Chapter 2 - What does it mean to have a mind?

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How do we decide which entities possess mental states?

Two Models of Mind

1. Wolfram's neo-animism: Are minds nothing more than computational devices?
2. Dennett's intentional stance: Is mind a property of intentional systems?

Minds and Organisms

3. Why only living things possess minds. Implications for AI.

Different kinds of intentional stance? Narrowing the search for mental states in organisms.
Linguistic constraints I shall observe when talking about organisms' mental states

Which Organisms have Minds?

*** EXCURSUS: The tree of life - major groupings and relationships

Case studies

4. Sensory capacities, perceptions and mental states in organisms
5. The role of memory in mental states
6. Is flexible behaviour enough for having a mind?
7. Does the ability to learn indicate the presence of mental states?
8. Mind and movement: the significance of control in intentional agency
9. Representations and mental states
10. Getting it wrong: the role of self-correction in belief
Synthesis: what makes a mind?

Models of Agency in Animals

Operant behaviour as a form of agency in fruit flies
Navigation as a form of agency in insects
Tool use as a form of agency in fish
Social learning as a form of agency in fish

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