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/ Colormap • Page 3293 • {1/135} (1)Wednesday, 24 May 2000 [Open session] --- Upon commencing at 9.40 a.m.
JUDGE RIAD: Good morning, ladies and
(5)gentlemen in the courtroom and in the visitor's
gallery. JUDGE RIAD: I apologise again today for this ten-minute delay. There are more urgent matters which (10)have to be settled as soon as we come to the Tribunal. Mr. Harmon, you have the floor. MR. HARMON: Good morning, Judge Riad. Good morning, colleagues. This morning, Mr. President, and all day (15)today, we will not present any live witnesses. We had scheduled a witness for today but because of problems in respect of passport and securing a passport, the witness was not able to arrive in time for her testimony. (20) JUDGE RIAD: Is she arriving in the near future?
MR. HARMON: She's now arriving today as
opposed to her scheduled time of arrival which was two
days ago.
(25)So in lieu of that, the Prosecutor proposes
JUDGE RIAD: But you're on the tape too. MR. HARMON: I am on the tapes, yes. JUDGE RIAD: So we'll have you with us. Is Defence counsel agreeable? (25)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Good morning,
(5)
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much,
Mr. Petrusic.
Mr. Fourmy. (10) JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Fourmy is asking whether Colonel Karremans had been here before us in this trial. I don't recall that. MR. HARMON: He has not been in this trial. JUDGE RIAD: I know he has not been here. (15) MR. HARMON: He has not. As I said previously, I discussed this matter with the Defence and they agree that the testimony that he had given under oath previously would be -- JUDGE RIAD: Is he coming? Would he be (20)coming? MR. HARMON: He will not be. JUDGE RIAD: Good. MR. HARMON: The tape will substitute for his live testimony. (25)
JUDGE RIAD: That answers Mr. Fourmy's
(5) MR. HARMON: Thank you very much, Judge Riad. If we could put the first video, the testimony of Colonel Karremans, on the screen. If I may be excused, Judge Riad. (10) JUDGE RIAD: How long do you think it will take? MR. HARMON: The video of Colonel Karremans is two hours and, I believe, twenty minutes; the video of Lieutenant Koster is 59 minutes; and the videotape (15)of Mr. Mesic is 29 minutes. JUDGE RIAD: So we can have the break after Karremans. MR. HARMON: We, perhaps, may want to have a break in between Karremans given the fact that it's two (20)hours and twenty minutes. JUDGE RIAD: Good. We'll see to that.
MR. HARMON: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will (15)speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. WITNESS: THOMAS KARREMANS. JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Thank you, Colonel. Please be seated. (20)Can you hear me, Colonel? Can you hear me? THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, I can.
JUDGE JORDA:
[Int.] Colonel
Karremans, the Tribunal, dealing with Mr. Karadzic and
Mladic, wanted to call upon you here so that we can see
(25)what you have to say in light of the indictment. I
MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honour. (5) • EXAMINED by Mr. Harmon: • Q.: Colonel Karremans, could you please state your full name and spell your name for the record. • A.: My last name is Karremans. I will spell that. K-a-r-r-e-m-a-n-s, Karremans. My first name is (10)Thomas, T-h-o-m-a-s, and middle name, Jacob. • Q.: Colonel Karremans, what is your occupation? • A.: My occupation now is that I am taking over an assignment in the United States. • Q.: Are you a member of the Dutch military? (15) • A.: I'm a member of the Dutch military. • Q.: Did you participate in UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina? • A.: Yes, I did, sir. • Q.: Where were you assigned in Bosnia and (20)Herzegovina? • A.: I was assigned in Bosnia-Herzegovina last year, from January up to July in Srebrenica. • Q.: What were your duties and responsibilities in that particular assignment? (25)
• A.: My mission was -- I was the battalion
• Q.: What was the UN mandate that you received in relation to your assignments? • A.: The UN mandate especially for the safe havens (5)or safe areas like Srebrenica was based on one of the United Nations resolutions. I can remember 819. After there was a ceasefire agreement between General Morillon and General Mladic in 1993, after that agreement, the Canadians went in in the safe area and (10)we took over the year after that, in 1994. My assignment there was commander of the Dutch Battalion. • Q.: Colonel Karremans, did the Bosnian Serb army interfere or obstruct with your unit's ability to perform its mandate after you had arrived in (15)Srebrenica? • A.: I think not at the time that we arrived but they did during our stay in the enclave during, let's say, the last five months, as of half February. • Q.: Can you expand on that, please. (20) • A.: I can expand on that but then I have first, let's say, to explain what the mission was of the battalion. • Q.: Please.
• A.: That was twofold; one was the purely military
(25)side of the mission and the other side was the
• Q.: What problems developed with the Bosnian Serb (20)military? Could you describe those, please.
• A.: Those problems started actually on the 18th
of February when the last convoy came in with diesel,
gas, which we needed for the performance of the
mission. I can a little bit expand on that. Normally
(25)we used 4.000 to 5.000 litres a day for our vehicles
• Q.: What effect did this have on the civilian -- did the Bosnian Serb blockade have on the civilian (15)population within the enclave?
• A.: Yes, sir, it did, because almost, let's say,
25.000 persons living in the enclave were refugees, as
there used to live about 8.000 in the village of
Srebrenica. So you can imagine that the civil
(20)authorities had a mighty challenge to bring under all
those refugees in a city with an infrastructure for
only 8.000 persons. But also the food for all the
people living in the enclave was a problem because the
UNHCR was responsible, or at least was -- they were
(25)responsible for bringing in the food. Also the UNHCR
• Q.: Now, were complaints made to the Bosnian Serb authorities about the blockade and its effects? (5) • A.: Yes, we did, sir. Every day, at 6.00 in the night, we sent our information, daily sitreps, to the higher echelons, and that started in sector north-east in Tuzla, going up to Sarajevo, the BH command, up to the force commander in Zagreb. They were aware of, (10)let's say, the problems within the enclave; on one side with the battalion and on the other side with the population. We noticed that and we put all the information, let's say, on a daily basis to the higher echelons. (15)On top of that, I have written a lot of reports during my stay over there, let's say once in two days, in describing the poor situation of the people over there. Also after the meetings we had with the local authorities, they always mentioned what their (20)problems were towards the people. We mentioned that in our daily reports, and I mentioned that quite some times in my, let's say, own reports up to the force commander in Zagreb, and also to the Crisis Staff here in The Hague. (25)
• Q.: Now, Colonel Karremans, did you have contacts
• A.: Yes. • Q.: In your contacts with those officials, did you complain to them about the effects of the blockade? (5) • A.: Yes. Every time when we had a meeting with, let's say, representatives of the Bosnian Serb army -- I think we will come to the persons later -- we made our complaints given by the civil authorities within the enclave, what happened with the population, not (10)only in providing food for them but also on the medical side of the whole support for the people. In the beginning we supported the population as much as we could, in combination with MSF, Medecins Sans Frontiers, by ambulances in the area, by giving them (15)medicines, giving them medical care, picking up wounded persons or sick persons and bring them to the hospital in Srebrenica or, if that wasn't possible, to our own field dressing station. That was, as of the end of April, also stopped. The same applied for, let's say, (20)the normal, daily living within the enclave. All those complaints we told several times when we had meetings with representatives of the BSA to those representatives. • Q.: What was their reaction, Colonel Karremans? (25)
• A.: None.
• A.: Yes, I can, sir. In the first place, and I (5)met him in the first week when I arrived in Bosnia, in Srebrenica, I met Colonel Vukovic. He was the so-called liaison officer between the battalion and the Drina Corps commander or the Drina Corps. He was also the commander of one of the brigades, the brigade in (10)the southern part of the surroundings of Srebrenica. The second BSA representative which we met quite often was Major Nikolic. He was the liaison officer from the Bratunac Brigade, and the Bratunac Brigade was the brigade in the northern area, outside (15)the enclave. He was the representative of that brigade and he was also the LSO which we dealt often with. Those two persons, we met during not daily meetings but sometimes a couple of times a week, sometimes even once a month, when they liked to have a (20)meeting and not when we liked to have a meeting. A third person I know is Petar. Petar is an interpreter who both of the just named officers used all the time.
• Q.: Colonel Karremans, during your contacts with
(25)Major Nikolic, did he ever express an opinion to you
• A.: Yes, sir, he did. Actually, that was in one of the meetings, from what I can remember, in (5)February. We had always our meetings either on OP Echo, that's an observation post in the southern part of the enclave, or OP Papa in the northern part. This was on one of the occasions which I can remember in February in which he told me, you could see it on his (10)face too, that the hatred of the Muslim people, especially those who were living in the enclave, and he said he had a reason for that because half of his family had been murdered during the Second World War. Secondly, he told me that, in his opinion, (15)all the Muslims should leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thirdly, I think looking in those days, at that moment to his face, that he meant that, and that there was quite some hatred in his eyes, and also in the words, I must say. (20)
• Q.: Colonel Karremans, you mentioned that a
number of Dutch soldiers were stationed inside the
enclave of Srebrenica. Let me show you an exhibit
which is a map of the enclave. It will be presented to
you and then I would like to ask you some questions
(25)about it.
• Q.: Colonel Karremans, there should be a monitor (5)in front of you that -- there should be that particular exhibit appearing in front of you on the monitor. Can you please point to the map and identify the locations where Dutch soldiers were stationed within the enclave. (10)
• A.: Yes, sir, I can. If, Your Honours, you look
to the map, you can see a dotted line in there, with a
"C" on top and a "B," Bravo, in the south. What we
did when we took that over from the previous battalion
was that we divided the area in two parts; the northern
(15)area was the responsibility of our C Company and the
southern part of the area was the responsibility of the
B Coy, the Bravo Company.
We started off in January with eight
observation posts from which we could see a great part
(20)of the area. In the beginning, in January and
February, both companies had some observation posts. I
start with the one here on top, OP Papa, that was the
observation post I just was referring to when we had
our meetings with BSA representatives. We have here OP
(25)Quebec and OP Romeo on the east side. We have OP
• Q.: Let me ask you, Colonel Karremans, how many soldiers were stationed in each of those observation (15)posts?
