|
Content
/ Colormap • Page 8375 • {1/121} (1)Tuesday, 12 December 2000 [Open session] [The witness entered court] [The accused not present] (5) --- Upon commencing at 9.20 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, the technical booth, the interpreters; good morning, the Prosecution; good morning to the Defence. I see that we do not have General Krstic with us today. (10)Madam Registrar, could you inform us what's happening first? THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Mr. President. I received a call early this morning that General Krstic would not be present. Apparently, he has a doctor's appointment this morning, and we weren't informed of that. So I requested a written waiver to be sent. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Good morning, Your Honours, Mr. President. An appointment that should have taken place yesterday, for reasons unknown to us, was not kept so that this appointment with the doctor has been postponed for today, according to the information we (20)received from the head of the Detention Unit, and that is the reason for the absence of General Krstic at today's hearing. And he has given his approval that the hearing may be held in his absence; that is, he waives his right to be present.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Thank you very much,
(25)Mr. Petrusic. I should like to ask the registrar to check what is
MR. CAYLEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, counsel.
WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC
[Resumed] (10) • CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. Cayley: [continued] • Q.: Good morning, General. Do you hear me, General? • A.: Good morning. Yes. • Q.: General, I'd like you to turn, please, to page 52 of your report. That's Defence Exhibit 160. (15) MR. CAYLEY: If page 52 could be placed on the ELMO. I'm interested in paragraph 3.4. THE USHER: Page 32? MR. CAYLEY: Page 52, Mr. Usher, and it's page 52 in the original version. (20) • A.: 3. -- MR. CAYLEY:
• Q.: 3.4, General. And I'm interested in the penultimate sentence of
that paragraph, and here you are referring to the ideal time for the
assumption of responsibility of command of the Drina Corps, and you refer
(25)to conditions of transfer, and you state, and I quote: "These conditions
(5) • A.: I stand by my report to the effect that the operation started on the 14th and that it was ongoing. This was the period when the Zepa operation was ongoing. • Q.: And there was, in your opinion, a lull on the 20th, was there, on the 20th of July? (10)
• A.: No. I didn't investigate the Zepa operation by hour and by day,
but in view of the decree that General Krstic received to take over duty
of Drina Corps Commander, the most appropriate time was looked for, and I
assume that time was the 20th since that was when it actually took place,
because, for that type of activity, the most suitable time is sought. So
(15)if there is a lull on the battlefront, the conditions warrant the
possibility of such a meeting.
As you know, documents went to the commands of units to see what
time would suit them best for the takeover of duty. Some said the 23rd
would be appropriate; some, some other date; but probably the commander of
(20)the Main Staff and the commander of the Drina Corps judged that this was
the most suitable date, that is, the 20th, when this ceremony took place,
an act marking the handing over and taking over of duty and the presence
of certain officers of a certain rank as prescribed in the rules of
service of the army of Republika Srpska and in the former JNA whose
(25)principle provisions were taken over by those rules.
• A.: Yes, I have read it, but the constancy of an operation does not mean that its intensity is the same every day and every hour. There was this obligation to transfer duty on the basis of the decree of the (10)president of the Republic, and a date was looked for when this could take place. Since it did take place on the 20th, I have no reason not to believe that the conditions were the most appropriate at that time. • Q.: General, if General Krstic stated that fighting was constant between the 15th of July and the 2nd of August, there was no respite in (15)the fighting, was there, in order for the transfer to take place on the 20th in accordance with your theory in paragraph 3.4 of your report, was there, General? • A.: I have a key event, that is, the transfer of duty on the 20th. That is a fact that has been proven without any doubt, that that is when (20)this event took place. Since the event did take place and the Zepa operation continued, I assume that that was the most suitable time.
• Q.: General, please answer my question, and I'll repeat it for you,
because we have to get finished today.
General, if the fighting was constant between the 15th of July and
(25)the 2nd of August, there was no respite in the fighting, was there, in
• A.: Sir, the fighting does not continue with the same intensity throughout that period. There is lower intensity, regrouping of forces, (5)the introduction of new units, manoeuvring in defence, manoeuvring on the offensive. So whether the greatest pause was on the 20th, I don't know; I wasn't there. But in view of the fact that this transfer took place on the 20th, I assume that there was a lull in the sense of lower intensity and a lesser need for General Krstic to be in Zepa on that date. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General, but according to your theory, that means that it was possible to envisage lower intensity of combat, but one cannot programme that. To have that ceremony, several people have to be invited to attend on a particular date and at a particular time; and I believe, but you are the expert, that it is not (15)possible to programme fighting in advance and to know in advance that it would be of lower intensity on a particular date. You see, that is the difficulty I'm having. • A.: Since the party on the offensive has the initiative, it is possible to plan the intensity or lower intensity for particular days, to (20)delay the introduction of other units, reserve units to lower the intensity of operations. Of course, that does not depend exclusively on the attacker; it also depends on the defender.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Very well, that's an answer.
I'm sorry, I have to give the Prosecutor his time, so thank you very
(25)much.
MR. CAYLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. President. • Q.: General, if you would please look at paragraph 3.5 of your report. MR. CAYLEY: And if you could move the report up, please, (5)Mr. Usher. • Q.: General, if you would be so good as to read the final sentence of paragraph 3.5, please. • A.: "It has been undeniably established that General Krstic assumed the duty of Drina Corps Commander on July 20, 1995, and this was properly (10)recorded." • Q.: General, have you seen that record of the takeover of command on the 20th of July? • A.: When I was working on my report, I was told that a record was made and that it does exist. I believed it would be no problem to find it, and (15)in the final analysis, I thought that General Krstic would have that record because whoever hands over duty and takes over duty takes a copy of those minutes. I really don't understand how those minutes could have disappeared because it is an official document inaugurating a new situation in the (20)command. However, there are living witnesses who have testified and confirmed that indeed that ceremony took place on the 20th. So I personally have not had that record in my hands, but I trusted General Krstic's statement and the statements of others who testified about it. (25)
• Q.: General, who told you that that record, who told you that that
• A.: I could give you several names if that is absolutely necessary to mention those names here in open session. (5) • Q.: Yes. Let's -- we'll have those names in open session. You can give me those names of individuals who saw in that document the date of 20th of July of 1995. • A.: I'm not saying that they saw that document. I'm saying that they attended the ceremony. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, what is the objection? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I have no objection. I'm withdrawing my objection. • A.: I didn't say that they saw the record but they were present at (15)that ceremonial transfer of duty. MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: Do you know of anybody that actually saw that record with the date the 20th of July in it, anybody at all, General? • A.: A record is not shown to people attending a meeting. A record is (20)kept in the archives and copies are giving to the person handing over and the person taking over duty to sign. It is not a document distributed to all.
• Q.: Now, General, you've spoken to Defence counsel and you're aware
from Mr. Petrusic that he has, in fact, confirmed that that record is
(25)missing, the record of hand-over. Did you receive that information from
• A.: No. I didn't investigate that. I asked for the record to be given to me from the Defence documents and they didn't, and they told me that it was missing. I asked where the record was, and they told me that (5)in some strange circumstances it had disappeared. I don't mean here in the Tribunal, but it simply is missing. That's what I was told. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, excuse me. In principle, General, how many copies should exist of such a document? You said that one should go to General Krstic, the other to (10)General Zivanovic, and a third to the archives. Should there be three copies? • A.: There should have been three, yes. There must have been at least three and maybe even more. Then there should be a copy in the archives of the Main Staff as well. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] And it so happens that all these three or more copies have disappeared. • A.: I must admit that I did not find the documents of the Main Staff. I don't know where they are, and I was unable to gain access to them. It is possible that in the Main Staff archives such a document exists, but I (20)have no access to those archives except what the Defence has. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, but General Krstic, according to you, should have a copy.
• A.: Yes. A copy is given to him. This record on the hand-over is a
document on the basis of which he gains certain benefits, not only in
(25)terms of command but also in material, financial terms. He acquires
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I understand. Thank you very much. Please continue, Mr. Cayley. (5) MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: Now, General, you'd agree with me that this is an absolutely fundamental document. Did you make inquiry with General Zivanovic to see whether he had his copy of this document? • A.: No, I didn't make any inquiries. When I contacted (10)General Zivanovic, at the time there was no question in my mind. I thought that it would be easy to find the document. I did discuss with him the Srebrenica operation, and this was in February or March this year. • Q.: So you spoke with General Zivanovic in February or March of this year, and you never asked to see his copy of the hand-over/takeover (15)document for the Drina Corps Command? • A.: No. I didn't address that problem with that. I discussed with him the strategic and operational aspect of the operation. He was Corps Commander, and that is the type of contact I had with him. I didn't check about that document. I never thought it would be a problem. When you (20)take the registration book of documents and look up the date July 1995, it should be very easy to trace a document. Unfortunately, I was unable to do that because I did not find the archives of the Main Staff at all.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] General, and having learnt that
the record was not in the archives, did you try to contact
(25)General Zivanovic again to see whether he had a copy?
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Thank you. (5)Please continue. JUDGE RIAD: General, since this issue was really an important one, did you pursue your inquiry to know what became of this document and what lay behind this disappearance, being aware of all the circumstances? Was there anything behind it? It looks like an intrigue. (10)
• A.: Your Honour, in my inquiries and investigations, I looked for the
date when General Krstic took over the duty of Corps Commander and, quite
frankly speaking, my interest focussed on when that was rather than on
whether the paper exists, so in my preparations for my testimony and the
finalisation of my report, I had hoped that I would find it. Perhaps that
(15)is my mistake. I actually assumed that somebody else should see to it, to
find that document. So believe me, I assumed that in the Prosecution
archives, among the Prosecution documents, this document existed, and that
they would find it, just as they successively produced numerous documents
in the course of these proceedings.
(20)I'm really sorry that I didn't look into this matter more
thoroughly to be able to answer this question properly, but I thought it
was more important to establish the actual date - and we have the live
witnesses who actually attended that ceremony - than to focus on the
document. I wish I had found it, but unfortunately I have not, and I'm
(25)unable to answer your question.
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone please, Your Honour. JUDGE WALD: In your discussion with General Zivanovic, did you ever ask him directly when he relinquished his command, on what date he (5)stopped being commander? Leaving the document and the handover ceremony aside. • A.: Your Honour, no. JUDGE WALD: You didn't -- in your conversation with him, you didn't ask him, even though it was apparent in February or March from the (10)early pre-trial documents of the Prosecution that this was a critical point for them, you didn't ask him when he stopped being commander? • A.: I had no doubt in my mind that he was Drina Corps Commander during the Srebrenica operation, and I focussed my attention on that operation. JUDGE WALD: Were you aware that he had given an interview to a (15)magazine that some -- I'm sorry, I don't have it in front of me, at some point in which he himself had placed his leaving the corps at a much earlier date than the 20th? • A.: No, I didn't know that. JUDGE WALD: All right. So just to tie this down, you and he (20)never discussed specifically when he said he stopped being commander. That's what you just said; is that correct? • A.: We did not discuss it. JUDGE WALD: Thank you.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] General, excuse me, another
(25)question for you. If I understood you correctly, you said that your
• A.: My concern, yes, was to establish the date when General Krstic became Corps Commander because the assessment of his responsibility (5)depends on that fact. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So it is as of that date it is possible to establish his responsibility. But my question is, as an expert witness, an experienced military man, the director of investigations, you have engaged in a great deal of research; doesn't it (10)seem to you to be normal when looking for a date to find the document, above all when you knew that there was a trial? I'm sorry, when you know that there's a record, going for the archives, a copy for the person handing over and the person taking over duty. So if your concern was the date, wasn't it normal to find the (15)document? Wouldn't that be the first thing to do? What do you think? • A.: Of course it is important. It's very important, but from previous contacts I had had with people who attended that ceremony, members of the Main Staff, I had Krstic's testimony --
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] I'm sorry for interrupting you,
(20)General, but wouldn't it have been more useful for you as an expert - you
knew you would be coming here to speak to the Judges - to say to the
Judges, "Your Honours, I have the document," instead of saying, "I spoke
to this or that or four or five or ten people who were present," and to
tell us that they told you that that was the date. Wouldn't it have been
(25)preferable to bring the document to the Judges and say, "Here, Your
(5) • A.: Unfortunately, no. This did concern me a great deal as my approach was a step-by-step approach. I first wanted to establish the crucial facts for me, or the relevant facts. A relevant fact for me was that, according to his testimony and what people I spoke to told me before coming here, I established the fact that General Krstic became Corps (10)Commander on the 20th, and then I started working on my research. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I'm sorry for interrupting you once again. Did you ask General Krstic whether he had his document? • A.: I have had no personal contact with General Krstic. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] But did you take steps to find (15)out whether he had such a document? • A.: Through the Defence, I did ask for this document to be given to me, and it was not given to me. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Why? • A.: Probably because they don't have it, either; otherwise, there (20)would be no reason why they wouldn't give it to me.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] So General Krstic's copy has
disappeared. It so happens that the document that General Zivanovic could
have had, you have lost contact with him. It is not to be found in the
archives, and then all in all, all the copies have disappeared. Is that
(25)what you are trying to tell us?
