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• Page 5956 - RADISLAV KRSTIC


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• Page 5951 • {1/74}

(1)Monday, 16 October 2000
[Open session]

--- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.
[The accused entered court]

(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning to the technical booth, the interpreters; good morning legal assistants and registrar. Madam Registrar, please call the case.

THE REGISTRAR: This is case number IT-98-33-T, the Prosecutor (10)versus Radislav Krstic.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much. Mr. Harmon, good morning. Can we have the appearances for this session, please?

MR. HARMON: Yes. Good morning, Mr. President; good morning to (15)Your Honours; good morning to my colleagues. With me are my colleagues, Mr. Peter McCloskey, to my immediate right, and to his right, Mr. Andrew Cayley, and to my left, Ms. Kirsten Keith.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon. (20)Mr. Petrusic, for the Defence, please.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Good morning, Your Honours, my learned friends from the Prosecution. With me during these proceedings is my colleague, Mr. Visnjic, and as from today, we will also be assisted by Ms. Tanja Radosavljevic who will provide technical assistance during this (25)sitting as we consider her assistance necessary. Thank you.

• Page 5952 • {2/74}

(1) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Good morning, General Krstic too. Welcome to you all. So we are here to begin the Defence case. And Rule 84, do you have an opening statement to make, Mr. Petrusic?

(5) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, Your Honours, as the Defence has already indicated at the Status Conference held on the 6th and 8th of February, the Defence will make a very brief opening statement referring to the evidence that the Defence will rely on this the course of these proceedings. (10)Mr. President, Your Honours, in our case the Defence will seek to prove that General Krstic did not order, participate, or in any way contribute to everything that happened in Glogova, Cerska, Orahovac, Pilica, Petkovci, Kozluk, and all other locations referred to in the indictment. We will seek to prove that there was another parallel chain of (15)command which was concealed from sight, knowledge of General Krstic so that he had no possible means of having any influence over it. In the course of this case, we will provide evidence that General Krstic throughout these events was the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, and in that capacity, by orders of the Commander of the Drina Corps (20)engaged in combat activities in Srebrenica from the 6th of July, 1995. And upon orders from the Commander of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, after the fall of Srebrenica on the 11th of July, 1995, was dispatched to engage in combat operations in and around Zepa. The Defence will seek to prove that the purpose and plan of (25)Operation Krivaja 95 was not to capture the town of Srebrenica, nor to

• Page 5953 • {3/74}

(1)carry out everything that happened afterwards, but to narrow down the enclaves to the city area itself. Units of the Drina Corps entered Srebrenica, which was a deserted town, a town abandoned both by the civilians and the military. The fate of Srebrenica in the past war to (5)appear as if it had been abandoned by the military, regardless of the military of which side. Three times Srebrenica changed hands from the control of one military to another, and it was always deserted. The Defence will present a whole series of evidence of violations of Security Council resolutions whereby Srebrenica was declared a (10)protected area. All violations of this status of a safe area, which lasted for about two years, occurred without any serious warnings or actions being taken first by the Canadian and later by the Dutch battalions. No serious measures were taken to demilitarise the zone and to withdraw the weapons from the area. Humanitarian aid that was (15)dispatched to Srebrenica was, at times, in short supply, but through that same channel, the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was supplied; local bosses gained wealth, black markets cropped up, but one thing is without any doubt true, and that is that there was never a shortage of weapons in the declared safe area. (20)Your Honours, the Defence will focus, in particular, on the Operation Krivaja 95. We will provide evidence to show that that operation was carried out under pressure and that in itself it denies all allegations by the Prosecution that there was a predesigned plan to carry out deportation and commit crimes. (25)In the course of these proceedings, the Defence will seek to prove

• Page 5954 • {4/74}

(1)that General Krstic left the area of Srebrenica on the 12th of July and, with units under his command, embarked upon a new military operation, that of Zepa. The Defence will provide evidence to show that the President of Republika Srpska at the time, Radovan Karadzic, by his decree of the 13th (5)of July 1995, which came into effect a day later, that is, the 15th of July, appointed to the position of Commander of the Drina Corps General Krstic, whereby the de jure situation was established. The Defence will tender evidence to show that General Krstic, on the 20th and 21st of July, 1995, was only then in a position to de facto (10)take over control of the corps and that as of then he has control and responsibility over it. This fact will be corroborated by witnesses that will appear before this Trial Chamber. Furthermore, the Defence will offer evidence to show that General Krstic commanded forces that were engaged in Zepa from the 14th of (15)July onwards, or rather from the moment when they gathered on the 12th and 13th of July until the 1st of August. General Krstic will be supporting every officer commanding subordinate units from the time of the fall of Srebrenica until the completion of the Zepa operation. He will say in defence of all of those officers that they acted in a professional manner (20)deign of military officers, that neither he nor any of them besmirched the reputation of an honourable Serbian officer that dates back to the beginning of this century. The Defence will disclose to Your Honours and the Trial Chamber all the documents that it has managed to gain possession of, though we (25)believe that this is only one part of the documents of the army of

• Page 5955 • {5/74}

(1)Republika Srpska that will all go to corroborate our submissions. The Defence was not in a position to gain hold of the report on the handover of duty between the outgoing Corps Commander, General Zivanovic, and the incoming General Krstic who came to take his place. That document (5)certainly exists; it was entered into the book of records. But not only has that document disappeared, but so has the book of records. Someone took care to do this, to get rid of those documents, and that is why General Krstic is here before you. Your Honours, that is all that the Defence has to say in its (10)opening statement, and we would like now to start with the testimony of General Krstic. Mr. President, before General Krstic takes his place in the witness box, the Defence would like to make a request to Your Honours to make it possible during the testimony of General Krstic for us to have (15)unhindered contact with him. The reason for this is that, in the first place, the Defence is of the opinion that the main determining position of the General is the status of an accused, and only then comes his status as a witness. And these two positions distinguish him from what I would call an ordinary witness. This will be an exception in relation to all the (20)other Defence witnesses that will be coming after him, so we appeal to you to grant us this request. The Defence has not discussed this request as it should have in the spirit of good cooperation with the Prosecution for the simple reason that we didn't have time, and so we do apologise to both Your Honours and (25)the Prosecution for failing to do so.

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(1) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Harmon.

MR. HARMON: Mr. President, we believe the request by Defence counsel is reasonable and appropriate, and we have no objections to it.
[Trial Chamber confers]

(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Regarding the request and the non-objection of the Prosecutor, and in view of the fact that this is indeed an exceptional situation, we will make an exception to the order of the Chamber and we will authorise contact between the Defence and General Krstic after he has taken the solemn declaration. (10)So we are ready now to call General Krstic to the witness box.
[The accused takes the stand]

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General Krstic, can you hear me?

THE WITNESS: [Int.] Yes, I can.

(15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning. Could you please first of all read the solemn declaration that the usher is giving you.

THE WITNESS: [Int.] Yes, I will. Good morning, Your Honours. I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

(20) WITNESS: RADISLAV KRSTIC
[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you, General Krstic. You may sit down now.

THE WITNESS: [Int.] Thank you, Your Honour.

(25) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Please make yourself as

• Page 5957 • {7/74}

(1)comfortable as possible. Before we proceed with your testimony, General Krstic, I have to remind you that you're coming from a different system than ours. In that system, an accused cannot testify. So I have to remind you that you will (5)be testifying under an oath and that you have an obligation to tell the truth. If not, you are likely to face consequences. In our system, the accused have the right to lie, if I may put it that way; however, here in this type of proceedings, you are in a capacity of a witness. I will first give the floor to your counsel, Mr. Petrusic. You (10)are already familiar with the procedure, and you know that you will be first answering questions that will be put to you by your Defence counsel. Having said that, I should like to thank you for having decided to testify in the name of the truth. (15)Mr. Petrusic, your witness. You have the floor.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.

• EXAMINED by Mr. Petrusic:

• Q.: General, could you first of all tell us the date and the place of your birth?

(20) • A.: Your Honours, I was born on the 15th of February, 1948, in the village of Nedjalista, situated in the municipality of Vlasenica, in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

• Q.: General, could you describe briefly for us your biography? Tell us where you went to school.

(25) • A.: I went to the primary school in my place of birth, in my village,

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(1) Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and English transcripts.

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(1)and I completed the elementary school in the town of Han Pijesak, where I also completed my secondary education in a grammar school. Upon completion of my secondary education, I enrolled in the military academy which I attended in Belgrade and in Sarajevo. I began my university (5)education in 1968 at the military academy, and I graduated in 1972, whereupon I became an active-duty officer of the former JNA.

• Q.: You have mentioned three different localities, Han Pijesak, Sarajevo, and Belgrade. You told us about your early childhood and your youth. Could you also tell us something about the places where you lived (10)at the time you were completing your military academy? And could you also tell us something about the ethnic composition of those places in those years?

• A.: I went to the primary school in my place of birth, and that is one of the very few places in the territory of the municipality of Vlasenica (15)which was rather heterogenous when it comes to the ethnic composition. Never had there been any incident, anything that would have been caused by national intolerance. Quite the contrary. We all went to school together, we socialised together, and we had a great respect for each other. This applied also to the elderly population of the village, but it (20)applied in particular to the younger generation. As regards the military academy and the years I spent there in Belgrade, in Sarajevo, I should like to say that the cadets at the military academy were also of various ethnic backgrounds, and I have to stress that we never had any problems, any incidents amongst us which (25)would have been caused by ethnic intolerance.

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(1)We were always taught, educated, and we were brought in the spirit of Yugoslavia. We were taught to defend and to respect our country, the country of Yugoslavia, which was a community which consisted of various ethnicities of equal nations and (5)nationalities. So that spirit at the military academy was something that was not only nominal and formal for us. It was something that we all strived for, and the idea was to preserve the brotherhood and unity in Yugoslavia.

• Q.: General, upon your graduation from the military academy, which is (10)a high-level educational institution which lasts four years, you became an active-duty officer and you started your military career. Could you tell us, in brief terms, what was your career like in the former Yugoslavia?

• A.: Yes, I will do that. After I graduated from the military academy and after I became an active-duty officer of the former JNA, I was first (15)assigned to the Sarajevo garrison; more precisely, to the centre of military schools which was called Josip Bros Tito. My first assignment was a platoon commander at the secondary military school. Apart from that duty, the duty of the platoon commander, I was also a company commander, and later on I was a head of class in the last (20)year of the secondary military school there.

