This is the account of the loss of 1Lt.
Henry "Hank" L. Allen
The Steve Canyon program was a highly classified FAC
(forward air control) operation covering the military regions of Laos. U.S.
military operations in Laos were severely restricted during the Vietnam War
era because Laos had been declared neutral by the Geneva Accords. The
non-communist forces in Laos, however, had a critical need for military
support in order to defend territory used by Lao and North Vietnamese
communist forces. The U.S., in conjunction with non-communist forces in
Laos, devised a system whereby U.S. military personnel could be "in the
black" or "sheep-dipped"
(clandestine; mustered out of the military to perform military duties as a
civilian) to operate in Laos under supervision of the U.S. Ambassador to
Laos.
RAVEN was the radio call sign which identified the flyers of the Steve
Canyon Program. Men recruited for the program were rated Air Force officers
with at least six months experience in Vietnam. They tended to be the very
best of pilots, but by definition, this meant that they were also mavericks,
and considered a bit wild by the mainstream military establishment.
The Ravens came under the formal command of CINCPAC and the 7/13th Air Force
56th Special Operations Wing at Nakhon Phanom, but their pay records were
maintained at Udorn with Detachment 1. Officially, they were on loan to the
U.S. Air Attaché at Vientiane. Unofficially, they were sent to outposts like
Long Tieng, where their field commanders were the CIA, the Meo Generals, and
the U.S. Ambassador. Once on duty, they flew FAC missions which controlled
all U.S. air strikes over Laos.
All tactical strike aircraft had to be under the control of a FAC, who was
intimately familiar with the locale, the populous, and the tactical
situation. The FAC would find the target, order up U.S. fighter/bombers from
an airborne command and control center, mark the target accurately with
white phosphorus (Willy Pete) rockets, and control the operation throughout
the time the planes remained on station. After the fighters had departed,
the FAC stayed over the target to make a bomb damage assessment (BDA).
The FAC also had to ensure that there were no attacks on civilians, a
complex problem in a war where there were no front lines and any hamlet
could suddenly become part of the combat zone.
A FAC needed a fighter
pilot's mentality, but was obliged to fly slow and low in such unarmed
and vulnerable aircraft as the Cessna O1 Bird Dog, and the Cessna O2.
Consequently, aircraft used by the Ravens were continually peppered with
ground fire. A strong fabric tape was simply slapped over the bullet holes
until the aircraft could no longer fly.
Ravens were hopelessly overworked by the war. The need for secrecy kept
their numbers low (never more than 22 at one time), and the critical need of
the Meo sometimes demanded each pilot fly 10 and 12 hour days. Some Ravens
completed their tour of approximately 6 months with a total of over 500
combat missions.
The Ravens in at Long Tieng in Military Region II, had, for several years,
the most difficult area in Laos. The base, just on the southern edge of the
Plain of Jars, was also the headquarters for the CIA-funded Meo army
commanded by General Vang Pao.
An interesting account of this group can be
read in Christopher Robbins' book, "The Ravens". This book contains an
account of the loss of 1Lt. Henry L. Allen and Capt. Richard G. Elzinga: The
post at Long Tieng had been under siege, and it became necessary for Ravens
to live in Vietntiane in new quarters nicknamed Silver City, but they
continued to stage out of Long Tieng. "They called the daily flight there
and back...the 'commute.'
"Hank Allen, an exceptional pilot with eyes like a hawk, took off with Dick
Elzinga in the front seat of his O-1. Allen was 'short', soon to return home
after a tour in which he had notched up four hundred combat missions, and he
planned to return directly to the States and marry his fiancée within a
fortnight. Elzinga had only just arrived in Laos, and it was his first trip
up to the secret city. Allen intended to use the 'commute' as a checkout
ride. It was a cloudy day. He took off and reported over the radio...that
the O-1 was airborne. It was the last thing ever heard from them. Neither of
the pilots, nor the plane, was ever seen again.
"They had disappeared. Each of the Ravens spent at least two hours, on top
of their usual day's flying, searching for the wreckage. No Mayday call had
been heard, nor had a beeper signal been picked up from the survival radio,
and no clue to the airplane's whereabouts was discovered. The disappearance
was a complete mystery."
The official point of loss was noted as 20 miles northeast of Vientiane, Laos.
Both men were classified Missing in Action. Three years later, on
March 10, 1973, a Pathet Lao agent was captured carrying three of Elzinga's
traveler's checks and money of three countries. Elzinga had not been in
Vientiane long enough to get a locker for his billfold. According to a 1974
list compiled by the National League of POW/MIA Families, Elzinga, at least,
survived the loss of the O1 plane.
Elzinga and Allen are among nearly 600 Americans lost in Laos.
Even though
the Pathet Lao stated publicly that they held "tens of tens" of American
prisoners, not one American held in Laos was ever released -- or negotiated
for.
Since U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War ended, nearly 10,000 reports have
been received by the U.S. Government relating to Americans missing in
Southeast Asia. Many authorities have reluctantly concluded that hundreds
are still alive in captivity today. We, as a nation, owe these men our best
effort to find them and bring them home. Until the fates of the men like
Elzinga and Allen are known, their families will wonder if they are dead or
alive ... and why they were abandoned. |