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 The Tajikistan Update 
State Administration in Tajikistan: Understanding Reality
Farrukh Salihov
May 1998

*Farrukh Salihov is from Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
Currently he is studying Public Administration at Rutgers University.

Contact Information:
Farrukh Salihov
Newark, NJ: 701 Hill Hall, 360 M-L King Bulevard
Newark, NJ 07102


(Note: This page was altered on February 14, 2000)

Objective: The paper was intended to address the issue of building a civil state in Tajikistan and to serve as an analysis of particular environment for this mainly administrative, as it is contemplated here, endeavor. It may be considered as a deliberation on a policy problem with regards to political, social, ethnological factors necessary to consider for sound administration of the state in the interest of people. In this view it may serve a basis for future research - search for concrete policies intended for restoration of the basic role and place of state - its rightness in guiding people's behavior across time. 

I. Introduction 

II. Part I 

                         A.  Soviet ideological transformation and its administrative
                         B.   Ethnicity, ideology, society and its control in Tajikistan 
                         C.   Politics' mutation and state administration 

III. Part II 

                     A.   Variables in state-building: leadership and bureaucracy 
                         B.   Broad guideline to regain confidence of people by the
                                state governance 




Part I

Part II



Map of Tajikistan    

The state's role in making and authorizing rules about public affairs and routine of private life may be taken for granted in the West, but not so in societies with relatively new states, particularly in Tajikistan after its rapid transformation from a Soviet Republic and gaining independence in 1991, which is characterized by major struggles in the society. These major struggles are over who has the right and ability to make the rules that guide people's social behavior. These struggles are beyond the formal roles of any existing political institutions, they are over whether the state will be able to displace or restrain other organizations - gangs, clans, client-patron dyads, kinsmen, etc. - which make rules against the wishes and goals of the state. 

Fair deal of literature is devoted to the description of the social environment in post-Soviet Tajikistan with the focus on it as a primary cause of cataclysm - the civil war and ethnic conflict. Distressing agony of the conflict might be quite misleading if the state continues to demonstrate discouraging performance and consequently is totally absorbed by the social environment. Political process which involves accommodation of social organizations emerged during this period - gangs, clans, kinsmen, involves balancing of a fragile peace in a war-ravaged country and at he same time threatens basic principles of governance. This paper is a result of an attempt to understand these developments and analyze the foundation for policy formulation for the state in such a complex situation. 
The paper consists of three parts. The first part, through the framework of the development of conflict, is the description of the social change and particular historical, cultural, political, economic, etc. factors which have shaped the society and are related to the cause and result of Tajikistan's civil war.  It is also an attempt to place the country on the diagram of the development of conflict and show how dramatic any shift at this stage of the development may be. The second part through some scholastic materials directly and indirectly related to state administration deals with explanation of the mechanisms of relationship between social organizations and state in circumstances of Tajikistan. The third part is an "open end" conclusion on the role and place of state in human relationships in particular circumstances of Tajikistan and broad path with necessary  factors for  restoration of governance. 