• Q.: Bearing in mind those two duties that you fulfilled at the time, apart from the fact that you were an officer, you were also an educator, you were also a kind of teacher. You trained young cadets in that school there. I should like to know, what kind of environment was that? I'm (25)referring to the school where you worked as a teacher and when you were an

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(1)officer.

• A.: It was not in any way different from the years that I spent at the military academy in Belgrade, in Sarajevo. The only difference, perhaps, was the fact that there were many young people in secondary military (5)schools. Those were children, very young people, and the work with them required a great amount of effort, because those young people were separated from their parents for the first time in their life and they were not used to living in a community. So from time to time there would be an incident here and there, (10)but again, never caused by any ethnic or national intolerance. I don't remember anyone at any point in time asking anyone else about his ethnic background or nationality. So that was the kind of atmosphere where I worked in the centre of secondary military schools. The objective, again, was to fight for, to (15)strive for, the ideals of brotherhood and unity, and I believe that we educated in that spirit the officers who later on -- the people who would later on would become officers and promote the ideals that we taught them.

• Q.: General, could you please slow down just a little bit because I believe that the interpreters are having some difficulty in following (20)you.

• A.: I will do that.

• Q.: You started a family in Sarajevo.

• A.: Yes, I did. The years that I spent with my family in Sarajevo were, I should say, the best years of my life. That is where I got (25)married, had a daughter. That is where I was given an apartment for the

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(1)first time. And those were beautiful years of my life. As regards my social contacts outside the garrison, outside the barracks, I have to say that all of us officers whenever we came to take up duties somewhere, we would be new in that particular environment, so at (5)the beginning it was only natural for us to socialise amongst ourselves. However, as time went by, we established more contacts with local people, with the residents of the place where we happened to live at the time and where we spent our free time. The town of Sarajevo in those years had something that other (10)cities in the former Yugoslavia didn't have for sure. This spirit of unity was particularly pronounced in the town of Sarajevo. We never inquired about each other's ethnic backgrounds. We all felt like the residents of Sarajevo. I believe that such an atmosphere lasted until the beginning of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, or rather until the (15)culmination of that crisis.

• Q.: After your tour of duty in Sarajevo which I believe lasted until 1981, what did your career look like? What did you do next?

• A.: My tour of duty in Sarajevo ended in 1981, whereupon I was posted to the general staff of the military academy in Belgrade. I can say that (20)that was a dream of all military officers in the former Yugoslavia who were career-minded. I began my education there in 1981 and I completed that training in 1983. So, that part of my education lasted two years. Throughout that time, my family stayed in Sarajevo. I didn't want them to be forced to come to Belgrade because I was sincerely hoping that (25)I would have coming back to Sarajevo and that I would go on with the life

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(1)that I used to have prior to my going to the general staff academy.

• Q.: However, obviously it was not meant to be because your next assignment was Negotin.

• A.: Yes. Though I felt like a real Sarajevan, my wishes also (5)depended on the wishes of my family and my superiors. I was given an assignment in Negotin which is a very small town positioned on the borders of three different countries: Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania. I was posted in the garrison as the battalion commander, but at the same time I was also the garrison commander in that area. So that was in mid-1983 (10)that I joined that garrison. As regards the relations amongst people in the unit where I started to work, the same spirit prevailed, the same spirit as the one that I had in Sarajevo. But that environment was no longer the environment of cadet corps but professional military officers. I had (15)people from various parts of the former Yugoslavia, and the people there were of various ethnic backgrounds. Although the crisis in the former Yugoslavia had just about started to brew and was mainly caused by economic problems and developments, we, the members of our unit and the garrison in general, managed to preserve a total unity amongst ourselves. (20)And the fact that the garrison was nationally heterogenous was something rather special which made us persevere in our objective. And we didn't have any incidents that would have been caused by ethnic intolerance. When it comes to social contacts amongst each other, amongst (25)military officers, and contacts with the people outside the barracks, with

• Page 5964 • {14/74}

(1)the locals, I can only repeat what I have already said in respect of Sarajevo. At the beginning we, officers of the garrisons, somehow had to socialise amongst ourselves and amongst our families. However, as time went by, we managed to acquire a number of friends and acquaintances (5)outside the barracks as well.

• Q.: Your next posting from Negotin was to Kosovska Mitrovica in early 1987.

• A.: Yes. In mid-1986, again because of the requirements of the service, I was posted away from the Negotin garrison to the Pristina (10)garrison where I was appointed to the operations organ of the command. I was in charge of training of officers and units in the Pristina corps. Although this is Kosovo, which was at the time rather specific in comparison to other localities in the former Yugoslavia, the command to which I had been posted was also very ethnically heterogenous. But there (15)was harmony; people respected each other. We socialised both in our work in the command but also in our private lives outside of the command itself, I would say to a much greater extent than it was the case in Sarajevo or in Negotin where we socialised mostly with the people outside the barracks. (20)The reason was the specific situation in Kosovo at the time. So that we somehow had to socialise with each other and we depended on each other, but of course we never consciously avoided contacts with the persons outside of the service, but these contacts were rare.

• Q.: This is the time of the great crisis in the former Socialist (25)Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The secession or the breakdown, the

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(1)collapse of Yugoslavia, a political economic and crisis of any other kind. And then in 1991 armed conflict breaks out in the former Yugoslavia. Where were you when the war started?

• A.: Yes. In the Pristina garrison, I remained until mid-1987 when I (5)was posted to the Kosovska Mitrovica garrison where my post was the Chief of Staff of the Motorised Brigade. I remained at that post until 1990 when I took over as the brigade commander in that very same garrison. This is the beginning of the constitutional and political crisis in the former Yugoslavia, or rather the culmination of the (10)constitutional and political crisis. We tried and we managed to retain at the beginning the mixed character of our community in the garrison and the unity that existed among us, the commanding corps and the soldiers, made us believe that any conflicts could be avoided and would be avoided, and that politicians would manage to find solutions and solve all the (15)problems, avoiding conflict and keeping Yugoslavia together and alive. However, the worst case scenario came to pass. Conflict breaks out first in the northern-most republic of the former Yugoslavia, in Slovenia, and then in Croatia. This was painful and horrible for all of us in my unit. Not only in my unit, but in the whole of the Pristina (20)corps. This in fact had an impact on the mixed ethnic character of the garrison because soldiers and commanders, officers from our unit, left the unit. Parting with those people was painful for us and it was very emotional for us. As they left, we would say goodbye believing and hoping that we -- perhaps we'll see each other again and perhaps that we would (25)work together again.

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(1) Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and English transcripts.

• Page 5967 • {17/74}

(1)I firmly believed, in light of the previous situation and the ethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that that would be the one place where conflict would not occur and where conflict would be avoided. Unfortunately, conflict breaks out in Bosnia-Herzegovina too, and the (5)ethnic mix, the ethnic heterogenity in the new Yugoslav army was completely destroyed, and only officers and soldiers of Serbian and Montenegrin ethnic background from the territories of Serbia and Montenegro remained there. Muslims from the Serbian territory of Serbia, and of course Albanians. (10)I realised that this was no place for me anymore in that unit, and indeed in the state, in the new Yugoslav state, and I decided to leave my post as the brigade commander. Of course I did that voluntarily. The reasons which prompted me to make this decision were the following: There were quite a few of them but I will just give you the three basic reasons (15)for my actions: The first reason is my family and my wife's family who were still in Bosnia. We had been out of touch with them for quite some time; the telephone lines were down so that we were very worried and we had every justification to be concerned for their lives and safety. (20)The second reason is because my colleagues, not only from my brigade but from the whole corps, had for a long -- had left their communities, their posts a long time ago and they joined their nations, their people. The third reason is that I realised that in the new Yugoslavia (25)there was no place for me. I didn't have anything to do there. And I

• Page 5968 • {18/74}

(1)realised that Bosnia-Herzegovina was my state.

THE INTERPRETER: I apologise.

• A.: In the army of the new Yugoslavia, I had nothing to do so I went to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

(5) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

• Q.: General, when you said, "I realise that Bosnia-Herzegovina was my state," in light of the year when you were born, are you a citizen of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the sense in which those citizenships were given out to (10)persons?

• A.: Yes. My wife, my daughter, and myself, we're all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We were also citizens of the Republic of Yugoslavia, just like all the other inhabitants in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

(15) • Q.: The reason why I asked you this question was, in fact, your previous answer. So you left the army of Yugoslavia voluntarily.

• A.: Yes, I left the army of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav army, voluntarily.

• Q.: So finally you arrive in the territory of the former Republic of (20)Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was at the time already, as of April, an internationally recognised state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can you tell us, where did you arrive and what were your activities after -- what were you doing after you arrived in Republika Srpska, or rather Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it was at the time?

(25) • A.: When I crossed the border between the Republic of Serbia and the

• Page 5969 • {19/74}

(1)Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I saw that all hell had broken loose. I saw villages burning, the burnt remnants of the villages. Unfortunately, I also noticed as I passed by that the villages that before the war, before the conflict, were ethnically mixed, that they were the first to go (5)down. And for me personally it was really horrible. I went to Han Pijesak, to my brother's place, he lived in Han Pijesak, where I found my mother who had been to the village where I had -- where I was born, just a little while ago. And I also visited my wife's parents; They lived, and indeed they still live in the territory (10)of the municipality of Han Pijesak. I spent a few days with them and then I reported to the Han Pijesak garrison. This is where the command of the Main Staff of what was then the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was located. I was immediately assigned to the post of the Commander of the 2nd (15)Romanija Brigade, which was located in the Sokolac garrison. The handover of duty from the previous commander, who was born in Croatia, took about ten days, the whole process took about ten days. So that I took over the command of the brigade in early July. Before I say a few words about the brigade itself, where it was (20)and what it was doing, I would just like to say the following: The overall situation at the Romanija plateau, Han Pijesak and Sokolac municipalities, was extremely difficult. It was chaotic and it was impossible to predict how things would evolve. I saw villages that before the war had been ethnically mixed, I saw that they were deserted by (25)Serbian and Muslim population, that they had been -- they had gone or they

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(1)were evicted, expelled, from these areas to go to areas which were very homogenous in ethnic terms. But there were some rare examples of villages where either the Muslim or the Serbian population remained there throughout the (5)war even in areas which were ethnically very homogenous despite the fact that they were of a different ethnic background. The villages of Burate and Vrbarija in the Sokolac municipality which had a majority Muslim population, an overwhelming majority, yet they left the area only after the signing of the Dayton Agreement. They had remained there throughout (10)the war, and after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, they went to Sarajevo.

