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• Page 7885 - RADOVAN RADINOVIC


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(1)Tuesday, 5 December 2000
[Open session]
[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.22 a.m.
(5) [The accused entered court]

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Good morning to the technical booth and interpreters. Good morning to the Office of the Prosecutor; I see that you're all there. The Defence counsel and the Judges are here, too. (10)Good morning, Professor. Good morning, Witness. We shall be taking up your testimony where we left off. Let me remind you that you will be continuing under oath in answering questions put to you by Mr. Visnjic. Please proceed, Mr. Visnjic. Your witness.

(15) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.

WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC [Resumed]
[Witness answered through interpreter]

• EXAMINED by Mr. Visnjic: [Continued]

• Q.: [Int.] General Radinovic, we're going to continue from (20)where we left off.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] And to do that, I should like to ask the usher to give us Defence Exhibit 426, and to prepare documents -- 425, and to prepare documents 426 and 427. So the next exhibit is Exhibit 425. Could the usher turn to page -- to paragraph 4, which is page 6 on (25)the Serbo-Croatian version.

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(1) • Q.: General Radinovic, yesterday you talked to us about a large number of operations which are mentioned in the directives and many of which were not actually implemented. On the basis of this decision of the Supreme Commander, can you -- of the army of Republika Srpska, can you explain to (5)the Trial Chamber what this -- how this applies to document 7?

• A.: In point 4, according to doctrine, this conceptual part, the concept of a decision, and as I said, in point 4 in the documents for command, the basic idea or concept is set out by -- that is to say, the command document sets this out. (10)In paragraph 4 of the directive of the Supreme Commander, the operations to be carried out are implemented -- are noted, and they are in this section here. They are set out in this paragraph here. They mention the strategic operation in 1995, Prozor, Spreca, and so on. That is an operation at the operational level. But none of those operations listed (15)here were carried out. They were not planned, and they were not executed.

• Q.: I should now like to ask you to look at page 8 of the directive, the section which refers to the Drina Corps. Have you found it? That is the English version.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could the usher please find that (20)part of the document and place it on the ELMO. It is page 10 of the English version, and page 11 as well later on. Page 10 now and page 11 later.

• A.: Yes, I've found it. This section relating to the Drina Corps --

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could you turn the page over, (25)please.

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(1) • A.: On the following page within the directive which relates to the Drina Corps, we see all the points that -- that is to say, operations that could come under that Corps and operations such as Spreca, Zvijezda 95, Spreca 95 are mentioned. None of those operations were in fact planned or (5)executed. As I said yesterday, in documents of this kind which provide a conceptual plan and indicate the possible activities in the ensuing period or in the coming year, and they therefore provide an analysis of the strategic situation, they assess the intentions of the two parties -- of (10)the parties, and they set out a sort of reliable forecasting, as far as that is possible, for the coming year. Having set out -- having drafted documents of principle of this kind, the Supreme Command in stages, in a concrete -- for a concrete period of time, in keeping with the conditions prevailing on the theatre (15)of operation, they order the execution of individual operations. That comes later. And as I studied the documents for the Krivaja 95 operation, I have become convinced that Krivaja 95 was not founded upon documents of this kind; that is to say, it was not -- it did not directly emerge from these documents. Of course, this directive was conceived in such a way (20)and devised in such a way to be an overall framework for most of the activities taking place in the theatre of operation, and that is why it is not a concrete document and cannot be a direct operative link to Operation Krivaja 95. And when I myself tried to find an answer to the question of what was the basis and foundation for the execution of that particular (25)operation -- because, of course, the Corps Commander cannot decide himself

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(1)to plan an operation. Operations must be tied into a uniform, strategic system on the battleground under the control of the Supreme Command, which means the civilian and state political powers that be. In the preamble to this directive, we -- that is to say, in the (5)preamble of the order of the Drina Corps commander for active action, there is a sentence which might lead us to an answer to this question, that is to say, what served as the basis and foundation and groundwork for the execution of this particular operation, and I hope we'll come to that in due course. But I think that it is quite certain that the operation (10)was executed on the basis of the concrete situation, the prevailing situation at that time, and the concrete situation related to the Drina Corps was that the -- where the activities of the Muslim forces from the enclaves within the framework of the sabotage operation named Skakavac or Grasshopper.

(15) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Would the usher now place on the ELMO Exhibit -- Prosecution Exhibit 426. We need page 3.

THE WITNESS: [Int.] I just have an additional document here, not the main one. I just have the attachment to the basic document. I haven't got the basic document, if it is directive 7/1 that (20)we're talking about.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]

• Q.: The exhibit number was 426. It is directive 7/1, issued by the Main Staff of the VRS. I haven't got a copy myself now, but could you find the section which refers to the Drina Corps. I think it is on page 3 (25)or 4.

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(1) • A.: It is page 3.4, which relates to the conceptual part and where the Supreme Command decides what actions should be taken.

• Q.: Could you wait for it to be placed on the ELMO, please. Thank you.

(5) • A.: In this point, point 4, for the Drina Corps, it is expressly -- the following is expressly stated: The forces of the East Bosnian Corps and the Drina Corps, with reinforcements from the Herzegovina and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps - and I stress - should, as soon as possible, realise the tasks from the Spreca operation, Operation Spreca 95, cut off (10)and destroy enemy forces east of the Vis-Stolica line, and in this way create conditions for continuing the attack towards Tuzla and Zivinice, that is to say, completely outside the zone of responsibility and any of the enclaves. It is that point up there, north-west of Zvornik. So there's no mention made at all in this directive, in directive (15)7/1, which should be the concretisation of the directive from the Supreme Commander, and with tasks specified, and the tasks that should be considered operative. However, as we see in this directive, there is nothing at all which could lead us to the Krivaja 95 operation.

• Q.: Could you now look at a separate paragraph which relates to the (20)Drina Corps itself.

• A.: We come to the tasks of the units and the Drina Corps, one of them. It is point 5.3, paragraph 5.3. And it is the task of the Drina Corps under paragraph 5.3 to defend and exert active combat activity in the north-western part of the battlefield and to prevent the breakthrough (25)of the enemy on the tactical axes, and demonstratively and with the

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(1)application of measures, operative measures, that is to say, active forms, to link up forces. And this is defence, not offence; a defensive action and not an offensive action. And with the IBK or East Bosnian Corps to realise the tasks from (5)the Spreca 95 operation as soon as possible. And this is not an operation that I know of. It was never executed, nor do we know what it applied to, what it actually meant. Perhaps those who -- I'm sure that those who devised this did know, but I myself did not learn what this meant because the operation was not planned and not executed. (10)So in the first stage of that operation, the aim was to break through to the Vis-Kalesija line, that is, towards Tuzla, and then to regroup forces. And then in the second and third phases of the operation by an appropriate manoeuvre, infiltrating strong groups into the enemy rear and introducing strong-armoured mechanised forces to execute an (15)attack in the direction of Kalesija-Tuzla, that is to say, quite outside the context in which Operation Krivaja 95 was positioned and everything that occurred in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps from the beginning of July up until the end.

• Q.: General Radinovic, in the previous document, directive 7, there is (20)a sentence which mentions -- which makes mention of the enclaves. It is the portion where the Drina Corps comes. However, in directive 7/1, in the portion which relates to the Drina Corps, the enclaves are no longer mentioned. Bearing in mind the relationship of the directives, and you said (25)that 7/1 should be an elaboration of directive 7, how do you explain that?

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(1) • A.: Well, I explain that in -- I have several explanations. First, what I stressed yesterday when I was talking about the organisational structure of the VRS and about Supreme Command and commanding, and if you recall, I said yesterday that the positioning of the Main Staff as a (5)parallel Supreme Command by giving it command responsibility - not staff and professional responsibility which is the practice in all armies of the world - this in a certain sense and in a certain way and under certain conditions and in certain situations can give birth to certain forms of dual authority and parallel Supreme Command. For example, these two (10)directives clearly bear that out. They clearly confirm that. So, and let's see how it reflects on the Drina Corps, the most important thing for the operative situation in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps is the conduct of the armed forces of the BiH army in the enclaves and their activity vis-a-vis the VRS. In directive number 7 (15)issued by the Supreme Commander, that is to say, the president of the Republika Srpska, there is one sentence which refers to the enclaves. Of course, I would not have written it. I would not have written it, and I do not think that he should have written it either. But there is not a single letter in directive 7/1 referring to that sentence, the sentence (20)which referred to the Drina Corps. Therefore, the commander of the Main Staff of the VRS and the military system considered that there is -- that they were not -- that the realisation of this idea contained in that sentence need not be realised, and in directive 7/1 that sentence, indeed, does not exist. It is not there. I personally as an officer am very (25)pleased to see that that sentence does not exist here.

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(1)Second, and this is another important point, the directive of the president, or rather, the Supreme Commander of the civilian head of state is a more generalised directive, and the directive of a -- of the Main Staff commander must be more precise with respect to the subordinates who (5)are to carry it out. And this directive issued by the commander of the Main Staff, directive 7/1, is indeed shorter. It is an abridged version, a more concise, precise version, without the descriptions that exist in the previous one. There is no assessment and analysis, but goes straight to the essential points, points which could be essential. (10)Therefore, if we want to take the order of realisation in turn, the commander of the Drina Corps realises the tasks sent to him by the commander of the Main Staff. The commander of the Main Staff is responsible to the Supreme Commander for his own conduct and for the conduct of his army. And when we spoke about at the very beginning of my (15)testimony yesterday of how orders are carried out, then we said that they are not -- orders are not carried out which imply a violation of law or violation of the principles of humanitarian law, and the commander of the Main Staff in his own directive did not take over a text which could imply that kind of behaviour.

(20) • Q.: General Radinovic, how long -- how much time is necessary for an operation to be well planned and organised?

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] And I should like to ask the usher to prepare Prosecution Exhibit 427 in the meantime.

• A.: In answer to that question, I can say the following, that is to (25)say, I would say the same thing that General Dannatt said in his expert

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(1) Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and English transcripts.

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(1)report, and I completely agree that for this level of operation, for an operation of this level, it is -- 72 hours would be quite sufficient for its planning. According to our standards, the time given for timely preparation (5)and all-around -- for preparing an operation well is three to five days, depending on whether the command system is in charge of the situation, is in control of the situation in the area where the operation is to take place, or whether you are planning to send forces to a terrain which is not well known to you, and where you have an operational situation which (10)is not well known. And this occurs in in-depth manoeuvres when the activities are to take place outside the zone of responsibility. In this concrete case, we're talking about the zone of responsibility which the command system of the Drina Corps is well acquainted with. I would say that it is quite enough to have three to (15)five days for the preparation of that kind of operation.

• Q.: General Radinovic, you have before you Prosecution Exhibit 427. It is a preparatory order number one dated the 2nd of July, 1995. In the context of the time necessary for planning, which is otherwise stated in the last paragraph of this order, how can you comment, the time which was (20)spent for the planning and preparation of Operation Krivaja 95?

• A.: In the last paragraph of this document, the last point on page 2, and that's this here, this last paragraph, the commander of the Corps orders that all the forthcoming activities with regard to the planning of combat activities in all variations, and the drawing up of all necessary (25)combat documents be completed by the 3rd of July, 1995, and the documents

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(1)to be delivered to the units performing active operations should be done only following his orders. If we go back to page 1 of this document, when the document was dated, that is to say, in the upper left-hand corner, the date is the 2nd (5)of July, 1995. That means that for all the preparations necessary and planning necessary for the organisation necessary, bringing in the units, reconnaissance work, and so on and so forth, that was -- only one day was allowed by the Corps Commander for all that to be done. It is my personal view that that is an extremely short space of (10)time and insufficient for any serious planning of the operation to be done within it. So that I myself would say that this operation, Operation Krivaja 95, with only that fact, bearing that fact in mind, I would rank it among the groups -- that is to say, with the groups of operations which are speedily, hastily prepared, and they hasty -- extorted, if I can use (15)that term, operation. And you know that anything done in haste is not done very well, and you can -- there can be many things that are not well-thought out in the haste given.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] May the witness now be given Prosecution Exhibit 428 to look at.

(20) • Q.: General Radinovic, what are the objectives of the Operation Krivaja 95, that is, the objective of the order for combat action?

• A.: I'm sorry, I don't have the document.

• Q.: Let us wait for the document, then.

• A.: Yes. May I? On page 2, this is the B/C/S version, in paragraph (25)4, we have the same conceptual part of the decision, that is, the concept

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(1)which was made by the commander whereby he decided to use the main force, and I stress that, the main force of the Drina Corps, that they should continue a resolute and active defence, and only to separate the enclaves of Zepa/Srebrenica with the part of the free forces. So there is no (5)mention of that in the conceptual part of the decision. No mention is made of the takeover of Srebrenica in the conceptual part. Operations have their stages, according to the military doctrine, and tactical activities have immediate and long-term tasks, long-term tasks not having to be necessarily completed. So the immediate task was (10)to reach out the line, which I will have to indicate on the map if that hasn't been indicated so far in the proceedings.

