|
Content
/ Colormap • Page 5282 • {1/77} (1)Wednesday, 19 July 2000 [Open session] [The witness entered court]
--- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, the technical booth, the interpreters, the legal officers, court reporters, Ms. Kirsten. Good morning, Mr. Harmon, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Cayley. Good morning, Ms. Holmes. Good morning, Mr. Petrusic, (10)Mr. Visnjic. Good morning, General Krstic. We're going to continue our case. Today, Mr. Butler, you're going to answer questions which the Defence counsel has for you, and I remind you that you are still under oath. Mr. Petrusic, finally it's your turn. Your witness. (15) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] First of all, may I say good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, my learned friends from the Prosecution. WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed] • CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. Petrusic: (20)
• Q.: Good morning, Mr. Butler. Mr. Butler, the cross-examination by
the Defence, as already established with the Prosecution early on, will be
based on your report which you produced on the 5th of April and the 15th
of May.
In your report, dated 5 April, in a brief historical survey, you
(25)said that the army of Republika Srpska was formed from the remnants of the
(5) • A.: In reviewing the documents that we seized from the VRS, particularly those pertaining to the early years, they discuss the issue of the fact that the army of Republika Srpska was -- or essentially evolved from those units that remained behind when the remainder of the Yugoslav National Army withdrew in May of 1992. (10)So in that sense, the embryo of the army came from those military formations. We also understand -- I also understand from reading that material that many of the territorial organisation based units that were there were wrapped into the army as it was formed and it became a formal structure. (15)As the months progressed through mid and later 1992, elements of what we traditionally call the paramilitary units, those units that were operating outside of a lawful command and control of either the army or the party at the time, many of those units by presidential decree were either folded into the army and placed under illegitimate command or they (20)were disbanded. So in that respect, that is my understanding of how the initial nucleus of the army formed, the elements that folded into the army of Republika Srpska through mid-1992.
• Q.: And the army of Republika Srpska was a constitutional category,
(25)was it not?
• Q.: The doctrine of the army of Republika Srpska, did it differ from (5)the doctrine of the former JNA? • A.: My analysis of the doctrine as it evolved from 1992, when the VRS formed out of the remnants of the JNA in Bosnia, through 1995 indicates that there were no major substantive changes with regard to command and control and organisational structure. (10)Now, clearly there were probably a number of minor changes that occurred as a result of the learned experience from combat in the prior three years. • Q.: One of the elements of that doctrine were the combat operations assigned to certain military units. The combat operations engaged in by (15)the army of Republika Srpska, as part of its doctrine, were they defensive and static as opposed to the JNA which, in its doctrine, envisaged as its main principles offensive combat operations?
• A.: The JNA doctrine as I understand it, while it discusses the
offence as a significant doctrine, gives just as much attention to other
(20)aspects of the doctrine as well to include defensive operations and
particularly to include the conduct of military operations in occupied
territory. So in that regard, I would not say that the JNA-based doctrine
is weighed in favour of the offensive.
In reviewing the army of Republika Srpska operations, while it is
(25)fair to say that as a whole the army reflected the political goals, which
• Q.: Mr. Butler, in the documents seized from units of the army of Republika Srpska, were the regulations from August 1992, I think -- so my question is, did those regulations apply to the 4th Corps of the former JNA? (10) • A.: The 4th Corps JNA documents, those particular regulations, were not part of seized material. They were part of documents that were provided to us by the BiH government which they gained custody of when the JNA left Sarajevo in 1992. • Q.: The Drina Corps, was it established in the area of responsibility (15)of the 4th Corps of the former JNA? • A.: To my knowledge, only a small segment of that, which would include the 2nd Romanija Brigade and some elements near Gorazde would have been included in the area of the former 4th Corps of the JNA. • Q.: Is it possible to deny the assertion, bearing in mind this fact (20)that you have just referred to, that the Drina Corps did not act according to the rules for the 4th Corps of the former JNA? • A.: I do not believe I ever made the assertion that the 4th Corps JNA rules were specifically applicable to the Drina Corps.
• Q.: Mr. Butler, I put this question to you because in the footnotes of
(25)your April report, reference is made to the regulations of the corps of
• A.: As I recall that footnote, sir, the idea that I was trying to bring forward was the fact that the 4th Corps JNA regulations at the time (5)represented an excellent example of how a corps would take the base JNA regulatory documents and how they would institutionalise those rules and those series of instructions in order to ensure that they were operating in accordance with the base JNA documents. In that respect, it was my analysis that the 4th Corps document (10)represents an excellent example of how to do that, and further, as the JNA transitioned into the VRS and as the 4th JNA Corps transitioned to become the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, that that would be an excellent example of how those regulations would still be adhered to. • Q.: Every corps of the former JNA had its own regulations, did it (15)not? And those regulations and -- were those regulations of an internal nature, that is, were they applicable to that corps alone?
• A.: My understanding of how the system worked is that the answer is,
yes, each corps would have made its own series of internal regulations.
They would have been certainly applicable to that corps. As part of that
(20)process, those same regulations would have been subject to the review of
the parent organisation. In the case of 4th Corps, it would have been the
2nd military district; in the case of the VRS Corps, it would have been
the Main Staff of the VRS. The presumption is that an individual corps
would not be permitted to publish instructions that were so far out of
(25)line from the base documents and regulations that that corps would
• Q.: In the process of transition of the former JNA and the establishment of the army of Republika Srpska which was founded in May (5)1992, as well as the Drina Corps which was established in December 1992, if this is a well-structured army which respects the constitution and the law on the army, was it essential to have a normative document for the corps to serve as a guideline for its activities? • A.: It would be normal to do that. My understanding is that in fact (10)it was done. • Q.: Mr. Butler, let us now move on to a second section, and that is the Commander and the Chief of Staff of a VRS Corps. The Corps Commander, does he realise his function of command directly without any intermediaries? (15) • A.: The Corps Commander, by both the regulations and the practical application as demonstrated, commands the corps through the series of intermediaries, as you've used the word, or at least how it's been translated, which, in effect, are his subordinate commanders and staff. • Q.: There may be a problem in the translation. Does the Corps (20)Commander command directly and without intermediaries, independently without intermediaries? • A.: He commands through his intermediaries, yes, sir. • Q.: So his intermediaries, if we can call them that, issue orders to lower-level units. (25)
• A.: The Commander is the position and function that issues the order;
• Q.: To make myself quite clear, an order issued by the Corps Commander (5)to a brigade, is it issued by the Commander, or is it the Chief of Staff who issues that order to the brigade? • A.: Technically, sir, it could be both, or it could be either, depending on the circumstances. • Q.: In your report, paragraph 2.1, you say that the right to control (10)and command units and institutions of the corps is the exclusive responsibility of the Commander; however, your previous answer, as I understand it, negates this statement that you made. • A.: No, sir, that's not a correct interpretation. What I mean to say, depending on the circumstances, and as I also discuss in my report, is (15)that once the Commander issues a broad directive, in many cases the Chief of Staff operating within the guidance and the framework of the Commander is empowered to issue supplemental orders or orders to the lower units, the brigades or the staff, in order to further the Commander's guidance. I don't mean to imply in any way, shape, or form that anyone other than (20)the Commander commands the corps. • Q.: And the right to issue guidelines within the framework of the orders given by the Corps Commanders, the orders or commands given by the Corps Commanders, what about those?
• A.: Again, within the framework of the orders or the guidance given by
(25)the Corps Commander, presumably at the discretion of the Corps Commander,
JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, Mr. Butler. In fact, you said before it (5)could be either according to the circumstances. So we have to be very clear. "Technically, sir, it could be both, or it could be either, depending on the circumstances." This has to be completely put into form. Thank you. • A.: Yes, sir. (10) JUDGE RIAD: To clarify it for us. • A.: Yes, sir. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: Further on, Mr. Butler, you talk about the concept of unified activities. We're now talking about the Chief of Staff, so the Chief of (15)Staff has a unique role within the structure of the corps. My question is whether this idea of a unique role, is it a legal concept, and whether the rules governing the corps include any such term, as you have used to describe its role as unique? • A.: As the corps rules articulate, the Chief of Staff, as concurrently (20)the Corps Deputy Commander, is the only person who, other than the Commander, is authorised to pass orders to subordinates. When he's -- as the Chief of Staff is the only other person designated as the Corps Deputy Commander, in that sense he is unique; and under the JNA regulations as adopted, that specific role and responsibility is articulated. (25)
• Q.: But regarding his basic activities as Chief of Staff, there is no
• A.: Going back to the base JNA regulations which I've cited in my (5)report, I believe under the roles and responsibilities of the Chief of Staff, those issues are, in fact, raised; that as the Commander of the staff, a large portion of his function is taking the Commander's guidance and orders and putting it into a format where it can be transmitted down to subordinates. Those are all -- those are all detailed as part of those (10)functions. • Q.: Are the directives regarding command part of the regulations of the corps? • A.: The directives pertaining to command are found in the two base JNA documents, the Corps Rules on Peacetime and the Base Corps Rules (15)Provisional. As an example, those provisions of command were articulated in the 4th Corps JNA document which I used as an illustrative point. Within the Drina Corps specifically, as I do not have the Drina Corps instructions during the wartime period, I'm unable to say whether or not those tenets of command are articulated in them. (20) • Q.: According to the rules and regulations of the 4th Corps of the former JNA, the Corps Commander does issue directives. • A.: That is correct, sir.