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Thank you very much, General. (5)Mr. Cayley. MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: So, General, in conclusion, the archive copy is missing, General Krstic's copy is missing, and you don't know whether General Zivanovic has his copy or not. And I would put it to you, General, that the reason for (10)that is because that document says the 13th of July of 1995, doesn't it, rather than the 20th of July of 1995? • A.: I do not agree with you because it's not just the probative value of a document. It is not just the document that has probative value, but also what all the people who are familiar with the situation say. I (15)didn't say that it has disappeared from the archives; I said that I didn't gain access to the archives of the Main Staff. I'm sure that it exists there, but to me, it is inaccessible. I have no access to those archives. • Q.: We'll move on. MR. CAYLEY: If we could have, please, Prosecutor's Exhibit 609, (20)please, Mr. Usher. You were adjusting the heating. It is a little chilly, isn't it.
• Q.: Now, General, this is a document with which you are familiar and
on which you have commented, and if I could just encapsulate your comments
on this document.
(25)You interpreted -- your opinion was, one, from this document that
• A.: Yes. (5) • Q.: And, secondly, you interpret this document as stating, or your opinion was that he was using brigade resources to secure those prisoners and clear the terrain. You came to that conclusion. Do you recall? • A.: I didn't understand the second half of your question. • Q.: In your professional opinion to the Judges, you came to the (10)conclusion from this document that the Brigade Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, was using parts of the Zvornik Brigade to secure prisoners and clear the terrain. • A.: Not to clear the terrain. I didn't say that. That does not follow from this document. But that brigade resources were used to secure (15)the prisoners. • Q.: Your third conclusion from this document was that Colonel Pandurevic did not know that all of the prisoners, by the 15th of July of 1995, had been liquidated. He did not know that fact. That was your interpretation of this document. (20) • A.: Yes. • Q.: Now, General, the Judges in this case have heard that there were a large number of Muslim men who were executed at a place called Orahovac on the 14th of July of 1995. Are you aware of that fact? • A.: Yes. (25)
• Q.: Now, General, are you also aware that the Prosecutor in this case
• A.: Yes. • Q.: And are you aware that it is the Prosecutor's contention, (5)position, that those members of the military police were guarding the prisoners in Orahovac? Are you aware of that fact? • A.: Yes, I am aware of that fact, that that is the submission of the Prosecutor. • Q.: Are you also aware, General, that that record showing the presence (10)of those military police in Orahovac was altered, was altered in order to conceal their presence at that location? • A.: I am aware that some markings were changed, but whether it was to conceal their presence there it would be difficult for me to say, but I am aware of the contention of the Prosecutor to that effect. (15) • Q.: General, secondly, are you aware that a survivor from the Orahovac execution site identified one of his executioners, his would-be executioners, by name? Are you aware of that? • A.: I have read the testimony. I am aware of it, yes. • Q.: And you're aware that the individual who that witness identified (20)was identified by the Prosecutor as a member of the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade? Are you aware of that? • A.: Yes.
• Q.: Lastly, General, are you aware, thirdly, that the Prosecutor has
presented evidence in this case to show that the Zvornik Brigade
(25)Engineering Unit was also in Orahovac and that witnesses -- the witness
• A.: I am aware of that testimony as well. (5) • Q.: General, if all of those three facts that I've stated to you are true, would you not agree with me that the Brigade Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, on the 15th of July, could not have possibly not known about the fact that Zvornik Brigade military assets were being used for the liquidation of Muslim prisoners? Wouldn't you agree with that, (10)General?
• A.: I agree with you partially, but I disagree in one respect, and
that is what I have conveyed to Mr. Visnjic, the Defence attorney. This
is a report which Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, the Commander of the
Zvornik Brigade, made on his return from Zepa. From the context of this
(15)report, it can be seen that he does know. He knows that there are
prisoners in his zone and that he feels that this is engaging his
resources and that he cannot continue.
If he had known that they had been liquidated, he would not have
put that in this document because it is incriminating. It is in his area
(20)of responsibility, and whatever happens in his area of responsibility, he
is aware he would be responsible for, and he would not incriminate himself
in that way.
So on that basis, I came to the conclusion that at that point in
time, he did not know that there had been an execution. Rather than
(25)wishing on my part to relieve him of any responsibility because that is
• Q.: General, this has a sent/received stamp of 1925 hours on the 15th of July. The prisoners have been liquidated by the 14th of July, by (10)the evening, and the burial process was ongoing. Are you stating to the Judges that, by the end of the day on the 15th of July, Colonel Pandurevic had absolutely no idea what his engineers were doing, what his military police were doing, and what one of his battalions within his brigade was doing; that he had no clue what those (15)three units had been doing? Is that your evidence? • A.: No. That is not what I am saying. I'm claiming, sir, that Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, was at Zepa on the 14th and that he was not in the zone of responsibility at that time and that at that time he did not know what was happening in the zone (20)of responsibility. He returned to his zone of responsibility on the 15th, and he was interested first and foremost as there was a crisis in the zone of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade. That's why he returned. He was primarily interested in --
• Q.: General, in Colonel Pandurevic's absence, who was commanding the
(25)brigade?
• Q.: Don't you think, General, that when Colonel Pandurevic returned to Zvornik that somebody briefed him, somebody told him - the Chief of Staff, anybody in the headquarters - as to what was going on in the area of (5)responsibility? • A.: At the time that Vinko Pandurevic was at Zepa, his Chief of Staff dealt with all the major -- dealt with the major operative problem in Snagovo where there was a conflict between the forces of the 28th Division and parts of the Zvornik Brigade. And his Chief of Staff, that is to say (10)the deputy commander, was not in the areas in which the executions had allegedly occurred, and it is certain that the Brigade Commander and Chief of Staff, as his deputy, at that time could not have known about it because they were busy with quite different matters and were not aware of that fact. That, of course, cannot free them of responsibility, but I'm (15)trying to explain the situation. • Q.: General, are you aware also on the 14th of July that a mass execution took place at the dam near Petkovci? Are you aware of that fact? • A.: Yes, I am aware of that fact. (20) • Q.: And are you aware, General, that the Prosecutor has demonstrated that members of the 6th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade were at Petkovci on the 15th of July? • A.: I read that finding by Mr. Butler, too.
• Q.: General, who is deploying all of these individuals? Give me a
(25)name. What was the name of the person? If it wasn't the Chief of Staff
• A.: Well, taking care of prisoners is not a problem that the operative part of the command deals with. The care of prisoners of war is something (5)that is seen to by the security system, the security organ and the military police, or rather, the civilian police. And it is quite possible and it is quite probable, indeed, that at the time that this took place, the officers dealing with operative command, that is to say -- • Q.: General -- (10) • A.: -- in charge of the combat operations -- • Q.: -- who were the people who were giving the orders? Give me the name or names.
• A.: I was not on the spot for me to be able to know who implemented
the orders, executed orders. I'm just saying that why Pandurevic and
(15)Obrenovic need not have known that on the 14th and 15th, the executions
had taken place. I'm not saying that the executions did not take place.
What I'm saying is that the situation in the area of responsibility of the
Zvornik Brigade was such that it could have happened, and it was quite
probable that it happened. At that moment when they made this report,
(20)they did not know about the executions. They were not aware of them;
otherwise, they would not have written that down in this report. The
information would have gone through different channels and not in an open
system of communications in the system of command which is accessible to
everyone, because the document itself -- a document itself is the greatest
(25)accusation of the command system in whose area of responsibility the
• Q.: So your evidence is that Colonel Pandurevic was aware of all of these prisoners all over the brigade area of responsibility, but had absolutely no idea whatsoever that most of his brigade was actually (5)involved in murdering these people on the 14th and 15th of July. Is that your evidence? • A.: I am quite certain that on the day he wrote the report, at the moment he wrote the report, he did not know about it, but later on quite certainly he did learn of it. He must have learnt of it, but at that (10)point when he wrote this, he did not. • Q.: Now, General -- JUDGE WALD: Can I just ask one question? MR. CAYLEY: Of course, Your Honour.
JUDGE WALD: I know this is irritating, to use a word to --
(15)turnabout is fair play.
What I don't understand, General, is in this very dispatch that
we're discussing here, Pandurevic says, you know, "We can't handle this,"
and he said, "I will have to let them go." And he also discusses, I
think, although it's not high enough on the screen, that there are
(20)negotiations going on, presumably with him and the Muslim army, as to
creating a corridor through which people will be let go.
Now, is it possible to have an army which allows a person in
command of a brigade to be negotiating with the opposite army and to
believe that he is in control of what's happening to the prisoners when he
(25)says, "I will have to let them go," at the same time that a phantom
(10) • A.: Your Honour, you're quite right. The situation was a very difficult one, very difficult. Negotiations. Now, the commander of the Zvornik Brigade was holding negotiations with commanders of the 28th Division, the representatives of the 28th Division, for opening up a corridor to let (15)through the column which was moving from Srebrenica towards Tuzla, making this breakthrough. It was such a strong column that he didn't even dare resist it, stand up to it, because at the front itself with the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade, three trenches had been taken control of, and this was a dramatic operative situation in the area of (20)responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade. The negotiations were not conducted to let the prisoners go. He did not have the mandate to do so. Therefore, the prisoners were not under his competence and authority, but probably he had the responsibility to be in charge of them and take care of them. (25)
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone please, Judge Wald.
• A.: No. He had the responsibility, or rather, his people while he was at Zepa had the responsibility to be in charge of the prisoners, take care of them, but then following pursuant to orders from the Main Staff, the (10)prisoners were taken over to the superior command. So the prisoners had to go to the collection centres, the holding areas, which the Republika Srpska had in the vicinity of -- in the northeast section, that is to say -- I can't think of the name of the place now. JUDGE WALD: Batkovic? (15) • A.: I can't -- Batkovic, yes, thank you. Batkovic was the place. So it was a collection centre in Batkovici, and their responsibility was to that. But as that was not what was undertaken, he had to use up resources which he needed on the front, and that is why he is making this dramatic appeal. From the context of this, I can conclude that he did not know (20)that those prisoners had been liquidated. Of course, that does not rid him of his responsibility, and I do not wish to do so. That's not what I'm trying to do. I don't want to justify him and rid him of the responsibility of the fact that that occurred in his area of responsibility. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. Cayley, I do apologise, but
• A.: I would first see where they had been taken to, and I would take
steps. I would relieve them of their duties, bring them to task, and all
the other measures and steps that I am authorised to take given a
situation of that kind.
(15)But the commander of the brigade, on the 15th, returns from Zepa,
and the first place he goes to is the command post and, from the
operations duty officer, he asks for a situation report because he -- the
circumstances are dramatic which brought him back to the zone of
responsibility, and he has established a front at Zepa. So he has
(20)withdrawn the army, he's brought the units, and he's now seeking a
situation report. He wants to know where the weakest points at the front
towards Tuzla are, or rather, towards the column being withdrawn.
So that is the problem which occupies him at that point. He
focuses on that problem, how to close the void. And it is quite certain
(25)that he cannot deal with any other matters because he thought that the
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General, just one moment. When somebody informs the chief of the brigade with respect to the prisoners, don't you think that information, specific information about the prisoners should be imparted at this point? (10) • A.: Yes, of course. Yes, of course. And I don't justify the system that did not give the proper information. But I'm just trying to explain why the Brigade Commander at that point did not know and could not have known, or to be more specific, need not have known, and that's how we come to get a report of this kind. That's why it's written in this way. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, I apologise. Please continue. JUDGE RIAD: I have just a small inquiry. You said that the Brigade Commander said that he would let them go and you inferred that they would be going to the collection centres or holding areas. He did (20)not say that he was sending them there, did he? He just said, "I'll let them go," but he didn't say where.
• A.: In the order or, rather, in the documents of the Command of the
Drina Corps for Operation Srebrenica, and also in the document of the Main
Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, it is prescribed how one should
(25)behave towards prisoners of war. So prisoners of war, by virtue of the
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. (15) MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Judge Riad.
• Q.: General, we've already presented, put forward, that the 4th
Battalion of the Zvornik, the military police of the Zvornik Brigade, and
the engineers of the Zvornik were all engaged in Orahovac on the 14th of
July in murdering people.
(20)Now, you're a military man. Put yourself in the position for one
moment of Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic returning to the brigade and the
meeting that he had that you've discussed with the President with the
operations officer.
Now, do you not think that Colonel Pandurevic would have asked the
(25)operations officer, captain whoever, "Tell me, what has the 4th Brigade
• A.: Well, he knows exactly what the 4th Battalion was doing. It was (5)holding the front. He knows what the battalion was doing. The question is whether somebody, whether anybody with parts of the 4th Battalion acted contrary to his orders because he gave orders where the 4th Battalion was to be. But quite obviously, somebody used the 4th Battalion for different purposes, and that 4th Battalion had the most difficult situation at the (10)front and that is where the corridor was, in fact, opened up for the column to move through because the 4th Battalion had lost its positions. • Q.: What do you think the operations officer said to Colonel Pandurevic about this robbed part of the 4th Battalion and the military police and the engineers? What do you think he told Colonel Pandurevic (15)about what they'd been doing in Orahovac?
