history that we have a right to expect.
So,
while Jesus did graciously grant him his request, Our Risen Lord was entirely
justified to advert to the fact that we cannot properly demand direct physical
access to historical events as a condition of believing them. Therefore, "blessed
are those who have not seen and yet [having heard and heeded credible testimony
and record, cf. vv 30 - 31!] have believed." And, indeed, millions across
twenty centuries (including the author of this note) have done so, and have indeed
experienced the miracle of the new birth and its result: eternal life -- JN 17:3:
"Now this is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and
Jesus Christ, whom you have sent" -- just as Jesus promised.
That
is, we plainly have an epistemic duty
to respond appropriately to credible evidence, through exercising reasonable faith.
E]
Some Rules for the Road:
In exercising such reasonable faith relating to matters of fact [e.g. the credibility
of the NT accounts], perhaps the list of time-tested, common-sense based principles
of wise reasoning worked out in Courts of Law over the centuries and collected
by Simon Greenleaf in his assessment
of the testimony of the evangelists may prove useful:
1]
THE ANCIENT DOCUMENTS RULE: Every document, apparently ancient, coming
from the proper repository or custody, and bearing on its face no evident marks
of forgery, the law presumes to be genuine, and devolves on the opposing party
the burden of proving it to be otherwise. [p.16.]
2]
Conversance: In matters of public and general interest, all persons must
be presumed to be conversant, on the principle that individuals are presumed to
be conversant with their own affairs. [p. 17.]
3]
On Inquiries and Reports: If [a report] were "the result of inquiries,
made under competent public authority, concerning matters in which the public
are concerned" it would . . . be legally admissible . . . To entitle such
results, however, to our full confidence, it is not necessary that they be obtained
under a legal commission; it is sufficient if the inquiry is gravely undertaken
and pursued, by a person of competent intelligence, sagacity and integrity. The
request of a person in authority, or a desire to serve the public, are, to all
moral intents, as sufficient a motive as a legal commission. [p. 25.]
4]
Probability of Truthfulness: In trials of fact, by oral testimony, the
proper inquiry is not whether it is possible that the testimony may be false,
but whether there is a sufficient probability that it is true. [p. 28.]
5]
Criteria of Proof: A proposition of fact is proved, when its truth is established
by competent and satisfactory evidence. By competent evidence is meant such as
the nature of the thing to be proved requires; and by satisfactory evidence is
meant that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind, beyond
any reasonable doubt. [pp. 28 - 9.]
6]
Credibility of Witnesses: In the absence of circumstances which generate
suspicion, every witness is to be presumed credible, until the contrary is shown;
the burden of impeaching his credibility lying on the objector. [p. 29]
7]
Credit due to testimony: The credit due to the testimony of witnesses depends
upon, firstly, their honesty; secondly, their ability; thirdly, their number and
the consistency of their testimony; fourthly, the conformity of their testimony
with experience; and fifthly, the coincidence of their testimony with collateral
circumstances. [p.31.]
8]
Ability of a Witness to speak truth: the ability of a witness to speak
the truth depends on the opportunities which he has had for observing the facts,
the accuracy of his powers of discerning, and the faithfulness of his memory in
retaining the facts, once observed and known . . . It is always to be presumed
that men are honest, and of sound mind, and of the average and ordinary degree
of intelligence . . . Whenever an objection is raised in opposition to ordinary
presumptions of law, or to the ordiary experience of mankind, the burden of proof
is devolved on the objector. [pp. 33 - 4.]
9]
Internal coherence and external corroboration: Every event which actually
transpires has its appropriate relation and place in the vast complication of
circumstances, of which the affairs of men consist; it owes its origin to the
events which have preceded it, it is intimately connected with all others which
occur at the same time and place, and often with those of remote regions, and
in its turn gives birth to numberless others which succeed. In all this almost
inconceivable contexture, and seeming discord, there is perfect harmony; and while
the fact, which really happened, tallies exactly with every other contemporaneous
incident, related to it in the remotest degree, it is not possible for the wit
of man to invent a story, which, if closely compared with the actual occurrences
of the same time and place, may not be shown to be false. [p. 39.]
