Engr Iftikhar Ahmed

A lot has been said, and is still being said, both in favour and against the KBD project, and the debate will continue till a final decision on its fate is taken.
In this respect, the federal government and WAPDA, having all the administrative machinery at their disposal, have conducted a number of studies and organised various seminars, for projecting the beneficial aspects of the project and to allay fears against its negative impacts.
On the other hand, enlightened professionals and nationalist organisations have, both individually and collectively, researched on the subject and tried to expose the over-shadowed negative aspects of KBD.
Whereas the few benefits of KBD project have been extensively propagated through the wide publicity of WAPDA, there has been a need to compile the findings of those researchers who have burnt their midnight oil to expose the multiple destructive consequences of Kalabagh Dam.
Building upon the work done by the said researchers, an effort has been made to present a critical analysis of the KBD project, so as to enable the reader to assess for himself/herself the ultimate utility of the project to Pakistan.
General observations on KBD project
KBD is the only major project in the history of Pakistan which has been most strongly opposed by the three out of the four provinces for various reasons. In this respect, unanimous resolutions have been passed by their elected Provincial Assemblies to reject the viability of the project. Also, in the National Assembly and the Senate, the project has been strongly opposed by a large number of elected representatives.
Apart from the technical flaws, making the construction and operation of the project an ultimate disaster, the people of the three provinces have certain reservations against its viability for the integrity of the country, and their common development. Some of these reservations are described below.
Reservations of NWFP (Pakhtunkhwa)
NWFP (Pakhtunkhwa) objects to the KBD because, a sizable number of its people will be displaced, and a vast area of its land will either be submerged under the reservoir or rendered waterlogged.
In the original design of KBD, the reservoir elevation was fixed at 925 ft above MSL, at which the water level in River Kabul was feared to rise by 2.5 ft at Nowshera, immediately after construction and to the ultimate 9.5 ft after 30 years of the project implementation.
To account for this, and as projection against damages in these areas, WAPDA had proposed to erect 25-ft high dykes around the Kabul River, so as to protect the cities from the water's spillover.
However, due to the high risk posed by the flooding eventuality and subsequent drainage problems, the government of NWFP (Pakhtunkhwa) seriously objected to the designs of the project and conducted investigations in 1985 to assess the possible impacts of KBD on the Peshawar valley.
As a result, it was revealed that, at the 925-ft reservoir elevation, the following major impacts were expected to occur:
i. 60000 acres of area will be affected by the 1 in 5 year floods
ii. 16 number unprotected villages will be required to be acquired and their population resettled
iii. 64933 persons will require resettlement elsewhere.
iv. Another 131000 persons will be requiring protection through 24-feet high dykes
v. A total of 28 miles long flood protection dykes will be constructed along the Kabul River, out of which 18 miles length will be specifically required to protect the Nowshera town alone.
vi. The dykes retained water was feared to contribute to the overall rise in water table in the immediate vicinity of the reservoir.
In addition, the following facilities were feared to be permanently submerged in the reservoir in a 1 in 100 year flood, and therefore required relocation:
i. 20 4.45 km of National Highway, 2 km Nowshera-Mardan road,
ii. 10 km Nizampur-Attock road, 25 km Pir Sabak-Jehangira road,
v. 6.92-km railway line between Khairabad-Nowshera,
vi. 5.43 km railway line between Nowshera-Mardan,
vii. Bridge at Khushal Garh
viii. Khairabad bridge at Attock required strengthening and modifications,
ix. Jehangira bridge required raising by 15 ft
xi. Nowshera railway bridge required raising by 6-ft,
xi. Telecommunication, power lines and gas lines also required relocation.
In the light of these findings, the Government of NWFP (Pakhtunkhwa) requested WAPDA to revise the project.
Lately, WAPDA has revised the designs and reduced the reservoir elevation to 915-ft above MSL in July 1986. And declared the designs to be safe against all the evils of the previous design.