• A.: We started in January with, let's say, ten
soldiers per observation post. But after the end of
April, when the left convoys didn't return to
Srebrenica, and we made more observation posts and we
(20)did less patrolling, or let's say it in another way,
another kind of patrolling, we changed a little bit the
manning of the observation posts and went to six in
some cases and ten in other cases. We had some
observation posts with ten persons just for observation
(25)and doing the patrols and we had some observation posts
(5) • Q.: Colonel Karremans, had the Bosnian Serb blockade not taken place, what was the normal number of soldiers you would have had in Srebrenica? • A.: The battalion consisted of 780 persons, soldiers; 180 were situated in the Tuzla area, one (10)company, a large company, I must say, and I had 600 soldiers, including 50 of the field dressing station, at my disposal within the enclave, 600. But at the end, let's say in April, about 150 to 180 didn't return, so I had about 400, 420 soldiers at my disposal (15)as of the end of April till the end of July. • Q.: Of those 420 soldiers, how many of those soldiers were infantry men? • A.: About half; 100 on the observation posts, about 100 for doing the patrols, special patrolling in (20)the enclave along the borders of the enclave, for the guarding of both compounds in Srebrenica itself and in Potocari, and the other 200 soldiers were all for manning the three company staffs, the battalion staff, for all the logistics and the field dressing station. (25)
• Q.: So by the time the invasion started in July,
• A.: That's correct, sir. • Q.: Can you describe to the Court what type of (5)weaponry was available to your troops at the time the invasion started? • A.: Yes, I can. Our government has chosen for a so-called light option and the weaponry we had in those days were small arms. Every soldier had his own arm, (10)either a pistol or a light machine-gun or a rifle. Then we had light machine-guns, guns on the observation posts and also on both compounds. We had the heavy machine-guns on our armoured personnel carriers. Besides that we had six mortars, 81-millimetre. They (15)were on the observation posts, let's say on some of the observation posts. I had at my disposal anti-tank weapons, medium range and long range, amongst them, for instance, the tow wide anti-tank systems, and some small anti-tank weapons as well. I think that is what (20)the main armament was of the battalion. • Q.: Did the Bosnian Serb army blockade of Srebrenica that started in April have any effect on the amount of ammunition or the quality of weaponry that you had at your disposal? (25)
• A.: Not really. That had already happened when
• Q.: Colonel Karremans, did General Mladic have good intelligence about what was happening in the (20)enclave?
• A.: Yes, sir, he did. In the first place he
could notice, by all the troops that he had around the
enclave, what was going on within the enclave. He
could say what we were doing, when we were patrolling,
(25)when we are leaving compounds with vehicles, or by
(20) • Q.: Okay. Now, when the Bosnian Serb invasion of the enclave started, did the Bosnian Serb army attack the outposts that you've described? • A.: Can you repeat the question, please.
• Q.: When the invasion started in July 1995, did
(25)the BSA attack your observation posts?
• Q.: Colonel Karremans, how many Dutch soldiers were manning OP Echo at the time of the attack? • A.: In those days? • Q.: At the time of the attack. (15) • A.: I think ten persons, ten soldiers. • Q.: Please continue describing the attacks on the observation posts.
• A.: After that attack, executed, what I stated
before, by about 60 persons, leaving with the APC the
(20)OP Echo, we did two things, actually three: In the
first place, we made an immediate report for the higher
echelons what happened, what was going on. Secondly,
we asked for a meeting with Colonel Vukovic or Nikolic
to ask them what was going on, the purpose of that
(25)attack, that we'd like to have back the observation
• Q.: What was the reaction of your Bosnian Serb (10)liaison officer when you asked for the observation post back and for your equipment back? • A.: It took quite a while when we had a first meeting after the loss of OP Echo. I cannot remember when we had the first meeting after, let's say, the 3rd (15)of June. But the reaction was that we couldn't get back the equipment and we couldn't get back the observation post at all. • Q.: Were there additional attacks on the observation posts prior to or during the invasion of (20)Srebrenica? • A.: No, sir. • Q.: Okay. As a result of the attacks on the observation posts, were Dutch soldiers taken prisoners by the Bosnian Serb army? (25)
• A.: Not on that occasion.
• A.: Yes, I can. That happened, Your Honours, on the start of -- let's say on the 6th of July, and that (5)was already a month later. In the period between the 3rd of June, OP Echo, and the 6th of July, it was rather quiet in the area. Also there was a tense situation, I must say, but it was really quiet, except one occasion somewhere in the middle of June, what (10)happened in the vicinity of Srebrenica itself. On the 6th of July, in the morning, about 3.00, the war started over there. It started in our area, the compound of Potocari, by shooting over the compound with some rockets. The attacks started in the (15)southern part of the enclave, in the area of OP Foxtrot. That was on the Thursday, Thursday, the 6th of July, and those attacks were carried out, let's say, during six days. The first OP which had been attacked really (20)by small arms, by mortars, and by tanks was OP Foxtrot; that one on Thursday, on Friday, and on Saturday. And it was on Saturday, I think by noonish or 1.00, that I ordered to retreat the manning of the OP and leave it during a pause of shootings. (25)
• Q.: How many men were stationed in OP Foxtrot?
• Q.: Thank you. Please continue, Colonel Karremans.
• A.: On Saturday, in the afternoon, when OP
(5)Foxtrot had been attacked for a third day, and I asked,
I can remember, for a second time for close air
support, things were going on rather quickly, because
on Saturday and Sunday I lost quite some observation
posts in the southern part of the enclave here.
(10)There were two possibilities for the soldiers
on the observation posts -- actually, there were three
possibilities: Just leave the observation post and go
back to the compound; secondly, stay as long as they
could, making use of defence walls, making use of the
(15)shelters within the observation post; thirdly, retreat
from the observation post knowing that the BiH should
make problems because they, not ordered us, but they
thought that we should stay on the observation post and
not retreat it or not leave them. There was another
(20)possibility: just to end up, let's say, taken away by
BSA forces. In most of the cases, leaving the
observation post, the last thing happened. The
observation posts were attacked by BSA forces, they
were encircled by forces, and the only thing soldiers
(25)could do is hand over equipment, use their vehicles,
• Q.: As a result of those actions by the BSA against the observation post, how many Dutch soldiers (5)were taken into custody by the BSA and detained? • A.: At the end there were 55 soldiers taken in custody and detained from seven or eight different observation posts. • Q.: Now, those 55 soldiers were all infantry (10)soldiers; is that correct? • A.: Yes, sir, they were all infantry soldiers. • Q.: If my mathematics are correct, that represented about 25 per cent of your infantrymen available in the compound at the time of the invasion? (15) • A.: That's correct. • Q.: Okay. Now, do you know how many Bosnian Serb army soldiers participated in the invasion of Srebrenica? • A.: Not at the moment. (20) • Q.: Did you subsequently find out?
• A.: Yes, because Mladic told me, General Mladic
told me, at the end that he had quite some troops
around the enclave of Srebrenica. Those were not the
original troops around the enclave but, let's say,
(25)fresh troops, fresh brigades. He used one brigade for
• Q.: How many men are in a brigade? • A.: I don't know, but I think that in every (10)brigade there were between 1.000 and 1.500 soldiers with this heavy weaponry and other weaponry than we had in those days. • Q.: Now I want to ask you specifically that question: Colonel Karremans, what type of weapons were (15)available to the invading Bosnian Serb forces?
• A.: They had all the equipment from the former
Yugoslavian army, at least that was left out of it.
They had quite some artillery pieces. We had noticed
those pieces already around the enclave during our stay
(20)over there. Sometimes they changed the position of
those artillery pieces; sometimes they changed the
positions of mortars they had, heavy mortars, light
mortars. Quite a lot, I must say.
They had some main bell tanks, the old T-55s,
(25)and even some new types which we had noticed and which
(5) • Q.: Did they also have multiple rocket systems? • A.: They had a couple of multiple rocket systems, small ones, all on wheels, of which we had noticed at least three north of the compound of Potocari, around the hills. And he had, let's say, a larger multiple (10)rocket system in the city of Bratunac which he used as well, shelling the city of Srebrenica. MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I am looking at the clock. Perhaps this is an appropriate time to recess for the day. (15)
JUDGE JORDA:
[Int.] I share your
view. This is a good moment to have a recess. We will
stop the hearing for today, and the Tribunal will
resume tomorrow at 10.00.
JUDGE JORDA:
[Int.] First
question: Can everyone hear me? Mr. Harmon, can you
(25)hear me? Can you hear me, counsel for the
MR. HARMON: Yes. JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Great. Can the registry hear me? Interpreters can hear me? Everybody (5)can hear what's going on? The visitors' gallery, everyone can hear all right? No technical problem. Fellow Judges hear me? Terrific. Now, Mr. Harmon, we can proceed with Colonel Karremans' testimony, and I would ask the usher to (10)bring him in.
MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honour. JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Colonel Karremans, good morning. You can hear me? (15) THE WITNESS: Yes, I can, Your Honour. JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Fine. So we shall resume with your testimony. You've been called by the Prosecution in the case of the Prosecution against Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. (20)Please proceed. MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honour. WITNESS: THOMAS KARREMANS [Resumed] • EXAMINED by Mr. Harmon: [Cont'd]
• Q.: Colonel Karremans, yesterday you described
(25)the Bosnian Serb army blockade that slowly strangled
• A.: I'd like to stipulate some things which I
have said yesterday concerning the circumstances, I
(5)must say, the miserable circumstances for the
inhabitants of the enclave, but also for my own
battalion. That could explain something on the
circumstances up to the 6th of July.
All those, let's say, miserable circumstances
(10)in April, May, and June were caused, what I said
yesterday, by refusing the incoming convoys either for
the battalion or by UNHCR for the refugees. Thus, we
had to do with a strangulation of the enclave or, so to
call, an isolation, a total blockade.
(15)That meant for the population, for instance,
that their situation was poorer than poor. There was
starvation for the refugees. Some died by starvation.
There was no medical treatment at all for the
population; no doctors, no dentists, no medicines. The
(20)Medecins Sans Frontiers, MSF, was not able to fulfil
its job in the local hospital. We couldn't do anything
about the infrastructure to support the local
authorities, like housing, like generators, power and
electricity, water supply for the population.
(25)It ended up, for instance, that hundreds of
• Q.: Colonel Karremans, based on the Bosnian Serb blockade and its effects, as well as the capture of 55 of your soldiers by the Bosnian Serb army, did you feel that you had the means to fulfil your mission? (25)
• A.: Not at the end. In the beginning, when we
(5) • Q.: Now I'd like to turn your attention to the actual invasion itself. What was the effect on the civilian population once the invasion started? • A.: As you know, Your Honours, the invasion started on the 6th of July. It started with heavy (10)fighting in the southern part of the enclave, in the direct vicinity of OP Foxtrot, and by shelling the city of Srebrenica itself, the compounds and some other observation posts. But actually it started in the south. (15)In the southern part of the enclave, there was the so-called Swedish shelter project, a lot of housing built under Swedish authorities. In that Swedish shelter project there used to live about 3.000 refugees. As soon as the attacks started in the (20)southern part, all those refugees fled in the northern direction, towards the city of Srebrenica. You can imagine there was panic, chaos, in those days, what I explained before, no food, and there was no way to give them houses in Srebrenica itself. Panic, I must say. (25)
• Q.: Where did the people flee to?
• Q.: Did they flee to the UN compound in Srebrenica? • A.: Not in the beginning. That was, I think, on (5)the 10th, on the Monday, and of course at the last day, on Tuesday, the 11th. • Q.: How many refugees were in and around the UN compound in Srebrenica? • A.: I don't know exactly, but there must be (10)hundreds at the compound and maybe thousands around it. They were all gathered together. • Q.: What happened to those refugees in the compound around Srebrenica? • A.: Do I have to refer to the 11th, the last (15)day? • Q.: Please.