• Q.: I believe it has. The Chamber is familiar with the geography.

• A.: So the line in question was Predol, Divljakinja, Banja Guber, Zivkovo Brdo, Alibegovac, Kak. So that was the immediate task. And the (15)next task was to reach the line going along Bojna and Siljato Brdo. So no mention is made in this part, which refers to the objectives of the operation by the Drina Corps commander, of the attack on the town itself. What is stated here is that they should reach certain features, certain lines, which will, militarily speaking, deactivate the enclave and (20)which will enable them to prevent all military activities which were being launched from the Muslim army from the enclave of Srebrenica throughout the period when the area functioned as a protected area, which was especially -- which became especially obvious during the Grasshopper operation. (25)The objective is further on articulated in paragraph 3, where it

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(1)is stated as follows: "By a surprise attack, to separate and reduce in size the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves." That is, not to take them over but to reduce them in size. And further on: "To improve the tactical position of the forces in the depth of the area and to create conditions (5)for the elimination of the enclaves." I should like to comment on this portion of the text, if I may. The very fact that the task was to reach and to take control of the features stated in this portion of the order, so by this fact the commander enabled -- wanted to enable strategical and tactical conditions (10)for the elimination of the enclaves, in military terms, if that should become necessary. However, the sentence that is stated here, that you can read here, cannot be interpreted as an attack on urban areas of the town. It merely refers to the creation of appropriate conditions to eliminate the enclaves should the development of the military situation require so. (15)In this manner, the scope of the Operation Krivaja 95 is finished; that is, the objective of the operation is accomplished once those features are taken possession of. There are other elements of the order here but which are not particularly relevant for our case here.

(20) • Q.: So we have talked about the main concept and the plan for the Krivaja 95 operation. General, let me ask my question. I would like to know which planning documents, which supporting documents you came across during your studies, during your analysis.

(25) • A.: Well, I found this planning document which is called the

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(1)preparatory order for combat activities. This is something very common when one should move over to the following stage. If the stage involving active operations should be started, then this document of this kind is drafted, and this is what I had. And I also had the order of the Corps (5)Commander for active combat and certain elements of the plan for communications support. I didn't have the actual plan for communications which would indicate the communications between the command post and other participants in the overall command and control of the operation. I just had access to certain planning documents concerning radio links. So those (10)are two documents which I had access to. There is a whole range of documents which are lacking. For example, there is no plan for -- explicit plan for artillery support, for logistics support, for quartermaster support, and so on and so forth.

• Q.: What can you -- what is the conclusion that you can make on the (15)basis of that?

• A.: Well, this is the consequence of the fact, which is beyond dispute for me, that this operation was extorted by the Grasshopper operation, so an operation which was not a result of a long-term planning but an operation which was an immediate response to the situation and the (20)developments that were taking place in the spring of 1995, and that is why they were allocated only one day for planning that operation. So they were not able to make a quality overall plan for the operation, which -- the fact which must have affected the operation itself.

• Q.: Bearing in mind what we have discussed so far, could you tell us (25)what were the specific events that actually provoked, that entailed the

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(1)planning of the Krivaja 95 operation.

• A.: I believe I have already answered that question in part when I said that the events were numerous, the events that were taking place during the last ten days of the month of June; namely, the terrorist (5)activities and the incursions of Muslim forces into the rear of the VRS, a huge amount of losses inflicted to the VRS, according to the documents and testimonies from the Muslim side. On the 15th and the 16th of June, for example, a whole brigade was infiltrated into the rear of the 1st Podrinje Brigade, which resulted in the killing of 40 troops.

(10) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could the usher please prepare D67 for the witness, please.

• A.: May I continue, please?

• Q.: Please do, General.

• A.: So if you link that with the events which were taking place in the (15)immediate vicinity of the enclave of Srebrenica, and from the enclave of Srebrenica, one can conclude that the Operation Krivaja 95 was planned as a response to such events and that the objective was to prevent such incidents from reoccurring. In this document here we can see a report of the commander of the (20)28th Division, which was addressed to the commander of the 2nd Corps. The report was written on the 30th of June, 1995. In this report the commander of the 28th Division is informing his commander of the activities of his units and formations in the immediate vicinity, that is, in the rear of the Serbian positions around the enclave.

(25) • Q.: General Radinovic, the Trial Chamber is familiar with the contents

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(1)of this document because it was entered into evidence some time ago. My question in relation to this document would be as follows: In this document, in a document like this, D67, can we find a brief overview of all of the activities of the 28th Division outside the boundaries of the (5)protected areas of Srebrenica and Zepa?

• A.: Yes. This is precisely such a document. It speaks about that.

• Q.: I should now like you to link this document with the orders, if you can remember, issued by the VRS, and which we discussed yesterday, D88 and D153, orders of the Drina Corps, signed by General Zivanovic, (10)concerning the inspection of troops and the order issued to the Milici Brigade, and so on and so forth.

• A.: Yes, I remember that document. In his order, to achieve better quality control over the area, General Zivanovic orders visits of all of the units and he orders the responsible individuals to report to them by (15)the 25th of June. In his document he makes mention of an incident involving an incursion of the brigade, of a Muslim brigade, into the rear of the 1st Podrinje and the 5th Podrinje Brigade. And he requests his commanders to carry out an inspection of their troops, inspection of the positions, and to see if the line is properly fortified and so on, and to (20)report to him about such visits by the 25th of June. And indeed, he was briefed about what has been accomplished to that effect by the 24th of June, by one of his commanders, and the same was probably done by other commanders, but that was the kind of report that I had access to.

• Q.: During -- while you were preparing your analysis, did you come (25)across any indications that active combat operations were being prepared

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(1)by the end of June 1995 concerning the enclave of Srebrenica? Was there any mention made, any indications, any documents, any signs which would indicate that such activities were undergoing preparations by the VRS, that is, the preparation of offensive combat activities prior to the 1st (5)of July, 1995?

• A.: You should bear in mind one particular fact which is of the essence for every single army in the world. Every army, by definition, are in the best state of preparation when they carry out offensive activities. Nobody likes defensive activities, because it implies (10)relinquishing the initiative to the enemy, and this does not -- nobody likes that. But I must say that I haven't come across any single piece of evidence, any single indication, neither in the documents nor through the conversations with the people who were involved in one way or the other in (15)this operation, which would indicate that by the end of June 1995, anybody had any thoughts about executing such an operation. There were no conditions whatsoever to launch an operation of that kind. The situation at the front line was very difficult, and especially in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps. So there was no talk whatsoever about (20)the possibility of launching such an offensive.

JUDGE RIAD: General, you just -- if I understood rightly, you said there was no way, neither in the documents, there was nothing indicated -- I'm sorry, I want to read it, that by the end of June 1993 -- 1995, anybody had any thoughts about executing an operation of that kind (25)by one -- from one way or -- with the people who were involved in one way

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(1) Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and English transcripts.

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(1)or the other. "Involved in one way or the other," do you mean the two, the two fighting sides? You mean the VRS and the Muslims, one way or the other, people involved in one way or the other? Who are they?

• A.: I'm afraid I have been misinterpreted. My response was to the (5)question whether throughout my preparations for this testimony and while I was studying this matter, whether I had come across any indication to the effect that the VRS, that is, the Drina Corps, was preparing an offensive operation around the enclaves. That was the question that I was responding to. And I said, that was part of my answer, that the nature of (10)every army is to be offensive, not to wait, because armies like to have initiative. Soldiers do not like defensive approach. However, in the month of June, 1995, the VRS was in a defensive position, and I didn't come across any single document which would indicate that offensive combat activities were being prepared. (15)Second, I said that neither in the conversations with people who were involved in the operation did I come across such indication. And yesterday I told you that I had spoken with the people who had been involved in the operation on the Serb side, unfortunately. I did not have an opportunity to discuss it with the people who were involved in the (20)operation on the other side, but that was not possible, unfortunately. So from the conversations with those individuals I made a very firm conclusion that there was no talk at the time about launching an operation of that kind. So that was the essence of my answer. I don't know whether it has (25)come across this time.

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(1) JUDGE RIAD: So you're speaking only of the -- you're speaking only of the VRS when you say one people --

• A.: Yes.

JUDGE RIAD: -- involved [Realtime transcript read in error (5)"going"] in one way or the other, only of the VRS? Thank you.

• A.: Yes.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]

• Q.: General Radinovic, I don't know whether you have exhibit number P428, the order for combat activities.

(10) JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, I want to correct the transcript of what I said. I didn't say "going" one way or the other; I said, "people involved in one way or the other." Thank you.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]

• Q.: General, in the order for active combat activities, a provision (15)was made for a forward command post?

• A.: If you will allow me before you proceed with your question, because I didn't fully answer your previous question regarding objectives. In paragraph 5 of the order issued by the commander when setting out the objectives, he said the objective of the units which -- involving (20)the separation of the enclaves and the shrinking of the territory of the enclaves. So you have this specific mention made in the title, that is, the reduction, to reduce the territory, to reduce them in size. So that is something that should be taken into account while assessing the objectives of the operation.

(25) • Q.: Mention is made of the forward command post at Pribicevac in this

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(1)order. What is the customary role of a forward command post in the execution of an operation? How do you divide them? How do you take possession of them? What kind of protection do they require?

• A.: Command posts refer both to the actual space, the actual location, (5)and the facility from which command and control is executed over the units involved in combat operations. These facilities include facilities for work, for rest and recuperation, and some support buildings, as well as facilities intended to provide protection for the command post. Command posts can be divided into the basic command post, the rear (10)command post, the forward command post, and reserve command posts. The command post in itself is the most developed one in the sense of the quality of the facilities that it has. It has to be on such a location in terms of space and have such conditions to be able to provide quality and relatively comfortable conditions for work of the command on the execution (15)of their tasks. So that is the basic idea of a command post. In order to accomplish that task, groups of commanding officers are assigned to a specific command post. We have the command group, the support group, and then the protection unit, and other necessary elements. Of course, the command group is the most important one. It also includes (20)the operational part, that is, the operation room, where all the necessary information is being gathered and collated, where the creative part of the operation is taking place, where necessary supporting orders are being drafted, and all other activities undertaken that have to ensure a good execution of an operation. (25)We have the commander there, assistant commander for intelligence,

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(1)for security, and the Chief of Staff of course, and the basic staff which provide relevant assistance to the commander. And we also have service chiefs, and there has to be someone from the logistics branch as part of the command group as well. (5)As regards the rear command post, it is used for the purposes of conducting logistical work, logistical support, and forward [as interpreted] command posts are determined -- are realised when one cannot conduct military operations from the basic command post. So it should be situated on an appropriate location from where one can have adequate (10)insight into what is going on in the field and from which adequate communication with the units in the field can be ensured, in a timely fashion, of course. As regards the Drina Corps in particular, and VRS corps in general, we have something that is perhaps contrary to some basic (15)doctrinary principles when it comes to command posts; that is to say, corps have their appropriate areas of responsibility. In their areas of responsibility they have their headquarters, the corps headquarters, where the command is located. In the case of the Drina Corps, this was in Vlasenica. (20)When it comes to the communicational aspect of command, the Drina Corps designated Vlasenica as its command post, which would mean that that was their basic command post. However, the basic command post is always determined for operations. However, there are peacetime command posts, and there are also command posts where commands are relocated in cases of (25)combat activities.

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(1)In this case, the location was renamed a basic command post, that is, the location in Vlasenica was the basic command post for the Drina Corps. So this was somehow contrary to the military doctrine, but the reason for that was the fact that the Drina Corps had a relatively (5)permanent area of responsibility, and it was possible to ensure proper functioning of basic command and functions from the headquarters in Vlasenica. The Corps command availed themselves of the possibility of creating forward command posts for certain military activities, and it did (10)so in the case of the Operation Srebrenica when they relocated their command post at Pribicevac, and also in the case of Zepa where they had their forward command post in the place called Krivace. The Corps Commander goes to the forward command post together with his Chief of Staff and the necessary number of staff officers who have to (15)be there, who are required to be there. There are no very strict regulations for that; however, there is a very strict requirement that the commander should be located at the forward command post because that is the very reason why the command is being relocated because it is so that the commander can have a more efficient control over his troops from the (20)forward command post.

• Q.: Which parts of the command of the Drina Corps were at the forward command post of Pribicevac?

