State Administration
in Tajikistan: Understanding Reality
Farrukh Salihov
May 1998
*Farrukh Salihov is from Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Currently he is studying Public Administration at Rutgers University.
Contact Information:
Farrukh Salihov
Newark, NJ: 701 Hill Hall, 360 M-L King Bulevard
Newark, NJ 07102
e-mail: farangis@pegasus.rutgers.edu
Outline
(Note: This page was altered on February 14, 2000)
Objective: The paper was intended to address the issue of building
a civil state in Tajikistan and to serve as an analysis of particular environment
for this mainly administrative, as it is contemplated here, endeavor. It
may be considered as a deliberation on a policy problem with regards to
political, social, ethnological factors necessary to consider for sound
administration of the state in the interest of people. In this view it
may serve a basis for future research - search for concrete policies intended
for restoration of the basic role and place of state - its rightness in
guiding people's behavior across time.
I. Introduction
II. Part I
A. Soviet ideological transformation and its administrative
factors
B. Ethnicity, ideology, society and its control in Tajikistan
C. Politics' mutation and state administration
III. Part II
A. Variables in state-building: leadership and bureaucracy
B. Broad guideline
to regain confidence of people by the
state governance
The state's role in making and authorizing rules about public affairs and
routine of private life may be taken for granted in the West, but not so
in societies with relatively new states, particularly in Tajikistan after
its rapid transformation from a Soviet Republic and gaining independence
in 1991, which is characterized by major struggles in the society. These
major struggles are over who has the right and ability to make the rules
that guide people's social behavior. These struggles are beyond the formal
roles of any existing political institutions, they are over whether the
state will be able to displace or restrain other organizations - gangs,
clans, client-patron dyads, kinsmen, etc. - which make rules against the
wishes and goals of the state.
Fair deal of literature is devoted to the description of the social environment
in post-Soviet Tajikistan with the focus on it as a primary cause of cataclysm
- the civil war and ethnic conflict. Distressing agony of the conflict
might be quite misleading if the state continues to demonstrate discouraging
performance and consequently is totally absorbed by the social environment.
Political process which involves accommodation of social organizations
emerged during this period - gangs, clans, kinsmen, involves balancing
of a fragile peace in a war-ravaged country and at he same time threatens
basic principles of governance. This paper is a result of an attempt to
understand these developments and analyze the foundation for policy formulation
for the state in such a complex situation.
The paper consists of three parts. The first part, through the framework
of the development of conflict, is the description of the social change
and particular historical, cultural, political, economic, etc. factors
which have shaped the society and are related to the cause and result of
Tajikistan's civil war. It is also an attempt to place the country
on the diagram of the development of conflict and show how dramatic any
shift at this stage of the development may be. The second part through
some scholastic materials directly and indirectly related to state administration
deals with explanation of the mechanisms of relationship between social
organizations and state in circumstances of Tajikistan. The third part
is an "open end" conclusion on the role and place of state in human relationships
in particular circumstances of Tajikistan and broad path with necessary
factors for restoration of governance.
Part I
Looking at it as the development in a broader field of events, Tajikistan
may be considered a remote land of indigenous people affected most by the
collapse of the socialist ideology. Sharp decline in some principal aspects
of social life, which are utilized to measure human progress in contemporary
world, was the gravest of all other former socialist countries. Obviously,
such achievements were brought about by regulation of social behaviour
by state through government institutions.
According to Gerald M. Easter, a state can be identified as weak or strong
by its capacities to perform territorial administration, military power,
revenue extraction, and socioeconomic operations. (1) Needless to say, that judging by these criteria the Soviet Union was a strong state, which
explains the inability of political scientists to have predicted its dramatically
rapid break-down.
Frank Fischer states, that the solutions to the deeply entrenched problems
often raise questions more about the configuration of social and political
values underlying contemporary societies. (2) This implies, that in practice, i.e., due to certain factors of social life that impacted perception of the Soviets, ideology of capitalism, which proved to be a progressive force of the century, penetrated weak spots of the communist ideology, led to its shift, and subsequently to the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
Fischer defines ideologies as integrated systems of beliefs, values, and
methods for realizing of changing the world. (3) With regards to beliefs, he says that: "the basic question concerns a person's or group's cognitive
grasp of the surrounding world: what is the nature of the social order?
