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(1)Thursday, 29 June 2000 [Open session] [The witness entered court] [The accused entered court] (5) --- Upon commencing at 9.35 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning; good morning to the technical booth, to the interpreters, the legal assistants, court reporters; good morning Mr. Harmon and Mr. McCloskey. Mr. Cayley, good morning; good morning Mr. Petrusic and Mr. Visnjic; good (10)morning, General Krstic; good morning, Witness. I think we with continue with Mr. Richard Butler and his testimony. We suggested yesterday to make a bit of a re-evaluation to see whether we can finish. I think that the Prosecutor can tell us a little more about that and where we stand in the matter. (15)
MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. We put our heads together
last night with the outline and the materials and crunched it as much as
we could. We believe that we can finish Mr. Butler's testimony by the
next Tuesday of the following session.
However, if you can give us any extra time this week, we would
(20)certainly take that and be willing to work whatever hours you deem
appropriate to help meet this deadline. I'm sure we've all experienced
over the years lawyers' estimates of time are not always reliable, and I
hate to say I have been guilty of that in the past, but that is our best
estimate. But if we did have extra time, I think that would help ensure a
(25)date by Tuesday, and that would leave us time to finish the rest of the
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well, Mr. McCloskey. We thank you for your efforts and we shall see the results. But to avoid overstepping the time limit, we are ready to work today until 4.30. So (5)we're going to adhere to our schedule, which means that at 2.30 we're going to have a half-hour break and resume at 3.00 and then go on working until 4.30 this afternoon to avoid overstepping the time limit and the agenda objectives that we have set. So thank you for that information. It isn't Friday yet, so I'm (10)sure everybody is willing and ready to put in a bit more work. Having said that, I would like to bid good morning to the witness. Mr. Butler, we're going to continue. Let me remind you that you are still under oath. You will be answering questions put to you by Mr. McCloskey. (15)Mr. McCloskey, your witness and make the best use of your time, please go ahead. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed] • EXAMINED by Mr. McCloskey: (20) • Q.: Mr. Butler, in your narrative you have concluded that General Krstic became Commander of the Drina Corps the late part of July 13th, 1995 [Realtime transcript read in error June] Can you briefly summarise that opinion, some of the materials you based it on, and then we'll go over each of those materials in detail. (25)
• A.: In the narrative where I make that conclusion, what I'm basing my
• Q.: I note the record in my statement said June 13, 1995. I may have slipped. I should have asked about July 13, 1995. All right. Mr. Butler, let's -- we left off yesterday with an order that General Krstic issued as Chief of Staff on July 13th. Where (15)does that -- can you fit that into your analysis? • A.: Again, reviewing that order, the times that are internal to the text of that order, that is the final order that General-Major Krstic signs as the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, and I believe that order was published approximately noon on the 13th of July, 1995. (20)So within the framework of consistency, that order, the Zepa operation order, does in fact fit with the theory of him assuming command later that day, on the 13th of July.
• Q.: All right. Let's go to Exhibit 462, which is a July 13th order by
General Zivanovic as Commander of the corps. If you could put that on the
(25)ELMO and tell us about this order and how it fits into your analysis.
• A.: We can't positively tell whose stamp it is by these times. Each unit has its own specific stamp, but I believe this stamp to be the (5)outgoing processor, which in this case would be the command of the Drina Corps. • Q.: Why do you believe that? • A.: On other Drina Corps orders that we have, we see the stamp in the exact same format. (10) • Q.: All right. Let's go to Exhibit 463, which is an order dated 13 July in the command of the Drina Corps, signed by Commander Major General Radislav Krstic. Can you explain this document and how it fits into your analysis?
• A.: Starting from the top of the document, again, the order is
(15)labelled, "The Command of the Drina Corps, 13 July 1995." The context of
this document is a directive to three subordinate formations of the Drina
Corps, the Bratunac -- the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, the
Skelani Separate Battalion, and the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade, to
conduct search operations in and around the former enclave of Srebrenica,
(20)to begin the search immediately and to finish it by 16 July 1995.
Moving further down this order, again, for the first time, this is
where we see General-Major Radislav Krstic signing as the Commander.
Further down we have the translation of the time annotations on the date
stamp indicating that the communications centre received the order at 2000
(25)hours on 13 July and sent the order or processed the order at 2030 hours
(10) • Q.: Now, you mentioned that we obtained this document from the RS government. Can you tell the Court how that process occurred, that we were able to get this particular order from the government?
• A.: As a result of the search that we conducted on the headquarters of
the 513th Infantry Brigade, formerly the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade,
(15)we received various -- a very large number of orders and documents. In
the case of some of those orders and documents, they referred back to a
Drina Corps order or directive.
One of the documents that we had that will be a later exhibit, I
believe the next exhibit, is an example of the Bratunac Brigade order
(20)which refers back to this. Based on the process of now knowing what
orders were issued, essentially we requested initially from the government
of the Republika Srpska that documents be provided, and failing to get
response from that, the Prosecutor requested a binding order signed by the
Trial Chamber, which was in fact done.
(25)Pursuant to that, we received approximately four of the 14
(5) • Q.: You have other records with General Krstic's name signed in a signature fashion on them? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: Now, you're not a handwriting expert, are you? • A.: No, sir. (10) • Q.: But you have had a chance to review the handwritten signature indicating Radislav Krstic; is that correct? • A.: Yes, sir, I have. • Q.: Now, the signature, this rough photocopy of Exhibit 463, does this -- what you can make out of this rough photocopy, does it in any way (15)resemble the other photocopied signatures that you've seen of General Krstic? • A.: Yes, this does, sir. It very closely resembles the other signatures that we have of General Krstic. • Q.: Could this be a typo, a "Commander" when it should have been (20)"Chief of Staff", in your view? • A.: In my view, an error like that is extremely unlikely, almost impossible. • Q.: Why?
• A.: When you look at the internal context of the orders, and when you
(25)understand how a military command and staff operates, one of the
• Q.: How about if General Krstic was the task force commander of the task force designated to take out the Zepa enclave; could this be commander as the task force and not as Commander of the Drina Corps? • A.: In that aspect there are two arguments that mitigate against (15)that. If I can go back to the original English translation, first of all, again looking at the header information, it specifies Command of the Drina Corps. The second aspect is evident within the context of the order itself. Within the context of the order, this order has absolutely nothing to do with the operation occurring at Zepa, but has everything to (20)do with the operations still ongoing at Srebrenica. • Q.: If there was another Commander of the Drina Corps at this time, how would that Commander have viewed an order such as this signed as Commander of the Drina Corps?
• A.: At a minimum, it would be a very bad reflection on both the staff
(25)people who prepared the order and the individual who signed the order. At
• Q.: Now, taking you up to the front left corner of this document and going to the number, strictly confidential number 01/4/157/5. We've talked a bit about these numbers before, but what, if anything, are you (10)able to make out of this number? • A.: In this case, with the numbers, and as I've noted before, because we don't have enough operational orders from the Drina Corps, I'm not able to conclude the 01 or the 4 piece as to who specifically drafted the order, other than to generally be able to say that it comes from the (15)command Chief of Staff operations area within the framework of the staff. The 157 middle numbers again clearly associate it with the series of orders related to both Srebrenica and the following orders that related to Zepa. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Excuse me, Mr. McCloskey, for (20)interrupting you. Witness Butler, if you compare this with the other exhibit, the document 462, if you compare that --
MR. McCLOSKEY: Excuse me, Mr. President. I didn't get the French
translation. I can understand "excuse moi," but after that I'm pretty
(25)hopeless.
THE INTERPRETER: You're not getting the English interpretation? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Can you hear? [In English] (5)Exhibit 463 and Exhibit 462. No. Yes. 462, 463, in this same aspect. • A.: Again in this aspect, sir, the 156 series of numbers we have related back to the original base order of Srebrenica operation, which is the order 156-1, the preparatory order of 2 July. In the case of the order series 157, we see the order 157 series (10)starting with preparations related to the sweeping of the terrain, the issue of the column, as well as starting to see preparations for military operations against Zepa. So clearly it ties back to a different base order. And within the sequence of the Drina Corps numbers, 157, it would be the next major order after the 156. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: All right. Mr. Butler, let's go on to the next exhibit, 464. If you could tell us what that is and how it fits into your analysis. MR. McCLOSKEY: In this regard, could we have the next big exhibit placed on the easel. (20)
• A.: With respect to the last order and as we previously discussed,
this is the Bratunac Brigade order which, in effect, implements the prior
order, and you can clearly see the Drina Corps reference number dated
13 July 1995.
What this order does for the Bratunac Brigade is it takes the
(25)broader guidance, or actually in this case the specific guidance of the
• Q.: Now, Mr. Butler, could you take us back to General Krstic's order of the 13th and just briefly, by this large exhibit that's in front of (10)you, whose number I will provide in a minute, point out the villages or areas that are referred to in General Krstic's order, and then if you could point out the response of the Bratunac Brigade in those villages and how they tie in with each other.
• A.: The Drina Corps order, as is written, essentially identifies a
(15)series of villages that we have in a shade of what's best described as
purplish or a form of dark red. Ravni Buljim, Zvijezda, Siljato Brdo,
Slapovici, Zeleni Jadar, Kostar, and Sed.
What these villages are used as, in the sense of the Drina Corps,
is they're designating unit boundaries to ensure that the forces of three
(20)separate brigades operating within this entire area don't cross over in
each other's lines, where you don't have incidents of military confusion
or worse, incidents where you have friendly soldiers firing on each
other. In a military context, that's an absolutely proper thing to do.
What we next see in the Bratunac Brigade order, again the
(25)implementing instructions beyond that, is the brigade Commander further
JUDGE WALD: Mr. Butler, both of these orders talk about searching the liberated area. What are they searching for? I mean the obvious stragglers or what? • A.: Yes, ma'am. Again through the context of this particularly, and (15)when you look at the other message traffic that we'll get into as exhibits, there are a large number of Muslims who remained in the area through the 17th, 18th, and 19th of July. And as a matter of fact, these types of sweep operations will be occurring several months after the fall of Srebrenica, simply because some of the Muslims honestly believed that (20)if they hid in the woods long enough and waited it out, they would be able to return home. And you will see the manifestation of that as sweep operations in this zone almost through September and October of 1995.
JUDGE WALD: So when they say "search," your interpretation is
that if they found Muslims there, they were supposed to take them
(25)someplace else.
MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: And on that subject, Mr. Butler, we will be getting into a more -- a talk about the substance of some of the superior command orders where (5)they are a bit more specific about who they're looking for and what to do with them; is that right? • A.: Yes, sir. We'll get into that in future orders. • Q.: Now, I call your attention, at the bottom of General Krstic's July 13 order of 463, paragraph 6. It mentions: (10)"At the end of the search submit a written report on 17 July 1995 until 1200 hours." What is this? • A.: Again, as a practical application of command, this demonstrates the Commander giving the order and an expectation by the Commander that (15)the subordinate Commanders in units that will be carrying out the order will report back to them the results of that operation. • Q.: And there's a similar statement on the July 14th Bratunac order, page 2, paragraph 7. Is that part of the same reporting process that you've discussed earlier? (20) • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Now, again, tell us how you conclude that the 14 July Bratunac order supports the 13 July General Krstic order in that General Krstic is the Commander?
• A.: Again, from the context. Clearly when you look at both orders,
(25)we're talking about the same subject within the context of the order.
(10) • Q.: Are these two orders consistent with a theory that the Main Staff was in direct command of the brigades, cutting out the Drina Corps in the command chain? • A.: No, sir. • Q.: Now, the July 14th order, Exhibit 464, refers in the top of it to (15)on the basis of strictly confidential order number 01/4/157/5. That is the exact number of the General Krstic order as Commander of July the 13th; is that correct? • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Now, let's go on to the next exhibit as part of your analysis, (20)466. It appears to be a 14 July intercept with a statement, a person named Zivanovic. Can you tell us what your analysis is and your conclusions you take from that?
• A.: The individual, in this case General-Major Zivanovic, having a
discussion with an individual named Slavko. I believe that to be Slavko
(25)Ognjenovic, an operations officer in the Drina Corps staff. And in this
• Q.: All right. Let's go to the next exhibit, 467. It's a communication from the command of the Bratunac Brigade. It's got various (5)dates on it, and can you tell us about what this is, how it fits into your analysis, and explain the various dates, if you can?
• A.: The first aspect that I'd like to discuss is the issue of the
dates because there are inconsistencies in the versions, and before I can
get into the analysis of what the order means, I've got to solve the date
(10)issue. And what I'd like to do first of all is direct your attention to
the second-to-last page of the exhibit, which is a handwritten version of
that order.