• A.: You mean the command? The command of the Drina Corps, you mean. At the forward command post of the Drina Corps, there was the (25)Corps Commander; the Chief of Staff of the Corps; the assistant for the

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(1)Chief of Staff for operative affairs; the assistant for intelligence, but he wasn't there all the time, he would go back to the basic command post from time to time; the head of communications, which is always there. So those are the organs that I was interested in. I didn't focus on the (5)others, but that is quite enough for the effective functioning of a forward command post.

• Q.: Did the commander of the Drina Corps during the Krivaja operation, was he at the forward command post all the time?

• A.: I did not study that problem for the simple reason that it is up (10)to the personal assessment of a commander whether he's going to spend all his time at the forward command post or whether he's going to make periodical tours of the units in combat, to the logistics portion, or whether he's going to be at the basic command post or in the region of the units who are the main forces of the Corps to carry out defensive (15)operations towards Tuzla and Kladanj. So the Corps Commander need not be at the forward command post all the time, but what is most important is that the command functions. And when the commander isn't on the spot, he has his Chief of Staff who replaces him, and this is an automatic mechanism. When the commander is (20)absent, the Chief of Staff de facto takes over the command so there are no breaks or pauses in the system of command, regardless of whether the command is at the forward command post or is absent from it. It is important to know that the forward command post is the spot from which the units are commanded, the units in the operation are being commanded, for (25)which the forward command post was established in the first place.

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(1) • Q.: General Radinovic, what portion of the overall forces were engaged - and I'm thinking of the Drina Corps, the overall Drina Corps - how many of their men were engaged in the Krivaja 95 operation, involved there?

(5) • A.: In the order of the commander, in point 4 of that order, the conceptual part that we commented in response to your previous question, is it explicitly says that the main forces of the corps should continue to exert defensive action at the outer areas of the zone of responsibility towards Tuzla and Kladanj, and those are the main forces, the bulk of the (10)troops. And only part of the free forces should execute the Krivaja 95 operation, and not even all those free forces, but a portion of them. In the order we saw that it was explicitly stated which these forces were. It was a combat group from the Zvornik Brigade, in fact, which went along the Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica axis and was active there. (15)It is the combat group from the 2nd Romanija and Bratunac Brigades as well, and the Milici Brigade. And the Bratunac Brigade, the Milici Brigade link up forces but don't actually take part in the operation, so they link up the forces and engage forces of the 28th Division. So in the Krivaja 95, to all practical terms, it was forces below (20)the number of a brigade, which means two and a half battalions perhaps, two and a half battalions took part. The equivalent would be about three battalions, which is far below the equivalent of a serious brigade. So in answer to your question, I can say, in summing up, that they were very restricted forces, just part of the free forces and in our (25)doctrine these are called auxiliary forces.

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(1) • Q.: What was the operative position of the forces engaged in the Krivaja 95 operation, both on the Muslim side and the -- that is to say, the BH army side and the VRS side?

• A.: Well, the forces of the 28th Division, at their positions, at the (5)positions they were at, were there for a long time. They held those positions for a long time, that is to say, from May 1993 -- of course, those forces -- not all the forces were there in 1993 that were there in 1995. They grew in number. But they were there from 1993, to all practical purposes, so they were there for two whole years in those (10)positions, regardless of whether they were there throughout or whether they came later on. But we can say quite certainly that they had enough time to prepare their defence positions very well. That means to become entrenched, a high degree of fortification and protection; to protect the (15)facilities, the existing facilities, and adapt them as protection against fire power. They had enough time to do all the reconnoitring they needed, to study the methods and dynamics of defence, to study all these things. They had enough time to do this very well, if they wanted to, of course. Whether they did so or did not, I don't know, but with regard to the (20)persistence that they defended Srebrenica, I do not think they did avail themselves of all that. They were engaged in their defence in a circular system. They were in an encirclement, which is an unfavourable indicator of their condition, this encirclement. The fact that they were in an encirclement (25)means that they were at a disadvantageous position.

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(1)The presence of UNPROFOR, or rather the Dutch Battalion, was a positive factor in the operational position of the forces of the 28th Division. Constant activity on the part of the units of the 2nd Corps, the Muslim army, on the external axes from Kladanj and Tuzla, and constant (5)pressure that was exerted on the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps made it binding on the forces of the corps to hold their main forces at defensive positions and defensive deployment towards the external boundaries of the zone of responsibility. And that was an additional factor advantageous to the position of the forces in the enclave, although (10)let me repeat once again: When forces are found in an encirclement, taken as a whole their position is considered to be disadvantageous. As far as the position of the Drina Corps forces is concerned, I would like to stress -- of course, we can stress some positive elements, but there are negative ones as well. The positive ones was that the (15)forces were on the external edges of the enclave and held the forces of the 28th Division in an encirclement. The space between the enclaves was not controlled by the VRS, and that was a disadvantageous fact for the operational position of the Drina Corps forces which held the enclaves. Another unfavourable fact for the VRS was that it did not -- that (20)is to say, the Drina Corps was, quite simply -- it did not have any free forces for manoeuvring and for taking over offensive actions. All the forces were engaged in defending the external reaches.

• Q.: What would be the overall ratio of forces between the BH army and the 28th Division on the one side and the others taking part in the (25)Krivaja 95 operation?

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(1) • A.: I analysed the ratio of forces in Srebrenica. I have analysed that. And if we take -- although the numerical situation, as borne out by the documents, they vary; the numbers vary from one document to another. Some documents say that the 28th Division had about 8.000 men; other (5)documents quote different figures. These are assessments rather than precise data, precise facts and figures as to how many troops there were. There is intelligence information which was used in the system of communication in the Drina Corps as well, for example, and you can draw conclusions from Muslim documents which speak of four organisational (10)formations in Srebrenica from the autumn of 1993 up to the middle of 1995, or rather April 1995. And if I weigh all those facts and figures up, then it would appear that the 28th Division in Srebrenica had about 10.000 men, in formation terms, and perhaps 8.000 armed men. So those were forces which far surpassed, numerically far surpassed the numbers of men in the (15)units engaged around Srebrenica. And if we talk about the directly confronted parties on the two sides, the two sides in Srebrenica in the Krivaja 95 operation, then my calculations would be as follows: The ratio of forces was 2.8:1 to the advantage of the 28th Division, 2.8:1 to the advantage of the 28th (20)Division, which meant that they were numerically superior. You must, of course, relativise that ratio in the sense that the VRS was better equipped, better armed, it had better fire power support, whereas the Muslim forces were weaker in that respect. But at any rate, that ratio of forces would still be to the advantage of the Muslim side, (25)regardless of that.

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(1) • Q.: Do any standards exist in military theory with respect to the ratio of forces in attacks on settlements, inhabited areas, and attacks on positions outside inhabited areas?

• A.: Yes, there are standards. They exist generally in war doctrine, (5)and we have a doctrine about that too. In latter-day doctrine, attacks on inhabited areas are to be avoided, for two reasons: First, because settlements are prepared for long-term defence and they rely on buildings and basements and cellars, which can be well adapted to provide defence and protection. So populated areas are resistance points of the first (10)order, and in principle they are not attacked. Let me remind you of the Israeli aggression on Lebanon in 1982. Israel blocked Beirut but did not attack Beirut. Of course, not only for those reasons, but it never entered anybody's mind to attack Beirut. So in principle, towns are not attacked, and latter-day doctrine (15)states this, because they are very strong fortification and can be used for long-term resistance. That is the first reason. The second more important reason is that by attacking towns with highly destructive systems and weaponry, there would be heavy losses sustained in human lives on the side of the defenders, and this could (20)never be justified through the principle of military effectiveness. So that is one serious reason why towns are not attacked. But if towns were to come under attack, then the ratio of forces between the attacker, they must be -- the attacker must be more superior, 7 to 10 times more -- 7 to 10 times stronger, because it is very difficult to take (25)control of a town, so you would have to be far stronger. Well-fortified

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(1)defence positions outside inhabited areas on open ground, in open space, if we're talking about what we call manoeuvring territory, where the defenders do not have facilities and features which are dominant and which rise up above the area of attack, then the ratio of forces is usually 3:1 (5)or 5:1 on the attacker's side. But for a well-prepared defence on a difficult terrain, inaccessible terrain, which enables the defender to organise a firm defence, then the ratio of forces goes up to 7:1, to the advantage of the attacker. Without that numerical superiority, they would have no chance of gaining control of the area.

(10) • Q.: And this brings me to my last question before the break. The existing ratio of forces, did it guarantee success of the attack on Srebrenica or was the takeover of Srebrenica planned at all, in view of the existing ratio of forces?

• A.: In the existing ratio of forces, it was absolutely not realistic (15)to plan the takeover of Srebrenica. Nobody in the command system of the Drina Corps could have had this, may I use the term, "mad plan" of taking over Srebrenica. No, it would have not entered anybody's mind because an attack on Srebrenica was absolutely not feasible in view of the forces that existed on the 6th of July, 1995.

(20) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, may I suggest a break at this point?

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, that is a good proposal. We shall reconvene at 11.00.

--- Recess taken at 10.39 a.m.

(25) --- Upon resuming at 11.01 a.m.

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(1) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, let us continue, and I think we should be working until 10 minutes past 12.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.

• Q.: General Radinovic, could you give us just a brief description, (5)because the Chamber has heard a lot of evidence to that effect, of the main course of the events and the developments during the Operation Krivaja 95, bearing in mind the internal structure of the combat activities; and also if you can give us your definition of the operation in question.

(10) • A.: Pursuant to the order of the Drina Corps Commander, the main axis of attack was along the Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica line, so that was the main axis of combat operation. The main feature that needed to be taken possession of was Zivkovo Brdo, which was on the route of advance of the 2nd Combat Group from the 2nd Romanija and Birac Brigades. In response to (15)one of your questions I said Bratunac Brigade. No, they were from the Birac Brigade. The main feature that had to be occupied was Alibegovac, and also the Kak feature which was also on the route of advance of those units. The attack started in the morning hours of the 6th, and the (20)weather conditions were very bad. It was raining all the time, so practically speaking there were no specific actions. Some reconnaissance work was still being done on certain locations, some regrouping of forces. My apologies to the interpreters. I tend to get carried away. (25)So one can say that the dynamics, that the rhythm of advance was

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(1)very slow indeed on the first day; that is, on the 6th of July they didn't make any significant gains at all. But it is important to give an assessment of the situation here rather than to engage into detailed description of the events themselves. (5)As early as on the 9th, objectively speaking, the units of the Drina Corps accomplished the objectives of the operation between the 9th and the 10th of July. By reaching the Kak and Zivkovo Brdo features, the main objective of the operation was achieved. The enclave was reduced in size, and it was made impossible for any military communication to be (10)conducted between the two enclaves, and that objective was accomplished in the night between the 9th and the 10th of July. As regards further developments concerning the Operation Srebrenica, pursuant to the order of the Corps Commander, the actual operation came to an end. That was the end of it at that time. Whatever (15)happened later on happened pursuant to the decision to enter the town of Srebrenica for which the Corps Commander needed a new mandate from his superior command. As regards the intensity of the activities, I would place this operation in the group of operations with very low intensity. On the (20)basis of what? Well, I can make that conclusion on the basis of the dynamics of advancing because we are talking about several kilometres per day. That is a very slow rate of advance. Second, there were very few losses, very few casualties on both sides. In the documents that I had a chance to study, I didn't come (25)across any such data, any data to the effect that there would be any

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(1)serious losses on both warring sides, talking about the Operation Srebrenica. Third, there was very little destruction throughout that time which speaks to the fact that the fire support and the equipment used to (5)provide fire support was very limited, very restricted. It is obvious that the Corps artillery did not take part in the activities. Had the Drina Corps had the intention to capture the town of Srebrenica, they would have used the Corps artillery support. However, this artillery was not present here, and their support was not used. (10)I came across various data concerning the number of rounds that were fired as part of the fire support to the operation. Some sources claim that over 200 artillery shells were falling every day. If we were to talk about, really talk about 200 artillery shells per day, the destruction would be quite serious and quite extensive. (15)On the video footage showing the entry of the VRS units into the town of Srebrenica I was not able to notice, to observe, such a level of destruction which would justify the number of rounds fired. But I must say that these are the data that I read in the documents and the reports which were sent by the UN military observers. They were probably located (20)inside their facilities; they didn't go out into the field. They were not able to verify for themselves that information, so they probably received that data from the local Muslim population which was, of course, afraid, and which led them to exaggerate the number. Again, the destruction would be far more extensive if that number of rounds were fired. (25)The reports of the Dutch Battalion are more accurate, and the

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(1)number that they give, the number of shells that were fired during the operation, was much lower. In view of the structure of the operation, one can say that we are talking about an operation with restricted objective and a low intensity operation. (5)Certain elements which characterise each operation are lacking here. When preparing for an attack on a fortified position, and one can expect that the positions of the 28th Division were very well fortified, because they had two years to prepare themselves, and in such conditions the preparation for fire support for the operation usually takes longer. (10)That element of the operation Krivaja 95 is lacking here. Of course, there were some -- there was a certain amount of support, but I think that that support was provided by the battalion forces who were actually taking part in the combat activities, and probably the support given by tanks. But I don't think that there can be any talk about large (15)artillery -- large-calibre artillery. So this element of serious artillery preparation is lacking. Not a single offensive operation can be carried out with any serious objective in mind without extensive artillery preparations. Furthermore, there were no major clashes along the confrontation (20)line. There were no deep advances, there were no flank attacks. So there is a certain dynamics which is lacking in this particular operation, and such dynamics is always characteristic for major military operations, and that leads me to conclude that the operation in question was one with a restricted objective, and, structurally speaking, it was a simplified (25)operation in view of the elements that it contained.

