The vertical form of the Cosmological Argument. –
This distinctly Thomist vertical formulation of the Cosmological Argument has been argued recently by Norman Geisler, and differs from the horizontal version in that it starts with a universe that exists at this very moment rather than reasoning from a universe that began some time in the past. It argues not for a First Cause, but for a Sustaining, here-and-now Cause for the continuance of the universe. (Or, it argues for the First Cause of continued existence, rather than of the beginning of existence.) So without further ado:
Now, the first premise is existentially undeniable—that is, it is self-evident that some things exist, and that these things are fundamentally limited and changing. The denial of (1) is self-refuting, for one must exist to deny it. (Whether or not there exist things independent of the mind does not affect the truth of this premise.) This premise also declares that these entities undergo change, which is also self-evident: the whole of existence is a fluctuating continuum. Life is change. Change occurs in many varieties, and is something that all honest, conscious entities observe. (If one embraces a view of change as the continuous annihilation of old entities and the creation of new ones, then one is led back to the first premise of the kalam version of the Cosmological Argument. This view of change is both counterintuitive, and not what objectors to this argument would want to appeal to.) Finally, (1) states that these entities are by nature limited and contingent, which is seen from the fact that they endure change, as anything that changes is ipso facto limited. Changing entities are not essentially unlimited or necessary with respect to existence, and are therefore existentially limited and contingent.
The second premise appeals to some other entity to explain the existence of those that are limited and changing. Nothing can will itself into existence, because it would have to be existentially prior to itself in order to do so, which is impossible. It must, therefore, depend on something else to cause its existence. A limited entity cannot actualize its potential to exist by the sheer possibility of its existence.
Premise (3), which states that “there cannot be an infinite series of causes of existence,” requires some elaboration. First, “causes of existence” here does not refer to what causes something to come into existence, but what causes something to continue to exist. So, “existence” here refers to an entity’s present “isness,” not its “wasness” or “will-be-ness.” Those who reject (3) usually try to argue against (3e), but an analogy should point out that this approach won't work, and that a circular, mutually dependent series is indeed impossible. Take a circle of falling dominoes. At least one domino has to be the cause of the falling of the other dominoes. Either one of the dominoes has caused the others to fall, including itself (a domino whose falling was self-caused, which is impossible), or something outside the circle of dominoes has triggered the falling.
It seems, then, that (3) is a reasonable premise. Now, if the first three premises of this argument are true, then (4) is the valid conclusion. There has to be a Being that sustains the existence of the aforementioned entities; that is, there has to be a Sustaining, here-and-now Cause for the continuing, present existence of these entities. This Cause does not have to be the immediate cause of every limited, changing entity, but if there is a series of intermediary existential causes in-between, such a series cannot go on to infinity, and require that this Sustaining Cause be at the head of such a necessarily finite series.
Premise (5), which is probably the most crucial in this argument, consequently requires the most defense. It claims that the Sustaining Cause must be: (a) uncaused, (b) infinite, (c) necessary, (d) pure act, (e) immutable, (f) eternal, (g) simple, (h) perfect, and (i) one.
Premise (6) is confirmed by the Christian Scriptures and the agreement of the church fathers. Of the God of Christianity it is written: “For by him [Christ, God] all things were created….He is before all things, and in him all things hold together”; “for you [God] created all things, and by your will they were created and have their being”; “‘For in him we live and move and have our being’”; “For from him and through him and to him are all things”; “[Christ] sustain[s] all things by his powerful word”; and, “God...[is] for whom and through whom everything exists” (Col 1:16,17; Rev 4:11; Acts 17:28; Rom 11:36, Heb 1:3, 2:10). Furthermore, the early church fathers are united in their asseveration of God’s possession of the attributes found in (5). They agree that the Christian God is uncaused, infinite, necessary, pure act, immutable, eternal, simple, perfect, and one. The Christian Scriptures also explicitly testify to the nature of God, declaring His immutability (Mal 3:6, Heb 13:8, Jas 1:17), eternality (Ps 90:2, Jn 8:58, 2 Tim 1:9, Titus 1:2), perfection (Mt. 5:48), and simplicity and oneness (Dt. 6:4).
If (5) and (6) are true, (7) follows. Thus the conclusion of this argument is that the Being in question—the Sustaining Cause of all that exists—is identical with (or astoundingly similar to) the God of Judeo-Christian theism. If there are any others who claim identity with this Being, they are remaining awfully silent. Even so, the other attributes of God shall be demonstrated in due course.