• A.: Because at that day and the days before,
Srebrenica itself was already shelled quite some
times. At the 11th, well, while all those refugees
(20)were gathered together, at least most of them, the BSA
started shelling the city, it started shelling the
compound of Srebrenica itself, and that ended up with a
lot of wounded persons, death. Also in the morning
and -- on the morning of the 11th, we already evacuated
(25)the local hospital and we brought all the wounded
• Q.: So, Colonel Karremans, some of the BSA artillery shells landed in and around the UN compound itself in Srebrenica; is that correct? (10) • A.: That's correct, sir. • Q.: Did that cause civilian casualties? • A.: That caused civilian casualties. • Q.: Now, you mentioned as a result of the attacks on the city of Srebrenica itself there was a large (15)exodus of civilians that fled to Potocari; is that correct? • A.: That's correct. • Q.: Did those people who fled from Potocari come to the UN compound in -- I'm sorry. Did the refugees (20)who fled from the UN compound in Srebrenica flee to the UN compound in Potocari? • A.: Yes, they did. • Q.: Approximately how many people gathered in and around the UN compound in Potocari? (25)
• A.: It's just an estimation, of course, but we
• Q.: What was the percentage of women to men in the 25.000 refugees that you say congregated in and around the compound? • A.: Of those 25.000 refugees, most of them were (15)women, children, and elderly people. I think, and that's what I stated before, there were about two to three per cent men between 16 and 60. • Q.: Could you please describe the general conditions that were present in and around the (20)compound.
• A.: Yes, I can. The general conditions from the
people, the refugees, it's what I explained before, was
poorer than poor. They hadn't had food and water
supplies during the six days of war over there. They
(25)were in very bad condition. We had no means to supply
(5) • Q.: Amongst those 25.000 refugees, were there some pregnant women who were delivering their babies? • A.: Yes, there were. What I heard later on, there were five pregnant women with their little babies. What I heard was that one man hung himself (10)during the stay over there. And life was, let's say, going on during the two days that we had all those refugees around us. • Q.: Okay. Now I'd like to turn your attention to air strikes. Can you please describe those air strikes (15)to the Court.
• A.: Yes, I can. As everybody knows, I asked
several times for air strikes, looking to the mandate,
the mandate which asked in the beginning of the
establishment of the safe areas of Srebrenica, Zepa,
(20)and Gorazde, that one needed about 40.000 soldiers for
that, and that was diminished after negotiations to
about 8.000; that they changed the mandate in that
sense, that they combined it with air strikes or, let's
say, close air support, air support in general.
(25)That was one of the parts of the mandate and
• Q.: Before I get to that point, let me just
clarify one point with you, Colonel Karremans. It was
your understanding when you were the commanding officer
of the DutchBat unit in Srebrenica that air support was
(25)supposed to be a significant part of the protection
• A.: That's correct, it was. • Q.: Okay. Now, you mentioned that there were air (5)strikes and that they were too little, too late; is that your testimony? • A.: Yes. • Q.: What effect did those air strikes have on General Mladic? (10) • A.: The effect was that through the hijacked soldiers, about 30 in Bratunac, on one of the BSA kazernes over there, Mladic or one of his officers used the communications equipment of the vehicles over there and ordered me to stop immediately using air (15)support. And if that was not the case, if I wasn't able to stop that immediately, he should use all his weaponry, that's what he said, to shell the compound of Potocari, to shell the refugees within and around the compound, and kill the 30 hijacked soldiers. (20) • Q.: Did General Mladic have the ability to deliver on those threats?
• A.: He could. He had the ability because he had
gathered a lot of weaponry around the compound, on top
of the hills, like mortars, two main bell tanks,
(25)artillery and, what I explained already yesterday,
• Q.: In fact, he had already used that on the UN (5)compound in Srebrenica. • A.: Yes, he did. • Q.: I'd like to turn to another topic now, Colonel Karremans, and that is the meetings that you had with General Mladic. (10)Can you explain the circumstances of your first meeting with General Mladic, and explain when it occurred and where is occurred.
• A.: Yes, sir. The first meeting I had with
General Mladic was on Tuesday night, at half past
(15)eight. I was notified by my ops room, they got a
message, again through the same communications systems,
that I had to show up in Bratunac for a meeting. I
didn't know what kind of meeting that should be but I
expected with somebody from the BSA, maybe Colonel
(20)Vukovic or Nikolic, or whatsoever.
I wasn't before in Bratunac but my LO,
liaison officers, had a couple of times been there
talking about trade, about military options with the
BSA, so they came with me, two liaison officers, and we
(25)went to the hotel in Bratunac. There was a crowd of
(15) • Q.: When he was addressing you, was he speaking calmly? • A.: No, he was shouting more or less. • Q.: Then what happened? • A.: Then we got our famous glass in our hands, (20)water -- • Q.: Would you describe how that occurred?
• A.: Yes. We just got a glass of something in our
hand and didn't toast with that, but the circumstances
were, if you can imagine, bad at that time because we
(25)too didn't sleep for five nights and had hardly no
• Q.: Was there a camera crew present at the meeting? (5) • A.: There was a camera group present, and they put everything on tape. • Q.: After the glass was put in your hand, were pictures taken of you and other Dutch officers? • A.: Yes. (10) • Q.: How long did that meeting last, Colonel Karremans? • A.: Not too long. I think three-quarters of an hour. I was able to explain the poor situation of the refugees, which I did. I asked him for a supply of (15)food, water, medicines, and then he said to me, "You will have to -- you should return for a second meeting at half past eleven, just before midnight," that I should take with me a representative of the refugees, if it was possible, one of the civil authorities of the (20)opstina. That was it. • Q.: What did you then do?
• A.: Then we went back to -- we left the hotel in
Bratunac and drove back to the compound. The first
thing I did there, I had a quick talk with my deputy
(25)battalion commander and we were desperately looking for
• Q.: Did you then return to Bratunac that evening? • A.: I returned to Bratunac that evening, just before midnight, with my same two liaison officers and with Mr. Mandzic. Mr. Mandzic was the representative. (15) • Q.: Who were the representatives of the Bosnian Serb army at that meeting? • A.: The second meeting? • Q.: Yes. • A.: More or less the same which I met in the (20)first meeting: General Mladic, General Zivanovic; there was an interpreter which I referred already to yesterday, Mr. Petar, a couple of BSA officers, and one or two civilians who I didn't know.
• Q.: At that second meeting --
MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honour, I think (5)it's fine. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. We'll resume in half an hour, at 11.30. --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.35 a.m. (10) JUDGE RIAD: Mr. McCloskey, you can proceed. MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. We're ready just to continue playing the tape of Colonel Karremans.
JUDGE RIAD: Good. • Q.: At that second meeting did you request permission for convoys to pass through and to ask permission for some form of relief of the refugees who were in and around your compound? (20) • A.: Yes, I did. • Q.: Would you please describe that second meeting.
• A.: The second meeting was a little bit more
friendlier than the first one, I must say, and I was
(25)able to explain again the very bad circumstances and
• Q.: Did he also make any statement with regard to whether NATO or the UN were capable of guaranteeing the (5)existence of the safe area? • A.: Yes. He quoted some words on that subject, but that he already did in the first meeting. I'd like to say a "meeting," between brackets. He stated that the UN forces in general were not able to fulfil, let's (10)say, the arrangements made by the ceasefire agreement and the UN resolutions as of 1993. I refer to the demilitarisation of the enclave. He said that in the first meeting and also in the second meeting, that "Your United Nations forces (15)were not able to fulfil their mission." • Q.: Now, after that second meeting did you return to the UN compound in Potocari?
• A.: Yes, sir. We did return in the middle of the
night. I think that meeting lasted one and a half
(20)hours in total. We went back to the compound of
Potocari. I had a telephone call with sector
north-east, told them what happened that day, what
happened during those two meetings, what was demanded
by General Mladic. Then we started looking for more
(25)representatives, to have them prepared for the meeting
• Q.: So the next morning there was a third meeting, is that correct, Colonel Karremans? • A.: Yes. (10) • Q.: Where did that take place? • A.: The third meeting took place again in Bratunac, in the same hotel. • Q.: Approximately what time did that meeting take place? (15) • A.: 10.30. • Q.: Can you describe the circumstances of that meeting.
• A.: Yes. It was more or less as the second one.
The same persons, at least most of them that I met in
(20)the second meeting, and there were some civilians as
well who attended that meeting. I didn't know them.
They were introduced but I can't remember which jobs
they had. They were all from Bratunac and Zvornik.
He started welcoming myself and the liaison
(25)officers, and also the committee of three persons --
• A.: General Mladic, yes. Then the two other,
let's say, the new representatives were able to
(5)introduce themselves shortly, starting with the woman.
She made some statements, very clear statements,
towards General Mladic about the very poor, bad,
miserable circumstances of all the refugees, and that
the refugees were not responsible for what happened in
(10)the enclave during the last two, three years, and that
women and children were not responsible for those
things which had been happening. She was the
representative of all women and children. They were
all civilians, and no military and no politicians.
(15)Also the man introduced himself and he asked
for help, and he said, stated, not blaming the
refugees, and that they need a lot of things which I
have already stated -- had already stated before, like
medicines, food, water, and other supplies. He said
(20)that neither he nor my battalion staff or myself were
able to make contact with the Bosnian government during
that night to ask for specific points for that third
meeting, which meant that he wasn't able to lean on
mandates or on other things to explain to General
(25)Mladic.
(5) • Q.: Will you describe that monologue, please.
• A.: It was a very long monologue. He started
with a piece of history, in 1992, that the Bosnian
army, the Bosnian soldiers -- and he blamed Oric
specially for that -- that they killed a lot of Bosnian
(10)Serb families, soldiers, civilians, that they attacked
a lot of villages in the surroundings of the city of
Srebrenica, devastated a lot of villages, and that
according to that, what happened in 1993, as soon as
those safe havens or safe areas had been established,
(15)that the destiny of poor people was in the hands of the
Bosnian Serbs. That was one of his other statements,
he said it was too late for help, help either by the
Bosnian government or by the UN troops.
He said that there was a lot of misery in the
(20)last years, that the BiH forces within the enclave had
murdered a lot around the enclave by raids looking for
food, revenge, looking for revenge, terror.
He stated that he was willing to assist the
refugees, those 25.000 refugees, but that he needed
(25)assistance, assistance by the local civilian and
(25)
• Q.: Can you explain what he meant by that.
• Q.: What was your proposal to General Mladic?
• A.: My proposal was to put on every vehicle one
soldier, not knowing how many vehicles there were. As
(25)soon as the evacuation started the same day, at 3.00, I
• Q.: We'll come to that a little later in your testimony.
• A.: Yes. I was unable to do that, I was unable
(5)to put on each vehicle one soldier.
Then he said, and it was quite a remarkable
expression, that Allah won't help, was not able to
help, and Mladic could. He gave his word. He said to
the commission not to be in panic, not to be afraid,
(10)and asked them to send that message to the refugees.