When we reviewed the material that we'd seized in Bratunac, and
this order comes from Bratunac, one of the consistent things that we saw
(15)was that for the most part, the orders were all handwritten and then
passed to the communications centre. The communications centre then typed
up the order, and as a way of indicating that the order was typed up and
sent, sent that order back to the operations centre or whoever published
the written order. So in respect with all of the Bratunac Brigade orders
(20)and directives that are of this type, we have two versions: We have the
original handwritten version by the drafter, and we have the electronic
version that was physically typed up by the communications operator.
When you review the original handwritten version as typed up or as
written, the date of publication of writing is 14 July 1995. Further, it
(25)references Drina Corps order 05-2-295, dated 14 July 1995.
• Q.: Mr. Butler, do you in fact have Drina Corps order number 05-2-295 dated 14 July? (25)
• A.: This order, like the previous order, was requested as part of the
• Q.: So this term that has been translated into English as "hitherto," basically meaning "up until now," how does that fit into your analysis? • A.: Working on the premise that General Krstic began to exercise (5)command of the Drina Corps on the evening hours of 13 July 1995, one of the fundamental things that the Drina Corps command and staff had to do was to inform all of the subordinate and relevant units that, in fact, a change of command had occurred. What we see in this, and again since we don't have a time when it was sent, but clearly the Drina Corps referenced (10)above is the manifestation of that process. JUDGE WALD: Excuse me, wouldn't that have to have been preceded, according to your earlier testimony, by some kind of order signed by the President? • A.: Yes, ma'am, it would have -- something would have had to have (15)occurred. JUDGE WALD: Something, something, yes. • A.: Yes, ma'am. JUDGE WALD: And we don't have that something, either; is that right? (20) • A.: We have a -- JUDGE WALD: A later one, a later -- • A.: Yes, ma'am. JUDGE WALD: Not one on the 13th or 14th? • A.: No, ma'am. (25)
MR. McCLOSKEY:
• A.: This is the Presidential Decree dated 14 July 1995, essentially (5)the formal appointment of General-Major Radislav Krstic as the Commander of the Drina Corps; and at the same time the appointment of Colonel Svetozar Andric, formerly the Commander of the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade, as now the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps. • Q.: And the next exhibit, 469, is related to this exhibit in a way. (10)Can you explain what that is? And we see it, Exhibit 469, is a cover letter, a more recent cover letter from the RS Minister providing this particular document for us. And if you could go to the next page so we can actually see the document, and just tell us about that, and how it relates to the appointment order of General Krstic. (15) • A.: What this order, again from the President of the Republika Srpska, places on disposal is the technical term, General Zivanovic, noting formerly the Commander of the Drina Corps, and has made available appointment to a position on the Main Staff on 15 July. • Q.: So how do you account for General Krstic signing orders as (20)Commander and the formal orders authorising that which are referencing the law that we spoke of the first day that requires the president to do these kinds of appointments? What kind of an explanation do you have for this?
• A.: What had to have happened, based on the document and the event
train that I've projected out, is that sometime late afternoon, early
(25)evening of 13 July, General-Major Krstic was made aware, either by
• Q.: Does it appear ambiguous to the command of the Bratunac Brigade that received the July 13th order by General Krstic who the commander is?
• A.: Absolutely not. They understood who was the commander, and they
(25)executed the orders accordingly.
• A.: This intercept, which is dated 15 July, and I believe that has (5)been established in prior testimony, is a short synopsis of a conversation between Colonel Beara, again identified as the Chief of the Main Security Administration, looking for General Zivanovic and being told that he was not present but he could be -- I believe it's Colonel Beara asking General Zivanovic to contact him at extension 139. (10) • Q.: And this is at 0952, intercept from the -- what date? • A.: 15 July, sir. • Q.: Now let's go to the next exhibit. If you could go to 472A. MR. McCLOSKEY: As the Court is aware, there are several versions of this particular conversation, which I believe you've gone into in some (15)detail. I will choose certain ones that I think are the -- will fit and be the clearest for the purpose of Mr. Butler's testimony. That first would be the conversation with General Zivanovic, 472A. • Q.: What can you tell us about that? • A.: In this conversation, which occurs two minutes later, clearly (20)Colonel Beara has reached General Zivanovic. When you read through the context of the discussion, Colonel Beara is informing General Zivanovic that individuals -- one individual commander, Furtula, didn't send Lukic's Intervention Platoon. Furtula, I believe, is Major Radomir Furtula, the Commander of the Visegrad Infantry Brigade, a Drina Corps asset. (25)
• Q.: Is he on your chart, the large exhibit to your left?
• Q.: Can you tell us who you believe or who Lukic may be? (10) • A.: I believe Lukic is, in fact, an individual known as Milan Lukic, who investigation has associated with criminal activities in the Visegrad area in 1992, at the very beginning of the war. • Q.: And as it says in the intercept: "And Lukic is waiting at Blagojevic." In this context, who do you think Blagojevic is? (15) • A.: In this context, Blagojevic is Colonel Blagojevic, the Commander of the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. • Q.: And then it says: "Lukic is here with me and his driver and we urged that." What does that tell you? Lukic is where with who? • A.: One of the correspondents, in this case Zivanovic, understands (20)that Lukic is with Blagojevic at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters, and the correspondent "B", Colonel Beara, informs him: "No, Lukic is here with me with a driver." What we don't know is where Colonel Beara is.
• Q.: Now, I want to take you down to that conversation. Beara says:
"He simply doesn't give a damn about what the Commander orders him to
(25)do. Well, now, that platoon has 60 men." Who do you believe the
• A.: In this case, I believe the Commander is, in fact, Major Furtula. • Q.: "He simply doesn't give a damn about what the Commander orders him to do. Well, now, that platoon has 60 men." Is that a higher Commander (5)or that Furtula or ... • A.: In the context of the discussion, Beara referring to it as the "Commander's orders", one can clearly infer that we're discussing the orders of his commander, which would, in effect, be General Mladic. • Q.: And then farther down Beara says: (10)"Have him send at least half. Zivanovic: Yes, yes. Beara: Say again? Zivanovic: To send them immediately. Beara: Yes. (15)Zivanovic: I can't arrange for that any more..." What does that mean to you, "I can't arrange for that any more," when Zivanovic says that? • A.: In that context, I believe that's General Zivanovic informing Colonel Beara that he no longer has the authority to issue those types of (20)substantive orders to subordinate Commanders of the Drina Corps. • Q.: And then the conversation goes on, and it's clear from the conversation that Zivanovic is referring Beara to Zlatar 385. What is that?
• A.: Zlatar is the radio-telephonic code name for the headquarters of
(25)the Drina Corps. The extension or drop 385, when you look at the
(5) • Q.: Now, I want to bring up a brief subject before we go on. We have -- the Court has heard, I believe, that General Zivanovic is on the radio net, both on the 14th and I believe on the 15th, talking to people in Zvornik, and in at least one case giving orders. How do you incorporate that into your analysis as to General Zivanovic's status? (10)
• A.: Clearly, General Zivanovic is in the area and is actively
communicating on 14 July 1995. Again, as I've noted, after a period when
I believe he was no longer the Commander of the Drina Corps. When you
look at the pattern of those orders and messages, a lot of it goes into
looking at the internal context of the message and order and determining
(15)what else was happening in and around the battlefield during those
periods. Clearly, some of the messages are nothing more than
administrative in nature. However, on the evening of the 14th and in the
late afternoon of the 14th, General Zivanovic is, in fact, clearly
involved in giving or having conversations which are clearly directive in
(20)nature to elements of the Drina Corps.
In one sense, that's not unexpected. He is still a General. We
don't see very active communications with General Krstic on the 14th, for
a reason that I don't know. One of the inferences that can be made is
that in many aspects, General Zivanovic is (1) either passing
(25)previously-made decisions by the Corps command to the relative Brigade
• Q.: All right. Well, we certainly hope to get to Zvornik, but before
we get there we have another few intercepts and other documents to go
(25)through.
• A.: Yes, sir, I do. • Q.: All right. Now, this is a conversation that basically identifies now Ljubo Beara speaking to someone named Krstic; is that right? (10) • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: All right. Now let's go to Exhibit 477/A, which is one of the most complete versions of that conversation but does not have the identifying factors like the last one. Could you go through this conversation and tell us basically how (15)it fits into your analysis, and then I may ask some specific questions about it.
• A.: In a timing sequence, clearly this discussion falls almost
immediately on top of the discussion that we previously had with Colonel
Beara and General Zivanovic, and again this is the application of Colonel
(20)Beara calling extension 385 and reaching General Krstic.
Reading through the conversation, and again we don't have the very
beginning, it was a prior exhibit, it is clear now that Beara is
discussing the same issue that he attempted to get a resolution of from
General Zivanovic. Again, Beara now understanding that General Krstic is
(25)the person who could resolve this issue.
• Q.: Both of whom are on your chart as Drina Corps subordinate units.
• A.: Yes, sir. And again, further down the conversation, the phrase
"Nasic" and "Blagojevic," it comes clear.
(15)They also discuss the issue of the 15 to 30 men with Boban
Indzic. In this sense, and from prior investigations which have occurred
in the Visegrad area by the Office of the Prosecutor, Boban Indzic is very
closely linked to Milan Lukic in criminal events which occurred in that
area.
(20)Further down the conversation -- up to this point, what you have
General Krstic describing is the fact that because of the situations which
occur on the battlefield and now -- and again, this is unfortunately taken
out of context with the battlefield, but at this time units from the
Zvornik Brigade have already been withdrawn from the Zepa access and are
(25)moving up to Zvornik. General Krstic is clearly indicating that he has no
• Q.: All right, Mr. Butler. Clearly this conversation has importance regarding its substance and what it may mean substantively, but I -- as (10)you've pointed out, when we get to Zvornik, it will have more meaning. What I would like to direct your attention to now, and then I think it -- or I could after the break, Your Honour. I know we're getting beyond the point. Why don't we break, as I'm listening to myself. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. McCloskey, it is quite (15)appropriate to have a break now, so we're going to have a 20-minute break. --- Recess taken at 10.50 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.12 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. McCloskey, you may (20)continue, if you please. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
• Q.: Mr. Butler, I want to go back very briefly to Exhibit 410/A, the
definition of exercising command, and I've asked you to highlight that one
particular section, and I will read it. "The commander shall undertake
(25)the command and control of units and institutions through command organs
(10) • A.: When you look at the order, or in this case the intercept, in this context, it is clear that in several instances General Krstic is giving orders or, in effect, exercising command in giving orders or directives, and in some cases, authorising Colonel Beara to take specific actions on his behalf. (15) • Q.: Specifically what?
• A.: Looking at the first aspect of that again, I believe it's the
fourth line of the intercept, General Krstic is specifically directing --
it might be easier this way -- Colonel Beara to take additional men from
Nastic and Blagojevic, two of his subordinate brigade commanders; and
(20)further noting down the conversation that if he pulls them out of the axis
that he's on, it will disturb a lot, and check with Blagojevic and Nastic
again, those two commanders.
He further very specifically directs Colonel Beara to check with
Blagojevic two lines down and take his Red Berets. The Red Beret unit is
(25)specifically a reconnaissance unit subordinate to the 3rd Battalion of the
• Q.: How about the section where Beara says, "They're not there. Only four of them are still there. They took off. Fuck em, they're not there (5)any more." Krstic says, "I'll see what I can do." Then Beara says, "Check it out and have them go to Drago's." Now, how do you interpret Beara's statement, check it out and have them go to Drago's? • A.: In the context of the commission of the crimes, and in the context (10)of the time, there are two issues here. The first one is Krstic indicating that, again, he'll try and assemble manpower for Colonel Beara, and Colonel Beara indicating when -- you know, if he can do that or when he can assemble the required manpower, that they should go up to Drago's which I believe in context of where we know the criminal acts occurred is (15)the office or the location of Lieutenant Drago Nikolic, the Security Officer of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade. • Q.: Can the statement, "Check it out and have them go to Drago's," be interpreted as an order from Beara to Krstic? • A.: Based on the entire conversation, I would not interpret it as (20)such. • Q.: Now, you've talked a bit about the conversation and the substance of it. From this conversation, in your opinion, does General Krstic appear to know what Beara is talking about, or do they appear to be on the same wavelength to you? (25)
• A.: Clearly Colonel -- or Colonel Beara and General Krstic are, in
• Q.: Now, as the conversation ends with General Krstic saying, "I'll see what I can do," this is around a 10.00 a.m. July 15th conversation, did the 10th Diversionary Unit get any assistance from Drina Corps assets (10)on July 16th in the executions at the Branjevo Farm? • A.: What we see in time sequence is on the morning of the 16th, first, the 10th Diversionary is at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters; it then goes to the Branjevo Military Farm; and according to the testimony of Drazen Erdemovic, while they are in the commission of the actual execution, (15)members of the Bratunac Brigade show up at the execution site and assist them for that phase of the execution, or, in effect, continue the execution. • Q.: And there are intercepts that support the presence of the Bratunac Brigade at that site also, is that correct, that we'll get to later? (20) • A.: There are intercepts which support the Bratunac Brigade at that site, and there are written orders which support the presence of Bratunac Brigade units in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade during the period as well.