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(1) • Q.: General Radinovic, if we compare the attack on Srebrenica, that is, the attack of the VRS which took place in 1993, when the objective was to take over Srebrenica and the Krivaja 95 operation, what kind of conclusion can we draw from that comparison?

(5) • A.: Well, the only conclusion that one can draw is the one which would confirm what I have just said about the scope and the intensity of the operation. In the Srebrenica Operation 1995, the forces that were committed were below the level of a brigade, whereas in 1993 the forces that were deployed were those of the strength of four brigades. (10)Let me just remind you that there were two guard brigades at that time: The 1st Guards Brigade from Bijeljina, with the code-name Mauzer, and one of the Protection Regiment, forces of the Milici Brigade. All those forces were deployed for the purposes of that operation, and they can -- they were in the strength of four brigades at that time. That (15)number of troops was necessary in order for the town of Srebrenica to be occupied, and that is the ratio of the forces that I spoke about, 7 to 10:1. Srebrenica was the objective of the attack in 1993. The VRS had the intention to take control of the town of Srebrenica, thereby gaining (20)the control of the overall area of central Podrinje. Yesterday we spoke about the reasons why that operation was never completed, and in response to your question here, I can just say that those forces were such that it was possible for them to take possession of the town, whereas the forces that were committed for the purposes of the Krivaja 95 operation were not (25)such as to guarantee the success of the takeover of the town. And from

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(1)that perspective, the only conclusion I can draw was that there was no intention whatsoever to take control of the town, and such conclusion can be made also on the basis of the documents which were drafted for the purposes of this operation, in particular, the order for combat (5)activities.

• Q.: General Radinovic, the 28th Division, how persistent was it in its defence of the town of Srebrenica?

• A.: Well, that's a different story. I don't think that they were very persistent in their defence. There were, I think, operational and (10)tactical possibilities for the town of Srebrenica to be fiercely defended. I am familiar with certain relevant testimonies to that effect, and I am familiar with the document issued by the UN Secretary-General where he stated that the forces of the 28th Division were not able to put up a fierce defence of the town of Srebrenica for a long time period. I (15)cannot agree with that, and I have a number of data which can support my conclusion. I know that the Secretary-General based himself on the report submitted to him by his soldiers, but when I spoke about the ways a town can defend itself, I wanted to say that Srebrenica was able to prepare adequate defence with its forces despite the fact that the area was (20)restricted and despite the fact that their combat readiness was not at the highest level. For the purposes for the defence of town of Srebrenica, it was quite enough -- what the 28th Division had at their disposal was quite enough, including mine and ordnance equipment, adequate ammunition and (25)weapons, because such operations were low-intensity operations, without

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(1)air support or artillery support. We're talking about minor clashes which are of very low intensity, with the use of -- with the restricted use of equipment. And I'm quite sure that the resources of the 28th Division were such that it was able to defend the town of Srebrenica so long as the (5)forces of the International Community didn't meddle in the defence, that is, the forces of the United Nations, which would prevent any further exacerbation of the conflict. And if I may at this point, I have to address a certain amount of blame for what happened there to the system of command of Srebrenica. Had (10)they put up a more persistent defence in the town of Srebrenica, I'm sure that the members of UNPROFOR would have intervened and they would have helped them. But I think the way things were happening, it was a fait accompli.

MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, could I make an objection?

(15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley.

MR. CAYLEY: I make this objection before we get on to matters which are really more germane, more material to the case. The General is making very sweeping, broad statements about matters. He's giving his opinion. And he makes statements in such a fashion - I'll give you an (20)example in a moment - without any specific basis for that opinion. He said to us earlier on, I think yesterday in his testimony, that he's relied on documents and speaking to a number of people and Prosecution exhibits; but a statement that he's just made where he states the 28th Division had sufficient equipment, sufficient ammunition to (25)defend the enclave, could he identify for the Prosecution how he actually

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(1)comes to that conclusion - here is Exhibit D57, here is Prosecutor's Exhibit such - rather than just making these very sweeping statements with some kind of broad bases of which we have absolutely know idea about at all. Because unless he was there and he actually counted all the (5)ammunition and the weapons that the Muslims had, I really don't see how he could make these kind of comments. That would be my point.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, you have heard this request for clarification. I should also like you to try and streamline the answers of your witness and to have him tell us the sources for his (10)conclusions, and tell us if he reached his conclusions after the events. It is very easy to draw conclusions later on, post facto; however, we have to try and place ourselves in the relevant situation in space and time. We need to hear very clear opinions of this witness, including the foundations for his answers, because after all, he is an expert witness, (15)and we have to know what the bases for his answers is. I hope that I was clear enough, Mr. Visnjic, and the witness has also heard me, I hope. Is that all, Mr. Cayley, that you wanted to object to?

MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Mr. President. I think you've been very clear. (20)It's just a specific basis for what the witness is saying, as Mr. Butler did. He would come forward to you with a conclusion, and then he would produce a document to actually support his conclusion. So that's all I'm asking for, thank you.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, go ahead, Mr. Visnjic. (25)Please continue.

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(1) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, if you will allow me just a brief response to my learned colleague Mr. Cayley. I cannot answer instead of the witness. I know that the Defence has provided the witness with a number of documents which speak about the (5)army -- of the arming of the BiH army inside the protected area of Srebrenica, so I assume that those documents are one of the sources and bases for his conclusions. On the other hand, I know that at the time the General was preparing his report, we had a number of difficulties because we had to work parallelly on certain documents that were already tendered (10)here into evidence, and the General had some other documents at his disposal. So that is perhaps the reason for this misunderstanding. As regards the issue of arming, one portion of the relevant documents hasn't yet been tendered into evidence. It has been handed over, but it is still not in evidence, and those are the documents that (15)the witness used during the preparation of his report, and I think he will mention them in due time.

• Q.: General Radinovic, did the forces and positions of UNPROFOR, were they the object of an attack target? No, I withdraw that question. Could you tell us more specifically the sources which allowed you (20)to make the conclusions you have been making about the weapons and fire power of the forces of the 28th Division?

• A.: Well, first, I did not -- let me say that I did not base my conclusions only on the documents that I studied for this particular occasion alone. There is something that we call a standard when an army (25)is being established. We know the standards. We know what a detachment,

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(1)a platoon, a company, a battalion, a brigade, a division has, how many men and so on, and what type of weaponry, and what units have what kind of weapons at their disposal if somebody, a soldier, under arms, that is to say, carrying arms, in the armed formations. (5)Then it is quite certain that these armed soldiers have their own personal weapons which means that they have rifles. Whether it is an M-48 rifle or an automatic rifle or semi-automatic rifle, that is another matter. That is the subject for additional analysis. But they would have had a rifle. (10)It is quite certain that a brigade in the organisational and formational sense has fire support. It had its brigade firing groups. It had mortars of the lowest calibre. So that materiel, coupled with mines and explosives because they had that too, and I say that had they only used that basic equipment, the basic equipment that each soldier has and (15)the mines and explosives, Srebrenica could have been defended in the encirclement for as long as it took the International Community to interfere and bring the conflict to an end. The testimony on the basis of that document does not have any great specific weight, but in the book about Srebrenica, and I quote it in (20)my expert report, there is a photograph from which we can see the type of uniform and type of weapons carried and worn by the Muslim soldiers in Srebrenica. And believe me when I say that not even the VRS had weapons of that kind. They were modern automatic rifles and special flack jackets and so on. I don't say all these soldiers in Srebrenica were equipped in (25)this way, but it does tend to show that they were a force to be reckoned

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(1)with, to inspire confidence.

• Q.: Were the forces of UNPROFOR targets of the VRS?

• A.: No, they were not. And in the documents that I have had occasion to study and see and consult for this expert opinion, the positions -- the (5)UNPROFOR positions were not the target of attack. And the documents of the superior command with the Drina Corps, it is explicitly stated that the UNPROFOR forces must not be the target of attack. And that they were not the target of attack, indeed, is borne out by the fact that most of the UNPROFOR forces passed through the front lines of the Drina Corps and (10)behind them -- they were behind them in the rear, and losses were prevented in this way. And we know that a member of the Dutch Battalion unfortunately was killed by the Muslims in Srebrenica, unhappily. But luckily, we do not have any data, and I think that is true, that we did not sustain any -- (15)that the Dutch Battalion did not sustain any casualties from the Serbian side.

• Q.: How do you assess the efficiency and effectiveness of UNPROFOR with respect to the combat activities in and around Srebrenica?

• A.: UNPROFOR did not have any combat, did not undertake any combat (20)activities. That is a fact, and there is no need to go into that. It did not act against the forces of the Drina Corps which attacked towards Srebrenica. However, I think that we must stress the fact at this point that the other UNPROFOR forces were not active either, in the sense of preventing - I say preventing - a serious operational crisis around (25)Srebrenica.

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(1)I personally feel that the UNPROFOR system should have reacted when it came to the Krivaja 95 operation and its execution, and they should have at all costs prevented its further advance; that is to say, it should have unleashed the mechanism which it had at its disposal and (5)compel the belligerents to respect the safe area, both the Serb side and the Muslim side. But that is a story apart; that is post festum, as the President has so aptly said. It is an assessment made after the fact, after the events, but I think that UNPROFOR did have the necessary materiel at its disposal to be able to prevent that operation, and it (10)would have had to have done so.

• Q.: What was the relationship of the BiH army towards UNPROFOR, that is to say, what were the -- what was the 28th Division's relationship towards UNPROFOR, its attitude towards UNPROFOR?

• A.: Well, it had a dual attitude, twofold. First of all, whether (15)rightly or not, they expected UNPROFOR to protect them fully, completely, and they were not concerned about the fact that they themselves were launching sabotage and divisionary action in the rear of the Drina Corps forces which directly led to the Krivaja 95 operation as a response. It was the direct consequence of the sabotage and diversionary groups from (20)the enclave and their activities. Had that not happened, the operation would have not happened because all the documents point to the fact that that was the main reason, and that unleashed the idea of having the operation. Second, when the activities had been undertaken, then the Muslim (25)forces of the 28th Division expected the arms controlled in the hands of

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(1)UNPROFOR to be handed over to them, probably. In assessing the relationship between the Muslim forces and UNPROFOR, the attitude they had towards UNPROFOR, we must bear in mind the fact that those forces expected more from UNPROFOR than UNPROFOR was able to give and that this led to a (5)certain amount of frustration on the Muslim side. I wish to believe that that was the consequence and that it was due to this force of circumstances which led to the death of one member of the Dutch Battalion, but it also indicates the negative attitude of the 28th Division vis-a-vis UNPROFOR. There are indications of that, and (10)there are documents which state that the Muslims seized weapons from the Dutch Battalion as well. So in a word, we could say in summing up that the attitude of the 28th Division towards UNPROFOR, that their relationships were not as might have been expected in this safe area, protected area. Nor did the members (15)of the 28th Division respect the regime; neither did UNPROFOR compel them to respect it on its part.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley.

MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I'm sorry to interrupt. I think you know the objection I'm going to make. (20)Here the witness is talking about the relationship between the Dutch and the 28th Division. He's saying that the Muslims expected to be protected, and that the relationship was not what it should have been. Could he please identify what is his foundation for saying that? Can he identify the testimony that's been heard by the Court, the documents, the (25)specific documents that indicate this.

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(1) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. Professor Radinovic, we are now at a different level of analysis and conclusion. A conclusion supposes an analysis behind it. So could you specify, please, what documents, what facts, or what results of your observations or (5)conversations that you have had allow you to draw those conclusions.