I asked again when that was possible what
happened or what should happen with the men between 17
and 60, and he again said or stated that there were
quite some war criminals amongst them and that he liked
(15)to investigate, person by person, what they have done
and what kind of persons those were.
At the end of that meeting, all of a sudden
he started to tell something about the evacuation
again, and he proposed, let's say it in that way,
(20)"proposed," that Kladanj should be the point for
evacuation. Kladanj is a small village just on the
border between Bosnian Serb territory and the Bosnian
territory around Tuzla. In fact, Kladanj is the first
Muslim city in that area.
(25)He repeated that within 24 hours all soldiers
• A.: I think about noonish, about 12.00, because at 12.30 I had a meeting in the compound with the (5)committee. • Q.: What time did the first transports arrive to take the refugees away from the compound? • A.: He said during the third meeting, I forgot to say that, that the evacuation should start about 1.00. (10)But it wasn't well-organised in the beginning, or efficiently organised, so the evacuation started at 3.00. • Q.: So three hours from the conclusion of your meeting with General Mladic transport arrived in and (15)around Potocari to start taking the refugees away. • A.: That's correct. • Q.: What type of transport arrived? • A.: A lot of buses, I think 20 or 30, vans, big lorries, and small military vehicles. I think the (20)first evacuation was about between 40 and 50 vehicles, and that was also, let's say, one of my decision points to change from one soldier at every vehicle to what we had done later on, put two vehicles with officers to escort the evacuations. (25)
• Q.: So as a result of the number of vehicles, you
• A.: That's correct, sir. (5) • Q.: Okay. So did you formulate another solution? • A.: We formulated, indeed, another solution. • Q.: Describe that solution, please. • A.: That solution was that we should escort each convoy by two vehicles, two jeeps, Mercedes jeeps; in (10)every jeep, one officer or non-commissioned officer and a driver with communications, up to Kladanj, and then they should return and pick up, let's say, the next evacuation. • Q.: What happened to those escort vehicles? (15) • A.: In the first escort or in the first evacuation, I put my personnel officer, a captain, and one of the liaison officers, and they managed to go with all the persons in that convoy to cross the border in the area of Kladanj. The vehicles that left in the (20)convoy returning to Srebrenica disappeared, and that happened with the other vehicles during the next evacuations too. And totally, or in total, 14, they were just picked up en route by -- either by BSA forces or irregular forces. (25)
• Q.: So I understand clearly, the first escort
• A.: Six kilometres -- • Q.: From Kladanj. (5) • A.: -- from Kladanj, because there was a barricade between the two borders and that meant that all the refugees, and later on also wounded persons, were forced to walk, struggle, I must say, the last six kilometres to the border of Kladanj. (10) • Q.: Did any other of your escort vehicles make it to Kladanj? • A.: Some of them in the beginning -- • Q.: Okay. • A.: -- but they didn't return. (15) • Q.: Okay. So what happened to those vehicles? • A.: They were hijacked, stolen. • Q.: What happened to the equipment that was used by the soldiers who participated in those escorts? • A.: The same. Weaponry, their personal weapons (20)were stolen. Helmets, flak jackets, private belongings were stolen. • Q.: What was the consequence of losing those vehicles in relation to the convoys that left your compound? (25)
• A.: The consequences were, I think, threefold.
(20) • Q.: Why did you do that?
• A.: Because in the beginning, especially for
individuals working between the refugees, they have
been stolen from the BSA soldiers around, there were
not so many. They stole the helmets, personal weapons,
(25)and flak jackets just by pointing a weapon on the head
• Q.: Did you again see General Mladic on the 12th (5)of July? • A.: That was on Wednesday, yes. At the moment that the first convoy arrived, let's say, the empty vehicles, and turned around in front of the compound and the first refugees were escorted to all those (10)buses, vans, and military vehicles, General Mladic appeared with his own vehicle and all his officers around him, and some bodyguards of course. And the press was there available too; they made nice pictures of him and what was going on over there. A lot of (15)publicity. • Q.: Did you have any conversations with General Mladic on this fourth meeting with him?
• A.: I had a short conversation with him about the
evacuation, about what he stated in the morning, that
(20)first priority should be the wounded persons, which he
stated, "Yes, that's correct, we should do something
about it. Bring them over to the hospital in
Bratunac." Then I said, "No, we won't do that. They
will stay here in the compound, in our own hands, or
(25)they should be sent or brought to NorMed Corps," that's
• Q.: What was his reaction? (5) • A.: None. • Q.: Please continue your description of the fourth meeting with General Mladic. • A.: He was so busy during his stay there with the press and impressing his soldiers and the officers (10)around him, and talking to some refugees, that I had hardly any chance to talk with him longer than, I think, those five minutes, and that was it. • Q.: When was your next contact with General Mladic? (15) • A.: The next contact was the next morning, on Thursday, Thursday morning. • Q.: Where did that take place?
• A.: Again in front of the compound, just opposite
the gate, the main gate. Again, a short meeting.
(20)There was no press available, or present, I must say.
He had only Colonel Jankovic with him and Major
Nikolic, both officers of the BSA, and of course his
interpreter, Petar, and some bodyguards.
He offered me, that was on that Thursday
(25)morning, he offered me that we could go or leave the
• Q.: In other words, that the Dutch Battalion could evacuate -- (5) • A.: Itself. • Q.: Is that correct? • A.: Yes, that's correct. • Q.: What was your response? • A.: I told him that I didn't like the idea of (10)leaving the compound because of a couple of subjects. One of the subjects was that I still had some military on OP Alpha, one of the observation posts that was still occupied. The officers and the soldiers from the day before, escorting the convoys that were still under (15)way, I missed them. • Q.: In other words, they were still missing.
• A.: They were still missing. I was faced at that
moment with 55 wounded civilians within the compound,
and I referred to the talk we had before, that I'd like
(20)to bring them over either by NorMed Coy or by the
International Red Cross; that I had my Bosnian local
workers on the compound, I mean, interpreters from the
battalion, interpreters from the United Nations
Military Observers which I had on the compound; that I
(25)had all the people of the MSF, Medecins Sans Frontiers,
• Q.: Was there any other significant matters discussed at that meeting, or did that conclude the meeting? • A.: That concluded the meeting. (10) • Q.: By the end of the 13th of July, had all the refugees been deported from the Potocari compound area? • A.: Yes, sir. I will look at my notebook. At 1600, on Thursday, the last refugee was gone outside the compound, and then one started with the evacuation (15)of the 4.000 to 5.000 refugees which were able to stay within the compound. It started at 1600 and it finished about 7.00. That was in three hours. • Q.: At the end of that -- at 7.00, then, there were no further refugees in and around Potocari; is (20)that right? • A.: There were no further refugees in and around Srebrenica -- I mean the compound at Potocari. • Q.: When was the next time you saw General Mladic? (25)
• A.: The next time that I saw General Mladic was
(15) • Q.: What happened?
• A.: We drove to that hotel in one vehicle with my
liaison officers. There was General Mladic with a
crowd of officers; most of them I knew already from the
meetings.
(20)My own -- well, that's not the right
expression. The chief of staff of the BH command,
General Nicolae, was there, a Dutch General, and his
military assistant and they offered us breakfast, and
we had some talks over a couple of things, about
(25)weaponry. I asked him again what happened with my
(15) • Q.: What was his response?
• A.: His response was that he should sort that
out. He was in contact with his Ministry of Internal
Affairs, and they should do that in close combination
or coordination, I must say, with the BH command. He
(20)referred to the presence of the chief of staff of BH
command.
My second question which I can remember
asking him was just a general one. I asked him what
should happen or should have happened if, during the
(25)stay of the United Nations troops in the safe areas of
MR. HARMON: Colonel Karremans, thank you very much. I have no further questions. Your Honours, I have concluded my examination (20)of Colonel Karremans.
JUDGE JORDA:
[Int.] Thank you very
much, Mr. Harmon.
Let me look at fellow Judges. Judge
Odio-Benito, I do believe you have some questions.
(25)Please proceed.
JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Colonel Karremans, after leaving Srebrenica and Potocari, where did the refugees go in these convoys, buses and trucks, you have (5)explained? • A.: Your Honour, all refugees, which I explained, left the safe area of Srebrenica within an amazingly short time -- that was Wednesday afternoon and Thursday, the whole day -- and they had been evacuated (10)to the Kladanj area, the one -- the first, let's say, Muslim city in the Tuzla area. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: To the confrontation line. • A.: To the confrontation line, exactly. (15) JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Do you know what happened to them during the travel?
• A.: No, because they stayed in vehicles. That
was one of the things that I'd like to do in the
beginning, to put a soldier per vehicle to have a look
(20)what was going on in buses or trucks. They didn't
inform me what was going on in the buses because we
didn't have eyes and ears for that. The only thing we
could do, and that was the second option, was just
escorting those big groups of vehicles, convoys, by two
(25)cars, in the beginning.
• A.: Yes, Your Honour. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: What did your soldiers do (5)after that? • A.: You mean the soldiers -- JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Yes, because you had soldiers in those vehicles and they lost the vehicles, the helmets, everything. But what did they do? (10) • A.: They were gathered together during that night, the night of Wednesday and Thursday, by the Bosnian Serb army, or the irregular part of it, I don't know exactly. They were gathered together, I think 12 in total, or 14 officers and soldiers. They stayed (15)overnight two times. Somewhere along that route, the route from Bratunac to Kladanj, they were fed by the Bosnian Serb army. They could have shelter for their own protection, they said. On Friday they returned, through Bratunac, to my compound. (20) JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Did you or any of your soldiers see Bosnian Serb soldiers beating, killing, raping the refugees in or around Potocari, in those factories that you mentioned?
• A.: Yes, Your Honour, they did. In some cases
(25)refugees had been beaten, and as soon as one of my
MR. HARMON: Your Honour, we will be presenting evidence in regard to both of those incidents described by Colonel Karremans. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Thank you. (10)Did you ever ask General Mladic during your meetings what happened to the people, the refugees? • A.: No, because the last meeting I had with him was on the 21st, that was eight days later on, and we were not aware of what happened with the refugees. I (15)mean, in general, I know -- I knew that they were all evacuated to the Kladanj area and afterwards picked up by the Pakistani Battalion and by the International Red Cross, by the Norwegian Medical Company. They built tents, shelters, supply points for the refugees. A (20)part of them had been transported to the air base of Tuzla and other parts of the amount of refugees were transported to other facilities. That's the only thing I knew, and I didn't discuss that with General Mladic at all. (25)
JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Would you say, Colonel,
• A.: Again -- JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: During those difficult (5)days before the fall of Srebrenica, you told us that you asked for support. • A.: Yes. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Did you receive that support? (10)
• A.: Your Honour, I can expand on that for days
and days, of course. That's why I was lucky that I
could explain yesterday and at the beginning of the
morning what happened with the inhabitants in the
enclave, the refugees, and with my soldiers.