Whereas, the validity of WAPDA's statement that a mere 10-ft reduction in reservoir height will solve all the problems is questionable and worth detailed investigation, the people of NWFP (Pakhtunkhwa) doubt the prediction of WAPDA's experts due to their previously ill-conceived designs of KBD, and hold strong apprehensions against the real objectives of the project.
Even in its revised form, the KBD is pregnant with the following consequences:
i. The dam will raise the water level of River Indus throughout the Attock gorge, right through the Haro river confluence and up to the Akora Khattak on Kabul River. And resultantly, the Nowshera City, inhibited by 200,000 people falling on both the left and right banks of Kabul River, will be under severe threat of flooding. And in the long term of about 50 years time, the Nowshera City and its adjoining areas will become waterlogged swamplands, due to the seepage from the raised water level.
ii. The Mardan Swabi SCARP projects, covering 123,000 acres of irrigated land, will face certain threat of failure, because of their outfalls being lower than the high flood levels in KBD reservoir.
iii. WAPDA has prepared a water release pattern of the post KBD irrigation supplies, which will have an adverse impact on the CRBC project, as it does not provide enough water for undertaking the lift components of CRBC in future. Similarly, the CRBC is also likely to be affected for long periods during the construction of the project and during the first ponding of the reservoir.
In the absence of an independent assessment of the damages at the 915-ft reservoir level, and with little in WAPDA's claims of all-well, impartial engineers take the previously arrived figures of social and economic costs as an eye opener on the viability of the project.
They believe that a mere 10-ft reduction in reservoir level will have a negligible mitigating impact in taking care of the colossal injury to NWFP (Pakhtunkhwa).
A detailed discussion on the various aspects of the injurious impact of the KBD on NWFP (Pakhtunkhwa) follows later:
Reservations of Balochistan
The largest province of Pakistan, Balochistan, does not touch River Indus and is not a riparian in the strictest sense. Still the Pat Feeder canal from Guddu Barrage, with 3400 cusecs of water, irrigates about 300,000 acres in the province. And with a recent request of Balochistan government to remodel the Pat Feeder canal, the flow is further expected to be increased to 6000 cusecs, irrigating a further 200,000 acres.
Balochistan's opposition to KBD is therefore based on its apprehension that future requests for more water from River Indus will meet little success if KBD overstretches the demand of water in Indus River system.
In addition, with the revised distribution of water in the post KBD scenario, Balochistan fears a further reduction in its share of irrigation water usage, which is already very low.
Reservations of Sindh
Sindhis believe that KBD left bank canal will divert the waters of Indus to Rasul-Qadirabad sector in the upper reaches of Punjab, and the whole of River Indus waters will be left to cater to the needs of Punjab only, whenever there is shortage of water in Jhelum, or in the eventuality of India appropriating all the waters of Jhelum, or Chenab or both.
Sindh, which is a lower riparian of River Indus, has constantly felt threatened by Punjab and has bitterly disputed the figures of water availability advanced by WAPDA, citing legal, economic, ecological, geomorphologic and many other reasons for opposing KBD.
>From the past experience of the operation of Taunsa-Punjab and Chashma-Jhelum canal, people in Sindh perceive that Punjab plans to allow the civil works or the canal system to be constructed as projects of national survival and run the surplus water for a few years to establish precedence and develop water users, who will then apply pressure to keep the water supply running. Later, when the water rights are well established in Punjab, they can force the lower riparian (or don't even ask) to accept the fait accompli and keep the water supply running since the tap is in the hands of the upper riparian.
Therefore, Sindh strongly opposes the construction of KBD.
Basic planning drawbacks in KBD project
The KBD project suffers from a multitude of planning and design drawbacks, which makes it the least desired development alternative, out of the various development opportunities available in the Indus Basin.
With the KBD as a test case, the following paragraphs exposes the planning capability of WAPDA and the intelligence level of the decision makers at the top, who are adamant to support and propagate the case of a technically unfeasible dam on River Indus.
Unavailability of enough water in the Indus River system
The amount of water flowing through the River Indus has been a point of acute disagreement between the planners of KBD project and other impartial engineers.