Did the social system in a society evolve because of inherent differences
in the talents or capabilities of men, or it is the result of some other
factors?" He further continues developing this thought saying that: "Ideologies
help people identify the larger significance they can find in the empirical
facts -- for example, what sorts of causal relationships the facts have
to one another, or how facts must be supplemented and supported by normative
assumptions. In short, how they all "add up" to a meaningful interpretation
of reality..." (4) The main principle of socialism or normative assumption "from everybody according to his labor to everybody according to his capabilities" as supposed to be well -constructed system of rewarding by the government -- the exclusive entrepreneur. Such exclusive role limited the capability
of the government to motivate and supervise production process in such
a huge country, i.e. in every factory, farm, and office. Thus, it entailed
in nation-wide decline of population's interest in personal contribution
into production development. For the most part of the socialist ruling
production was developed through coercive management of social relations
by the state. As soon as Gorbachyov loosened the "iron fist" and initiated
actions directed at democratizing society, long dissatisfaction with the
principle of human relationships, enforced by witnessing the progress of
capitalism, evolved into actions against socialist government, and consequently
led to dissolution of the Soviet Union into fifteen independent states.
As Fischer states, "people mix their own perceptions, formal learning and
experiences of reality with interpretation of their own preferences and
needs. ... In order to advance their own social and material gain, people
to a greater or lesser extent, rationalize their beliefs." (5)
This puts ideology in periphery of human motivation to achieve something
called "good life", Waldo's interpretation of which is "with much emphasis
upon the material, but not neglectful of the aesthetic and cultural, or
hostile to the spiritual" (6) Although material, no doubt, is a dominating principle, preferences for it, as well as aesthetic, cultural, spiritual,
etc. vary among individuals, and construct a variation of their combination
in the human mind according to individual's perception of universe and
his/her place in it. Then, values that construct ideology can be understood
through acceptance of concrete human relationships as a way to achieve
desirable socioeconomic status that indicate well-being of the group/s
of people. According to these combinations of what constitutes "good life",
not only its final contours but also ways to achieve it are multiple, explaining
variations in political structure of states and their administration in
different countries. In this context, socialism was a failed attempt to
achieve "good life". Its failure lies not so much in the main discourse
that is criticized so fiercely, as it would not spread to half of the world
if it were not carrying some meaning linking humans with good life but
with administration of rules of human behaviour that its interpretation
prescribed.
State control, argues Joel Migdal, "involves the successful subordination
of people's own inclinations of social behaviour or behaviour sought by
other social organizations in favour of the behaviour prescribed by state
rules." (7) At the same time, it seems worth to me to cite Tilly's statement brought to attention by Baltonado that "the major forms of political participation which Westerners now complacently refer to as "modern" are for the most
part unintended outcome of the efforts of European statemakers to build
armies, keep taxes coming in, form effective coalitions against their rivals,
hold their nominal subordinates and allies in line, and fend off the threat
of rebellion on the part of ordinary people".(Tilly, 1975) (8)Explanation
of the collapse of the USSR may lie not as much in so blamed ideology as
in the lack of state's efforts, abilities, or intentions to manage social
compliance and avoid "rebellion on part of ordinary people" through meaningful
adjustment of relationship of production to aspirations of people at large,
which would be the key to maintain social order. It goes without saying,
that it was not the situation in which ideology influenced the behaviour
of people in such a way that their conduct occurs as if they have made
content of the ideology the "rule of their conduct for its very own sake"
-- relation of domination introduced by Weber (1968). (9) Instead,
it seems to me, that content of ideology was not linked to individual motivation
by "flexible" administration. Command of the rule imposed on population
though coercive means was just another type of management that was not
open for adjustments or self-correction and not tolerant to any expression
of ideas deviating from the "regime of truth". Thus, the relation of domination
or compliance (necessary to deal with social conflict and struggle for
power which are viewed by Weber as "irradicable elements of the human conditions") (10)
was not reached as a result of persuasion and acceptance of the main discourse
as reflection of people's aspirations for good life, but through compulsion
and maintenance of supply of public goods that distanced a possibility
of a revolt. Administration through such means prevented social conflict
as well as emergence and concentration of support for struggle for power
by another ideology. And as soon as changes were brought about by difference
in management towards democratization of the country's affairs which coincided
with decline in supply of goods and services by state-entrepreneur and
with some influx of components of another ideology (which had been better
managed to link it with people's aspirations) through facts of achievements
towards "good life", i.e. boom in economic and success in social development
in most of the Western Europe, Japan, USA, the social change was ready
to come.
