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### *** SUMMARY (Conclusions reached)

Definitions

Definitions relating to informational states

A computation is a rule-governed transformation that takes an entity from one state to another.

The intentional stance is a way of modelling an entity's behaviour, where the entity is treated as if it was an agent who chooses to behave in a certain way, because of its underlying beliefs about its environment, and its desires. Intentional systems exhibit the philosophical property of aboutness: beliefs and desires have to be about something.

Information (Shannon's definition, 1948) is conveyed by a signal if it reduces the receiver's uncertainty about the state of the world.

Information (Dretske's definition, 1981) is found wherever there is contingency and correlation. Any variable in the world which has a range of possible states is a source of information. When the state of a source of information is correlated with the state of another variable, as a result of physical laws, the second variable carries information about the first.

A random sequence is a non-compressible sequence.

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Definitions relating to fixed and flexible behaviour

Definition - "fixed pattern"
We can mathematically represent a pattern of behaviour in an organism by an output variable (say, z). A fixed pattern can be defined as a pattern where the value of the output variable z remains the same over time, given the same values of the input variables.

Definition - "flexible behaviour"
If a program governing some aspect of an organism's behaviour changes over time, such that the value of an output variable z is no longer the same for the same inputs, whether because of a change in the function(s) which define the value of z, or the parameters of the function(s), or the conditions in the program under which the function(s) are invoked, then the behaviour described by z is flexible.

Internally generated flexibility refers to the ability of some organisms to modify their existing patterns of (input -> output) information transfer, by means of an inbuilt mechanism.

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Definitions relating to action selection

An action selection mechanism is a mechanism for "resolving conflicts between competing behavioural alternatives". It requires a repertoire of actions, combined with the ability to select the most appropriate one for the present circumstances.

Centralised action selection refers to an action selection mechanism found in animals with a central nervous system. Centralised action selection suppresses signals from one side of the body while the other is active, thereby functioning as a centralised conflict-preventing mechanism, of vital importance to an organism with a brain and bilateral symmetry.

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Definitions relating to bodily movement

Directed movement is movement in the direction of a stimulus.

Internal control over a bodily movement refers to the existence of an internal program that regulates a bodily movement of a certain kind.

Fine-tuning refers to the presence of efferent motor commands within an organism's body, which allow it to stabilise a motor pattern at a particular value or within a narrow range of values, in order to achieve a goal.

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Definitions relating to kinds of learning

Non-associative learning can be defined as those instances where an animal's behaviour toward a stimulus changes in the absence of any apparent associated stimulus or event (such as a reward or punishment). Only one kind of event (the stimulus) is involved in this kind of learning. The animal does not learn to do anything new or better; rather, its innate response to a situation or a particular stimulus is modified. The two main forms of non-associative learning are habituation and sensitization.

Habituation can be defined as the waning of a response, as a result of repeated stimulation.

Sensitization is "the opposite of habituation and refers to an increase in frequency or probability of a response" to a stimulus. Non-associative sensitization occurs when an organism is exposed to an intense stimulus that elicits a strong innate response (e.g. electric shock).

Associative learning is a form of behaviour modification involving the association of two or more events, such as between two stimuli (as in classical conditioning), or between a stimulus and a response (as in instrumental and operant conditioning). In associative learning, an animal does learn to do something new or better.

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Self-correction is abandonment of behaviour that increases, and continuation of behaviour that reduces, the animal's deviation from its desired state.

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Necessary conditions for the identification of mental states

N.1 Our identification of computations in an entity, or rule-governed transformations that take it from one state to another, is a necessary condition for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

N.2 Our ability to describe an entity's behaviour according to the intentional stance is a necessary condition for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

N.3 An entity must be alive in order to qualify as having cognitive mental states. Justification.

N.4 A necessary condition for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to an entity is that we can identify the following features: (a) basic needs, essential to its flourishing; (b) internal relations between the parts (i.e. new physical properties which appear when they are assembled together); (c) dedicated functionality, where the parts' repertoire of functionality is dedicated to supporting that of the unit they comprise; (d) a nested hierarchy, where the parts are hierarchically ordered in a nested sequence of functionality; and (e) stability - the parts are able to work together for some time to maintain the entity in existence as a whole. These conditions enable us to impute a final cause or telos to the entity, and identify its various "selfish" or intrinsic ends. Additionally, we must be able to identify a master program that regulates the internal structure of an organism and the internal interactions between its components - i.e. a formal cause. Justification.

N.5 An entity must be an individual biological organism in order to qualify as having cognitive mental states. An evolutionary lineage of organisms cannot be meaningfully described as having cognitive mental states. Justification.

N.6 An organism must be capable of encoding and storing information about its environment before it can be said to possess mental states.(Corollary of N.2.) Justification.

N.7 Behaviour by an organism must vary in response to its internal states, as well as external conditions, before it can be regarded as a manifestation of a cognitive mental state. Justification.