Part I 

Looking at it as the development in a broader field of events, Tajikistan may be considered a remote land of indigenous people affected most by the collapse of the socialist ideology. Sharp decline in some principal aspects of social life, which are utilized to measure human progress in contemporary world, was the gravest of all other former socialist countries. Obviously, such achievements were brought about by regulation of social behaviour by state through government institutions. 
According to Gerald M. Easter, a state can be identified as weak or strong by its capacities to perform territorial administration, military power, revenue extraction, and socioeconomic operations. (1) Needless to say, that judging by these criteria the Soviet Union was a strong state, which explains the inability of political scientists to have predicted its dramatically rapid break-down. 
Frank Fischer states, that the solutions to the deeply entrenched problems often raise questions more about the configuration of social and political values underlying contemporary societies. (2) This implies, that in practice, i.e., due to certain factors of social life that impacted perception of the Soviets, ideology of capitalism, which proved to be a progressive force of the century, penetrated weak spots of the communist ideology, led to its shift, and subsequently to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Fischer defines ideologies as integrated systems of beliefs, values, and methods for realizing of changing the world. (3) With regards to beliefs, he says that: "the basic question concerns a person's or group's cognitive grasp of the surrounding world: what is the nature of the social order? Did the social system in a society evolve because of inherent differences in the talents or capabilities of men, or it is the result of some other factors?" He further continues developing this thought saying that: "Ideologies help people identify the larger significance they can find in the empirical facts -- for example, what sorts of causal relationships the facts have to one another, or how facts must be supplemented and supported by normative assumptions. In short, how they all "add up" to a meaningful interpretation of reality..." (4) The main principle of socialism or normative assumption "from everybody according to his labor to everybody according to his capabilities" as supposed to be well -constructed system of rewarding by the government -- the exclusive entrepreneur. Such exclusive role limited the capability of the government to motivate and supervise production process in such a huge country, i.e. in every factory, farm, and office. Thus, it entailed in nation-wide decline of population's interest in personal contribution into production development. For the most part of the socialist ruling production was developed through coercive management of social relations by the state. As soon as Gorbachyov loosened the "iron fist" and initiated actions directed at democratizing society, long dissatisfaction with the principle of human relationships, enforced by witnessing the progress of capitalism, evolved into actions against socialist government, and consequently led to dissolution of the Soviet Union into fifteen independent states. 
As Fischer states, "people mix their own perceptions, formal learning and experiences of reality with interpretation of their own preferences and needs. ... In order to advance their own social and material gain, people to a greater or lesser extent, rationalize their beliefs." (5) This puts ideology in periphery of human motivation to achieve something called "good life", Waldo's interpretation of which is "with much emphasis upon the material, but not neglectful of the aesthetic and cultural, or hostile to the spiritual" (6) Although material, no doubt, is a dominating principle, preferences for it, as well as aesthetic, cultural, spiritual, etc. vary among individuals, and construct a variation of their combination in the human mind according to individual's perception of universe and his/her place in it. Then, values that construct ideology can be understood through acceptance of concrete human relationships as a way to achieve desirable socioeconomic status that indicate well-being of the group/s of people. According to these combinations of what constitutes "good life", not only its final contours but also ways to achieve it are multiple, explaining variations in political structure of states and their administration in different countries. In this context, socialism was a failed attempt to achieve "good life". Its failure lies not so much in the main discourse that is criticized so fiercely, as it would not spread to half of the world if it were not carrying some meaning linking humans with good life but with administration of rules of human behaviour that its interpretation prescribed. 
State control, argues Joel Migdal, "involves the successful subordination of people's own inclinations of social behaviour or behaviour sought by other social organizations in favour of the behaviour prescribed by state rules." (7) At the same time, it seems worth to me to cite Tilly's statement brought to attention by Baltonado that "the major forms of political participation which Westerners now complacently refer to as "modern" are for the most part unintended outcome of the efforts of European statemakers to build armies, keep taxes coming in, form effective coalitions against their rivals, hold their nominal subordinates and allies in line, and fend off the threat of rebellion on the part of ordinary people".(Tilly, 1975) (8)Explanation of the collapse of the USSR may lie not as much in so blamed ideology as in the lack of state's efforts, abilities, or intentions to manage social compliance and avoid "rebellion on part of ordinary people" through meaningful adjustment of relationship of production to aspirations of people at large, which would be the key to maintain social order. It goes without saying, that it was not the situation in which ideology influenced the behaviour of people in such a way that their conduct occurs as if they have made content of the ideology the "rule of their conduct for its very own sake" -- relation of domination introduced by Weber (1968). (9) Instead, it seems to me, that content of ideology was not linked to individual motivation by "flexible" administration. Command of the rule imposed on population though coercive means was just another type of management that was not open for adjustments or self-correction and not tolerant to any expression of ideas deviating from the "regime of truth". Thus, the relation of domination or compliance (necessary to deal with social conflict and struggle for power which are viewed by Weber as "irradicable elements of the human conditions") (10) was not reached as a result of persuasion and acceptance of the main discourse as reflection of people's aspirations for good life, but through compulsion and maintenance of supply of public goods that distanced a possibility of a revolt. Administration through such means prevented social conflict as well as emergence and concentration of support for struggle for power by another ideology. And as soon as changes were brought about by difference in management towards democratization of the country's affairs which coincided with decline in supply of goods and services by state-entrepreneur and with some influx of components of another ideology (which had been better managed to link it with people's aspirations) through facts of achievements towards "good life", i.e. boom in economic and success in social development in most of the Western Europe, Japan, USA, the social change was ready to come. 