• Q.: Okay. Let's go to another exhibit, 479A. This is a 13 July
(25)conversation between "X" and "Y". Can you just tell us briefly what this
• A.: In reading this conversation, and again matching it up with the prior conversation between Colonel Beara and General Krstic, clearly what (5)you have here is the recounting of circumstances of an order to send Boban Indzic and a group of people to the command at Bratunac, the command being the command of the Bratunac Infantry Brigade, and the fact that their transportation has broken down, and that they're not going to arrive when they're supposed to. (10) • Q.: In the previous conversation, Beara said that they should have been there by the 13th, and this shows the bus breaking down on the 13th; is that right? • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Were buses hard to come by on July 13th in this part of Eastern (15)Bosnia? • A.: Within the context of the ongoing operation to move the Muslim population from Potocari, buses were probably extremely hard to come by.
• Q.: Okay. Now I would like to go to another subject, if we could,
moving out of Potocari and out of that particular command issue towards
(20)the military responsibility area of the Bratunac Brigade.
Mr. Butler, there is a large map that is exhibited in front of
you. Could you step to that map and just give us a little background --
unfortunately, we have to go back into time a bit -- and talk to us about
the column, but more importantly, the areas of military responsibility
(25)that the column had to go through.
(5) MR. McCLOSKEY: That's correct. We do need a number, Your Honour. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Thank you. • A.: Based on the -- MR. McCLOSKEY: (10) • Q.: Excuse me, Mr. Butler. Do you see the exhibit number on the map, just to -- it may be on the back. Just to make sure we've got it, because you may have the small version of that. • A.: Exhibit 485. • Q.: Thank you. (15)
• A.: In context -- in context with the general military operation that
was occurring on the 12th and 13th and how the forces of the VRS were
arrayed in response to the movement of the column, what I'd like to do is
just kind of bring you around the general military area.
As previously discussed, in this area south, in the area of
(20)Srebrenica, the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the Bratunac Light Infantry
Brigade. The 2nd Infantry Battalion of the same Bratunac Light Infantry
Brigade, the MUP elements, as noted on the video, present in Potocari.
The 1st Battalion of the Light Infantry Brigade along the road
from Bratunac. The 4th Infantry Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade, which,
(25)incidentally, is also the 8th Infantry Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade,
• Q.: Now, Mr. Butler, we have a series of daily combat reports that helped tell the story of the Bratunac Brigade and the column. Can you start with 486A, and, as best you can, just briefly tell us what they show (15)us, and just move through them at your own pace, if you could. We'll get to some photographs of the same area, and then we'll get to some intercepts that add to the story. It's a long story, but if you can try to pace yourself, we should be able to get through it.
• A.: Fixing the stage in context, this is the 11 July 1995 daily combat
(20)report from the Bratunac Brigade to the command of the Drina Corps. It
reflects the situation on the day of the fall of Srebrenica.
As noted in previous discussion, again fuel and ammunition
consumption submitted in a separate report, the continued process of
keeping the command of the Drina Corps informed about the situation within
(25)the brigade.
JUDGE WALD: Mr. Butler, let me just ask one question. From here on in, these reports seem to assume, if you read, or at least as an (15)outsider, and I want to make sure it's correct from you as a military analyst, they seem to assume that the column, which we know had elements of the 28th at the front but then had thousands of civilians who didn't -- who weren't, at least so far as we know, regular army members, on top. They seem to assume that that's all a military -- the enemy, a military (20)operation. Is that a correct reading of some of these reports? They seem to treat it as a combat -- the entire column as a combat operation, as a combat unit or something.
• A.: That is correct, ma'am. When you look at this information as well
as other information, it clearly indicates that their frame of
(25)reference --
• A.: -- was that the column was a military target in its entirety. JUDGE WALD: I don't know whether it's within your scope to say whether or not under their own military law you think that's justified. (5)If you don't think it is, don't answer. • A.: I can comment that my reading of the SFRY Laws of Land Warfare, as adopted by the VRS, does address that issue, and it does address the issue of operations against mixed civilian-military targets. Within the context of those definitions, the column, granted it was a mixed military-civilian (10)column, in their definitions, that column qualifies as a military target. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: And, Mr. Butler, the 12 July combat report, you refer to paragraph 6, notes that there have been no wounded or injured. • A.: Yes, sir. That is correct. (15) • Q.: And they refer to the population as the Turkish population. They're not, in fact, Turkish, are they? • A.: No, sir. • Q.: That's the term we've heard before many times in this case. • A.: Yes, sir. (20) • Q.: All right. Let's go on to the next exhibit.
• A.: Moving to Exhibit 488/A, this is the 13 July 1995 combat report
from, again, the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade to the command of the
Drina Corps.
In this context, they're discussing the military activities
(25)related to circling and crushing groups of Muslims attempting to escape in
• Q.: Now, before leaving that exhibit, which I cannot see -- hold on (20)one second. Can you tell who wrote that and where the commander is?
• A.: As I noted the previous practice of the Bratunac Brigade, to
handwrite the order and then have the electronic version stapled or
attached to it, by definition, these combat reports, these daily combat
reports, are either drafted by the Commander, the Chief of Staff, or the
(25)duty officer as during the day the people who would be most cognisant of
(15) • Q.: All right, let's go on to the next. • A.: And in fact, it is this exhibit. This is Exhibit 489. • Q.: Okay. I think we can then go on to the next.
• A.: The next series of exhibits are a series of video stills that were
extracted from the Petrovic video, that video tape that was taken on 13
(20)July 1995, both in Potocari and along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road by
Zoran Petrovic in company of MUP official Lieutenant Colonel Borovcanin.
What I have done, in an effect to save time, is rather than try and go
through that entire video, I have extracted stills from that to show the
Court vignettes or highlights of the army activity and the MUP activity on
(25)that road, and how they're relevant.
• Q.: How about the MP Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment, did they have any tracked vehicles as far as you know? (15) • A.: To my knowledge, they had no tracked vehicles. • Q.: The 10th Diversionary Unit?
• A.: The only tracked vehicles that the 10th Diversionary Unit had,
according to Drazen Erdemovic, were those that were stolen from the UN on
the 11th of July.
(20)Again, I apologise for the graininess of this, it was a rather
rapid camera pan across, but when we stopped it and we pulled the still
from it -- and it shows up much better digitally than on photo,
regrettably -- is again less than a few seconds later after the tank
looking across the meadow. This vehicle here, a BOV 3 anti-aircraft
(25)vehicle. This car, which later shows to be the car that the photographer
(5) • Q.: And these are all July 13th? • A.: Yes, sir. THE REGISTRAR: Could the witness mention the number of the exhibit every time it is on the ELMO so that we can follow, please? • A.: Yes, ma'am. The last exhibit was 492. (10)This exhibit is 493, and again, it's shown on the Petrovic video on 13 July, a group of soldiers guarding Muslim prisoners at Sandici. One of the things to note here is this soldier particularly as he's bending down, clearly you can see he's wearing some form of a ballistic protective jacket, flak jacket, bullet-proof vest type of clothing. This soldier (15)appears to have a similar one as well. • Q.: Could you indicate where in the photograph various things are for the record, please? • A.: The soldier wearing the flak jacket is located in the centre of the photograph, a little to the left of centre; the other soldier wearing (20)a flak jacket is located in the centre of the photograph, a little to the right of centre. • Q.: What does this tell you?
• A.: The information that we have from the records of the Bratunac
Light Infantry Brigade indicates that in July of 1995, their soldiers had
(25)neither helmets or bullet proof jackets or flak vests. So knowing which
(5) • Q.: There's other units that may also have flak jackets in the area also, isn't there? • A.: Yes, sir, there is. • Q.: And why don't you go to the next exhibit and tell us what it is. Exhibit number please. (10) • A.: Exhibit number 494. As I previously noted, the BOV anti-aircraft gun is the vehicle in the foreground, the vehicle in the background, another self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, both of these now being used in anti-personnel mode. These vehicles were seen earlier at the Sandici meadow. (15)If I can move to Exhibit 495, this is a close-up of that first vehicle, the vehicle in the foreground. Notice the spray painted identification "Loklok," and I hope I pronounced that correctly. We've seen that video earlier in time, or that particular vehicle earlier in time. It was identified and photographed by one of the Dutch Battalion (20)people from the window of the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac, that particular photo being Exhibit 95. Again, the manifestation of these series of photos showing the migration of the military vehicles out along the road from Bratunac to -- from Bratunac to Konjevic Polje in order to deal with the increasing number of Muslims surrendering along the road. (25)
• Q.: Do you know what unit owns these, these anti-aircraft vehicles?
(10) • Q.: And that is a Drina Corps asset? • A.: Yes, sir, it is. • Q.: What about non-Drina Corps assets, 10th Diversionary, 65th Protection? • A.: To my knowledge, the 10th Diversionary did not have any equipment (15)of this such -- or of this type. It was specifically organised as a light infantry sabotage type of outfit where equipment like this, anti-aircraft defence, would not have been necessary. Again, with the 65th Protection regiment, the military police battalion, this type of equipment would have been inconsistent with military police-type roles and functions. This (20)equipment is specifically designed for air defence, and again, in the context of the operation that occurred where they did in fact expect and received air attack from NATO, it's completely logical that it would be down there and in that context. • Q.: We need to slow down a bit. (25)
• A.: My apologies.
• A.: Sir, this is Exhibit 95. MR. McCLOSKEY: (5) • Q.: You mentioned that the Zvornik Brigade combat vehicles were not along this road based on their records. Can you tell us what kind of combat vehicles you're referring to and where the records indicate that they were on July 13th?
• A.: The records that I'm referring to are, in fact, the daily fuel and
(10)mileage utilisation records that the drivers of each vehicle were required
to maintain on a daily basis. Again, as I previously noted, fuel,
particularly diesel fuel, was an extremely valuable commodity to the army,
and it was accounted for very closely.
When we conducted the search operation of the Zvornik Infantry
(15)Brigade, we seized the vehicle movement records for the month of July
1995. Looking at those vehicle records, we're able to track the movement
of the tank company and the armoured personnel or armoured car company
that the Zvornik Brigade sent down to participate in the operation.
If I can step to the map. What those records indicate is that on
(20)12 July and through the early morning hours of 13 July, the armoured
vehicles and most of the assets of the Zvornik Brigade in fact travelled
along a road through this southern quadrant of the former enclave, again
known as the Bandera Triangle, looking and conducting operations for where
they believed the 28th Division was. And as I've previously noted, they
(25)had lost contact with it. They believed it was here, and it wasn't until
(15) • Q.: Okay. Could you continue with the next exhibit, 496. It appears to be a tank. • A.: Exhibit 496 is a T-55 tank at the Sandici meadow. It may, in fact, be the same tank that was seen in the earlier exhibit at Sandici, but because of the graininess of the photograph from the first one, I (20)wouldn't conclude that. • Q.: Do you have any idea who this tank belongs to? • A.: Again by the process of eliminating which units did, in fact, have tanks, I would say that this tank belongs to the 2nd Romanija Brigade. • Q.: And could you go to the next exhibit, 497. (25)
• A.: As the camera panned on the Sandici meadow less than a few seconds
(5) • Q.: Okay. If you could go to the next exhibit, 498. • A.: As I noted in my testimony yesterday pertaining to a tank in Srebrenica on 13 July 1995, related to the identification of that unit patch that the tank commander was wearing, this is, in fact, a frontal view of that tank as it's coming up the road past the cameraman. (10)Going back and putting this together with the part on the tank commander's patch, this tank again falls under the control of the 2nd Romanija Brigade. • Q.: Could we go to the next exhibit. It should be 186. If you could double-check that. (15) • A.: Exhibit 186, again an extract from the same Petrovic video on the same day, shows Lieutenant Colonel Borovcanin of the MUP Special Police along that same stretch of road. • Q.: All right. And if you could go to the next exhibit. It should be 499/A. Now, this is a lengthy article from a Belgrade weekly that I (20)believe you've referred to earlier. Can you tell us briefly what this article is, who wrote it, and what military information you obtained from it?