10]
Marks of false vs true testimony: a false witness will not willingly detail
any circumstances in which his testimony will be open to contradiction, nor multiply
them where there is a danger of his being detected by a comparison of them with
other accounts, equally circumstantial . . . Therefore, it is, that variety and
minuteness of detail are usually regarded as certain test[s] of sincerity, if
the story, in the circumstances related, is of a nature capable of easy refutation,
if it were false . . . . [False witnesses] are often copious and even profuse
in their statements, as far as these may have been previously fabricated, and
in relation to the principal matter; but beyond this, all will be reserved and
meagre, from fear of detection . . . in the testimony of the true witness there
is a visible and striking naturalness of manner, and an unaffected readiness and
copiousness in the detail of circumstances, as well in one part of the narrative
as another, and evidently without the least regard to the facility or difficulty
of verification or detection . . . the increased number of witnesses to circumstances,
and the increased number of circumstances themselves, all tend to increase the
probability of detection if the witnesses are false . . . Thus the force of circumstantial
evidence is found to depend on the number of particulars involved in the narrative;
the difficulty of fabricating them all, if false, and the great facility of detection;
the nature of the circumstances to be compared, and from which the dates and other
facts to are be collected; the intricacy of the comparison; the number of intermediate
steps in the process of deduction; and the circuity of the investigation. The
more largely the narrative partake[s] of these characteristics, the further it
will be found removed from all suspicion of contrivance or design, and the more
profoundly the mind will rest in the conviction of its truth. [pp. 39 - 40.]
11]
Procedure: let the witnesses be compared with themselves, with each other,
and with surrounding facts and circumstances.[p. 42.]
Here,
we supplement: J W Montgomery observes
of the NT accounts -- and following the McCloskey and Schoenberg framework for
detecting perjury -- that the modern approach to assessing quality of such testimony
focusses on identifying internal and external defects in the testimony and the
witness:
(a)
Internal defects in the witness himself refer to any personal characteristics
or past history tending to show that the "witness is inherently untrustworthy,
unreliable, or undependable."
(b) But perhaps the apostolic witnesses suffered from external defects, that is,
"motives to falsify"?
(c) Turning now to the testimony itself, we must ask if the New Testament writings
are internally inconsistent or self-contradictory.
(d) Finally, what about external defects in the testimony itself, i.e., inconsistencies
between the New Testament accounts and what we know to be the case from archaeology
or extra-biblical historical records?
-->
In each case, the answer is in favour of the quality of the NT, as can be observed
here.
12]
The degree of coherence expected of true witnesses: substantial truth,
under circumstantial variety. There is enough of discrepancy to show that there
could have been no previous concert among them, and at the same time such substantial
agreement as to show that they all were independent narrators of the same great
transaction, as the events actually occurred. [p.34. All cites from The Testimony
of the Evangelists (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Classics, 1995). The
First Easter's timeline gives a good case in point. You may find it profitable
to also examine Edwin Yamauchi's review
and W L Craig's remarks on the
resurrection vs the current version of the hallucination hypothesis. Craig's
critical
assessment of the Jesus Seminar is also well worth the time to read it.]
CONCLUSION:
The fallacy of selective hyperskepticism occurs when one
exerts (perhaps inadvertently) a double-standard on the degree of warrant demanded
for accepting matters of fact, matters which as Simon Greenleaf observed,
can only be shown to be so beyond reasonable doubt, i.e. to moral rather than
demonstrative certaintly. (This fallacy, unfortunately, is especially common in
addressing matters relating to the underlying evidential basis for the Christian
Faith.) However, it can be relatively easily detected, and avoided. When one turns
to the underlying root factors, one sees that there is a need to first address
the self-referential inconsistencies in radical skepticism and associated evidentialism
and narrow foundationalism. Once that is done, one may then proceed to a fairer
examination of matters of fact in general and Christian evidences in particular.