(15)We had our daily sitreps, our daily situation
reports, in which we wrote everything that happened
that day, what we needed for supplies. Besides that, I
reported at different times, several times, I must say,
on the level of north-east command in Tuzla and the BH
(20)command in Sarajevo, what I needed to fulfil my
mission. I was very specific in that, exactly what we
needed, medicines, food, diesel, et cetera. I asked
for support many, many times during our stay over
there.
(25)I know that there have been many discussions
(5) JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: I'm going to ask you a last question and ask for your personal opinion, Colonel. Looking back, would you say that the United Nations and NATO did its best to help people, to save (10)their lives? • A.: On the one hand, yes. If we should have had our freedom of movement, which was one of the points of the NATO -- United Nations resolutions of 1993, and we could travel back and forth to the safe areas in (15)general, and to Srebrenica in particular, for my battalion but also for the International Red Cross, the other non-governmental organisations like the MSF, the UNHCR, and we were able to assist, help, the refugees, I think the answer is yes. But because of the (20)strangulation and because of the isolation and not having had support at all, then the answer is no. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Strangulation and isolation ordered by General Mladic. • A.: Yes, Your Honour. (25)
JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Thank you, Colonel. No
JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Thank you. I now ask my other fellow Judge if he has any questions. (5) JUDGE RIAD: Colonel Karremans, throughout these, perhaps, five meetings that you had with General Mladic, did he ever take into consideration your demands, or was it always, as you said, a monologue and he did not respond to any of your objections or claims? (10)
• A.: I have had, let's say, three major meetings
with him, but "meetings" between brackets, because in
my opinion, a meeting is two directions and a monologue
is not a meeting. Indeed, those were monologues.
In the second meeting I was able to explain
(15)the bad situation, and he made even notes of that, and
that was it.
The third meeting, on Wednesday morning, the
woman and the other men of the committee could make
their statements. They made note of it and that was
(20)it.
So the conclusion, only monologues, no
two-way negotiations. He did listen to my requests, if
I may say so, but didn't support them at all. He had
his own line in negotiating or in telling what he would
(25)like to tell and what he'd like to do.
(5) • A.: Yes, I did, Your Honour. I objected to that already in the meeting when he said that by asking, "What is the meaning of that?" His explanation was what I stated before, that he'd like to have the men between 16 and 60, to look if there were war criminals (10)amongst them. Maybe he thought that all the Bosnian soldiers were war criminals. He didn't explain what he'd like to do with them except that he wants to speak with them all. JUDGE RIAD: Did he ask you for information (15)about these people, to give him any kind of indication of where they are and who they are? • A.: No, Your Honour, he didn't. JUDGE RIAD: So there was absolutely no way of knowing about them through your battalion. (20) • A.: No, Your Honour.
JUDGE RIAD: In your last meeting with him,
you said it was on Friday morning, by that time it
seems that you had already known about the executions
you mentioned. Were you aware of everything that had
(25)happened and the way the refugees fleeing away were
• A.: No, I think not at all. The information in those days confirmed the information about, let's say, the military side of what was going on in the (5)battalion, resupplying, what had to be done before our own evacuation, if I may say so, and lastly, what happened during our week that we stayed there, and negotiations between some of the officers of my battalion staff and some of the BSA soldiers on wounded (10)persons. I had still one of the colonel surgeons in Bratunac in hospital to see what was going on with the wounded persons over there. We had discussions about the diesel because on that Friday after the evacuations I got a lot of diesel; what we should do with medicines (15)and food. Those were more or less the subjects we discussed in a couple of, let's say, small meetings, not with General Mladic, because I haven't seen him after the evacuation, but with his officers. I think (20)that was it. JUDGE RIAD: But did you include any mention, not to say protest, against the executions or the things you heard about in this last meeting you had with him, and what was his response, if you did? (25)
• A.: I haven't protested in the last meeting
JUDGE RIAD: According to you, he was present all the time and he was aware of all that was (15)happening.
• A.: He was present during the six days there of
the attack and invasion of the enclave, at least I
presume. He was present during the evacuation. He had
been there two times, which I explained, and if he
(20)wasn't there, he was at the hotel in Bratunac which he
used as a command post, and a kazerne in Bratunac which
he used as a command post for, let's say, the other
things he had to do concerning Gorazde, Zepa, and I
don't know what.
(25)After my last meeting with him, a short,
JUDGE RIAD: You speak of evacuation, and you mentioned that several times he asked you to assist in (5)this evacuation; that means, really, that the deportation of the people of Srebrenica to the Bosniak side. This deportation, although you did not assist, was very highly organised, and you said that buses came and that everything was very minutely organised. So (10)this was the headquarters of Mladic who did it.
• A.: Yes, Your Honour. It was -- I think he
ordered that himself. What I stated before during many
briefings, also open that everything was prepared --
preplanned in advance. And also the massive crowd of
(15)buses and vehicles, and I always use the example, in
modern Western countries, if you like to have 30 or 40
buses, then you have a challenge, but in a country like
the former Yugoslavia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, to gather
there 30 or 40 buses, you are not able to do that in
(20)one day, that must be preplanned a long time before.
So he had a plan and he executed that plan more or less
minute by minute or day by day. He ordered for the
evacuation. He asked for assistance of the battalion
but not more than -- and you will hear that from the
(25)next, I think, witnesses -- assist the people to go to
(5) JUDGE RIAD: You mentioned that 55 soldiers were taken into custody by the Serbs. I think it was on the 6th of July. How were they treated and how long did they stay?
• A.: Your Honour, that was not on the 6th of
(10)July. On the 6th of July, on the Thursday, let's say,
the invasions started, the attacks or -- yes, the
attacks started, the fighting between both parties in
the southern part of the enclave, also by shelling
compounds and the city of Srebrenica itself. It ended
(15)up on Saturday, two and a half days later, on the
retreat of OP Foxtrot that one of my soldiers died.
After that, let's say, Saturday afternoon and
Sunday and Monday, he picked -- or he attacked a lot of
observation posts by using force, weapons and soldiers,
(20)encircled them -- circled them and took the soldiers
hostage and took them with him. He gathered at the end
55 of my soldiers at two points; one in Bratunac, in
the northern part of -- let's say north of the enclave,
and one in Simici, south of the enclave. At the end,
(25)after the evacuation, they were gathered together, all
JUDGE RIAD: You mentioned several times that you raised the matter to the higher echelons, to your higher echelons. Was there a prompt response, or did (15)they leave you just to your fate?
• A.: Looking at the circumstances at that time and
knowing that both commanding officers of the north-east
command and the BH command were not available, I had to
deal with both chiefs of staff. My direct superior
(20)was, of course, the commanding officer of north-east
command in Tuzla. What I did was every time I thought
it was necessary, in shelters and in my own offices or
in the communication centre of the battalion staff, I
had direct communications with either the north-east
(25)command or BH command.
JUDGE RIAD: I'd like to ask you also, in one of the meetings where you mentioned Major Nikolic, he (15)stated that all Muslims should leave Bosnia. • A.: Yes, Your Honour. JUDGE RIAD: That was at an official meeting?
• A.: That was -- no. We had a sequence of
meetings with both parties, not together. We tried to
(20)have them together around the negotiation table. My
predecessor did. He wasn't able to do that one or two
times. We weren't because of the quarrels, because of
the fights over and over. So we had, every week, a
fixed meeting with the civil authorities, with the
(25)military authorities, within the enclave, and also
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, Colonel. • A.: You're welcome. JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] I have some very short questions I would like to put to you. (20)The troops you talked about, where did they come from? What was their composition? You talked about the fresh troops that arrived.
• A.: Yes, Your Honour. We were -- no. Around the
safe area of Srebrenica there were three brigades: the
(25)so-called Skelani Brigade in the south, the Bratunac
JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Thank you. Did (20)you think there were any militia, fresh people, fresh militia, in these forces?
• A.: Yes. Your Honour, what I had heard, I hadn't
noticed that myself, was that the so-called Arkan's
Brigade was involved as well. That was a brigade with,
(25)let's say, special forces from the BSA. But personally
JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] The evacuation (5)with the Dutch Battalion, was it possibly in the plan with your superior? Was the Dutch Battalion asked to provide that assistance? • A.: Do you mean the assistance, Your Honour, for the evacuation of the refugees? (10) JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] I'm talking about the evacuation. You've talked about a meeting with General Mladic, I think it was the second or the third, I can't remember, where all of a sudden he said that you had to proceed with the evacuation. It seems (15)that it wasn't tackled during your first or second meeting in Bratunac. So I had the impression that you weren't surprised, that you knew that there might be an evacuation, or did you decide, as the superior, did you decide that the evacuation would take place? (20)
• A.: During the first two meetings I didn't have a
clue about what was going on about the destiny of the
refugees. Knowing that we had about 25.000 refugees in
and around the compound, one of my major points was to
ask support, as much as I could get, from the BSA; what
(25)I stated before, food, water medicines, a good
(25)
JUDGE JORDA:
[Int.] Colonel, I'm
• A.: I had no time to -- I had time to inform my higher echelons, which I did. I asked several times (10)what could I do, how could you assist me, what should I do. No answer on that. There was no policy in that either. So I could, let's say, do what was the best thing to do at the moment. And knowing what time was left between that third meeting and 1.00, which was (15)mentioned by Mladic when the evacuation should start -- we were completely surprised, everybody, that such a thing could happen and that he already had organised such an evacuation -- I wasn't able to do anything about it. That's why we decided -- I decided in the (20)beginning to put on every bus, or whatsoever, a soldier, that was the least I could do, and assist the refugees as much as possible in going to the buses, giving them food, water, and medical care, and look for them during the evacuation. (25)
JUDGE JORDA:
[Int.] Thank you. My
• A.: We had, as you know, Your Honour, 25.000
persons in and around the enclave, almost all women,
children, and elderly people. We estimated about two
(10)to three per cent men, men between 16 and 60 more or
less, and we didn't know how many men there were -- in
general we knew -- how many men there were outside the
compound. We had asked through the interpreters and
through the committee if it was possible to note or,
(15)yes, set on a piece of paper all the names of those
persons, male persons, between 16 and 60 within the
compound. There was no time left to do that for all
the other persons.
There was one person who asked me in the
(20)past, "Why didn't you put the names of all the refugees
on a piece of paper?" You can imagine, Your Honours,
that that's impossible. What we did was we put the
names of men within the compound on a list, what I can
remember, 239. There were about 70 who didn't like
(25)that and they didn't do that. We have done that on
(5) JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Fine. Colonel, the Tribunal would like to thank you for your testimony. Last question. JUDGE RIAD: Colonel, did by any chance (10)General Mladic's office get hold of this list? • A.: I'm not sure about the answer I should give now, because there are two possible answers and maybe one of the witnesses after me could answer that question. There are two possible answers. One said, (15)or it has been stated that one of my officers offered or handed over that list to one of the BSA officers at the gate. Some others said, no, that was not the case. I am still at this moment not aware of what was going on with the list towards the BSA. I don't know. (20)I can't answer the question, do or does the BSA -- did the BSA receive that list of persons. I don't know. JUDGE RIAD: Did you ask the officer? • A.: No. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. (25)
JUDGE JORDA:
[Int.] Prosecutor,
(5) MR. HARMON: I do not, Your Honour.