• A.: The article was written by Zoran Petrovic-Pirocanac -- I hope I
pronounced that correctly -- who, in fact, is the cameraman who is
(25)responsible for the video footage taken in Potocari and along the
(15) • Q.: If I could take one moment just to read a section of that for the record: "Several months ago, he lost a leg in battle and now walks with a prosthesis. That's all I managed to learn about him, and, ironically enough, I do not even have his photograph for this article. But the world (20)should remember him. Of course not because of the refugees, but because of the way he conducted the operations in Srebrenica. However drastic this may sound, refugees are a peripheral phenomenon in war." Okay, Mr. Butler.
• A.: What I would like to next point out is the -- on page 6, again the
(25)reference to Streten Petrovic, previously identified as the Commander or
MR. McCLOSKEY: And, Your Honours, I would like to take you back to page 5, and with respect that this is in part a genocide case and that ethnic bias is a part of the case, I would like to read into the record a section that I think gives us some background into the ethnic climate (10)associated with this article and this situation. Starting from the top of the page: "Demographers will surely find interesting the fact that there were approximately 10.000 children among the refugees. And out of that figure, around 8.000 are under three years old. The 'war children,' as (15)they say. This is what they really do, their hkojas ... the motherfuckers ... they are completely surrounded, no food at all, they keep complaining, but they go on procreating ... is that normal? Would you believe that? Now, you tell me, what kind of religion is that, Islam. They made one more corps of soldiers right there, in the middle of (20)Srebrenica, who will be after us in 15-20 years. Just let them stay as far away as possible, my friend, the motherfuckers ...." Can you get anything else out of this article, Mr. Butler, or should we go on to the next exhibit?
• A.: The last thing I would like to note on this article would be the
(25)last item, page 7 of the interview, page 9 of the translation. The
• Q.: Now, Mr. Butler, we're getting into a series of intercepts that (15)have relevance to the time period 12, 13 July, in this particular area. Could you go through them and tell us what you can glean from those, and if you could begin with Exhibit 500/A.
• A.: In most respects, a lot of these intercepts, and 500/A is
indicative of that, are no more than what I would say an awareness piece;
(20)unidentified subscribers. However, the context of what they're talking
about, indicating the events that they are aware are happening on the
battlefield.
And again in this one, 0630
[sic] Hours on 12 July 1995, an
awareness of the column and its location.
(25)Moving to Exhibit --
• A.: My apologies. • Q.: And before an army can plan for prisoners and what to do with (5)those prisoners, they must know where the prisoners are coming from and when they can anticipate getting them; is that right? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: And that is a part of what this information is important for? • A.: Yes sir,. Again, establishing the awareness of the column and a (10)continuing awareness of the growing number of prisoners that are taken through the day of the 12th and through the day of the 13th. • Q.: And could we go now to OTP Exhibit 502/A bis on my copy. It's at 0656 hours, 12 July intercept. • A.: Again between two unidentified subscribers. The time is 0656 (15)hours, 12 July, discussing the issue of groups of people from the column. And in context of time, what I believe is -- the issue that we're seeing here is the lead elements of the column, as it's called, the armed elements of the column, the best armed elements whose job was to create a path through the lines for the remainder of the column to follow over the (20)course of the next few days. • Q.: I note that in the middle of this exhibit, "X" is saying:
(X.:) They informed me first at 3.00 a.m., but it was broken in
several parts and we couldn't determine exactly where it
was."
(25)So this is an indication, at 0300 a.m. on the 12th, is perhaps a
• A.: That is correct. In the context of the fog of war, what you have here again between the 0300 and 0600 hours are the initial indicators of awareness that the front-line troops and their immediate commanders are (5)becoming aware that there is a new situation facing them. • Q.: In addition, it says: "Maybe we should see or you could see if the MUP can set up some ambushes and so on." How does that tie into your overall analysis of the MUP? (10) • A.: Again from two aspects: (1) the army recognising that the MUP is operating as a part of it; and (2) recognising that at this point in time, they're unprepared for the military activities that are going to occur. • Q.: All right. And we could go on to Exhibit 504/A. This one, I would like to read a section and ask you about it. (15)"O" says at a point:
(O.:) As far as I know, he's here."
Then another statement:
"He's not, he isn't answering. Listen, please tell him that
I called, that Mane, Laco's deputy, will call him, that the
(20)police in Konjevic Polje have been told to the same as the
Engineering Battalion are doing, and that he can give orders
to them through the commander of the Engineering Battalion."
Now, first, can you tell us who you believe that Engineering
Battalion is and then what this means in the context of the overall chain
(25)of command and where they may fit in?
• Q.: Okay. If we can go on to the last exhibit for this binder and (10)perhaps the last exhibit before the break. I would direct you specifically. It is OTP exhibit 506/A bis. He says early on: "I spoke with Mane." Then"G" says:
(G.:) Good."
(15)Then:
"He left the hotel and is on his way home, and from there
he'll contact you to brief you on the current situation. One
of his companies is up there next to our man with the
bulldozers, over there in /?Konjevic Polje/ and his task of
(20)doing whatever he does. So you can give orders what to do
through the Commander. For your information, he has reserve
forces, so if it's thought that reinforcements are needed, he
can do it."
Now, first, could you -- there's a lot of talk about reserve
(25)forces, companies, reinforcements. Can you try to sort out, as best you
• A.: In this respect, the command relationship that was fuzzy in the first intercept becomes clearer. That looking at it within in case it's specific that the army commanders understand that the orders can be passed (5)to the MUP units again through the Commander of the Engineer Battalion. Again, again utilising his communications network, integrating their operations into those of the army. In the aspect of "For your information, he has reserve forces," again in this aspect, while it's unclear who has the reserve forces, (10)either the MUP or the Engineer Battalion, again the issue of the fact that as the situation is developing, that the reserve forces are located in and around that area and can be deployed as needed, that he can do it. When you read further into this, it's possible, from an analytical sense, to lean more in the direction of the fact that the MUP forces are (15)those being referred to as the reserves. The next line: "It is not necessary yet on condition ... first company from Konjevic Polje." And we know that one of the MUP Special Police companies was, in fact, at Konjevic Polje. • Q.: Of course, at the top of the page -- well, it starts out, "Hello," (20)and then "G" says, "Yes," and then, "General, I spoke with Mane." Now, we've learned that there are two Manes in the police. Can you tell anything from this, who that might be?
• A.: In context with the entire intercept, I would say that that would
be -- it would not be Mane who is the Deputy Commander of the municipal
(25)police in Zvornik. In all probability, it is Mane, and his last name is
• Q.: For the record, that's "Djuric." It's the same last name as the Deputy Police Chief in Zvornik. • A.: He would be the individual, because it specifically refers, as the (5)MUP entity being a company, and municipal police wouldn't necessarily be organised that way, certainly in a combat context. • Q.: And again, this ends by referring to a large column of Turks starting to arrive and gives various locations. What is your understanding of the general location that they're referring to here at (10)0748 hours on the 13th? • A.: Again in context, I believe this is -- in context of the date, I believe this is the 12th, not the 13th. • Q.: We'll clarify that at the break. • A.: But I mean certainly again they're talking about the physical (15)location of the column, again an awareness of it. • Q.: Thank you, Mr. Butler. MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, it may be a good time to take a break. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. We're going to have a (20)20-minute break again. --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m. --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, we can continue. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. (25)
• Q.: We've checked the date, and you were correct, Mr. Butler, this is
(5) • A.: Clearly in the context, it's the general zone identified. The phrase "in the depth of the territory" again implies the rear area of the zone where the combat is occurring. The fact that whoever this "general" is, is referring to the police as "my" police, and again, in conjunction with sending this Praga, concludes in that the general in question is an (10)army general. • Q.: Okay. Now, I have to apologise at this point because we need to go backwards in time a bit. I've inadvertently taken one of the key documents out of Mr. Butler's analysis on his conclusion that General Krstic was the Corps Commander, so we need to go back to Exhibit 481/A, a (15)July 17th order from the Drina Corps command by General Krstic. And Mr. Butler, I apologise again, but could you work us back into that analysis briefly?
• A.: This is a 17 July 1995, order from the Drina Corps command to the
command of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade dealing with general matters
(20)pertaining to the mobilisation of all individuals in the zone of the,
specifically the brigade, but in the zone of the Drina Corps all
inclusive.
What this order does, is essentially delineates out the laws,
regulations, and guidelines pertaining to previous orders issued by the
(25)Main Staff in June 1995, and further back to the laws of the armed forces
• Q.: How does the 24 July 1995, date work with the July 17 date that's (15)on the front of the order? Is it not possible that this was written on July 24th?
• A.: When looking at that aspect, the -- again, the two components and
the same issues that we reviewed with the 13 July 1995, order. It's the
dual aspect of awareness, the fact that when he signed the order,
(20)General-Major Radislav Krstic understood that he was the Commander to sign
the order, and also it is important on 17 July that the staff component of
the Drina Corps that published this order, or, in effect, wrote it for his
signature, that staff component understood on 17 July that he was the
Commander of the Drina Corps. So again, it's the dual aspect of
(25)awareness.
(10) • Q.: All right, thank you. Let's go back to where we left off. We are continuing through a series of intercepts, we should be at Exhibit 507/A, and these are intercepts related to those dates, the column and the command. And if you could go through them individually and tell us how they fit into your analysis, and I will ask you some questions on (15)individual parts, but we'll try to get through this as efficiently as we can.
• A.: Very quickly, again, this represents an awareness piece by an
unidentified general and an individual, last name Ognjenovic, whom I
believe to be Colonel Slavko Ognjenovic of the Drina Corps Operations
(20)Staff; the code name Zlatar, again being the radio telephone code name of
the Drina Corps; and a general, again, asking members of his staff, or
members of the staff, to bring him up to speed, so to speak, on the
situation occurring in the area. Palma is the code name or the radio code
name for the 1st Zvornik Brigade command, that is, it's highlighted in the
(25)intercept.
• Q.: All right. Let's go on -- JUDGE WALD: Who is the Commander in this, and has the Commander (10)ordered them? • A.: Because the general is unidentified, I can't make that determination, ma'am. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: All right. Let's go on to 508/A, another 12 July, 1156 hours. (15)Tell us about this.
• A.: This intercept discusses the -- or parts of a conversation between
the duty officer at the Badem operation centre, "Badem" the telephonic
code name for the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, and "Zlatar" the
code name, of course, for the Drina Corps command. Again, an awareness
(20)piece discussing the situation. They're discussing, "Have you linked up
with your neighbour on the right?" In context of the Bratunac Brigade,
that neighbour on the right would, in fact, be some elements of the Milici
Brigade or elements of the military police of the 65th Protection
Regiment.
(25)It notes that they're moving towards Konjevic Polje; notes that
(5) • Q.: Now, in time, July 12th, almost noon, that's the time period of the July 12th meeting with the Dutch, the Muslim civilians, and General Mladic and General Krstic at the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac; is that right? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: So when they say "Listen, the general is here," and that's been (10)identified as Badem from the Bratunac Brigade, that's consistent with where we know from video where General Krstic actually was about that time? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: All right. Let's go to Exhibit 509/A, 12 July, it's now a little (15)later, 1345 hours.
• A.: The correspondents here, "Z" to indicate the duty officer at
Zlatar, the Drina Corps command, in the context, the duty officer talking
about "complications over there, the connection with the 4th Battalion,
those boys."