• Q.: From the documents that you had access to during your research
work, did you ever come across a document which would point to the fact
(25)that the Corps Commander or the Chief of Staff of the corps is authorised,
• A.: If I understood that correctly, sir, what you asked me was, have I come across a document that specifically authorises or empowers a Corps Commander to command his corps. Is that correct, sir? (5) • Q.: No. My question was: In the material that was available to you, did you -- were you able to reach a conclusion that the Corps Commander was empowered to issue directives in the sense that they are issued by the Supreme Commander and the Main Staff, directives not orders? I'm referring to the directives as an act, that is, within the purview of the (10)Supreme Commander and the Main Staff? • A.: I did not come across any documents which could indicate that the Corps Commander is authorised to issue instructions for areas or activities that are within the purview of either the Main Staff or the Supreme Command, no, sir. (15) • Q.: Can we therefore say that the Corps Commander issues assignments to its subordinate units through orders and commands? • A.: That would be a fair statement, sir. Yes, sir. • Q.: Mr. Butler, can we say that as regards the function of the Deputy Commander, there are no special powers of the Deputy Chief of Staff -- (20)Deputy Commander, I'm sorry, except the fact that he can take over the role of a Commander in those circumstances when the Commander is not capable of exercising his function?
• A.: I would argue that the powers and authority to assume that
Commander's role and function in those circumstances in fact qualify as
(25)uniquely special powers which only he possesses as the Chief of Staff.
• A.: As was noted in the regulations, it's not just the physical absence of the Commander, it's also under circumstances where the Commander may be unable to effectively exercise command, sir. So it's not (5)just qualified on a physical absence. • Q.: The Commander, therefore, and we are talking about the Corps Commander, can in that case be present in its area of responsibility and have at the same time the Chief of Staff take over the role of the Corps Commander; would that be your interpretation? (10) • A.: I can envision a circumstance, for example, the Commander on a portion of the battlefield or for a technical reason, unable to communicate with his staff and where immediate decisions had to be made, where the Chief of Staff, understanding the Commander's temporary absence, would in fact issue the required orders. So certainly the regulations (15)make provisions for those types of exceptional circumstances, yes, sir. • Q.: Those circumstances, are they regulated by the corps regulations or by the law of the army or some other statutory acts or sublaws?
• A.: There are actually within the framework of -- certainly if not
law, certainly within the regulations where it is expected that in the
(20)absence of orders in an extraordinary circumstance, that the next higher
ranking individual would give the required orders.
We see at the very lowest levels that idea manifested in the
service regulations of the VRS published in 1992, where even at the lowest
levels of the army, it is expected that in the absence of orders, should
(25)the circumstances dictate, the senior officer or senior person present
• Q.: I'm clear on that, Mr. Butler. However, what I'm interested in is whether in those statutory laws and sublaws there's any provision for the particular circumstances in which that can take place. When I say (5)"circumstances," I refer to certain operations that are being conducted, the unavailability of the Commander, or any other reason for this particular situation to take place. • A.: I do not believe that any of those more detailed types of guidance are found in any of the base defence laws or laws on the army, sir, no. I (10)believe they're all found only within the relevant military regulations and orders that pertain to the operation of the army. • Q.: In combat operations, when they do take place, and also in the absence of combat operations, the corps -- the Chief of Staff of the corps is the person who is coordinating the work of the Corps Command; is that (15)true? • A.: Yes, sir, that's a fair statement. • Q.: I think that we can agree that the Drina Corps, as well as other corps of the VRS, were under the immediate command of the Main Staff of the army of the Republika Srpska. (20) • A.: Yes, sir, that is correct. • Q.: The Main Staff of the VRS, does it get directives, not orders but directives as a statutory law, from the Supreme Commander?
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] I apologise, Mr. Butler, and I
apologise to Your Honours and the President. When I say "directive as a
(25)statutory act," I am saying that for the benefit of the interpreters
• A.: In that sense, the Main Staff receives its -- the directives and (5)guidance, if you will, from the Supreme Command of the Republika Srpska. That would be the chief agency responsible for ultimately directing the course of the war. JUDGE WALD: Mr. Butler, excuse me, but in answering Mr. Petrusic's questions, he drew our attention to the need to (10)differentiate between the directive and the order of command. But I'm not sure from our end we understand in the way you answer the question what you conceive to be a directive versus an order, and an example would be very helpful. • A.: I believe the best practical application of an example would be (15)going back to one of our early exhibits which was Republika Srpska Supreme Command Directive 7, which in essence articulated out the broad orders and guidance of the political leadership to be, in turn, executed by the military. The Main Staff takes operation -- Directive 7 and then publishes (20)their version of it, which is Directive 7/1, which takes that guidance and expands upon it for the Corps Commanders. It takes much of that guidance and puts it in the phrases and terms of operational orders for the military unit. So I believe that is what Mr. Petrusic is referring to as the process. (25)
JUDGE RIAD: So ultimately, what is the sanction of disobeying a
• A.: Under the laws of the army and the general laws on military service, the disobeying of such directives and orders of that nature qualifies as a punishable offence, sir. (5) JUDGE RIAD: So both orders and directives are compulsory? • A.: Yes, sir. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: I think we can clarify this situation in the following manner: (10)The directives are acts which can be issued only by the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska and the Main Staff of the VRS. The directives as such cannot be issued by a corps, a brigade, and, of course, by other lower units such as platoons or companies. Would that be correct, Mr. Butler? (15)
• A.: I believe maybe where we're mixing it up is an issue in how the
words translate in context. In my view, a directive is a very broad set
of guidance. Mandatory guidance, but guidance just the same. An order is
a much more specified, much more -- I don't want to say specified
directive, but it's a much more specified product. So in a sense, from
(20)echelonment of command, I would agree that the Supreme Command level and
the Main Staff would issue the broader directives, and the Corps
Commanders would issue more specified orders.
But at the same time, particularly if you look at operations
order 7 or directive 7, some of the guidance in that particular directive
(25)is very specific, and is, in fact, literally copied by the Main Staff in
(5) • Q.: You said that the disobeyance of directives, specifically in this case you refer to Directive 7, entails sanction, and it is a punishable offence that entails a certain responsibility. In that directive, Directive 7 and 7/1, one of the tasks was that the army of Republika Srpska achieve certain objectives during the year (10)1995. Those objectives were not reached, and to your knowledge, were any Superior Commanders held responsible for that, for failure to obey the directive, to execute the directive? • A.: That's a rather broad channel, but what I would say along that framework was that certainly the army is obligated to attempt to meet the (15)goals of the directive, and if they fail to attempt to meet those goals, they would -- or they could conceivably face sanctions by the President of the Republic. In taking your point further, sir, as the Court and history is aware, on 4 August, President Karadzic did, in fact, attempt to remove (20)General Mladic as a member of the Main Staff for circumstances. In a sense, that could infer the army, or certainly the Chief of the Main Staff in the army, incurring a form of a penalty for failing to meet the object of the directive, sir.
• Q.: Since you have mentioned it, did he try to punish him or to
(25)relieve him from his duty for not entering Tuzla, which was the objective
• A.: Certainly my understanding is that by 1995 there was a general (5)disagreement between General Mladic, as the Chief of the Main Staff of the army, and the political leadership as to the conduct of the war. Having said that, I believe it would be speculation on my part if I tried to identify a specific cause as to why President Karadzic tried to relieve General Mladic, sir. (10) • Q.: You stated, Mr. Butler, that the directives were issued by the political leadership, including the Directive 7. That particular directive was signed by the Commander of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, that is, Radovan Karadzic. So he did not sign it as the President of a political association or a political party, he signed it in his (15)capacity as the Supreme Commander. How can you therefore conclude that this was a directive issued by a political leadership? • A.: In reviewing the RS laws on the army and defence, it specifically articulates that the President of the republic is also the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. Because of that statement, I base my (20)conclusion on that. • Q.: The conclusion that it was issued by political leadership. • A.: Yes, sir.
• Q.: Mr. Butler, it was not my intention to dwell on the issue of
directives for such a long time; however, there are certain things that
(25)need to be clarified. Would it not be preferable to say that the
• A.: That is a correct statement, sir, yes. (5) • Q.: So the directive was issued by the President of the Republic and the Main Staff and it -- when it reaches the corps, does the corps then analyse this directive and does it transform it into an order or a command which, in turn, are subsequently transmitted to lower units as a form of statutory command documents? (10) • A.: In a broad sense, that is how the process should work, sir, yes. • Q.: Does the Chief of Staff issue orders in any other case, except for the case when he is replacing or acting on behalf of the Commander, in the sense that you have mentioned it, for example, due to his absence? • A.: Yes, sir. According to the regulations, the Chief of Staff is (15)also designated as the head of the corps staff and is empowered to issue orders to the subordinate officers of the corps staff. • Q.: Therefore, an order can be issued by him only when he is replacing the Commander or acting for the Commander.