• A.: The operations officer told the Brigade Commander, gave him as
a -- brought him up-to-date with the situation on the front. That was the
urgent information which the commander was exclusively interested in at
the beginning, as soon as he arrived, to understand the situation facing
(20)his brigade.
After that, he learnt -- somebody told him that there were
prisoners of war in his area of responsibility and probably he was told
the localities. He does not specify the localities. Whether he knew them
or not, I can't say, but I allow for the possibility that he knew the
(25)localities as well. And he was informed that his people were there
• Q.: General, let's go back to the order and the sort of key paragraph. "An additional burden for us is the large number of prisoners distributed throughout schools in the brigade area, as well as obligations of security and restoration of the terrain." (10)I want to concentrate on the word "security" for a moment. Who was the assistant commander for security in the Drina Corps? • A.: The assistant commander for security, I believe, was Nikolic, for security. Please help me if I can't remember his first name. • Q.: It's -- the name is Lieutenant Colonel Popovic, Nikolic -- (15) • A.: No. No, that's in the corps, sir. That's in the Drina Corps. • Q.: That's the question I asked you. You must have got a misinterpretation. • A.: I understood you to be asking about the Zvornik Brigade. • Q.: So we're agreed that the assistant commander for security in the (20)Drina Corps was Lieutenant Colonel Popovic. • A.: Yes. • Q.: Who was the security officer, the chief of security, in the Main Staff of the VRS? • A.: The chief of security in the Main Staff of the VRS was Beara. (25)
• Q.: So we're agreed it was Colonel Ljubo Beara.
• Q.: Now, General, you're aware that it is the Prosecutor's position that Colonel Popovic and Colonel Beara were involved in the murder of thousands of Muslim prisoners in the Zvornik area? Are you aware of (5)that? • A.: From the documents which I studied, I did not come across that kind of information nor did I glean it. But in reading some intercepts, that kind of information is contained there, although I have my reservations with respect to that material. But I am aware of the fact (10)which is contained in those conversations. • Q.: Now, General, bearing in mind that Colonel Pandurevic is using the word "security," you would agree with me that what he is referring to is the murder of thousands of Muslims by Colonel Popovic and Colonel Beara? That's what he's referring to in this report, isn't he, General? (15) • A.: In this report? No. • Q.: General -- • A.: In this report -- please, sir. This report says, the last sentence, "As well as obligations of security." "Obezbedjenje" means "control," "supervision," and so on, and that implies -- that is what we (20)mean by the word in my language of "obezbedjenje." • Q.: General, the word -- • A.: Not "bezbednost." • Q.: General, the word "restoration," can you explain to the Judges what that means in military terminology? (25)
• A.: Clearing up of the battlefield is an action which is undertaken in
(15) • Q.: Now, General, I have the military lexicon in front of me of the JNA. I'm not going to waste time showing it to you, but what I'm particularly interested in is the meaning -- you've stated it yourself, that "asanacija" means burying the dead, doesn't it General? That is one of the meanings of the term "asanacija." (20) • A.: It is one of the acts undertaken within the framework of the asanacija procedures.
• Q.: And indeed when Colonel Pandurevic is referring to restoration in
this report, General, he's referring to burying thousands of dead Muslims
who have been executed. That's what he's talking about, isn't he,
(25)General?
• Q.: Now, General, fighting in the Zvornik area, as you know, did not cease until the 17th of July of 1995, did it? • A.: There was fighting even later, but on the 17th of July, the corridor was closed. Most of the column had passed through, but there (10)were battles later on as well. • Q.: So are you suggesting to the Court that Colonel Pandurevic was busily clearing up the battlefield with ongoing fighting against Muslims in the area? Is that what you're suggesting? On the 15th of July, with ongoing fighting, he's wandering the battlefield with his units, clearing (15)it up. Is that what you're suggesting? • A.: Sir, this is a document dated the 15th, the 15th, and of course Pandurevic is not doing asanacija on the 15th, but a part of the resources of the brigade have to be engaged for that too. • Q.: General, Colonel Pandurevic is reporting on the 15th of July that (20)one of the burdens that he has is the restoration of the terrain, and you and I both know it's a fact that he was not clearing the battlefield on the 15th of July. He's talking about burying the bodies of executed Muslims, isn't he, General?
• A.: If that was the action he was engaged in exclusively, he would
(25)call it that. He wouldn't say "restoration of the terrain," he would say
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President -- I'm sorry, Judge Riad. (5) JUDGE RIAD: General, would such things as burying the killed prisoners be openly stated in reports or in correspondence? I think I understood that differently, that these things are not to be said openly. I think I even heard you saying that. • A.: They are not said openly. But if the report really did refer to (10)liquidation of people, then there was no need to conceal it because if everyone in the communications chain knew about it, then there would be no need to hide it behind the term "asanacija," which implies much more than burial. It also implies finding the casualties, collecting them in particular places, and taking all the other measures, as I have no other (15)possibilities of interpreting this term in any other way but to include all these other activities. It certainly does not imply only that, but once the commander finds out, then the term covers that, too. But I think, and I'm almost sure, that at the time this report was compiled, he was not aware that he (20)had this problem, too, in his area of responsibility. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley. MR. CAYLEY: Do you wish to take a pause now?
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, perhaps this would be a
(25)good time.
(5) MR. CAYLEY: I'll be finished soon, Mr. President. --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley, please proceed. MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. (10)If the General could be provided with Prosecutor's Exhibit 614, please. • Q.: General, this is an interim combat report from Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic from the 16th of July of 1995. Are you familiar with this document? Have you seen this before? (15) • A.: Yes. • Q.: I'm particularly interested in the final paragraph, the paragraph 6. After you've read that -- do you have paragraph 6 there? Could you read out the final sentence of paragraph 6, please. JUDGE RODRIGUES: Mr. Cayley, take care of the throat of the (20)witness. MR. CAYLEY: I was thinking of my throat, Mr. President. JUDGE RODRIGUES: Yes, okay. We have to balance these things. MR. CAYLEY:
• Q.: I'll read it, General, in order to save your vocal chords. "I
(25)consider that the Krivaja 95 operation is not complete as long as a single
(5) • A.: On the 13th in the evening. • Q.: So by that time, these 30.000 civilians had left the enclave and were now on Muslim-controlled territory? • A.: That is what follows from the document. • Q.: And also by the 16th of July, you're aware that there had been (10)executions in the Jadar River, Cerska Valley, Kravica, Orahovac, the dam at Petkovci, Branjevo farm, the Pilica school, the Pilica Dom, and Kozluk. You are aware that there had been -- of the executions that we know about, they had all taken place by the 16th of July, hadn't they, General? (15) • A.: Everything in connection with the locations, the dynamics, and the dates of the executions contained in Mr. Butler's testimony is something I agree with. I have studied it in detail, and I concur. • Q.: So by the 16th of July, General, in essence, the Muslim community in Srebrenica had been extinguished apart from the stragglers that were (20)left in Zvornik; isn't that right? • A.: I wouldn't say extinguished or destroyed. According to the documents, about 30.000 people were relocated, and by the 13th of the evening, they were in territory under the control of the Muslim army and authorities. (25)
• Q.: By the 16th of July, General, apart from the stragglers in
• A.: They were moved to Tuzla, plus the information on the executions that I have studied and with which I concur. (5) • Q.: And that's exactly what Colonel Pandurevic is talking about in this document, isn't he? He's saying that Krivaja 95 is not complete until every single member of the Muslim army or civilians are either moved or dead. That's what he's saying, isn't he, General? • A.: Do you really think that a brigade commander can rule when an (10)operation is over? An operation is over when the aims set in the order of the Corps Commander have been attained, and that is capturing the prominent features around Srebrenica. • Q.: General -- • A.: The operation was completed on the 11th. (15) • Q.: -- that is not what the brigade commander is saying. The brigade commander is saying that, "Krivaja 95 is not complete as long as a single enemy soldier or civilian remains behind the front line." And by that, he's saying, "Krivaja 95 is not complete until all of the civilians have been moved and we've killed all the Muslim soldiers." That's what he's (20)saying, isn't he, General?
• A.: No, he's not saying that. First of all, he doesn't know whether
the operation has been completed or not. The person who planned and
executed the operation knows that, and his superior commander, the
commander of the Drina Corps, or rather, the Drina Corps command, and the
(25)Main Staff command. The commander of the Zvornik Brigade was only one of
(10) • Q.: So your evidence is that one of the brigade commanders of the Drina Corps had a completely different understanding of the purpose of Krivaja 95 as compared to everybody else in the Drina Corps headquarters and all of the other brigade commanders. Is that what you're saying? • A.: What I'm saying is that the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade did (15)not consider the aim of the operation to be the destruction of the last remaining Muslim. The aim of the operation is determined by the corps commander, and he defined it in his order for active combat. MR. CAYLEY: If we could have Prosecutor's Exhibit 675, please. • Q.: Now, General, this is an order that you've already referred to in (20)your evidence, and, in particular, you referred to paragraph 4. MR. CAYLEY: So, Mr. Usher, if page 2 could be placed on the ELMO.
• Q.: And Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic writes, on the 18th of July:
"During the last 10 days or so the municipality of Zvornik has been
(25)swamped with Srebrenica Turks." "Derogatory term for the Muslims" is the
• A.: Yes. • Q.: So by that time, you would agree with me that Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, even if on your theory he didn't know on the 15th of (15)July that thousands of Muslims had been killed in Zvornik, he certainly knew that a lot of Muslim prisoners had been killed in his area of responsibility by the 18th of July of 1995, didn't he? • A.: From this paragraph on page 3, that is, point 4, it is indeed possible to infer that the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade is aware of (20)the executions in his zone, but also he says explicitly that he cannot understand that someone should have brought 3.000 military-aged Turks, as he says, and puts them in schools in the municipality. So he says somebody, somebody else brought them there.
• Q.: And when he states that "these actions have stirred up great
(25)discontent among the people and the general opinion is that Zvornik is to
(5) • A.: Of course, that too can be inferred from the contents of this paragraph, but he's also thinking of the 7.000 who had fled and who could link up with the 2nd Corps and lead to the fall of Zvornik, but he does have what you are saying in mind as well. • Q.: He's angry, isn't he, General, because his whole area is soaked in (10)Muslim blood. That's what he's saying to the Drina Corps. The population, the Serbian population was discontented with that situation, weren't they, General? • A.: Yes. The Brigade Commander, who probably learnt what had happened, is furious that this had happened and that somebody did it (15)without his knowing about it. MR. CAYLEY: We can move on, Mr. President, to another area, and I'm gradually getting to the end. If the following exhibits could be made available: Prosecutor's Exhibit 435 and Defence Exhibit 151. If 151 could be placed onto -- (20)Defence 151. Sorry. • Q.: Now, General, my understanding of your testimony was that within the Drina Corps, the Chief of Staff had no command authority over the assistant commanders. He only had command authority over his own staff; is that correct? (25)
• A.: Yes.
• Q.: Now, General, on the 12th of July, General Krstic was the Chief of Staff of the brigade, wasn't he? Of the corps, I'm sorry. (5) • A.: Of the corps, yes. Yes. • Q.: Now, this is an intercept that you have seen before, and in it, General Krstic is giving orders to Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic, the Chief of Transport of the Drina Corps. Now, since Colonel Krsmanovic was directly underneath the (10)assistant commander for rear services, under your theory, General Krstic should have had no authority to give this man orders, should he? • A.: In principle, I have reservations towards intercepts, as a matter of principle, and I can back this up with arguments. If I may be allowed, I can tell you what I think about it. (15) • Q.: General. General. • A.: I will answer your question. I will answer your question. • Q.: Let us say this is a hypothetical situation. For one moment, put your reservations about the intercepts to one side. Mr. Visnjic can deal with that in his re-examination. (20)If this is correct, if General Krstic is, in fact, giving an order to Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic, then your theory that the Chief of Staff has no authority over assistant commanders or their subordinates is incorrect, isn't it, General?
• A.: No, sir. My theory is correct. But you have to bear in mind
(25)another fact and that is that General Krstic is also the deputy commander,
• Q.: And he's authorised to issue those orders to assistant commanders and brigades when the commander is not available to issue those orders (20)himself, isn't he, General? • A.: Yes.
• Q.: If we could now move on.