JUDGE JORDA:
[Int.] Fine. Colonel,
in this Mladic/Karadzic case, we have finished with
your testimony, and we will now finish until 2.30. (10)
JUDGE RIAD: I think it's time for us to have
a break. JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Olivier Fourmy has something (15)to say.
MR. FOURMY:
[Int.] Thank you,
Mr. President.
I think I would like to make a general remark
at this point with regard to the French transcript of
(20)the testimony of Colonel Karremans and with regard to
the Rule 61 hearing. I think that it contains a
certain number of mistakes with regard to the substance
that was stated, at least in the French version. I
think that when Colonel Karremans speaks about BH
(25)command in English, he was talking about the one in
(5)
JUDGE RIAD:
[Int.] I think that
Mr. Mark Harmon ought to respond to that, perhaps. MR. McCLOSKEY: As we saw, he was there and (10)would probably be in a good position to respond. But I don't doubt Mr. Fourmy's statement. I'm sure there are some errors that might change things a little bit; that just seems to be a natural part of the process. But we can discuss that with Mr. Harmon and see if we need to (15)make a change or try to add an addendum or something.
JUDGE RIAD: We'll trust you with this
mission. MR. McCLOSKEY: We have another video of Mr. Koster that lasts for 59 minutes so ... (25)
JUDGE RIAD: All right. If we start at 1.35,
MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. We'll be a little over. JUDGE RIAD: I'll request our interpreters (5)and our staff to give us ten minutes more. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned for half an hour. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President. JUDGE RIAD: Yes. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] If I may. I (10)do apologise. But in this case, if we were to continue working late, we're going to have the same problem we had yesterday with the medical intervention for General Krstic, medical treatment, so we have the same problem. We should like to propose -- the Defence (15)proposes, if you permit, that General Krstic could leave the courtroom earlier, like he did yesterday. JUDGE RIAD: The same solution would apply today too. He can either leave now or he can leave at 2.15, it's up to him. But you agree that we should (20)finish with the videos today. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, Your Honour. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Thank you
(25)too.
--- Recess taken at 1.13 p.m. --- On resuming at 1.50 p.m. (5) JUDGE RIAD: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. McCloskey. MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. We're ready to go with the testimony of Mr. Koster, which is 59 minutes. We have another tape which we'll save for another time of (10)Pasaga Mesic, which is about half an hour. JUDGE RIAD: Which means that we have another hour and a half to go? MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, for two witnesses. One witness is an hour and then the other witness is 30 (15)minutes, but we can save that for a time -- if there's ever a time we don't have enough witnesses in the trial, we can put in that tape. JUDGE RIAD: I'm ready for both options, so what do you prefer? What does the Defence counsel (20)prefer, and the registrar? MR. McCLOSKEY: We've talked about it and the one-hour tape appears to be, with Mr. Harmon's input, the decision that we've made.
JUDGE RIAD: Good. So one hour will take us
(25)to ten to three.
JUDGE RIAD: That will be enough, I think. We'll stop at ten to three, with the permission of the interpreters. If there is any objection, I'm ready to (5)hear it, if anybody has a commitment which he cannot avoid. So everybody agrees. Of course, General Krstic will be allowed to leave at any time. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, (10)I should just like to ask you so as not to lose time whether, without your permission at that stage, General Krstic can leave at 2.15, in the presence of the security officers, of course. May he leave the courtroom at that time, without me having to ask you (15)again? JUDGE RIAD: You don't need to ask me. Thank you. The permission is granted. Thank you. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. (20)
JUDGE RIAD: Please proceed, Mr. McCloskey. JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Prosecutor, you have the floor.
MR. OSTBERG: Thank you very much. We would
(25)like to call our next witness, Lieutenant Koster.
JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Lieutenant Koster, do you hear me? Do you hear me? Please take the statement which has been given to you and read it (5)out. THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. WITNESS: LIEUTENANT KOSTER (10) JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Thank you, Lieutenant. Please be seated. THE WITNESS: Thank you. JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] I think my first question would go to the Prosecutor, and he will (15)introduce you to us. MR. OSTBERG: Thank you, Your Honour. • EXAMINED by Mr. Ostberg: • Q.: Lieutenant Koster, would you please state your full name and spell it for the record. (20) • A.: My last name is Koster. I'll spell it. K-o-s-t-e-r. • Q.: Thank you. What is your present occupation? • A.: I'm a logistics officer and an infantry soldier. (25)
• Q.: In the Dutch army?
• Q.: Have you been serving with the United Nations? • A.: Yes, I did. (5) • Q.: Would you please tell the Court where and when? • A.: I served in Srebrenica, and that was January 1995 till July 1995. • Q.: When did you start, did you say? (10) • A.: In January. • Q.: In January. Was Colonel Karremans your commanding officer? • A.: Yes, he was. • Q.: What was your position with the Dutch (15)Battalion? • A.: My position was to be the logistics officer of the battalion. • Q.: Just give us the outline of your duties in that position. (20) • A.: Well, I had to manage all logistic affairs, although we had few means, and, well, that meant very strict planning and distributing our logistic affairs. • Q.: Where in the chain of command were you placed in that position? (25)
• A.: I was a staff officer, and my direct
• Q.: Thank you. Were you on duty in the beginning of July 1995? • A.: Yes, I was. (5) • Q.: Where? • A.: I was on duty in Potocari, inside the compound. • Q.: Inside the compound. • A.: Yes. (10) • Q.: So your working place was inside the compound mostly. • A.: Most of the time, yes. • Q.: Okay. You were there even on the 11th of July, 1995? (15) • A.: Yes, I was also outside the compound then, yes. • Q.: Will you tell us about what happened after the fall of Srebrenica when refugees started to arrive in Potocari? (20)
• A.: Yes, that was on the 12th -- sorry, that was
on the 11th of July. We were ordered to go outside and
to form a unit to receive the refugees. So we went
outside and made a hole in the fence from where we
could guide the refugees towards the compound.
(25)When we were posted outside, approximately at
• Q.: You said that you formed a unit to take care of the incoming refugees. How big was that unit? • A.: Well, approximately 30 men at first. (10) • Q.: Were you in command of these 30 men? • A.: Yes, I was. • Q.: You said you opened a hole in the fence. • A.: Yes. • Q.: Is that the way you led them into the (15)compound? • A.: Yes. We were not allowed to let them in by the main gate. • Q.: Why?
• A.: Because the road which led from Srebrenica to
(20)Potocari was constantly under the direct sight and
direct fire from the Serbs. For example, in the days
before when we left the compound by vehicle, we were
fired upon with mortar fire, that kind of thing. So it
was better for people to take another route and another
(25)way to the compound which was more covered by trees and
• Q.: And you opened that hole in the fence. • A.: Yes. • Q.: When the people started to arrive, the first (5)ones who arrived, did you show them all into the compound? • A.: No, we were not allowed at first. We first showed them the way to the large buildings of a former bus station, where bus repair and bus maintenance was (10)done, and we told them to take cover inside of these buildings. • Q.: When you are saying that you were not allowed, allowed by whom? • A.: By my commander. (15) • Q.: By your commander. • A.: Yes. • Q.: What was the kind of shelter you gave them? • A.: Sorry? • Q.: What kind of shelter did you give them? (20) • A.: The big buildings of the former bus station. • Q.: Outside the compound. • A.: It was outside the compound, yes. • Q.: Then when did they start entering the compound? (25)
• A.: Well, that was later on that day. When the
(5) • Q.: How did these people arrive? • A.: Well, like I said before, first in small groups. Later on they -- there was one big mass of people coming down the road from Srebrenica to Potocari. Well, they came with a big, big noise, women (10)crying, children screaming, children also crying, well, people in terror. They came down the road towards our position. • Q.: On foot? • A.: On foot, yes. When we could receive them, we (15)just only could tell them to wait and to stay at our position. We couldn't tell them what to do, and they kept asking these questions, "What are we going to do? What are the plans for now?" They were very much afraid of what was going on with them, what was going (20)to happen with them, but we couldn't tell them so -- and they were -- sorry? • Q.: Had they walked the way from the city of Srebrenica?
• A.: Most of them, yes. Most of them. There were
(25)several vehicles from the compound in Srebrenica to the
(5) • Q.: When you're talking about these vehicles, were they UN vehicles? • A.: Yes, they were our UN vehicles. • Q.: No other means of transportation, like buses or trucks for these fleeing people? (10) • A.: Well, some APCs for medical aid. Those APCs were also carrying some wounded people and some healthy people towards our position, and the wounded people toward the compound, yes. • Q.: They started coming in small groups and then (15)they grew more and more. • A.: Yes. • Q.: Can you make some estimations, looking at what time they started and then how they slowly encompassed a big crowd of people? (20)
• A.: Yes. Well, I was ordered to make a rough
counting of the people constantly. Well, it started
with ten people, then hundreds of people, and then even
more, thousands of people. Well, it started
approximately -- they started coming around about 1500
(25)hours, and, well, until late in the evening it
• Q.: When you said you started to count them, did (5)you do that yourself? • A.: Yes. Later on that day I compared with my colleagues to make a rough counting of the total number of people, and we came to a number of approximately 15.000 people. (10) • Q.: 15.000 people. • A.: 15.000 people, yes. • Q.: How many of them were led into or brought into the compound? • A.: Well, on top of the 15.000, there were 4.000 (15)to 5.000 people let into the compound. So at the end of the day there were 15.000 outside the compound and 4.000 to 5.000 inside the compound. • Q.: We're talking now about the 11th of July. • A.: Yes. (20) • Q.: Did they stop coming in the evening?
• A.: Yes, they stopped. There were -- the crowds
stopped. There were a few people coming down the road
still, but the big mass, the big mass of people, the
big crowd, stopped coming towards our position, yes.
(25)It was fully filled with these people.
• A.: Well, during the day I ordered for some reinforcements because we couldn't stand any longer to (5)hold the people. We had some interpreters to make it clear for them what to do. Well, what we were doing down there was the best we could, giving them some medical help, telling them that we would guide them and escort them and protect them as best we could. Well, (10)whether it was help -- any help needed, we were there. • Q.: And that with 30 persons? • A.: Well, I ordered some reinforcements. Later on that day, I guess it would be 50 to 60 men outside. • Q.: What kind of medical support could you give (15)them? • A.: Mainly first aid. • Q.: Like bandages and things like that? • A.: If we had some, yes, some bandages. There were several wounded men and women, also women giving (20)birth to children at our place. We also had some assistance from MSF. • Q.: "MSF" is?
• A.: Medecins Sans Frontiers. So the wounded, we
could give them only the first aid because we didn't
(25)have more means outside, also inside the compound.
