Tobacco Explained: 1. Smoking and health

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Tobacco Explained

"A demand for scientific proof is always a formula for inaction and delay and usually the first reaction of the guilty …in fact scientific proof has never been, is not and should not be the basis for political and legal action"

An example of (private) candour from a scientist at the tobacco company BAT ¹. (S J Green 1980)

1. 1 Summary

At the beginning of the fifties, research was published showing a statistical link between smoking and lung cancer. At the same time the tobacco industry’s own research began to find carcinogens in smoke and began to confirm the relationship between smoking and cancer. This posed a serious problem for the industry: whether to admit to the health problems and try and find marketable solutions, or whether to basically deny everything.

In the face of mounting damning evidence against their product, the companies responded by creating doubt and controversy surrounding the health risks, whilst at the same time by responding to the growing public concern by putting filters on cigarettes and promising research into the health effects of smoking. They lulled the smoking public into a false sense of security, because, whilst this had the hallmarks of responsible companies acting in the public interest, it was actually a public relations strategy to buy time, at the expense of public health.

Many of the internal documents reveal that the industry was trying to look responsible in public, but privately was out to convince the public that smoking was not harmful. Despite decades of evidence to the contrary, and millions of deaths caused by tobacco, the industry still largely maintains that the case against the cigarette is unproven.

In the early fifties, research is published showing a statistical link between smoking and lung cancer. At the same time the industry’s own research begins to find carcinogens in smoke and starts to confirm the relationship between smoking and cancer.

By the late fifties industry scientists had privately accepted the association between smoking and lung cancer, believing it to be one of cause and effect. Thirty years later, the majority of the industry still publicly denies the causation theory – with one exception – the US manufacturer Liggett, who broke ranks in 1997, much to the dismay of the other tobacco majors.
Beginning in the late fifties, and certainly by the mid-sixties, industry scientists were urging their executives to admit to the problem and solve it, arguing that there were commercial opportunities to exploit. Research was undertaken into the "safe cigarette" (see separate section), but it soon fell under the influence of the lawyers, who successfully argued that a company could not produce a "safe" product, because this would imply that its other products were dangerous.

One all-encompassing fear of the American companies that had repercussions on their British counterparts was the threat of litigation. This affected what the companies researched in private and what they said in public.

In the US, industry research was taken over by the lawyers and then most in-house research facilities were closed down, or in the case of Philip Morris, partly secretly moved to Germany. American companies pressurised their British counterparts not to publish incriminating research. As one memo says: "Ignorance is bliss".
By the early sixties, lawyers for the industry recognised the health problem – and put forward the radical step of a voluntary warning on packs to be used as a safety device in case of litigation. This was accepted as the way forward by the late sixties.

By the early seventies, internally the industry began to reassess their inflexible attitude on causation, as they believed it was damaging their credibility. The lawyers’ rigid attitude on causation has dismayed many industry scientists, but the industry maintains that the causation theory is unproven.

Publicly the companies’ overriding policy has been to argue that they are not qualified to comment on the health consequences of smoking, but when they do so to create confusion and "keep the controversy open". This has been done by, on the one hand denying the existing evidence, whilst on the other demanding absolute proof of causation and calling for more research. This research, much of which has been covertly funded by the tobacco industry, is designed to look at other causes of cancer and to water down the evidence linking smoking and disease. For example, the industry statements are peppered by fudging comments such as "no clinical evidence", "no substantial evidence", "no laboratory proof", "unresolved", and "still open". Nothing has been "statistically proven", "scientifically proven", "or "scientifically established". There is no "scientific causality", "conclusive proof", or "scientific proof".
It is still the case in 1998 that tobacco company representatives will not give a straightforward ‘yes’ to the question ‘does smoking cause lung cancer, yes or no?’

1.2 What is known - key facts on smoking and health

In the UK, the Health Education Authority estimates that 121,000 people per year die prematurely as a result of smoking (1995 figure) ².

Causes are divided as follows:

- 38% Cancer (of which two thirds are lung cancers)
- 34% Heart and circulation disease

- 28% Respiratory illness

This death toll is six times higher than the total (19,892) arising from road accidents (3,647), poisoning and overdoses (1,071), all other accidental deaths (9,974), murder and manslaughter (448), suicide (4,175), and HIV infection (577) in the UK (1996 figures) ³.
One in two long-term smokers will die prematurely as a result of smoking - half of these in middle age ⁴.
The average loss of life expectancy among those that die prematurely from smoking in developed countries is 16 years of life ⁵.
World-wide, approximately 3 million die prematurely per year as a result of smoking - on current trends this would rise to 10 million per year by 2030. In the European region of the WHO, 1.2 million people die prematurely each year ⁶.
Cigarette smoke contains over 4,000 chemicals, many are known to be toxic, carcinogenic or mutagenic ⁷.