• A.: No, sir, that's not what I meant to imply. What I meant to say
(20)was that when he is in his role functioning as the Corps Deputy Commander,
those circumstances apply. When he is performing the functions, his
normal functions as the Corps Chief of Staff, under the regulations he is
empowered to issue orders to the corps staff officers who are subordinate
to him. The issuing of orders that he does, while in theory within the
(25)framework and guidance of the Corps Commander, should not require the
• Q.: His is the role of the Deputy Corps Commander only when the Corps Commander is not there, only when the Corps Commander is absent. (5) • A.: As the regulations note, it's not just a physical absence, sir. It is other circumstances where the Corps Commander is unable to effectively command. So again I would be hesitant to tie that condition to a physical absence. • Q.: In your previous answer, it was stated that the conditions of a (10)physical absence of the Commander are not provided for in the regulations. • A.: No, sir. What I said was that the provisions for the physical absence of the Commander were not broadly provided for under the defence laws or army laws, sir. (15) • Q.: The Assistant Commander for Security, does he have a dual kind of subordination, the one that's going towards the Corps Commander and the other one towards the Chief of Security Service of the Main Staff? • A.: I would not, under the circumstances, use the phrase "dual subordination," which would inadvertently imply a dual chain of command. (20)The Corps Assistant Commander for Security, by the regulations, is subordinate to the Corps Commander. There is, in fact, a chain, a communications link, where technical guidance, where management issues, administrative issues flow to that next higher level, that being the Chief of Security of the Main Staff. (25)
• Q.: In his activities and reporting, is the Assistant Commander for
• A.: As I noted in previous testimony, my readings of the security regulations note that issue. However, it also -- again, taking into (5)account the specific role of the security officer, in the case where the Corps Commander himself may be the object of the investigation, in that regard certainly the security officer would not inform the Corps Commander of that fact; however, that decision would most probably have been made by the Commander of the superior echelon above that. But for the daily (10)activities of the Security Branch, the Assistant Commander -- Assistant Commander for Security would be informing the Corps Commander of those activities. • Q.: In your report, on page 39, points 8 and 9, you talk about the Chief of Staff and you say that in performing his duties he coordinates (15)the activities of the corps staff and the work of subordinate commands and ensures complete unity of action in relation to directives and the ideas of the Commander. • A.: Notwithstanding different words for translation, the gist of that is in fact correct, sir, yes. (20) • Q.: When speaking about directives, did you mean directives as a legal document issued by the Main Staff and the Supreme Commander, or did you mean a command document issued by the Corps Commander? • A.: In this regard, it is a document issued by the Corps Commander.
• Q.: Does the Commander or Chief of Staff coordinate the work of
(25)subordinate units?
• Q.: You said that the Chief of Staff of the corps is obliged to
(15)monitor the ability of units and to submit to the Commander reports on the
results of this supervision. The results of subordination, this (20) • A.: If I could ask you to repeat, sir. There was a word that didn't come through in translation, and I think it's kind of critical to the question, so if I could ask you to repeat the question, sir. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] For the interpreters, it is page 39, paragraph 8.10, third: "The Corps Chief of Staff --" (25)
• A.: Okay, sir, I understand.
(10) • A.: With respect to the regulations, I believe that the direct literal translation refers to the phrase "and ensures they are carried out," which I then take in English to infer ensures compliance. The practical application of that, and it is as you suggest, sir, endemic through the entire chain of command, the daily and interim combat reports which notify (15)from lower to higher the results of operations for the subordinates for the benefit of the higher command to realise what is occurring, what missions are being accomplished, what missions cannot be accomplished and what the status of them is, so in that sense, it is in fact completely accurate. (20) • Q.: The regular or interim combat reports, periodical or operative reports, and all the other kinds of reports that exist, are they sent to the superior command by the Corps Commander or the Chief of Staff?
• A.: With regard to the corps level reporting echelon, the report is
sent out in the name of the Corps Commander to the Main Staff. This is
(25)not to mean that on each and every day the Corps Commander authors the
• Q.: Such a report, may it be sent by the Chief of Staff if the (10)Commander is present? • A.: I don't see any reason why that wouldn't be feasible, sir, no. It would again be up to the individual Commander in question. • Q.: Lower level subordinate units, in this case brigades, do they send their regular and interim reports to the Commander, to the Corps (15)Commander? • A.: As evidenced in the variety of exhibits that have been produced to date, on certainly a minimum of a daily basis, the reports are sent to the Corps Command, yes, sir.
• Q.: We are now referring to paragraph 8.12 in which you say: "That
(20)despite his more limited command authority, the Corps Chief of Staff still
assumes a significant degree of responsibility pertaining to the
commission of illegal acts."
You're here obviously making a certain distinction in relation to
criminal responsibility. I don't know whether I'm making myself clear. I
(25)don't quite understand what the comparison is with when you talk about the
• A.: In the SFRY regulations pertaining to the application of the Rules of International Law of War, there are three broad categories where they define where an officer or soldier can be held liable. One of them, and (5)as previously discussed, is the category of superior responsibility; the second one is the category of individual responsibility; and the third one is the category of individual responsibility for carrying out illegal acts under orders. In the sense of paragraph 8.12, in that regard I am specifically (10)qualifying it as the responsibility for breaches of the Rules of Law of War committed on orders. • Q.: When the Chief of Staff is acting as the Chief of Staff when his Commander is present, does he have to be aware of any violations of the provisions of the law of war, or in other words, are there any (15)circumstances when he may not have any knowledge about it or may not have been informed about it? • A.: Clearly, as you indicated in the question, it would be impossible to make the assumption that just by virtue of the individual being the Chief of Staff that he would be knowledgable of 100 per cent of the (20)activities to occur at a given time, particularly with regard to illegal acts which may have occurred. So I would agree that that's a physical impossibility.
• Q.: The function of Chief of Staff, does it consist primarily of
collecting information of an operational nature about the progress and
(25)outcome of combat activities, logistics support for those activities, and
• A.: Those activities that you've discussed are in the spectrum of his responsibilities to collect information about and monitor the activities of, yes, sir. Along the same vein, the other two branches, the morale, (5)legal, and religious service and the security service would also fall within his purview to have to monitor the activities of and be aware of what is happening with those as well. He has responsibility for doing that throughout the entire corps staff, sir. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I would like to (10)suggest we have a break now, but of course I will stand by your decision whether that suggestion is acceptable to you or not. JUDGE RODRIGUES: Yes. [Int.] I think it is a good time for a break. So we are having a 20-minute break now. (15) --- Recess taken at 10.50 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.13 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, you may go on. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.
• Q.: Mr. Butler, let me now move on to the report about the military
(20)events in the area of Srebrenica, that is, the Operation Krivaja 95.
Before I begin with specific questions, I just want to note that
you probably were given a very specific assignment by the Prosecutor as to
the particular area that had to be analysed, but I should like to know
whether you think that for the purpose of having an overview of the
(25)situation in Srebrenica and all the events that took place at the relevant
(10) • A.: As I noted in the introduction to the narrative, and as you so noted, sir, it is a limited scope of analysis with respect to three specific areas. On a broad level, I'm aware of the events that occurred there and occurred in Eastern Bosnia in general from 1992 to 1995 and have included (15)some of them in order, again as you note, to place the issues of July 1995 into context. However, and again, an analytical judgement on my part, I did not feel that a long analysis and review of historical events from 1992 through the beginning of the safe area and from the safe area on would be required in order to analyse the military events that occurred (20)from 1 to 11 July 1995 and the events that occurred subsequent to that, which the analysis represents my trying to link military units and individuals to known crime scenes.
• Q.: You say that main seat of the Drina Corps was established in
Vlasenica. I assume that by that you are referring to the command post of
(25)the Drina Corps as being in Vlasenica.
• Q.: Apart from Srebrenica and Zepa, which were declared safe areas, was a part of the Gorazde safe area also under the responsibility of -- under the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps? (5) • A.: My understanding is that some units of the Drina Corps held positions along parts of the Gorazde safe area. So with that regard, I make the inference that with at least some territorial area, the Drina Corps had some responsibility for the Gorazde safe area, yes, sir. • Q.: Can we say, therefore, that the forces of the VRS, by making (10)certain plans, by drafting certain plans, had the intention to prevent military activities of the Muslim formations, and I am referring mainly to the 8th Division and the Tactical Group of the Srebrenica safe area, and the intrusion of such forces to the rear area of the Drina Corps units which were deployed along their static positions around the safe area? (15) • A.: The VRS documents that we have indicate that the Bratunac Brigade, the Milici Brigade, and the Skelani Separate Battalion were, in fact, in a static defensive posture around the Srebrenica safe area with the goal of preventing Muslim movement in and out of the safe area, smuggling operations, as well as combat raids. (20)
• Q.: Those plans, did they have as an objective to prevent the linking
of the two enclaves, the Srebrenica and the Zepa enclaves, bearing in mind
the fact -- an undisputed fact, if I may say so -- that an area had
actually remained between the two enclaves which was not covered by the
forces of the Drina Corps, and that there was some unhindered
(25)communication between the two enclaves which was used for some smuggling
(5) • A.: Okay, sir, there are three questions embedded there. Let me go over them one at a time. As to the first one, did the plans have an objective to prevent the linking of the two enclaves, Srebrenica and Zepa, that is in fact clearly articulated in the plans. Specifically, we see that articulated (10)in both Drina Corps operations -- I'm sorry, the Main Staff Directive 7/1 and the Supreme Command Directive 7 to ensure the physical separation of the enclaves. The second question, my understanding of the VRS documents as we've received does in fact confirm that despite the deployments of the (15)Milici Brigade, the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, and the Skelani Separate Battalion, there was, in fact, a gap in the lines which the Muslims used for both communications and smuggling. So in that respect, that's also correct. And that, again, leads to your third question, is it true the (20)enemy forces -- I assume when it says -- translated "enemy forces of the Drina Corps," I assume you're referring to the Muslim military forces, were they operating in that zone and conducting combat raids. Again, the answer is yes.