• A.: The killing of the member of the Dutch Battalion is a fact which testifies and speaks of the unacceptable relationship of the 28th Division towards members of the Dutch Battalion, for example. That is a fact which illustrates that most directly. I don't know what else would be stronger, (10)which argument would be stronger than the death of an innocent soldier who was there to protect the safe area and not there to lose his life or to put his life in jeopardy.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Witness, but the bad relationships that you spoke about between the 28th Division and the (15)UNPROFOR forces existed before the death of that soldier. Did they -- was it because of those relations that the soldier lost his life or was it because of the soldier's loss of life that the relationships were poor? You must see this line of reasoning. So in order to say that relations were bad between the 28th Division and UNPROFOR, or if you say that they (20)weren't good, at any rate, you must have reasons for saying so, reasons to back this up, and that is what Mr. Cayley is asking you: What is the foundation for you to make that conclusion? The death of that particular soldier, as I have demonstrated, does not show that, because your answer does not establish a relationship before the killing and after the (25)killing, cause and effect.

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(1)Mr. Cayley is still on his feet, I see, so please proceed, Mr. Cayley. Any more objections?

MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, you've actually articulated my thoughts, so I have nothing to add.

(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: I'm so sorry. [Int.] I do apologise for doing your work for you. Witness, you have heard the line our discussion has taken. What do you have to say in response?

• A.: It is the principal responsibility of the Dutch Battalion, as a (10)part of the UNPROFOR mechanism, to ensure the regime of a safe area in Srebrenica. The principal responsibility of the 28th Division was to respect that regime. The 28th Division, as we have seen on the basis of a series of documents, did not respect that regime, and for me that is the most important pointer to unacceptable behaviour on the part of the 28th (15)Division and the principal responsibility of the Dutch Battalion, which was to ensure that the safe area be respected. That is to say that from the safe area, from Srebrenica, no combat activities were allowed towards the VRS. So that is the main indicator. Whether they had any emotional relationship towards the Dutch Battalion, that is not a subject of (20)discussion here; it is not important for what we're discussing. But their conduct was not proper. They did not respect the regime of the safe area, which they signed in the agreement of April and May 1993 and pledged themselves to do so.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I shall now attempt (25)to help the witness respond to that question with a few documents, and

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(1)later on I should like to give a brief explanation to the Trial Chamber.

• Q.: One of the documents, General Radinovic, that you based your report on, was it the report based on debriefing in Srebrenica of the Dutch Defence Ministry? Was that one of your basic documents?

(5) • A.: Yes.

• Q.: Now, in that document, and I have the Serbian version -- that is to say, does the document speak of the relationship of the BH army towards the Dutch Battalion, if you happen to remember?

• A.: Yes, it does.

(10) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I can quote from the document which has already been introduced into evidence as a Prosecution Exhibit. Just by way of example of what Mr. Cayley is asking Mr. Radinovic to do: Mr. Butler was a very good witness in that respect. He had a lot of facts and figures in his head. I talked to General (15)Radinovic in preparation for his testimony, and there are two reasons for which he cannot fulfil Mr. Cayley's demands. The first is that he does not have all the sources with him at the moment, all the sources he used. And the second reason is that he can't remember; relying on his memory, he can't sometimes remember all those documents. Now, if the Prosecution (20)insists upon having each assertion backed up by its source and foundation, I propose that we do this later on in writing, and then the assertions could be supported by these written materials or it can remain open as an assertion without the corresponding foundation or support, if I can use that term.

(25) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I would like to open up

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(1)this -- I don't want to open up a full discussion, but I would like to ask Mr. Cayley's position on this point: That is to say, if the witness expresses his opinion and then tells us the steps which he took to make that conclusion, and next we will have the cross-examination by the (5)Prosecution, which will take up more time elucidating those points. But at any rate, I would like to hear Mr. Cayley's response to the proposal just made by Defence counsel.

MR. CAYLEY: I've had the opportunity, Mr. President, of consulting with Mr. Harmon, so the Prosecution speaks with one voice. The (10)reason that I ask this is not to be difficult but is simply, as I think you already understand, to facilitate an efficient cross-examination of the witness. Because unless we are aware of the foundation on which the witness bases his opinion, it makes it exceptionally hard to cross-examine him, because we simply have to kind of look up into the sky to try to (15)fathom out how he's come to a particular conclusion. Our view would be that that is not an acceptable way of presenting this kind of evidence, that the witness comes here, he testifies, he's cross-examined, and then subsequently the Defence produce some kind of written document which supports every written assertion he makes by (20)reference to a particular document. That is what he should be doing here and now as a witness, otherwise it makes the whole process ridiculous; it doesn't make it a proper kind of examination and cross-examination at all.

JUDGE WALD: I would like to just add to this. I think we have to allow a certain amount of flexibility in expert opinion. As you know, in (25)some jurisdictions, including our own, the expert does not always have to

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(1)specify and give the exact line of his reasoning or all his documents behind it. Certainly I understand your position that you need to have some notion of where it's coming from in order to conduct the cross-examination, but as I recall, and I have to do this from memory, (5)even Mr. Butler and others, they sometimes gave opinions in which they didn't give a source. I can remember a specific instance or two, because we asked them a question and they gave an opinion without saying, "I am basing this on this document." It was their opinion based upon the overall investigation that they had done. And certainly Mr. Ruez did a (10)certain amount of that in his testimony. So while I sympathise with your general notion, I do think that we have to allow an amount of flexibility, and I think the credibility of the expert's opinion will be assessed by us to some degree on the amount of specification he can give to pass it up, to follow it up, and that I know (15)you will bring out adeptly on cross-examination. So I'm finding it just a little bit -- I won't use the word "irritating," but I'm finding it a little bit disconcerting to have the notion that every time he says a sentence, given that we do have his report and we know what it's based on, that he's expected to produce the exact document. I would like to, (20)frankly, hear the narrative and get on with this expert opinion on this. I think we gave you a fair amount of flexibility with some of the Prosecution's expert witnesses in this regard.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, can I add, can I add some -- perhaps what Judge Wald said. Of course, sweeping statements have got their weight (25)before this Court or anywhere, and they are worth what they are worth, and

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(1) Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and English transcripts.

• Page 7936 • {52/100}

(1)it might be difficult for you to cross-examine a sweeping statement except by a sweeping statement. But if then we might need support of the sweeping statement if it's not available now. It's in the interests of justice to have it. In that case you are entitled, in fact, since you (5)have not been able to cross-examine it, you are entitled to ask that the witness comes back to be examined on this if you are really challenging the supporting material, if that suits you.

MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if I could respond to what Her Honour --

(10) THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Judge Rodrigues, please.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I apologise. I was saying that you spoke the same language and the interpreters have difficulties following you. If you don't make pauses between your interventions, we will have problems. I apologise, Mr. Cayley, for this interruption. (15)Please continue.

MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. If I could respond, Your Honour, to the comments that you made. I'm not suggesting for one moment that every single assertion that he makes has to be supported by a particular document or by reference to oral (20)testimony, but I think - and I'm objecting now before we get on to matters which we all know are going to be really material to this case - that where he does come out with assertions, with propositions which go right to the heart of the indictment, I think it's not unreasonable for him in those particular instances to actually give evidential support for that (25)particular statement.

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(1)Moreover, in respect of the report itself, Your Honour, there are, I think, in total about 30 footnotes, and I think if you look at Mr. Butler's report, there are literally hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of footnotes actually supporting assertions that he makes. So (5)whilst I don't wish to irritate anybody in the courtroom by making these objections, I do believe and I do maintain my position that for fundamental assertions which are important to this case, the witness has to give some kind of foundation. Otherwise he can simply say, "I am making an inference." If he's not basing it on something specific he can (10)say, "I'm making an inference." And in fact, when he was questioned about the 28th Division relationship, it was apparent that it was an inference based on one single fact, that he made a global statement about the relationship between the 28th Division and the Dutch Battalion.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I think that we have just heard (15)a very important argument from Mr. Cayley. I think that we are now coming to the core of this issue. So far we have been discussing the framework. We have to make a distinction: Either the witness is giving his personal opinion or his opinion as an expert. He has to tell us about the documents that he saw, and he has to tell us specifically on the basis of (20)which documents he has come to that conclusion, the conclusion that he makes as an expert witness, otherwise I think that we will be allowing the Prosecutor to interrupt the Defence constantly. This is the basic requirement for his cross-examination. He needs to have some sources on the basis of which he can conduct his examination. (25)I don't want the witness to think that we are now discussing his

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(1)credibility. This is just a technical aspect of the hearing of evidence. It is not a personal question. It has nothing to do with you personally. Mr. Visnjic, I think that we can see certain similarities here with the issue of leading questions. It is possible to lead the witness (5)towards certain aspects which are not really at the heart of the matter, but we cannot do that when we are discussing core issues. I should like to appeal to Mr. Visnjic to lead to a certain extent his witness in the extent that he should go to the important questions, really pertinent questions, and streamline him in his answers. Because if you let him (10)speak at length, then the witness will be tempted to give his personal opinions without quoting sources which he used as the basis for his conclusions. So I should like to ask Mr. Visnjic to intervene a little more, once we have reached the heart of the matter, and you can also ask the witness specific questions as regards his sources, the documents on (15)which he based himself, and in that way we will avoid very frequent objections. And Mr. Cayley, your objections, let me tell you, are never irritating; on the other hand, they are quite welcome. So Mr. Visnjic, if you can bear this guideline in mind and lead (20)your witness a little more in his testimony.

JUDGE WALD: I feel compelled to add one thing more. I think we have to keep in mind the difference between a fact witness and an expert witness. A fact witness gives you a lot of documentation. An expert witness is called as an expert witness precisely because he is thought to (25)have the experience and the academic training which allow him to give a

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(1)particular lens or a particular viewpoint to it. I agree, he has to let you know if that's happened, but suppose, just suppose he were to say, "Based upon the events which happened in Srebrenica prior to the takeover in Srebrenica, just based upon those events, it is my expert opinion, (5)having studied the military organisations and battles of the world, that that signifies a bad relationship between them." We might not agree with him, but I think that would be a perfectly credible statement or a perfectly legitimate statement for an expert witness to have rather than to have to put in ten documents showing us.

(10) MR. CAYLEY: I agree with you.

JUDGE WALD: Okay.

MR. CAYLEY: I agree with you on that.

JUDGE WALD: I just wanted to draw that -- I'm not irritated, but I wanted to draw that distinction so we keep it in mind.

(15) MR. CAYLEY: That is exactly what -- I'm sorry, because the interpretation has got to catch up. Your Honour, what is exactly the point that I make, and if the witness had said that, I would never have jumped to my feet and caused all this delay. If he says, "I'm a Lieutenant General. Based on all my (20)experience over the years, I can't point to any particular document, but I can tell you as a professional soldier, this is my opinion" that's all I ask for.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, I would like to reassure you that -- to trust the good judgement of the Bench, and when certain things are just an (25)inference, we know it's an inference. When he says, for instance, the

• Page 7940 • {56/100}

(1)28th Division was hostile to the DutchBat because one DutchBat soldier was killed, we know what it means. We know that it's an inference, as you know -- draw the same thing. So let him do the inferences, and leave the other job to us.

(5) MR. CAYLEY: I apologise, Your Honour, if you think I'm doing your job, but that fact was actually drawn out by the President. The actual fact of the death of the soldier was brought out by the President on the questioning of the witness. Prior to that it was based on apparently nothing at all.

(10) JUDGE RIAD: We can draw the same conclusions, so don't you worry.

MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, if you will allow me to -- in reply to this issue that was broached by Mr. Cayley very briefly.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, we have to bear in (15)mind that we are in front of an expert witness, what my colleague Judge Wald has just pointed out, and the objective of this testimony is not fact but the evaluation of the facts made by this witness, which is implied by the very concept of expert witnesses. Very often it is very difficult to speak about evaluations without having adequate facts attached to it. (20)I think we can find a compromise solution here. Once we get to the most important aspects of the case, we have to know if there are -- if the opinion in question is a personal opinion or if it's an expert opinion. Since we are here to judge the facts, one has to support those facts with evaluations and opinions. (25)So I should like to ask Mr. Visnjic to bear that in mind while

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(1)examining his witness. I think we have about ten minutes to see if it is going to work. Mr. Visnjic, please continue.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. But (5)if you will allow me to expose a very brief aspect that I think is important and should be taken into account while assessing the value of testimony of Mr. Radinovic. I'm glad that Mr. Cayley mentioned a comparison of this testimony with the testimony of Mr. Butler and Mr. Dannatt, although Mr. Dannatt's testimony was not as detailed as (10)Mr. Butler's. It was allowed for the witness to have 60 hours to deal with this issue, but believe me, in view of the quantity of documentation and in view of the nature of -- I'm sorry, my colleague has just corrected me: 80 hours. In view of the quality of the documents and in view of the pace (15)with which the documents -- the witness received the documents, this precise analysis which was carried out by Mr. Dannatt and Mr. Butler, we would need an additional two or three months in order to comply with the requests of the Prosecutor. Bearing in mind our very restricted resources -- and I must say (20)that I do understand the situation of my learned colleagues from the Prosecution, but they also have to put themselves in our shoes. Bearing in mind our restricted resources, the very little amount of time, and the nature of the subject matter, it is my opinion that this witness has put a huge amount of effort in order to comply with the conditions and (25)requirements which were posed by the Chamber in respect to his testimony.