With such a change and wave of social indignation, state collapsed and pyramidal structure of the centralized Soviet government mutated into new governments of the former Soviet Union republics which encountered the same problem -- gaining social control -- ability to have people follow the state's rules. In addition to the defeat of ideology, the failure of the normative administrative image -- centers are active and creative while peripheries are passive and controllable that might be viewed in the approach of central Soviet government through centralized administration and control maintained for decades, resulted in total inability of the government of Tajikistan to keep situation under control on a local, republican, level. This may explain presence of Russian military in Tajikistan and Russian economic assistance since the break-up. Failure of one discourse caused emergence of others, and such political activism resulted in new for Tajikistan phenomena - Democratic Party, Islamic Revival Party, Rastokhez - Party of Cultural Renaissance, which sought support of population in their pursuit of power. However, due to unsophistication of mostly rural population and its division into large ethnic groups, the leaders of political parties that came to light from the worldly layer of the country's capital's population were not seen as carriers of a political doctrine but as representatives of a particular ethnic group. Thus, support of one political party by an ethnic group caused counter-move by another ethnic group which, in a way, was a strategy of survival for an ethnic group in a state weakened economically with the abrupt cut from the unified infrastructure, and ideologically with the dissolution of socialist views. Economic and political fractionalization resulted in social fractionalization, in the form of ethnic groups, as it seemed natural to cling to untouched even by Socialist rule ethnic roots which one could count on for protection and presentation of one's interests. Thus, a new regime of truth, which employed primordial moods of an ethnic group facing a possibility of threat to its well-being from another one, emerged. In this situation failure of the state to adjust to a new situation, find ways to mobilize and motivate population was a main element in an offspring of the ethnic conflict. Weakness of the state in territorial administration, military, socioeconomic operations, etc. makes effects of the failure of state to prevent social revolt dependent on its degree: in case of Tajikistan, the results were devastating. 
The differences in ethnicity (of the same nationality) in view of particular cultural and historic factors were not as substantial and potentially explosive as in any other multi-ethnic country to cause a civil war. It is hardly believable that conflict on the basis of group identity is inevitable in plural societies as people do not fight simply because they are ethnically different. Their differences carry meaning that varies in different settings and at different times, depending upon the context. For example, a citizen of Dushanbe of Tajik nationality might identify himself or herself in 1990 as Gharmi, Kulyabi, Pamiri, Khojandi, Bukhori, Samarqandi, etc. It meant to the person and others not much more than a place of origin until the above changes sparked the tensions between the few and quickly spread on all. As conflict escalated it slipped beyond a person's own control and even without close ties to their ethnic origins, people had to behave according to the rules of war, as, if otherwise, they would be doomed to prosecution. Personal safety was the main objective in the decisions and adaptations of people in such environment. Facing possibility of sanctions and rewards (even in the future) linked to their ethnicity and concerning their well-being directly people put together their strategies of survival trying to explain their place and prospects in chaotic world. 
The motives of individuals led to striking and unexpected collective results. Schelling compares this process with the atomic process: "If there is enough uranium so the half of the neutrons produce two others, the process is self-sustaining and a "critical mass" of uranium is said to be present." (11) An ethnic conflict may serve an example of how people's behavior depends on how many others and how much they are behaving in a particular way - "all critical mass model involve some activity that is self-sustaining once the measure of that activity passes a certain minimum level." (12) Conflict in Tajikistan seems to be an effect of the social change without a sufficient force to maintain a certain "minimum level", i.e. government. In this regard, "The commons", says Schelling, "has come to serve as a paradigm for situations in which people so impinge on each other in pursuing their own interests that collectively they might be better off if they could be restrained, but no one gains individually by self-restraint." 
The new ideologies with different methods of their presentation flooded into the weakened state. They were based on principles of democracy, liberty and market economy, and as practice of it in the West proves, it represents a canon of wide usefulness. However, initiated as a democratic arrangement in post-Socialist years, the new wave toward democratization and acceptance of different ideological discourse was not based on some existing authority to set up a system of its management, whereas obsolete system of management, being under shock without guidance of  central government, was not able (not to mention confident) to emerge in such a role. Therefore, it was far from applicable in Tajikistan at that time. Guidance of social behavior by the state in such a setting, then, is rooted not less in the field of administration than in the field of ideology. As the state was absorbed by struggle between other social organizations - ethnic groups and due to its total inability to protect people from sanctions and show prospects of being awarded, it was not considered for individuals' strategies for survival. Not rules of the state but those of chieftains and strongmen were accepted, mainly for consideration of security, thus creating an environment of conflict over which government had less and less control as tensions rose. In this particular life situation the state could not compete with other social organizations to meet mundane needs of population, i.e. security and cohesion, not to mention material and spiritual. 