• Q.: Was there any danger, if I may say so, for the forces of the VRS,
(25)or specifically the forces of the Drina Corps, for a linking of the two
• A.: In that regard, and again, qualifying my expertise as based on the (5)VRS documents and orders that I've read which reflects that situation, again, my analysis reflects what I read in those materials. In that regard, the VRS was extremely concerned about the linking of the Zepa and Srebrenica enclaves. I do not get a reflection, certainly from the 1995 period documents that I possess, that there was such a broad concern that (10)the Muslims in Srebrenica, the 28th Infantry Division at that time, would be able to physically establish a cohesive link, a combat link, with the forces of BiH 2 Corps. Now, having said that, and as previously noted in testimony, there was in fact a relatively active passage between Srebrenica and the forces (15)of BiH 2nd Corps in Tuzla which smugglers and couriers carrying material orders and ammunitions frequented along that line. So while not a physical linkage, certainly a tenuous line of communications existed between the Srebrenica enclave and the Muslim forces in Tuzla, sir. • Q.: Mr. Butler, what we have been discussing so far, does that (20)constitute military elements which led the army of the VRS and the Drina Corps forces in certain of their intentions?
• A.: I believe you're referring to -- and if I can rephrase the
question just to make sure I understand it accurately: Are the military
forces that you're referring to, would they be the Muslim military forces
(25)in question?
(10) • A.: Yes, sir, they certainly do. • Q.: Pursuant to Directive 7 and 7/1 of the Supreme Commander or the Main Staff, were military -- rather, combat operations around the enclave and in the direction of the enclave, were they intended to be very restricted in their scope; that is, was the objective to separate the (15)enclaves and to bring them down within the boundaries -- within the confines of the safe areas in question? • A.: Yes, sir. That intent is pretty clearly articulated in both directives. • Q.: The boundaries of the safe areas which were established pursuant (20)to a resolution of the Security Council issued in May 1993, did they remain fixed, the same, as they had been established by the Security Council, or did those boundaries change during the period of time when the safe area was in place?
• A.: The short answer is that I don't know that. I do know from the
(25)documents from both the VRS and from the UNPROFOR forces that both the VRS
(5) • Q.: Mr. Butler, reading through your findings, I fear that we may lose continuity for the Chamber and the public, but my intention is to refer exclusively to your findings so that I hope the Chamber will have understanding for my method of doing this cross-examination, and of course you as well, Mr. Butler, because we will be referring to it from time to (10)time again. When the military operations in the enclave started on the 6th of July, 1995, were there any activities or combat activities against the United Nations forces, or rather the UNPROFOR, the Dutch Battalion?
• A.: The combat activities that occurred with regards to the Dutch
(15)Battalion, as described by the Dutch Battalion, were a series of combat
activities that in most cases weren't directed against them per se;
however, they did receive fire in specific instances, but were designed to
put the relative Dutch observation posts in a position where they were
untenable and the Dutch would abandon those posts and even move further
(20)into their own lines or towards Srebrenica or place themselves in the
custody of the army of Republika Srpska.
I have no indication from the documents that the army of the
Republika Srpska specifically targeted the Dutch as a military target with
the specific intent of defeating them on the battlefield in a classic
(25)military sense.
• Q.: A part of the Dutch Battalion forces, did they surrender to the forces of the VRS, and analysing their statements, did you come to any (5)such conclusion? • A.: I believe using the phrase "surrender" is, in effect, unfair. The accurate statement that I would use is that given the situation, they placed themselves in the custody of the VRS. In my mind, "surrender" implies defeat or a defeated enemy, and clearly in the case of the Dutch, (10)this was not the case. It was just a case of placing themselves in the safe custody of the army of Republika Srpska. • Q.: So without the use of force or weapons, one could call it a voluntary placing of themselves in the custody of the VRS, that they did so voluntarily, in a sense; of course, on the basis of their assessment of (15)the overall situation regarding individual observation posts? • A.: I would agree with that statement up to the point of "without the use of weapons," because clearly there was weapons fire involved as part of the process. • Q.: But not directed against the members of the Dutch Battalion. When (20)they placed themselves under the protection of the VRS?
• A.: In most cases, from the Dutch statements, that's true; however,
there are two specific incidents where Dutch witnesses report, and it's
reflected in their reports, that they were specifically engaged by the
army of Republika Srpska directly. So I would agree with you: In the
(25)majority of the cases, that's true. There are still, in fact, specific
• Q.: Mr. Butler, in the course of your analytical work on this case, and it has taken quite some time, did you acquire any knowledge as to the casualties of the Muslim forces during the operations from the 6th until (5)the 11th of July, 1995? When I say "casualties among the Muslim forces," I'm referring to the population, the Muslim population that was in Srebrenica and around Srebrenica at the time. • A.: The documents that we have pertaining to the situation in the enclave or in Srebrenica proper, that we have from the Muslims' talks (10)about the situation and does talk in broad terms that they are taking casualties. Those casualties, the specific numbers are not delineated. So on a broad sense, yes, the Muslims took casualties, both military and civilian; but I have no way to qualify that in a scheme of numbers, sir. (15) • Q.: Apart from being an analyst, you are also a military man, a military officer of the Army of the United States, and in any event, you have a great deal of military experience. So taking into account statements that a large number of shells were fired, up to 200, within a relatively short period of time, so on the basis of your professional (20)experience, would you say that the number of casualties would be enormous if the target had been the column formed in the town of Srebrenica or the town of Srebrenica itself and the surrounding locations inhabited by Muslim population?
• A.: As part of, as you note, being an analyst and having military
(25)experience, one of the dangers is when one receives a report, as you've
• Q.: When the Muslim inhabitants gathered and assembled, their gathering and the decision to abandon the town, did it come about spontaneously, or was it based on a decision taken by a certain leadership, be it a military or a civilian leadership? (20) • A.: As I've noted in the narrative, my understanding of the chain of events that occurred is that sometime on the late evening of 10 July, the Muslim leadership in Srebrenica made the decision to abandon the town. I believe it was a combined military-civilian decision that did that, but because of the lack of data, I can't be 100 per cent sure of that. (25)
• Q.: On the basis of the documents available to you, is it possible to
• A.: I have never made the contention that the civilians of Srebrenica (5)were the target of the operations. I do not believe that, and I have no evidence from the VRS which indicates that in the actual military takeover of the town of Srebrenica, that civilians represented the target. • Q.: The group of several thousand, and data differ, ranging from 10.000 to 15.000 that had assembled in Jaglici and Susnjari, was that (10)group armed? • A.: As I believe I've noted earlier, that is in fact -- the column is a mixed military and civilian group. There were many soldiers, perhaps up to 1.000, who were part of that column and who were armed. • Q.: You're referring to the column that numbered 10.000 to 15.000 (15)civilians and military men. • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: The column that is moving from Jaglici and Susnjari. • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: The indictment upheld by my learned friend Mr. Harmon, we find the (20)fact that one-third of that column was armed. We hear from you today that about 1.000 members of that same group, 1.000 of the Muslim fighters, were under arms.