(20)As I discussed earlier, the physical locations of that 4th
Battalion of the Bratunac Brigade on the road, in that general location
out from the area along the road from Kravica out towards Sandici as
depicted on the map. Again, more of an awareness piece as they're
becoming, again, not more aware, but the more refined knowledge pertaining
(25)to the aspects of the column. And again, a conversation part relative to
• Q.: What significance, if any, do you put in this line that says "Krstic is in charge of this attack"? (5) • A.: The difficulty with that line in isolation is relative to trying to determine whether the correspondent is discussing Krstic is in charge of the attack on the column, or, as we've already noted, the planning piece for Zepa beginning as early as the afternoon of the 12th; whether the correspondent is noting Krstic is in charge of the attack related to (10)Zepa. So while there are two options, I can't make a conclusion based on just this information. • Q.: And we have seen General Krstic in a leadership role as Chief of Staff from the very beginning of the attack on Srebrenica in any event; is that correct? (15) • A.: Yes, sir, that is correct. JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, you said the afternoon of the 12th. It's not written here, the 12th of July. Is it? • A.: My reference to the 12th was when we began to see the initial planning process for the operation against Zepa. This specific intercept (20)I believe is dated 12 July 1995. JUDGE RIAD: Okay, thank you. MR. McCLOSKEY:
• Q.: Mr. Butler, going to Exhibit 510/A, it's a relatively long
intercept with some mentions of Krstic at page 3. Can you briefly
(25)describe what, if anything, we can get out of the first two pages of this,
• A.: What this intercept broadly discusses, and right now I've gone to page 2 of the English language translation, is the correspondents discussing the military situation as they understand it. Midway through (5)the page as correspondents are changing over, and you clearly pick up the point where one correspondent is dropping off and another one is coming on, looking at the individual's name, "Radika, Radika". The commander of the 4th Battalion or 8th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade, his first name is in fact Radika, Radika Petrovic. (10)Further, down the page the discussion, "My boys are looking for Zlatar operations duty officer. Is that you?" In many respects, what you're listening to is somebody on a switchboard trying to make sure he gets to the right extension, and in context with understanding how this network was established, it was -- in many aspects it was not direct dial, (15)it was connection through a switchboard. On page 3, the "Z" correspondent identifies himself as Krstic; the "X" correspondent identifies himself as Komjenovic. He says, "Go ahead General, sir." Clearly, "I asked to be put through to Komjenovic, is he there," there appears to be communications difficulty between the "Z" (20)correspondent Krstic and the "X" correspondent in hearing each other; and while the intercept operators are able to pick up that aspect of the conversation, the two correspondents clearly aren't making contact. • Q.: So this is, very minimally, perhaps General Krstic on the radio at 1440 hours trying to find Krsmanovic? (25)
• A.: Krsmanovic or the individual Komjenovic, however it connects in,
• Q.: Does this name Komjenovic come up in your records anywhere? • A.: No, sir, it does not. The closest possible match goes to the name (5)Ognjenovic, again Slavko Ognjenovic of the Drina Corps operations staff.
• Q.: Let's go to the next intercept, Exhibit 511/A, again a 12 July
intercept at 1640 hours, talking about the column as it's going through
various places. And I would note in the -- just below the middle of it,
"O" says, "Some are armed. There are also civilians and who knows what
(10)else." And then it goes on to talk about the police that set up an
ambush, then says:
"The civilian police.
Yes.
The ambush on the Konjevic Polje-Hrncici stretch.
(15)Just a moment.
So, the police is civilian.
Konjevic Polje.
Hrncici?
Hrncici?
(20)Yes.
Okay.
One squad."
Now they're referring to police as a squad. Does that make any
connection to you regarding police? We've heard police referred to as
(25)companies. Police as squads, can you make anything of this?
• Q.: Okay. Anything from that first page, anything else that adds to your analysis? (10)
• A.: The correspondent identified as Obrenovic is Major Dragan
Obrenovic, the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the 1st Zvornik
Brigade. Again, as previously noted, one of the Zvornik Brigade units,
the 8th Battalion, which was functioning also as the 4th Battalion of the
Bratunac Brigade, was located in that area and had a stretch of
(15)responsibility on that road. As the Chief of Staff Deputy Commander of
the overall brigade, certainly at a microlevel, Major Obrenovic would be
interested in the events occurring with that unit.
Expanding that out, Major Obrenovic, as the man in charge of the
Zvornik Brigade with the absence of Colonel Pandurevic previously noted
(20)south of Srebrenica on this day, is aware of the movement of the column
and is very aware that the column is now going to move into his brigade
sector. And what this conversation represents is a continual awareness
piece on his part of the column, the size of the column, and starts
discussing with other correspondents the things that he has to do as a
(25)military commander in order to prepare to meet this enemy column which is
• Q.: Could you go to page 2 and read down from the top? We'll get to a "mention" after "Protection Regiment", and tell us what you can about that after you read through that section. (5) • A.: What I believe this is is the manifestation of Major Obrenovic attempting to coordinate the elements of his unit's defences with the ambush elements of the defences established by the Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment which are up along the Nova Kasaba area. Again, a rather prudent thing for the Commander to do in (10)order to try to determine where all the defensive positions are going to be located from a fratricide perspective; certainly you don't want to be shooting at your own soldiers. From a tactical perspective, to make sure that there are no gaps in the line through which the enemy column could can pass. And again you see what he's doing is a series of these (15)conversations, is working that coordination piece. • Q.: All right. Let's go to Exhibit 513/A. We're now into the 13th of July, 0905 hours. From the military aspect, what can you tell us? • A.: The two correspondents are, in the text of this, discussing what I believe is to be the issue of what to do with wounded Muslim prisoners. (20)In the aspect of, "Bring them to Zvornik, Milici is full," we know from other information that the hospital facility at Milici did, in fact, fill up quite rapidly and that some wounded were sent to the hospital in Zvornik, and I believe that this intercept is a reflection of the two correspondent's awareness of that. (25)
• Q.: In addition, I would just read into the record two-thirds of way
(10) • A.: I believe the time on this is 0910 hours, 13 July. I hope I have the right exhibit. Mine is marked 514/A bis. • Q.: This should be 515.
• A.: My apologies. This is an intercept of a conversation between
Beara, who is Ljubo Beara, Chief of the Main Staff, Main Security
(15)Administration, and a correspondent named Lukic -- or Lucic, who I don't
know.
The discussion pertains to, again, an awareness from Beara
explaining to the other correspondent if he knows that 400 Muslim
prisoners have shown up in Konjevic Polje, that they're being disarmed.
(20)There are also numbers of them, and it's written "20," on a playground,
which we believed the reference as the Nova Kasaba soccer field.
Discusses lining them up in rows.
And looking at page 2 of that same intercept, Beara wanting to
speak to another individual who is later identified as Zoka, and I don't
(25)know who that individual is by nickname. And again they're recounting the
• Q.: Now this part about the Frenchman and the Russian, that's probably General Janvier from the UNPROFOR forces trying to get in contact with various people. That's a whole other chapter. Does that relate to your analysis at all? (15) • A.: That does not factor into the analysis piece. No, sir. • Q.: Now, back to the first page. Nova Kasaba, lining people up in rows, four to five rows. Are you aware of an aerial image that is an exhibit in this case -- and I'm sorry I don't have the exhibit number right now -- that relates at all to this? (20) • A.: Yes, sir, I am. • Q.: Can you just remind us of that?
• A.: Again, it's an aerial image taken the early afternoon hours of
13 July, which shows a block of individuals in a relatively well-formed
square, numbering several hundred, in the centre of the soccer field at
(25)Nova Kasaba.
• Q.: And if we could go to the next exhibit 517/A, 13 July, 1355 hours, participants Milanovic and Palma Duty Officer. What do you glean from this conversation?
• A.: This is a discussion between Colonel Milanovic, who is the Chief
(15)of Air Defence for the Drina Corps, and the Duty Officer at Palma. Palma,
of course, being the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade.
Colonel Milanovic identifies himself. The Palma correspondent
tells him to go ahead, and Milanovic identifies a need that they require a
bulldozer backhoe with a scoop, and it needs to be -- "report to Konjevic
(20)Polje and it should be there for us."
Part of the conversation is unreadable, but it's clear from the
back of the conversation that Palma, the Zvornik Brigade, is unable to
comply with that order for whatever reason or at least within the time
frame specified, and Milanovic notes: "Nothing before then?" Palma
(25)says: "No," and Milanovic rings off the net.
• A.: Certainly from the aspect of air defence, the air defence officer might very well be looking for such a piece of equipment to prepare firing (5)positions for mobile air defence units or anti-aircraft units. • Q.: How do you -- how do you evaluate that probability? • A.: In this instance, I would rate that probability as low in so much the fact that as part of the fundamental agreement or ceasefire between the UNPROFOR and the VRS that occurred 11 and 12 July, one of the (10)provisions was NATO would not bomb the Serb forces within the area. So within a military context at the time, the VRS and certainly the air defence officer should have been able to judge the air defence threat in that area as being particularly light. • Q.: What other probable uses, legitimate military uses of bulldozers (15)might there be in the context of this roadway, 13 July, 1355 hours? • A.: Again, within the context of the military operations and the fact that those air defence weapons in many aspects were used as anti-personnel weapons against the column, it would have been logical that they would have been dug in or dirt revetments pushed up in front of them to provide (20)shelter for the crew and the firing. • Q.: All right. Let's go on to the next exhibit, 519, 13 July, 1445 hours. What can you tell us about that?
• A.: This conversation discussing again, from the correspondents, the
awareness that buses are being stopped in the area of Zvornik. I believe
(25)those are UN vehicles up there that are being stopped in Zvornik. We know
• Q.: Okay. And on the next page of that conversation there's a mention of Milanic down there called Major Savic. These are familiar names. Can you remind us of those names and where this conversation may fit in? (10) • A.: Milanic is the Commander of the Military Police Regiment -- I'm sorry, the Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment. He notes talking to a Major Savic, while not an exact match, may very well correspond to Lieutenant Colonel Savcic. That one's a difficult call insomuch as they got the rank right but not the name. So I wouldn't go (15)very far to conclude that. The issue next down of Pelimir. The close match is Lieutenant Pelemis. And I have no awareness of an individual Gusic. • Q.: Do you have any information about Pelemis being on this roadway at this time? (20)
• A.: Based on the previous testimony of Drazen Erdemovic, his
understanding is that elements of the 10th Diversionary are operating at
Nova Kasaba along this time frame. Further, he discusses, in his own
context, that elements of the 10th Diversionary that he was part of, part
of those who took the UN vehicle or who went up in trucks after the stolen
(25)tracked UN vehicle, they went along this roadway as well. But the only
• Q.: Let's go to Exhibit 521/A. It should be 13 July, 1553 hours. (5) • A.: The intercept here, while clearly not an intercept, it in fact represents a summary which the operator wrote as part of that, noting a correspondent Milanovic looking for a Simovic or Avramovic. This correspondent Milanovic still looking for an excavator or a bulldozer. He can't get one. "They're all in the field," it's noted. He asks the (10)Zlatar duty officer, identified as Lieutenant Colonel Blagojevic, for a typist. Colonel Vikic will come up later. In this context, the Colonel -- Lieutenant Colonel Blagojevic is not the same Colonel Blagojevic as the Commander of the 1st Bratunac Brigade. He is, in fact, Lieutenant Colonel Nedjo Blagojevic, who is the (15)communications officer of the Drina Corps. • Q.: How are you able to conclude that? • A.: We have various documents from the Drina Corps that we got when we seized from the Bratunac and Zvornik Brigade that identify him as that position. (20) • Q.: So the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade shouldn't be a duty officer at the Drina Corps headquarters. • A.: Absolutely not, sir. • Q.: All right. Let's go to the next exhibit, 522/A. It should be the same day, 1602 hours, the 13th. What can you tell us about that? (25)
• A.: Two unidentified correspondents again. In this case discussing
• Q.: All right. Let's go to the next exhibit, 523/A, 13 July, (10)1730 hours, X and Y. What can you tell us about this? Though I can start off by reading from the top: (X.:) Is it possible for us to send about ten buses from Bijeljina? (Y.:) Well, tell them right away to come. There are about 6.000 (15)of them now. (X.:) Of military age? (Y.:) Shut up. Don't repeat." What about that?
• A.: The aspect of military-aged men was first raised in the meetings
(20)on 11 and 12 July 1995 by General Mladic, where it was made clear that
there would be some form of a vetting process of the military-aged men who
were suspected of being involved in war crimes or war crime related
activities. Again from the further broader context within what the VRS is
aware of, military-aged men to them, they're looking for that broad
(25)category of men who are potentially soldiers.