With social control shifted from state leaders to strongmen, the latter were resistant to state's effort of political mobilization and therefore continued to provide survival strategies to their ethnic groups, villages and neighbourhoods. Not only notion of "intervention" on behalf of the state but the one of "state" itself were loosing any meaning. Since then state, or what is left of it, has become an arena of accommodations or "trade-offs" between and among state officials and strongmen in an effort to enhance personal gains and somehow ensure minimum social stability to maintain them. Such stability is based on territorially fragmented social control by strongmen. As such, diverse and comprised of allied forces the central government and its role to regulate affairs inside its boundaries is limited by strongmen in maintaining basic prerogatives stated in the country's constitution. The cycle started with the failure of state to have people behave as state leaders want changed to political accommodation, which affected coherence and character of the state itself and returned to the starting point - inability of state to reach the level of individuals. The result is more depressing, as in the meantime, there was large outflow of human assets of the state, potential productive force of the country - professionals and intelligentsia; the educational institutions degradated, economic activity sharply decreased and crime increased. At the same time, limiting the state's authority by something resembling patrimonial regimes resulted in internal corrosion of the government with all the following consequences - corruption, appointments to government positions on the basis of ethnicity and personal loyalty, use of kinship ties in allocating scarce public resources, using official position to provide opportunities for individual gain, rearranging key positions in strategically important agencies (Ministry of Security, Ministry of Interior, Central Bank, etc.) to strengthen one's or group's position in the struggle for power. 
Claims of the state to be the only organization to rule and, consequently, to link the country's affairs within its territory to its development across time, seem groundless, at least up to now. Such difference between what state propagates and the real state of things make people less confident in state and reluctant to support it. Reconciliation efforts did not solve the issue of fragmented social control in Tajikistan, especially on local level. Large areas of the countryside outside Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan are under control of local warlords who have unknown number of troops and have ignored the demands of peace agreement. On the other side, power infrastructures - Ministry of Security, Ministry of Interior, Presidential Guards are being under major influence of strongmen of another ethnic group loyal to the present state leader but pursuing their own intentions, centered on perseverance of their strength for the sake of their well-being. 
State leaders are undoubtedly aware of world norms of what state should do, but an attempt to do so can spark the conflict anew between these forces comprised of warriors, a new class of fighters emerged during the civil war, who do not play by the state's rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders they do not like. With no marketable skills, experience only in fighting, loyal only to warlords, having no interest in peace as it means the end of good times for them, they create problems when without war. "Paramilitary warriors", Ralph Peters describes them, "-thugs whose talent for violence blossoms in civil war - defy legitimate governments and increasingly end up leading governments they have overturned. This is a new age of warlords, from Somalia to Myanmar/Burma, from Afghanistan to Yugoslavia. In Georgia an ex-convict has become a kingmaker, and in Azerbaijan a warlord who marched on the capitol with a handful of wheezing armored vehicles became prime minister. In Chechnya, on the northern slopes of Caucasus, a renegade general carved out the world's first state run entirely by gangsters - not the figurative gangsters of high Stalinism, but genuine black marketeers, murderers, drug dealers.." (13)
Even intention (not to mention action) of repression of these forces on behalf of the state may be interpreted as repression of democratic opposition in terms of expression of political view, or their demand of "fare share" in participation in the country's affairs. This is where strongmen and their gangs use ethnic motives to escalate tensions which, judging by the course of the civil war, proved effective in enhancing their control over population in their battle with each other and the state. Prevention of this "chain reaction" that for the second time may lead to disappearance of the nation is on top of the agenda of the coalition government, which realizes its threat to destroy the national regime of survival. How it will deal with this issue of state administration is of utmost importance. 
In this context, the principle of popular sovereignty "to perfect the state and to realize the opportunities presented by accumulation of power" (Hume 1981, 20) (14) needs careful handling, as power is not accumulated by the state, and even if we assume so, the accommodation of the strongmen's will driven by anything but "sovereignty" would threaten opportunities to "realize opportunities" which behind all are critical to realize. 
The action on behalf of government to restore the role of state for the sake of the country and its people should be taking place with the consideration of present conditions or, using words of the Dolbeares, "the process by which change is to be thought is not confronted by the scope of change; it depends also on the ideology's world view definition of present circumstances and power distribution within society." (Dolbeare & Dolbeare, 1976:7) ( 15)
Judging by the changes in the government and forces that shape its internal and external activity, the ideology that has substantial impact on state-building is the one of strongmen. Their cognitive grasp of surrounding world - values, beliefs, and, most importantly, methods for realizing of changing it in present situation through their pursuit of  a "good life", does not offer any alternative to nation-state and are, therefore, conceptually weak. This ideology presents a threat to national polity and is fundamentally against accepted models of governing people in the present world. In this context, the role of state as, primarily, the arena for struggle and compromise between political actors may be less important then the role of state as, primarily, penetrator in and regulator of human affairs through mobilization of their support across ethnic lines. Political path to lead to realization of the role and responsibility of state to its population, accepted to be an evolutional way to "good life", proved to be painful and in case of Tajikistan, threatening the very existence of the nation. These have been difficult years of crisis for people of Tajikistan. Insecurity, difficulty of everyday routine, selecting survival strategies to deal with and adjust to strongmen's "dead-end" ideology and shifted values, all this makes it the right time for a new strategy that only government can offer to turn decline into progress, or ideology of "least ideological government". It is this discourse that might be leading in state building and could govern political, economic, social relations within itself and boundaries of the state. 