• A.: My understanding of the composition of the column reflects that
one-third of the column were military members or potential military
(25)members; the remaining two-thirds were not. I don't believe, considering
JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. What do you call potential military members? (5) • A.: The 28th Infantry Division had a large number of members on its rosters, at least, the rosters that we have from the early 1995 time frame. Again, their consideration of the eligible military population pool were those military members between the age of 15 and 65. In many aspects, because they didn't have enough weapons, these people were (10)technically considered part of the military but were not actually in and present in formations. One of the customary practices that used to occur within the scope of the Muslims while they were in the enclave is the fact that unarmed soldiers would come up to the lines, take the weapon of the soldier who (15)was going off-duty, and they would use that weapon during their period of duty. So it's within that framework where I qualify it as potential military members. JUDGE RIAD: So does that mean that they were armed? • A.: Most of the members of the 28th Division as organised in (20)Srebrenica did not -- were not under arms. They qualified as members of the military, as members of the military organisation, but because of a lack of weapons, they were not armed. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] (25)
• Q.: Mr. Butler, on the basis of which data are you saying that there
• A.: The two pieces of information or two bodies of information that I used to make that determination are the various witness and survivor accounts from people who trekked as part of the column, and also the (5)information and understanding of the army of the Republika Srpska in their own intelligence reporting about the column. • Q.: Intelligence information of the army of Republika Srpska about the armed members of the column refer to the 13th and 14th of July, that is, when the column had partially been broken up, when it was entering the (10)area of Mount Udrc and is trying to make a breakthrough towards Nezuk, Nezuk and Bajkovica, when it is split into three different directions. And intelligence information of the Zvornik Brigade come from several sources. • A.: I believe the first intelligence report on the column originates (15)from the early morning hours of 12 July as based off of intercepted communications from local commanders who are along the Nova Kasaba-Konjevic Polje-Milici road. In that regard, they are referring to the column earlier, and certainly we see other written reporting coming out on the evening hours of the 12th July to the Drina Corps pertaining to (20)their estimates of the column. So there's two separate series of reporting, sir.
• Q.: Mr. Butler, I have here a book entitled "Crafty Strategy," Sefer
Halilovic, the Commander in Chief of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I
will not tender it into evidence in this part of the trial, but I would
(25)like to show you a report by Mr. Halilovic who says that the strength --
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, what is your response to this objection? MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I withdraw the question, and I will continue with the cross-examination. I will withdraw the intention to (10)show this text to the witness. MR. McCLOSKEY: Well, if that's counsel's wish. We don't wish to, obviously, infringe on his right to cross-examine. We would just like to be able to see what he is using to cross-examine. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. Surely the parties always (15)have the right to put any questions, so long as they are relevant and put properly. So I think that we have a problem here. It is possible to quote a sentence from a text, but we have to have the text, and the Prosecution says they don't have the book. So it is quite possible to read a part or a paragraph and ask a question regarding that paragraph, (20)but there's always the problem of context, so perhaps you could prepare your question for a later stage and provide the Prosecution with the appropriate text. But you have already said that you are withdrawing your question, and after these comments, you may proceed, and you can prepare for that question later on if you wish. (25)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] In the course of the proceedings,
• Q.: Mr. Butler, are you aware of the fact that in Srebrenica in 1995, there were 6.000 soldiers? (5) • A.: I couldn't claim to give you that number as an exact count, but I would say that that's certainly within the realm of the numbers that I've seen, sir, yes. • Q.: In your examination-in-chief, you said that the column which was partly armed and partly unarmed, that is, consisting of civilians as well, (10)was a legitimate military target. • A.: If I recall correctly, in answer to a question by Judge Wald, the answer that I gave was, my understanding of the SFRY application of the Laws of Land Warfare, that under their rules that were applicable, that they would not consider the column -- or that they in fact would consider (15)the column to be a legitimate military target, yes, sir. • Q.: Would it be correct to say when this partly armed column started off towards Jaglici, Bajkovica, Konjevic Polje, Udrc -- no, not Bajkovica, I'm sorry, Ravne Buljim, then across Konjevic Polje towards Udrc, and from there on towards Nezuk, that it was actually engaging in a breakthrough as (20)a combat operation? • A.: That is an accurate description of the operation, yes, sir.
• Q.: Would it be correct to say that in the minds, though it is
difficult to discuss minds as a subjective category, but could it be said
that among the military leadership, there must have been awareness that
(25)along that route, they would be engaged in combat with the army of
• A.: I would say that from the BiH military side and the column, that that would, in fact, be a fair assumption. • Q.: So this cannot be described as a march when it is known that that (5)march has to pass through enemy territory; and when I say "enemy territory," I mean territory under the control of the army of Republika Srpska. • A.: I guess I wouldn't qualify it as certainly an administrative march, and as it was understood by certainly the VRS, again going to your (10)previous description, it was a breakthrough operation. • Q.: I'm asking you this because during the course of the proceedings, we heard terms such as "march" being used. So along this route, in the course of the breakthrough, if at a certain point in time the two parties engage in combat, the Serb and the Muslim, can anything else be expected (15)but casualties on both sides, at least in the initial stages of that contact or conflict? • A.: Militarily speaking, that's a fair assumption, yes, sir.
• Q.: On that way, through the area -- that is, reaching the area of the
Zvornik Brigade, when the head of the column reached the boundary of that
(20)area, whereas the end of the column at the same time was south of the
communication line Konjevic Polje-Kasaba, the operations that were
conducted by the Drina Corps in terms of searching the area, were they
legitimate military operations or activities, bearing in mind the fact
that it was already evident that the column of the 28th Infantry Division
(25)was located in the area?
(10) • Q.: The operations in question were, therefore, the ones that were conducted on the 13th and the 14th as well as in the course of the following days, in the area south of the route and also combat activities that had already started in the area of the Zvornik Brigade south of the Konjevic Polje-Kasaba road. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm going to object to that, Your Honour. It's not a question. It should be proper. It's also compound and vague as to time and place. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, what is your response to the objection? (20) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I believe that the question was asked in an appropriate manner, especially bearing in mind the fact that we had discussed the issue during the examination-in-chief. I'm referring to the 13th of July, the combat activities and the sweep-up operations that were taking place south of the Konjevic Polje-Kasaba road. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. McCloskey, do you wish to
MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I have no objection to the overall subject matter, certainly. My objection was, as can be read from the question itself, there is no question. It's merely a statement, and (5)he's not even asked to comment on the statement. Not only that, but it's talking about some very serious activity but over a broad range of time and is not specific to the area geographically or -- so he's not even asking Mr. Butler to speculate. It's just an impossible question.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] It is beyond dispute that the
(10)issue, the contents of the question, is pertinent. I know that the
parties can ask any questions as long as they are relevant and pertinent
and relative to the subjects that are discussed, and as long as they're
related to the examination-in-chief. But at the same time, we have to
have a proper question. If we make assertions, then we will risk the
(15)situation of having things in the transcript that need to be further
discussed. We really need to have proper questions with a question mark
at the end of it.
I should like to mention something else as well. We have been
hearing this witness for awhile now, and he's an expert witness. Bearing
(20)that in mind, it is my opinion that we can discuss his opinions and we can
debate his report because we have an expert witness here, and they often
testify or give evidence about their opinions and conclusions; however,
when we ask an expert witness for an opinion, we have to ask a proper
question. So the assertion should be in the form of a question, and we
(25)have to avoid compound, composite questions, and we have to avoid posing
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. When we (5)will show the exhibits to Mr. Butler, I will go back to my previous question, but for the time being, I'm going to withdraw it. • Q.: Mr. Butler, if the police is under the military command during the combat operations, is it the case that the police continues to be under the military command once the operations in question are completed? (10) • A.: The RS law pertaining to the Ministry of Interior Forces specifically articulates that the police units under military command are under military command for a designated period of time previously agreed by the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, and the President of the Republic, in that context. (15)Having said that, I can't make a blanket statement which says that after the end of a military operation that relationship ceases. If it was the intent of the parties that made the agreement, in which case this is up at the Supreme Command level, that it continue longer, then it would. • Q.: As far as I can understand, you cannot state that that (20)relationship continues after the cessation of the combat activities.
• A.: No, sir. What I said is that that relationship continues or ends
when it was designated by the authorities that made the relationship. I
can't say that the trigger for ending that relationship is the end of
combat activities or the end of a certain date. I mean, it's whenever the
(25)agreement or whenever the specified organisation and tasking ended.
• A.: Again, my readings of the pertinent law believe me to understand that the way that the situation works is that the military, in this case, the Main Staff, would request special police support for a determined period and that the Ministry of the Interior, or perhaps even specifically (10)the Minister of the Interior, would make that decision in conjunction with the Minister of Defence and the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. • Q.: In your report, in your opinion, you speak about the fact that General Major Milenko Zivanovic was replaced or, rather, succeeded by General Major Radislav Krstic, and the date you give for that is the 13th (15)of July. • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: When you make this claim, this conclusion, rather, do you take into account the decision of the President of the Republic of the 14th of July whereby it was decided or, rather, decreed by the President of the (20)Republic that the commander of the corps in question would be Radislav Krstic? The decision in question came into force on the 15th of July. • A.: Yes, sir, I did take that into account, and I believe I have addressed it in both the written version of the narrative and in my testimony, sir. (25)
• Q.: So the Corps Commander, General Major Radislav Krstic, when did he
• A.: Based on my analysis of the information, it is my opinion that General Major Krstic began exercising command of the Drina Corps in the (5)late afternoon, early evening hours of 13 July 1995. • Q.: The only person who was empowered to name, to appoint Corps Commanders, was it the President of the Republic or the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, I'm sorry, I have (10)to interrupt you once again, but your question had to be who is the person who is empowered to appoint commanders, otherwise you're simply making an assertion with the question mark at the end. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I base myself on the general assumption that it was the President of the Republic, but I do accept your (15)suggestion, Your Honour. • Q.: So, Mr. Butler, who is the person that is empowered to appoint the commander -- Corps Commanders? • A.: Under the relevant laws in question, it would be the President of the Republic, Radovan Karadzic. (20) • Q.: Did the President of the Republic do that in his decree of the 14th of July? • A.: He, in fact, did that, sir, yes.