1.3 What the industry knew and what it said

1.3.1 Early-mid 1960s: the birth of the problem
Independent research shows there is a problem		Dr. Richard Doll and Professor Bradford Hill publish an article in the BMJ, which states that there is a: "real association between carcinoma of the lung and smoking." ⁸ (1952) The US journal Cancer Research publishes details of experiments undertaken by Dr. Ernest Wynder on mice, which show that 44 per cent of animals whose skin was painted with smoke condensate developed cancerous tumours. Wynder notes that the "suspected human carcinogen has thus been proven to a carcinogen for a laboratory animal." ⁹ (1996)
Tobacco companies seem to accept it		"Studies of clinical data tend to confirm the relationship between heavy and prolonged tobacco smoking and incidence of cancer of the lung." ¹⁰ (RJR, 1953)
Respond with public relations		Companies are advised they need a two-pronged PR attack to "get the industry out of this hole." ¹¹. (Hill and Knowlton,1953) Leading PR firm Hill & Knowlton are hired: "We have one essential job -- which can be simply said: Stop public panic … There is only one problem -- confidence, and how to establish it; public assurance, and how to create it . . . And, most important, how to free millions of Americans from the guilty fear that is going to arise deep in their biological depths – regardless of any pooh-poohing logic - every time they light a cigarette".¹². (Hill and Knowlton, 1953)
Tobacco companies start the denials		The US tobacco industry responded to the public concern by producing the ‘Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers’, which sets the tone for the next few decades: "Distinguished authorities point out: That medical research of recent years indicates many possible causes of lung cancer. That there is no agreement among the authorities regarding what the cause is. That there is no proof that cigarette smoking is one of the causes. That statistics purporting to link smoking with the disease could apply with equal force to any one of many other aspects of modern life. Indeed the validity of the statistics themselves are questioned by numerous scientists." ¹³. (TIRC, 1954)
…but take care to avoid commitments		An early draft of the Frank Statement, includes the following text, which is struck out before publication: "We will never produce and market a product shown to be the cause of any serious human ailment …The Committee will undertake to keep the public informed of such facts as may be developed relating to cigarette smoking and health and other pertinent matters." ¹⁴. (Tobacco Industry Research Committee, December, 1953)
UK Government accepts there is a problem in 1954		"I have come to the conclusion that the statistical evidence does point to a causal relationship between tobacco smoking and lung cancer, but that there are important qualifications. There is no precise evidence of how tobacco smoking causes lung cancer or indeed of the extent to which one causes the other." ¹⁵ (Minister of Health, 1954).
Industry public denials continue		"there still isn't a single shred of substantial evidence to link cigarette smoking and lung cancer directly." ¹⁶ (RJR, 1954)
1.3.2 Mid-late 1950s: what about the honest response?
Industry scientists accept privately there is a problem and want to tackle it…		Alan Rodgmen, a chemist for RJ Reynolds, argues that: "Since it now well-established that cigarette smoke does contain several polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and considering the potential and actual carcinogenic activity of a number of these compounds, a method of either complete removal or almost complete removal of these compounds from smoke is required." ¹⁷ (Cited in Dirty Business, 1998)
Using a code word for cancer, scientists discuss a causal link to smoking		An internal BAT memo describes work underway at BAT’s laboratories in Southampton, using code words for lung cancer "ZEPHYR" : "As a result of several statistical surveys, the idea has arisen that there is a causal relationship between ZEPHYR and tobacco smoking, particularly cigarette smoking. Various hypothesis have been propounded one of which is that ‘tobacco smoke contains a substance or substances which may cause ZEPHYR’." ¹⁸. (BAT, 1957)
US tobacco industry scientists agree that smoking causes lung cancer		BAT scientists visited the US for a study tour that included visits to Philip Morris, American Tobacco, Liggett and several research institutions. They found a consensus: "With one exception the individuals with whom we met believed that smoking causes lung cancer; if by ‘causation’ we mean any chain of events which leads finally to lung cancer and which involves smoking as an indispensable link." ¹⁹ (BAT, 1958)
…and some see this as a business opportunity		"Evidence is building up that heavy smoking contributes to lung cancer", writes a scientist at Philip Morris, who then articulates the benefits for the company if only they could find the.. "intestinal fortitude to jump on the other side of the fence admitting that cigarettes are hazardous. ‘Just look what a wealth of ammunition would be at his disposal’ to attack the other companies who did not have safe cigarettes." ²⁰ (Philip Morris, 1958)
