August 2009
Many people today feel that God (or religion) and science are at war with one another. General sentiment is that religion is a faith that requires a denial of the facts. It is often also felt that science is continually proving religious beliefs false. This leads some to the conclusion that religious and scientific truths are diametrically opposed to each other, usually with the former being far less trustworthy and significant than the latter. This paper seeks to show that this is an incorrect and unfortunate misunderstanding.
Some people state one cannot know something unless one can prove it scientifically. They state things like God, spirituality, and ethics cannot be tested, are purely subjective, and the stuff of opinion. In fact, some go so far as to claim that the only true propositions are those of science. Others compromise and merely assert that science is the most important, valuable, and authoritative source of knowledge. Let us investigate these claims and this apparent contradiction between theology and science.
The first major problem in asserting that science is the only truth is that of its presuppositions. "All sciences, including psychology, involve assumptions or basic principles concerning knowledge and reality" and these presuppositions are outside the domain of science (Farber 368). The very practice of science is based on assumptions. For instance, "the average scientist readily admits that, although his study is based upon certain beliefs in the uniformity of nature, the rationality of the world, and the relative attainability of truth, he is not himself, as a scientist, called upon to subject these notions to critical examination" (Benjamin 150). These are taken as fact before the experiments are run or the results collected. Or consider that scientific correlation and the scientific method "presupposes the existence of other 'selves'", that other scientists exist and can confirm the work done (Khatchadourian 196). The scientific method operates on the reproduction of experiments by others for verification. Even in gathering evidence, the "use of probability-estimates as a basis for prediction presupposes the existence of causal relations between events" (Khatchadourian 198). That is, the assumption that what one is measuring is actually causing the effects one is observing. The starting points of science, that there is order in nature, that rationality exists, cause and effect, that our senses interface with reality, that our memory is trustworthy, and that truth is attainable are all assumed before science can get off the ground. Without these assumptions the motivation of science would be seriously inhibited and its findings would be of no value.
The dependence of science on philosophical and metaphysical underpinnings grows more certain the deeper one looks into the subject. One example is the method of induction, a foundation of scientific truth:
"Our inductive generalization, by contrast, states more than is implied in strict logic by the observational evidence; for by no process of formal logic can one deduce a general law... from a finite number of propositions... The law is, from a logical standpoint, a construction from observations; or again it is an interpretation, since evidently the observations are treated not as bare data but as signs of some general law, which we discover by interpreting them" (Caldin 203).
"If induction is to be valid we must have grounds for believing it, or something like it, to be true... They cannot be purely logical; as we have noted, formal logic is concerned with valid inference from given premises, not with the truth of the premises. They cannot be derived from science, for all scientific conclusions rest on induction and so the argument would be circular. If there is any basis for induction, it must be derived from outside science - it must indeed be metaphysical. If we believe that there is order in nature, it is on metaphysical grounds; in science the belief is presupposed, and we cannot therefore appeal to science to support it" (Caldin 204).
"Theories are in fact not deductions, but interpretations, as indeed they are commonly called. They are believed because we regard empirical laws as signs of a more fundamental order in nature, represented by the unified theoretical scheme which interprets them. This order must be presupposed. Thus the justification for theorizing requires again the assumption of order in nature" (Caldin 204-205).
When inducing general laws of nature by observing a set of phenomena, one does not have a guarantee that the general law is correct, it is inferred based on the creation of a rule or equation that conforms to all of the known facts. Sometimes new information comes to light to which the rule does not conform. Then changes to the general law are undertaken. It is not believed that the law of nature has changed, but that the interpreted theory is incorrect or insufficient in its explanation. This methodology cannot be worked out by logic, as logic works the other way, from premises to conclusions not from data to premises. The trustworthiness of induction is assumed by science but it is upheld by metaphysical arguments. We believe there is order in the universe not because we can deduce it scientifically but because we have reasoned it metaphysically. While scientific inquiry has upheld this assumption, it is taken to be the case even when conflicting evidence arises.
Certainly when it comes to interpreting and applying the findings of science one is drawn into the realm of philosophy.
While the scientist can record and correlate data endlessly without worrying about what this means for us, as soon as this question is asked we are forced back into the domain of philosophy. All of the big questions of life, such as, how the facts should influence society, or how should we live our lives, bring us back to philosophical and theological considerations. This issue prompts one writer to state, "It appears that science is not, and cannot be, self-sufficient, but requires, and must always require, to be supplemented and interpreted by philosophy (including metaphysics); and however much it may resent it, it cannot but rest on foundations which in the final analysis it cannot call its own" (Khatchadourian 203). There is no way around the metaphysical assumptions in the foundations of science.
Hence, one notes that science is but one of many methods of discovering truth and that truth can be known outside science in metaphysics. In fact, the true contradiction is, "a proposition or theory can only be true if it is a scientific proposition or theory" (Moreland). Not only is this statement self-refuting, it is misguided. It is a proposition about the philosophy of science, not a scientific proposition itself, and so if it is true it is also false. Science is based, and only operates, on propositions outside the scope of science. Science cannot be the most important, valuable, or authoritative source of knowledge as it does not provide a method of authenticating or proving rational its own presuppositions. Nor can it interpret its own findings to let us know how we should live. Other avenues for truth exist, and necessarily exist, such as philosophy. Hence it is not irrational to think that avenues such as the theological could provide discovery of truth as well.
The pursuit of scientific truth and religious truth are, at the heart, a search for the same thing: knowledge. Both are valid descriptors of truth with reasonable assumptions. There are limits to the five senses and one must recognize both their tremendous usefulness but also their finite capabilities. One can easily believe in both God and science. Each should be consulted in the quest for what is true in the world. God helps one to interpret how science may be used to increase the quality of human life. Science allows one to verify trustworthiness of spiritual beliefs, in areas that can be verified, so that one can have confidence in the beliefs that cannot be verified completely.
The actual conflict is not God and science, but rather the metaphysical presuppositions that some bring into the question of truth, notably the philosophies of Theism and Naturalistic Materialism (or Atheism). Does the supernatural exist or does it not exist? That is an exclusive proposition. These presuppositions are opposed to one another and can cause bias both in what evidence is sought and how such evidence is interpreted. In recent years, naturalistic presuppositions have often been masked as scientific and some have tried to use science as a weapon against theistic philosophy. One should remember that this is, in essence, a philosophical argument and that the conflict is not the things being used (e.g. science) but rather the ideologies being pursued.
Note that all of the following references, with the exception of Moreland and Wikipedia, come from peer reviewed academic journals.
References
Benjamin, A. Cornelius. "Science and Its Presuppositions." The Scientific Monthly Vol. 73, No. 3 (Sep., 1951), pp. 150-153
Benjamin, A. Cornelius. "Science and the Pursuit of Values" The Scientific Monthly Vol. 63, No. 4 (Oct., 1946), pp. 305-313
Caldin, E. F. "Science and Philosophy: Implications or Presuppositions?" The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 1, No. 3 (Nov., 1950), pp. 196-210
Farber, Marvin "Concerning "Freedom from Presuppositions"." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 7, No. 3 (Mar., 1947), pp. 367-368
Moreland, J. P and Dallas Willard. Love God With All Your Mind. NavPress Publishing Group, 1997.
Khatchadourian, Haig. "Some Metaphysical Presuppositions of Science." Philosophy of Science Vol. 22, No. 3 (Jul., 1955), pp. 194-204
"Scientific Method." Wikipedia. 13 August 2008 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method