With such a change and wave of social indignation, state collapsed and
pyramidal structure of the centralized Soviet government mutated into new
governments of the former Soviet Union republics which encountered the
same problem -- gaining social control -- ability to have people follow
the state's rules. In addition to the defeat of ideology, the failure of
the normative administrative image -- centers are active and creative while
peripheries are passive and controllable that might be viewed in the approach
of central Soviet government through centralized administration and control
maintained for decades, resulted in total inability of the government of
Tajikistan to keep situation under control on a local, republican, level.
This may explain presence of Russian military in Tajikistan and Russian
economic assistance since the break-up. Failure of one discourse caused
emergence of others, and such political activism resulted in new for Tajikistan
phenomena - Democratic Party, Islamic Revival Party, Rastokhez - Party
of Cultural Renaissance, which sought support of population in their pursuit
of power. However, due to unsophistication of mostly rural population and
its division into large ethnic groups, the leaders of political parties
that came to light from the worldly layer of the country's capital's population
were not seen as carriers of a political doctrine but as representatives
of a particular ethnic group. Thus, support of one political party by an
ethnic group caused counter-move by another ethnic group which, in a way,
was a strategy of survival for an ethnic group in a state weakened economically
with the abrupt cut from the unified infrastructure, and ideologically
with the dissolution of socialist views. Economic and political fractionalization
resulted in social fractionalization, in the form of ethnic groups, as
it seemed natural to cling to untouched even by Socialist rule ethnic roots
which one could count on for protection and presentation of one's interests.
Thus, a new regime of truth, which employed primordial moods of an ethnic
group facing a possibility of threat to its well-being from another one,
emerged. In this situation failure of the state to adjust to a new situation,
find ways to mobilize and motivate population was a main element in an
offspring of the ethnic conflict. Weakness of the state in territorial
administration, military, socioeconomic operations, etc. makes effects
of the failure of state to prevent social revolt dependent on its degree:
in case of Tajikistan, the results were devastating.
The differences in ethnicity (of the same nationality) in view of particular
cultural and historic factors were not as substantial and potentially explosive
as in any other multi-ethnic country to cause a civil war. It is hardly
believable that conflict on the basis of group identity is inevitable in
plural societies as people do not fight simply because they are ethnically
different. Their differences carry meaning that varies in different settings
and at different times, depending upon the context. For example, a citizen
of Dushanbe of Tajik nationality might identify himself or herself in 1990
as Gharmi, Kulyabi, Pamiri, Khojandi, Bukhori, Samarqandi, etc. It meant
to the person and others not much more than a place of origin until the
above changes sparked the tensions between the few and quickly spread on
all. As conflict escalated it slipped beyond a person's own control and
even without close ties to their ethnic origins, people had to behave according
to the rules of war, as, if otherwise, they would be doomed to prosecution.
Personal safety was the main objective in the decisions and adaptations
of people in such environment. Facing possibility of sanctions and rewards
(even in the future) linked to their ethnicity and concerning their well-being
directly people put together their strategies of survival trying to explain
their place and prospects in chaotic world.
The motives of individuals led to striking and unexpected collective results.
Schelling compares this process with the atomic process: "If there is enough
uranium so the half of the neutrons produce two others, the process is
self-sustaining and a "critical mass" of uranium is said to be present." (11) An ethnic conflict may serve an example of how people's behavior depends on how many others and how much they are behaving in a particular way -
"all critical mass model involve some activity that is self-sustaining
once the measure of that activity passes a certain minimum level." (12)
Conflict in Tajikistan seems to be an effect of the social change without
a sufficient force to maintain a certain "minimum level", i.e. government.