• Q.: Pursuant to that decree, did General Major Radislav Krstic take
office on the 15th of July or did the decree in question come into force
(25)on the 15th of July?
• Q.: If we bear in mind the statutory laws regulating the appointment of Corps Commanders, is it true that General Krstic was able to start exercising his function as a Corps Commander in a legitimate and legal manner pursuant to an authorisation by General Mladic? (10) • A.: If one makes the assumption that General Mladic was, in fact, following an order or directive from the Supreme Commander, then one could in fact do that, in which case General Mladic is essentially operating under the delegated authority of the Supreme Commander to do that. • Q.: Which directive do you have in mind when you speak about delegated (15)authority?
• A.: I do not have a specific directive in mind. I base that back
under the general principles that subordinates, in their operations, when
they give orders and directives, in almost all cases they're giving them
under the authority of their superior commander. I have no specific order
(20)or directive that designates General Mladic to appoint anyone as a Corps
Commander, and specifically under the army law it notes that that
authority cannot be delegated from the President.
So again, as I noted earlier, if one makes the assumption that
General Mladic did, in fact, give this order, the inference has to be that
(25)he is giving such an order on the authority of the President of the
• Q.: From the documents that were available to you, you could not reach a conclusion as to such powers and authorisations, that is, that the Supreme Commander would transmit such authority to the Commander of the (5)Main Staff. • A.: I have no information which would indicate that did or did not occur, sir. • Q.: Mr. Butler, if the appointment of a Corps Commander is made pursuant to some presidential power, and following the logic -- following (10)that logic, such a presidential power or authority can be delegated, therefore, to vice-presidents and not to the Commander of the Main Staff. Would you agree with that assertion? • A.: Sir, I would have to go back to the original article on the law, but I believe it is extremely specific that that power is vested only with (15)the President. There is no where in my reading of that specific article anything which can be inferred any form of a delegation that can occur. I believe it is extremely specific on that point. • Q.: I accept that the law is very clear in that respect, but I went back to the issue of delegated authority because you actually raised it. (20)As far as I understand you, Mladic was the person who was delegated to appoint General Krstic as a Corps Commander at one point. And I spoke about delegated authority in that context. But I think we understand each other and I can agree that the President of the Republic was the only person who was able to do that. (25)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, I should like to
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, this is, indeed, a convenient time for a break. We will have a 20-minute break at this point. (5) --- Recess taken at 12.27 p.m. --- On resuming at 12.51 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, you may continue. I apologise for the delay. We were here waiting but I think there was a misunderstanding. The break was 20 minutes and not 30 minutes. So having (10)said that, you may continue, Mr. Petrusic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: Mr. Butler, we were talking about the regulations governing the appointment of the Corps Commander. My next question is whether you have any information about what is known as the takeover of duty in the army of (15)Republika Srpska, command duties at certain levels, both at the corps level and at the lower echelons, and also in the Main Staff itself?
• A.: My understanding of the process and the documents that I have
reflects that that is at the brigade level which reflects a -- or when
circumstances allow, a formalised transition of command, or even in
(20)respect with a formalised transition of duties, where it's customary that
the outgoing person who held those duties, be it a Staff Officer, be it a
Chief of Staff, be it a Commander, goes through a briefing process of
letting the incoming individual know the status of the unit, where they're
going in respect to duties and responsibilities and what the goals are for
(25)improving the unit. And then as that transition is done, the incoming
• Q.: The day of the appointment to a certain position, in this specific (5)case, the appointment by the President of the Republic of General Major Krstic to the position of Corps Commander, is that the same day when the transition is carried out between the outgoing Commander, General Major Zivanovic, and the incoming Commander, in this case General Major Krstic? • A.: My understanding is that it is not the same day, sir. (10) • Q.: So it must be some later date. • A.: My understanding is it is, in fact, a later date. • Q.: On the basis -- JUDGE WALD: Excuse me. The answer is which is the later date. I'm sorry. Which takes place after the other. I couldn't understand the (15)answer. • A.: My understanding is that the actual transition takes place later than -- JUDGE WALD: After the debriefing. • A.: Yes, ma'am. (20) JUDGE WALD: Thank you. JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. Later than what?
• A.: Let me try again because I see it on the transcript. The
actual -- in the case that we're talking about, the actual transition of
command takes place later than the 15 July 1995 date on the order from the
(25)President of the Republic. As to a more specific portion, when during
JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. When you say takes place, do you mean factually, on the ground, or officially? • A.: When, at a specific point in time in that transition, when there's (5)a document that is signed by the outgoing Commander or the outgoing Staff Officer, the incoming Commander and the incoming Staff Officer, at what point in time in the transition that document is physically signed, and that's what I mean when I say "takes place." JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. (10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: The documents that you had at your disposal did not include a document on the transition of duty between the outgoing Commander and the incoming Commander who is taking over those duties; is that correct? • A.: That is correct, sir. (15) • Q.: In view of the fact that a corps can be described as a significant military formation in every sense of the word, that is, that it is composed of quite a number of subordinate brigades with their specific locations, in your opinion, that process of transition or takeover of duty, does it require a minimum of, let me say, ten days for the incoming (20)Commander to become acquainted with the units and everything else he needs to learn about when taking over the duty of Commander?
• A.: In my army, that would be a fair statement because, for the most
part, the Commander is not anyone who has grown up or come through the
unit. In this particular instance, I wouldn't say that that would be
(25)required when the Commander of the organisation is the former Chief of
• Q.: In your army, Mr. Butler, from the day of the transition of command between the former and the new Commander, does that mark the (5)beginning of the rights and duties of the new Commander and the termination of duties of the former Commander? • A.: In the US Army, that process, in all but emergency or sudden circumstances, that transition process occurs prior to the effective date of the order from the superior authority. In rare instances where a (10)Commander is relieved for an unexpected reason, then that transition occurs afterwards. But the customary procedure is that all of the items that are required to be done prior to the assumption of command are accomplished prior to when the effective date of command is designated. • Q.: Mr. Butler, from your own experience, was it to be expected -- at (15)the time when the Corps Commander, that is, General Zivanovic, was replaced by General Krstic, were the conditions appropriate for such a replacement to take place just then? • A.: I would say that the conditions were not appropriate for the transition process, but the actual replacement or changeover of command (20)doesn't fall into that programme.
• Q.: Just to remind you, we're talking now about paragraph 15 of your
narrative, when you say: "In the confused fighting --" so paragraph 15:
"In the confused fighting that follows, the Zvornik Brigade forces were
pushed aside and the Muslim column began to envelope the rear areas of
(25)three battalions of the Zvornik Brigade."
• Q.: Just a moment, please. Let me check between the two versions. (5)In the Serbian version, it is page 3, paragraph 15, beginning with the words: "As these first two mass executions are under way, the head of the Muslim column comes into contact with Zvornik Brigade assets." • A.: Okay, sir, we're on track. • Q.: "The Muslim forces," or, rather, "column on that occasion began to (10)surround the rear areas of the three battalions of the Zvornik Brigade." How large is that area held by a battalion, in this case holding a defensive posture? • A.: As indicated on the map, and I believe it's Exhibit 2 which lays out the positions, I mean, coming -- not off of memory, I would say that (15)each battalion held a frontage of between two to three kilometres, sir. • Q.: According to the rules on the structuring of units, is that designated as the area of activity of a battalion? • A.: I presume we're talking the battalion rules at this point, sir. My understanding of those rules is that in the defence, that even for an (20)infantry battalion, that is an extended frontage that is longer than normally doctrine would want it to be. • Q.: Could you conclude as to how large a territory it would be in kilometres that was surrounded by the Muslim forces or enveloped?