General, I want to discuss with you a little the rules of service
of the security organ which you discussed in the, I think, the final day
(25)of your examination-in-chief. And you stated that paragraph 49 of those
• A.: Yes. (5) MR. CAYLEY: Now if, please, Prosecutor's Exhibit 418 could be made available. • Q.: Now, General, do you recall stating that prisoners of war are essentially the responsibility of the assistant commander -- • A.: I didn't hear that, I'm sorry. (10) • Q.: Do you recall stating in your evidence that prisoners of war are the responsibility of the security section, the assistant commander for security, and also the chief of intelligence or the intelligence body of the corps? Do you recall stating that? • A.: Everything within the unit is the commander's responsibility, but (15)for certain departments, he has his assistants, and therefore the security department covers the treatment of prisoners of war. • Q.: Let me read to you your evidence, General, and this is on page 8064. "In the system of command of the prisoners of war, by nature of this duty, it would have to be the security organs and intelligence organs (20)who would deal with this, but first and foremost the security organs." Now, based on what you said, General, would I be right in concluding that both the intelligence organ and the security organ were involved in dealing with prisoners of war?
• A.: No, only the security organs. The intelligence organs provide
(25)information for the Security Service when interrogating prisoners of war,
• Q.: Now, General, if you could -- THE INTERPRETER: Microphone. (5) MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, if you could look at paragraph 16, and I will read this: "The security organ is directly subordinate to the commanding officer of the command, unit, institution, or staff of the armed forces in whose strength it is placed in the establishment, and it is responsible to that (10)officer for its work, while JNA security organs," and then it goes on to talk about the federal secretary for national defence. Now, General, who was the assistant commander for security in the Drina Corps? • A.: Lieutenant Colonel Popovic. (15) • Q.: Now, if we substitute Lieutenant Colonel Popovic's name in place of "security organ," it reads, this document, "Lieutenant Colonel Popovic is directly subordinate to the commanding officer of the command, unit, institution, or staff of the armed forces in whose strength it is placed in the establishment ..." (20)Now, General, since Colonel Popovic was the assistant commander for security within the Drina Corps, on the basis of that regulation, he was directly subordinate, was he not, to the commander of the Drina Corps; that is who he answered to? • A.: To the commander of the Drina Corps, yes. (25)
• Q.: Now, going back to your fissure or crack theory, I wish to read to
MR. CAYLEY: On page 61 in the English and on page 37, Mr. Visnjic, in the B/C/S. • Q.: "I cannot be responsible for the acts of Lieutenant Colonel Popovic because he's an individual. In all this, he was activated by the (10)order of General Mladic and the chief of security administration going along the line of the chain of command of security." General, based on your crack theory, was Lieutenant Colonel Popovic -- were Lieutenant Colonel Popovic and Colonel Beara and General Mladic the individuals responsible for killing thousands of Muslim (15)prisoners of war? • A.: I cannot answer your question whether they are responsible for the killing of Muslims or not. I can talk about the role of the Security Service in the system of command, and about the possible crack in the command system which resulted in the independence of the Security Service, (20)but --
• Q.: General, these were the security officers in the Drina Corps and
the Main Staff, and General Mladic was in command of the entire VRS.
These are the very people. Were these the people, General, who were
responsible, Colonel Beara and Colonel Popovic; were they responsible for
(25)killing all these people?
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I should like to object to the question of my learned friend Mr. Cayley. It is the submission of the Defence that this question belongs to a certain (5)investigation engaged in by the Prosecution, and I don't see how the witness can, within the context of his answers, determine whether somebody is responsible or not when he did not address that issue, as the witness has told us several times. If the Prosecution wishes to investigate, I would appeal that he (10)refrains from doing so in his questions to this witness. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, do you wish to respond? MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, the witness, an expert, has put forward a theory to the Court that there was a crack in the command chain, (15)and he's essentially inferred, said expressly, that this security organ was working all by itself. Now, we know who the individuals are that were in the security branch. Now, if he's putting that theory forward, he can certainly make that theory good by actually inserting the actors into his theory and (20)telling the Court whether or not his investigation indicates that these people are responsible. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, I think that
Mr. Cayley has provided the answer himself. If the witness has presented
(25)a certain theory and the Prosecution knows who the people are holding
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, bearing in mind the fact that we have a military expert witness, you perhaps could rephrase (15)your question without using the term "responsible" because, after all, that is a judicial term. So could you rephrase your questions, perhaps. MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I can actually move on. I can move on to a new area. If the witness could be provided, please, with Prosecutor's (20)Exhibit 777 and also if you could have Defence Exhibit 142 available. • Q.: General, this is not an order that you have seen before, and I'm not particularly concerned with the content. I'm more concerned with the format. MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, if you could place that on the ELMO. (25)
• Q.: General, you're a senior military man. Is it normal in an order
• A.: I'm sorry, I didn't understand your question, Mr. Prosecutor. (5) • Q.: If you look in the top, left-hand corner of this order, you will see that it states "5th Engineers Battalion Command," and then it states the location, "Konjevic Polje," and then it states the number of the order, "9-4/94," and it also incorporates the date. You were a commander of a battalion. Is it standard practice for (10)an order to be set out in this format? • A.: It depends on the type of official correspondence. If it is open post, that is to say sent by regular post, then the communication is with the military post, and here 50/60/1. Then in the register they know what unit it concerns. (15)If it is a confidential post and if the way in which it is dispatched is confidential and controlled, then this is the manner in which the communication is made. • Q.: Would an order always contain the name of the unit and the number of the order? (20)
• A.: If it refers to an order from a superior, then it would be
customary for the number to be mentioned, or if there is no mention of any
number, then mention is made of what the order refers to. For example,
pursuant to the order on the transfer of the soldier of such-and-such a
date, in that case, you don't have to have a number. But it is customary
(25)for a number to exist. That is the must customary mode of procedure.
• Q.: We've nearly finished, General. Now, General, you'll see that this is an order in the same format as the previous one that we've seen, but it is, in fact, missing the name of the command and the order number. (5)Would this order have had those markings on them in its original form? Would it have had the "Command of the 5th Engineering Battalion" and the file number on the original document?
• A.: Could you just give me a moment to read through the order to see
what it is about, because depending on what the order contains will depend
(10)how the document is -- the appearance of the document.
Yes. I think I can answer now. This order has a series of
omissions. There are a series of omissions. First of all, he orders that
he will be replaced by his deputy. The deputy replaces or stands in by
definition, so there would be no reason for this to be stated. This is a
(15)document for internal command, that is to say, it just makes public in the
unit that this man will be standing in.
His order on this standing in does not lead to the same kind of
consequences as would a document received from the Superior Command. No
personal rights from the service does this stand-in for the commander have
(20)on the basis of this type of document.
Had the Superior Command compiled this document, the person taking
over the function would have the right to higher salaries, more rights,
perhaps the right to an apartment and so on, which goes with the post,
with the function. But this kind of paper, this document, only has the
(25)function of informing that he will be replacing him and that he won't be
• Q.: General, don't you think it's unusual that this order makes no reference in the form of a caption like the last order to the 5th Engineers Battalion command and to the order number? There is no (5)reference on this document to the order number at all. Don't you think that's unusual? • A.: I said that this is an internal document. It's just a document within the unit, an internal one. So the person compiling this document did not do what you said, and that is an omission, a mistake of this (10)document. It wasn't shaped properly. But even if it were, the results would be no different. MR. CAYLEY: We can move on. • Q.: General, do you recall in your evidence you stated, and this is at page 8051: "If, in the command system and the system of informing, the (15)Command of the Drina Corps found out that these units committed something that was proscribed under regulations, then they would be obliged, the Drina Corps, and the command system would be obliged to act in accordance or exactly the same way that any officer or any member of an army would behave when they found out that somebody was acting against rules and (20)regulations, meaning that procedures would have to be initiated and investigations which would be required in such a particular case. So only in this regard can there be responsibility for the conduct of others in their zone." • A.: Yes, I did say that. (25)
• Q.: Now, General, are you aware that General Krstic has stated to this
• A.: As far as I know, I'm acquainted with General Krstic's statement, what he said was that he learnt of the executions when he returned to the command post, which means that that was -- that before the end of the (10)operation, he did not know about it, if I got the meaning of your question properly. • Q.: General, General Krstic has stated that by late August, he was aware of executions that had happened in the Corps zone of responsibility. Are you aware of that fact? (15) • A.: Yes. • Q.: Now, based on your theory that you presented to the Court, that there is an obligation on all VRS officers to do something about alleged atrocities, even if the unit is not one of your own, General Krstic had an obligation to do something about these crimes that had happened within his (20)area of responsibility, didn't he, General? • A.: Yes. • Q.: Finally, General, I want to refer to a section of your report. MR. CAYLEY: And this is page 66 in the English version, Mr. Usher. (25)
• Q.: And page 66 in your version, General. It's paragraph 4.3.
• Q.: And it's the section that begins "Goran Matic," and I'll read it. "Goran Matic, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Information Minister, talked about the massacre of Muslim civilians at a press conference when (5)giving information about results of the investigation conducted against the arrested "Pauk" (or Spider) group. That group consisted of paid Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, and Serbs. French intelligence service organised, equipped, and trained the group to perform the massacre of Muslim civilians with the aim of attributing that crime to the Serbs and (10)declaring the Serb military and political strategy to be criminal and Republika Srpska as a political result of a world crime. After that scenario, all violence against the Serbs became legitimate." Paragraph 4.4: "Neither General Krstic nor any other Serb commanding officer could have known about that criminal plan, and so (15)unfortunately they could," and it says "could prevent," I believe you meant they "could not" prevent it. General, do you really believe that the French intelligence services used mercenaries to kill thousands of Muslims in the Zvornik and Bratunac areas in July of 1995? Do you believe that statement by Goran (20)Matic?
• A.: Sir, I, as a responsible individual, with a difficult subject to
study which is pregnant with terrible crimes over which there is a great
deal of controversy, I did not consider that I had the right to ignore the
fact that before the national public and the international public, the
(25)authorised representative of any country whatsoever should present facts
• Q.: General, do you believe that Goran Matic was telling the truth? (5)It's in your report, General. You refer to this. Was Goran Matic telling the truth when he said the French intelligence services were responsible for killing of thousands of people in July of 1995? • A.: Sir, I do not know or not know [as interpreted] whether he was telling the truth. And as somebody that studied the topic, I could not (10)ignore the fact that that minister at that time spoke about that subject. Therefore, I included it in my expert report without giving it too much specific weight, but just indicating the fact, pointing this fact out, because maybe that had an effect on the events that took place as well. And that I was not totally wrong is borne out by the decision of (15)the French parliament to form an investigative commission about that matter. I don't think that I influenced this, or the Yugoslav minister either, but most probably the facts that became known and the intention to have openly -- and precisely locate the events and perpetrators. So my quotation and what I say goes along those lines. It is not (20)arbitration one way or another, either for or against. It is a presentation of fact. • Q.: General, thank you very much indeed. MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, thank you. I've finished my cross-examination. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Very well, Mr. Cayley, thank
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I do have some (5)questions, but I should welcome a break because we're going to use some exhibits, and perhaps it would be opportune to take a rather longer break so that we can put all that in order. Thank you, Mr. President. I don't think I will need more than 40 minutes, one hour to the most, for my additional examination of the witness. Thank you. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] It is now more or less time for our long break of the day. So shall we have a 20-minute -- if we have a 20-minute break, we'll have to interrupt for the lunch break, or shall we take the lunch break now? Perhaps that would be better. Yes? I see that there is general acquiescence and support for the (15)latter proposal for the lunch break. Perhaps lunch isn't ready yet, but anyway, that's why I was wondering, but let us take a 50-minute lunch break. --- Luncheon recess taken at 11.51 a.m. --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic. You have the floor. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. • RE-EXAMINED by Mr. Visnjic:
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] May I ask the usher to show the
(25)witness Prosecution Exhibit 425, please.
• A.: Yes, I see it. (5) • Q.: My learned friend Mr. Cayley, in the cross-examination, asked you about the obligation to inform units as envisaged in this directive, and you answered his questions. My question is the following: Have you found in the course of your research any report or any response addressed by a unit to the Main (10)Staff or the Supreme Commander directly linked to the order in the directive? • A.: I have not come across any such document. It would have been natural for the Main Staff of the VRS to inform the commands of the operations assigned to them and Commander of the Drina Corps and the Drina (15)Corps Commands, their Main Staff about the operations assigned to them. So I have not come across any such document, and my conclusion is that this is because those operations were mostly not conducted. • Q.: General Radinovic, if the directive number 7 had been implemented, would the plan for the Srebrenica operation been called Krivaja 95? (20)
• A.: If the directive number 7 had been applied, then the plan of the
operation for Srebrenica would not have been called Krivaja 95 because
directive number 7, Krivaja -- the code name Krivaja was meant for the
Hercegovina Corps in the far south of Republika Srpska, and it was planned
that this operation be conducted in the Neretva River valley, which is a
(25)completely different part of Republika Srpska.