In this regard, "The commons", says Schelling, "has come to serve as a
paradigm for situations in which people so impinge on each other in pursuing
their own interests that collectively they might be better off if they
could be restrained, but no one gains individually by self-restraint."
The new ideologies with different methods of their presentation flooded
into the weakened state. They were based on principles of democracy, liberty
and market economy, and as practice of it in the West proves, it represents
a canon of wide usefulness. However, initiated as a democratic arrangement
in post-Socialist years, the new wave toward democratization and acceptance
of different ideological discourse was not based on some existing authority
to set up a system of its management, whereas obsolete system of management,
being under shock without guidance of central government, was not
able (not to mention confident) to emerge in such a role. Therefore, it
was far from applicable in Tajikistan at that time. Guidance of social
behavior by the state in such a setting, then, is rooted not less in the
field of administration than in the field of ideology. As the state was
absorbed by struggle between other social organizations - ethnic groups
and due to its total inability to protect people from sanctions and show
prospects of being awarded, it was not considered for individuals' strategies
for survival. Not rules of the state but those of chieftains and strongmen
were accepted, mainly for consideration of security, thus creating an environment
of conflict over which government had less and less control as tensions
rose. In this particular life situation the state could not compete with
other social organizations to meet mundane needs of population, i.e. security
and cohesion, not to mention material and spiritual.
With social control shifted from state leaders to strongmen, the latter
were resistant to state's effort of political mobilization and therefore
continued to provide survival strategies to their ethnic groups, villages
and neighbourhoods. Not only notion of "intervention" on behalf of the
state but the one of "state" itself were loosing any meaning. Since then
state, or what is left of it, has become an arena of accommodations or
"trade-offs" between and among state officials and strongmen in an effort
to enhance personal gains and somehow ensure minimum social stability to
maintain them. Such stability is based on territorially fragmented social
control by strongmen. As such, diverse and comprised of allied forces the
central government and its role to regulate affairs inside its boundaries
is limited by strongmen in maintaining basic prerogatives stated in the
country's constitution. The cycle started with the failure of state to
have people behave as state leaders want changed to political accommodation,
which affected coherence and character of the state itself and returned
to the starting point - inability of state to reach the level of individuals.
The result is more depressing, as in the meantime, there was large outflow
of human assets of the state, potential productive force of the country
- professionals and intelligentsia; the educational institutions degradated,
economic activity sharply decreased and crime increased. At the same time,
limiting the state's authority by something resembling patrimonial regimes
resulted in internal corrosion of the government with all the following
consequences - corruption, appointments to government positions on the
basis of ethnicity and personal loyalty, use of kinship ties in allocating
scarce public resources, using official position to provide opportunities
for individual gain, rearranging key positions in strategically important
agencies (Ministry of Security, Ministry of Interior, Central Bank, etc.)
to strengthen one's or group's position in the struggle for power.
Claims of the state to be the only organization to rule and, consequently,
to link the country's affairs within its territory to its development across
time, seem groundless, at least up to now. Such difference between what
state propagates and the real state of things make people less confident
in state and reluctant to support it. Reconciliation efforts did not solve
the issue of fragmented social control in Tajikistan, especially on local
level. Large areas of the countryside outside Dushanbe, the capital of
Tajikistan are under control of local warlords who have unknown number
of troops and have ignored the demands of peace agreement. On the other
side, power infrastructures - Ministry of Security, Ministry of Interior,
Presidential Guards are being under major influence of strongmen of another
ethnic group loyal to the present state leader but pursuing their own intentions,
centered on perseverance of their strength for the sake of their well-being.