Joel Migdal says, "Although there will always be important differences among actors in the state concerning the state's real interests, strong states can emerge only when the shared notion that there should be an autonomous set of state interests exists and when bureaucrats believe those interests coincide with their own. A society, such as Lebanon, where primary loyalties are still with religious sects ethnic groups, regional organizations, and the like, has difficulty in producing independent cadres for the state." (16) He adds that a strong state is not likely to emerge without "severe social dislocations and additional conductive conditions".(17 ) This being true, standardized  prescription to developing countries intended to help those countries in their struggle towards "sustainable human development" through political compromise, decentralization, etc. not only may not achieve its goals but may delay the process. The socio-economic indicators measuring level of living in India with her traditional division on caste, capitalist system of production, multi-party politics do not substantially differ from those  50 years ago, before independence. 
It seems to me, that Said Abdullo Nuri, the Chairman of Reconciliation Committee and the Head of the Islamic Revival Party, who said that the war in Tajikistan was "imported from outside" and "involved those who wanted democracy and freedom and those who wanted totalitarianism and bureaucracy" and added that those who favoured totalitarianism had "misused the religious and nationalist feelings of the people", has used notions of ideology in meaning quite controversial to circumstances of the country just to express his political view which may leave a reader without insight on real developments in this amalgam of words. (19) In times when reconciliation is taking place, at least at the top, the issue, as it seems to me, is how to deal with ideologies evolved from the pursuit of "good life" by strongmen that put the state in distance from the state, regardless of how it may be interpreted - administration of politics, bureaucracy, or even totalitarism if it suppresses such an ideology by means that state may employ in its pursuit to build a civil society. 
Political views or acceptance of main ideologies, that Mr. Nuri mentions, by the few (representatives of Dushanbe intelligentsia, top religious clergy, agonizing Communist leadership) might well be the impulse of the social change, but, as we saw, the change was destined to happen due to completely different motives that originated in minds of many Tajiks regardless of their nonsubstantial differences. Waldo, talking about the relationship of administration and politics, states, that when dealing with "..genesis, organization, and exercise of.. political power and authority" ...."we can neither live with or without the distinction, realistically separate the two nor find an agreed, proper joining"(20)
Such social foundation which I tried to throw light upon may redirect attention to another possible alternative to the beginning of state building as such social foundation proved insolvency of seizure of a political discourse that would establish particular economic and social relations, whether it is communism/totalitarism or capitalism/democracy and brought to confusion of population and decline in stateness. According to Marx, "It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers... reveals the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence.. the corresponding specific form of the state." (Karl Marx, Capital, 111-772). (21) Paraphrasing Marx in terms of the main subject of this paper would look as "it is always the direct relationship of the owners of guns to those who do not own them reveals ... the hidden basis of the entire social structure and with patrimonial form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence.. the corresponding specific form of the state." 
Institutionalization of this relationship through gradual steps of political accommodation, as the only explanation of the possible answers to problems in Tajikistan would permit range of economic, political, and social behavior of strongmen and limit it to the rest. Thus, if state participates in the creation of "imagined communities" (Anderson, 1991) (22) as they are comprehended by these strongmen, the system of political and administrative organization that makes possible the formation of "communities of aspirations and memories" (de Visscher 105. p-6) (23) would fall astray of the belief in human being's ability to control their history. 
Weber's interpretation of social change and order as tension between charismatic and traditional forces further implies that social change results from inability of social institutions to respond to new situations and demands. ( 24) The new demands as a result of political struggle and its peculiar characteristics in Tajikistan, if responded through accommodation, would integrate the value patterns of "warrior'' culture in the concrete legitimate structure of administrative state. Making a parallel with the "relational power" described as "the capability of actors to secure outcomes where the realization of these outcomes depends upon doings of others" (Cohen, 1989, 150) (25) and as "the doings of others" are intended to be "organized and structured in accordance with objectives of the government that controls it"( 26) the state with "warrior ideology" would have no intention to introduce changes in patterns of human behavior, thus diminishing the role of state and its administrative power as "coordination and control over the timing and spacing of human activities" (Cohen, 1989, 158). (27) Accepting means of accommodation in providing political stability, therefore, threatens explanation of the social situation on a national level and meaningful action to improve it. 
As the Soviet era was a unique historical precedent, state building in its aftermath may not have a valid example for comparison in history of human organization into state in contemporary civilization. Democratization and state building through political struggle, as guidance in state-building popularly accepted in most developed countries, might not apply in the context of a post-Soviet Tajikistan without careful consideration of state of the state and its capabilities to be an arena for political activism. Evolution of state in case of Tajikistan may employ still unevaporated belief of population in state as a main instrument for achieving the good life. The success of it, however, greatly depends on administration of  the state affairs that would bring meaning to such a belief with all the adjustments in it after considerable experience of dealing with ideologies and humans. Government institutions are not yet totally abandoned by professionals, financial credits (though mostly conditional) are coming from well-to-do countries concerned with situation in the confused "orphan" country standing at crossroads of its future. The idea that we are, in the expression of Graham Wallace, "biologically parasitic on our Social Heritage" (28) and we need governing class, "the group dedicated to the preservation, exercise, and extension of this social heritage" for the sake of civilization as we have known it" is in the air, or at least I hope so. 