• Q.: General, when you arrived in Han Pijesak and reported to the garrison, was that the time when the army of Republika Srpska was already a legally established institution in accordance with the constitution and (15)the laws in force at the time in the Republika Srpska?

• A.: Yes, that was the impression that I got. The army of Republika Srpska, or rather of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had already been set up and organised. My brigade, the brigade that I took over and which came under my command, had been established and organised, (20)as had all the other units in the army. It was established and organised predominantly in accordance with the territorial principle and with the participation of the population who had fled from other areas. So that this particular brigade was composed of the people from the Sokolac municipality, Olovo and Kladanj municipalities, and from the refugees from (25)the Zenica, Kakanj, Breza, and Vares municipalities. So it was ethnically

• Page 5971 • {21/74}

(1)homogenous, composed only of ethnic Serbs. For me, of course I understood what the situation was, but it was very difficult for me, after I left the post where the situation was completely, completely different. However, I was hoping against hope that the situation in (5)Bosnia-Herzegovina would calm down and that it would not escalate into armed conflict, or that the armed conflict would not escalate, because I simply could not believe despite all the developments, probably because I had been away from Bosnia-Herzegovina for such a long time and I was not there right at the beginning, I did not (10)know -- I was not aware of all the problems, in particular of political problems.

• Q.: When you said that the unit you took command of, the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, was composed of exclusively ethnic Serbs, the opposing side, conditionally speaking, or the enemy, were their forces also (15)ethnically homogeneous? Of course there were exceptions but they only confirm the rule.

• A.: Yes. On the basis of intelligence reports that we had at the time, I think it was so. In fact, I do believe that the units facing my brigade were similarly ethnically homogeneous, though I do not exclude the (20)possibility of some Serbs being in those units as well.

• Q.: When you took over command, the duty of commander of that brigade, were combat activities engaged in? Were the front lines already established? Could you describe to us the situation in the brigade and around the brigade, and specifically in the area of your command. (25)So please make a pause between the question and answer, and slow

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(1)down a little bit.

• A.: When I took over as Commander of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, the entire brigade was engaged on the front of defence towards Kladanj, Olovo, and Vares. There were combat activities between the (5)warring parties; however, within my area of responsibility, there were no conflicts. When I took over as Brigade Commander, regarding the command and control functions, I had a certain number of difficulties primarily caused by the fact that the officers in the brigade command and subordinate units (10)lacked experience in the kind of duties they were expected to perform, and they simply were not familiar with the prescribed duties for a particular position in the chain of command. However, with time that situation significantly improved, so that later on I didn't have any particular problems regarding the command and control functions.

(15) • Q.: So you took over that unit with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: So this was the rank that you acquired in the former army of the SFRY.

• A.: I joined the army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, (20)having the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, and in October of the same year, that is, in 1992, I was regularly promoted to the next highest rank, and that is the rank of Colonel.

• Q.: So this is a regular promotion.

• A.: Yes. I had already served as Lieutenant Colonel for four years, (25)so this was the next step.

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(1) • Q.: Were there any significant events in the area of responsibility of your brigade?

• A.: Before I answer that question, I should say if I may, I should like to say a few more words about control and command in my brigade.

(5) • Q.: Yes, please do so.

• A.: For me it was a great advantage that in the command and in subordinate units I had active-duty officers holding key positions, officers from the former Yugoslav People's Army with sufficient experience to perform those duties successfully. A particular advantage for me was (10)the fact that as Chief of Security, one of the key positions in those times, was held by an active-duty officer with many years of experience and years of service in that kind of service. His main duty in the brigade was counter-intelligence, and he was indeed the man who organised and implemented security measures in the (15)brigade. Not only did he implement them, but he also carried them out. He made a particularly noteworthy contribution to the organisation and implementation of such measures in subordinate units, and particularly with respect to prisoners of war and the treatment of the same from the moment of their capture until their handing over to the superior command.

(20) • Q.: Did your brigade have prisoners of war during the time when you were in command?

• A.: Yes, the brigade did have prisoners of war. In most cases they were captured on the front lines in attempting to infiltrate our units and those areas which were not defended or were inadequately defended. (25)Similarly, we had prisoners captured deep within the rear of our

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(1)territory. They were mostly sabotage and terrorist groups operating from Kladanj and Zepa and infiltrated deep within our territory with the aim of carrying out diversionary activities. I would like to add that these prisoners of war were treated in (5)every respect as required by our own rules and regulations and the Geneva Conventions. Their treatment was absolutely correct. They were housed in buildings under the conditions in which we lived and worked; they were fed with the same kind of food that our troops were provided with; they did have adequate medical treatment; they were registered in a regular manner, (10)always with the International Red Cross and other institutions and organisations that were responsible for them. The security service took care of the prisoners, more particularly the chief of security, as was his duty, and the security of them was provided by the military police. After a certain period of time and when (15)all the checks had been done, and after they had been registered with the International Red Cross, they were then sent on to the superior command for further treatment.

• Q.: So you were satisfied with the work of that body.

• A.: Yes, I was extremely satisfied. As I have said, these were (20)wartime conditions and it was normal that he should be one of the key figures in the brigade.

• Q.: I assume that as the Brigade Commander you dispatched regular and extraordinary and periodical reports to the higher command, in this case, to the Drina Corps, the Command of the Drina Corps. What I would like to (25)know is in compiling those reports, did the security body participate;

• Page 5975 • {25/74}

(1)that is, whether the security organ of your brigade sent separate reports or was this a single combined aggregate report sent by your brigade command?

• A.: The Chief of Security in my brigade would frequently and in a (5)timely fashion inform me about all problems regarding security in the brigade. He did so accurately and on time. Within the framework of daily and extraordinary reports, one of the items was always security, and the compilation of those reports, the Chief of Security did participate; and as such they were forwarded to the Superior Command. (10)However, there were cases while I was the Brigade Commander of certain security chiefs in the brigades of the Drina Corps not submitting their reports to their immediate superior, that is, the brigade commander, and they even failed to inform him about certain questions and problems. Instead, they forwarded their reports directly to the security (15)organ of the higher command, more precisely, to the security organ of the Drina Corps and the Main Staff. Let me mention by way of an example the reaction of the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade in 1994, I think this was sometime in the middle of the year, when the brigade commander informed the Corps Command and the (20)Main Staff that his chief of security is not reporting to him in a regular manner, nor is he informing him about problems and difficulties, but is instead sending his reports to the security organ of the Drina Corps, and even to the security department of the Main Staff in some cases.

• Q.: General, the relationship between the Drina Corps Command and the (25)brigade of which you were the Commander, were those relationships regular

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• Page 5977 • {27/74}

(1)in terms of tours, controls, visits, reports, suggestions, recommendations, everything that occurs between the higher- and lower-level commands?

• A.: Contacts between us in the brigade command and the officers in the (5)superior command in this case with representatives of the Drina Corps Command were regular, and when the corps command toured the brigade, to gain insight into the overall situation and any problems that may exist in the brigades, it would be normal for such touring teams of officers to be led by the Corps Commander. However, that never happened in the case (10)of my brigade. The Corps Commander in most cases came, escorted by General Mladic. I don't know why this was so. I know for certain that he acted quite differently in the case of some other units, such as, for instance, the Bratunac Brigade, the Skelani Battalion, and even the (15)Zvornik Brigade. When those units were toured, the Corps Commander often spent several days with them. However, in the case of my brigade, he stayed only as long as General Mladic stayed. So my impression was that this officer somehow had something against me personally, not against the brigade, and this would prove to be (20)true later on when I took over duty as Chief of Staff, and later on.

• Q.: The duties of a brigade commander, did they involve contacting officers in the Drina Corps and in the Main Staff, specifically General Mladic and his assistants?

• A.: Yes. That would occur when units of the Drina Corps were being (25)toured. And I think that on two or three occasions I did have contact

• Page 5978 • {28/74}

(1)with General Mladic, who led those Main Staff teams to check the combat readiness of Drina Corps units. Each time when he came with his team, in his company, General Zivanovic was always there.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The Defence, Mr. President, would (5)suggest a break now.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. Very well, Mr. Petrusic. Perhaps you could see with General Krstic how much time is most convenient, in view of his health, for us to continue at a time. So we're now going to have a half-hour break.

(10) --- Recess taken at 10.49 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.23 a.m.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, you may continue.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.

• Q.: General, before we finish with this area, could you just tell me (15)whether during the time you were commanding the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, that is, whether in the area of responsibility of that brigade there were any serious or major armed conflicts between the warring parties?

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the General, please.

(20) • A.: It is difficult for me to say what was the most important at the time I was the Commander of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade. Combat operations were conducted on a daily basis at the front lines, that is, along the confrontation line between the warring factions. There weren't any major changes of the lines with either party. There were some (25)attempts to improve the tactical situation so that a better control over

• Page 5979 • {29/74}

(1)the territory would be gained. Let me perhaps mention two examples as being somewhat more important. Firstly, in the summer of 1993, behind the positions of my units that were engaged in the front line in the area of Kladanj, there (5)was a synchronised infiltration of some significant sabotage forces, and the villages in the territory of the Han Pijesak municipality, such as Zerovice, Rijeka, and Potkosovaca were levelled to the ground during those attacks. A major portion of that population was either killed or captured and a smaller part managed to pull out. That occurred at the beginning of (10)August 1993, on the St. Ilijas Day, which is an important Orthodox holiday. There is another event that I should like to mention, and it involves a pre-planned operation which was carried out by the army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the beginning of spring, that is, (15)in late April, around Easter, when from the direction of Kladanj significant forces were moved with the objective, and according to the forces that had been engaged and according to the intelligence data that we had at the time, the objective was to capture Vlasenica and to link up from the direction of Kladanj with the protected area and the forces (20)within the protected area of Zepa. This particular offensive lasted for about 20 days, and it was crushed only - and the forces of the army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were stopped - only around the 20th of May. The combat took place day and night. The battle in question was referred to as Spilacko (25)Bilanska battle, as far as the Serbian side is concerned, but I believe

• Page 5980 • {30/74}

(1)also as far as the BH army forces are concerned. After that offensive had been crushed, the forces of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina were returned to their initial positions.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

(5) • Q.: You left the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade in 1994. You were transferred to another duty. Before we broach this new subject, let us deal with the following: It is common knowledge that the army of Republika Srpska granted awards and decorations to their staff. During that period of time while you were the Commander of the 2nd Romanija (10)Motorised Brigade, were you ever awarded any such decoration? If you were, could tell us very briefly about that.