But for now, it would seem that this argument bolsters the claim of St. Paul, allowing him to write in all truthfulness that “since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made…” (Rom 1:20).
The vertical form of the Cosmological Argument and Personal Intelligence. –
The above form of the Cosmological Argument has appreciably more power than its horizontal forms, and is more compelling than the kalam form, but absent from it is any reference to an important distinguishing feature of the Christian God—personality. For could not the uncaused, infinite, necessary, pure act, immutable, eternal, simple, perfect, one Sustaining Cause of the universe be an impersonal Being? a divine Force perhaps? The theist can respond to this unavoidable objection a couple of ways. The first is to admit that the vertical argument only establishes the impersonal metaphysical attributes of God, and attempt to draw out personality via the Teleological Argument below. A better way to go, albeit more ambitious, is to implement a modified version of the last part of the kalam argument.
The Sustaining Cause of the present existence of the universe is either personal or impersonal. It has been shown that this Being is eternal (and therefore exists in an eternal state), so from the timeless state of eternity the necessary and sufficient conditions for the present existence of the universe either did or did not exist. If such conditions did not exist in this eternal state, then it would seem that the universe would not presently exist. But it does exist, giving one reason to think that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the present existence of the universe did exist from eternity.
Now, if these conditions did in fact exist from eternity, the present existence of the universe would arise spontaneously. It seems that the only way for the present existence of the universe to arise spontaneously from eternity is for a personal agent to willfully cause this event through an act of deliberation. Without a personal agent who so intends and acts to create the universe (i.e., the universe from beginning to ending, from alpha to omega), the necessary conditions are present, but the sufficient conditions are lacking. If there is a personal Sustaining Cause who has the intention-so-to-create, and power-so-to-create, and the action-that-creates, the necessary and the sufficient conditions are satisfied.
If the argumentation of the last two paragraphs is found to have some irremediable fault, then the theist can still argue for personality (as well as intelligence) by way of the Teleological Argument.
The Teleological Argument for the existence of a Personal Intelligence. –
In the past, theists have used the Teleological Argument with various ends in mind. Some have endeavored to prove God’s existence from design, but the aim here is to expand on the type of Being that has already been shown to exist via the previous two forms of the Cosmological Argument.
The universe contains a great magnitude of order, simplicity and complexity, as well as beauty and purpose. Even the frantic indeterminacy of quantum particles seems fine-tuned to permit the existence of life, for as Hugh Ross points out, “Quantum tunneling must function no more or less efficiently than what we observe for hemoglobin to transport the right amount of oxygen to the cells of all vertebrate and most invertebrate species,” and concludes that counter to Einstein’s assertion that “God does not play dice,” God does play dice, but has “exquisitely designed the dice for the benefit of physical life” (CC, 151-2). Some criticize such fine-tuning arguments, which rely heavily on the anthropic principle, by saying that the type of God who would need to fine-tune creation would seem to be less powerful (and thus not omnipotent) than one who created things perfect ab initio, i.e., from the start (a similar criticism will occur when we treat the atheological Problem of Evil). However, from the perspective of an eternal, timeless Being, there is no “from the start,” properly speaking, but even if this is found to be irrelevant, the theist holds that God has his reasons (more on which later).
Now, if the Teleological Argument succeeds, it would seem that God, the Sustaining Cause of the universe, is one that purposefully creates life, although life itself may not be the only end it has in mind. Life may even be a means to a further end. Another criticism, that self-organization (more on which later) reduces the power of the argument, rests on the unwarranted assumption about the way an omniscient and all-wise God should go about creating a world and its living inhabitants.
Turning now to the argument from order (popular among theists and pantheists), one notes many instances of spatial and temporal order in the universe. Richard Swinburne has called attention to these observed regularities (“AD,” in Pojman, ed., PR:AA, 59), which he calls regularities of co-presence and of succession, respectively. A regularity of the first kind is one of structure, and the latter kind has to do with temporal succession. Because Swinburne is aware that the design arguments that rely on structural regularities face certain Darwinian objections, he prefers to focus on regularities of temporal succession. (He thinks these objections can be overcome by a reconstruction of the argument, but that such a reconstruction relies on a weak analogy that reduces the probability of the conclusion). He notes that simple laws govern most successions of events, allowing humanity to learn how almost everything in the world behaves, and says that the “orderliness of the universe to which I draw attention here is its conformity to formula, to simple, formulable, scientific laws.…[For it] might so naturally have been chaotic, but it is not—it is very orderly” (ibid., 61).