It
is appropriate to close off these remarks by giving a brief summary of the current
state of play on the credibility of the New Testament accounts, by citing some
remarks by the distinguished Canadian New Testament Scholar, Craig Evans, in the
November
2004 Benthal Public Lecture, in Calgary:
My
purpose tonight is to lay before you what I believe are key facets in the scholarly
discussion of the historical Jesus. In my view there are five important areas
of investigation and in all five there has been significant progress in recent
years. I shall frame these areas as questions. They include (1) the question of
the ethnic, religious, and social location of Jesus; (2) the question of the aims
and mission of Jesus; (3) the question of Jesus’ self-understanding; (4) the question
of Jesus’ death; and (5) the question of Jesus’ resurrection. All of these questions
directly bear on the relevance of Jesus for Christian faith and some of them have
important implications for Jewish- Christian relations . . . .
The
story told in the New Testament Gospels—in contrast to the greatly embellished
versions found in the Gospel of Peter and other writings— smacks of verisimilitude.
The women went to the tomb to mourn privately and to perform duties fully in step
with Jewish burial customs. They expected to find the body of Jesus; ideas of
resurrection were the last thing on their minds. The careful attention given the
temporary tomb is exactly what we should expect. Pious fiction—like that seen
in the Gospel of Peter— would emphasize other things. Archaeology can neither
prove nor disprove the resurrection, but it can and has shed important light on
the circumstances surrounding Jesus’ death, burial, and missing corpse . . . .
Research
in the historical Jesus has taken several positive steps in recent years. Archaeology,
remarkable literary discoveries, such as the Dead Sea Scrolls, and progress in
reassessing the social, economic, and political setting of first-century Palestine
have been major factors. Notwithstanding the eccentricities and skepticism of
the Jesus Seminar, the persistent trend in recent years is to see the Gospels
as essentially reliable, especially when properly understood, and to view the
historical Jesus in terms much closer to Christianity’s traditional understanding,
i.e., as proclaimer of God’s rule, as understanding himself as the Lord’s anointed,
and, indeed, as God’s own son, destined to rule Israel. But this does not mean
that the historical Jesus that has begun to emerge in recent years is simply a
throwback to the traditional portrait. The picture of Jesus that has emerged is
more finely nuanced, more obviously Jewish, and in some ways more unpredictable
than ever. The last word on the subject has not been written and probably never
will be. Ongoing discovery and further investigation will likely force us to make
further revisions as we read and read again the old Gospel stories and try to
come to grips with the life of this remarkable Galilean Jew.
Perhaps,
then, a fresh -- and unprejudiced
-- look at the record, is in order?
END _________________________ The
following reproduced blog post was originally a part of a discussion on
Pullman's His Dark Materials trilogy in light of the Golden Compass
film. As a part of the onward discussion -- which began with a series of posts here, here, and here
-- the underlying issues of the contrast with C S Lewis' Chronicles of
Narnia came up, and thence the issue of believing in the reality of a
world beyond one's immediate experience and familiarity based on
credible testimony. So, this further remark was added, with minor adjustments: _________________
Matt 24 watch, 43: The Golden Compass 4 -- the Lucy Pevensie school of epistemology
Just
this morning on the local relay of the usual morning BBC news -- a
familiar 7:00 am or 8:00 am morning ritual all over the
English-speaking Caribbean -- there was an item on the 75th anniversary
of that venerable global institution.
As I listened to it, my mind went back to the recent issues over BBC's sad loss of credibility and tendency
to regrettably biased reporting and commentary. Thence, my mind turned
to this blog's recent remarks on the Golden Compass movie [which by the
way, opened with unexpectedly low box office numbers], and to The Chronicles of Narnia, which Mr Pullman has so often and so harshly derided.
. . . . I found the suggested explanation for the Golden Compass' low box office numbers in the USA interesting, especially the contrast with numbers in the UK:
Rolf Mittweg of New Line Cinema, which released Compass,
concedes that the religion controversy might have had an effect. But he
points out, "Historically, that tends to be ineffective — look at The Da Vinci Code. No one was supposed to see that, either."