• A.: As you go down the context of the conversation, what they're dealing with is the issue of large numbers of prisoners, 1.500 to 2.000, and the problem that the required transportation to start moving them (5)isn't available because all of the available transportation is still moving the women and the children. "Have them report to the stadium," an indication that what they're going to do to get around that is start assembling all of the prisoners in central locations. One of those locations presumably the stadium at Kasaba, as identified. (10) • Q.: And at about 5.30 p.m. on the 13th, we know that they are, in fact, still transporting women and children from Potocari; is that right? • A.: In the order or in the report that was completed by Colonel Jankovic on the 13th, he notes in his report to the Main Staff that the evacuation, as he calls it, was not completed from Potocari until (15)2000 hours on the 13th. So they would have been still moving the people, the women and children, and the buses during this time frame. • Q.: Let's go to Exhibit 525/A, 13 July, 1829 hours. It begins by some unidentified people or someone named Zile talking about records on war criminals. What do you make of this conversation? (20)
• A.: Zile is a nickname that is frequently associated with
General Zivanovic. The -- discussing the issue of a list of individuals,
recognised or known by the local municipal police and the CSB, who are
suspected of committing war crimes. Reading into it, clearly the concern
is that as this column is moving out of the area and this vetting process
(25)is not taking effect or under plan, that people might be getting away who
• Q.: Now, at this point on 13 July, people have been executed at the Jadar River, people have been executed at Cerska, there are people at the Kravica warehouse that are either being shot or about to be shot; a (5)process is well under way. But you have someone on this intercept that is worried about war criminals and thinks they may get away scot-free. What does that tell you, if anything? • A.: It indicates, at a minimal level, that the correspondents in this conversation may not have an awareness of what was happening relative to (10)those people who are being captured or any of the executions, and may indicate that they're still working under the assumption that there will, in fact, be a formal vetting process of the male prisoners. • Q.: Are you aware of an actual list of alleged Muslim war criminals that the -- was in possession of the VRS? (15) • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: What is that? • A.: On 12 July 1995, the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade produced a listing of approximately 400 individuals who were suspected by the brigade command, specifically by the Office of the Security and Intelligence (20)people, of being suspected of committing war crimes against the VRS. That list is dated 12 July 1995.
• Q.: In a military interrogation of prisoners for any number of
subjects, including this one, would the identification documents of the
prisoner be of value to the forces that held the prisoner in order to
(25)determine whether they may be a war criminal or who they may be?
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, excuse me for interrupting you, but I think that we can't go on until 2.30 without a break. So I'm wondering whether it would be convenient for you now to (5)have a 20-minute break. MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] [No translation] --- Recess taken at 1.33 p.m. --- On resuming at 1.55 p.m. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, please continue. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: Mr. Butler, can you look at Exhibit 527/A, 13 July conversation at 1945 hours, "X" is calling from General Krstic's and looking for Ljubisa who has gone to Bratunac. What can you tell us about that? (15)
• A.: The name Ljubisa in context with the rest of the conversation
pertaining to a detachment from Janja and references to Bijeljina and
Doboj where we know police units originated from, the conclusion that I
make on that is Ljubisa is in fact Lieutenant Colonel Borovcanin the
Deputy Commander of the Special Police Brigade.
(20)The issue of additional MUP units coming in, as the combat
situation, particularly in the later afternoon, early evening hours of 13
July, continues to grow far more serious than was first anticipated.
Despite the very large number of prisoners being taken, again the
awareness on the part of the VRS that more are still slipping through, and
(25)that the size of the column they underestimated initially.
• Q.: Down near the bottom it says, "Have Ljubisa call me at General Krstic's," do we have any idea where that is and where General Krstic might be in the early evening hours of 13 July? • A.: Based on this piece of information alone, no. Based on the other (15)pieces of information, there are three options. Option number one is that he is in the forward command post of the Drina Corps in Krivaja in Zepa which should have been established as of 1800 hours that day. • Q.: Excuse me, I think you said Krivaja. • A.: Krivace. (20) • Q.: Krivaja is the plan. Krivace, I believe, is the forward command post, I believe; is that right?
• A.: That is correct, sir. The second option would be that he is still
in Bratunac at the command post there. The third option might be that he
is at the command post in Vlasenica which would be a logical stopping off
(25)place between him going from Bratunac, the former command post, to
• Q.: I believe we discussed an intercept on the 13th that we related more to the previous testimonies where we were able to conclude that (5)General Krstic and General Mladic were together somewhere. Was that the evening or afternoon hours of the 13th in your recollection? • A.: I believe that was the afternoon and evening hours of the 13th, yes, sir. • Q.: Let's go to Exhibit 529/A, 13 July 1920 -- sorry, 1995 at 2040 (10)hours. What can you tell us about this? • A.: This conversation is a conversation between General Krstic and Lieutenant Colonel Borovcanin. In this case it's easy, both the principals compromise their identities early. Essentially a conversation where both sides -- or in this respect, General -- Colonel Borovcanin is (15)letting General Krstic know that he doesn't have any problems, essentially briefing him up to speed on what the situation is. Further, he asks, "Is there anything special for us from you," and General Krstic notes that he's working on that, indicating that he has some orders that will be coming down, but he's not prepared to issue them (20)yet. • Q.: Do you have any indications whether Borovcanin went down to Zepa to assist, or whether he stayed up in the Srebrenica-Bratunac area?
• A.: I have no information which puts Lieutenant Colonel Borovcanin in
or near the Zepa area during this period. Considering that the MUP units
(25)under his direction would be operating in the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje area
• Q.: Would it have made sense on the evening hours of the 13th or 14th to pull that MUP unit out of the area and taken them down to help out in Zepa? (5) • A.: Given at that point in time the military had assembled or was assembling a fairly robust capability with the military or the army specific assets that had conducted the operation, the actual capture of Srebrenica, and that those were being deployed or had already been deployed to Zepa, the use of the MUP units down there would not have been (10)necessary at this particular state. • Q.: I don't want to get into this subject in detail at this point, but did the commander's responsibility change merely because his location changes from one area of the corps responsibility to another? • A.: No, sir, it does not. (15) • Q.: I believe General Dannit will go into that subject in more detail. Okay, if we could go to Exhibit 530, 530/A, should be a 2100 hours conversation of 13 July. • A.: Krsmanovic again being one of the correspondents, the Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic, Chief of Transportation Services of the Drina Corps; I (20)don't know who the correspondent identified as Viskovic is. In this case, they're discussing the issue that as of 2100 hours, there are still 700 people, presumably Muslim prisoners, at Sandici, and the arrangements being made for buses to pick them up and move them somewhere. • Q.: Let's go to the next exhibit, 531/A, 2305 hours, 13 July. (25)
• A.: I notice on this exhibit on the bottom that there are, in fact,
• Q.: Thank you. Now, we have apparently have Mladic's side only of this conversation. What can you glean, if anything, from this Mladic one-sided conversation? (5) • A.: Correspondent referred to as Ljubo, could be Ljubo Beara, the main Security Administration Chief for the Main Staff. There is a reference to having an order sent, for something at Krle's place to be sent. "It is over there at Mladic's," another reference to the Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment. The issue of a lot of hungry (10)mouths, again it's a very oblique reference, and within the context of looking at only one side of this, I'd be very hesitant to define what that would mean. • Q.: Did Dutch soldiers spend the night at the 65th Protection Regiment, the night of the 13th? (15) • A.: A small group of Dutch soldiers did, in fact, spend the night at the facility in Nova Kasaba on 13 July 1995. • Q.: And do you recall anything in the record about Muslim prisoners being held at the 65th on the 13th of July? • A.: To my knowledge, based on the information, there were no Muslim (20)prisoners under VRS custody at Nova Kasaba the evening of 13 July 1995. • Q.: How about during the day? • A.: During the day there were several hundreds, up to a thousand if the numbers are correct here.
• Q.: Have you seen anything in the records that you've reviewed or the
(25)statements you've reviewed that indicate that the VRS provided any
• A.: No, sir, there's no indication of that at all. • Q.: Now, that takes us to the end of the intercept period that talks (5)about the column and the various commanders involved in this particular area on these dates. And I want to take you to the next subject related to the column, and that is at least two Main Staff orders of 13 July that cover that subject and one Drina Corps order that we've briefly discussed in the context, I believe it was Zivanovic's last order. But let's first, (10)if you could, discuss Exhibit 532. Tell us what that is, how it relates to the topics that I've just outlined.
• A.: This order, dated 13 July 1995, and if I could refer to another
series of notes, we identified this order, I believe, as order number
1623. The translation of it is very poor. The actual numbers of the
(15)order number, because of the copy that we received, and what gives me the
indication of what the order number is and what the actual date of 13 July
is, a future exhibit that is a Drina Corps order that is an almost
verbatim text match, and we'll discuss that next few exhibits, but I
wanted to set the stage of the date for 13 July.
(20)What this order is, is to the commands of the Drina Corps, the
Drina Corps forward command post, and select elements of the Drina Corps
to their brigades to the Commander or Chief of Staff personally, and it is
an overall discussion or roll-up of the -- first, the understanding of the
situation by the Main Staff of the VRS, and further, a series of orders
(25)pertaining to what the Main Staff wants the Corps Command to accomplish
(5) • Q.: Are you able to get any kind of a time fix on this order that -- dated 13 July but received by Bratunac on 14 July? • A.: I believe this order came out on the morning of the 13th of July, 1995. By dating it, by virtue of the fact that with the Drina Corps order that is a verbatim copy of this order further sent down to the units, that (10)order signed by Colonel Zivanovic was sent out by the Drina Corps at 1735 on 13 July. So again, taking it in sequence and time, presumably this order was received by the Drina Corps in order for them to retransmit it sometime in the morning, early afternoon hours of 13 July 1995. (15) • Q.: What can you tell us about who this is addressed to? It's a Main Staff order, it appears to be addressed directly to the Drina Corps and the forward command post, the Zvornik Brigade, the Dutch brigade, Vlasenica Brigade?
• A.: The first addressee, the Command of the Drina Corps, and the
(20)second addressee, the Drina Corps forward command post number one, clearly
for the relevant general officers at the time.
Taking it further, to the commands of the 1st Zvornik Brigade, the
1st Birac Brigade, the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, again, to the
Commander/Chief of Staff personally. A reflection that as far as the Main
(25)Staff was concerned, this was an order that was relevant to all of them.
• Q.: Is it normal for the Main Staff to order brigades to do things directly like this? • A.: It is not normal for them -- or the Main Staff to order brigades (10)to do anything with -- certainly in isolation of the corps command. And as I read this, I don't read this and I don't interpret it to be specific orders and directions to the brigades independent of the corps command. Reading this order as is, and further taking it in series with the Drina Corps order that follows it, it's clear that it is a proper manifestation (15)of the chain of command: The Main Staff giving the series of orders to the corps; the corps turning those orders and giving it around to the brigades. In this instance, my interpretation is that because of the timeliness issues, the Main Staff wants the brigades to be aware just as (20)fast as they want the corps staff to be aware what their view of the situation is, and what steps need to be taken.
• Q.: Let me get into a little of the substance of the order. You've
described it generally. The first question I would have is on the first
main paragraph, this order is an order basically, as you've said, to have
(25)these units capture the Muslim column. It mentions, in the first
• A.: Given the role of General Gvero as the Assistant Commander of the Main Staff for Moral, Legal and Religious Affairs, and in many aspects the public mouthpiece of the army of the Republika Srpska, and looking at a (10)lot of his past writings related to this, and in future months the types of orders that he puts out on this basis, while it is unique in hyperbole, it is not unique to him as an individual. • Q.: All right, let's get into the substance of the orders. Basically, the first paragraph: (15)"The corps command and brigade command shall use all available able-bodied manpower in their zones of responsibility in discovering, blocking, disarming, capturing observed Muslim groups, as well as preventing their crossing into Muslim-controlled territory. Setup ambushes along the whole Zvornik-Crni Vrh-Sekovici-Vlasenica road on a (20)24-hour basis." Now, is this the same area that is outlined in the big map that you've talked about earlier with all the various brigades and units there?
• A.: This entire zone, as described, falls into the zone of the Drina
(25)Corps command.
• A.: In that context, I read the superior command to be the next (5)immediate command above the units that capture them, which would, in this case, being that it would be the brigades on the ground capturing the units, the Drina Corps command. The Drina Corps command, in turn, would notify the Main Staff. • Q.: We've got to slow down a little bit. I think it's getting late, (10)and I think people -- everything becomes more difficult. So this is directed to Zvornik Brigade troops. What about the Bratunac Brigade? • A.: The Bratunac Brigade, in this message, is not an addressee. • Q.: How do you account for that? (15) • A.: This order, for the most part, again in context, is dealing with how they're going to deal with the aspects of the column that have already moved or are moving from the Bratunac Brigade area, those -- as the column goes up towards the Zvornik Brigade and it's alerting the brigades that are in line of attack for the column. (20)In the case of the Bratunac Brigade, in this case, they are already dealing with the issue in accordance with previous directives, so there would be no need to identify for them specifically on this.
• Q.: Paragraph 7 talks about reporting on captured and blocked groups
on secure lines of communication, preventing unnecessary conversations
(25)which may lead to leaking of information, and then the last paragraph
• A.: Again the discussion pertaining to the aspect of a responsibility to report back through the higher chain of command very much to the top (5)level, the general staff or the Main Staff at the time of the Republika Srpska. They stress the need for timely reporting to allow the superior command elements the necessary time to make whatever decisions may be required. • Q.: Is this order an indication to you that the Main Staff has taken (10)over direct control of the Drina Corps brigades, taking away the authority of the Drina Corps? • A.: No, sir. I don't see that in this order at all. • Q.: And we'll be discussing more on that subject later. Can we go to the next exhibit, which should be 462/A. Do you have that in front of (15)you? • A.: I do not have 462/A. • Q.: If we could -- that is a prior order that we've already discussed. It's Zivanovic's last order. • A.: Thank you, sir. (20) • Q.: Now, we discussed this previously in the context of it being General Zivanovic's last order in the context of General Krstic taking over command. Now let's talk a bit more about the substance and how it relates to the order you've just referred to.