• A.: No. No. Neither during the time when I was the Brigade Commander nor later on; I never received any decoration.

• Q.: General, could you now describe for us the duty that you took over (15)at that time, that is, the duty which is directly related to the Drina Corps in 1994, that is, in the second half of that year?

• A.: According to a decision which was issued by the Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska, on the 15th of August, 1994, I was appointed to the duty of the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps. The takeover of (20)duty between myself, who until that time was the Brigade Commander, and the new commander, the incoming commander, lasted from the 15th of August until the 1st of September. After that period of time, I took up my new position within the Command of the Drina Corps, that is, the position of the -- the post of the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps. (25)I was appointed to that post, as I have already indicated,

• Page 5981 • {31/74}

(1)pursuant to a decision issued by the Minister of Defence of Republika Srpska. Thereafter, a takeover of duty took place between myself and the outgoing Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, General Skocajic. I should like to describe in very few words the procedure of (5)takeover of duty. It is a procedure that takes a prescribed amount of time, during which time the new officer who is supposed to take up that post is supposed to familiarise himself with the most basic duties and responsibilities encumbered upon him by virtue of the post according to establishment. (10)The takeover of duty between myself and the former Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps lasted between the 1st of September, 1994, until the 28th of September that same year, 1994. During that period of time, the time which was regulated by the Corps Commander, I became familiar with the following: First of all, I was supposed to acquaint myself with the (15)duties and responsibilities which are prescribed for that particular post, that is, duties and responsibilities of the post according to establishment. After that, I was briefed on the structure of the bodies of the Command of the Corps and on their duties and responsibilities so that I would be able to fulfil my duties as best as possible. (20)During that time, I was also briefed with all statutory regulations governing the work of the Corps Command and the work of the Corps in general, after which I was briefed on the type of organisation and structure of subordinate units, their working and living conditions, but I spent most of the time getting briefed about the situation on the (25)ground. When I say "on the ground," I refer primarily to the forces which

• Page 5982 • {32/74}

(1)were engaged on the defence of the north-weastern area of the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, that is, Zivinice, Kladanj, Tuzla, and Olovo area. So it means that I had an opportunity to personally inspect on the ground the relevant units and to be briefed on all the relevant (5)problems that we were faced with at the time. Of course, the said amount of time was not sufficient because the procedure of the takeover of duty constitutes a basis for further action and further successful work.

• Q.: Does that mean, General, that on the 28th of September, 1994, you (10)actually took up duty or, rather, the post of the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, and legally speaking, de jure and also de facto, on the ground?

• A.: Yes. It is as of that particular date that I was officially on my post, that is, the post of the Chief of Staff of the Corps. After that (15)particular date, I was able to avail myself of all the rights and to fulfil and exercise all the duties and responsibilities of that functional position, functional post. But let me say one other thing. Before a record was made on the takeover of duty, I was also briefed about the situation involving the (20)army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its intentions towards the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps and inside that area of responsibility. I was briefed about the activities, the operations, coming from the direction of Tuzla, Zivinice, Kladanj, and Olovo against our defence lines.

(25) • Q.: Let me interrupt you for a moment, General.

• Page 5983 • {33/74}

(1) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I should like the assistance of the usher, and can Exhibit 27 be placed on the ELMO, Defence Exhibit 27, D27, that is.

• A.: While the usher is looking for the documents, I would like to add (5)that I was also briefed about the activities of the 28th Division from the protected areas of Zepa and Srebrenica against our positions, the forces that were engaged in the defence around the protected areas and inside of the area of responsibility of the Corps; and also of the weapons they had, and daily deserters, the people who deserted daily from the protected (10)areas towards Tuzla, Zivinice, and Kladanj.

• Q.: General, we have in front of us a document of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 8th Operative Group, Srebrenica. The number of the document is 130-01-63/94, of the 26th of July, 1994. It was sent to the Command of the 2nd Corps, attention of the commander in (15)Tuzla. In this document - we have it also in the English translation and that is good - with reference to a telephone conversation with the member of the Srebrenica War Presidency, "we forward the list of materiel and equipment required and ask you to procure and deliver these to the free (20)territory of the municipality of Srebrenica." Mentioned here are rifles, light and heavy machine-guns, and the quantity is 4.000 pieces; the ammunition, and the quantity is 500.000, 300.000, 100.000, 5.000 respectively; 100.000 again on several items; then weapons such as Zoljas, hand-held rocket launchers; Osa likewise; and also (25)shells and mines.

• Page 5984 • {34/74}

(1)Did your predecessor brief you about the situation and the armament -- the process of arming which was going on in the Srebrenica safe area? Or to be more specific, the quantities of weapons that were requested and the quantities of ammunition requested, in your estimate, (5)what do they amount to?

• A.: Yes. My predecessor briefed me and told me that regardless -- despite the status of the safe area accorded to that area and the obligations stemming from the agreement on demilitarisation, that the forces of the 28th Division of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in (10)Srebrenica and Zepa were, in fact, continuously arming themselves, obtaining or procuring more weapons in addition to the light or infantry weapons they already had at their disposal and failed to hand over; that they were obtaining future -- further weapons from Tuzla and Kladanj or directly from Sarajevo.

(15) • Q.: This is the 26th of July, 1994, and this request was submitted to the Supreme Command, to the General Staff of the army of Republika Srpska
[as interpreted] If Srebrenica and Zepa were demilitarised and safe areas protected by the United Nations, then why such a request for additional weapons? (20)But also for the procurement of a huge amount of ammunition for the weapons listed there. This is signed by the commander of the 28th Division, Mr. Naser Oric. The next document is Exhibit 25 -- sorry, 28 --

MR. HARMON: Excuse me.

(25) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Harmon.

• Page 5985 • {35/74}

(1) MR. HARMON: I apologise. There appears to be a mistake in the transcript, and it appears at -- let me just find it again.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.

MR. HARMON: There appears to be a mistake on line 11:43:20 to (5)28. In other words, the exhibit is referred to as a request that was submitted to the Supreme Command, to the General Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, and the exhibit is different on its face.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. Harmon. (10)The request or the document referred to by the Defence, document number 27, is a request of the 8th Operative Group Srebrenica of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, number 103-01-63/94, 26th of July, 1994. It is submitted to the Command of the 2nd Corps in Sarajevo, attention Commander in Tuzla. (15)So I would now like us to refer to the other document. That's Defence Exhibit number 28. Mr. President, since this document has not been translated by the translation service, we only have a copy in the Bosnian or Serbian language. I will read the heading of the document so we know what the (20)document is about. It has been marked for identification as 28, 28B, in fact. "Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8th Operative Group, Srebrenica Command."

JUDGE RODRIGUES: Mr. Harmon, do you have the document?

MR. HARMON: We're waiting for it, Mr. President. We don't have (25)it yet. We request that we not proceed until we have a copy of it. Thank

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(1)you.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: Very well then. We're going to wait, because I don't have the document either.

MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I have copy of it now. I've located (5)it in a binder that was given to me by counsel for the accused.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: Can we, therefore, proceed?

MR. HARMON: Yes. I would ask, however, that in the future when an exhibit is disseminated to the witness, that we be provided in court with a copy of the exhibit. Otherwise, we're going to be looking through (10)a rather thick binder, trying to find a needle in a haystack.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: Yes. I think that Madam Registrar will take care of that for our future hearings. Mr. Petrusic, I believe we can now continue.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Your Honour. (15)So in the document that was quoted before that was submitted to the 2nd Corps Command, the security section in Tuzla, the situation in the territory of Srebrenica is discussed. More specifically, that in the night between the 24th and the 25th of July, 1994, a group of around 17 people left the free territory of Srebrenica, heading towards Tuzla. (20)General, did you have any knowledge of such activities?

• A.: Yes. This problem -- I was also briefed about this problem by my predecessor. This is just one in a series of documents presenting the fact that people were leaving the protected areas of Srebrenica and Zepa is presented as a problem. These were actually members of the (25)28th Division leaving the areas. Sometimes there were even civilians when

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(1)there were larger groups. In most cases, desertion from the protected area of Srebrenica involved those members of the 28th Division whose families had left the area immediately prior or after the outbreak of the hostilities that left (5)the area of responsibility of the 28th Division, that's the municipalities of Zvornik, Vlasenica, Bratunac, Srebrenica, and Milici. So one of the main reasons and causes for desertion was the fact that the families of those fighters had left for Tuzla, Kladanj, and Zivinice, whereas they remained in the 28th Division. Then later, they decided to leave their (10)unit and to get back together with their families. In document, this overview, indicates that these are the members of the 28th Division. It is even specified what duties they had, and it is indicated that they had their weapons with them. The fact that they were armed caused great problems to us at the front lines as they crossed (15)the intermediate areas of our units. It is -- you can see that this -- that this document was sent by the 8th Operative Group to the security organ of the 2nd Corps in Tuzla, and it is signed by the assistant to the commander for security, Mr. Nedzad Bektic.

• Q.: Thank you, General. I would now like to refer to Exhibit 29B. (20)This document is also a document issued by the Srebrenica 8th Operative Zone. The number is 103-26-18/94, dated 31st of August, 1994. Can you tell us, from the point of view of familiarisation of the situation in the Drina Corps, can you make a brief comment about this document?

(25) • A.: This document also refers to the desertion of the area of

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(1)responsibility in the direction of Tuzla and Kladanj. It mentions a rather large number of persons who in the period covered by the report had deserted their units and who went to Tuzla and Kladanj. Most of them were from the Vlasenica municipality and the Bratunac municipality, and their (5)families had, before the outbreak of the hostilities, had gone to Kladanj and Zivinice, and this is the basic reason why they left their units and the whole area. And I could say at the time, the Serbian propaganda was not the reason. Their goal was to get back together with their families. I also have to say that a large number of them, of the people (10)listed here, are, in fact, from my home village, and I know for a fact that after I came to Bosnia and Herzegovina, that the inhabitants of my village and of their village at the beginning of the conflict fled towards Tuzla, Zivinice, and Kladanj. The document is signed by the intelligence officer, Mr. Ekrim Sahlihovic. (15)This mass desertion of the protected areas was a great problem for the 28th Division, primarily because of the loss of personnel, both soldiers and officers, and the fact that they took their weapons with them was also a major problem. I have already mentioned, referring to the previous document, this (20)was a great problem for us too, because they crossed the depth of our territory between the protected area of Srebrenica and the positions of our forces that were engaged on the front lines against Tuzla, Kladanj, and Zivinice. I have to say that en route, as they encountered the members of (25)our units and when they were spotted by our units, that combat occurred

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(1)and a large number of those people were injured or killed, and we also had casualties. Our units had casualties too.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next document that I would like to have tendered into evidence is document 30B. This document is also a (5)document of the 8th Operative Group of Srebrenica, number 130-17-04/94, dated the 7th of September, 1994.

