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/ Colormap • Page 5359 • {1/75} (1)Thursday, 20 July 2000 [Open session] [The witness entered court] [The accused entered court] (5) --- Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning to the technicians, the interpreters; good morning, legal assistants, court reporters; good morning, representatives of the Registry; good morning, Mr. Harmon, Mr. Cayley, Mr. McCloskey; good (10)morning, Mr. Petrusic; good morning, Mr. Visnjic; and good morning to you, General Krstic. Good morning, Mr. Butler. We are going to continue with your testimony, and let me remind you that you are still under an oath. Mr. Petrusic, you have the floor. (15) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Good morning, Mr. President; good morning, Your Honours; good morning, my learned colleagues from the Prosecution; good morning to all of you present here in the courtroom. WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed] • CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. Petrusic: [continue] (20)
• Q.: Mr. Butler, I would like to move on to your second chapter,
chapter 2, of your report from the month of May. I hope that we will be
able to proceed at a somewhat faster pace than yesterday.
Mr. Butler, from a military point of view and from the point of
view of the VRS, could we say that in the month of July 1995, there were
(25)any significant operations for the army of Republika Srpska and the Drina
• A.: Specifically for the month of July 1995, and dealing with the zone of the Drina Corps, the significant military operations would have been (5)Krivaja-95, would have been the follow-on military operation Stupcanica or Stupcanica-95, which was Zepa. It would have been the issue pertaining to the column moving from Srebrenica through the lines towards Tuzla, and it would have been the maintenance of the line of confrontation which the corps maintained throughout the zone of the brigade against the Muslim (10)army. • Q.: In the material that was available to you, did you come across any fact, any circumstance, or piece of evidence that the Commander of the Drina Corps, up to the day of the appointment of Radislav Krstic to the office of the Commander, that is, that the previous Commander had been in (15)any way prevented to command the corps? • A.: If I understand you correctly, sir, what you're asking is did I come across any piece of information that indicates that General Zivanovic was prevented from commanding the corps up to a point in time when General Krstic took over. Is that correct, sir? (20) • Q.: Yes. That was exactly my question.
• A.: There is one piece of information that I have that would fit into
that, and that is an interview taken with General Zivanovic by a Newsweek
press reporter, and in this interview, which again I've been unable to
substantiate through my own documents, General Zivanovic notes that he
(25)relinquished command of the Drina Corps officially at the headquarters in
• Q.: That piece of information, has it been substantiated in any way in terms of evidence or exhibits that you have analysed and that you have mentioned in your testimony yesterday and today? Do you have any such (15)piece of evidence? • A.: No, sir. And as I've indicated, the evidence that has been introduced today refutes that version of events. • Q.: Mr. Butler, can we say that the composition of the Corps Command is made of the Commander, the staff, and the assistants, the assistants (20)being the assistants of the Commander for the Security, then morale and religious issues, and Assistant Commander for Logistics? • A.: I would add the Chief of Staff into that mix, but, yes, sir, that is correct.
• Q.: That would have been the second part of my question. So can we
(25)agree with this assertion or not?
• Q.: Speaking of the staff, is it composed of the Chief of Staff and the assistants, Assistant Commanders for Operations, Intelligence Affairs, and also Commanders of special departments or branches of the army? (5) • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: The Chief of Staff, is he in charge of controlling and commanding the staff and coordinating the work of the command in general, of the headquarters in general? • A.: That is correct, sir. (10) • Q.: Can we finally conclude -- or, rather, reach a conclusion as to the duties and authorities of the Chief of Staff, and can we therefore say that the competence is the authority pursuant to the regulations on the authority of the Corps Command in peacetime from 1990 is such authority and such competence that are vested with the Chief of Staff? (15) • A.: If I understand your question correctly, are you -- you're asking if the 1990 corps regulations are an accurate reflection of the roles and responsibilities of the Chief of Staff? • Q.: Exactly, yes. • A.: Yes, sir. Those are baseline foundational documents which (20)demonstrate that. • Q.: So that would be the exact roles and responsibilities of the Chief of Staff, nothing more, nothing less than what has been provided for in the regulations that we mentioned?