• Page 7942 • {58/100}

(1)I do not wish to discuss his capacity, his ability to provide you instantly with his sources, and that was precisely the reason for my proposal. If something is really very important and very relevant, and if we cannot have the relevant source right away, we will make additional (5)effort to provide the Chamber and the Prosecution with the relevant sources in due time.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, I really think we need a break at this point. It is 12.00. It is high noon, and we're going to have a break now, and when we come back we will take up the issue (10)once again.

THE WITNESS: [Int.] Mr. President, Your Honours, can you just allow me two sentences?

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] After the break, General. After the break.

(15) THE WITNESS: [Int.] Maybe it would be more useful for you to hear it now, if you will allow me.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] No, I'm sorry, General. After the break. We will come back at 1.00.

(20) --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.01 p.m.

--- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Professor Radinovic, you wanted to say a few words. I apologise for not allowing you to do so before the pause, but I had some urgent business to attend to. I agree that for (25)purposes of economy, that might have been better, but would you like to

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(1)add anything to the discussion we were having before the break?

THE WITNESS: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President. To avoid repetition of situations of this kind, may I explain how I have understood my role in this trial to be, what I have understood it to be like? And (5)perhaps this explanation would be useful. I'm a military expert dealing in military strategic synthesis. Of course, I do not do this arbitrarily. I do not devise strategic synthesis arbitrarily but on the basis of analyses, comparative analyses, study of documents, but of course also basing it on my experience and the great (10)knowledge and experience that I have gained in the many years that I have worked in the field, in my professional field. I am not the type of witness of Mr. Butler. I have enormous respect for Mr. Butler and the enormous effort that he made in writing his expert report, but I am not that type of analytical witness. I am a (15)witness of the type of General Dannatt, and that is how I understood my role. So for all of my assertions, I, of course, do have arguments to back them up as foundation, but in the kind of synthesis that I make, it is absolutely not possible to say each and every time which source I base my assertion on. (20)I have been -- I have said here that I gained the impression that the relationships between the 28th Division and UNPROFOR in Srebrenica were not good relations. I assumed that that was sufficient -- that it was sufficient to illustrate that. And I, of course, have arguments to back my opinion up. I have the plan of attack, the document of the plan (25)of attack on the UNPROFOR camp devised by the Muslim command in November

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(1)1994. Furthermore, I have the whole chapter on debriefing, which speaks about the poor relations that existed between the 28th Division and the Dutch Battalion of UNPROFOR. (5)I also have the testimonies of the Dutch officers themselves about the fact that they did not know which forces existed in Srebrenica, what their structure was, what the command composition was, what kind of weaponry they had. And when there are two armies on the same territory, in the same region, you don't know what they have by way of materiel and (10)equipment, then the conclusion is clear. It means that they have not exchanged information of that kind, which means that their relations are poor. So I want to tell you of the way in which I draw my conclusions and make my assertions and what they are founded upon. The method of (15)work, the methodology of my work, is different from what it was with some of the other participants in these legal proceedings, and so -- and I would not have accepted -- I do not accept Mr. Visnjic's defence. I did not -- I am not lacking -- I did not lack -- not do something because of the -- I didn't have enough hours at any disposal. I don't accept that (20)defence. Even if I had two hours, I would have made my expert -- given my expert opinion with all validity. So the problem was not that I didn't have enough hours at my disposal, as Mr. Visnjic implied; it was quite something else, that I did my best with all the knowledge and experience that I have as a professional and expert.

(25) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Professor Radinovic, thank you

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(1)for your explanations. We have heard them and we'll try to function in accordance with what you have presented. Yes, it is true that you did not have as much time as you might have liked and the Registry did not pay you for all the time that you did invest. (5)But Mr. Visnjic, was there something that --

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] No, Mr. President, perhaps we did not understand each other. It wasn't a question of payment or reimbursement.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Let us move forward. What is (10)the problem now? If it wasn't a problem of reimbursement, then let's move on. I was just trying to -- right, you say that it wasn't a matter of payment. Very well, very well.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] No, Mr. President, that is not what I meant. The remark was with respect to the time necessary. That was how (15)I understood the problem, but the General put me right there. He knows what he meant, so he presented his view.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, what we're going to do now is the following: You are going to continue your examination of the witness, your examination-in-chief of this witness. Try to explain to (20)us the foundation for his opinions, and do not lose from sight that the object of the testimony is for the Trial Chamber to assess matters, and the Prosecution will be able to cross-examine on the basis of the foundation presented. But for the Prosecution to be able to do that and to have the minimum -- the minimum must be furnished so that the (25)Prosecution knows where it stands and can use that information during the

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(1)cross-examination.

JUDGE RIAD: I have a comment, Mr. President. General Radinovic, you are a professor, and you can apply, of course, the method -- I'm going to say it's not anything you don't apply. (5)When we listen to you, we'd like to know, to make things easier for us, to differentiate between facts and between your personal inferences. For instance, you can say -- tell us that the 28th Division was well armed. You know it's a fact; you know about it. When you told us, for instance, that the 28th Division was hostile to the UNPROFOR, I took (10)it as a fact. Then when Mr. Visnjic asked you to develop it and to give the reason, you said because they killed one man. That's not fact any more, it is your own inference. I accept it, too, but if you just tell us, "This is my inference," we don't even need to ask you why. That's your conclusion, and then you can proceed and know what is your conclusion (15)as an expert, but -- and what are the facts which don't require -- the way you do when you teach. Thank you.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]

• Q.: General Radinovic, when did the forces of the Drina Corps succeed in their planned targets?

(20) • A.: The Drina Corps forces achieved the goals of their Operation Krivaja 95 when they reached the line Kak-Alibegovac-Zivkovo Brdo, when they took possession of those dominant heights above the enclave. And that I say on the basis of the documents and what happened between the 9th and 10th of July.

(25) • Q.: When was the decision taken to extend -- expand the objectives of

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(1)the operation, that is to say, to launch a new operation for taking control of Srebrenica? And who made that decision?

• A.: That decision was made by the sole person authorised to do so, that is to say, the Supreme Commander, the president of Republika Srpska (5)in his role as Supreme Commander.

• Q.: On the basis of what?

• A.: On the basis of documents, documents which at the command post of the Drina Corps were sent by one of the assistants of the Main Staff of the VRS informing them that the president of the republic agreed, was in (10)agreement, that the activities continue, and that they enter Srebrenica. That is the document dated the 9th of July, the evening of the 9th of July, and it came from the Main Staff and was dispatched to the Drina Corps command. Do you want me to produce the document?

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] It is Prosecution Exhibit 423 for (15)the benefit of my learned colleagues for the Prosecution.

• Q.: General Radinovic, what forces of the VRS entered Srebrenica? How many troops, and what do you know about that?

• A.: I was not able to ascertain exactly how many soldiers entered Srebrenica; however, I did have occasion to see a videotape when the (20)commander of the Main Staff, together with some of his commanding officers, entered Srebrenica. There was a very limited number of soldiers there, and quite simply, you can't see soldiers moving in file. You don't see the combat weapons; combat formation isn't seen. And as I don't know these facts, I can conclude that there were not many soldiers. Several (25)dozens.

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(1)I read the book of the Commander-in-Chief of Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Sefer Halilovic, who reacted. This was in reaction to the situation in Srebrenica, and he made the assessment. What he said was that there were less -- less Serbian soldiers entered Srebrenica than (5)there were in the security of -- providing security for General Delic at the seminar or congress of the SDA party in Tuzla, and he said that not even 200 soldiers entered. That is a statement from General Halilovic, a quotation from him, and I assume that he would be well placed to know those things.

(10) • Q.: Who did the forces of the Drina Corps encounter when they entered Srebrenica?

• A.: From that document, that is to say the videotape which I saw, I was able to conclude that they did not come across anyone in Srebrenica, that is to say that Srebrenica was empty.

(15) • Q.: Where was the civilian population at that time, and where was the 28th Infantry Division; do you know about that?

• A.: The civilian population had been gathering in the Potocari UNPROFOR base, and the members of the 28th Division in the region of these villages of Susnjari and Jaglici, and that is in this region here. May I (20)get up to indicate it on the map? [Indicates]

• Q.: The withdrawal and grouping and formation of the retreating members of the 28th Infantry Division, that is to say, what was the nature of that withdrawal? I'm thinking of them going to the village of Susnjari, and on what do you base your assessment?

(25) • A.: I can conclude that the withdrawal of the forces of the 28th

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(1)Division from Srebrenica began much earlier than the 11th when they appeared in the Susnjari and Jaglici region, which is where the blue circle is and the arrow on the map. How do I -- what do I base that on? The Trial Chamber and the Prosecution must believe me when I say (5)that I have studied things of this kind my whole life, and I know how this is usually done. The confronting parties, for them to be separated and to avoid the enemy continuing an attack from the rear and take control of their own combat positions, they must organise lines of collection and reception in the rear and so lose this combat contact and confrontation (10)line, and create conditions for them to become separated and to move towards Susnjari and Jaglici. And this is an ongoing process. It lasts; it has its duration. That is one fact. The second relevant fact is that it is an area which from the confrontation line up to Susnjari is about 10 kilometres. The contact (15)line from Susnjari is 10 kilometres away, at a distance of 10 kilometres. It wasn't individual withdrawal, but units had to be established. Furthermore, they were coming from different directions, from a circular area, an encirclement, so they had to be gathered together and collected up. (20)And another important fact for my assessment in saying that it probably took place much earlier on was that no member of the 28th Division was captured. Their members weren't captured around Srebrenica or in Srebrenica. That means that the 28th Division spent one day or one and a half days -- they started their withdrawal one and a half days (25)before. So quite certainly on the 10th -- they started withdrawing on the

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(1)10th. That is certain. And there's another fact that leads me to draw that conclusion, and I think it is an important fact; it is significant. On the 9th of July we had the -- saw the first initiative on the part of the civilian (5)representatives of the population in Srebrenica, who sought contacts with the VRS, the army of Republika Srpska, with regard to the departure of the population. I don't think that the representatives of the civilian authorities in Srebrenica would ask for having contact with the VRS if the 28th Division were in combat preparedness, full combat preparedness, and (10)had -- if they had persisted in the defence of the approaches to Srebrenica. Those are the facts on the basis of which I draw my conclusion.

• Q.: This withdrawal, could that have taken place on the day Srebrenica was taken control of itself?

(15) • A.: No, that couldn't have occurred on that same day, quite simply because from that large circle and encirclement, had there not been within the organisation of the 28th Division, had this not been agreed, then what would have happened was that some portions of the 28th Division, that is to say, the forces who were in the direct contact line, they would have (20)been encircled and captured or destroyed. As that did not happen, I assume that this action of withdrawal was done in a planned fashion, in a timely fashion, which means that it took place during the 10th. So those are my analytical assessments on the basis of which I can conclude that this whole withdrawal process lasted for a day to a day and (25)a half.

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(1) • Q.: General Radinovic, let us move on to a new area, still, of course, following the chronology of the events. From the moment when the Drina Corps units entered the town of Srebrenica, several operational problems -- the parties were faced with several operational problems. (5)Could you tell us something about those operational problems that both sides had at that moment?

• A.: For the Muslim side, the main problem was the pull-out of the forces of the troops of the 28th Division, their regrouping; that is to say, the troops had to be gathered at certain holding points, see what the (10)situation was, what kind of problems they were facing, and try to see what they can do next, what would be their next step. The commanding officers had to gather at one particular location where they were supposed to agree on what to do next. Now, whether it was possible to make an overall plan to that (15)effect, that remains unclear. However, there must have been a kind of contact between the commander or whoever was in command at the time with the subordinate brigade commanders, and the brigade commanders had to contact their subordinates in turn in order to agree on the route that needed to be taken and the kind of formation that would follow that route (20)for the purposes of the pull-out. So that was the main problem that the Muslim side had to resolve after the entry of the Serb forces into the town of Srebrenica. There was an even more serious problem with which they were faced at the time, and that was what to do with the civilian population that had (25)gathered around the UN base in Potocari or inside the base itself,

• Page 7952 • {68/100}

(1)including all the humanitarian problems that are implied and the problems which such an action would imply. As regards the Serb side, their problem was, acting in accordance with the requests of the representatives of the civilian authorities in (5)Srebrenica, how to organise and ensure the transfer of the population, because such initiative was taken not only by the civilian population but also by the representatives of the International Community. We have a document by Mr. Akashi, a telegram which he sent to the United Nations headquarters on the 11th and which concerns the problem of the pull-out of (10)the civilian population from Srebrenica. Likewise, the commander of the Dutch Battalion, during the meeting which took place at the Fontana Hotel, requested for the members -- for the representatives of the VRS for that measure to be ensured. So that was one of the problems that they had, that is, the civilian population, and what to do with them. (15)The second problem was, of course, the whereabouts of the 28th Division and what the obligation of the Drina Corps was in respect of those forces, the forces of the 28th Division, with whom they had obviously lost contact.