State leaders are undoubtedly aware of world norms of what state should
do, but an attempt to do so can spark the conflict anew between these forces
comprised of warriors, a new class of fighters emerged during the civil
war, who do not play by the state's rules, do not respect treaties, and
do not obey orders they do not like. With no marketable skills, experience
only in fighting, loyal only to warlords, having no interest in peace as
it means the end of good times for them, they create problems when without
war. "Paramilitary warriors", Ralph Peters describes them, "-thugs whose
talent for violence blossoms in civil war - defy legitimate governments
and increasingly end up leading governments they have overturned. This
is a new age of warlords, from Somalia to Myanmar/Burma, from Afghanistan
to Yugoslavia. In Georgia an ex-convict has become a kingmaker, and in
Azerbaijan a warlord who marched on the capitol with a handful of wheezing
armored vehicles became prime minister. In Chechnya, on the northern slopes
of Caucasus, a renegade general carved out the world's first state run
entirely by gangsters - not the figurative gangsters of high Stalinism,
but genuine black marketeers, murderers, drug dealers.." (13)
Even intention (not to mention action) of repression of these forces on
behalf of the state may be interpreted as repression of democratic opposition
in terms of expression of political view, or their demand of "fare share"
in participation in the country's affairs. This is where strongmen and
their gangs use ethnic motives to escalate tensions which, judging by the
course of the civil war, proved effective in enhancing their control over
population in their battle with each other and the state. Prevention of
this "chain reaction" that for the second time may lead to disappearance
of the nation is on top of the agenda of the coalition government, which
realizes its threat to destroy the national regime of survival. How it
will deal with this issue of state administration is of utmost importance.
In this context, the principle of popular sovereignty "to perfect the state
and to realize the opportunities presented by accumulation of power" (Hume
1981, 20) (14) needs careful handling, as power is not accumulated by
the state, and even if we assume so, the accommodation of the strongmen's
will driven by anything but "sovereignty" would threaten opportunities
to "realize opportunities" which behind all are critical to realize.
The action on behalf of government to restore the role of state for the
sake of the country and its people should be taking place with the consideration
of present conditions or, using words of the Dolbeares, "the process by
which change is to be thought is not confronted by the scope of change;
it depends also on the ideology's world view definition of present circumstances
and power distribution within society." (Dolbeare & Dolbeare, 1976:7) ( 15)
Judging by the changes in the government and forces that shape its internal
and external activity, the ideology that has substantial impact on state-building
is the one of strongmen. Their cognitive grasp of surrounding world - values,
beliefs, and, most importantly, methods for realizing of changing it in
present situation through their pursuit of a "good life", does not
offer any alternative to nation-state and are, therefore, conceptually
weak. This ideology presents a threat to national polity and is fundamentally
against accepted models of governing people in the present world. In this
context, the role of state as, primarily, the arena for struggle and compromise
between political actors may be less important then the role of state as,
primarily, penetrator in and regulator of human affairs through mobilization
of their support across ethnic lines. Political path to lead to realization
of the role and responsibility of state to its population, accepted to
be an evolutional way to "good life", proved to be painful and in case
of Tajikistan, threatening the very existence of the nation. These have
been difficult years of crisis for people of Tajikistan. Insecurity, difficulty
of everyday routine, selecting survival strategies to deal with and adjust
to strongmen's "dead-end" ideology and shifted values, all this makes it
the right time for a new strategy that only government can offer to turn
decline into progress, or ideology of "least ideological government". It
is this discourse that might be leading in state building and could govern
political, economic, social relations within itself and boundaries of the
state.
Joel Migdal says, "Although there will always be important differences
among actors in the state concerning the state's real interests, strong
states can emerge only when the shared notion that there should be an autonomous
set of state interests exists and when bureaucrats believe those interests
coincide with their own. A society, such as Lebanon, where primary loyalties
are still with religious sects ethnic groups, regional organizations, and
the like, has difficulty in producing independent cadres for the state." (16) He adds that a strong state is not likely to emerge without "severe social dislocations and additional conductive conditions".(17 ) This being true, standardized prescription to developing countries intended to help
those countries in their struggle towards "sustainable human development"
through political compromise, decentralization, etc. not only may not achieve
its goals but may delay the process. The socio-economic indicators measuring
level of living in India with her traditional division on caste, capitalist
system of production, multi-party politics do not substantially differ
from those 50 years ago, before independence.
It seems to me, that Said Abdullo Nuri, the Chairman of Reconciliation
Committee and the Head of the Islamic Revival Party, who said that the
war in Tajikistan was "imported from outside" and "involved those who wanted
democracy and freedom and those who wanted totalitarianism and bureaucracy"
and added that those who favoured totalitarianism had "misused the religious
and nationalist feelings of the people", has used notions of ideology in
meaning quite controversial to circumstances of the country just to express
his political view which may leave a reader without insight on real developments
in this amalgam of words. (19) In times when reconciliation is taking
place, at least at the top, the issue, as it seems to me, is how to deal
with ideologies evolved from the pursuit of "good life" by strongmen that
put the state in distance from the state, regardless of how it may be interpreted
- administration of politics, bureaucracy, or even totalitarism if it suppresses
such an ideology by means that state may employ in its pursuit to build
a civil society.