• A.: No, sir, that's incorrect. As I've indicated yesterday and on
(25)previous testimony, these regulations are baseline foundational documents
• Q.: Is there any legal document which provides that the Chief of Staff would be bound by them? • A.: There is no specific legal document relative to the RS law and defence or the RS law and the army that specifically pertains to what a (15)Chief of Staff is bound or not bound to. However, in reviewing those same laws, it's specific that the soldiers and the officers of the army will follow the regulations and the instructions and the orders of those individuals appointed over them and carry out the instructions as such. So it's a general roll-up, it's not a specific designation. (20) • Q.: According to your opinion, was the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, that is, did the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps have any large -- any more authority than the authority that is provided for in the said regulations, Regulations On the Authority of the Ground Forces Corps Commander In Peacetime? (25)
• A.: I believe, sir, that he had additional authority, and what I use
• Q.: Can we agree that the regulations of the 4th Corps is a body of regulations that were issued by the 4th Corps of the JNA? (25)
• A.: That is correct, sir.
(5) • A.: I believe that I've noted that. And again, it is not my intention to infer that the Drina Corps in any way, shape, or form was bound to follow the instructions of another corps. The point that I'm making is the fact that in those specific regulations, the Chief of Staff roles and responsibilities, I see those reflected through the fact basis and my (10)analysis of those being the actual roles. • Q.: Mr. Butler, would it be true to say that the doctrine of the former JNA, including the 4th Corps, at the times of the events that took place in Croatia in 1991, that the doctrine was different from the doctrine of the VRS in 1995? (15) • A.: I would observe that, as I've noted before, while there were changes made to reflect wartime experience, the base doctrine and the base operating methodologies were the foundation of how the VRS conducted combat in 1995. • Q.: In your report in paragraph 2.10 on page 13, you speak about the (20)Chief Commander. I must say that I am -- when you say Chief Commander or the Main Commander, the Defence is somewhat confused, and we think that you probably want to say that there are some additional, some other, Commanders. Can we conclude from your statement here that there would be some kind of dual or concurrent command? (25)
• A.: No, sir. I believe that in this case, we're both victims of a bad
• Q.: I should like the situation to be that way. So that can refer to the Commander-in-Chief of the area in question and during the relevant times, that is, the times you are discussing in your report. (10)Mr. Butler, am I correct in understanding you, that you are referring to the Commander-in-Chief in a specific place at a specific time?
• A.: No, sir. I would not use the phrase "Commander-in-Chief." In my
vocabulary, the phrase "Commander-in-Chief" would roughly equate to either
(15)the president of the republic or the Commander of the Main Staff, and I
don't want to make that designation. What I am saying is that when I use
the phrase "the overall commander" in a series of groupings where various
military units are grouped together and an individual commander is
designated, and maybe the best way to explain this is to refer back to the
(20)Main Staff order of 17 July 1995, whereas part of that order a group of
units were identified, a specific zone was articulated, and then a
specific individual, a Colonel Keserovic, I believe, was identified as the
Commander of those groupings of forces, and that is the context in which
I'm trying to place the phrase "overall commander" in, those types of
(25)groupings, sir.
(5) • A.: I don't believe impaired, but these temporary command groupings, in some cases, were resubordinated to a formation outside the Drina Corps or were resubordinated in operating under the Drina Corps control. So while command responsibility for some of these groups shifted outside of the corps, I wouldn't use the phrase "impaired" in any way. (10) • Q.: Speaking of the role of the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps and bearing in mind the regulations, would any different type of role in any way endanger the principle of the unity of command?
• A.: With respect to the Chief of Staff and putting it into the context
of, for example, July 1995, we have the example of during the operation
(15)Krivaja-95, the Chief of Staff was in charge of or commanded the tactical
portion of the operation against Srebrenica until that point in time when
General Zivanovic and General Mladic showed up. And even after that
period he was actually the person responsible for the specific directives
to the brigades. He was in command of those formational units and
(20)directing their activities during the period he was still the Chief of
Staff of the Drina Corps and General Zivanovic was the Corps Commander.
General Mladic was the Commander of the Main Staff.
So I don't see how a circumstance in that regard would or could be
potentially interpreted as something improper within the framework of
(25)unity of command.