• A.: Well, outside it was impossible for us to do because we had so scarce means of food rations and all that, so we couldn't give them any food outside the (5)compound. What I learned later on is that we made a soup of food rations, mixed, mingled, with water for people inside the compound. Outside the compound, some people were carrying jerrycans and bottles of water, carrying water with them, and nearby our position there (10)was a small well where people could get some water, so that was -- it was needed because it was tremendously hot that day, so water was a very needed factor over there. • Q.: The people inside could get some soup to eat (15)or drink, but outside, could you give them anything at all apart from the water from the well? • A.: Yes, that's correct. • Q.: Could you paint the picture, what it looked like when nightfall came. What did it look like in and (20)around the compound then?
• A.: Well, it was like being on a scene. It was a
little bit surrealistic. Being outside, these people,
I slept outside, also my men slept outside. We did
some patrolling that night and we had some posts to
(25)protect them. Well, the big noise stopped, all the
(5) • Q.: Were there any attacks from the Bosnian Serb army, or any soldiers or units attacking this amount of people? • A.: Well, not in person but we were fired upon with mortar fire during the day. Well, the shelling (10)wasn't among the people. It was very close, close firing, approximately 50 metres from our position. Among the houses nearby our position, the explosions of the grenades, of the mortar grenades, came down, yes. That's true. (15) • Q.: But these crowds of people were not shelled or fired at directly. • A.: Not directly, no. No. • Q.: Then you said you had some 30 people and some reinforcements. What about the rest of the personnel (20)of the Dutch Battalion? Where were they deployed during this time? What I want to know is: How many persons, how many soldiers, of the battalion in total were present in Potocari when this flood of refugees arrived? (25)
• A.: Well, it should be approximately 200 men, I
• Q.: Two-hundred men. • A.: Yes, I guess. • Q.: Where were the rest of the battalion (5)deployed? • A.: They were assigned to the OPs. • Q.: And "OPs" are? • A.: Observation posts. • Q.: Observation posts. (10) • A.: Yes. Also part of them were located in the compound of Srebrenica. But most of these men and women were supply forces so they were not fighter men, they were not infantrymen. • Q.: But the ones you're talking about in (15)Potocari, those were fighting men, infantry soldiers? • A.: A few of them, yes, but most of them were supply forces. • Q.: Most of them were supply forces. Were any of your personnel taken hostage or assaulted during this (20)day, the 11th? • A.: No, not on the 11th. • Q.: Okay. Could any of you have any rest the night between the 11th and the 12th of July last year?
• A.: Well, for me personally, no. For most of
(25)them, I guess not, because we were busy helping people,
(5) • Q.: Will you then turn your attention to the following day and give us an account of what happened on the 12th of July, 1995. • A.: Well, in the morning it was relatively quiet. The people, well, they woke up and started (10)asking questions about what was going on and what we were planning to do and what the Serbs were planning to do, so we couldn't tell. We carried on giving them medical aid. Still wounded people came down to our position asking for (15)doctors, asking for medical help. Still women were looking for their children like the day before, because they lost their children in the big crowd of people. And also children looking for their families, those kinds of things. That carried on all morning. Also (20)the sun appeared again so it became tremendously hot again that day. Later on that day, approximately at 1300 hours -- • Q.: What time? (25)
• A.: 1300 hours.
• A.: We heard the noise of tanks and APCs, and I heard by radio that there was a tank and an APC coming down the road toward the compound. So the people -- (5)well, there was panic and the people were scared, and they ran down to the south of our location. So we had to wait for what was going on then and wait for the Serbs to make a move. • Q.: Okay. (10) • A.: When they did, they came to our position, and also to the compound. • Q.: You're now talking about the army, the Bosnian Serb army. • A.: That's correct. (15) • Q.: Yes.
• A.: Yes. They came to our position. We made a
demarcation line of some red and white tape over the
road and, well, they stayed behind the tape. Some of
them asked for the commanding officer at my location,
(20)so that was me, and he introduced himself and so do I.
I can't remember his name.
I asked him what he was planning to do and he
didn't tell me. Well, after that he turned his back on
me and went down to his forces. At that time there
(25)were, well, approximately 20 to 30 Serbian soldiers at
• Q.: Could you give us an example of what they said to the people? • A.: Well, most of the times they were mocking at them, and doing that, it was a very odd situation (10)because they sat down on the ground and started singing. They also -- they actually didn't make a move. They were just saying over there at their location, behind the red and white tape, probably -- I don't know what they were doing. So we just could stay (15)there and wait for what they were going to do. • Q.: Then what happened? • A.: Later on that day, Major Nikolic came down also to my position and he introduced himself. • Q.: Did you know him beforehand? (20) • A.: Yes, I recognised him from photos in the operations room. • Q.: Yes.
• A.: Well, he wanted to have a look among the
people and he wanted to walk through to the other end
(25)of our location. At that time it was reported from my
• Q.: How many people did get some bread? Did they have something for everybody?
• A.: No, not at all. It was a very small truck
and, well, they were throwing the bread and giving the
(20)bread to the people. My interpreter told me that while
we were doing that they were shouting at the people
again and mocking them and calling them names.
Well, the vehicle returned one more time also
loaded with bread, and also a fire truck came down to
(25)our position to give the people some water. Well, one
• Q.: He wouldn't? (20) • A.: No. • Q.: Who wouldn't, Mladic? • A.: General Mladic. • Q.: So you asked him to go and talk to the commanding officer. (25)
• A.: Yes, several times.
• A.: He said, "No, I am doing what I please to do, and I am in charge here and Mate Boban tells me what to do. I am outside here and you will see what's going to (5)happen." He told us to cooperate or else there would be -- we were, you know, told to cooperate with him, we would be best off by cooperating. • Q.: You said "or else." Did he -- • A.: No. We would be best off by cooperating, (10)those were the words said. • Q.: Yes. Go on with the story, please. • A.: Then he went to the people and he spoke to the people not to be afraid, that he should -- he would take care of them. He was talking to little children (15)accompanied by a filming team, a camera team. I was constantly protesting that he should go to the compound. While doing that, some buses arrived and I reported that. Then I asked him again what he was going to do. He was irritated and he told me that he (20)would evacuate the people to another place. At once some of the Serbian soldiers pulled down several of my men. • Q.: What did they do?
• A.: They pulled down and pulled away several of
(25)my men who were holding the civilians, and, well, the
• Q.: How many Bosnian Serb troops were present then, in your estimation? • A.: Well, I estimated approximately 40, 50 men and, well, they were still coming up, more men, men (10)with dogs, all that kind of thing. • Q.: You were outnumbered. • A.: Yes, we were severely outnumbered. Yes, that's true. • Q.: Okay. Please go on. (15) • A.: Then I was told to escort the people and to provide any harming [sic] of the people, and we could not do anything else other than just escorting them. The Serbs took over and they pushed the people to go to the buses, and they kept on doing that till the buses (20)were fully stuffed with people. They were putting far more people inside the bus than normally is usual. The buses drove away. Then we had to stop the people again and we had to wait till other transport arrived at our location. (25)
• Q.: Did you in any way convoy or send somebody
• A.: Yes. • Q.: Tell us about that. • A.: I learned later that we escorted the buses (5)and the trucks by sending some of our men with a jeep driving in front or with the buses. Well, the first transport, they succeeded escorting them, and the other transports, well, the jeeps were taken away from us so we couldn't escort them any more. (10) • Q.: By the Serbian soldiers. • A.: By the soldiers, yes. • Q.: Bosnian Serb soldiers, yes. Was any separation of sexes taking place before they were loaded on buses? (15) • A.: Yes. Well, they were looking for men, older men -- well, men of fighting age, potential fighting men, and they were separating them from their families and from the rest of the people. Well, they kept on doing that the whole time. (20) • Q.: What happened to these men who were separated from their families? Where did they go?
• A.: They put them inside a house, and from what I
have seen they were just sitting there and waiting.
Their personal belongings were taken away and put
(25)outside of the house, and I only saw these men
• Q.: Of course. What about General Mladic? Was (5)he present while these things went on? • A.: Well, I lost sight of him. When the first buses started to drive away, I lost sight of him. • Q.: This transportation of people started, as I remember you said, at about 1600 or -- (10) • A.: That was the time when General Mladic arrived -- • Q.: When he arrived. • A.: -- and, well, it shouldn't be more than a half hour, an hour later, when the buses arrived and (15)drove away. • Q.: How many busloads of people left Potocari this day, the 12th? • A.: I didn't count them all but, well, they started -- I'm sorry, they ended up when night fell. (20) • Q.: With nightfall, they stopped. • A.: Yes. • Q.: Do you have an idea of how many busloads that was? Do you have any idea how many people left on the first day? (25)
• A.: No.
• A.: No, I have no estimation. • Q.: You can make no estimation. They stopped at nightfall, you said. (5) • A.: Yes. • Q.: Still then, people were inside and outside the compound. • A.: Yes, that's correct. • Q.: Was anybody taken out of the compound on this (10)first day and put on the buses, or was that people from outside? • A.: From what I know, there were people from outside the compound because I was there. I don't know if people from inside the compound were taken outside (15)because I couldn't see it from my position. • Q.: You couldn't see it. • A.: I don't know that. • Q.: You don't know that. Then night came, and can you tell us something about what happened during (20)the night? • A.: Yes. We were told by the Serbs that we had to clear the road and to join the people on the terrain in front of the former bus station. • Q.: Clear the road of refugees. (25)
• A.: Yes. The road should stay open because they
• Q.: Can you describe in what way they did that. • A.: Well, they joined -- they formed groups of three or four men, and they walked up to a UN soldier (10)and told him to give away his weapon, his bulletproof vest, his helmet, and his equipment, and when he refused that, he was forced to do so. • Q.: At gunpoint? • A.: Me personally at gunpoint, yes. (15) • Q.: How many of your soldiers did lose their equipment in this way? • A.: I don't know. Many of them. • Q.: Many out of these 30, 40 soldiers. • A.: Yes, that's correct. (20) • Q.: The majority? • A.: The majority, yes. • Q.: That went on during the night.
• A.: Yes, in the beginning of the night. Later on
that night they disappeared, and I didn't know where
(25)they went. We were alone with these people and then
• Q.: Okay. Then we arrive at the 13th of July. I will now ask you to tell the Court what happened on that day. • A.: On the 13th, well, we put down four APCs on (10)the road to make some of the -- • Q.: "APCs" stands for? • A.: Armoured personnel carriers. • Q.: Armoured personnel carriers. • A.: Armoured, yes. Sorry. To make some of them (15)an artificial gate so we could guide the people in a better way. Then at approximately 700 hours the buses arrived, and half an hour later the Serbs arrived. Then there were more and more troops coming down to our position, and when -- (20) • Q.: Again, an estimation, if you can. How many troops?
• A.: At least 50, 60 of them. Then they started
again to pull away my men and to put the people inside
of the buses and the trucks, and that carried on during
(25)the day.