Political views or acceptance of main ideologies, that Mr. Nuri mentions,
by the few (representatives of Dushanbe intelligentsia, top religious clergy,
agonizing Communist leadership) might well be the impulse of the social
change, but, as we saw, the change was destined to happen due to completely
different motives that originated in minds of many Tajiks regardless of
their nonsubstantial differences. Waldo, talking about the relationship of administration and politics, states, that when dealing with "..genesis, organization, and exercise of.. political power and authority" ...."we can neither live with or without the distinction,
realistically separate the two nor find an agreed, proper joining"(20)
Such social foundation which I tried to throw light upon may redirect attention to another possible alternative to the beginning of state building as such social foundation proved insolvency of seizure of a political discourse that would establish particular economic and social relations, whether it is communism/totalitarism or capitalism/democracy
and brought to confusion of population and decline in stateness. According
to Marx, "It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions
of production to the direct producers... reveals the hidden basis of the
entire social structure, and with the political form of the relation of
sovereignty and dependence.. the corresponding specific form of the state."
(Karl Marx, Capital, 111-772). (21) Paraphrasing Marx in terms of the
main subject of this paper would look as "it is always the direct relationship
of the owners of guns to those who do not own them reveals ... the hidden
basis of the entire social structure and with patrimonial form of the relation
of sovereignty and dependence.. the corresponding specific form of the
state."
Institutionalization of this relationship through gradual steps of political
accommodation, as the only explanation of the possible answers to problems
in Tajikistan would permit range of economic, political, and social behavior
of strongmen and limit it to the rest. Thus, if state participates in the
creation of "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1991) (22) as they are comprehended by these strongmen, the system of political and administrative organization that makes possible the formation of "communities of aspirations and memories" (de Visscher 105. p-6) (23) would fall astray of the belief in human being's ability to control their history.
Weber's interpretation of social change and order as tension between charismatic
and traditional forces further implies that social change results from
inability of social institutions to respond to new situations and demands. ( 24) The new demands as a result of political struggle and its peculiar characteristics
in Tajikistan, if responded through accommodation, would integrate the
value patterns of "warrior'' culture in the concrete legitimate structure
of administrative state. Making a parallel with the "relational power"
described as "the capability of actors to secure outcomes where the realization
of these outcomes depends upon doings of others" (Cohen, 1989, 150) (25) and as "the doings of others" are intended to be "organized and structured in accordance with objectives of the government that controls it"( 26) the state with "warrior ideology" would have no intention to introduce changes in patterns of human behavior, thus diminishing the role of state and its administrative power as "coordination and control over the timing and spacing of human activities" (Cohen, 1989, 158). (27) Accepting means of accommodation in providing political stability, therefore, threatens explanation of the social situation on a national level and meaningful action to improve it.
As the Soviet era was a unique historical precedent, state building in
its aftermath may not have a valid example for comparison in history of
human organization into state in contemporary civilization. Democratization
and state building through political struggle, as guidance in state-building
popularly accepted in most developed countries, might not apply in the
context of a post-Soviet Tajikistan without careful consideration of state
of the state and its capabilities to be an arena for political activism.
Evolution of state in case of Tajikistan may employ still unevaporated
belief of population in state as a main instrument for achieving the good
life. The success of it, however, greatly depends on administration of
the state affairs that would bring meaning to such a belief with all the
adjustments in it after considerable experience of dealing with ideologies
and humans. Government institutions are not yet totally abandoned by professionals,
financial credits (though mostly conditional) are coming from well-to-do
countries concerned with situation in the confused "orphan" country standing
at crossroads of its future. The idea that we are, in the expression of
Graham Wallace, "biologically parasitic on our Social Heritage" (28) and we need governing class, "the group dedicated to the preservation, exercise, and extension of this social heritage" for the sake of civilization as we have known it" is in the air, or at least I hope so.