To technically analyse the issue, the table 1, from the year 1922 to 1991, indicates 69 years maximum flow pattern of the western rivers of Pakistan, measured at rim stations (Indus at KBD, Jhelum at Mangla and Chenab at Marala)
>From table 1 five parameters are evident
i. Maximum flow of the 3 western rivers (186.79 MAF evidenced in 1959-60)
ii. Minimum flow of the 3 western rivers (100.31 MAF evident in 1974-75)
iii.Average (per year) flow of the 3 western is (137.27 MAF)
iv.4 out 5 years flow of 3 western rivers is (123.59 MAF)
A closer analysis of the flow pattern reveals that super floods occur approximately once in 5 years time, which may jack up the average flow to the respectable 137.27 MAF per year, but in the remaining four years, availability of water remain around 123.59 MAF only, or lower.
In all its calculations of the availability of water for KBD, WAPDA has insisted upon the average flow figures i.e. 137.27 MAF, whereas the criteria for designing a storage dam is of using the 4 out of 5 years flows, giving an 80% probability of water coming down the rivers to enable its storage. By adopting this criteria for our storage reservoirs, we end with a figure of 123.59 MAF available in our Indus River system.
If in table 1 of 69 years flow, the 9 years of exceptionally low flows of less than 120.0 MAF are disregarded, the next consecutive 2 years of low flows are 1931-32 (123.59 MAF) and 1932-33 (125.26 MAF), with an average of 124.4 MAF, which is very close to the 123.59 MAF, the figure of 4 out of 5 years water availability (80% probability flow).
To support this theory, the US Supreme Court Ruling is "to be available in a practical sense the supply must be fairly dependable, storage dams cannot be filled on expectations of average flows which do not come, nor on recollections of unusual flows which have passed down the stream in previous year."
Considering the Indus Water Apportionment Accord to be the benchmark, the simple and correct arithmetic of our water resources availability in the Indus River System should read as follows:
Availability of Water in 3 Western Rivers (below rim station) 123.59 MAF; Requirements of the 4 provinces (according to the Water Accord) 114.35 MAF; Release below Kotri (provisionally agreed in Water Accord)10.00 MAF; Remainder -0.76
The negative balance in the calculation shows that, there is virtually not enough water in River Indus, to be stored for usage in later part of any year. And if storage is tried, it will only be at the cost of the downstream riparian, depriving them of their legitimate rights of water use.
Contrary to realising this fact, WAPDA has been publicising the news of floods in River Indus and its breaching of protective bunds at various places, to try create a perception that enormous quantities of water go "waste" every year, and that if this water was stored in KBD, Pakistan would not only be saved from the damages of these high flows, but its agriculture would take a giant leap towards self-sufficiency. It has been argued that 34.84 MAF of water pass below the Kotri Barrage every year to the sea, and is therefore going waste.
To clarify the misconception of exceptionally high discharges of 34.84 MAF below Kotri, the following points needs to be closely followed:
i. At present all the barrages and the canals of Pakistan can take about 105 MAF against the allocated 114.35 MAF under the Indus Water Apportionment Accord 1991.
The remaining 9.35 MAF ends up on its way to the sea through Kotri. And this will eliminate if the irrigation network is completed to accommodate this additional allocated flow.
ii. Outflow from the eastern rivers of Sutlej, Beas and Ravi into Indus is about 6.97 MAF. Since all three rivers are committed to India, and with the progressive development going on in India, these flows will be reduced to zero (except in the few years of exceptionally high flood season flows), thereby reducing the Kotri discharges by that amount.
iii. As per the Indus Water Treaty, India has also been given an unrestricted use of water to cultivate 1343477 acres from the western rivers, in addition to all the rights of eastern river. India, to date, has utilised 6.75 MAF and will draw another 4.79 MAF from the system, to further reduce the flows at Kotri by that amount.
iv. The 34.83 MAF flow to sea is in fact the mean discharge, and is bound to be lower by 10.0 to 14 MAF in any specific year.