• A.: No, sir. I'm sorry. Commander of the Main Staff, General Mladic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] (5) • Q.: In that case, that is, during the period from the 6th until the 11th of July, did the Chief of Staff obey orders of his superior, that is, the Corps Commander? • A.: I believe that's a factual statement, yes, sir. • Q.: Does that follow from the stand that only the Commander has the (10)competence to command unless he transfers that authority to his subordinate? • A.: The Commander, as articulated under the body of regulations, instructions, and other orders, is the sole authority to command the corps at that level. And while the regulations and the instructions and other (15)orders allow for him to delegate authority down to other officers to include the Chief of Staff, to include Assistant Commanders, to include other staff officers, for that matter, it specifies that he, the Commander, retains the responsibility for the actions of those subordinates in those command positions. (20) • Q.: Mr. Butler, the unit, the 65th Protective Motorised Regiment [sic] based in Nova Kasaba or, rather, with the command post in Nova Kasaba, was a unit of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, was it not?
• A.: The unit in question was the Military Police Battalion of the
65th Protection Regiment. It was in Nova Kasaba. It was directly
(25)subordinate to the Commander and command of the 65th Protection Regiment,
• Q.: Is there any evidence to prove that after the 15th of July, during the search of the terrain south of the Konjevic Polje-Nova Kasaba road (5)that crimes were committed in that area during the sweep-up operations? • A.: My answer to that would be that while I'm not going to qualify whether it is or is not evidence, I have information from the Bratunac daily combat reports which indicates that numbers of other prisoners were taken by the Bratunac Brigade units in that area through July, through (10)August, through September, and we've demonstrated and put in those documents as exhibits. We don't have qualified numbers of how many people were taken as part of those sweep operations, and we don't have hard facts because there were none taken by the brigade as to names or locations as to what the (15)ultimate disposition of these people who were captured in the sweep operations or what happened to them. So again, I can't qualify it as evidence, but I certainly have a fact base which shows that prisoners were being taken in those areas after the date in question, sir.
• Q.: Colonel or Lieutenant-Colonel Ignjac Milanovic -- please correct
(20)me if I'm wrong -- addressed a proposal to the Corps Commander -- I'm
referring to Exhibit 537 -- in which he makes certain suggestions as to
how a military tactical situation on the ground should be addressed. Do
we have any evidence to show that the Corps Commander acted in accordance
with those suggestions or, to put it differently, that he accepted that
(25)proposal and naturally translated it into an order?
(15) MR. McCLOSKEY: That's Exhibit 539 for the -- if it's considered needed. • A.: As I noted earlier, those are indicated in paragraph 2. THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I'm sorry. (20) • Q.: Is this proposal in line with military regulations regarding conduct in the area of combat operations, and generally under the circumstances in which the Bratunac Brigade found itself after the 11th of July, 1995?
• A.: Sir, this reflects not the Bratunac Brigade, but this reflects the
(25)series of circumstances which the Drina Corps found itself after 11, 12
• Q.: When I said the Bratunac Brigade, I had meant that these activities were taking place in the area of responsibility of the Bratunac (5)Brigade. • A.: The activities occurring in that scope of the area, while a large portion were in the zone of the brigade, it was not exclusively within the zone of brigade, sir. • Q.: Mr. Butler, can it be said that the operation Krivaja-95 was (10)completed on the 11th of July at about 1800 hours at the time when the units and the Command Officers of the Drina Corps entered Srebrenica? • A.: Sir, I don't have the information that would specifically allow me to answer an exact day and time the operation ended. The only broad inferences that I can make would be that in one instance, presumably the (15)operation would end prior to the beginning of the following operations Stupcanica-95, although that does not necessarily have to be the case; you can run multiple operations simultaneously. And I would further refer you back to the comment by Colonel Pandurevic in one of his interim combat reports -- and memory fails me. It's either the 15th or the 16th I (20)believe -- where he specifically notes that he doesn't consider the operation Krivaja-95 completed until after all of the issues are dealt with in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade.