Part II
"We, the people of Tajikistan, as an inseparable
part of the world community; seeing ourselvesresponsible and duty bound
to past, present, and future generations; wishing to ensure the sovereignty,
development, and perfection of our state; recognizing the rights and freedoms
of the individual as sacred; affirming the equality of rights and friendship
of all nationalities and peoples of Tajikistan; seeking to built a just
society; adopt and declare as valid this constitution." (Preamble)
Chapter One: Fundamentals of the Constitutional Structure
Article 1. The Republic of Tajikistan is a sovereign, democratic, law-governed,
secular, and unitary state. Tajikistan is a social state; its policy is
aimed at providing relevant living conditions for everybody. The names
Republic of Tajikistan and Tajikistan are of equal validity.
(Constitution of Tajikistan adopted by the government of Tajikistan on
November 6, 1994)
As James Katarobo puts it, first, government is a thought-after prize of
social conflict and breaks down under economic stress, war-like conditions,
uncertainty and distrust. But while the processes of government are disrupted,
it is these same government institutions which can be reoriented to establish
a basis for reconciliation, stability and renewal of social and economic
life. (29) Fragmented distribution of power and conflict environment greatly influenced by "warrior" ideology of small armed groups, make such a basis
difficult to achieve and more importantly to sustain. Understanding of
the sources to resistance to the design of the state - its constitution
and of reasons that make state leaders unable or unwilling to overcome
such resistance is a basis for reistitutionalization of social compliance
and meaningful and productive "reproduction of human activity" across ethnic
lines. Defeat of the counter culture of "warriors" is possible only through
mobilization of social control by the state.
As population, due to the processes described, is divided ethnically, territorially,
etc. and overwhelmingly passive, peculiar political struggle of strongmen
pursuing their own motives is leading to deepening the social crisis and
state's loss of control over its affairs. Such accommodations are believed
impossible to overcome without suffering unacceptable costs in terms of
stability. While it is necessary to avoid destabilization and upsurge
of armed conflict, which would threaten existence of the nation, state's
being arena of political activity in such situation contradicts to the
notion of governance.
Governance is a concept associated with the legitimate exercise of authority
to manage a country's affairs in the interests of the people with the traditional
theme of sound public management. The establishment of administrative machinery
for governmental operations would lead not only to delivery of needed services
but also to the rebirth of confidence in national administrative process.
Commitment to individual, family and community development would reinforce
the central role of government administration to facilitate sustainable
development and to stimulate economic development. Consequently, a base
would be built for citizen participation and state would be capable to
manage and prevent conflict, if such occurs, through political means.
It is impossible to escape strong leadership as a necessary condition to
reverse decline. Leader must know where society should be in 20-30 years,
they must know when and how to move in pursuit of their vision, must be
competent, pragmatic, must carefully select bureaucrats who can offer strategies
of administration based on principles of the state and its leaders. Leader
has to take advantage of the conditions to concentrate social control.
When a common strategy of survival tends to be linked to informal local
organizations and based on customary intrinsic rules it takes vision, courage
and skills to mobilize population's attention to promotion of harmony,
solidarity and conflict resolution, reduction of corruption. It should
be mentioned that singular pursuit of enlarging and protecting individual
creeds and freedoms, evident in western societies, is not well suited to
the country's context. Taking into consideration these factors of historical
heritage, leader should construct the best model of governance. Among principle
guidelines in this endeavor is the belief that exercise of power should
be guided by values and ethics. Politics, then, should be an exercise of
principles. Politics, in the case of Tajikistan, mutated into accommodations
and persuasion by wide range of means including violence. It has been neither
the expression of state autonomy nor the dominance of a majority. Ethics
should govern all segments of society - families, communities, public administration,
and so on. To institutionalize these principles and good governance practices,
leader must lead by example. "Nothing gives a prince more prestige than
undertaking great enterprise and setting an example for his people", said
Nicholo Machiavelli in "Prince". History demonstrates number of examples.
Popular respect would be the leader's most valuable asset. At the same
time, it is not arguable that economic base is a determinant for a strong
state and words of Jim Morgan, chairman and CEO of Applied Materials (Silicon
Valley) deserve mentioning: "From my experience managing turnarounds and
developing businesses, I have found three keys to success: recognizing
opportunities, building consensus to capitalize on those opportunities,
and building momentum." (30) Leadership should encourage restoration of spirit of enterprise as it will lead to restoration of spirit of community.