Meanwhile, the public denials continue		Imperial Tobacco: "I state that in our considered opinion there is no proof at all that smoking causes lung cancer and much to suggest that it cannot be the cause." ²¹. (Imperial Tobacco, 1956)
1.3.3 Early-mid 1960s: enter the lawyers
Industry consultants admit cigarette smoking is cancer causing and promoting	Consulting firm Arthur. D. Little, working for the US Liggett company reviews the results of seven year’s research work; "There are biologically active materials present in cigarette smoking. These are a) cancer causing b) cancer promoting c) poisonous d) stimulating, pleasurable and flavourful." ²². (Arthur D. Little, 1961)
Worried tobacco scientists want to find a solution	Alan Rodgman, a research chemist with RJ Reynolds writes that the company is publicly denying a link between smoking and cancer in public, whilst the company’s own research shows there is a link. "What would be the effect on this company of not publishing these data now, but being required at some future date to disclose such data, possibly in the unfavourable atmosphere of a lawsuit? …It is recommended that the Company’s management recognise that many members of its Research Department are intensely concerned about the cigarette smoke-health problem and eager to participate in its study and solution." ²³ (RJR, 1962)
UK and US evidence accumulates	The Royal College of Physicians issues the first major report on "Smoking and Health", which concludes: "Cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer and bronchitis … cigarette smoking is the most likely cause of the recent world-wide increase in deaths from lung cancer." ²⁴ (RCP, 1962) First Report of the US Surgeon-General, "Smoking and Health", concludes: "Cigarette smoking is causally related to lung cancer in men; the magnitude of the effect of cigarette smoking far outweighs all other factors." ²⁵ (US Dept. of Health, 1964)
Lawyers suggest warnings to offset against liability	"I have no wish to be tarred and feathered, but I would suggest the industry might serve itself on several fronts if it voluntarily adopted a package legend such as ‘excessive use of this product may be injurious to health of susceptible persons’ …This is so controversial a suggestion - indeed shocking- that I would rather not try to anticipate the arguments against it in this note but reserve my defence." ²⁶ (Brown and Williamson, 1963)
Lawyers must be put in charge	The strategy became increasingly defensive and early talk of safer cigarettes and scientific solutions to the problem gave way to denial and a legal approach: "The main power on the smoking and health situation undoubtedly rest with the lawyers .. the U.S. cigarette manufacturers are not looking for means to reduce the long-term activity of cigarettes." ²⁷ (P Rogers, G Todd, 1964)
The public denials continue	Following the US Surgeon General’s report of January 1964, a Philip Morris director dismissed the findings: "We don’t accept the idea that there are harmful agents in tobacco." ²⁸ (Philip Morris, 1964)
1.3.4 Mid-late 1960s: but fixing the problem means admitting it
Lawyers arguing to "research the disease" not tobacco		According to a memo taken by Brown and Williamson, Janet Brown an attorney with American Brands argued in favour… "of the long established policy to ‘research the disease’ as opposed to researching questions more directly related to tobacco… first, we maintain the position that the existing evidence of a relationship between the use of tobacco and health is inadequate to justify research more closely related to tobacco, and, secondly, that the study of the disease keeps constantly alive the argument that, until basic knowledge of the disease itself is further advanced, it is scientifically inappropriate to devote the major effort to tobacco." ²⁹ (B&W, 1968)
And there’s a agreement to scale down in-house research		Philip Morris Vice President Helmut Wakeham, writes about a ‘gentleman’s agreement,’ under which the companies had agreed to refrain from conducting in-house biological experiments on tobacco smoke: "We have reason to believe that in spite of gentlemans [sic] agreement from the tobacco industry in previous years that at least some of the major companies have been increasing biological studies within their own facilities." ³⁰. (Philip Morris, undated c. 1965)
Respond by creating controversy and contradiction		18 October: Carl Thompson from Hill and Knowlton writes a letter on the best angles for the industry magazine, Tobacco and Health Research: "The most important type of story is that which casts doubt in the cause and effect theory of disease and smoking. Eye-grabbing headlines were needed and "should strongly call out the point - Controversy! Contradiction! Other Factors! Unknowns!" ³¹ (Hill and Knowlton, 1968)
Focus tobacco industry research on denying problems		Helmut Wakeham, Head of Research and Development of Philip Morris, writes: "Let's face it. We are interested in evidence which we believe denies the allegations that cigarette smoking causes disease." ³² (Philip Morris, 1970)