• Q.: Before I put a question to you, I would like to know, General, and I think that in the course of these proceedings, the unit in the protected area of Srebrenica has been established to be the 28th Division; and the (10)name we see in the heading of this document, that is, the 8th Operative Group of Srebrenica, is that the same unit? Tell me, please.

• A.: Yes, it is the same unit. At the beginning of the outbreak of fighting in Eastern Bosnia where forces of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina were located, the name given to those forces, that (15)grouping, was the Defence Staff of Srebrenica, or rather the Defence Staff for Eastern Bosnia. Later on those forces reorganised by order of the Supreme Command of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that name was changed to the 8th Operative Group of Srebrenica. And then at the (20)beginning of May 1995, this 8th Operative Group was again, by order of the Supreme Command of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, renamed and became the 28th Division Srebrenica, which was located in both protected areas, that is, in the territory of Srebrenica and Zepa.

• Q.: So let us now go back to this document and my question. As they (25)left the protected area, or during attempts to flee from the area, did

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(1)these soldiers and civilians come across minefields that had been placed there by the 8th Operative Group, when we are talking about Srebrenica?

• A.: Yes. This document or, rather, report does not specifically refer to the departure from the protected area. These are planned activities of (5)the 28th Division in Srebrenica, and I have spoken about this, which I was briefed about when taking over duty; that in fact they continuously carried out reconnaissance activities regarding our forces' positions around the protected areas of Srebrenica and Zepa and also deep within our territory. (10)This particular document refers to reconnaissance into our positions on the 27th of July, 1994, in the area of Pribicevac, when a soldier member of the 28th Division was seriously injured; it says that he was here reconnoitring enemy positions. And also on the 6th of July, 1994, in the area of Pribicevac, another soldier was wounded. Then on the (15)6th of August, in the region of Buljim, while reconnoitring Serb positions, two fighters were killed, three were seriously injured, and all of them belonged to the 280th Light Bosnian Brigade -- Eastern Bosnian Brigade which was deployed in the area of Buljim at the time. We see that the officer for engineering signed this, Mr. Mirsad (20)Dudic. So in accordance with his position, he is reporting to the Command of the 2nd Corps, probably to the engineers' body, because his duty was mining and demining and other such activities that come under his responsibilities.

• Q.: The next exhibit is Defence Exhibit D31B. This is a report of the (25)8th Operative Group of Srebrenica, number 130-13-75/94, addressed to the

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(1)2nd Corps of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, dated the 9th of September, 1994. At the bottom of this report, on the first page, the last sentence says: "There is massive desertion from the enclave. In the last seven (5)days, the enclave has been abandoned by about 1.200 people, of which one-third are without weapons." If we were to -- judging by the documents we had in our possession, the previous cases of desertion could be described as sporadic and in small groups or individuals; in this case we are talking about a (10)large group, a large number of people who are abandoning the enclave. Were you aware of this? And since these were armed personnel, were they a danger for the units deployed around the enclave? Were they a threat to them?

• A.: Yes. This is another in a series of documents, and this stands (15)out in particular, this one, from which we can see that desertion of the protected area of Srebrenica was carried out on a large scale. I said that there were such cases daily, they were daily occurrences, and they were a cause of great problems for us especially when they were armed. In this case, we are talking about a large number of individuals, (20)as stated in this document, and they were indeed a very serious threat; not only for our units facing Tuzla, Zivinice, and Kladanj, but also for the civilian population within the area of responsibility, because they had to cross that area in order to reach Tuzla, Zivinice, and Kladanj from Srebrenica. (25)So in this report, too, reference is made in several places to

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• Page 5993 • {43/74}

(1)people who are leaving the area of responsibility and giving their particulars, that is, which municipalities they came from; their aim being to reunite with their families. So in those days there were no attacks, no offensives, against protected areas, and there were no other reasons (5)for them to leave those areas except the one I have just given. I apologise. One of the reasons that is expounded in this document by the author of the report is that they're leaving the protected area, among other reasons, because of the propaganda activities offering free passage towards Tuzla and Kladanj, safe passage to Tuzla and (10)Kladanj.

• Q.: The next document is 33B. General, the document is in front of you. This document bears the number 130-28-169/94, dated 7th of November, 1994. It is sent from Srebrenica to the Command of the 2nd Corps. In paragraph number 4 reference is made to the delivery of (15)humanitarian aid and selection of certain supplies from that delivery of aid which is being distributed to members of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Were you aware about the arrival of such humanitarian aid at all and how that aid was distributed, and to whom; that is, as far as this (20)fourth paragraph is concerned?

• A.: Yes, I did have some information to the effect that humanitarian aid was being delivered to the protected area of Srebrenica. I must admit that I had no knowledge about the possible problems that existed prior to the entry of such humanitarian aid into the protected area. (25)On the basis of intelligence reports that we had regarding the

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(1)distribution of that aid within the protected area itself, how it was distributed and to whom, all I can say is the following: And that is that the vast majority of that humanitarian aid was distributed among members of the 28th Division and their families, of course. A part of that (5)humanitarian aid was put aside for certain individuals who traded in those goods for personal gain, and this will later prove to be true.

• Q.: On page 2 of this report, there is reference to offensive activities by each brigade belonging to the 8th Operative Group, and the Defence and Their Honours are interested in knowing whether this was so (10)and whether you had information about all these things.

• A.: This is the first document in a series of documents in which there is reference in quite specific terms about measures that are being taken in preparation for offensive activities from Srebrenica towards Tuzla, Zivinice, and Kladanj. It is true that this is a report on the morale of (15)the members of the 28th Division, but among other things, this report also states as follows -- if I may, I should like to read it out: "A turning point in the improvement of combat morale occurred after the order of the Commander of the 2nd Corps of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to carry out reconnaissance of enemy (20)positions and to carry out preparations for possible combat activities towards Konjevic Polje, Cerska, and Kamenica. All units showed a full measure of willingness and readiness to carry out all such assignments from superiors. Combat morale has not declined because of the death and wounding of a number of soldiers when reconnoitring enemy territory." (25)So this document mentions for the first time preparations for

• Page 5995 • {45/74}

(1)carrying out offensive activities and their actual implementation, which means that the Supreme Command of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 2nd Corps in Tuzla, even during 1994, had planned offensive combat activities not only from the direction of Tuzla, Zivinice, and Kladanj, (5)but also it had planned to engage the forces of the 28th Division in Srebrenica and Zepa so that the territory of the protected areas should be linked up with the territory of Tuzla, Zivinice, and Kladanj. Specifically, the author of this report, of this document, who is sending it to the Command of the 2nd Corps in Tuzla, the sector for (10)morale, makes an individual assessment of morale in all the brigades of the 28th Division and explains how this morale had increased in the units of the division after they had learned that there would be offensive activities. As an introduction of those offensive activities, we will see later, and we've already seen from one document, was the carrying out of (15)planned sabotage activities deep within our territory along the axes from Srebrenica via Konjevic Polje, Cerska, and Modrica.

• Q.: General, on page 3 of this report -- let us finish with it -- the second paragraph, it says: "The greatest problem will be the infiltration of a large number of soldiers from the demilitarised zone to the (20)destination without UNPROFOR noting them, and also avoiding minefields on the road from Srebrenica to the destination."

• A.: Yes. Clearly all the activities that they engaged in from the moment Srebrenica was declared a safe area were carried out in such a way as to not to be noticed by UN forces. They concealed these activities (25)from them. I simply find is hard to believe that the Canadian Battalion

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(1)first and later the Dutch Battalion would not have reacted to this if they had known about it.

• Q.: How long did you, therefore, stay at the Corps Command and how long did you tour the units after the takeover of your duties as the Chief (5)of Staff of the Corps Command?

• A.: After I took over my duties as the Chief of Staff of the Corps Command, and after being briefed about the situation through the procedure of the takeover of duty, while carrying -- I stayed at my post at the Corps Command until the 1st of November, 1994, whereupon, upon an order of (10)the Corps Command and pursuant to an order issued by the Main Staff, I established a unit with the strength of a brigade and took it to the area of the Herzegovinian Corps for the purpose of taking part in the crushing of the offensive which was being conducted at that time by the BH army from the area of Bjelasnica and Igman towards the area of the (15)responsibility of the Herzegovinian Corps. I'm referring to the area of Treskavica and Trnovo. And I was personally commanding that brigade as the Chief of Staff.

• Q.: Maybe I haven't followed you, and I apologise for that. How long did you stay in the area of Treskavica and Trnovo?

(20) • A.: In the area of responsibility of the Herzegovinian Corps, that is, in the area of Treskavica and Trnovo, I remained until mid-December 1994, whereupon I returned to the command of the Corps in Vlasenica, to my post, in order to continue with the duties that I had taken up. After I had returned from the area of responsibility of the (25)Herzegovinian Corps, naturally, I was briefed about the situation in the

• Page 5997 • {47/74}

(1)area of responsibility of the Corps, and I became familiar with all the problems that they were facing at the moment, in particular, with the activities which were conducted by the forces of the BH army at that time towards the area and inside the area of responsibility of the Drina (5)Corps. The briefing involved the situation in general, the attempts and intentions of the BH army in the north-western part of the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, that is, towards the area of Tuzla, Zivinice, Kladanj, and Olovo. (10)I was also briefed on further activities and operations that the Command of the 28th Division in Srebrenica, acting upon orders of the Main Staff of the 2nd Corps in Tuzla, that they were conducting towards the positions of the Drina Corps and also in the depth of the area of our area of responsibility. In particular, I'm referring to the area of the Milici (15)municipality, Han Pijesak, and also parts of the territory of the Vlasenica municipality. I was also briefed about the continuation of the army and weapons and ammunitions supply to the protected area, that is, to the members of the 28th Brigade. Also, I was informed on the first case of a helicopter (20)landing from the direction of Kladanj in Tuzla, into the protected areas.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I think that there is a procedure regarding breaks that has been well established by now. However, I should like to ask Your Honours to deviate a bit from that established procedure and to shorten the length of testimony for a couple (25)of minutes, and I should like to request a break at this point.