• Q.: On the basis of your military, practical, and theoretical
expertise, and the positions of your military doctrine, the system you
(25)belong to, what is meant when it is said that an operation has been
• A.: That's a very broad question. There is no formula for that. In many cases, in a finite sense, in terms of time, an operation ends at a given date and time that's specified in the order. If the goal of the (5)operation is the destruction of a force or the seizure of an objective, it ends upon the completion of those missions. I guess the broadest way to put it is, the operation ends when the Commander declares that the mission is completed. There's no fixing of date, time, or circumstances, other than a designation by the Commander. (10) • Q.: Mr. Butler, could you tell us whether there is any act, any document, Command document, whereby the special MUP Brigade or Police Brigade was placed under the command of the Drina Corps? • A.: In that instance, the document that I would refer back to is the Krivaja-95 operations order which indicates as part of the reserve forces (15)of the Drina Corps, that two or three companies of MUP forces will be part of that. Based on where we've discussed on the issue of reserve, I infer that to be that those three companies are operating under the command of the Drina Corps. • Q.: In the order that you are referring to, those three companies are (20)in the reserve? • A.: They are dedicated -- they are designated as the corps reserve, yes, sir. • Q.: Do we have any evidence to show that those three companies were actively deployed in combat? (25)
• A.: Considering that I do not have the Drina Corps orders or combat
• Q.: Does that mean that the same principle of inference can be used for the cessation of activities by MUP units in the zone of responsibility (10)of the Drina Corps, that is, the termination of their deployment? • A.: I'm sorry, sir, I don't understand what you're asking me. Could you ask me the question or rephrase it, please? • Q.: You have told us that you have no documents of the Drina Corps to show when those units were deployed in the operation that was ongoing in (15)the area. My question is, do you know when the need to deploy those units ceased, when there was no longer any need for them to be deployed? • A.: Again, because I don't have the documents, I would be unable to give any form of a judgement as to when the exact date would be, sir, no. • Q.: Mr. Butler, we now come to chapter 3 of your expert opinion. In (20)your opinion, and on the basis of your analytical work about which you testified in the examination-in-chief, did the UNPROFOR members fully execute their obligations as provided for by the resolution of the Security Council and the agreement on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica -- or rather, of the safe area? (25)
• A.: You're asking me a question way over my pay grade, sir. I don't
• Q.: Mr. Butler, I'm sorry, I really didn't have that in mind in (5)preparing for this cross-examination, but I came across one of your conclusions in studying your report, and that is what prompted this question. Let us leave the United Nations aside. But could you tell us, did the Muslims respect the obligations emanating from the UN resolution and, (10)of course, from the agreement, the signed agreement on demilitarisation? • A.: I believe that the information basis which we forwarded to date reflects the fact that Muslim armed military units continued to operate out of the safe area, yes, sir. • Q.: I am now referring to the presence of General Zivanovic, referred (15)to in paragraph 3.6, in the zone of responsibility of the Bratunac Brigade, and my question has to do with the 3rd and 4th of July. In the combat and tactical rules on the deployment of units in the military that you come from, are such activities provided for as customary, as a regular component part of the operation? (20)
• A.: I believe what you're referring to and what I'm referencing here
is what in the JNA, as adopted by VRS doctrine, is called the Commander's
reconnaissance, in which the Commander, in many cases, physically takes
his subordinate Commanders to a position where they can overlook the
battlefield, and they will discuss, as part of the planning process, what
(25)steps are to be taken, what steps are not to be taken.
• Q.: So this is something that is quite legitimate, is it not? • A.: It's -- (5) • Q.: And it applies to both the Commander and the Chief of Staff? • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: Can the Chief of Staff, as part of the organisation of the corps, have the right to issue preparatory orders and information so that the units can prepare in the best possible manner for the execution of (10)assignments and carry out the orders of the Commander? • A.: Preparatory orders are, and again as I've testified, are a normal and expected part of a military operation in order to allow subordinate units to -- they are the time to gather the necessary resources prior to the actual conduct of an operation or to even -- even prior to the actual (15)receiving of the operations plan. I believe the regulations note -- I believe they note that the Commander is responsible for publishing the preparations order. However, again it wouldn't be uncommon for the Chief of Staff to publish a preparations order if necessary. • Q.: After this preparations order comes the order of the Commander for (20)active combat, this order being within the competence of the Commander, in this case, the Corps Commander.
• A.: The order again actually assembled and all the portions of it, and
if you go back and understand through the JNA documents and the VRS
documents how the actual command and staff planning process works, it is a
(25)very formalised process, particularly with respect to large orders, where
(10) • Q.: Mr. Butler, in the course of your analytical work, did you come across any more precise or detailed information or data about the strength of the 28th Division, its structure, its composition, its weaponry, generally the elements that characterise a military unit such as the 28th Division? (15)
• A.: If I recall correctly, if you look at the Krivaja-95 OP order, the
beginning paragraphs of that OP order specifically outline the Drina
Corps's understanding of the enemy dispositions in the enclave. Further
to that, as you asked what other data I possessed, we had the limited
records of the 28th Division that were captured by the Drina Corps, the
(20)Zvornik Brigade specifically, at Srebrenica and were in the custody of the
VRS for several years before we, in effect, reseized them back, and we
have some documents that come from the Milici Brigade which further
outline their view of the Muslim strength and military compositions within
the enclave.