• A.: Yes, I would agree with that statement because the presence of officers of the Main Staff, including the Main Staff commander, is a sign that the operation was conducted by the Main Staff, a very significant (15)sign, and the fact that resources of the Drina Corps were included is quite natural because the Main Staff is not an abstract concept. It is using the effectives of the VRS available to it in particular areas. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could I ask the usher to show the witness Prosecution Exhibit 77/6. (20) • Q.: General Radinovic, could you please look at the second sentence of this report. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] I would read it in English so the interpreters can interpret it for the General. The second sentence. Could the exhibit be moved down a little. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. Visnjic, excuse me. Which
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, it is Prosecution (5)Exhibit OTP 77/6. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Thank you. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]
• Q.: General Radinovic, allow me to read the second sentence of this
report, and then I will ask you a question related to it.
[In English]
(10)"UNMOs have so far counted up to 31 explosions in Potocari but due to the
distance, there may be more that we have not heard."
• A.: It is true that it is possible for members of the VRS not to have
(10)heard all the explosions in the broader area of Srebrenica, especially if
those witnesses learnt about the number of explosions from one particular
location. The causes can be different. There may be an obstacle in front
of them in the direction from which the shelling can be heard, then the
sound is pushed back. If they were so far away that an explosion could
(15)not be heard, that could be a reason, too.
And also, the same could apply to UN observers who were in the
urban part of the area. And as you know, the operation was being
conducted on the whole area, that is, the whole breadth of the enclave,
wherever there were positions held by members of the 28th Division, and
(20)the only people who could, with relative reliability, identify the
explosions were members of the Dutch Battalion who were at their
observation posts.
And as I have testified here, the number of those identified
explosions by the Dutch Battalion are considerably higher than the figures
(25)given by the UNMOs. I think that the UN monitors mention a figure of 870
• Q.: Does the strength of the explosion depend on the artillery being used? In other words, a higher calibre weapon would produce a more powerful sound? (10) • A.: Certainly. I'm not an expert for artillery shells, but being a member of the Engineers, and I have dealt with explosives, more explosives and a higher calibre produces a louder explosion. • Q.: Did members of the Dutch Battalion analyse the structure of the explosions, where they came from, which artillery pieces were used, and so (15)on? • A.: No. Members of the Dutch Battalion approached the matter in an extremely professional manner, and they reported on the number of explosions, but you didn't go into any analysis as they were not -- they did not study the craters, the ranges, the locations from which the fire (20)came. They didn't analyse the structure of those explosions, but they simply registered the explosions themselves.
• Q.: General Radinovic, the Prosecutor has made a submission that
General Krstic became commander on the 13th of July, 1995. How does the
fact that the Chief of Staff - the new Chief of Staff, Colonel Andric, did
(25)not take over duty at that time but remained Brigade Commander until the
• A.: That is an eloquent example how documents on appointments cannot and mustn't be interpreted literally. Colonel Andric, the Commander of the Birac Brigade at the time of (5)the Zepa operation, was the Brigade Commander when the appointment came for the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, but he did not leave his position as Brigade Commander but remained in that position until the end of the operation and only then took over the duties of Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps. (10) • Q.: General Radinovic, the Prosecutor has also made a contention that the record on the takeover of duty is dated the 13th of July. What is your comment?
• A.: I would be able to answer your question with precision if I had
that report. As, unfortunately, I don't have it, I can only rely on
(15)undeniable arguments, and those are that the president of Republika
Srpska, in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the VRS, issued a decree
on the appointment of General Krstic to the position of Commander of the
Drina Corps. This decree is dated the 14th of July and it explicitly
issues the order that this should be on the 15th, and there is no army in
(20)the world that would ignore the decree on appointment by its Supreme
Commander and organise the actual takeover of duty and report on the same
two days prior to the date mentioned in the decree.
In the report on the handing over of duty and in the preamble of
any document, all documents, reference is made to the act pursuant to
(25)which this is being done. The handing over of duty is being done by the
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could the witness be shown Prosecution Exhibit 469, and at the same time could you prepare Exhibits - this is a large group but we'll be through with them very quickly - 759, (10)Prosecution Exhibit; Defence Exhibits 76, 96, 77, 78, 98, and Prosecution Exhibits 404/441 and 404/381. • Q.: General Radinovic, you have before you an OTP exhibit. I think this is an accompanying document but not the document itself. It must be here somewhere. (15)General Radinovic, I think my learned friend Mr. Cayley asked you whether in the period following the 15th, the 20th, or on some other date, whether there is any information that General Zivanovic held a different post, and you said that you have no such information. My question is: In the period from the 15th to the 20th, if there (20)is no information that General Zivanovic did assume another position, why is that so?
• A.: The only reason why General Zivanovic could not assume any other
position was that the position of Corps Commander is an obligation until
he hands over that duty to the newly-appointed commander. Since in the
(25)period from the 15th to the 20th that appointment could not have been
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could I ask the usher now to prepare (5)for the witness, could you prepare for the witness this set of documents that I have just listed. • Q.: General Radinovic, before this document is removed, let me remind you of a part of your answer in response to a question regarding the numbers on the documents and to what extent those numbers are important (10)for identifying who the author of the document is, that is, who is issuing the order. • A.: While they're preparing the documents, so as not to waste time, I understand your question -- • Q.: No, let's wait. Perhaps it's better to wait. (15) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Can we begin with Exhibit 759, OTP Exhibit. Please take my copy. • Q.: General Radinovic, we're dealing with two documents, and explaining the right half of this exhibit, Exhibit 463, you explained that the number in the heading -- (20) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could the usher push the document down a little. Thank you. • Q.: You explained that the number at the top of the document can identify the commander. Would you please now look at the left half of this same exhibit. (25)
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Could the usher put it onto ELMO.
• Q.: General Radinovic, who was the commander of the Drina Corps on the 12th of July, 1995? • A.: Major-General Milenko Zivanovic. (5) • Q.: General Radinovic, according to the number of this document, if we ignore the content, can that be -- can it be established that this was a document issued by the Drina Corps Commander? • A.: No. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could I ask the usher to place on (10)the ELMO exhibit, Defence Exhibit D76. Could the usher move the document down a little, please, so that we can see the heading. • Q.: General Radinovic, who was the commander of the Drina Corps on the 5th of July, 1995? • A.: Milenko Zivanovic. (15) • Q.: On the basis of the number of this document, is it possible to ascertain that it was issued by the commander? • A.: No. • Q.: Thank you.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Could the usher place on the ELMO
(20)Exhibit D77,
[In English] 77.
JUDGE RIAD: Could I just ask? How could you ascertain that it is
issued by the commander? Are there some methods or means, or is it
(25)supposed to be evident that if it's there in the name of the commander, it
• A.: Your Honour, in the heading in the left-hand corner of the document, top left-hand corner, there is an indication of the unit and which command system is issuing the document: the Drina Corps command, (5)referring to a particular number, a date, who it is addressed to, the content of the document, and in the lower -- in the bottom corner, the signature, the title and the signature. Among the documents we have seen so far, there was a series issued by the commander without any numerical indication in the top left-hand (10)corner that accompanies that position. As I have already testified, documents issued by the commander should customarily bear the number "01," the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander "02." That is how those positions are numbered, right down to number 12. But obviously they're not abiding by that convention, and that identification in itself, numerical (15)identification, is not sufficient to establish who authored that document. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] • Q.: General Radinovic, you have before you Defence Exhibit 77. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could it be moved down so we can see (20)the number in the left-hand corner, please. Thank you. • Q.: It is a document issued by the Drina Corps command, forward command post Pribicevac, number 08/95. Who was Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps on the 6th of July, 1995? • A.: General Radislav Krstic. (25)
• Q.: According to the numerical indication, ignoring the content, is it
• A.: No. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] For the benefit of Their Honours, could the English translation of this document be moved up so that we can (5)see who signed it. In the bottom left-hand corner, it is stated "Chief of Staff, Major General Radislav Krstic." Thank you. • Q.: General Radinovic, could we go on to the next exhibit, Prosecution Exhibit 404/441. The first page of the document will be sufficient, please. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, perhaps there's a problem with the number of this exhibit. I don't think there is such an exhibit that is numbered 404/441. I think it doesn't exist. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, it is Exhibit 404, footnote 441, but it is an attachment to the report of Mr. Butler. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I apologise. Thank you very much. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] • Q.: General Radinovic, this is a regular combat report of the Zvornik Brigade, dated the 24th of July, 1995. Who was the Commander of the (20)Zvornik Brigade on the 24th of July, 1995? • A.: Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurevic. • Q.: On the basis of the numerical indication at the top of this document, if we ignore its content, is it possible to conclude that this was a document issued by the Zvornik Brigade commander? (25)
• A.: No.
• Q.: General Radinovic, the document is on the ELMO now. It is the document issued by the Drina Corps with the number 04/156-5. Who was the Commander of the Drina Corps on the 8th of July, 1995? • A.: Major-General Milenko Zivanovic. (15) • Q.: On the basis of the numerical indication on this document, can it be inferred that it was issued by the commander of the Drina Corps? • A.: No. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could the usher now please move the document on the ELMO so we can see the bottom half and the signatory. In (20)the lower left-hand corner, we see "Commander, Major-General Milenko Zivanovic." Could the usher place on the ELMO Prosecution Exhibit -- no. Sorry. Defence Exhibit D98.
JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. Was there any signature on this document
(25)of General Zivanovic? I didn't see any signature. Has the original got a
• A.: Yes. The signature is on the Serbian version. On the Serbian version of the document, there is the signature. JUDGE RIAD: Is his signature known? Was it -- if this was a (5)forgery, would it be known? • A.: Yes. Probably, yes. JUDGE RIAD: Was there any verification to know it was his signature or not? • A.: I didn't engage in any such expert analysis. (10) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Your Honour, I can just inform the Trial Chamber that these are documents on which there is stipulation between the Defence and the Prosecution that they are authentic, and some of the documents are Prosecution exhibits, which is something I omitted to say, and also the Defence had no query as to their authenticity. (15)So now we're talking about Defence Exhibit D98. The Serbian version for the General. • Q.: General, I must ask you to read first who issued this document and the number under which it is registered, as I don't have a copy with me now. (20) • A.: This document was issued by the Commander of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska on the 11th of July, 1995. • Q.: And under which number has it been registered? • A.: "Strictly confidential number: 03/4-1616."
• Q.: General Radinovic, looking at this document, without entering into
(25)its content, can you conclude that it was issued by the Commander of the
• A.: According to the number in the left-hand corner, no. • Q.: General Radinovic, who was the Commander of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska on the 11th of July, 1995? (5) • A.: Commander General Ratko Mladic. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could I ask the usher to find the last page of this document in the English version and to place it on the ELMO. In the bottom left-hand corner, we see the signature of the author (10)of the document, "Commander General Ratko Mladic." Thank you. And that brings to an end this series of documents. I should now like to ask the witness to be shown OTP Exhibit 467. Prosecution Exhibit 467, please. • Q.: General Radinovic, we have before us a document sent by the (15)Command of the 1st Bratunac Brigade, signed by Colonel Vinko Blagojevic. Of course, this document too -- Vidoje Blagojevic. Yes, Vidoje Blagojevic. Of course, this document too has a number. It is 03, which does not denote the commander, but that is not what I want to ask you. What I (20)want to ask you is the following -- MR. VISNJIC: [Interpetation] I think the document's well placed on the ELMO now. Leave it like that, please.
• Q.: Could you comment on this document in the sense of its form and
contents, the form and contents of this document. May we have your
(25)comments to that, please?
• Q.: General Radinovic, just a moment, please. May I interrupt you? (10) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] In the English version, the date in the top corner is the 17th of July. As the Trial Chamber has already been informed, this is an error on the typewritten page on the document in front of you. So the document was issued on the 14th of July, but on the document, it was typewritten that it was issued on the 17th of July. (15) • A.: Yes. I wish to draw attention to a more serious mistake, and that is that, in the response by the commander of the Bratunac Brigade to the command of the Drina Corps, it says that the commander of the brigade will be able to attend the handing over of duty between the old and new command of the Drina Corps on the 23rd of June, on the 23rd of June, 1995. So (20)that is a complete mix-up in the dates. • Q.: In your opinion, what is the probative value, that is to say, how did you -- how do you assess the weight of that document with respect to its probative value in determination of the facts?