Swinburne anticipates the objection that it is no wonder humans observe such order, as without this order, there would be no one to observe it. He notes that this is false, because, “There is a great deal more order in the world than is necessary for the existence of humans.…The teleologist’s starting-point is not that we perceive order rather than disorder, but that order rather than disorder is there” (ibid., 61-2, emphasis mine). He goes on to couch the argument in terms of the “powers and liabilities” of material bodies:
But Swinburne does not think that the explanation should stop altogether. He believes that it is simpler to suppose that the order of the universe can be explained by the same cause as its existence. If he is right, then the Sustaining Cause is much more likely to be a Personal Intelligence, for it is vastly more probable that a personal Intelligence causes the universe to be ordered the way it is than an impersonal Force.
Responses to some Humean criticisms of the Teleological Argument. –
Now skeptic David Hume (1711-1776) has criticized the design argument, posing an important question: “A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world?” (“CDA,” in Pojman, ed., PR:AA, 57). Why might the design argument not merely lead us to conclude that there exist a handful of finite and corporeal gods rather than an all-powerful Creator? There are a couple of responses to this. First, as J. P. Moreland rightly notes,
Second, Swinburne points out that even if Hume were correct that the antecedent probability of his hypothesis of polytheism were equal to that of theism, the hypothesis of theism still has greater explanatory power than Hume’s does, and ipso facto has a greater probability. This is because Hume’s hypothesis would lead us to expect distinctive features of the work of each deity in different corners of the universe, “just as we see different kinds of workmanship in the different houses of a city,” whereas “theism leads us to expect that we will find throughout nature one pattern of order” (op. cit., 63). Atheist Michael Martin denies this, pointing to the very analogy that is central to the Teleological Argument:
Martin does have a point, but it is considerably less potent with the acceptance of the vertical Cosmological Argument, because a Being of Pure Act would presumably need no help or “cooperation” in ordering the universe, either spatially or temporally. At any rate, it is up to the critic of the Teleological Argument to decide whether it demonstrates the greater probability of a personal Intelligence which orders creation deliberately, or an impersonal Force which orders creation “accidentally.” (The evidence that follows shall hopefully make this latter view seem all but preposterous to the honest individual, if the second to last section has not done so already.)
Irreducible complexity, Paley’s watch, and Hume’s confusion. –
So far it has been contended that the order in the universe seems to demand an intelligent Being-who-orders. The irreducible complexity in the universe further augments the probability that this Being be an Intelligent Agent. Michael Behe, a prominent advocate of Intelligent Design theory, brings to bear evidence from biochemistry that poses difficulties for the Darwinian theorists who rival the ID movement. Charles Darwin himself writes, “If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ existed which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, then my theory would absolutely break down” (OS, 154). And this is precisely what Behe sets out to do:
Behe comments on William Paley’s (1743-1805) classic presentation of the design argument, which reasons that just as the “marks of contrivance” one finds in a watch lead one to believe it was designed by a watchmaker, the design found in the world leads one to think that it was designed by an intelligent Designer. Behe says that despite some of Paley’s poor examples of design, he “frequently hits the nail on the head,” as when he “writes about discrete systems, such as muscles, bones, and mammary glands, that he believes would cease to function if one of several components were missing. This is the essence of the design argument” (ibid., 212). But, Behe asks, where was Paley’s argument refuted?
In fact, the discovery of the specified complexity of DNA, as well as Behe’s examples of irreducible complexity sprinkled throughout his book, have served to amplify the power Paley’s argument. While Hume postulates that chance could have produced such a world as this, the evidence makes this possibility beyond improbable.
Hume, Behe points out, criticizes the argument for its induction. Because the conclusion of design is based on experience, one would have to observe living things being designed before one could infer that something designed other living things. However, “[m]odern biochemistry routinely designs biochemical systems, which are now known to be the basis of life,” so “we do have experience in observing the intelligent design of components of life,” so Hume’s criticisms are no longer valid (ibid., 219). Ross elaborates:
The evidence for the personal intelligence of the Being who gives being flourishes. Those who dismiss the Teleological Argument as outdated have not appreciated the full support the argument has received (and continues to receive) from modern biochemistry to date, or have not taken it in conjunction with the vertical Cosmological Argument.
It may also be possible that the notion of design, and especially of a supernatural Designer, is unpalatable to the antisupernaturalistic tastes of the scientific community. Behe thinks that this is at least part of the problem:
But let it pass. There is more to be examined concerning the Teleological argument.
Apologetics pg. 1
Apologetics pg. 2
Apologetics pg. 3
Apologetics pg. 4
References for Apologetics
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Reasons to Believe