Part II 

    "We, the people of Tajikistan, as an inseparable part of the world community; seeing ourselvesresponsible and duty bound to past, present, and future generations; wishing to ensure the sovereignty, development, and perfection of our state; recognizing the rights and freedoms of the individual as sacred; affirming the equality of rights and friendship of all nationalities and peoples of Tajikistan; seeking to built a just society; adopt and declare as valid this constitution." (Preamble)
   Chapter One: Fundamentals of the Constitutional Structure 

Article 1. The Republic of Tajikistan is a sovereign, democratic, law-governed, secular, and unitary state. Tajikistan is a social state; its policy is aimed at providing relevant living conditions for everybody. The names Republic of Tajikistan and Tajikistan are of equal validity. 
(Constitution of Tajikistan adopted by the government of Tajikistan on November 6, 1994) 
As James Katarobo puts it, first, government is a thought-after prize of social conflict and breaks down under economic stress, war-like conditions, uncertainty and distrust. But while the processes of government are disrupted, it is these same government institutions which can be reoriented to establish a basis for reconciliation, stability and renewal of social and economic life. (29) Fragmented distribution of power and conflict environment greatly influenced by "warrior" ideology of small armed groups, make such a basis difficult to achieve and more importantly to sustain. Understanding of the sources to resistance to the design of the state - its constitution and of reasons that make state leaders unable or unwilling to overcome such resistance is a basis for reistitutionalization of social compliance and meaningful and productive "reproduction of human activity" across ethnic lines. Defeat of the counter culture of "warriors" is possible only through mobilization of social control by the state. 
As population, due to the processes described, is divided ethnically, territorially, etc. and overwhelmingly passive, peculiar political struggle of strongmen pursuing their own motives is leading to deepening the social crisis and state's loss of control over its affairs. Such accommodations are believed impossible to overcome without suffering unacceptable costs in terms of stability.  While it is necessary to avoid destabilization and upsurge of armed conflict, which would threaten existence of the nation, state's being arena of political activity in such situation contradicts to the notion of governance. 
Governance is a concept associated with the legitimate exercise of authority to manage a country's affairs in the interests of the people with the traditional theme of sound public management. The establishment of administrative machinery for governmental operations would lead not only to delivery of needed services but also to the rebirth of confidence in national administrative process. Commitment to individual, family and community development would reinforce the central role of government administration to facilitate sustainable development and to stimulate economic development. Consequently, a base would be built for citizen participation and state would be capable to manage and prevent conflict, if such occurs, through political means. 
It is impossible to escape strong leadership as a necessary condition to reverse decline. Leader must know where society should be in 20-30 years, they must know when and how to move in pursuit of their vision, must be competent, pragmatic, must carefully select bureaucrats who can offer strategies of administration based on principles of the state and its leaders. Leader has to take advantage of the conditions to concentrate social control. When a common strategy of survival tends to be linked to informal local organizations and based on customary intrinsic rules it takes vision, courage and skills to mobilize population's attention to promotion of harmony, solidarity and conflict resolution, reduction of corruption. It should be mentioned that singular pursuit of enlarging and protecting individual creeds and freedoms, evident in western societies, is not well suited to the country's context. Taking into consideration these factors of historical heritage, leader should construct the best model of governance. Among principle guidelines in this endeavor is the belief that exercise of power should be guided by values and ethics. Politics, then, should be an exercise of principles. Politics, in the case of Tajikistan, mutated into accommodations and persuasion by wide range of means including violence. It has been neither the expression of state autonomy nor the dominance of a majority. Ethics should govern all segments of society - families, communities, public administration, and so on. To institutionalize these principles and good governance practices, leader must lead by example. "Nothing gives a prince more prestige than undertaking great enterprise and setting an example for his people", said Nicholo Machiavelli in "Prince". History demonstrates number of examples. Popular respect would be the leader's most valuable asset. At the same time, it is not arguable that economic base is a determinant for a strong state and words of Jim Morgan, chairman and CEO of Applied Materials (Silicon Valley) deserve mentioning: "From my experience managing turnarounds and developing businesses, I have found three keys to success: recognizing opportunities, building consensus to capitalize on those opportunities, and building momentum." (30) Leadership should encourage restoration of spirit of enterprise as it will lead to restoration of spirit of community. 