• Page 5998 • {48/74}

(1) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well, Mr. Petrusic. We will have half-hour breaks, and, therefore, we will be acting according to the procedure that has already been established. If we have a half-hour break at this point, we will have to work 1 hour and 30 minutes after (5)that. I don't know whether General Krstic is in a position to continue for about ten minutes at this point. If not, if his health condition does not allow him to do so, we will have a break. What do you prefer? You prefer to have a break now?

(10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. We will have a half-hour break at this point, then.

--- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

--- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

(15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, please continue.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, before resuming, in principle we are going to work until 2.30. Will General Krstic manage to work for that period, or do we need a small break in between? We'll (20)see?

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] From your gesture, I assume that we will see.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. Let's see around 2.00. In any event, General Krstic, if you need a break, please let us (25)know whether you can continue or not.

• Page 5999 • {49/74}

(1) THE WITNESS: [Int.] Thank you very much.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, please continue.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Your Honour. In line with the answer that was received, the answer to the (5)previous question, I would now like to ask the usher to place Exhibit 32B on the ELMO.

• Q.: This document bears the number 130/01/220 [as interpreted] I have to admit that the heading of this document is illegible, but its contents, however, are in a better condition. It is originating from the (10)Commander of the 8th Operative Group, Brigadier Naser Oric, and it is sent to the Command of the 284th Brigade, attention Commander. The document is dated the 6th of October, 1994, 10.00 a.m. This order, in the first paragraph of this order, it is stated as follows: "Immediately start preparing and selecting personnel for (15)reconnaissance activities in the temporarily occupied territory of the wider region of Konjevic Polje." My first question, General, is whether at the time Konjevic Polje was an area controlled by the units of the Republika Srpska army, of the Drina Corps, which is outside of the territory of the Srebrenica safe (20)area.

• A.: First of all, this was not an area that was controlled by the Republika Srpska army units. It was not defended, it was not a defended area, because facing Srebrenica there were Drina Corps units in front of this area, and I'm referring to the Bratunac and Milici Brigades. So this (25)is a space in which the 5th Engineer Battalion of the Drina Corps was

• Page 6000 • {50/74}

(1)located. This is where they stayed, this is where they resided and worked. The 5th Engineer Battalion is --

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic, you want to interrupt? I beg your pardon.

(5) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Your Honour, I would like to apologise, but in order to speed up the matter, I will be correcting the errors in the transcript. The number of the document is 130-04-020, dated 6th of October, 1994 -- I have to intervene. The number of the document is 202. So it's (10)130-04-202.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, you are right, Mr. Visnjic. Thank you very much for drawing our attention to this error. You may continue, Mr. Petrusic.

(15) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

• Q.: So in this territory, in Konjevic Polje, this is where the 5th Engineer Battalion of the Drina Corps was deployed.

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Does this document show that the activities -- that the 8th (20)Operative Group continue activities against the forces of the Republika Srpska army?

• A.: Yes. This is an order issued by the Commander of the 8th Operative Group to one of the commanders of the subordinate brigades. This was sent to the attention of the Commander of the 284th Eastern (25)Bosnian Light Brigade, and he issues a specific order which axes to

• Page 6001 • {51/74}

(1)reconnoitre, in what time period, and what is the deadline for the reconnaissance. This order is related to an explanation that I gave for the previous documents relating to the preparations for offensive operations (5)on the Srebrenica-Konjevic Polje-Cerska-Tuzla direction. This is, indeed, the shortest direction from Srebrenica to Tuzla for actions to be carried out.

• Q.: The next document is document number 570-11/94, that's Exhibit 34B, dated 7th of November, 1994. (10)So this document is entitled "The Plan For Counter-offensive Action of the S.B. Battalion," and since this is a plan, the Defence would like to know -- the Defence would be interested in hearing what you knew about these activities carried out by the 8th Operative Group or the S.B. Battalion.

(15) • A.: This document relates to the previous document. The Commander of the Independent Mountain Battalion from Srebrenica takes action in accordance with the order issued by the Commander of the 8th Operative Group, and he drafts a plan which he entitled "The Plan for Counter-offensive By the Independent Mountain Battalion." (20)The Independent Mountain Battalion, according to the intelligence we had at our disposal, was a unit, the unit that was the best unit for combat at that level in the 28th Division, which can also be seen from this report. The Commander of the 8th Operative Group gives a task -- assigns a (25)task to him first. His battalion that was issued -- given the task to

• Page 6002 • {52/74}

(1)penetrate into the depth of the territory controlled by Serbs as an advance for other forces, the remaining forces which should start from the wider area Srebrenica towards Tuzla [Realtime transcript read in error Tuesday] in order to link up with the forces from Tuzla. (5)So he gives a specific task that is to be his units, specifying the axses, direction of movement to each of the units and the tasks assigned to those units, the composition of the groups which are to carry out certain tasks. He goes as far as to determine the type of weapons they are to (10)use, the weapons that they will take with them as they carry out the tasks. He also determines the quantity of ammunition and other materiel that is necessary for the execution of the reconnaissance and sabotage and terrorist operations. To conclude, I would like to read what it says at the end of this (15)plan. Page 2, the last paragraph: "When the Stolica elevation is taken, half of the soldiers are to remain there and hold the area, and the remaining forces should go to Tusto Brdo," and the direction of new operations is in that direction, and that is in the depth of the territory controlled by Serbs. When personnel from Avdaginu Njivu, which is closer (20)to the positions of both parties are being -- are freed, the brigades from the barricades from Kravica, Radukica, and Magasica, soldiers are supposed to go towards Tusto Brdo and the new operations -- direction of operation is Polom. In this plan for counter-offensive, the soldiers from Krusev Dola (25)are not taken into account. Krusev Dola is in the territory of the

• Page 6003 • {53/74}

(1)protected area of Zepa. So they were not a part of this independent battalion nor of any other brigade located in the Srebrenica territory. So he takes soldiers from the 1st Zepa Brigade, which was also part of the 28th Division after the restructuring of the 8th Operative (5)Group into the 28th --

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, for the transcript, line page 46, 24th line, which is still on the screen, from "Srebrenica towards Tuzla." That is what it should say in the original.

(10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, I noticed that instead of "Tuzla," we could see "Tuesday." So something -- an error in the transcript. But it will be corrected, as you know. On the other hand, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that if you're quoting a document, one has to be very clear when you're (15)beginning to quote and when you come to the end of the quotation. Otherwise, there may be problems. You understand, Mr. Petrusic, because
[Realtime transcript read in error Busovaca] reading the text, if General Krstic is commenting on the text is one thing and quoting is another thing. So unless you tell us that it is the end of the quotation, (20)there could be confusion.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

• Q.: The next exhibit is number 35B.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I see that the word "Busovaca" appears in the text. There was never any mention of "Busovaca" here. (25)We'll have to correct all that. Those are the conditions we're working

• Page 6004 • {54/74}

(1)in. I'm talking about page 48, line 7. But nevermind. We will have "Busovaca" deleted because it has nothing to do with these matters we're discussing here.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

(5) • Q.: The document was issued by the army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Command of the 283rd Brigade, number 191-10/94, dated 7th of November, 1994. I will quote: "Our units in the strength of 200 soldiers, our unit has been assigned the task of infiltrating into the enemy rear, and it could be considered as an Infantry Company strengthened (10)with Engineer Platoons, Anti-Armour Platoon, and Sabotage Platoons. We feel that the lines that should be occupied have not been determined because they are deep in the rear. We assume that the enemy has a barracks next to the school where there is a company-strength unit and that the location is guarded by a tank and an APC. The same location is, (15)in fact, protecting a vital road for Milici." The next thing that I would like to quote before asking my question, it is from the order that has already been referred to, page 1, that's paragraph 5: "Our unit has 200 sharp rifles. At least 30 should be left to defend Srebrenica. In my estimate, 120 sharp rifles are at our (20)disposal, and about five Zoljas," that's hand-held grenade launchers, "and grenade launchers with three grenades." General, do you, from this information about the enemy, reach certain conclusions as to their intentions and as to the way in which they conduct their activities? And could you please explain the term "sharp (25)rifle" or "sharp barrel"? What does it mean? Because this is the first

• Page 6005 • {55/74}

(1)time that we come across this term.

• A.: This order issued by the Commander of the 283rd East Bosnia Light Brigade is given to the subordinate units for the execution of the task given to them by the Commander of the 8th Operative Group; that's General (5)Oric. This document relates to the document I referred to earlier, the previous document in which Oric issued orders to all units pertaining to the combat activities in the Srebrenica-Konjevic Polje-Cerska-Udrc-Tuzla area, and as is usual, they carry out the orders they received from their (10)commander. As regards this quote that you have just given me and the request for me to explain what this term "sharp barrel" means, I would first like to refer to what he is saying about the enemy and his own forces, stating that they have engineers, sabotage, and anti-armour units in their (15)formation equipped and armed with all the materiel that enables them to carry out their assigned duties. The term "sharp barrel" is not a specific term. It refers to rifles they had. And these are the rifles that also have bayonets. It can be fitted onto semi-automatic rifles which they had from the former (20)JNA, and also automatic rifles which they had, and Kalashnikovs. I think that the knife, the bayonet, was not actually attached to the barrel, but there is a knife that can, if necessary, be placed on the rifle itself. At the end of this order, that's page 3, the penultimate paragraph, I quote: "It is my opinion that we should wait for the units (25)from Tuzla to occupy the key points Udrc, Kuljic, Cerska," and so on, "and

• Page 6006 • {56/74}

(1)then carry out the infiltration. Any extension of the action for longer than 2400 hours on our lines and the failure of the forces of the 2nd Corps to advance towards us would be fatal for us."

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's remark: There is a typing mistake (5)in the original text.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

• Q.: Does that mean that this plan or action should have been synchronised with the forces of the 2nd Corps from the direction of Tuzla, from the one side, which would then come out to the Zvornik, Milici, and (10)other brigades, into their rear, and on the other side there would be an advance from Srebrenica on the part of the 8th Operative Group?

• A.: Yes. It was an order issued by the 2nd Corps of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the goal of linking up their forces with the forces from the Srebrenica area, and the events that will (15)transpire later will prove that this was indeed so. The Commander of this brigade expresses his opinion in a very realistic way and justified way, because infiltrating that deep into the territory controlled by the Serbs was very risky. If the forces from Tuzla failed to move, and if they do not move fast enough in their attack, (20)it would be very hard for the infiltrated units to hold the positions they had taken without linking up with the forces attacking from Tuzla. We will see later in the developments in early 1995 how these events actually transpired.