N.8 Behaviour by an organism must vary in response to non-random internal states before it can be regarded as a manifestation of a mental state. Justification.

N.9 A necessary condition for the ascription of beliefs to an organism is that it be capable of mis-representing events occurring in its surroundings. Justification.

N.10 The existence of memory capacity in an organism is a necessary condition for ascribing cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

Definition - "flexible behaviour"
If a program governing some aspect of an organism's behaviour changes over time, such that the value of an output variable z is no longer the same for the same inputs, whether because of a change in the function(s) which define the value of z, or the parameters of the function(s), or the conditions in the program under which the function(s) are invoked, then the behaviour described by z is flexible.

N.11 The occurrence of flexible behaviour in an organism is a necessary condition for ascribing cognitive mental states to it. (Corollary of S.7.) Justification.

N.12 Internally generated flexibility of behaviour (i.e. the ability to modify patterns of information transfer, by means of an inbuilt mechanism) is a necessary condition for the existence of cognitive mental states in an organism. Justification.

N.13 An organism must be capable of internal control over its bodily movements before these movements can be regarded as a manifestation of a cognitive mental state. Justification.

N.14 An organism must have an action selection mechanism before it can be said to have cognitive mental states. Justification.

N.15 An organism must be capable of fine-tuning its bodily movements before it can be said to have cognitive mental states. Justification.

N.16 An organism must be capable of associative learning before it can be said to have cognitive mental states. Justification.

N.17 An organism must be capable of self-correcting behaviour before it can be said to have cognitive mental states. Justification.

TENTATIVE. N.19 A central nervous system is a necessary condition for the occurrence of cognitive mental states in an organism.

Sufficiency conditions for the identification of mental states

S.1 Our identification of rules that describe an entity's behaviour (as per Wolfram's computational stance) is not a sufficient condition for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to that entity. Justification.

S.2 Our ability to describe an entity in terms of Dennett's intentional stance is not a sufficient condition for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to that entity. Justification.

S.3 Our ability to identify behaviour in an organism that can be described using the intentional stance is not a sufficient warrant for ascribing mental states to it. Justification.

S.4 Being an organism is not a sufficient condition for having mental states. Justification.

S.5 The possession by an organism of sensors which encode information about its surroundings is an insufficient warrant for saying that the organism is capable of cognitive mental states. Justification.

S.6 The existence of memory in an organism is not a sufficient ground for ascribing cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

Definition - "fixed pattern"
We can mathematically represent a pattern of behaviour in an organism by an output variable (say, z). A fixed pattern can be defined as a pattern where the value of the output variable z remains the same over time, given the same values of the input variables.

S.7 Behaviour by an organism which conforms to a fixed pattern or rule is not a sufficient warrant for ascribing cognitive mental states to that organism, even if stimulus-response coupling is indirect and modifiable (by the addition or removal of other stimuli). Justification.

S.8: The occurrence of non-associative habituation and sensitization in an organism does not provide a sufficient warrant for the ascription of mental states to it. (Corollary of Conclusion S.7.) Justification.

S.9 The occurrence in an organism of flexible behaviour does not provide a sufficient warrant for the ascription of mental states to it. Justification.

S.10 The occurrence of control over bodily movements in an organism, even when combined with sensors, does not provide a sufficient warrant for the ascription of mental states to it. Justification.

S.11 The fact that an organism has an action selection mechanism, sensors and a nervous system with reflexes, does not provide a sufficient warrant for the ascription of mental states to it. Justification.

S.12 The occurrence of centralised action selection, sensors and a central nervous system in an organism does not provide a sufficient warrant for the ascription of mental states to it. Justification.

S.13 The presence in an organism of flexible behaviour patterns that are acquired through an internal mechanism does not provide a sufficient warrant for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

S.14 A capacity for learning in an organism does not provide a sufficient warrant for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

S.15 A capacity for associative learning in an organism does not provide a sufficient warrant for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

S.16 The presence in an organism of Dretskean representations, defined as indicators acquired through learning which serve a biological function, does not provide a sufficient warrant for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

S.17 The occurrence in an organism of blocking does not provide a sufficient warrant for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

S.18 The occurrence of higher-order forms of associative learning in an organism do not, taken by themselves, warrant the conclusion that it has cognitive mental states. Justification.