• A.: When this order is matched up against the previous exhibit, it is
(25)clearly an almost verbatim text transmission of that order, and, in fact,
• Q.: So this would include the Bratunac Brigade? • A.: Yes, sir, it would. • Q.: And where is the geographic focus, if there is one, or where is (10)the focus of this order? It speaks of Bratunac-Konjevic Polje-Milicic. Could you explain that to us? • A.: The geographic focus of this order corresponds with the projected route that the Muslim column has taken and in time will take to go from Jaglici-Susnjari, to Tuzla. This area, Nova Kasaba-Konjevic Polje, and (15)then further to the north and off this map the locations of Crni Vrh and Cerska, which are major landmark features in the zone of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade that track along the route towards Tuzla. JUDGE WALD: Could I just one coalescence? Could you just put -- this order or these two orders that we're talking about which went out on (20)July 13th or you think were issued on July 13th, that's also the date in which, toward the end of July 13th, we had some of the first mass executions. Is there any way to figure out the time line, whether these went out simultaneously, before, or after?
• A.: That is a piece of my analysis. It's rough insomuch as the
(25)witnesses clearly don't know in exact time frames, but using the hard time
JUDGE WALD: Okay. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: All right. Let's go to the next exhibit, which should be very brief. This is a 13 July order from the Main Staff to several different (10)units. MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, this may not be as brief as I thought. This might be a good time to take a break. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. We're going to have a half-hour break now. (15) --- Recess taken at 2.32 p.m. --- On resuming at 3.02 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, are you ready to continue? MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Go ahead, then. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: Mr. Butler, taking you very quickly back to Exhibit 532, the Main Staff order that -- July 13th, it does not have the Bratunac Brigade as an addressee. Can you tell us what the received stamp says about that? (25)
• A.: Looking at this order, it does not indicate at face value in the
• Q.: All right. Let's now go back to the Exhibit 533/A where we left (5)off, a 13 July Main Staff order from General Mladic. Can you tell us about this order and how it may relate or not relate to the other couple of orders which you've discussed this afternoon?
• A.: This order, again from the staff, the Main Staff of the army of
Republika Srpska, is another one of those series of orders that broadly is
(10)dealing with the issue of the Muslim military column moving out of the
area of Bratunac and towards Tuzla, as well as the expanded conduct of
operations now in the area of Zepa as they are now preparing to go into
those operations.
From the addressee listing, the order is sent to the command of
(15)the Drina Corps, the 65th Protection Regiment, the 67th Communication
Regiment, and the Sector for Morale, Legal, and Religious Affairs, and the
Intelligence and Security Services of the Main Staff; and for information,
the 1st and 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigades, the 2nd Romanija
Motorised Brigade, the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade, the 1st BLPPR -- it's a
(20)repeat, in that case it's the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, the 1st
Milici Light Infantry Brigade, and the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry
Brigade, and in that context, it's for their information. Finally at the
bottom after a piece of garbled text, it's noted the 1st Zvornik Infantry
Brigade and notes to the Commander personally.
(25)Putting that all in the context, this order is directed to the
• Q.: What's the military purpose of the "for information" to the various units?
• A.: The general theory or the general practice on that, to be more
accurate, is -- again is, one, is part of a time saving function. As a
(10)superior officer following the proper established chain, you're giving the
order to the next subordinate command level; and as a staff and officer,
you're going to know that ultimately it's going to be carried down to the
second level. So by doing this, in essence you're helping your own
planning process because you're giving the lower units time to prepare
(15)because they understand that this order will be coming down from the corps
command as well.
A second aspect, and in this case the most likely aspect, is the
fact that when you look at the context of the message, particularly
pertaining to road closures, in most cases the roads that were closed are
(20)in the zones of many of these brigades, either in their normal zone of
operation, or in the case of the Vlasenica and the Birac units, where
they're operating in relation to Zepa. So clearly an awareness of the
fact that while they're , the brigades, are not the implementing
authorities per se, this is something which the brigades need to be aware
(25)of because it will have a military impact upon them.
• A.: The Gvero order, the previous order in that respect, I place it, (5)again, in the same category as this one, that circumstance were in the context of the proper chain of command being followed. The originator of the order, in this case being the Main Staff, wanted a rapid awareness by the brigades at the lowest level, those people who would ultimately have to carry out the order and planned to do so, to have the maximum amount of (10)time available in order to accomplish that. One of the really unspoken aspects of military plans and planning, and I know that General Dannit will get into this later, is the aspect of dealing with time. It's the one aspect that a commander cannot modify somehow. So the emphasis when you do orders like this -- and at least in (15)my army it is a relatively common practice, and reviewing the documents that I've noted in the VRS it's not a unique practice, these type of things are done in order to ensure that the people at the lowest end who will execute the orders or have to deal with the consequences of the orders, have the maximum amount of time and warning to do just that. (20)
• Q.: Now, going to paragraph 2, I note that it talks about closing the
roads in this general area to traffic, except for military vehicles
engaged in combat operations, and one of the units it refers to is MUP
units engaged in combat operations. Is this consistent with your
understanding of the MUP and its involvement in combat-related activities
(25)with the column?
• Q.: And I would note paragraph 5, "A ban and prevent the giving of information," et cetera, "particularly on prisoners of war, evacuated civilians, escapees, and similar." So this order from Mladic makes (5)particular attention not to let information about prisoners of war get out. Is that also correct? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: All right. That wraps up our informational segment from intercepts, documents, daily combat reports for this particular area, the (10)southern crime scenes. But before having you discuss briefly each of the crime scenes and what you can glean from the information relating to those crime scenes, I would like you to go over the Bratunac Brigade daily combat reports for the period of the 14th through the 16th of July to help provide a context of that overall situation at that time period, and as (15)well, help us look into the situation on the 13th and see if there's anything that those documents from the later period can tell us about the activities on the 13th. So with that in mind, could you go to Exhibit 534, 14 July daily combat report from the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, and tell us (20)what is the essence of what your analysis gets from this document.
• A.: First, as reflected, the combat report is addressed to the command
of the Drina Corps. Paragraph 1 notes that in the sector that they're
sweeping, that they're not coming into significant contact with the enemy
forces. They note enemy forces being surrounded in another geographic
(25)area, this area following closer to Konjevic Polje.
(20) • Q.: Also noting that in paragraph 6 that there was no VRS soldiers or no Bratunac Brigade soldiers killed. • A.: That is correct. • Q.: Now, does this give us any indication where Commander Blagojevic is? (25)
• A.: Looking at the original handwritten version of that and down at
(10) • Q.: And you learned a little bit more about where he is in the day or two in addition; is that correct? • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Let's then go to the next report, which is dated the same day, 14 July, and tell us about this. Exhibit 535/A. (15)
• A.: This is a request from the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade to the
Drina Corps command pertaining to the relief of a unit attached to a
formation referred to or known as the 4th Drina Light Infantry Brigade.
As I discuss in my narrative but we don't address here because
it's not particularly relevant to the criminal acts as they're charged,
(20)elements of the Bratunac Brigade and the Zvornik Brigade were formed
together to create a composite unit which is operating in the zone of the
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
This is a rather typical occurrence within the army of Republika
Srpska, again a reflection of their lack of manpower and how they had to
(25)put together composite units from one corps formation to operate in the
(10) • Q.: A request to bring the boys back home to Bratunac, is that what this is? • A.: In short, but the other piece of puzzle is that they have to be replaced out of sector as well. So it's not a question of bringing them home, it's a question of assembling another group of individuals to go (15)replace them. • Q.: Would this document be consistent with the Main Staff having taken over direct control of the Bratunac Brigade for this period of time? • A.: No, sir, it wouldn't. • Q.: How so? (20) • A.: If that, in fact, were the case, particularly pertaining to manpower, you would expect that the order or request would be to the Main Staff and not to the command of the Drina Corps.
• Q.: All right. Let's go to the next exhibit, 536/A, daily combat
report from the Bratunac Brigade, 15 July. What can you tell us about
(25)this?
(20)
• Q.: Now, I want to make clear at paragraph 2 it says:
"Our forces are still searching the terrain in accordance with
your strictly confidential order number 01/4-157/5, dated 13 July 1995."
That's the very order that General Krstic signed on the 13th as
Commander of the Corps, directed to this very brigade as well as others;
(25)is that right?
• Q.: And has the investigation revealed that General Krstic was at the forward command post at Krivace on 15 July 1995? • A.: Yes, sir, it has. (5) • Q.: So in the context of the military orders, should General Krstic have received this order or this, excuse me, daily combat report? • A.: Yes, sir, he should have. • Q.: That's Exhibit 463, the Krstic July 16th order -- 13th. Excuse me. (10)Do we see the Bratunac Brigade sending any other combat orders, excuse me, daily combat reports to the IKM or the forward command post in this immediate period? • A.: Within this immediate period, we don't see the Bratunac Brigade sending one to the IKM per se. However, we have a report sent by Colonel (15)Milanovic, of the Drina Corps staff, from the Bratunac Brigade command post to the IKM in much the same context. • Q.: Okay. Well, let's go to Exhibit 537. I believe this is perhaps the document you're referring to, dated 15 July, from Colonel Milanovic, same, Bratunac. Tell us about -- again, remind us who this fella is or (20)who this officer is, and tell us about this document.
• A.: The person in question, Colonel Ignjat Milanovic, is the Chief of
the Aircraft Defence for the command of the Drina Corps. He was
previously associated with the Bratunac Brigade in late 1992, early 1993
as its Chief of Staff before coming up to the command of the Drina Corps.
(25)Looking at the address line, it's delivered to the command, and in
(10) • Q.: How do you know that? Where do you make those conclusions from?
• A.: In trying to come to an understanding of what that is, and, again,
not being fluent in this language and not being well acquainted with it at
all, I've spent several hours over the course of many days with the
revisers and the senior translators of the registry with various military
(15)documents, trying to come to grips with the sometimes lack of consistency
with how these orders are addressed. In some sense, you have singular "To
the command of" and then multiple addressees. In some cases you have the
plural, "To the commands of," and one case -- and in some cases only one
addressee.
(20)In many aspects, again in dealing with the senior language
specialists of the Tribunal, their interpretations of these, which, in
effect, are reflected in the translations, are that this is, in fact, to
the commands of the units that follow.
The phrase komanda or komandi do not represent an individual
(25)undesignated command somewhere.
• A.: Essentially this document is first a report on the situation (5)within the zone of the Bratunac, the Milici, and the Skelani Separate Battalion, and then a report of what that specific officer has ordered to take place relative to that situation, and further, his recommendations to the commander as to what steps should be taken over a longer term. • Q.: Okay, let's go through this slowly. I want to take you back to (10)the part about -- that says in the English translation "delivered to the corps IKM, to the attention of the commander." Who in your opinion is the commander referenced here in this document, Exhibit 537? • A.: That would be General-Major Krstic. • Q.: And the forward command post would be where? (15) • A.: Located in Krivace, or Krivace. • Q.: And then the next addressee, the Drina Corps command, what does that mean in relation to General Krstic as the Commander? • A.: The Drina Corps command represents essentially the broad organisation of the headquarters of the Drina Corps in Vlasenica. (20) • Q.: General Krstic's staff? • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Now, in the first paragraph, "In accordance with your orders, I went to Milici and Bratunac." In your opinion, who is the "your" referring to here? (25)
• A.: In this context, I would say the "your" is a specific reference to
• Q.: And it goes on to say that he acquainted himself with the situation to the east of the Milici-Konjevic Polje-Bratunac road. Generally large groups of enemy soldiers are still located to the east of (5)this road. The 1st Bratunac Brigade is still searching this terrain and is almost at the limit laid down. So what is your understanding of the Bratunac Brigade being sent to Zepa, or units of it? Where are they on this date? • A.: Clearly, with the exception of the previously-mentioned company (10)under the command of the Chief of Staff of the brigade, the remainder of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade is conducting the sweep operations in its zone. • Q.: Can you give us an estimate of how many soldiers would be in a company like this that went to Zepa, roughly? (15) • A.: I believe, going back to the exhibit, and I'm going to work off of memory here, the number is, in fact, specified at approximately 90 or 80. • Q.: Can you give us an estimate of how many combat soldiers -- or how many soldiers, I should say, that would leave in the Bratunac Brigade area of responsibility, of course accounting for the group that is with the (20)Sarajevo-Romanija Corps elsewhere?