One of the views on history is as a social interpretation of a community's past and as a reference for anticipating the future. Administrative state, according to this view, an active participant in the management of the tensions between social experience and social expectation. (31) It seems to me, that the civil war was not long-term social expectation, and as an experience should not be a determinant to a broader social expectation, and the point of view of warring groups prove just the opposite. In order to create social order and continuity, says Baltonado, (32) one of the most important functions of the state is to synchronize these dimensions of history. 
A group of people to realize this historical mission  would be bureaucrats, skillful enough to implement strategic changes, society's expectations of which, would help the state to regain social control and conquer the intrinsic mode of human organization for the very own sake of these organizations. 
Bureaucrats should be independent of social control of the other state organizations - clans, ethnic groups, etc., therefore, they must identify their ultimate interests with those of the state. It is extremely difficult to produce independent cadres for the state, but it must become a priority issue for state leadership, as it would not only affect implementation and supervision of development programs by competent personnel but also gain confidence of people in state. Principles of leader would be linked to broad administration of programs and policies in which population directly or indirectly would participate willingly and astride. Here again Webers' "manifested will of the ruler is meant to influence the conduct of the ruled and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake" (33) These motivated people of local nationality representing bureaucracy should be able to manipulate and should be competent and possess organizational skills. They should be ideologically sophisticated statesmen who could understand and explain broad concepts as well as have clear loyalty to the motivation of population giving enough emphasis to material drive recognizing its strength. They notion of governance in the interest of people. In this context of material incentives that the state should promote, the notion of civic entrepreneurs deserves attention. (34) Civic entrepreneurs, the authors say, take their regional economy - its opportunities and needs - as a starting point and help communities make positive choices about their future, building the relationships and specialized resources for success. They view it as being in their best interests and those of their state to work toward a "long-term positive interconnectedness between business vitality, schools and universities, physical infrastructure, natural environment, and tax base." (35)So, the key to restoring the state seems to be through attraction to the small segments of population that function again. 
In the process of society development, the strongest development tools, according to James Katarobo, are those that utilize multi-system approach to capture and make sense of complexity. In each sector - for example, education, health, employment, production - and for each level - national, intermediate and local - there are many systems and subsystems which all lead to purposeful results linked to a development of vision. When improvements in these various systems are linked strategically, the systems are mutually supportive and most productive. (36) The foundation for such a system was built during the Soviet time; i.e. centralized infrastructure of sectors with division on regional, local and sub-local branches and their units. However, the war has destroyed this network and it seems enormously difficult to restore its operational capacity especially with the lack of professionals in rural areas. 
In the widest sense governance vision represents the future to the present, i.e. it includes a long-term, strategic approach to social and economic development within a framework of social integration. The major role of governance is the linkage between a society-wide vision and citizen action. Political problems in Tajikistan stand on the way to sound governance and radically contradict to its postulates. Inability and reluctance to expedite erosion of special interest power - groups of warriors - on behalf of state leadership and continuous accommodation of their will affects government coherence and population's confidence in it as the protecting and permitting a civilized life organization have been decreasing. It results in increasing distance between the state and society and at the same time increasing social control by chieftains, warlords, etc. thus limiting vision and future development prospects for the constructive forces of society. Regaining trust of society by the state is being delayed and becoming not only physical, economic, social, but also psychological process.  State itself cannot be democratic, it should insure democratic process for pursuing goals by other social organizations. But it is the only one to set rules of the game. "The perception of the particular takes priority in the sense that a good rule is a good summary of wise particular choices, and not a court of last resort" (Aristotle). General sensitiveness to democratic process in nation-building should not distract from awareness of particular situation, which threatens state's authority to manage a country's affairs in the interest of the people. "Wise particular choices" are what the people of Tajikistan still hope for and still expect from their state. 