• Q.: General Radinovic, the transfer of the population, was it (20)something that could be realistically expected in that operation?

• A.: In view of my insight of the situation, the moving out of the population was not something that could be expected.

• Q.: Did it constitute a desirable military objective of the VRS?

• A.: No. The moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica (25)could by no means constitute a desirable objective of the VRS. Now, what

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(1)do I base my conclusion on? Every army, if they want to behave in a rational way, would try to ensure with all accepted means to restrict the demographic potential of the enemy, of the opposing side. That is to say, the VRS didn't like the idea to have a new 10.000 combatants appearing on (5)the front lines. That was a more unrealistic situation for them. So the most logical step for the VRS would be for the local population, for the civilian population to remain in Srebrenica, but for them, for the civilian population not to be active in the military sense. So the area had to be deactivated in the military sense of the word. That was the (10)objective of the VRS.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Can we have 404, footnote 73, presented to the witness, and can we also prepare Prosecution Exhibits 39A and B.

• Q.: General Radinovic, to your knowledge, who first had the initiative (15)to move out the civilian population from the UN base in Potocari? Who was the first person who came up with such an idea?

• A.: According to what I know, I think that the initiative for the moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica came from the president of the presidency, Osman Suljic, who signed a document to that (20)effect, that is, the presidency of the Srebrenica municipality. The document in question is dated the 9th of July, 1995, and it was issued in 1900 hours. President of the presidency, Mr. Osman Suljic, addresses himself -- I'll try to paraphrase the document. "Since the aggressor (25)enemy entered the town of Srebrenica at 1800 hours from the direction of

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(1)Zeleni Jadar, and since our military command is dissolving and the members of the 28th Division are no longer able to do anything to prevent aggressive forces from entering the town, chaos and panic prevail and the civilian authorities are left with the least unpopular step to save the (5)population. And it is also stressed at the meeting at the level of the state and military organs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Serbian aggressors side, that a meeting should be organised as soon as possible with the aim of finding the possibility to open a corridor for the population to move to the nearest free territory of the Republic of (10)Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of international factors. We need an urgent reply, at the latest by 2400 hours." This document was signed by the president of the presidency of the Srebrenica municipality.

• Q.: If we place this document in the context of the time, that is at (15)the time where the order was expanded to the effect that Srebrenica should be attacked.

• A.: Yes, this document was issued before that, obviously, before it was ordered for the troops to actually enter the town of Srebrenica.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could the usher please give to the (20)witness the Prosecution Exhibit 39, and to put the page 9 - I believe it is the same page in both versions - on the ELMO. Your Honours, the document in question is a transcript of a video clip which we have seen on a number of occasions here during this trial. It is a video footage of the first meeting between General Mladic and (25)Colonel Karremans.

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(1) • Q.: General Radinovic, I have just asked the usher to turn to page 9 of this document. We have a combined translation here, English and Serbian. Page 9 or 8. Could you give us a brief description of this conversation?

(5) • A.: This conversation was conducted between Colonel Karremans and General Mladic. Colonel Karremans speaks through an interpreter, and he says that there is a lot of weapons. There's a huge amount of weapons in the enclave, and that the weapons had been smuggled from outside of the enclave. He goes further on to state that he had put that many times in (10)the information to the higher military authorities and nationals in Tuzla and Sarajevo. The reason for that, says he, is because the Dutch Battalion didn't -- was not able to defend the enclave and to have a full control over its territory. It's difficult for me to follow this because there are both (15)versions of the text here. He refers at one point to a request which was made on behalf of the civilian population, because he was not in a position to demand anything. He says that the command in Sarajevo had said that the enclave had been lost, which we can link up with this request for the moving out (20)of the civilian population that we have just seen, and Colonel Karremans is asking for this to be ensured.

• Q.: General Radinovic, have you come across any document of the VRS, or before the 11th of July did you come across any indication that the moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica had been planned, (25)anything that would speak to that effect?

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(1) • A.: No. I have never come across any such document, anything that would indicate that anyone from the Drina Corps command or the VRS command would expect that the population would be moved out.

• Q.: Had that been planned, would certain documents have surfaced to (5)that effect, the documents that were actually part of the overall planning of the Krivaja 95 operation?

• A.: I fully agree with General Dannatt on this issue. This issue is discussed in the portion of his report when he says that the moving out of the civilian population is a very complex step to take, and that an (10)overall plan is necessary which would include provisions for the accommodation and so on and so forth. So there should have been a number of such documents, and I fully agree with his claim to that effect. However, I must add one more thing. Such a comprehensive plan could not be articulated or submitted to the Drina Corps for execution (15)without at least something of those documents being exposed to the public. I don't think that such a document could be drafted without necessarily making it public because it would involve a great number of participants, and such a plan would not -- it wouldn't be possible to conceal such a plan because there would have been a number of individuals (20)who would have to be familiar with such a plan. So as regards the planning documents for the Krivaja 95 operation, there should have been something which would speak to that effect, on condition that such a plan had indeed existed. I didn't find anything of that kind, and on the basis of that, I can conclude that those who were (25)involved in the planning of the Krivaja 95 operation, that is to say, the

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(1)Drina Corps command, did not envisage that consequence.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] I should like the usher to prepare Defence Exhibit 154, OTP Exhibit 404, footnote 125, 126, and 127, and 128.

• Q.: General Radinovic, when was the first contact made, that is to (5)say, the first actions, the first steps that were taken to that respect, that is, for the purposes of the moving out of the civilian population from Potocari?

• A.: In view of what I had at my disposal, I first came across such indicators in the documents which date from the evening hours of the 11th (10)of July, that is, the documents originating from the meeting that took place in the Fontana Hotel between the representatives of the VRS and the Dutch Battalion. On the 12th of July, we see many more of such documents, and I'm referring to the request of the Drina Corps Commander, for means of (15)transportation, for vehicles.

• Q.: I believe that the usher has just prepared some documents for you.

• A.: Yes. The Drina Corps command on the 12th of July, 1995, addresses itself to its subordinate brigades - the 1st Zvornik, the 1st Bratunac Brigades, the Romanija Motorised Brigade, the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry (20)Brigade, the 1st Birac Brigade, the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade - whereby it requests or, rather, orders that all available buses and vans in ownership -- which are property of the VRS units, that they should be placed at the disposal of the Drina Corps command on the 12th of July, 1995. (25)The said buses are to be forwarded to Bratunac, the sports

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(1)stadium, on the 12th of July, 1995, not later than 1630. The buses passing through Vlasenica were supposed to be filled up at the petrol station in Vlasenica.

• Q.: I don't think we need to discuss the details of this document, (5)General Radinovic. The document 154 is actually the same document as Prosecution Exhibit 404, footnote 125; it's just that it has come to us from a different source. As regards 404 and footnotes 125, 126, 127, and 128, it is actually a range of documents which speak about the same issue, and I (10)should like to hear your very brief comment on that.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] And if we can have just one of those documents placed on the ELMO so that we can see by way of illustration what we are talking about.

• A.: I believe I have already read this document. This is the same (15)document. Yes, Major-General Zivanovic for the 12th of July. This is exactly the same document.

• Q.: Can we just hear your comments of the remaining three documents, OTP 404, footnotes 126, 127, and 128.

• A.: Secretariat for Defence in Zvornik, on the basis of a request (20)issued by the general staff of the VRS on the 12th of July for the purposes of mobilising a certain number of buses, they request for such buses to be placed at their disposal -- all of the buses from the municipality, Zvornik, Visegrad, Vlasenica, Milici, and Bratunac and, if necessary, from other municipalities as well. A request is being made (25)here that the vehicles, that is to say, the drivers of the vehicles should

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(1)immediately report at the stadium. So this is a similar request. We have a request which was made by the Drina Corps Commander and addressed to the commanders of his brigades, that is for the buses which are property of the army to be placed at their (5)disposal. Then we have this same similar request issued to the municipal authorities, and also we see that the mention is made of the general request made by the general staff of the VRS. So we can see that in the space of one day or one morning, a request, an urgent request is made for buses and other vehicles to be (10)placed at their disposal for the purposes of moving out of the civilian population as it had been agreed upon.

• Q.: When did that start, and how long did that operation last?

• A.: In accordance with the documents sent by General Zivanovic and the Ministry of Defence, one can conclude that the moving out of the (15)population started on the 12th, in the afternoon hours of the 12th of July, and on the basis of the documents that I had an opportunity to study, the operation was completed on the 13th of July by half-past seven p.m.

• Q.: What were the mechanisms that were employed to that effect, the (20)mechanisms of the United Nations, and what was their situation?

• A.: Well, the Dutch Battalion was in a very difficult situation because they had received this very high number of people there. And in view of the fact that its mission was to ensure protection of the safe area, they had a very weighty responsibility to bear. I'm not going to (25)make any assessment as to how successful they were in accomplishing that

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(1)mission; I just want to stress that I know how difficult their position was. However, I must say that they acted irresponsibly once they found themselves in such a situation and faced with such a difficult problem. I personally think that a mere telegram should not have sufficed, the (5)telegram that Mr. Akashi sent to the Security Council in New York. He had to find means and transport himself to the location, well, if not personally, then to send someone, his personal envoy, his personal representative, to act pursuant to his instructions and to be there in place. (10)Furthermore, I think that Mr. Bildt also should have been there at the scene. The same applies to the UNPROFOR BH commander, General Smith. I just cannot explain to myself why they never showed up, why the commander never showed up at the location. Had the whole commanding mechanism of UNPROFOR been actively involved in the situation, I believe (15)that the whole procedure, the whole operation, would have been carried out without adverse consequences. At least, I believe that it would have been carried out in a more orderly fashion and with much less serious consequences.

• Q.: In the documentation that you studied, which relates to the period (20)immediately after the moving out of the population, did you come across certain parts which stressed the irregularity of the moving out of the population? And here I mean the documents of the United Nations or some of its organs.

• A.: Yes, I did encounter some. In the Secretary-General's report it (25)talks about that, the UN Secretary-General's report, that there were

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(1)irregularities. And in the expert opinions they also speak about that, the witnesses, Prosecution expert witnesses. And in all the studies that I read through and studied for Srebrenica, the authors are Muslims, that is to say, members of the Muslim nation. These authors speak about the (5)fact that there were irregularities, and I have no reason not to believe that.

• Q.: General Radinovic, do you know of any other example where the population moved out in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Apart from this instance in Srebrenica, was there any other example and occasion?

(10) • A.: Well, unfortunately there were instances when the population moved out, and this was something that was continuously apparent as the result of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As soon as an army, one army or the other had established control in certain parts of the territory, all those who did not consider that army to belong to them, they left the (15)area; they moved out. So this moving out of the population is a regular occurrence of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Let me give you some examples which confirm my thesis. For example, the Neretva River Valley, including Mostar. Mostar is a large town compared to the size of the former Yugoslavia. All the Serb (20)population left, from Capljina to Konjic; they all moved out. The Croats from Central Bosnia, they were moved out and escorted by the VRS army, and this moving out of Central Bosnia was the result of the Muslim activities there, not the Serb activities. The Serb army helped the population to shift and move out, without any serious repercussions. (25)There was an instance of moving out of the Muslim population in

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(1)1993 as well from Srebrenica. On that occasion 10.000 Muslims moved out. As you know full well, from Sarajevo, at the end of the war, all the Serb population, all the Serb inhabitants, left Sarajevo. So we can say and make the conclusion that the moving out of the civilian population from (5)areas taken over by war is no specific feature of Srebrenica; it is something that always accompanies civil wars. I repeat: Civil wars, civil wars of the kind that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

• Q.: And finally, General Radinovic, how would you assess the moving out that took place on the 12th and the 13th of July, 1995 in Srebrenica? (10)How would you characterise it: as a planned operation, an operation planned in advance, or as an ad hoc operation?