• Q.: In one of your previous answers you mentioned Naser Oric and you (25)said he was a General. Is this an error on your part, or was it the rank

• Page 6007 • {57/74}

(1)that he had?

• A.: No, it was not an error. According to our information, Naser Oric was a General, the Commander of the first staff of the Srebrenica Territorial Defence, which later became the 8th Operative Group; and as of (5)May 1995 he was the Commander of the 28th Division. So he was, indeed, a General and the Commander of the 28th Division.

• Q.: The next document is a document bearing the number 36B. It is a document issued by the Command of the 8th Operative Group in Srebrenica, number 01/1-2, dated the 9th of November, 1994, submitted to the Command (10)of the 2nd Corps in Tuzla. On page 2 of this document, signed by Naser Oric, and I quote: "I, therefore, ask you, because of the planned combat operations on the linking up of the 8th Operative Group and the 2nd Corps, to postpone the realisation and implementation of this order until the completion of the (15)planned operations, and to advise us thereof a little bit in advance." Was there, then, a continuous and planned activity on attempts to link up the Srebrenica enclave with the forces of the 2nd Corps, with its headquarters in Tuzla?

• A.: Yes.

(20) • Q.: Before you go into your answer, we have Prosecution Exhibit 2; it is a map. Could you please point at the map -- could you please show on the map the positions of the 2nd Corps. So the position of the units of the 2nd Corps and the positions of the 8th Operative Group.

• A.: As everyone knows, the Command of the 2nd Corps of the army of the (25)Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was located in Tuzla. The forces of the

• Page 6008 • {58/74}

(1)2nd Corps of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina were deployed along three axes or in three directions. One of those axes was west of Tuzla, towards Doboj, in the direction of the 1st Corps of the army of Republika Srpska. (5)The second axis of activity was northwards, that is, towards the forces of the Eastern Bosnia Corps, whose Command was based in Bijeljina. A part of the forces was deployed in defence and offensive operations in the direction of the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps from the direction of Tuzla. This is Tuzla, Kalesija, Zvornik -- (10)Tuzla, Kalesija, Zvornik. So these are these forces here. The area where the 2nd Corps were to link up in the planning and execution of offensive operations was between Srebrenica and Tuzla. This is the area from Srebrenica towards Kalesija. So this is this area here. The axis we are talking about is this one: Srebrenica, Konjevic Polje, (15)Cerska, Udrc, and further on towards Kalesija.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] For the transcript, the forces of the 2nd Corps, on Prosecution Exhibit number 2, are marked in blue. Could I ask for Exhibit 39, please.

• Q.: This document was issued by the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina of the (20)283rd Brigade. The number of the document is 22-50-52, dated 13th of November, 1994. Dated the 13th of November, 1994, I see. The number of the document is 22-50-59. This document, General, constitutes a plan as the heading indicates, and I quote: "To disarm members of UNPROFOR in the Vezionica (25)compound in Srebrenica. The plan envisages seizure of materiel and

• Page 6009 • {59/74}

(1) Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and English transcripts.

• Page 6010 • {60/74}

(1)equipment held by UNPROFOR, infantry weapons, ammunition, communications devices, clothing, footwear, and others which could be of great use for the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the further course of the defence and liberation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the (5)information that we have, there are about 70 UN members in the camp armed with personal weapons and with six anti-aircraft guns located on APCs. For the execution of this operation, we intend to deploy 50 members of our brigade, of which 35 members from a" -- an abbreviation I am not familiar with, "DIV, and 15 members of" -- another abbreviation I'm not familiar (10)with, "POC, divided into five groups of ten." Are you familiar with this plan in view of the fact that many documents that we have discussed so far are linked to activities within a relatively brief period of time, on the one hand, the activities of the 28th Division or, rather, the 8th Operative Group in collaboration with (15)the activities of the 2nd Corps. Just a moment, General, please. As this document exists in translation, we have an English version of this document. Could you please place the English version on the ELMO if Their Honours don't have the English version in front of them. It is document 39A.

(20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic, we do have the document. But in any event, I think it is always a good idea to place it on the ELMO, because I was able to note that there may be certain differences between the translation that we have here on paper and the interpretation that we get from the booths on the basis of the B/C/S (25)document, which means that tomorrow, if we have to review these documents

• Page 6011 • {61/74}

(1)once again, the reading of the document will not coincide with the quotation that is registered on the LiveNote. And to avoid such discrepancies, whenever you have the English version -- as you know, the transcript is in English and not in B/C/S, of course we're still waiting (5)for translations of the other documents which you hope we will have as soon as possible. So to sum up, whenever you have a document in English, you should put it on the ELMO so there should be no discrepancies between the document itself and the translation in the transcript. (10)Please continue now.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

• Q.: Please, General, continue.

• A.: This document is linked to the participation of the 28th Division in offensive operations carried out by the forces of the 2nd Corps along (15)the axis from Tuzla to Srebrenica and vice versa as part of the offensive operations going from the direction of Srebrenica towards Tuzla with the purpose of linking up with the forces of the 2nd Corps. When I was speaking about the fact that when taking over duties and being briefed about the situation, among others, in the army of the (20)Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, their intentions and goals with respect to the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, and I said that I had been briefed that those forces, in spite of the fact that this was a safe area and the fact that the area of Zepa and Srebrenica should constitute demilitarised zones, that nevertheless, they were constantly procuring (25)weapons. And one of the ways in which they armed themselves was through

• Page 6012 • {62/74}

(1)this plan of disarmament of UNPROFOR forces in the Vezionica camp in Srebrenica, as you have just quoted from this document. In this plan, which is carried out by the 283rd Eastern Bosnian Light Brigade, very precise assignments are given to units which are (5)expected to carry out this task, and, among others, there is a sketch drawing of everything stated in text form regarding the number of UNPROFOR forces in the Vezionica camp and also with respect to the way in which the assignment should be carried out by the 283rd Brigade. I don't know, I really don't know whether this plan was indeed (10)carried out by the 283rd Brigade.

• Q.: This plan envisages opening of fire in certain cases in the process of the implementation of the plan, and this is part of the assignment of the 5th Squad, on page 2. Do you have any comments to make?

(15) • A.: Yes. With respect to the tasks given to the other groups, they were not given such a task. However, the 5th Squad was given such a task, with the annotation that if UNPROFOR forces put up resistance -- I may have already said that the Command of the 28th Division and the subordinate brigade commands and lower-level commands carried out all (20)combat activities of which UNPROFOR forces were not aware and, as I was saying -- and it can be seen from this document that one of the tasks, in quotation -- that one of the targets, in quotation marks, were UNPROFOR forces, which means that they do not trust the peace mission of the UNPROFOR forces. (25)Of course, it is noted that this should be done only if they do

• Page 6013 • {63/74}

(1)not join in their defence or if they do not act in the way they wish in accordance with the implementation of the plan for offensive operations.

• Q.: The next document is document number 40. 40B, please. This document, too, was issued by the 8th Operative Group of Srebrenica, number (5)01/130-125, dated the 15th of November, 1994, and addressed to the headquarters of the Supreme Command of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, attention Brigadier-General Enver Hadzihasanovic, in Kakanj. For the first time, mention is made here of Kakanj as a town, a place within the area of responsibility of the 2nd Corps to which this (10)document is being addressed. Maybe my recollection is not quite correct, but it seems to me at least that this is the first time that we have come across this town in these documents.

• A.: Yes. It is one of the advance command posts of the Supreme Staff of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina situated in Kakanj, and (15)in charge is General Enver Hadzihasanovic. Following the course of subsequent events, we will see what was the purpose of General Hadzihasanovic's stay at the advance post in Kakanj -- forward advance post in Kakanj. From this forward command post, he commanded the operation (20)code-named Skakavac or Grasshopper. It is an operation of planning and executing sabotage activities within a broader area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, among other places, including the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Operation Skakavac is a secret code name of that operation, and in the implementation of this operation, the forces of the 28th Division from (25)Srebrenica were included, from Srebrenica and Zepa, regardless of the fact

• Page 6014 • {64/74}

(1)that it is clear to everyone that these two areas were protected areas, under the control of the United Nations' forces.

• Q.: The Commander of the 8th Operative Group, Naser Oric, is requesting from the Brigadier-General reinforcement, and I quote -- I'm (5)sorry, "replenishment of 100.000 pieces of bullets," this is the last page of the document, please, "7.9 millimetre bullets, pieces 55.000; and Zoljas, 150 pieces, or portable grenade launchers; chargers for Osa, a portable rocket launcher, 50 pieces; shells with basic chargers, 200 pieces; and 50 Motorolas," or radio equipment. (10)In view of this fact and the composition, which we'll be coming back to, of the 8th Operative Group, this quantity of ammunition and weapons which is being requested, is it an important indicator for assessing the strength and intentions of the 8th Operative Group in Srebrenica?

(15) • A.: Yes. The Commander of the 8th Operative Group is requesting from his superior from whom he received orders to carry out a task, in this case, his task assigned to him by the Supreme Command from the forward command post in Kakanj, and in response to the question you put to me with regard to the quantities of ammunition and weapons and materiel requested (20)by the Commander of the 8th Group, this is fully in line with the task assigned to the Division. He is requiring fresh supplies of those means which have already been spent from what they had at their disposal. So they need these replenishments to be able to embark upon the execution of the assigned task. (25)It is very important to mention here the requests for hand-held

• Page 6015 • {65/74}

(1)rocket launchers, so-called Zoljas. This is an anti-armour weapon, and he's asking for 150 pieces. Also, the charger for Osas, he's asking again for 50 pieces, the ammunition for these. And the shells, these are M-53 launchers. So he's using to -- he is asking for replenishments so as to (5)be able to embark upon the implementation of the task assigned to him by General Hadzihasanovic; and linked to the tasks coming under the Operation Skakavac, which was an introduction to offensive operations, or this operation may have been conducted in parallel with the offensive operation. But we will see that later.

(10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next exhibit is Exhibit 38B. Mr. President, with great hesitation we deviate from the Rules of this Trial Chamber, but I would request only five minutes as a break, please, not more.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We'll give you ten minutes.

(15) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you.

--- Recess taken at 1.58 p.m.

--- On resuming at 2.08 p.m.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic, let us continue.

(20) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. Usher, would you please place document number 38B on the ELMO. Document number 38B, Command of the 8th Operational Group Srebrenica. Could you please place the document on the ELMO?