Definition - Operant conditioning
An animal can be described as undergoing operant conditioning if the following features can be identified:

(i) innate preferences or drives;

(ii) motor programs, which are stored in the brain, and generate the suite of the animal's motor output;

(iii) an action selection mechanism, which allows the animal to make a selection from its suite of possible motor response patterns and pick the one that is the most appropriate to its current circumstances;

(iv) fine-tuning behaviour: efferent motor commands which are capable of stabilising a motor pattern at a particular value or within a narrow range of values, in order to achieve a goal;

(v) the ability to store and compare internal representations of its current motor output (i.e. its efferent copy, which represents its current "position" on its internal map) and its afferent sensory inputs;

(vi) direct or indirect associations between different motor commands, sensory inputs (optional) and their consequences, which are stored in the animal's memory and updated when circumstances change;

(vii) a goal or end-state, which is internally encoded as a stored memory of a motor pattern or sensory stimulus that the fly associates with attaining its goal;

(viii) a pathway for reaching its goal, which is internally encoded as a stored memory of a sequence of movements or sensory stimuli which allows the animal to steer itself towards its goal;

(ix) sensory inputs that inform the animal whether it has attained its goal, and if not, whether it is getting closer to achieving it (the latter part is optional);

(x) a correlation mechanism, allowing it to find a temporal coincidence between its motor behaviour and the attainment of its goal;

(xi) self-correction: abandonment of behaviour that increases, and continuation of behaviour that reduces, the animal's deviation from its desired state. Source.

S.19 Animals that are capable of undergoing operant conditioning are bona fide agents that possess beliefs and desires. Justification.

S.20 We are justified in ascribing agency to a navigating animal if the following features can be identified:

(i) a goal or end-state, which is internally encoded as a stored memory of a visual stimulus that the fly associates with attaining its goal;

(ii) sub-goals, which are internally encoded as stored memories of visual stimuli that help the fly attain its goal;

(iii) a pathway for reaching its goal, which is internally encoded as a local vector or a stored memory of a sequence of movements which allows the animal to steer itself towards its goal;

(iv) exploratory behaviour, as the insect tries to locate food sites;

(v) visual inputs that inform the animal about its current position, in relation to its goal, and enable it to correct its movements if the need arises;

(vi) direct or indirect associations (a) between visual landmarks and local vectors; (b) between the animal's short term goals (landmarks) and long term goals (food sites or the nest). These associations are stored in the animal's memory and updated when the animal's environment changes;

(vii) the ability to store and compare internal representations of its current motor output (i.e. its efferent copy, which represents its current "position" on its internal map) and its afferent sensory inputs. Motor output and sensory inputs are linked by a two-way interaction;

(viii) fine-tuning behaviour: efferent motor commands which are capable of steering the animal towards a short or long-term goal. It has to be able to detect both matches (correlations between its view and the stored image of its goal) and mismatches or deviations - first, in order to approach its goal, and second, in order to keep track of it;

(ix) self-correction: abandonment of behaviour that increases, and continuation of behaviour that reduces, the animal's deviation from its desired state. Justification.

S.21 The capacity for rapid reversal learning in an animal does not, by itself, warrant the ascription of mental states to it. Justification.

S.22 Progressive adjustments in serial reversal tests constitute good prima facie evidence that an animal is trying to adjust to sudden changes in its environment, by rapidly revising its expectations. Justification.

S.23 An animal's ability to form categorical concepts and apply them to novel stimuli indicates the presence of mental processes - in particular, meta-learning. Justification.

S.24 An animal's ability to identify non-empirical properties is a sufficient condition for its having mental states (intentional acts). Such an animal can apply non-emprical concepts, by following a rule. Justification.

Range (or scope) of phenomena required for mental states

R.1 All natural entities and natural processes can be described according to Wolfram's computational stance: that is, the set of natural entities which perform computations is universal. Justification.

R.2 The set of entities which can be described by Dennett's intentional stance is not universal in scope, but includes all organisms (and their parts). Justification.

R.3 All cellular organisms possess sensors which encode information about their surroundings. Justification.

R.4 All cellular organisms possess some kind of memory capacity, which enables them to detect changes in their environment. Justification.

R. 5 In any cellular organism, the reaction to a stimulus is always indirect and modifiable (through the addition or removal of other stimuli). Justification.

R.6 All organisms exhibit flexible behaviour, to some degree. Justification.

R.7 All cellular organisms are capable of directed movement. Justification.

R.8 Only organisms with central nervous systems are capable of fine-tuning their bodily movements. Justification.

R.9 Associative learning appears to be confined to organisms with central nervous systems. It is found in most but possibly not all phyla of animals with central nervous systems. (Flatworms may not be capable of associative learning, but many other phyla of worms are.) Justification.

Necessary and sufficient conditions for learning

L.1: The existence of memory in an organism is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for learning. Justification.

L.2: Learning should not be attributed to an organism unless it displays a change in its pattern of behaviour which it is able to reproduce on a subsequent occasion. Justification.

L.3 The ability of an organism to undergo habituation and sensitization is not a sufficient condition for learning. Justification.

L.4 The occurrence in an organism of flexible behaviour is not a sufficient condition for learning. Justification.

L.5 The capacity for associative learning in an organism is a sufficient condition for its being able to engage in internally generated flexible behaviour. Justification.

L.6 The ability of an organism to undergo associative learning (classical and/or instrumental conditioning) is a sufficient condition for its being able to learn, in the proper sense of the word. Justification.

L.7 Operant conditioning is a form of learning which presupposes an agent-centred intentional stance.