…and continue the public denials		"No case against cigarette smoking has ever been made despite millions spent on research ...The longer these tests go on, the better our case becomes." ³³. (Philip Morris, 1968)
1.3.5 Early-mid 1970s: denial and denial of responsibility
Gallaher accepts that the "smoking beagles" prove beyond reasonable doubt that smoking causes lung cancer		The General Manager of Research at Gallaher Limited writes a memo to the Managing Director regarding the work that Auerbach had undertaken on beagles: "We believe that the Auerbach work proves beyond all reasonable doubt that fresh whole cigarette smoke is carcinogenic to dog lungs and therefore it is highly likely that it is carcinogenic to human lungs … the results of the research would appear to us to remove the controversy regarding the causation of the majority of human lung cancer … to sum up we are of the opinion that the Auerbach’s work proves beyond reasonable doubt the causation of lung cancer by smoke." ³⁴ (Gallaher, 1970)
… but Gallaher publicly denies these findings in 1998		Gallaher responded to the revelation of document above in March 1998 in a press release: "Gallaher considered this published research. The internal memo, now made public, was an initial reaction. Gallaher subsequently discounted the views expressed in that memo." ³⁵ (Gallaher, 1998) No explanation is offered for why Gallaher does not accept this work - or the conclusion of its top research scientist. Imperial Tobacco, followed up with more fudge: "Any document like this has to be seen in the context of the many, many documents on the subject. One would need to look at all of them to put things in context." ³⁶. (Imperial Tobacco, 1998)
Two months after the beagles - the Mouse House is closed		RJ Reynolds Biological Research Division, employed in the "Mouse House" is abruptly closed. One of the leading scientists recalls: "We felt we were on the road to making a discovery of a cause and effect relationship to a clinical disease ... I think the company’s lawyers felt that the type of work we were doing was potentially damaging to the company itself and policy was that that wouldn’t happen and that was the Legal Department’s policy." ³⁷ (RJR scientist, speaking on BBC TV, 1993)
Evidence is so great it is time to change tack on causation		A "strictly confidential" internal BAT document says "While in the past it has seemed good sense for the industry to contest the validity of all the evidence against smoking (and may still be necessary to avoid damages in lawsuits), there is little doubt that the inflexibility of this attitude is beginning to create in some countries hostility and even contempt for the industry among intelligent, fair-minded doctors …it is thought that we should reconsider our basic answer on causation." ³⁸ (BAT, 1970)
…the "we are not doctors" stance is not working		Dr Green from BAT writes : "I believe it will not be possible indefinitely to maintain the rather hollow ‘we are not doctors’ stance and that, in due course, we shall have to come up in public with a more positive approach towards cigarette safety." ³⁹. (BAT, 1972)
…and it was only ever PR anyway…		A memo from Fred Panzer of the US Tobacco Institute says: "It is my strong belief that we now have an opportunity to take the initiative in the cigarette controversy, and turn it around. For twenty years, this industry has employed a single strategy to defend itself on three major fronts – litigation, politics and public opinion. While the strategy was brilliantly conceived and executed …it is not - nor was it intended to be - a vehicle for victory. On the contrary, it has always been a holding strategy, consisting of Creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying it. Advocating the public’s right to smoke, without actually urging them to take up the practice. Encouraging objective scientific research as the only way to resolve the question of health hazard." ⁴⁰. (Tobacco Institute, 1972)
Meanwhile the public denial continues		"It is our opinion … that the repeated assertion without conclusive proof that cigarettes cause disease – however well-intentioned- constitutes a disservice to the public." ⁴¹ (Brown and Williamson, 1971)
1.3.6 Mid-late 1970s: recognition that there is no easy way out
We have retreated behind impossible demands for "scientific proof"		"The industry has retreated behind impossible demands for ‘scientific proof’ whereas such proof has never been required as a basis for action in the legal and political fields …It may therefore be concluded that for certain groups of people smoking causes the incidence of certain diseases to be higher than it would otherwise be …A demand for scientific proof is always a formula for inaction and delay and usually the first reaction of the guilty." ⁴². (BAT, 1976)
Publicly: "we are not doctors"		Imperial Tobacco shrugs and stands by the 'we are not doctors' ploy: "As a company we do not make, indeed we are not qualified to make, medical judgements. We are therefore not in a position either to accept or to reject statements made by the Minister of Health." ⁴³ (Imperial Tobacco UK, 1975)