• Q.: I'm going to read it because it's rather short. "8th Operation (25)Group Srebrenica, number 130-01-123/94." The document is dated the 11th

• Page 6016 • {66/74}

(1)of November, 1994; it was addressed to the 2nd Corps Command, to the attention of the Commander in Tuzla. "In your strictly confidential document, number 02-1/1347-1, dated the 1st of November, 1994, you requested that together with the (5)Commander of the Zepa Brigade, Avdo Palic, and a number of guides from Zepa, that I dispatch a group of soldiers towards Kladanj for the purpose of bringing in materiel and equipment, in particular ammunition. "Since at that time the Zepa Brigade Commander was in Srebrenica, I personally acquainted him with the order and we agreed to send a joint (10)group towards Kladanj. He was accompanied by a group of soldiers from Srebrenica so that he could organise the trip to Kladanj from there. "However, five days later the group came back from Zepa to Srebrenica and informed me that Commander Palic could not organise the trip towards Kladanj because his soldiers had refused to act as guides and (15)to carry out the stated assignment. "Would you please inform me in writing about the status of the Zepa Brigade, because Commander Palic told me orally that the said brigade was placed under the Command of the 8th Operative Group Srebrenica. I should also like to ask you to ensure that 'Ciko' speeds up his work on (20)the supply of ammunition towards our positions. "Till final victory," the document is signed by the Brigade Commander, Naser Oric. General, does that mean that this action of linking up the 2nd Corps and Srebrenica, that is, the forces deployed in Srebrenica, was also (25)assisted by the Zepa Brigade? Did the Zepa Brigade take part in that

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(1)action?

• A.: Yes. The Zepa Brigade was part already at that time of the 28th Division. From the text which you have just quoted and in relation to the (5)implementation of the assignment which was received by the Commander of the 28th Division from the Commander of the 2nd Corps, he makes specific mention of that particular order. From that text it can be seen that the Commander of the 28th Division has certain problems with the Zepa Brigade commander. (10)Regardless of the corridor which had been established between Srebrenica and Zepa, it seems that that brigade was separated from the main forces of the 28th Division in Srebrenica, that is, from the Division Command and other units deployed in the area of Srebrenica.

• Q.: The next document is document number 37B. This document was (15)issued by the Command of the Srebrenica 8th Operative Group, that is, from the intelligence section of that group. The number of the document is 130-26-31/94. The document is dated 11th of November, 1994. I'm going to quote the last paragraph of that document, but let me just mention that the document is addressed to the 2nd Corps Command, that (20)is, to the intelligence organ of the Corps. "Chetniks have probably learned about the forthcoming offensive activities of our units. That is why they are currently conducting preparations so as to prevent the intrusion of our forces in the rear area of the PZT." (25)And the document is signed by intelligence officer Ekrem

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(1)Salihovic. General, were you or the Command made aware of that? Did you undertake certain measures or activities? And the previous document and this present document, are they in any way linked together?

(5) • A.: We did have intelligence reports according to which preparations were under way to plan and conduct offensive activities. This particular document is linked with the previous document. Reconnaissance forces of the 28th Division observed a reinforced presence of the forces of the Drina Corps in the area of the safe zone (10)which were around Srebrenica, that is. The rotations were not taking place as previously, and offensive activities were obviously under way. The forces of the Bratunac and Milici Brigade and the Independent Skelani Battalion were deployed, all of them, on the positions around the protected area.

(15) • Q.: As regards the combat readiness of the Milici and Bratunac Brigade and the Independent Skelani Battalion, was that combat readiness linked and made conditional upon the activity of the 28th Division?

• A.: Yes. That was the reason for their combat readiness, that is, the activity of the 28th Division. All forces of the Drina Corps at that (20)time, regardless of the place of their deployment, whether it was in the north-west part of its area of responsibility in Zivinice, Zepa, Kladanj, and Olovo or around the enclaves of Zepa and Gorazde were on a higher level of combat readiness because of the Grasshopper or Skakovac Operation whose preparations were under way and because of the operations that were (25)being under way by the forces of the BH army in the area.

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(1) • Q.: Our next document is document number 41B. Could the usher please place the document on the ELMO. 8th Operative Srebrenica Brigade Command, Security Organ, document number 130-13-104/94, document dated 17th of November, 1994. The document was addressed to the 2nd Corps Command, that (5)is, to the Security Department of that Corps in Tuzla. It is a weekly report which, in paragraph 3, subparagraph (G), that is the last paragraph, states as follows: "On the 14th of November in 1994, the Sabotage Reconnaissance Group of the 281st Brigade liquidated three enemy soldiers, wounded one of them. Nothing is known of one other. It seized (10)three rifles and an insignificant amount of ammunition." The document is signed by the Commander, that is, Commander for Security Affairs, Nedzad Bektic. General, does that mean that despite a higher level of combat readiness that you spoke about earlier on, the sabotage and terrorist (15)groups from the area of Srebrenica were still infiltrating themselves and opening -- launching combat activities and sabotage activities against your units?

• A.: Yes. When it comes to these type of activities, they usually focused on the unoccupied areas around the Srebrenica protected -- (20)Srebrenica and Zepa protected areas. And they infiltrated these type of forces into those areas for the purpose of conducting the type of activities that you just quoted from this document. The document was not signed by the Commander but the Assistant Commander for Security Affairs, Nedzad Bektic. (25)However, despite a presence of reinforced forces of the Drina

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(1)Corps around the Srebrenica protected area, they were able to find ways to infiltrate themselves in undefended areas for the purpose of carrying out these type of combat activities.

• Q.: Let us move on to document number 42B. This document was issued (5)by the Main Staff of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was issued to -- at KM Kakanj. The number of district, confidential document is 02-1/1608-1. The document was issued on the 13th of December, 1994. The document was issued by Brigadier-General Enver Hadzihasanovic and is actually a (10)response to the document which was sent by the Zepa Brigade, number 180-78/94. In this document, on page 2, I will quote the words of the Brigadier-General: "To conduct sabotage activities on the axis used by the supply -- for the supply lines or to infiltrate there so as not to (15)uncover them." General, does that mean that in this particular case, the Zepa Brigade had a kind of communication line or march route which it used for the supply of ammunition and weapons in the area, and does it mean that the Brigadier-General who signed this document was in charge of all these (20)activities?

• A.: Yes, that is correct. I already explained and described earlier on the Supreme Command of the BH army was directly in charge and was directly conducting everything through the 2nd Corps Command. Very often, they were -- they had an immediate and direct control over all of the (25)activities that were conducted by the 28th Division. This very document

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(1)shows this. The document was sent by General Hadzihasanovic to the 8th Operative Group Command as regards the infiltration of forces on certain axes, and he is suggesting that forces should not be infiltrated in those areas which were used for supply -- to supply the BH army units (5)with ammunition and weapons.

• Q.: In paragraph 4 of this document, the following is stated, I quote: "The procedure with UNPROFOR was indicated in strictly confidential document number 02-1/1597-1. However, they should not be permitted to pull out. However, in case you cannot prevent them from (10)doing so, you should seize the weapons from them, the weapons that had been handed over for us -- by us for storage." General, did you have any knowledge about the relationship between members of the BH forces and UNPROFOR, and did any reports from liaison officers reach the command concerning those problems, if there were such (15)cases?

• A.: Not too -- not enough. We did dispose of certain intelligence data concerning the relationship between the 28th Division command and UNPROFOR command in Srebrenica. However, as regards these particular data and the document that was quoted earlier on regarding the disarming of (20)UNPROFOR in Srebrenica were the only documents which had such detailed information contained in them.

• Q.: Could I ask for document number 43B, and if it could be put on the ELMO. This will be our last document for today. This document was issued by the Staff of the Supreme Command of (25)the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kakanj Command

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(1)post. The number of the document is 02-1/1613-1, dated the 14th of December, 1994. The document was issued by the Brigadier-General that we mentioned earlier on, Enver Hadzihasanovic. If my memory serves me well, and correct me if I'm wrong, General, (5)this is the first document that we have come across that officially mentions the operation with the code name Skakavac.

• A.: Earlier on I mentioned this operation because we had information about its secret code name, and also about the activities that were part of that operation in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps and (10)around its area of responsibility. This operation was conducted and commanded by General Hadzihasanovic, Enver Hadzihasanovic, and the document shows once again that the 28th Division from Srebrenica and Zepa, pursuant to the orders of General Hadzihasanovic, participated in the events that were taking (15)place. Among other things it states, and if you will allow me I will quote only the first paragraph: "With the purpose of continuing the Ciko-Kale operation, which is only a part of the secret Operation Skakavac, which was regulated in the (20)order issued by the Chief of Staff of the General Staff, Brigadier-General Enver Hadzihasanovic, and approved by the Commander of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina ..." which means that the Commander of the Main Staff of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was involved in this action. And we know very well who that person was at the time.

(25) THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.

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(1) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

• Q.: General, we are now approaching a period of time during which you were absent from the Corps. On the 29th of December, 1994, you stepped on an antipersonnel mine, you sustained injuries, and as a result of that you (5)were transferred to the Sokolac military hospital.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, with your permission, I believe that this would be a convenient time to stop the testimony of our witness today and to resume tomorrow morning.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Harmon.

(10) MR. HARMON: Mr. President and Your Honours, I notice that we have seen 14 exhibits this afternoon and this morning that are only in B/C/S, and in order to prepare properly for cross-examination, we would request that we receive copies of these in English. I anticipate that the cross-examination may start as early as Friday, so I bring that to the (15)Court's attention and make that request. Thank you.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Harmon. Thank you very much. I myself also had the intention of asking about the translation issue. I'm not going to ask that the documents be translated into French as well. (20)As you know, tomorrow we will be sitting until 2.00 only, and I thought that we might have three blocks of one hour and ten minutes, with three breaks of 20 minutes in between. I don't know if this is agreeable with General Krstic and his health condition. Let me ask you, General Krstic. What do you think of the proposed (25)schedule? How do you feel about it? You don't have to stand up.

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(1) THE WITNESS: [Int.] Mr. President, I will do my best and try to respect the schedule that you have just proposed.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you. We will try, we will make an attempt, but whenever you need a break, please tell us so. Can we (5)agree on that?

THE WITNESS: [Int.] Yes. Thank you very much, Your Honour.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well, then. Mr. Petrusic, I don't know if you wish to add anything to this (10)proposal.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] No, Mr. President. We accept your proposal, by all means.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much. Tomorrow at 9.30, and we will be working until 2.00.

(15) --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.37 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 17th day of October, 2000, at 9.30 a.m.