One of the views on history is as a social interpretation of a community's
past and as a reference for anticipating the future. Administrative state,
according to this view, an active participant in the management of the
tensions between social experience and social expectation. (31)
It seems to me, that the civil war was not long-term social expectation, and as an experience should not be a determinant to a broader social expectation, and the point of view of warring groups prove just the opposite. In order to create social order and continuity, says Baltonado, (32) one of the most important functions of the state is to synchronize these dimensions of history.
A group of people to realize this historical mission would be bureaucrats,
skillful enough to implement strategic changes, society's expectations
of which, would help the state to regain social control and conquer the
intrinsic mode of human organization for the very own sake of these organizations.
Bureaucrats should be independent of social control of the other state
organizations - clans, ethnic groups, etc., therefore, they must identify
their ultimate interests with those of the state. It is extremely difficult
to produce independent cadres for the state, but it must become a priority
issue for state leadership, as it would not only affect implementation
and supervision of development programs by competent personnel but also
gain confidence of people in state. Principles of leader would be linked
to broad administration of programs and policies in which population directly
or indirectly would participate willingly and astride. Here again Webers'
"manifested will of the ruler is meant to influence the conduct of the
ruled and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to
a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content
of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake" (33)
These motivated people of local nationality representing bureaucracy should
be able to manipulate and should be competent and possess organizational
skills. They should be ideologically sophisticated statesmen who could
understand and explain broad concepts as well as have clear loyalty to
the motivation of population giving enough emphasis to material drive recognizing
its strength. They notion of governance in the interest of people. In this
context of material incentives that the state should promote, the notion
of civic entrepreneurs deserves attention. (34) Civic entrepreneurs,
the authors say, take their regional economy - its opportunities and needs
- as a starting point and help communities make positive choices about
their future, building the relationships and specialized resources for
success. They view it as being in their best interests and those of their
state to work toward a "long-term positive interconnectedness between business
vitality, schools and universities, physical infrastructure, natural environment,
and tax base." (35)So, the key to restoring the state seems to
be through attraction to the small segments of population that function
again.
In the process of society development, the strongest development tools,
according to James Katarobo, are those that utilize multi-system approach
to capture and make sense of complexity. In each sector - for example,
education, health, employment, production - and for each level - national,
intermediate and local - there are many systems and subsystems which all
lead to purposeful results linked to a development of vision. When improvements
in these various systems are linked strategically, the systems are mutually
supportive and most productive. (36) The foundation for such a system
was built during the Soviet time; i.e. centralized infrastructure of sectors
with division on regional, local and sub-local branches and their units.
However, the war has destroyed this network and it seems enormously difficult
to restore its operational capacity especially with the lack of professionals
in rural areas.
In the widest sense governance vision represents the future to the present,
i.e. it includes a long-term, strategic approach to social and economic
development within a framework of social integration. The major role of
governance is the linkage between a society-wide vision and citizen action.
Political problems in Tajikistan stand on the way to sound governance and
radically contradict to its postulates. Inability and reluctance to expedite
erosion of special interest power - groups of warriors - on behalf of state
leadership and continuous accommodation of their will affects government
coherence and population's confidence in it as the protecting and permitting
a civilized life organization have been decreasing. It results in increasing
distance between the state and society and at the same time increasing
social control by chieftains, warlords, etc. thus limiting vision and future
development prospects for the constructive forces of society. Regaining
trust of society by the state is being delayed and becoming not only physical,
economic, social, but also psychological process. State itself cannot
be democratic, it should insure democratic process for pursuing goals by
other social organizations. But it is the only one to set rules of the
game. "The perception of the particular takes priority in the sense that
a good rule is a good summary of wise particular choices, and not a court
of last resort" (Aristotle). General sensitiveness to democratic process
in nation-building should not distract from awareness of particular situation,
which threatens state's authority to manage a country's affairs in the
interest of the people. "Wise particular choices" are what the people of
Tajikistan still hope for and still expect from their state.
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