The correct calculations in this respect will be: see table 2
Hence, the net available water to flow to the sea reduces to a negative balance, leaving nothing for storage into KBD. Therefore, the news of floods "wasting enormous amount of water" does not hold true.
Still for people, who consider the flood water to be a mere waste do not realise that there is no mechanical method of removing millions of tons of deposited silt from the river beds of the barrages, and it is the force of water from these high floods that helps in washing away much of the accumulated silt.                                     Continued
Seasonal & Annual Flows in Western Rivers (MAF)
Year Kharif Flow Rabi Total Flows
1922-23 121.48 25.96 147.44
1923-24 130.41 23.55 154.01
1924-25 109.51 20.13 129.69
1925-26 100.51 18.22 118.73
1926-27 99.16 18.15 117.31
1927-28 90.42 20.41 110.83
1928-29 108.22 22.09 130.31
1929-30 97.20 26.94 124.14
1930-31 117.13 19.73 136.86
1931-32 101.10 22.30 123.40
1932-33 107.62 17.64 125.26
1933-34 125.68 18.77 144.44
1934-35 108.19 18.68 126.86
1935-36 116.81 22.28 139.09
1936-37 124.91 20.91 145.82
1937-38 110.10 21.34 131.44
1938-39 125.36 22.59 147.95
1939-40 127.24 17.54 144.78
1940-41 107.52 15.58 120.10
1941-42 107.75 25.92 133.67
1942-43 143.57 23.51 167.08
1943-44 127.39 19.61 147.00
1944-45 116.08 20.10 136.16
1945-46 131.64 18.86 150.50
1946-47 110.44 18.42 128.86
1947-48 101.36 23.31 124.59
1948-49 132.15 23.57 155.72
1949-50 132.29 23.71 155.00
1950-51 151.28 20.38 171.66
1951-52 93.60 20.21 113.81
1952-53 112.33 17.97 130.30
1953-54 116.31 26.77 143.08
1954-55 119.98 20.27 140.25
1955-56 107.51 25.02 132.53
1956-57 131.92 25.46 157.38
1957-58 123.0 28.10 151.10
1958-59 124.47 39.09 158.56
1959-60 154.74 32.05 186.79
1960-61 124.97 20.74 145.71
1961-62 119.58 20.93 140.51
1962-63 89.96 19.85 109.81
1963-64 113.40 21.66 135.06
1964-65 116.11 22.32 138.43
1965-66 117.81 21.09 138.98
1966-67 116.84 23.83 140.47
1967-68 120.43 25.76 146.19
1968-69 115.63 23.21 138.85
1969-70 114.49 19.77 134.26
1970-71 90.27 15.90 106.17
1971-72 88.40 15.74 104.14
1972-73 101,62 24.45 126.09
1973-74 144.97 19.12 164.09
1974-75 79.47 18.27 97.74
1975-76 116.30 23.22 139.52
1976-77 116.86 18.43 135.28
1977-78 104.36 23.10 127.46
1978-79 137.45 26.03 163.47
1979-80 108.84 23.14 131.98
1980-81 109.81 26.58 136.39
1981-82 117.69 22.93 140.62
1982-83 97.10 25.27 122.38
1983-84 128.28 21.67 149.96
1984-85 115.99 18.93 134.92
1985-86 91.66 26.04 117.70
1986-87 116.38 30.27 146.67
1987-88 111.79 29.28 141.07
1988-89 136.56 24.84 101.42
1989-90 102.01 29.31 131.31
1990-91 130.97 35.14 166.12
1991-92 141.53 30.57 172.10
1992-93 138.62 31.06 169.68
1993-94 104.67 22.80 127.47
Mean 115.24 22.03 137.27
Median 116.20 21.66 137.64
Maximum 154.74 35.09 186.79
 (1959-60) (1958-59) (1959-60)
Reference: Surface Water Availability for Further Development, Wapda, December 1994. 
  This artical was adopted from The Frontier Post. The only English daily from Pakhtunkhwa.
Continued. KALABAGH DAM III