He
notes that the film did better internationally, grossing $55 million in
25 territories, led by the United Kingdom, where it brought in $18
million. Outside the USA, Mittweg says, movies are "not at all affected" by religious controversies. [Translation:
Slander, hostility-inducing misinformation, advocacy for questionable
early sexual behaviour, and blasphemy against the Church and God have
little impact on the public's sensibilities in truly secularised cultures. Shades of
Rom 1:19 ff and Eph 4:17 - 19.]
Gregg Kilday, film editor with The Hollywood Reporter,
paints a complex picture. Though church opposition can't be discounted,
he says, "to claim it's a victim of religious controversy, there's no
real evidence of that, at least not at this point." The film may have suffered from a general tiring of fantasy films, he says. He noted the poor box-office performance of Stardust, which topped out at just $38.3 million this year. "And while the movie has been treated as a potential franchise, a la Lord of the Rings,
in some ways, it was never fated to be like that," Kilday says. "The
Pullman trilogy isn't as well known, and this is a fantasy built around
a young girl" — not exactly a fit with the genre's core young-male
audience. What's more, he says, "in reaching out to younger females, it obviously ran up against Enchanted." Disney's
princess film, in fact, is holding well, according to studio estimates
from Nielsen EDI. The film captured No. 2 with $10.7 million after two
weeks at No. 1 . . .
Muy interesante.
Especially,
let us observe the deft dodging of the point that Pullman has clearly
gone across some very serious lines in the culture with his very overt
hostility to the Judaeo-Christian tradition and a highly questionable
incident in his trilogy, in which Lyra, the approximately 12 year old
anti-heroine engages in a highly sexually charged encounter with Will,
her companion for much of the trilogy. [Cf Atlantic Monthly's
discussion here.]
Onward, my thoughts went to a key incident in the very first book in the Narnia series, The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe.
The
incident occurs shortly after Lucy, the youngest of four Pevensie
children, had discovered a gateway to the parallel universe of Narnia,
while hiding in a wardrobe. (NB: In a later book, The Magician's Nephew,
it turns out that the wardrobe was made from the wood of an apple tree
planted from a Narnian seed and used to save the life of Professor
Kirke's mother. That name Kirke is also, plainly, a hint: "kirk" is the
Scotch word for "church.")
On
returning to England from Narnia, Lucy announced her discovery to her
brothers Edmund and Peter, and her older sister, Susan.
They don't believe her and worry as to whether she has turned liar all of a sudden, or whether she has lost her mind.
Soon enough, the worried older siblings bring the matter to Prof Kirke, and ask for his help. An epistemologically interesting exchange occurs, starting with a sharp retort from the good Professor [which I duly emphasise]:
"How do you know?" he asked, "that your sister's story is not true?"
Oh,
but--" began Susan, and then stopped. Anyone could see from the old
man's face that he was perfectly serious. Then Susan pulled herself
together and said, "But Edmund [NB: who had by then also been
to Narnia and had come under the bewitchment of the wicked white witch,
Jadis, who had usurped power in Narnia and was running a Nazi-style
police state, making it "always winter but never Christmas"] said they
had been only pretending."
"That is a point," said the
Professor, "which deserves consideration . . . For instance . . . does
your experience lead you to regard your brother or your sister as the
more reliable? I mean, which is the more truthful?"
"That's just the funny thing about it, Sir," said Peter. "Up till now, I'd have said Lucy every time." . . . .
"Well," said Susan, "in general, I'd say the same as Peter, but this couldn't be true -- all this about the wood and the Faun."
"That
is more than I know," said the Professor, "and a charge of lying
against someone whom you have found truthful is a very serious thing .
. ." The issue of Lucy's possible madness, naturally enough, then comes up.
The
Professor dispatches the suggestion with a hook-shot to the boundary: "
Oh, you can make your minds easy about that. One only has to look at
her and talk to her to see that she is not mad."
Next . . .
"But then," said Susan and stopped . . . .