• A.: No. • Q.: Shooting? (5) • A.: No. • Q.: Nothing? • A.: We heard some shooting on the west side of the compound coming from houses and that kind of thing. But not on my position, there was no shooting. (10) • Q.: Did this separation type of handling, this thing, did that go on even this day? Did they separate men from the rest of their families, or was that done only on the first day? • A.: No, it still went on that day. For example, (15)we saw a 19-year-old boy being separated from his family and, well, we protested against it, and the Serbian soldier, he was impressed and let the boy go to the buses. But they carried on separating the men, yes. (20) • Q.: That went on on the 13th of July, all day? • A.: From what I've seen, yes. • Q.: When was the place emptied of refugees or everybody evacuated? When was that?
• A.: I will have to look it up. One moment,
(25)please. It was on the 13th of July.
• A.: Yes. • Q.: What time of the day; can you recall that? • A.: Well, it would be approximately at 1800 (5)hours. I had to do my report at the compound and get some food and a few hours of sleep, two hours, and that was at 1600 hours. When I reported to duty in the operations room, that was at 1830, I was told that it wasn't necessary any more because all the people had (10)gone. • Q.: All of them? • A.: All of them had gone. • Q.: Even the people who were in the compound? • A.: Yes, except the wounded people. (15) • Q.: Except the wounded people? • A.: Yes. • Q.: They left the wounded people. What about the men who were separated? Were they still around or were they gone also? (20) • A.: They were also gone. • Q.: Did you see them go? • A.: No, because I was in the compound sleeping. • Q.: Did you see when the people were taken from that compound into the buses? (25)
• A.: No, I didn't see that.
• A.: No, not in person. We heard several single (5)shots, like I told you before. We did hear some rumours; that was on the 12th of July, while I was reporting at the compound. We heard some rumours from people inside the compound that there was a place where they had seen eight or nine bodies laying down on the (10)ground. On the 13th of July, two colleagues of mine and I investigated that place. • Q.: Was that in the vicinity of the compound -- outside the compound? • A.: Well, it was approximately -- well, 500 (15)metres away from the compound. • Q.: What did you find?
• A.: When we came down to that place, we saw nine
bodies laying in a field, near to a river. We went up
to that location and we took pictures. We didn't
(20)actually investigate the bodies, but we saw seven of
them lying down on the ground, with their face down to
the ground. Two of them were lying on their sides,
their backs. They had -- well, the seven of them had a
shot in the back, in the middle of the back. We took
(25)pictures, and we also found some papers. But the
• Q.: You did these findings on the 13th of July. • A.: Yes. (5) • Q.: Did you hear some shooting you could relate to that incident, to these people's death? • A.: Well, I only heard the several single shots during the day. That's only what I have heard. • Q.: Did you see other killed people around? (10) • A.: Yes, that was in the morning. One man hanged himself on the ceiling of a small building, and he was already dead when we released him from the rope. • Q.: Any other incidents of that kind? • A.: No. (15) • Q.: So by the evening of the 13th, the place was empty, there were no refugees any more. • A.: Outside of the compound, no. Inside also, no, except the wounded people. • Q.: The wounded people. Did you see General (20)Mladic more than these times on the 12th that you talked about?
• A.: Yes. During the night on the 12th and on the
13th, during that night I saw him passing by our
position, sitting in a jeep. He moved up to
(25)Srebrenica, and later on that night he moved back
• Q.: So you saw him twice during that night. • A.: Sorry? • Q.: You saw him twice during that night? (5) • A.: Yes, that's correct. • Q.: But he didn't stop? • A.: No. • Q.: You didn't talk to him? • A.: He just drove on. (10) • Q.: Okay. Then when only the wounded people were left, what happened then? What did you do in the coming days? • A.: Well, for me personally, I picked up my job again as a logistics officers, doing the things (15)requested and waiting for us to leave the enclave. We were making preparations for leaving the enclave because we didn't know if we could leave with all our equipment or just by taking our personal belongings and then leave the compound. So I took up my old job. (20) • Q.: As a logistics officer, you can certainly tell us, how much equipment did you lose during these days? • A.: Well, I don't know the exact numbers and figures. We lost weapons; we did lose some jeeps. (25)
• Q.: How many jeeps?
• Q.: Can you make an estimation? • A.: No. • Q.: You can't. (5) • A.: APCs, we lost APCs, and we lost, well, equipment, soldiers' equipment, bulletproof vests, and helmets. • Q.: When did you leave? When did the battalion leave Srebrenica? (10) • A.: It was on the 21st, on Friday, July. • Q.: The week after. • A.: The week after that, yes. MR. OSTBERG: Thank you very much. Your Honours, I have concluded my examination. (15) JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. Ostberg. Fellow Judges, you have questions. Please proceed. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Thank you. (20) • QUESTIONED by the Court:
JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Lieutenant Koster, you
talk of 15.000 people coming from Srebrenica to
Potocari looking for help. Mostly, you said, they were
women and children and elderly people. Is that
(25)correct?
JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Were you expecting this exodus from Srebrenica? • A.: I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question? (5) JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Were you in Potocari, you and your team, expecting this exodus from Srebrenica? • A.: Yes. We were outside there to receive the refugees, yes, and we could expect that refugees should come to our position. That's why we were posted (10)outside. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Were you prepared for receiving them? • A.: No. Just being there, being posted there, and doing the best we can. We didn't have the (15)equipment, medical equipment, or even enough food to receive them. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Had you, your team, asked for help to your superiors or to the superior command of NATO or UNPROFOR to face this emergency? (20) • A.: I do not know. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Did you receive any additional support for help before or after the 11th of July? • A.: No. (25)
JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: What happened with these
• A.: Sorry. You're only talking now about the wounded people? (5) JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: About the women, children, elderly people in Potocari, coming from Srebrenica, when the Serb soldiers arrived. • A.: Well, they were afraid and they were not harmed or anything by the Serbian people, from what I (10)could see, outside the compound. Well, later on, during the periods we were outside, they were put inside the buses and evacuated from my position. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Did you hear about massacres committed by Serb soldiers against Muslims in (15)and around Srebrenica, Potocari, Bratunac at that time? • A.: No. I only learned on the Wednesday that there was a position -- there was a rumour about eight or nine bodies. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: After those days, had you (20)heard about massacres committed? • A.: No, only when I returned, in the news. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Did Colonel Karremans, or anyone else, say no to General Mladic when he ordered the evacuation of the refugees? (25)
• A.: I do not know that because they already
JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: But the refugees were under your support, under the UN support, under (5)protection. • A.: That's correct. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: So did you or your superior try to avoid that the refugees were taken out? • A.: It was impossible to do because we were (10)outnumbered. We were pulled away, and then the Serbs, they pushed the people and shouted at the people to go to the buses now, to get inside these buses. So being outnumbered, we couldn't do anything at that time. JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: I see. Thank you. No (15)further questions. JUDGE RIAD: Lieutenant Koster, you just said that you were outnumbered, completely outnumbered. In fact, you were in a state of helplessness, completely. • A.: Yes, that's correct. (20) JUDGE RIAD: Were you at any moment threatened? • A.: In person? JUDGE RIAD: No, the whole group, in your capacity, you and your colleagues. (25)
• A.: No. We were just told to cooperate, that
JUDGE RIAD: Yes, "best for us" means that something could be worst; if there is something best, then something can be worst. (5)You mentioned that Mladic himself told you, he told you you'd better cooperate, you are right, and then he told you, "You will see what is going to happen." Is that right? • A.: I'm sorry. I don't understand the question. (10) JUDGE RIAD: Mladic, among his statements, he told you, "You are going to see what will happen." You mentioned that from your notes. • A.: I still don't understand your question. I'm sorry. (15) JUDGE RIAD: What did Mladic tell you? • A.: Okay. Yes, he told me that, and later on he told me that he was going to evacuate the people of Srebrenica. JUDGE RIAD: Yes. (20) • A.: Yes. JUDGE RIAD: Then you mentioned that you saw them separate men of fighting age from the others. • A.: Yes, that's correct. JUDGE RIAD: Did you protest or anything? (25)
• A.: Yes, we did.
• A.: Well, sometimes they let the men go with their families and their wives. Well, at the places we (5)were -- we couldn't protest where we were not located, so we couldn't do a thing. JUDGE RIAD: Did they pick them just at random, or did they have a list in their hands? • A.: No, just at random. (10) JUDGE RIAD: Because there was a list of 200-and-something people which nobody knew if it was given to them or not. Do you have any idea about that? • A.: I know about that list, yes, and that was on the compound -- at the compound. (15) JUDGE RIAD: I beg your pardon? • A.: That list was made just to make sure and to inform the Serbs that we were watching them and keeping things under control about what they were going to do with the men, and by that list we were also protecting (20)them. So we were checking them -- JUDGE RIAD: This list was made by your men, by the officers? • A.: No, it was not. JUDGE RIAD: No. (25)
• A.: It was made by a committee of the refugees
JUDGE RIAD: And given to you? • A.: No, not to me. JUDGE RIAD: I mean to your -- (5) • A.: My commanding officer. JUDGE RIAD: Yes. • A.: From what I know, it was not given to the Serbs. JUDGE RIAD: You don't know if it was given (10)to the Serbs or not. • A.: From what I know, it was not given to the Serbs. JUDGE RIAD: It was not. Thank you very much. (15) JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Lieutenant, on the basis of what we've heard, apparently there's some vehicles from the battalion that escorted the jeeps -- some jeeps that escorted the vehicles, so you did have some jeeps that went along with the convoys. (20)Now, I take it that those jeeps came back, at least some of them came back, so you had a chance to see some of your men before you left the compound. What did your men tell you about what happened, and were they aware of the events? (25)
• A.: I only learnt about that when we left the
JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Because the (5)jeeps that were doing the escorting did not leave Potocari? • A.: Some of them were already taken away at our main gate, and, well, that's what they told me while I was doing my reports. Well, at least one of them made (10)it through, and that was the first transport. But that is something I learned later, when I left the enclave. JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] When soldiers came back, because there was a gathering before you left the enclave, what did people say to one another? (15)What did the soldiers say there? Did anybody tell you anything? Did they know anything? • A.: No. JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Nothing was said? (20) • A.: No. JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] They didn't say anything about what they might have seen? They didn't see anything?
• A.: No, because I wasn't speaking to them. I was
(25)too busy at that time doing my job as a logistics
JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Fine. You got together on a regular basis with the reports about the (5)meetings with General Mladic, or was there a compartmentalisation between the different levels of command? • A.: Can the interpreter repeat the question, please. (10) JUDGE JORDA: [Int.] Did you have any input about the meetings with General Mladic, or was there no information trickling down at the various levels? • A.: No, I didn't know what was going on. I (15)didn't know the exact details of the meetings with General Mladic.
JUDGE JORDA:
[Int.] Thank you.
Mr. Ostberg, we have no further questions for
the witness so we could have the usher show the witness
(20)out.
Lieutenant, the Tribunal would like to thank
you for your testimony which you provided on behalf of
the Prosecution. Then the Prosecution can show in the
next witness.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honour. JUDGE RIAD: So we'll adjourn till tomorrow, (5)at 9.30. Thank you. --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 25th day of May, 2000, at 9.30 a.m. |