• A.: With that company out, with the element deployed with the
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, also noting the additional 80 soldiers that were
sent up to the zone of the Zvornik Brigade, and given a roster strength
that the unit itself reports at approximately 1400 soldiers at the end of
(25)July 1995 as being on the roster, you're probably looking at a good 800 to
• Q.: And referring back to the big map, can you give us an idea of roughly where those forces would be located on the time period of July 12th, 13th, 14th? (5) • A.: Again, this specific order or this specific proposal notes that the Bratunac Brigade forces have just about reached the search limit, presumably that line that was designated in the 13 July 1995 order. That line essentially runs from beyond Sandici into the former enclave, coming around south of Jaglici, Susnjari, sweeping south into Srebrenica or (10)beyond Srebrenica to the east of it -- I'm sorry, west of it, to a point where it would connect in with where the Skelani separate battalion from the Zeleni Jadar access was conducting its sweep. • Q.: Thank you. Under the section it says, "I have ordered," number two, "the assignment you have given to the commanders to be carried out (15)without fail." Do you know what that assignment is, or can you give us any indication of what it might be? • A.: In the context of the military operations, re: a formation, that the tasks designated to those military commanders and the lines given to them must be achieved. (20) • Q.: Okay. And what is the colonel's proposal?
• A.: The colonel is proposing that the Commander authorise and appoint
the Commander of the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade as the Commander
of all forces, participating in searching the terrain and sweeping the
battlefield to the east of the road in the control of the Kasaba-Drinjaca
(25)road, noting that we have no one to appoint from the command of the Drina
• Q.: Where is -- do you know where the commanders from the command of the Drina Corps are? • A.: At this point in time, many of the senior staff officers of the (5)Drina Corps who are qualified to command ground forces type of operations are either at the forward command post in Zepa, or are deployed with the composite brigade with the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. In fact, the commander of that brigade is identified as Colonel Veletic, the Drina Corps Chief of Artillery. (10) • Q.: And we haven't gotten to Zvornik yet, but on 15 July there's quite a bit of activity in Zvornik, and the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade has been pulled out of the Zepa operation and gone up to the Zvornik area at about this time; is that correct? • A.: At this point in time, the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, (15)Colonel Pandurevic, has been pulled out of the Zepa operation, and his units have been moving back into the zone of the Zvornik Brigade to deal with the issue of the column. • Q.: Now, going to page 2 of this document, paragraph 2, it says, "If you agree with the proposal in item 1, send a telegram of confirmation to (20)the commands of the 1st Bratunac Brigade, the 1st Milici Brigade, and the Zvornik CSB centre." Now, again, the "you" that's referred to in your opinion is who? • A.: General Krstic, sir.
• Q.: Can you provide any reason why the confirmation of this proposal
(25)should be sent to the CSB in Zvornik, meaning the police department in
• A.: Again, it fits into the aspect of the broader issue of the units having to know formally who is in command. In a military sense, it's not a random, ad hoc designation of command; it is a formalised process. In (5)this sense of paragraph 2, Colonel Milanovic is indicating that an order should be sent to the affected units, the 1st Bratunac Brigade, the 1st Milici Brigade, and the Zvornik CSB, indicating General Krstic's decision on the appointment of commander so all three of those units understand who the designated commander is, and that they are, in fact, under that (10)officer's command. In the sense of the Zvornik CSB singularly, it's another affirmation that on 15 July 1995, the forces of the Zvornik CSB, those being the municipal police specifically, are under the command of the Drina Corps. (15) • Q.: Let me go to paragraph 3. "I am going to Bracan and on to Stublic, and I propose taking those 200 or more soldiers from the 1st Milici Brigade in the direction of Stublic besides the SB Skelani," and this is the part I want to ask you about, "if Pandurevic settles his situation." Now, in the next -- we're going to, in the next day, hear a lot (20)about that situation, but can you just give us a very brief outline of, very brief, just the military situation and the -- well, just give us the military situation in a very brief format to try and put this in context.
• A.: On the 15th of July and carrying into the 16th of July 1995, in
the zone of the Zvornik Brigade, what you have is an extremely significant
(25)and very bitter battle between the elements of the Muslim column
(15) • Q.: Did that situation in Pandurevic's area also involve thousands of prisoners located in many schools and their eventual destruction at Orahovac on the 14th, in Petkovci dam on the 14th and 15th, at the Branjevo farm on the 16th, Kozluk on the 15th or 16th, and the Pilica Cultural Centre on the 16th, and did that additionally complicate the (20)situation? • A.: Yes, sir, it did. • Q.: Could we go to the next exhibit, 538. Can you tell us about that?
• A.: This is an order from the command of the Bratunac Light Infantry
(25)Brigade to the brigade staff pertaining to the organisation of a battalion
• Q.: Okay. So Bratunac is finally gearing up to send more people to Zepa on the 17th. (10) • A.: That is correct, sir. Or on the 16th when this order is published. • Q.: Now let me take you very briefly back to Exhibit 537, Colonel Milanovic's report and proposal to General Krstic regarding these various -- putting these units in various organised fashion. (15)Is this communication in any way consistent with the idea that the Main Staff and General Mladic have taken over direct command of the Bratunac Brigade or other Drina Corps brigades in this area, leaving the Drina Corps without authority over them? • A.: This is in no way consistent with that theory. (20) • Q.: Now let's go to Exhibit 539, daily combat report, 16 July, to the command of the Drina Corps from the Bratunac Brigade. Tell us what this is and how it fits into Milanovic's proposal.
• A.: We do not have the order that was presumably sent by
General Krstic which in essence made Colonel Blagojevic the Commander of
(25)those units that are operating in that sector. What we see, however,
(25)
• Q.: So we see these units, the 65th, the Engineering Battalion, the
(5) • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: Does this tell us anything about what these units may have been doing on the 15th, the 14th, the 13th in the area where, in the case of the 65th, were living, and in the case of the 5th Engineering Battalion were stationed? (10) • A.: Working back in time, you can infer and I do infer that all of these units were involved with first combat operations against the Muslim column, and supplemental to that, activities pertaining to the capture of Muslim males from the column. • Q.: Let's take the example of the 65th Protection Regiment. If (15)they're involved in capturing Muslims, on the 13th, that are coming through the woods but they're not formally under the command, at that point, of the Drina Corps, could they be expected to be working with the other units around them in the Drina Corps and assisting each other in their project? (20)
• A.: If for no other reason other than the safety and security of your
own troops, those activities would have to have been very well
coordinated. You -- as a matter of military necessity, as a unit
commander, particularly in a line and certainly within the parlance of the
former JNA and VRS doctrine, close coordination with units adjacent to you
(25)is a military necessity.
(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Until half past. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: Mr. Butler, I'd like you now to talk about, in a military context, the various crime scenes and what you may be able to glean from them and some of the information you've referred to, and I'm going to take you out (10)of chronology now, because of the topic that you were just discussing, the coordination of units in the area of Kravica, Sandici, Nova Kasaba, Konjevic Polje. So I would like to first ask you about what you can tell us about the Kravica warehouse and the early evening hours of 13 July. Whose area (15)of responsibility was that in, and what was the military situation around it as you're aware?
• A.: With respect to the Kravica warehouse killings, that occurred,
timing-wise, around 1700 hours on 13 July 1995. The road
Bratunac-Konjevic Polje runs and is well in the zone of the Bratunac Light
(20)Infantry Brigade. It is the major and only significant line of
communication from Bratunac-Konjevic Polje in that aspect.
At a lower level, the troops along that road, as the map depicts,
closest to Bratunac would be the 1st Infantry Battalion, and then closer
to Kravica, the 4th Infantry Battalion in those zones. Further, relative
(25)to the 4th Battalion, going back to the 14 July 1995 Bratunac Brigade
(10) • Q.: Testimony has provided information that Muslims were bussed to the Kravica warehouse from the Sandici area as well as marched in large numbers up to perhaps 500, stored there at the warehouse, guarded, and then shot by a large -- well, relatively large number of soldiers with weapons, shooting through windows, throwing hand grenades. (15)What kind of coordination could you expect from a guarding, transporting, guarding, shooting, removing operation which such a murder must have involved or from the survivors we know involved?
• A.: In looking at the event as it occurred, and again, inferring the
military aspects which had to have taken place for various aspects that
(20)were witnessed to occur, first with relation to the buses, as we've
previously gone through, the buses were operating under the command of the
Chief of Transportation -- or its control of the Chief of Transportation
of the Drina Corps, and ultimately the Drina Corps commander.
With the priority of effort, certainly through the day of 13 July,
(25)moving the women and children out of Potocari, again, a reflection of the
JUDGE WALD: Let me ask one last question on that. You've covered every step of what might have been involved in the Kravica warehouse, I mean, in terms of the preparation, except for the actual killing of the (10)people inside. We have two orders, you know, which came out on the same day saying secure in a secure place and guard the prisoners, and then you've -- what in your opinion or that you can tell from the material before you, what level would have had to be involved if you are securing people according to orders that have come down from the top before you (15)can, in effect, do away with them? • A.: In possibly an overly simplistic way, but based on the orders and everything else that were issued, somebody somewhere has to inform the commander what happened to all these prisoners. Initially, somebody has to inform the Commander of the 1st Bratunac Brigade and then somebody has (20)to inform the Commander of the Drina Corps that several hundred prisoners who were secured are now dead. JUDGE WALD: Okay. MR. McCLOSKEY:
• Q.: All right. Let's go to Cerska Valley, and it's, as you know, it's
(25)down the road not very far from Kravica, involved about 150 people with
(10)
• A.: Starting with the actual execution and burial site in the Cerska
Valley, for the most part I believe that falls in the zone of the Milici
Light Infantry Brigade. I cannot be 100 per cent sure of that, insomuch
as while I have the brigade boundaries from map graphics of the Zvornik
Brigade, and I have the map graphics from the Bratunac Brigade, I do not
(15)have the map graphics of the Milici Brigade. So I cannot tell you with a
hundred per cent certainty that the execution site and burial site is in
that zone. But based on the geographic distribution of the units at
headquarters, I'm fairly comfortable being able to say that I believe that
it is the zone of the 1st Milici Brigade. Regardless, it still falls
(20)within the broader zone of the command of the Drina Corps in physical,
geographic terms.
In reviewing the witness testimony related to that, in the sense
of, first, the actual movement of prisoners, the witnesses recount -- or I
believe a witness recounts the convoy moving up the valley of buses filled
(25)with male prisoners and engineer equipment following those buses. Again,
• Q.: Let me give you a hypothetical and ask you a question about it.
If we assume that an APC full of soldiers and three buses full of Muslim
prisoners followed by a bulldozer means that there has been a decision
made to murder and bury the people in the buses, does it make any military
(25)sense for, let's say, the 65th Protection Regiment, or perhaps the 10th
• A.: In a military parlance, that doesn't make sense. (5) • Q.: Why not? • A.: In that specific hypothetical, it assumes that the 10th Diversionary has military armoured personnel carriers, which it doesn't normally have. Somebody must have given it to them, or somebody who had them must have had them accompany the 10th Diversionary. The 10th (10)Diversionary clearly doesn't have bulldozers or earth-moving equipment; and certainly in the case of specific engineer equipment, not only do you require the piece of equipment, you require a trained operator to use it. The 10th Diversionary Unit in and of itself wouldn't be diverting buses at that period in time from the flow taking the women and children (15)out and putting prisoners on them. Taking that a step further, the 10th Diversionary itself would not have captured all of these prisoners in the first place, the inference being somebody previously had captured them and assembled them and then turned them over to the custody of that unit. Again, the inference being somebody had to have ordered them to do that. (20)So within the context of that hypothetical, the assumption that a unit like the 10th Diversionary could, in isolation, conduct all the aspects of the criminal act as its described by the witnesses doesn't make military sense.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. Butler.
(25)Mr. President, we are just about where we hoped to be today. We
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. I think that I should also thank all the personnel and my colleagues. (5)And Madam Registrar, I think that everything is ready for tomorrow morning at 9.00? THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Mr. President, all the arrangements have been made for our meeting to be resumed tomorrow morning at 9.00. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] And we shall be finishing (10)tomorrow by 2.00 p.m.. We adjourn until tomorrow morning at nine o'clock. --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.35 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday the 30th day of June, 2000, at (15)9.00 a.m. |