• A.: Are we referring to the actual front line positions, or are we
(25)referring to a more broader figure which would include the rear zones of
• Q.: In view of the fact that these three battalions have their own area of operations, their own zones, and that that territory was enveloped or, rather, those battalions were enveloped, can you tell us in kilometres (5)how large that area would be? • A.: I could say it would be a large area. But rather than throw out a figure which could be completely inaccurate, I'd ask for time to do the actual calculations on a map. • Q.: Considering that you said that it is a large area, at that point (10)in time, was the Muslim column a serious, a respectable military force in relation to the Zvornik Brigade which was holding a defensive position? • A.: As I've testified previously, it certainly represented a significant military threat, even more so because of the fact that it was approaching the battalion defensive positions from the rear in positions (15)where they weren't adequately able to defend themselves. • Q.: In that conflict, in view of the fact that units of the Zvornik Brigade were holding fortified defensive positions, was it to be expected that there would be considerable losses on the Muslim side, that is, within the moving column? (20)
• A.: As I've noted in my previous testimony, while the army of the
Republika Srpska, the Zvornik Brigade particularly and those battalions
specifically, were in fortified positions, it's again worth noting that
the fortified positions were facing the main line of confrontation against
the forces of the BiH 2nd Corps in the Tuzla area. They were not facing
(25)and not geared towards dealing with an enemy column approaching from the
• Q.: But the conflict -- an armed conflict did occur, did it not? Or, (5)rather, let me ask you, did an armed conflict occur? Of course, there were casualties on both sides, weren't there? • A.: In the context of the military operations that occurred in that area, there were, in fact, casualties on both sides, yes, sir. • Q.: In the course of your analysis, did you come to learn where the (10)Muslim casualties from that column were buried? • A.: As part of my analysis, that was one of the questions that I posed to the investigation team which deals with those issues specifically relevant to the crime scene. And what the investigation has revealed was that for the most part, and almost exclusively in that case, that the (15)Muslim casualties that occurred from that column were not, in fact, buried but were left on the surface as surface remains. • Q.: So they were never removed from that area? • A.: My understanding is that at a point in time after the war, that there were, in fact, some efforts on the part of both the BiH and the (20)Republika Srpska to police up the surface remains in that general area. • Q.: Was it not to be expected, Mr. Butler, that an army or a corps and a brigade, such as the Drina Corps and the Zvornik Brigade, to restore the battlefield, precisely what is referred to in the regular, interim, and combat reports by Mr. Pandurevic? (25)
• A.: In respect to the combat operations, and particularly if you
(5) • Q.: The agreement between the two armies, I'm referring to your previous answer, was this limited to an agreement or were those remains, in fact, policed up from the surface? • A.: Sir, to be honest, I don't know the answer to that question. I know that there was a process involved and I do not know the specifics of (10)it. • Q.: In the course of your research, did you learn that in that area there were prisoners of war who were sent by the Zvornik Brigade or a superior command to the collection centre or to the camp at Batkovici? • A.: As I've discussed in my previous testimony, that at a certain (15)point in time, Muslim prisoners taken by the Zvornik Brigade were, in fact, sent by the brigade and the superior command to the Batkovici collection centre, yes, sir. JUDGE WALD: What's the certain point in time? • A.: I believe, as I have indicated earlier, based on the daily combat (20)reports of the Zvornik Brigade, the 22nd of July begins the first series of instances where we see that occurring. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]
• Q.: When you say that the first series of instances began on the 22nd
of July, was that the date when they were captured or is the 22nd of July
(25)the date when they were received and registered by the International Red
• A.: As reflected on the 22 July Zvornik daily combat report, that is the date that they give that they're in the possession of the command of (5)the Zvornik Brigade. I can't speculate as to when they would have been registered by the ICRC at the Batkovici camp, sir. • Q.: Do you know, or did you learn in the course of your investigations about the number of prisoners from that area and from the column that were transferred to the camp in Batkovici? (10) • A.: My understanding, based on the work of the investigation team, is that they have a designated number of individuals who were transferred from the camp who were previously at the Bratunac Medical Centre, and I believe that number is approximately 120. I don't know for sure. I know from my analysis and from dealing with the investigation (15)team that after 22 July, approximately 100 Muslim prisoners, collected over a series of days, were accounted for by the Zvornik Brigade and presumably went to the Batkovici collection centre, but I don't know that. And the only other prisoners that I know that would qualify into the prior category would be the two identified survivors of the (20)Branjevo -- two of the identified survivors of the Branjevo Military Farm massacre who were later taken into custody by, I believe, the Republika Srpska police and later emerged through the camp at Batkovici when the war ended.
• Q.: The 10th Sabotage Detachment is a unit of the Main Staff of the
(25)army of Republika Srpska, is it not? Is that correct?
• Q.: Is there any evidence to prove that this unit was subordinated to the Drina Corps at the time when the Commander of the Drina Corps was General Krstic? (5) • A.: I have no technical evidence that supports that during that period that you've mentioned that the 10th Diversionary Unit was under the command of the Drina Corps, sir. • Q.: We're now talking about the 16th of July and the military farm at Branjevo where executions were carried out by the 10th Diversionist (10)Detachment and the units sent from the Bratunac Brigade. Mr. Butler, can you tell us what that unit consisted of? • A.: Which unit, sir, the 10th Diversionary or the unit from the Bratunac Brigade, sir? • Q.: The unit sent from the Bratunac Brigade. (15) • A.: My understanding, based on the records from the Zvornik and the Bratunac Brigade, is that during that period the unit consisted of two platoons of infantry and, as noted also, a small element of the military police of the Bratunac Brigade who were in Pilica. • Q.: So according to your understanding, at the military farm in (20)Branjevo there were two platoons from the Bratunac Brigade; is that correct?
• A.: No, sir. Two platoons of the Bratunac Brigade were deployed in
the Zvornik Brigade area. I do not believe that two full platoons were
located in the zone of the -- or in particular at the Branjevo Military
(25)Farm that day, sir.
• A.: At that time the elements of the Bratunac Brigade would have been under the command of the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, yes, sir. (5) • Q.: And elements of the military police from Bratunac or, rather, the Bratunac Brigade, when you describe them as elements, could you explain, using military terminology, what you mean when you say "elements"? Do you mean an individual, several individuals, a platoon, a company, a detachment? (10) • A.: I believe the direct quote from the military police platoon journal during that period comes out in English as "a small portion." I take that to understand, considering the fact that the military police platoon probably numbers approximately 30, that we're talking an element of perhaps five, ten; maybe one vehicle, maybe two. I can't be specific (15)because the actual document isn't specific. I would only assume that they'd have to have their own transportation to get back up there. So I'm qualifying the number as extremely small. • Q.: So we can talk about individuals belonging to the military police, can we? (20) • A.: In that aspect, I believe it's accurate, sir. • Q.: Mr. Butler, you talk about the identification of the Lieutenant Colonel Popovic, Assistant Commander for Security of the Drina Corps, and you mention the date of the 16th of July. You say that he was overseeing the execution process on that date, Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic. (25)
• A.: Yes, sir, I make that conclusion.
• A.: The primary documentation that I use would be the series of intercepted telephone communications that discusses the issue in a series of three or four rapid conversations of Colonel Popovic, needing the fuel (5)up at Pilica to finish the job, "job" unspecified; the fact that in the Zvornik Brigade technical records, we have the confirmation that the fuel was, in fact, distributed to him on the dates given in question when he was supposed to be there; the fact that there was no significant military activity up in that area, certainly none which would have required his (10)presence; and the after-the-fact part of the investigation that shows those specific areas would be crime scenes. • Q.: So that would be the information on the basis of which you concluded that Popovic was, indeed, on the site of the execution. • A.: On the site of the execution and relative to the fuel part of the (15)process, yes, sir. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, Mr. McCloskey was about to object or ... JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey can respond, but I think that he's just now preparing his redirect examination, no? (20)Mr. McCloskey, did you want to say something? MR. McCLOSKEY: No, Mr. President. We're just twitching around over here a bit.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Very well, then. Thank you.
However, I will take this opportunity to make a short break because we
(25)will be working until 2.30 today, and we should split the remaining
--- Recess taken at 1.32 p.m. --- On resuming at 1.50 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic, you may continue. (10) THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you. • Q.: Mr. Butler -- JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Excuse me. We cannot continue because General Krstic is not here yet. Thank you for reminding me. (15)
THE REGISTRAR: There are a few interpreters not in the booth
also. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I'm sorry, Mr. Petrusic, it seems that you can continue now. (20) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: Finally. Mr. Butler, considering the type of the Bratunac Brigade, can you tell us whether it had a military police amongst its members?
• A.: By the structure of a former JNA Light Infantry Brigade and that
(25)structure adopted by the army of Republika Srpska, military police are not
(5) • Q.: If we bear that fact in mind, could you tell us who it was who would put the military police in question in use? • A.: The technical aspect of overseeing the functions of the military police would fall under the purview of the brigade Assistant Commander for Security and Intelligence. The command of the police platoon would be (10)exercised by the Brigade Commander. • Q.: Would that constitute also a legal aspect of the use of the military police? • A.: In that regard, I'm not qualified to answer the question, sir. I don't know and would not know if whether or not the organisation of the (15)Military Police Platoon is structured, authorise them to have the bona fide military police and law enforcement roles and aspects in question. My assumption is that it would because the organisation was bona fide by the Brigade Commander, but again I can't answer that question. • Q.: Mr. Butler, considering the material that was available to you and (20)relating to the Bratunac Brigade, did you come across a piece of evidence which would indicate that Lieutenant Colonel Blagojevic put into use a certain number of policemen from that particular platoon, that is, the Military Police Platoon, on the 16th of July?
• A.: What I have is from the 16th of July the journal that notes what
(25)the police are doing. I cannot specifically say that Colonel Blagojevic
• Q.: Was it possible that this was ordered to them by someone else? • A.: As I indicated earlier, the role of overseeing the military police would have fallen under the purview of the Brigade Assistant Commander for (5)Intelligence and Security, and either further down in the command chain, the Military Police Platoon Commander could have ordered them to do this as well. • Q.: I have to go back to one of your previous questions, Mr. Butler. You said you had the journal of the military police or the journal of the (10)platoon. I don't think I understood you correctly. What kind of journal did you have in mind? Whose journal was it? • A.: This is the -- and perhaps "journal" is an inaccurate word. This is a logbook that shows the daily activities of the Military Police Platoon of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. (15) • Q.: In the rules and regulations relating to the land army in peacetime, talking about the security body, Article 29 -- MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Just a second, Mr. President. Mr. Visnjic has helped me. This is the additional material relating to the report on the command responsibility, footnote number 10. (20)The issue discussed is the role of the security body, Article 29, paragraph 9 -- Article 29, paragraph 9 -- where it is stated as follows -- we can put it on the ELMO if the Chamber deems it necessary or if it will be of assistance to Mr. Butler.