(25)So I believe that the documents indicate that the VRS had a good
• Q.: You said that on the 9th of July, the Muslim military and civilian leadership decided to abandon the enclave. This is paragraph 3.12. • A.: No, sir. In paragraph 3.11. (5) • Q.: Yes, yes. You're right. I'm sorry. 3.11. • A.: In paragraph 3.11, what I say is that by the evening of 9 July, the situation was rapidly becoming critical for the Muslim civilians and military leadership in Srebrenica. I believe, as I've previously discussed, my understanding is the decision by the Muslim military and (10)civilian leadership to abandon the enclave occurred on the evening of 10 July. • Q.: In view of that decision, the decision which was substantiated in Exhibit 404/2, I believe -- MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. Usher, could I have your (15)assistance, please. • Q.: So in view of this decision dated 9 July, reached in the evening hours of that date, was it to be expected -- was anything else -- could anything else be expected from the Serbian army except from their entering an empty town? (20) • A.: I'm sorry, are you asking me what my view of the expectations of the VRS would be pertaining to when they -- what the circumstances would be when they entered Srebrenica?
• Q.: My question is as follows: If we have in mind the decision that
had been reached, and also if we bear in mind the fact that the Muslim
(25)population was abandoning the city and withdrawing in the direction of
• A.: Okay, sir, I understand your question. The first thing that I (5)would point out is that, again, this being a Bosnian Muslim document from a Serb municipality, I would in no way enter that the VRS gained possession of this document prior to or anywhere as part of the 9 July decision-making process. So this is an unknown fact to the army of the Republika Srpska. (10)Secondly, as indicated by the previous testimony, the forward command post of the Drina Corps had excellent line of sight. The army was in the hills and the town is in the valley. They had good visual observation of the town, and, as such, they should have had a good indication of what the state of the town was, and the reports being (15)received from their units pertaining to whether or not the town was going to be defended or what the status of the civilian population or -- excuse me -- what the status and location of the UN forces would be. So given all of that, and particularly with respect to exhibit, this is an after the fact piece of information that I would not assume (20)that the VRS knew about on 9 July.
• Q.: But in any case, in view of the position of the RKM and the
intelligence data and everything else that was followed by the army of
Republika Srpska in terms of events that were taking place in Srebrenica,
it is obvious that at one point in time they did have knowledge and
(25)information that the town was abandoned, that it was empty, that is, that
• A.: The best that I can say is that certainly by the evening of 9 July 1995, and again based on the directive from the Supreme Commander, president Karadzic, and again based on the success to date of the (5)operation by the army of Republika Srpska, the military was given permission to continue to advance in the town. What one reads back from that is speculation, but certainly the circumstances existed, to the knowledge of the president, that now the goal of actually taking the town was open to them and they chose that (10)option. • Q.: Units of the 10th Sabotage Detachment were also spotted in Srebrenica. I think we can agree on that assertion. • A.: That is correct, sir. They were identified there over the foothills where they arrived on 10 July, and they were in the town on 11 (15)July, yes, sir. • Q.: Mr. Butler, the 10th Detachment or, rather, the number of soldiers of the 10th Detachment, was that number of soldiers such a significant military asset that was -- that would have been indispensable to the units that were taking part in the attack on the takeover of Srebrenica for the (20)purpose of those specific military operations?
• A.: Now, sir, now you're asking me to comment on the military
judgement of certainly General Krstic and General Mladic, individuals who
have many more years of leading troops than I do.
What I would say, though, is that given the fact that the mission
(25)objective had now changed to essentially trying to physically occupy an
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, would this perhaps (10)be a convenient for you to have a break? MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, Your Honour. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We will have a 20-minute break. --- Recess taken at 10.42 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, you may continue. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: Mr. Butler, speaking of the character and composition of the 10th Sabotage Detachment, which was a reconnaissance and sabotage unit in its nature intended for combat activities inside the enemy territory, and in (20)view of that fact, can we conclude that the unit, as such, could not be made part of the combat operations in Srebrenica on the 10th of July?