• A.: Well, I did not attach any great importance to it because it --
(25)written in this form, dates in this form, is not a serious business. We
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] I should just like to draw attention to the Trial Chamber that the translation of the words are also contested in the one-but-last line of the document, which refers to the (5)interpretation of the statement -- of the status of General Zivanovic, and the Defence would like to ask the interpretation service to give an official explanation as to the word best suited to the original and what it incorporates, what the term comprises. • A.: If I may, I don't know what it is in the English version, but the (10)usual phrase, the customary phrase that is used in documents on the handing over and takeover of duty, the transfer of duty, is to use in Serbian the word hitherto, "dosadasnji." Dosadasnji commander and the new commander. "Dosadasnji" is the Serbian word, but that word does not mean (15)that at the time the document was issued, compiled and issued, that that dosadasnji commander is no longer the commander. It is a phrase which is always used in documents on the takeover and -- handover and takeover of duty. So this term "dosadasnji," "hitherto" is the accepted term without (20)any arbitration as to who at that point is the commander. It means the outgoing and the one coming in, the one going out and the one coming in. But in standard procedure for correspondence, the term "dosadasnji," "hitherto," is used.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] May the witness now be given Exhibit
(25)402, please, and it is a report. It is Mr. Butler's report -- no, it is
JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] Excuse me, the word "a c'est jour" (5)means -- does it mean that that day is not included? It is a day which is not a day in the life of; it is the day between two days. Which day, no man's land? • A.: It remains the status quo until the transference of duty. JUDGE RIAD: Which means he's still in power, he's still in (10)office? Status quo? • A.: Yes. JUDGE RIAD: So the French word "jusqu'a present" was right, that's what you mean? • A.: Here it is falsely -- the demarcation line is false of the (15)handover and takeover. That is to say, when you inaugurate a new commander, when a new commander is inaugurated, and the old commander, the outgoing, the previous commander, is leaving his post or his duties, there is a point -- an act of this transference of duty when they shake hands in front of the assembled gathering, and that is the demarcation line. That (20)is the point from which the new commander takes on all responsibility -- all authority and competency, and the old one loses his authority and competency. So that is the principle. That is the demarcation line or point applied in the army.
JUDGE RIAD: But there is no vacuum? I mean, there is always
(25)someone who is General, who is in command at any point. Even in any
• A.: You're quite right. There is no discontinuity of command. JUDGE RIAD: And at that time, who would be the commander? (5) • A.: While they're holding hands like this, you mean? JUDGE RIAD: Yes. That day, let's say. • A.: [No translation] JUDGE RIAD: We didn't get that answer. • A.: [No translation] (10) THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English? Something must be wrong with the microphone. MR. HARMON: Now we can hear it. JUDGE RODRIGUES: When you say something is wrong with microphone, we hear, so -- (15) THE INTERPRETER: The General said, "Until the moment when they shake hands, the former, the outgoing commander, is in command." And the moment when they're shaking hands, he doesn't really know who is, that very moment. JUDGE RIAD: At that moment, would the decree decide, the (20)presidential decree decide? • A.: The presidential decree prescribes, orders, on what date, as the earliest date, the new commander may take over duty and the former commander give up his duty. It cannot be done before that day. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. (25)
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Could the witness be shown Exhibit
• Q.: Have you found it? (5) • A.: Yes, 7.60. • Q.: As I know you have a problem with your throat, let me read it: "While he did not formally relinquish command of the brigade when he assumed command of the `tactical group' deployed to Srebrenica, he left the daily operations of the brigade in the hands of his Chief of Staff, (10)Brigade Deputy Commander, Major Dragan Obrenovic." General Radinovic, this is analysis by the Prosecution expert witness Mr. Butler. In formal terms, in any document was a tactical group appointed which was led by the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade? • A.: Are you referring to Krivaja 95? (15) • Q.: Yes, I'm referring to Krivaja 95. As we can see from this paragraph, the period is from the 2nd to the 4th and onwards. • A.: No. That phrase was not used for a part of the forces of the Zvornik Brigade that were engaged in the operation Krivaja 95. • Q.: Did the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade issue any kind of (20)document with the words "tactical group" in the heading? • A.: No. I have not seen any such document. • Q.: Did Major-General -- was Major-General Radislav Krstic commander of the operative group for Zepa? • A.: Yes. (25)
• Q.: Did Major-General Radislav Krstic issue any document with the
• A.: No. • Q.: The allegation by the Prosecution expert witness Mr. Butler, does it completely coincide with your own submission? Only we're talking about (5)tactical groups here as opposed to operational group, which are different in size, but in terms of formal command and documents issued by those groups. • A.: Regarding this assertion, Mr. Butler as the Prosecution witness and myself are fully in agreement. He claims that Lieutenant Colonel (10)Vinko Pandurevic was commander of the Tactical Group for Krivaja 95, even though he was not formally called that, just as I am claiming that General Radislav Krstic was commander of the operative group for the Zepa operation, even though it was not called that in formal terms. But more important than the formal name is the actual state of (15)affairs. Indeed, they were forces that were, in terms of strength, area, method of combat, an operative group, and that is why I have used that phrase. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] I should like to ask that the witness be shown Prosecution Exhibit 675 now, please. (20)Could we see point 4 on the ELMO, please. Could you focus on point 4 of this report. It is an interim combat report of the Zvornik Brigade, dated the 18th of July, 1995.
• Q.: General Radinovic, you answered questions put to you by the
Prosecution with respect to this document and this particular paragraph.
(25)I should just like to ask you to explain to the Trial Chamber part of this
(5) • A.: From this paragraph, we arrive at the incontestable conclusion that the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, at the time when he issued this document, knew that in his zone of responsibility in the last ten days there were prisoners of war, and he sets a figure, that they were there. He says that someone brought in -- brought them in, that someone brought (10)them in, that the command system of the Drina Corps -- if the command system of the Drina Corps, Vinko Pandurevic as Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, would have been informed of that through the chain of command, and he would not send out a report to the Corps Command in the form of a protest, because this is a protest. We have here a protest over the fact (15)that someone had brought in these prisoners of war to his zone of responsibility. That means that he did not do so nor did he do so pursuant to a command, an order. What is worst and what is most tragic and worst of all, we can see that from the sentence, the last sentence, in fact. We can really -- we understand that he knows what was done with (20)them because there is a great lot of dissatisfaction amongst the people with this kind of conduct, probably thinking about the liquidation of the prisoners of war.
• Q.: General Radinovic, as my learned colleague Mr. Cayley on several
occasions intimated this, let me ask you in the end what is your view of
(25)the intercepted conversations, the intercepts, as probative value,
• A.: I owe the Trial Chamber an explanation, and the Prosecution as
well, why I did not use the intercepts as evidence and empirical
background and basis for arriving at my own conclusions despite the fact
(5)that I studied them all, and let me say I studied them in depth. I will
present my reasons and it will be up to the Trial Chamber to assess
whether I was right or wrong.
I just had the transcripts in my possession. I did not have the
audiotapes, audio recordings, so I was not able to ascertain whether what
(10)was written down was actually said.
Second, in many places in those intercepts I was not able to
ascertain the identity of the speaker -- the speakers, the colloquiters
• Q.: General Radinovic, you said that in the course of your research
(25)you talked to General Zivanovic. When was that?
• Q.: You mean the year 2000? (5) • A.: Yes, yes, 2000. • Q.: At that time, how many documents did you have, including the Defence documents and the documents disclosed by the Prosecution? • A.: Well, unfortunately, at that time, I did not have very many documents, the ones that I call primary source of data and information, (10)that is to say, the operational documents, operative documents. And if I were to measure that in proportion compared to what I have now, it would just be a fifth, a fifth of the documents that I have now. The studies that I used, I had almost all the studies except Carl Bildt's book, which came out later on, so I did have the books. (15) • Q.: When did you receive the bulk of the material, most of the documents? When was that? • A.: Well, I received the bulk of the documents for preparing my findings and for my own personal preparations, I received the bulk sometime in June, July, which I think coincides with the time, and let me (20)be quite frank and say that an invaluable contribution was the brilliant expert report by Mr. Butler. It was a role model, and he must have had enormous help from a series of assistants, each of whom did his work very well in order to be able to come up with that kind of report.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Your Honours, I have asked the
(25)General these questions -- let me just remind you that most of the
• Q.: And my last question, General Radinovic: If we look at that whole (5)period of time from the beginning of the Srebrenica operation up until the end of the operation for Zepa, at which points did the command composition of the Main Staff interfere with the system of command of the Drina Corps? • A.: The command system of the Main Staff, in keeping with its authorisations and competencies, interfered with the Drina Corps command (10)in several ways, modalities, and points, points in the sense of dynamics, and in space, the operations of the Drina Corps. The Main Staff did this with the help of acts of command, orders via its -- through its authorised representatives. In the documents, we can see that on different occasions, in (15)different localities, the representatives of the Main Staff would arrive and become involved in the command posts and the process of decision-making in the Drina Corps of the forward command post at Pribicevac -- from the forward command post at Pribicevac further on. However, there were decisions which directly either (20)disenfranchised or directly compelled the command of the Drina Corps, and I think that that is meritorious for an assessment of the situation that we are discussing here. The first radical decision -- • Q.: Just a moment. For purposes of the record, you said disempowered or directly committed, disempowered or directly committed? (25)
• A.: Both, I said both.
(5) • Q.: General Radinovic, if that is not a problem, as we've already heard a lot about each of these subjects, could you just give us a brief review of what those points were.
• A.: First of all, an expansion of the goals of the Operation Krivaja
95, which meant the taking control of Srebrenica.
(10)The second radical form of inclusion by the Main Staff into the
system of command of the Drina Corps was the realisation and leading of
the population -- of moving out the population from the UNPROFOR base at
Potocari.
The third instance was the order and assigning the mandate to
(15)General Krstic and the Drina Corps to launch the Zepa operation and
implement it.
And finally, fourth, the direct disempowerment of the command of
the Drina Corps, and that was the order dated the 17th of July pertaining
to the formation of a provisional command led by the officer of the Main
(20)Staff of the VRS, Lieutenant Colonel Keserovic, for joining up the
activities, linking up the activities in the Bratunac-Drinjaca-Milici zone
to search the terrain. There was the Milici Brigade there, the Bratunac
Brigade, the 65th Protection Regiment, and I think parts of the 67th
Regiment as well, and other units which found themselves there, along with
(25)an unexplained, insufficiently known to me, role of the command system of
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I have no further questions. (5) • Q.: Thank you, General Radinovic. JUDGE RIAD: Just to repeat what you are saying; all this would still be under the command and the control of the commander of the Drina Corps, or would it be a parallel, completely parallel line? • A.: Your Honour, in this chain of events which I have enumerated, (10)there were decrees which completely excluded the Drina Corps as a command in charge and at the head of the operation. The command of the Drina Corps did not -- was not in charge of the operation to move out the population. It was the Main Staff that was in charge of that operation. Second, the Main Staff directly conjoined all the activities of the forces (15)engaged in searching the terrain from the 17th to the 19th of July. So those are two episodes where the Main Staff really and actually disempowered the command of the Drina Corps. The other forms of interference that I spoke about earlier on were decisions which were binding on the command of the Drina Corps which (20)obliged it to behave pursuant to the orders given, i.e., to expand the goals of the operation and to launch a new operation on Zepa, which had a vital effect on the whole command system of the Drina Corps in that whole post-operative situation after Krivaja 95. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] I see that Mr. Visnjic has
--- Recess taken at 2.02 p.m. (5) --- On resuming at 2.15 p.m. • QUESTIONED by the Court: JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Judge Riad. JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. I have no questions. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much. Madam Judge Wald, if you please.
JUDGE WALD: Thank you. I want to open, Professor, by thanking
you to come to testify before us. I think your overview will be of great
assistance to us in the final analysis, but there are about seven or eight
(15)questions I have, and I hope that we can get through them in the next
20 minutes or so.
The first one is that I believe you testified that if a VRS
officer were to receive an order that he recognised as violating law,
either his own law or international law, that his duty would be not to
(20)execute it, to try to get it in writing, not to execute it, and to tell
the superior, as it were.
Now, what I would like you to answer for me is what we call a
hypothetical, and I'm sure you're familiar with a hypothetical, and that
is suppose that a law -- an order which was clearly recognised by the
(25)officer receiving it as violating international law came from the
(5) • A.: Your Honour, in the rules governing the execution of orders, there's an explicit prohibition not to execute orders which violate the law. Now, this concept of violation of the law, as a non-expert, I take the liberty of saying that it is very broad. It can be interpreted in a variety of ways, from mildest violations to war crimes. That is not my (10)speciality, and I won't go into it. But what recourse does a soldier or officer or general or commander have who receives an order, the execution of which would imply a violation of the law? Every officer is duty-bound to caution the person giving him that (15)order that that order is contrary to the law and contrary to the rules that apply for that profession. The superior is duty-bound or, rather, it is his right to respond or turn a deaf ear, but he must suffer the consequences. The subordinate must not execute an order which implies a violation of the law. There is nothing that can justify him. The (20)execution of laws which violate -- the execution of orders which violate the law imply consequences for the person giving the order and for the person executing the order. The principles are quite clear in that respect.
JUDGE WALD: Does the officer, and you covered this in your
(25)testimony as well, I believe, does the officer who sees a violation of
• A.: He does. JUDGE WALD: And I will go back to my original question. Suppose that hypothetically, suppose that the violation comes from the highest (10)levels of the command in the army, does he have an obligation to go above the army into the civilian commander-in-chief, perhaps the president of the company? Does he have some duty to go above the highest command if it is the highest command that is doing the violating? • A.: He does have that obligation, yes. (15)
JUDGE WALD: I appreciate your answer very much. Now let me go on
to the second question.