"Logic!"
said the Professor half to himself. "Why don't they teach logic at
these schools? There are only three possibilities. Either your sister
is telling lies, or she is mad, or she is telling the truth. You know
she doesn't tell lies and it is obvious that she is not mad. For the
moment then, unless further evidence turns up, we must assume that she
is telling the truth." And so, we come to the central issue of epistemology, the philosophical study of knowledge: whose report do we believe, why?
The
best answer, in a world of fallible, finite, too often ill-willed
people, hinges on credibility, and on being open-minded but critically
aware.
On the principles of reasonable faith, in short:
--> We should trust the straightforwardly and plainly, habitually truthful over the devious, manipulative and deceptive.
-->
We should examine circumstances and known facts to see if one who
hitherto has usually told the truth may be either lying or mistaken or
outright deceived.
--> We should not beg the question by
ruling out logically possible options that don't fit our current view
of the world, or by demanding an impossible standard of evidence for
such: extraordinary things require ADEQUATE evidence, not "extraordinary evidence."
--> When in doubt, we should hold our conclusions provisionally, pending further clarification.
-->
When such a conclusion holds up and shows itself to be reliable
relative to facts and fresh discoveries, is coherent and powerfully
explains a lot about the world, we should be prepared to trust its
reliability.
By that light, The Chronicles of Narnia wins hands down over The Golden Compass, and the His Dark Materials trilogy.
(So, by the way, if you are looking for a set of books to give to a favourite child for Christmas, Narnia takes my endorsement hands down over The Golden Compass and its ilk, or for that matter the latest Harry Potter tome.)
And,
by that light, the Apostle Paul's AD 55 report takes my endorsement
hands down over and against the fulminations of Mr Pullman and his
atheistical ilk:
1CO
15:1 Now, brothers, I want to remind you of the gospel I preached to
you, which you received and on which you have taken your stand. 2 By
this gospel you are saved, if you hold firmly to the word I preached to
you . . . .
1CO 15:3 For what I received I passed on to you as
of first importance: that Christ died for our sins according to the
Scriptures, 4 that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day
according to the Scriptures, 5 and that he appeared to Peter, and then
to the Twelve. 6 After that, he appeared to more than five hundred of
the brothers at the same time, most of whom are still living, though
some have fallen asleep . . . 8 and last of all he appeared to me also,
as to one abnormally born.
11 Whether, then, it was I or they, this is what we preach, and this is what you believed. So, now: whose report will you believe this Advent Season? Why? END
___________
PS:
One of Mr Pullman's ill-founded but sometimes persuasive accusations
against Narnia is that C S Lewis sends Susan to hell for simply growing
up and becoming fashion conscious.
I find Chris Whiteside's rebuttal to such notions here very interesting, and telling on Mr Pullman's want of doing basic research before making sharp accusations:
. . . a careful reading . . . will show that [The Last Battle”] does not predict whether Susan will go to heaven when she dies. There
is a far more practical reason why she does not join the other
characters in heaven at the end of the book – she isn’t dead yet. At
the conclusion of the Narnian series Susan is alive and well in England
and, if she has any sense, suing British Rail for vast sums of money as
compensation for wiping out her entire family in a rail accident.
This is not just my own interpretation, although I arrived at this view myself from reading “The Last battle”. C.S. Lewis confirmed it himself in a letter to a boy named Martin in 1957 which can be found in the book “Letters to Children.” In his words
“The
books don’t tell us what happened to Susan. She is left alive in this
world at the end, having by then turned into a rather silly, conceited
young woman. But there is plenty of time for her to mend, and perhaps she will get into Aslan’s country in the end – in her own way.” Personally
I suspect that Susan would have come back from what would appear to her
as the wasteful and tragic death of her parents, brothers, sister and
cousin by campaigning for better rail safety and justice for the
survivors and families of rail crash victims. When Susan rediscovered
the strength she had as the Queen who defied and outwitted Prince
Rabadash, the Board of British Rail and the Department of Transport
wouldn’t have known what hit them ! Indeed!
posted by Gordon @ 7:36 AM
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