• Q.: Could you please turn to the next page, paragraph 9, please. The
(25)passage reads as follows: "Expertly directing security organs and the
• A.: If I can clarify your question. Are you referring to can the corps Security Organ ... • Q.: Yes. (10) • A.: My reading of that would be that while they can technically manage that, the actual usage of the military police would be contingent upon the approval of the echelons commander, which would mean that presumably for the corps to request the use of the police to do that, the Corps Commander would have to either order that to occur or the subordinate Brigade (15)Commander would have to receive that in the form of a request from the corps security officer, approve it, and to make his unit available for their use. Yes, sir. • Q.: The rule pertaining to the security organs of the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1984 states as follows -- (20) MR. McCLOSKEY: Excuse me. THE INTERPRETER: Microphone to the counsel, please. MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we get an exhibit number or some reference so we can know where to go to find what counsel is referring to?
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, we need one second
(25)for this. I'm sorry for this interruption.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: Is that enough for you, Mr. McCloskey? MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, I think we've got that document. Thank you. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: Okay. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] If the Chamber thinks it is necessary, we can put the material in question on the ELMO. JUDGE RODRIGUES: No, really, it is not necessary. You can continue, Mr. Petrusic. (10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: In paragraph 16, the following is stated: "The Security Organ is subordinate to the commanding officer of the command, unit, institution or staff of the armed forces in whose strength it is placed in the establishment, and it is responsible to that officer for its work, while (15)JNA security organs in organisations for NVO are responsible to the competent Assistant Federal Secretary for National Defence." In paragraph 18, it is stated as follows: "The security organs of the superior command, unit, institution, or staff of the armed forces provide and they are --" (20) THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry, but the interpreters do not have the relevant text.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] I'm sorry, Mr. Petrusic, but the
interpreters are telling me that they do need the text on the ELMO. I
have to change my previous decision. So if we can please have it on the
(25)ELMO now.
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: I am referring to paragraph 18, and I will repeat: "The security organs of the superior command, unit, institution, or staff of the armed (5)forces provide specialist administrative services for security organs in subordinate commands, units, institutions, and staffs of the armed forces, provide assistance to these organs, and organise, direct, coordinate, and supervise their work." In relation to the same issue, we have one additional rule, that (10)is, one additional paragraph. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] If I can have the assistance of the usher, please. • Q.: Paragraph 49 states in its second passage the following: "An officer, under paragraph 1 of this item," which we have discussed, "may (15)pass on information that constitutes an official secret to other authorised Security Organ officers or other persons only with the authorisation of his superior officer in the Security Organ." Mr. Butler, does this mean that the Corps Commander could not -- that is, his Assistant Commander for Security was not under the obligation (20)to inform him about the usage of the military police?
• A.: No, sir, I wouldn't interpret that at all. I would refer back to
the base paragraph which starts the programme, paragraph 16, placing the
Security Organ directly subordinate to the commanding officer of the
commanding unit. The Security Organ manages the military police.
(25)Under the theory that you've surfaced, what that means is that the
• Q.: I could agree with you regarding paragraph 16. But paragraph 49 of those same rules excludes the Corps Commander -- whereas the Commander for Security and Intelligence of the Main Staff, without giving the Assistant Commander for Security to inform his Corps Commander about (10)certain activities. I think that in this paragraph, paragraph 49, this is explicitly stated. • A.: I disagree, sir. I don't share that interpretation at all, particularly the phrase "and other persons" or "other persons." With this regard, and again based on the theory that you've (15)advanced, even in a circumstance where that could occur classified as a secret, somebody has to inform the Brigade Commander that his military police or elements of his units are being taken away from him. They cannot just disappear in isolation and not let anyone know where they're going or what they're doing. (20) • Q.: Is the Assistant Commander for Security authorised to take that unit and use it, according to Article 29 [as interpreted], point 9, of the Rules on the Authority of the Corps Command? • A.: Could I ask you to show me that particular passage, please. I don't seem to have it in front of me. (25)
• Q.: This abstract was under the ELMO a moment ago.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Excuse me for interrupting. We are talking about paragraph 49, are we not? Because I see in the (5)transcript it mentions Article 29, point 9, and on the ELMO I can see that we're looking at Article 49. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The question relates to Article 29 of the Rules on the Authority of the Ground Forces Corps Commander, which was previously on the ELMO, Article 29 of those regulations. (10) • A.: I do not have those rules in front of me, sir, no. I'm sorry. I believe -- here we go. I believe this is what we're referring to, sir. • Q.: Yes, that is it precisely. • A.: I'm sorry. • Q.: Page 2, please, point 9. So my question is: Can the Security (15)Organ commit the use of the military police? Can the Security Organ, the Assistant Commander for Security, deploy the military police? • A.: And we're discussing this in the context of the Corps Assistant Commander for Security deploy the subordinate brigade military police; correct, sir? (20) • Q.: Yes, precisely. I thought we cleared that point up at the beginning.
• A.: I just want to make sure that it didn't change, sir.
In that respect, I would say no, sir, because when one looks at
the functions of the Security Organ at the superior unit as well as the
(25)Security Organ at that level, in both cases it specifically notes that it
(10) • Q.: Mr. Butler, that is not what I am claiming. I was just quoting from a legal provision of these rules. To conclude with that, your opinion disowns or refutes this Article 29 or, rather, paragraph 9 of Article 29. • A.: No, sir, that's not correct. What I am saying is that when you (15)read the series of the regulations and the articles in their totality, in an entire context, it becomes clear that the role of the Assistant Commander for Security at both the Corps and at the Brigade echelon is to determine tasks and uses for the military police and to propose them for the adoption of the relevant Commanders. (20)It is within that entire context that I make the conclusion that it is not militarily sound or feasible that a superior Assistant Commander would reach down to a subordinate unit and do that in isolation. So based on my total analysis of all the material relevant to these regulations, that's where I make my conclusion. (25)
• Q.: If the Assistant Commander for Security of the corps orders the
(5) • A.: Sir, if you just wait for a second. That was a long question and I want to read the whole transcript before I answer. Okay. I'm afraid I'm confused with the question, sir. Could I ask you to restate it, please. It doesn't make sense to me. • Q.: If the Assistant Commander for Security at the corps level (10)receives an order on the use of the military police from the Assistant Commander for Security and Intelligence Affairs of the Main Staff, would the Assistant Corps Commander for Security in that case be obliged to advise the Corps Commander of the same in that case? • A.: Now I understand, sir. In that regard, if the Assistant Commander (15)of the corps received instructions pertaining to the use of the military police, and considering that the military police are subordinate to the Corps Commander, the Assistant Commander for Security of the corps should inform the Commander as to what the utilisation instructions are. He should be informed of that, yes, sir. (20) • Q.: Mr. Butler, your opinion and the formal regulations governing the competencies of the Corps Command and the Security and Intelligence Service regulations differ substantively. But in any event, I will not have any more questions for you in this regard.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] I beg you for your indulgence,
(25)Mr. President, for a moment.
• A.: In fairness, sir, the military lexicon defines the term in a medical sense. I would hesitate to get very far down the road speculating what the phrase "triage" might mean in various other forms of potentially criminal or noncriminal applications. It is the word that they used, and, (15)as I generally note, I try not to put additional or more meaning into their words than is self-evident. JUDGE RIAD: I'm sorry. What do you mean by "self-evident"? • A.: Sir, they use the phrase "triage." One possible explanation is, as Mr. Petrusic forwards, there could be multiple possibly explanations. (20)All I'm saying as part of my analysis is here's the word that was used, as translated, and I would prefer not to try to speculate as to what they really mean behind that individual word, sir. JUDGE RIAD: So it's not self-evident. • A.: Agreed, sir. (25)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.]
• A.: Do I use it personally in a military sense or in an individual sense, sir? (5) • Q.: In your report. • A.: Triage, as described and in my report, I believe, refers to a separation process, but I'm not specific as to who the separation process is. I use "triage" in the report, again, as a quotation of what the translation notes. (10)If you could direct me to a specific paragraph in question, maybe I can clarify it further for you in that regard, sir. • Q.: That is quite sufficient. It is the word used in the conversation between Colonel Cerovic and Beara. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I would suggest we (15)adjourn for today. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic, we're going to accept your suggestion. It is most appropriate. We've come to the end of our work for today, and we will meet here again tomorrow at 9.30 to continue the hearing. Thank you very much, and (20)have a good afternoon, all of you. --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.32 p.m. to be reconvened on Thursday, the 20th day of July, 2000, at 9.30 a.m. |