You said at one point -- this is a -- more of a strategic tactical
question drawing upon your experience, both as a theoretician in military
matters and your practical experience in the army. I think you said at
(20)one point that control of Srebrenica was considered to be a "to be or not
to be" situation in the Serbian objectives in 1995 of having contiguous
territory in which Serb populations could live.
My question would be, why would -- if that is true, why would the
VRS have been content to keep to the borders and to restrict them a little
(25)bit, the territory of the enclave, and to try to prevent communication
• A.: When the Drina Corps command was assigned the task of executing
(15)Krivaja 95, and when this was defined in the order for active combat for
Krivaja 95, the limited objectives were indicated. The most important
military operational goal then was to prevent military activity by forces
of the 28th Division from the enclaves towards the VRS which held the
front line around the enclaves. So that was the logic behind the
(20)determination of the military objective.
Why? I do not consider it to have been productive, in military or
political terms, to set as a goal the capture of Srebrenica, and I think a
similar analysis was made by the army of Republika Srpska in 1995, and
that is that these were safe areas protected by the United Nations. And a
(25)radical goal, that is, capturing the whole area fully, was incumbent with
JUDGE WALD: Okay, thank you. • A.: And there's one further point, if I may make, in response to your (5)question. It was quite clear that whatever the outcome of the war in accordance with the objectives that I presented them or some objectives as seen by others, but peace had to come to Bosnia-Herzegovina eventually, and this means that there was absolutely no possibility of any territory -- any part of Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining ethnically pure. (10)Cohabitation had to be re-established, and any violence which involved violence towards the civilian population postponed that peace for a long time. And I assure you that in 1995, and much before that, but in 1995 certainly it was the greatest interest of the Serb people everywhere, and especially in that part of Republika Srpska, to have peace restored as (15)soon as possible.
JUDGE WALD: Okay. You testified, I believe, that you concluded
that Krivaja 95, and we've just talked about this, was never intended
originally to capture, we just talked about that, Srebrenica; but of
course, as you -- your report shows and the others, General Mladic did
(20)change the objective in midstream, as it were, and he extended the
objectives of Krivaja 95 to cover -- or, at least, he went ahead to order
the capture of Srebrenica. And indeed, he was on his way to extending
that down to Bratunac and Zvornik, but his Generals, including General
Krstic, prevailed upon him not to do that for many of the same reasons
(25)you've just detailed.
• A.: Of course, this is a hypothetical but also a practical question.
(15)It is hypothetical in the sense that whether that is possible in
principle.
The senior commanders, in this particular case the Commander of
the Main Staff, has the power to extend goals and objectives. It is not
in the power of the subordinate to check the correctness of the
(20)commander's ideas regarding the conduct of the operation, on condition
that it is militarily legitimately executed. They have an obligation to
draw his attention to all the negative consequences, but his is the last
word, except, of course, regarding decisions which, as you said in your
question, are flagrant violations of the law and conventions.
(25)This particular case and this example and this right also applies
JUDGE WALD: Yes. You've answered my question. Thank you.
My next one is that you said at one point that, unlike the
situation in some other armies, the Main Staff in the VRS had some command
(15)responsibility. I think that's correct.
Now, my question is: Is it your understanding that Main Staffers
or people who are officers of the Main Staff had the power to requisition
the assets and the personnel of corps such as the Drina Corps for their
own purposes? They did have the power. In other words, a Main Staffer -
(20)again you can call it hypothetical if you want but I think you've
discussed the possibility yourself - a Main Staffer could go to one of the
brigades in the Drina Corps and say, "I want some equipment, I want some
personnel to do something that's part of my Main Staff responsibility,"
and at that point the Drina Corps personnel would have to accede? I mean,
(25)assuming his level was high enough. And if so, did they even have to
• A.: In principle, the senior command does have the power to use the (5)resources of a lower-level command. In this particular case, the Main Staff of the VRS does not have any army of its own. It only has the army of Republika Srpska, which means in the areas of responsibilities it has its corps and it has some units that were under their direct command, like the 65th Protection Regiment, the 67th Communications Regiment, the (10)10th Diversionary Detachment, and so on. So if the Main Staff plans an operation and executes an operation, it cannot do so without relying on the resources on the ground, and in that sense, I don't think there is nothing in dispute. But -- JUDGE WALD: My question, if I can interrupt you, would be how (15)that's done. In other words, assume exactly what you said, that the Main Staff has an operation. It needs some of the assets, both personnel and equipment, of one of the brigades. Now, does it just go in itself -- say it's a high enough person, an Assistant Commander from the Main Staff. Does he just go and say, "I'm (20)ordering you to give me your equipment," or does he have to go through the top levels of the brigade, go to the Brigade Commander and say, "I want so many trucks and so many men," and so that a record or report is kept, or but does he just go in and take it by dint of his rank?
• A.: In principle, all activities are planned if they can be planned
(25)unless they are sudden situations, unexpected situations, contingencies.
(5) JUDGE WALD: So the command would normally -- normally the command would know. The command of a brigade would know that the Main Staff was requisitioning certain of its assets to perform a task of the Main Staff. • A.: If we're talking about regular operations which had been planned in the system of command. However, on the battlefront, there are (10)situations which are not regular and which cannot be foreseen and sometimes things have to be done ad hoc, without fully respecting the chain of command. JUDGE WALD: If they have to be done ad hoc in an emergency situation, would the Main Staffers just be able to go and take the order (15)of the people from the brigade to come with them, the equipment, or would they still have to at least file something or communicate with the command of the brigade to let them know they were doing this so that they didn't suddenly find 15 of their trucks weren't there any more or 50 of their men weren't there any more? Would there be any obligation, even in an (20)emergency, to at least inform the regular command that they were requisitioning their material for their own tasks? • A.: In order to use the assets of subordinates in emergency, in emergencies, the authority of the superior is quite sufficient.
JUDGE WALD: Okay, thank you. I've got three or four more
(25)questions and I'll be done.
• A.: I base that statement on several facts. The first fact is that
the forces of the 28th Division, in defending the enclave, did not show
and prove that they wanted to retain control over the enclave by a
decisive defence, so that this population had their reservations vis-a-vis
(25)the 28th Division. Sometime on the 9th, this was followed up by an
JUDGE WALD: Thank you. I have two more questions and then I'll
be done.
Now, when a commander, a commander of a corps, or commander of
a -- yeah, of a corps, is at a forward command post -- let's say he's in
(15)charge of an operation, there's combat operations; he's set up a forward
command post. This is the commander of the corps now.
Now, even though a combat operation is going on and he's running
it, as it were, from the combat -- from the forward command post, are we
to expect that he will have established communication facilities
(20)sufficient so that he will be able to get reports from all the other parts
of his command where he can't be physically present, and even outside
information about what's happening to the civilians, what the enemy is
saying, all of the kind of information you would think that the commander
of a corps would need to know?
(25)I mean, can we assume when a commander is at a forward command
• A.: I'm not sure I understood your question fully, so please excuse me (5)if I am not going to answer what you actually asked me. I'll go back to that. But the forward command posts are established, are formed, for only given assignments to be implemented effectively and efficiently, that means for the operations for which it is indispensable to be able to (10)command from a forward command post. They do not always have to be formed. And in that case, the number of communications are reduced towards that forward command post, that is to say, those which could hamper the effectiveness of the command communications in the operation.
JUDGE WALD: Okay. Let me try to rephrase it.
(15)Let's assume the commander of the corps -- I don't care whether we
assume at the moment it was General Krstic or we assume it was still
General Zivanovic. Okay. He's running the Zepa -- he, whichever one is
commander, is running the operation from the command post, but he's still
the commander of the Drina Corps and all of the area that it entails. My
(20)question is simply, would you expect that, even though he was at a forward
command post running the particular combat operation, he would have the
facilities in place so that he would be getting the regular reports he
would need to know what was going on in the rest of the area of his
responsibility, as well as any outside information about the activities of
(25)civilians or the UN or the outside world that you would expect him to need
• A.: No, because the possibility of simultaneous communication in the system of command is considered to be an optimum number -- an optimum number of communications is between five and seven. That means that the (5)commander at the same time can have operational contacts and commands with five to seven lines. Over and above that, the system of command does not function properly. It is stifled. And that is why a forward command post is set up to limit the number of information coming in to the forward command post, and all other information which is not relevant, (10)sufficiently relevant for that particular operation that is being undertaken from the forward command post are redirected to the basic command post. And then that is where they are analysed to see whether they are urgent or not. If they are urgent, deemed urgent, they are dispatched to (15)the forward command post; if not, they wait for his return. So they don't go towards the forward command post directly, except the ones directly linked to the operation being undertaken. JUDGE WALD: So somebody, somebody at the regular command headquarters, not the forward, makes a decision as to whether or not a (20)communication is important enough to send on to the commander in the forward command post, right? Somebody has to make that decision. If all of the reports are coming in to the regular command post, somebody has to make the decision as to what goes over to the commander at the forward command post, right? (25)
• A.: Well, the command post is never without people, left without
JUDGE WALD: Okay, all right, all right. Now my very last question is the following: You have made your case for believing that General Krstic did not become commander until the (5)handover ceremony on August 20th [sic] I want you for just a moment to assume, assume the opposite just as the predicate for a question. Let's just assume that in fact, as the Prosecution has itself tried to prove, he did become the commander on, let's say, July 13th, I think is the date they used. Would your (10)assessment of his lack of responsibility for anything that happened after that date be changed at all if in fact he had become the commander as of the 13th? Would that change - and if so, how - your assessment of his lack of responsibility for any of the ensuing events after that? In short, would that change your assessment of the total responsibility (15)situation, if he had become commander on the 13th?
• A.: Not essentially. And this is why: For responsibility, it is
essential to know whether he could have known what was happening in the
broader area of responsibility.
If we bear in mind my answer to your previous question on the
(20)reduction of information, then he truly could not have known. But whether
he has to know or not, that is up to legal qualifications and not
operational qualifications for which I am professionally competent. I am
not competent in the legal field. I don't think it would be --
essentially or substantially change my vision of viewing the
(25)responsibility of the General Krstic because, at that time, he was at
JUDGE WALD: Just to follow that up with one follow-up question. In short, to make sure I understand your answer, if he had been the commander on the 13th and was at Zepa running the -- getting ready for and (5)running the Zepa operation and everything else happened just as it happened down in the rest of the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, you don't think that, one, he would have been likely to have received information about what was going on in those parts as commander; and, two, that he would not have a greater responsibility to follow up or (10)even make initial inquiries as to what was happening in the rest of the area had he been the commander and not, as you posit, just the operational commander of the Zepa part? • A.: Had he been the corps commander, it could have happened that he could leave his deputy at the forward command post and then go personally (15)to tour the zone of possibility, and then possibly he could have become acquainted with the events in the broader zone. But for as long as he was at the forward command post, information did not reach him except from the units within the composition that was engaged towards Zepa. So in that sense, I consider that it wouldn't -- I wouldn't change (20)my stand -- position with regard to responsibility substantially because, for me, it was important whether he could have known when the actual events took place. JUDGE WALD: Thank you very much, Professor.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Thank you very much,
(25)Judge Wald.
JUDGE RIAD: Mr. President, thank you. I would like to dissipate some confusion which your answers -- something said to my colleague Judge Wald. Of course you were speaking as (5)a Professor and she called you a Professor. I want you to speak to me as a General in a specific army. Now, you said in order to use -- I'm quoting you: "In order to use in emergencies, the order of the superior is quite sufficient." Now, applying this to our situation, it means that the Main Staff (10)could help himself, could help himself and grab anything from the Drina Corps when they wanted it, being superior? Just in a few words, is it possible to happen without even coordination or information? • A.: They have that right, but it is assumed that they would have informed somebody. It is the right of the commander to utilise resources, (15)assets. JUDGE RIAD: Either the Drina Corps or the other corps would have been having other plans and then they come and just grab their transport or -- their transportations or anything. Wouldn't that cause a real - What can I say? - disturbance even in the execution plan of the corps? Is (20)it within the military discipline?
• A.: The Superior Command coordinates the work of subordinates and it
has the right to set the priorities. So it can, according to its right of
command to utilise any resource, but it is implied that this goes through
the commander, through the system of command, except in emergencies when
(25)the whole chain of command is not functioning properly and there are
JUDGE RIAD: Another thing you said was that the subordinate must not execute the order which violates the law and that he can, if need be, (5)surpass his command and report to the higher -- to the highest or to the higher authorities. Now, practically speaking, if he knows -- the subordinate knows that it is a policy that is being executed, what could be his reaction and what would be the risks he takes? Practically speaking, not as a (10)Professor. • A.: Practically speaking, one can ask for an explanation that he be told why this is being done. He can caution of the consequences. He can write a document to the superior, requesting that he be relieved of the execution of the order and he can resign, simply give up his position if (15)he does not wish to have a part in it. And the worst consequence is to lose his life, and it's better to sacrifice one's life than one's honour.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Excuse me for interrupting, but
there's a problem with the transcript for some time now. What's
happening? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Madam Registrar, tell us what's happening, please.