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(1) BBC News, Wednesday, March 18, 1998 Published at 18:32 GMT 

(2) Gerald M. Easter, Personal Networks and Post- Revolutionary State Building: Soviet Russia Reexamined, World Politics 48.4, 1996, p.553). 

(3) Frank Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy, 1995 by Nelson Hall Inc., p.157 

(4) ibid., p.157 

(5) ibid., p.158 

(6) ibid., p.161 

(7) Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State, Second Edition, 1984, p. 94 

(8) Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, 1988, Princeton University Press, p. 22) 

(9) Baltonado, Andres Perez, The Study of Public Administration in Times of Global Interpretation: A Historical Rationale for a Theoretical Model, Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory. 7(4):615-638. 1997 Oct. 

(10) ibid. 

(11) ibid. 

(12) Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, W.W.Norton & Co. 1978, p. 94 

(13) ibid., p.95 

(14) Ralph Peters, The New Warrior Class, Parameters, 1994, p. 16 

(15) Baltonado, Andres Perez, The Study of Public Administration in Times of Global Interpretation: A Historical Rationale for a Theoretical Model, Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory. 7(4):615-638. 1997 Oct. 

(16) Frank Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy, 1995 by Nelson-Hall, p.160 

(17) Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 275 

(18) ibid., p. 277 

(19) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline Vol. 2, No. 78 Part 1, 23 April 1998 

(20) Dwight Waldo, Administrative State, 1984, p. 9 

(21) Bruno Rizzi, "Bureaucratization of the World. The USSR: Bureaucratic Collectivism" 1939 

(22) Baltonado, Andres Perez, The Study of Public Administration in Times of Global Interpretation: A Historical Rationale for a Theoretical Model, Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory. 7(4):615-638. 1997 Oct. 

(23) ibid. 

(24) ibid. 

(25) ibid. 

(26) ibid. 

(27) ibid. 

(28) Commencement Address presented by His Highness the Aga Khan at MIT's graduation exercises at Killian Court, May 27, 1994 

(29) James Katarobo, Creation and Maintenance of a Sound Governance Environment, Thirteenth Meeting of Experts, United Nations, New York, June 1997 

(30) Douglas Henton, John Melville, Kimberly Walesh, The Age of Civic Entrepreneur: Resorting Civil Society and Building Economic Community, National Civic Review, 86(2): 150, 1997 Summer 

(31) Baltonado, Andres Perez, The Study of Public Administration in Times of Global Interpretation: A Historical Rationale for a Theoretical Model, Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory. 7(4):615-638. 1997 Oct. 

(32) ibid. 

(33) ibid. 

(34) Douglas Henton, John Melville, Kimberly Walesh, The Age of Civic Entrepreneur: Resorting Civil Society and Building Economic Community, National Civic Review, 86(2): 150, 1997 Summer 

(35) ibid. 

(36) James Katarobo, Creation and Maintenance of a Sound Governance Environment, Thirteenth Meeting of Experts, United Nations, New York, June 1997 

*This article was posted  at the Tajikistan Update on September 27, 1998