• A.: I would refer back to the statements and testimony of Drazan
Erdemovic which, in fact, indicates that the 10th Diversionary Unit was
operating as part of the Drina Wolves, the Zvornik Infantry Brigade
(25)elements, that conducted combat on 11 July. They became part of that
• Q.: In your research, did you come across a piece of evidence which would support the fact that the Main Staff of that unit was resubordinated (5)to one of the units of the Drina Corps? • A.: As translated, your question reads to me "the Main Staff of that unit," and I don't understand, what unit is that that we're referring to, sir? • Q.: There has obviously been a misunderstanding. (10)Do we have any evidence that the Main Staff of the VRS had resubordinated the 10th Sabotage Detachment to a unit of the Drina Corps? • A.: I do not have a specific document relative to the operations orders or anything of that nature which indicates that the 10th Diversionary was resubordinated to the Drina Corps for that aspect of the (15)operation. Again, I draw my conclusion based on the testimony of Drazan Erdemovic and the fact that how they tactically operated as part of that unit, the military judgement would be that they are, in fact, attached to the unit at the time.
• Q.: Mr. Butler, the events in and around Srebrenica were taking place
(20)throughout the war and since 1992 up until 1995, and I will take the
liberty and conclude that Srebrenica was, strategically speaking, a
problem -- a thorn in the thigh of the army of the Republika Srpska.
Bearing in mind the fact that even before the relevant times, certain
events had happened involving Srebrenica, can we say that as early as the
(25)10th of July when it was obvious that the VRS would enter Srebrenica, that
• A.: When you say "everyone," I will assume that you're talking about the army of the Republika Srpska side of everyone. The conclusion that (5)you've noted is that everyone wanted to be there or to be seen to be there at the eve of a significant victory, and I would say that certainly the physical appearance of Mladic showing up at that time supports that conclusion, yes, sir. • Q.: My question referred to the units, Mr. Butler, including the 10th (10)Sabotage Detachment and the police as well. • A.: In that regard, that while individuals and commanders may want to show up and be part of the publicity programme, I would not credit that to military units. The 10th Diversionary in and of itself does not show up at a designated point on the battle for a photo opportunity. (15)Taking that aside in a military complex -- or context, even, is the fact that, remembering that there are still significant combat activities occurring, the VRS does not have a clear indication of where the Muslim 28th Division is and what its future intentions are; and as, you know, their own forces are operating in the battlefield, and we're (20)talking about an environment with a lot of life ordnance going both ways, military units just don't show up unannounced and in undesignated zones. That's a real easy way to get a lot of your own people killed.
• Q.: From the establishment of the IKM at Pribicevac for the purposes
of the operation Krivaja-1995, did you come across a piece of evidence as
(25)to which Commanding Officers of the Drina Corps were present at that
• A.: I have several pieces of information pertaining to that, yes, sir. • Q.: As regards the information of the 4th of July, do you know the composition of the Command staff at the Pribicevac forward command post? (5) • A.: Before answering your question, sir, and keeping in mind the agreement that the Prosecution and you have made pertaining to some parts of information, I would request that we go into closed session to discuss this. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey? (10) MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honour, I would support Mr. Butler on that. I'm not precisely sure, of course, what his answer is, but I think it would be on the safe side if we go into closed session.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Very well, then. We will move
into private session.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. Madam Registrar tells me (20)that we are already in public session. You may continue, Mr. Petrusic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]
• Q.: Mr. Butler, we are now discussing chapter 4 of your report. The
date is the 11th of July.
In your opinion, the directive of the president, Mr. Karadzic,
(25)number 01-1340, on the appointment of Deronjic as the civilian
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] For the record, Exhibit number 404/2, footnote number 90. • A.: In my view, I would say that the information is relatively specific. However, I would note that the investigation has gained (10)information that indicates that certainly the individual in question was less than clear about his role, sir. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: The information that you mention is not available to us, that is, they cannot be found within the materials submitted as evidence, as (15)supporting material. MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, that sounds like a statement to the Prosecution more than it does to the witness, and we can discuss that, and if we want to discuss this topic, there's many other -- there are other investigative materials, of course, that have not been provided to the (20)Defence, and if we are going to discuss those issues, we prefer that it be done in closed session. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] For the time being, I will withdraw
my question. If later on we have to move into private session, I will
(25)bring up the issue again.