So the denials continue		"None of the things which have been found in tobacco smoke are at concentrations which can be considered harmful. Anything can be considered harmful. Apple sauce is harmful if you get too much of it." ⁴⁴ (Philip Morris, 1976).
1.3.7 1980s: dig in and brazen it out
Industry wrestles with its credibility gap		A secret BAT document shows that: "The company’s position on causation is simply not believed by the overwhelming majority of independent observers, scientists and doctors …The industry is unable to argue satisfactorily for its own continued existence, because all arguments eventually lead back to the primary issue of causation, and at this point our position is unacceptable …our position on causation, which we have maintained for some twenty years in order to defend our industry is in danger of becoming the very factor which inhibits our long term viability …On balance, it is the opinion of this department that …we should now move to position B, namely, that we acknowledge ‘the probability that smoking is harmful to a small percentage of heavy smokers’…. By giving a little we may gain a lot. By giving nothing we stand to lose everything." ⁴⁵ (BAT, 1980)
Whilst the evidence accumulates		Another authoritative report from the US Surgeon General: "Cigarette smoking is the chief, single, avoidable cause of death in our society, and the most important public health issue of our time." ⁴⁶. (Report of Surgeon-General 1982)
…but the public denials continue		"The view that smoking causes specific diseases remains an opinion or a judgement, and not an established scientific fact." ⁴⁷. (Tobacco Institute of Hong Kong, 1989)
1.3.8 1990s: blanket denial
Damning legal opinion		US Judge Sarokin rules in the tobacco case Haines v. Liggett Group that: "All too often in the choice between the physical health of consumers and the financial well-being of business, concealment is chosen over disclosure, sales over safety, and money over morality. Who are these persons who knowingly and secretly decide to put the buying public at risk solely for the purpose of making profits and who believe that illness and death of consumers is an apparent cost of their own prosperity. As the following facts disclose, despite some rising pretenders, the tobacco industry may be the king of concealment and disinformation." ⁴⁸. (1992)
We don’t smoke that s***		An actor promoting RJ Reynolds products asks an RJR executive why he does not smoke. He is told: "We don’t smoke that s. We just sell it. We just reserve the right to smoke for the young, the poor, the black and the stupid."* ⁴⁹ (Cited in, First Tuesday, ITV 1992)
Ex- industry scientist says its time for the truth		Anthony Colucci, a former scientist with RJ Reynolds, states: "I’m a scientist who says: ‘It’s about time they quit this charade. I’m sick and tired of the way they distort and ignore the science. It’s time for them to tell the truth ... They had a responsibility early on to tell what their own researchers were finding out. Instead, they ignored it and made a mockery of it. I think it’s time for the tobacco industry to say: This stuff kills people. We know that. Smoke at your own risk." ⁵⁰ (1992)
But the denials continue into 1998 and under oath		Murray Walker, Vice President and Chief Spokesperson for the Tobacco Institute, testifying at the Minnesota Trial: "We don't believe it's ever been established that smoking is the cause of disease." ⁵¹ (Murray Walker 1998) Geoffrey Bible, Chairman of Philip Morris, testifies at the Minnesota trial: "I'm unclear in my own mind whether anyone dies of cigarette smoking-related diseases." ⁵² (Cited in Pioneer Press 1998)
…and fudging continues in the press		John Carlisle of the Tobacco Manufacturers Association gives is questioned in a magazine: Question: Does it [smoking] cause lung cancer? John Carlisle: There's no shortage of statistics: it's extraordinary the amount of research that has gone into our product and the many and varied opinions that people hold about it." ⁵³ (UK TMA, 1998)
..and to the BBC the industry still will not give a straight answer		Following the release of a 1970 memo showing that Gallaher accepted that smoking caused lung cancer, John Carlisle of the TMA is interviewed on BBC Radio’s flagship Today programme. Question: "What would it take to convince you that tobacco can be harmful, Mr Carlisle, if this doesn’t? John Carlisle: "Well, I … one cannot pull out just one report which has been leaked to a national newspaper and say this is the evidence we have been waiting for." Apparently Mr. Carlisle has not noticed numerous reports of the Royal College of Physicians and US Surgeon General, and is still waiting for evidence. Question: "But Mr. Carlisle this is absolutely conclusive evidence that, apart from what the research shows, that Gallahers has concealed conclusive knowledge about the harmful effects of tobacco for all those 30 years." John Carlisle: "[…]There is no such thing as conclusive evidence when you are talking about such a vast subject." ⁵⁴