THE REGISTRAR: I spoke with the technical booth and they said
they're working on it right now and it will take a couple of minutes to
(25)fix.
JUDGE RIAD: Your answer, General, is extremely enlightening, but (5)without asking somebody to be a hero and sacrifice his life, as you said, in a regular army, in particular this regular army, was there any danger of sacrificing one's life if you resigned or if you bring up the violation? Was there a real risk? • A.: I'm really not able to answer that question whether there was such (10)a risk or not. I really don't know. I don't know. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much, Judge Fouad Riad. JUDGE RIAD: [Intepretation] Thank you, Mr. President. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General, Krivaja 95, we already know that its objective was to essentially separate the two enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica and reduce them in size. So to attack Srebrenica was not part of the plan. If I tell you that such an operation would have required (20)preparations lasting 20 to 30 days, what would be your reaction? • A.: I would say that it wouldn't need 20 to 30 days. It would need less time, but certainly more time than was used.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] If I tell you that the person
who made this statement was precisely the person who planned Krivaja 95,
(25)that is, General Krstic, would you revise your response or would you abide
• A.: I wouldn't because I know how operations are planned, just like General Krstic, because this was command staff who were directly in the area of responsibility. There are no great marches that require a long (5)time for the movement. They were units that were in contact. They were units from the area. They were people who were mostly familiar with the area. And except for the materiel side, replenishment of fuel, supplies, armaments, logistical development, in that sense more time would be needed if such a radical operation was involved. But I think a month is too (10)long. For the actual preparation of the preparation for bringing in the forces and deploying them wouldn't need so much time, but General Krstic probably bore in mind the condition in which the corps was, their equipment, their materiel, their ammunitions. So he felt that, for the (15)reinforcement and replenishment, he would need more time, but not in terms of the staff actually. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Another question, General. You have told us there wasn't a town or village, a Serb town or village in Podrinje. What period are you referring to when you say that? (20) • A.: I'm referring to the 7th of January, 1993. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So on that date there wasn't a town or village occupied by the Serbs? • A.: On that day, the last Serb village in Central Podrinje was captured. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Very well. But how do you
• A.: It is nothing unusual there or strange. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I'm sorry for interrupting you, (5)but you did say that the objective of the VRS was not to conquer territory which was not Serb territory. • A.: Yes. I said that the army of Republika Srpska or, rather, its political strategy had in mind their own ethnic territory, a vision of their own territory. It is questionable whether they were right, but when (10)they reached those borders with their army, the borders of the territory which they laid claim on without entering into whether they were right or not, then they switched to a strategic defensive. They captured defensive positions, which meant holding on to defensive lines. But Republika Srpska had a very small population. It still has a small population. So (15)after that, they never carried out a single offensive operation which would mean capturing additional territory beyond those borders which they had taken possession of. Within that territory where the VRS has a strategy of defence, so it no longer has any further ambitions, nor does it believe it should (20)conquer fresh territory, there were certain areas that were still under the control of the Muslim army, such as the enclaves. Within the territory that they considered their ethnic territory, they did engage in military actions which were tactically of an offensive nature. One such action is Krivaja 95. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Thank you, General. We have
(5) • A.: Yes. I was referring to the Muslim commanders, yes. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Take the example of the intercepts. When the soldiers or the technicians were intercepting radio communications in order to inform their superiors, their commanders, do you think they -- that they had a reason to lie to their commanders? (10) • A.: You have asked me a question which it is difficult for me to answer logically without making an error. Theoretically speaking, they need not have, but they could have lied. They could have presented the situation as being more dramatic than it was, that they were more exposed, that they were holding on better than they were. This is possible, but it (15)need not be so. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] But do you think that these persons who are doing this work, were they or not fully aware of the importance of their information for the decisions to be taken by the commanders; so if they lied to their commanders, they are exposing (20)themselves to danger? What do you think about that? • A.: As far as I remember, I said that the Muslim leaders and commanders from Srebrenica more correctly reported about their own effectives than did the soldiers of the VRS in their estimates based on intelligence. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] I'm not talking about that
• A.: I personally think that it would be more realistic to expect them not to lie than to lie. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I have another question. Did (10)the VRS intercept radio communications of the enemy army, if I may call it that? • A.: All armies do that, so I assume that they did, too. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Fine. How did they use those intercepts? (15) • A.: They are used in intelligence work, but they are never used with a high level of reliability. They always have to be verified. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. I have some shorter questions now. Do you know what was the time required for the handing over of (20)duty between corps commanders and his deputy?
• A.: If we're talking about people belonging to the same command, if it
is the same command, then it doesn't take long. It can be done in an
hour, in a day. But the normal procedure would be for the old and the new
commander to tour the units on the occasion of the handing over the duty,
(25)when that is possible. When it is not possible, it's not done.
• A.: No. No, that is not possible. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Imagine that the commander falls ill and he's unable to exercise his duties. What happens from the standpoint of his replacement? • A.: Automatically his duties are taken over by the Chief of Staff, that is, his deputy. So that excludes the possibility of having hasty (15)decisions because this system has already been built into the system, that is, of the Chief of Staff being the deputy. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So is it possible for General Krstic de facto to be the acting corps commander because somebody has said to Zivanovic, You cannot -- "You go, and the commander will replace you"; (20)having verified this, the decree is published, and after that, the official ceremony is held? Would that be possible from the legal standpoint? • A.: Legally, no. It is only possible if you wish to violate the law.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Why not? If the Deputy
(25)Commander automatically replaces him, why not legally?
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, that is my hypothesis. He is prevented by somebody telling him, "You go." General Mladic could have (5)said that, President Karadzic could have said that, or not? • A.: There is no need to do that when a decree on appointment can be issued quickly. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well, General, I have another question. (10)Why was General Zivanovic replaced in the middle of the war? Why should a corps commander be replaced; can you imagine a reason? • A.: I don't know of any reason. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, but on the basis of your military expertise, doesn't it seem to you to be strange to replace a (15)corps commander, and then also to discuss which is the most convenient date for the ceremony? Because, after all, the war is continuing. Why? When General Zivanovic is not urgently needed for another position, why? Don't you find that strange?
• A.: Personnel changes are made in wartime, Your Honour. There are
(20)appointments, changes on the personnel -- in the personnel structure.
This is also normal in wartime. There is a personnel service in wartime.
The Main Staff of the VRS had assistant corps commanders for personnel
matters, and lists are made, forecasts of personnel development, and the
best combinations are made in terms of personnel. In the process of these
(25)personnel changes, it was decided that General Krstic should become corps
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well, that is your opinion and your position. As a military man, as an expert, a military expert, how do you (5)view General Krstic's career? Did he -- was he promoted quickly or slowly? • A.: Neither quickly nor slowly. I was a younger general than he was. Even though it was peacetime, I became a general at a younger age than he did. It was not an extremely successful career nor an unsuccessful (10)career. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] But in any event, can it be said that the promotion to the position of corps commander was, in a sense - I don't know how to put it - a way of remunerating or recognising his good work in the previous period? Could we reason it that way? (15) • A.: Unsuccessful people are certainly not appointed to be commanders, that's the first principle. People who are successful in their positions are appointed to such positions. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Are there any other conditions to be promoted? Are there any other conditions to be promoted, for (20)instance, those linked to the Security Service, anything to do with the Security Service?
• A.: The principle in the army I served in, and a very similar doctrine
was adopted by the VRS, that the Chief of Staff, the outgoing Chief of
Staff should be appointed to the commander, precisely in order to more
(25)easily adjust to his new position. So one of the conditions is success,
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, but we heard people here in (5)the courtroom who told us that the opinion of the Security Service was required. If someone was successful and the Security Service was against it, he couldn't be promoted. Are you aware of that? Is that true or not? • A.: The Security Service does not verify expertise. It does not have (10)the ability to do that. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] But what does it verify? I understand not the professional qualities of the person, but tell me what the Security Service does verify as a precondition for a senior officer to be promoted. (15) • A.: In armies in democratic societies, the Security Service does not have that role, but in ideologized and politicised systems the Security Service does screen people which in normal armies should not be done. Unfortunately, this also applied to the army I served in and also in the VRS. This was verified. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So it means that the Security Service did check whether General Krstic met all the requirements for promotion. Yes or no.
• A.: In this particular case, I don't know. I cannot tell you. But
let me say that the assistant for security of the Superior Command which
(25)initiates proposals for personnel is a member of the personnel council of
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Thank you, General. I would also like to have a final question for you. I don't know -- I don't want to know whether you answered my learned friend Madam Wald as a professor, but Judge Riad asked you to answer in your capacity as general, (10)which means you have both qualifications. You are a professor and you are also a general. At the end of your expert testimony, do you feel that you referred more to your qualities as a professor or to your qualities as a general? Which did you rely on most in your testimony? (15) • A.: You really put me in a dilemma, but I shall take the liberty to give you an answer. My career as a professor and my studies and the references I required in that area of my life made it possible for me to address this problem better as a general. So it helped me. Therefore, in this Court, (20)in this honourable Tribunal, I testified in the first place as a general, but being a professor, I did my best to make recourse to all my knowledge and all the means available to me through that career to address this predominantly military problem as best I could. To what extent I was successful it is up to you to judge. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Thank you. I see that
JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. Actually, it's a question that follows on a reply that you gave to the President. In any event, I have to comment on what you said. (5)You're a general but you have all the art of a professor. I was a professor all my life and I can see you are a true professor. In the reply that you gave to the President, and I'm almost quoting what you said, you said the rules do not allow a commander to assume powers de facto prior to his official appointment and that is normal when you were (10)speaking as a professor and talking about regular conditions. But now, in a practical situation, if - it is a hypothesis - if a commander is not well seen, is more or less a persona non grata by the authorities, and he's going to be replaced, doesn't that successor de facto play an important role? Of course, if it is according to the rules, then it is de (15)jure, but I'm talking a de facto situation when the commander is suspect and not in people's good books. What would be your comment, as a hypothesis? • A.: You want me to speak as a general or as a professor? JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] You are both at the same time, (20)because after all, the professor does not live in an ivory tower. He has to have his feet on the ground.
• A.: Yes. I would act as a general and I would replace the commander
who I consider not to be appropriate for the position he holds.
Therefore, I would not be guided by my personal feelings but by his
(25)abilities. If a corps commander is not suited to that position, I would
JUDGE RIAD: One more question, but I relieve you of the obligation to answer if you don't want to. (15)The appointment of General Krstic as a commander, according to your research, and you were there, was there any opposition between the leaders over that appointment, that is, between Karadzic and Mladic, in your opinion? And this could have slowed down the official nomination. • A.: I think there was no disagreement whatsoever. (20) JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] Thank you.
JUDGE WALD: It provoked one last question, Professor/General. If
you were, in fact, the appointing authority and you had the authority to
appoint the commander of the corps and you really -- hypothetical -- you
really thought the present commander was inadequate and you wanted to get
(25)a new one on the spot as fast as you could and you were ready to take the
• A.: The Supreme Commander has that right too. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So, General, it is 3.30. We promised to finish at 3.30. I see that we can't do that. I see that Mr. Visnjic has something to say. The documents that you wish to tender, can we do that tomorrow? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President. I was just -- I (15)just wished to notify you that the witness service has informed us that the General will be staying here tomorrow as well, so we can take advantage of the first ten minutes tomorrow to tender the documents in his presence, if that is required by the Rules of Procedure. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I think it is not necessary. (20)Mr. Cayley? MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, as far as the Defence documents are concerned, I have no objections to any of their documents. I don't know if they have any objection to mine. If there are no objections, then I don't think the General needs to be here. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES: Do you have any objection to the Prosecution
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, no, no. We have no objections at all. And we have a list of documents ready, so we can exchange it with the registrar. The lists have already been provided to (5)the registrar, and I can simply ask for the record that the documents on the list be tendered.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] What I wish to do, Mr. Visnjic,
is to adjourn at 3.30 and also to release the witness. Because our aim is
not to prolong but rather to release the witness because we were told that
(10)he had to leave. So, so long as there are no objections, we can address
the matter tomorrow. We do have another witness for tomorrow. Otherwise,
I did say that we would be working an extra half hour; otherwise, we can
go on for a whole hour. So we can do that tomorrow. So please be seated
for us to say good-bye to the witness.
(15)I don't know how to call you now, "General" or "Professor" or
both. I have taken note of the fact that you had a dilemma here. I think
you had a trilemma because, in addition to your qualifications as a
professor and a general, you have a certain problem with your voice.
But I think you have contributed to eliminate this stigma that you
(20)spoke of, the stigma that all the Serbs have as a result of these events.
I think you have the words and the throat to contribute to the process of
peace, as you have done here, and I thank you very much, General and
Professor, for having come and for having clarified many questions and
many matters on which we have to decide.
(25)So I wish you a happy journey back to your country, and much
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.36 p.m., to (5)be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day of November, 2000, at 9.20 a.m. |