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: Mr. Butler, in that presidential decree was there any mention of (5)the Drina Corps? I'm not referring to specific individuals, so I think you can give me an answer to that question. • A.: There is no specific reference to the Drina Corps in this document, sir. • Q.: I should now like to go on to discuss the meeting of the 11th of (10)July, in the evening, about 10.00, attended by representatives of the Muslim authorities and the Commander of the Dutch Battalion, as well as representatives of the military and civilian authorities of Republika Srpska. At that meeting, General Mladic, on behalf of the party he (15)represents, has the main say; is that correct? • A.: As a representative of the army of Republika Srpska, General Mladic is doing most of the talking, yes, sir. • Q.: The other commanding officers of the Drina Corps are present, who, without any exceptions, are all quiet; they are silent. Is that correct? (20)Or, rather, they do not take part in any of the discussions at that meeting. • A.: My understanding is that is correct. • Q.: On that day and at that time, General Krstic was the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, wasn't he? Wasn't he? I'm sorry. (25)
• A.: Yes, sir. At that meeting and during that time, I believe he was
• Q.: So we can agree that General Zivanovic was the Corps Commander at the time? • A.: That is correct, sir. (5) • Q.: In your opinion, Mr. Butler, relative to everything that was said by General Mladic, if the Drina Corps command did not agree with that, would the Corps Commander have to express that disagreement or the Chief of Staff, in the event that they disagreed? • A.: That being an individual military-style judgement call, if you (10)were, there are two possible courses of action which I could conceive of. The first one would be that specific disagreements, General Krstic as the Chief of Staff would take them to General Zivanovic as the Corps Commander, request guidance and explain where he understands the problems to lie. If the disagreements were of a minor nature and did not have to (15)do with either substantive policy issues and just perhaps reflected a misunderstanding about the abilities or the resources of the corps to do something, then General Krstic, as the Chief of Staff, could, presumably after the meeting, remind General Mladic that because of other orders and considerations that they would be either unable to carry out some tasks or (20)that in order to carry out some tasks they would have to suspend others. How the individual officer in question chose to deal with those issues would be very much circumstance dependent.
• Q.: I understand you, as discussing the individual reactions and their
individual positions, but if you view the corps as an institution, which
(25)it is, which has its own Commander, and bearing in mind the rights and
• A.: Again, I would refer back to depending on the context of the disagreement, and I'm also placing it in the military context of the Chief (5)of Staff. For example, an issue where the Chief of Staff might be very knowledgeable pertaining to the amount of resources needed to move people from point "A" to point "B," he might very well immediately know what the answer is, that they can or cannot support that, and would conceivably take the opportunity to remind the general, in this case General Mladic in (10)question, that, "Sir, you realise what you said that if we're going to do that, we'll need additional resources." But again, those are minor technical issues. In a certain major -- on major related issues, and I won't speculate on to what the qualifying line would be, certainly the Chief of Staff would be -- the (15)most appropriate course of action for him would be to go to the Corps Commander and express his disagreement with the course of action that has been articulated by the Superior Commander. • Q.: You're placing this in the context of the Chief of Staff, but can you also place that within the context of the Corps Commander and his role (20)and attitude towards the same issue? MR. McCLOSKEY: I object at this point as to vagueness, Your Honour. These discussions are so open ended that the answers are not relevant and are -- in many cases the questions aren't, for vagueness.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. Petrusic, what is your
(25)response?
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, any additional remarks to make? MR. McCLOSKEY: No, Your Honour. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, continue, please, (10)with your question. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: So, Mr. Butler, do I need to repeat the question? In the context of the Corps Commander, what would be the attitude of the Corps Commander relating to any objections he may have and any disagreement with what the (15)Commander of the Main Staff has said? • A.: Without commenting on an individual's mental state or attitude, with the respect of the Corps Commander, conceivably he has a similar series of options. The first option would be to approach the superior in his case, the Supreme Commander or Superior Commander in this case, and (20)since we're talking corps, let's put a name "General Mladic" on it just so we don't get confused, and express the fact that either he disagrees with the course of action or that he agrees with the course of action, but just does not have the required resources to carry out an activity. With regards to another avenue, it would not be unusual for a (25)Corps Comm |