References:

S.J Green, BAT, 1980

Health Education Authority. London, December 1996. Unpublished.

Office of National Statistics, 1998. General Register Office for Scotland, 1998. Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 1998. Figures for 1996.

Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health, 1998. See para 1.5 page 17.

Peto R., Lopez A., Boreham J. et al. Mortality from Smoking in Developed Countries 1950-2000, Oxford, ICRF and WHO. OUP, 1994. Updated 1997.

Peto R., Lopez A., Boreham J. 1994. op cit.

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Dr. Bradford Hill, Letter quoted in Central Health Services Council, Standing Cancer and Radiotherapy Advisory Committee, Note by the Secretary, 1952, May

P. J. Hilts, Smokescreen - The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Cover-Up, 1996, Addison Wesley, p4; R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes - America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p161-2

C. Teague, RJ Reynolds, Survey of Cancer Research with Emphasis Upon Possible Carcinogens from Tobacco, 1953, 2 February

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Hill and Knowlton, Memo, 1953, December; quoted on www.tobacco.org

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RD 14 Smoke Group Programme for Coming 12-16 Week Period, Southampton Research and Development Establishment [R&DE], British American Tobacco Company, Ltd, 1957

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P. J. Hilts, Smokescreen - The Truth Behind the Tobacco Industry Cover-Up, 1996, Addison Wesley, p26 quoting C. V. Mace, Memo to R. N. DuPuis, untitled, 1958, 24 July

E J Partridge, Letter to Sir John Hawton, 1956, 9 March

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Howard Cullman, board member Philip Morris. 1964. Cited in R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes - America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p260

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S. Karnowski, 'Gentlemen's Agreement' is one key to State's Tobacco Case, AP/Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune, 1998, 23 February; H. Wakeham, Need for Biological Research by Philip Morris, Research and Development, undated {Minn. Trial Exhibit. 2544}

R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes - America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p324 quoting C. Thompson, Memo to Kloepfer, 1968 18 October [Cipollone 2725]

H. Wakeham, Best Program for CTR, 1970, 8 December {Minn. Trial Exhibit 11,586}

R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes - America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p325 quoting Duns Review, 1968, April

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Imperial Tobacco quoted in the Financial Times, Revelation may hit tobacco shares, 16th March 1998.

BBC Panorama, 1993, 10 May

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S. J. Green, The Association of Smoking and Disease, 1972, 26 July [L&D BAT 16]

F. Panzer, Memorandum Re The Roper Proposal, 1972, 1 May [L&D BAT 15]

B&W, Presentation called The Smoking /Health Controversy: A View from the Other Side, 1971, 8 February {BW-W2-03113} {L&D BAT file 4}

S. Green, Cigarette Smoking and Causal Relationships, 1976, 27 October {2231.07}; .S. Green, Smoking, Associated Diseases and Causality, 1980, 1 January

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Thames Television, Death in the West, 1976

BAT, Secret - Appreciation, 1980, 16 May [L&D RJR/BAT 8]

A Report of the Surgeon-General, The Health Consequences of Smoking. Cancer, US Department of Health, and Human Service, 1982, pxi

Tobacco Institute of Hong Kong Limited, Introducing the Tobacco Institute, 1989, March [C.7]

R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes - America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p676

Thames TV, First Tuesday, Tobacco Wars, 1992, 2 June

J. Castanoso, Man Who Once Helped Now Criticises Reynolds, News and Record [Greensboro], 1992, 26-28 September

M. Walker, Testimony at the Minnesota Trial, 1998 {Minn.Att.Gen}

D. Shaffer, No proof that Smoking Causes Disease, Tobacco Chief Says, Pioneer Press, 1998, 3 March

John Carlisle, Tobacco Manufacturers Association, Punch, 11 April 1998.

BBC Radio 4, Today. 16 March 1998. John Carlisle of the TMA, interviewed by Sue Macgregor. Transcript by Broadcast Monitoring Company.

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