• A.: Looking at the initiatives that were taken to move the population out, and when I look at the documents that I had at my disposal for assessing this action, this occurrence - and all documents indicate that (15)the problem should be resolved and that this referred to the 12th, before noon - I am adamant in my conclusion that it was an ad hoc problem which occurred on the spur of the moment, completely an unplanned consequence of the Operation Krivaja 95, an unplanned consequence of the Krivaja 95 operation, and that is why it could not have been planned in advance, (20)planned beforehand, elaborated beforehand, and agreed upon beforehand, and all the necessary things secured for it to be implemented, precisely because it was an ad hoc operation. It was carried out with serious negative features which led to the consequences that are talked about in the documents.

(25) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, in view of our

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(1)timetable yesterday, perhaps this would be a good moment for a break.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. We're going to split up our afternoon work in two halves. We're going to have a 15-minute break now.

(5) --- Recess taken at 1.55 p.m.

--- On resuming at 2.11 p.m.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, please proceed. You have until 3.00.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.

(10) • Q.: General Radinovic, before this Trial Chamber we have heard numerous testimony, exhibits, videotapes, and other evidential material speaking about the separation of military-abled men in Potocari on the 12th and 13th of July, 1995. Do you consider it legitimate to test the identity of the military-abled men?

(15) • A.: Yes, I do consider it legitimate to check up the identity of the males, of the men. Now, why do I say that? Because in Srebrenica, the 28th Infantry Division was positioned at the BiH army, was based there, and like any other army, it engaged in warfare. Since the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, up until the (20)time of the Srebrenica operation, the VRS had data on a number of members of the 28th Division who had committed crimes. The command of the Bratunac Brigade had a list, had in its possession a list of people, that is to say, members of the 28th Division, who had been suspected of committing war crimes, and this list was handed over to the Main Staff, (25)the headquarters, that is to say, the command of the Drina Corps.

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(1)It was quite normal, therefore, to check out the people and to see whether these members were not among the civilian population in Potocari or around Potocari, to see whether any of those from that list of war criminals were amongst the population and had mingled with the population.

(5) • Q.: The representatives of UNPROFOR were informed about this on both meetings, on the 11th and on the 12th. No, I'm sorry, on the 12th, the evening of the 12th, and the following day.

• A.: Yes. The commander of the Main Staff at the meeting directly imparted this information to the commander of the UNPROFOR battalion.

(10) • Q.: General Radinovic, let us move on to another area now, and that is the pulling out and withdrawal of the 28th Division and the breakthrough. You said that the forces of the 28th Division had collected up in the village of Susnjari, and the Trial Chamber has sufficient other evidence about that, that this was on the 11th of July. (15)When these forces appeared on the periphery of the enclave, when did that happen? When did they appear on the periphery of the enclave?

• A.: There are two facts which are relevant in establishing when they appeared. On the 11th, it is incontestable that those forces were concentrated in that area and that they were preparing for a breakthrough. (20)From the report of the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade who sat in for the brigade commander who was at Zepa, that report was dated the 13th of July, the 13th of July, which means that on the 13th of July, the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade, assuming the role of commander, sent to the command of the Drina Corps a report in which he clearly states that he (25)knows that the column has started moving towards his zone of

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(1)responsibility. And that means, and from that document I'm able to conclude, that for him to be able to send this, dispatch this report out on the 13th, he must have known about it on the 12th. So the first contacts were quite certainly on that day, and already on the 13th we have (5)combat contact.

• Q.: Do you have any information as to which forces of the 28th Division were there, how long the column was, what kind of weapons they had, and the composition of the column itself?

• A.: This differs from one source to another. Serb sources assess (10)this -- Serb sources say that the number is between 10.000 and 15.000 and that a third were armed. In the testimony of Mr. Butler, the number of armed persons was lower. But I don't think that we need say specific numbers. The column was a numerous one and there was quite a considerable number of armed men. According to my analysis, if you look at the overall (15)men that the 28th Division had, if we know that they were not captured or did not surrender, then it would be quite certain that in that column there would be between 7.000 and 10.000 members of the 28th Division.

• Q.: What operative formation were the forces of the 28th Division moving in, and what, according to military doctrine, is that action they (20)took called? How do you refer to it? What is the term used to denote it?

• A.: According to some information and certain data that I found in the documents of the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade and his reports to the command of the Drina Corps of the 13th and 14th - and he stresses that the first combat contacts with the members of the 28th Division took place (25)here, where you see the blue arrows, on the 13th - the bulk of the column

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(1)from the Susnjari and Potocari region could not have, in such a short space of time, crossed such a large area. I now conclude, on the basis of that, that most probably the command of the 28th Division had formed a forerunner, an advanced group (5)which started out earlier on. And in view of the fact that in the reports and later documents I failed to find that any of the commanders had -- or leaders of the units had fallen, had been casualties, except one, Major Golic, Ejub Golic, I therefore conclude that in this advanced group or party, that the whole commanding cadre of the 28th Division was in that (10)advanced group and that that advanced group pulled out before the main fighting began in the zone of responsibility in the Drina Corps against the forces of the 28th Division. So this operative formation for withdrawal, for pulling out, had an advanced group, it had the main column, without enough operative links (15)between the advanced group and the main column, and it would appear that it was not the goal of the advanced column to allow the column to be able to pull out but to reach the area controlled by the Muslims as fast as possible. Now, this action that the 28th Division performed, according to (20)military theory and doctrine, is called a breakthrough out of an encirclement, that is to say, to break out of the encirclement. This action also contains within itself elements of a military action which is called a desist march, which implies a certain formation and order, which means that they must be led by the -- for detachments which enter into (25)combat action with forces preventing the withdrawal, they break through

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(1)those ambushes and obstacles in order to prevent their withdrawal. They expand this area, place security on their flanks, and the columns march through these openings in their withdrawal. And this occurs at all of the spots where positions are organised to prevent this from taking place, to (5)prevent this pulling out. It is obvious that the command of the 28th Division did not do that. It did not do that for the simple reason that according to data and information and a portion of the testimony of Mr. Ruez, what happened was that at individual places, the Muslim forces in retreat suffered heavy (10)losses.

• Q.: The VRS also took certain action prescribed in military doctrine with respect to the combat formations of the 28th Division. What were those actions?

• A.: The expected combat actions in situations of this kind is to (15)pursue the enemy. It is called "pursuing the enemy." And after losing combat contact with the enemy, forces are established for pursuing, pursuing forces. Pursuing columns, pursuing forces, pursuing detachments, various pursuing formations are established and put into effect in situations of that kind. (20)Now, what is the characteristic feature here? For this process and for an assessment of this entire complex of activities, that is to say, the withdrawal of the 28th Division and all the consequences that arose from that, it is highly unusual that the command of the Drina Corps did not organise the pursuing of the enemy, pursuit of the enemy. Why he (25)didn't do that, I cannot say. All I know is that he did not. Probably

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(1)because in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps, the forces existed which were able to apply another method of preventing the forces of the 28th Division from moving out of the zone of responsibility under the Drina Corps, and the main reason was that immediately after the end of (5)the operation for Srebrenica, the Drina Corps was ordered to continue with the Zepa operation. It is not natural to begin a second operation until you have completed, fully completed the first, with all the consequences that that entailed, the consequences of the previous operation. But it is the right (10)of command to do so, and we have seen that, in fact, it was an operative error that that was so. Had it turned out that the Drina Corps after completing the Srebrenica operation had gone in pursuit of the enemy which was withdrawing, it is quite certain that the consequences to the 28th (15)Division would have been much more serious than they actually were.

• Q.: When was the first combat contact established of the 28th Division and the VRS in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps? When did this -- where did this happen, what were the conflicting, combatting parties, and what were the consequences for the VRS and, of course, for (20)the 28th Division?

• A.: I will adhere to the testimony of Mr. Ruez here. At the tip of this first arrow there is a place called Bare, and Mr. Ruez claims that on the 13th of July, that that was where the first serious settling of accounts took place between the force -- with the forces of the 28th (25)Division who were in retreat and the forces that were in control of that

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(1)territory. According to Ruez's testimony, there were about 600 members of the 28th Division who were killed on the occasion. I personally think that such heavy losses could have been expected in view of the fact -- in view (5)of the situation that the 28th Division found itself in, and bearing in mind first and foremost the fact that it was not capacitated for such a complicated and risky operation, this operation of retreat and breakthrough, the encirclement in enemy territory which was more than a hundred kilometres in depth. And if we know that it is not a straight (10)line, then they weren't moving in a straight line. And if we bear in mind the fact that along that axis of movement, there had to have been resistance and retreat through three or four -- through four or five lines or positions.

• Q.: Let me give some additional information. It was Mr. Ruez's (15)testimony of the 14th of March, page 594 and 595, where he says that in the zone that you yourself mentioned in 1996, about 600 bodies were found when -- in the course of an operation conducted by, I think it was the Finnish experts, not linked to the Prosecution's activities. So in that zone, about 500 bodies were uncovered. It is assumed that they are Muslim (20)soldiers and that they died in battle because there were no other indicators. General Radinovic, could you tell the Trial Chamber what the depth of the area was that the 28th Division had to overcome, and what time they needed for that under the prevailing operative conditions?

(25) • A.: In my reply to your previous question, towards the end of it when

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(1)I explained it was a risky business, it was a risky undertaking for these forces to decide to break through, I said that the depth -- because it was not linear movement, they weren't proper roads, they were paths, winding paths, that this was between 80 and 100 kilometres in depth. (5)Now, during the fighting in combat, it is a route and a distance which it is difficult to cross in less than eight to ten days, but the 28th Division did so in a shorter space of time, that is to say, quicker; probably partially because the units along its path, along their path, failed to do what they should have done in a situation of that kind and (10)had they put a stop to this retreat in the way that that should have been done.

• Q.: General Radinovic, in response to my question you told and explained to the Trial Chamber what the VRS failed to do and what it should have done in pursuit of the enemy, but I think my question was what (15)action did the VRS take. Not what action it did not take, but what action did it take. How did it deal with the 28th Division?

• A.: The army of Republika Srpska applied a method which was available to it at the time, which was open to it -- in view of the fact that the Drina Corps immediately after the Srebrenica operation received an (20)assignment to launch another operation for Zepa, they applied the method of ambushes, ambushes at these lines, and they used the forces that were available to them in the area. So these ambushes and obstacles were placed immediately after the ring around Srebrenica. The next one was positioned at the (25)Kasaba-Konjevic Polje road, the following one is at Snagovo where the

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(1)arrows are, the two arrows, and the fourth was in the zone of responsibility of the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade. Where it says the 16th of July, that position there. So that unit in retreat had to overcome several successive (5)ambushes and obstacles that the forces had placed in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] I'd like to ask the usher to prepare Prosecution Exhibit 540 and 550, Exhibits 540 and 550.

• Q.: General Radinovic, in retreating from the zone of responsibility (10)from the Srebrenica zone, the 28th Division established combat contact with part of the forces belonging to the Drina Corps, and they were the forces of the Zvornik Brigade. What operative problems did the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade have to solve from the 13th of July, and how did he endeavour to solve the problems that arose?

(15) • A.: I have a document that I've already mentioned dated the 13th of July. It is the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade in the role of commander, sending --

• Q.: I apologise, just one moment. It is Exhibit 540.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could the usher please place Exhibit (20)540 on the ELMO so as to facilitate the work of the Trial Chamber.

• A.: On the 13th, therefore, the command of the Zvornik Brigade, and the Chief of Staff acting as commander, informs the command of the Drina Corps that with the aim of blocking the groups retreating towards Tuzla and -- from Srebrenica and Tuzla, and that the following measures were (25)undertaken: that a platoon of the military police had organised an ambush

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(1)at Dzafin Kamen, and that is here. That is this location here, Dzafin Kamen. That was where the military police platoon was. And some intervention platoons from the 5th Battalion and the 6th Battalion, they organised an ambush here in this part. And it is the Snagovo region, (5)Snagovo. Now, what am I able to deduce from that? I am able to deduce from that that the commander - the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade acting as commander, actually - did not assess the situation seriously enough, nor was he conscious of the forces that he had to face, until he came face (10)to face with them in this area here. Only then, when he came up against those forces, the forces of the 28th Division, and when they were able to break the ambush that was set up, and when they moved -- started moving towards Zvornik, from that time on, that is to say, from the 14th of July, in actual fact, the Chief of Staff was -- asked the command of the brigade (15)to return - he was panic-stricken, if I can use that term - and parts of the brigade at Zepa to deal with this serious operational situation which occurred in the zone of responsibility of that brigade. And as a result of his demands, the commander, the Corps Commander, orders the Zvornik Brigade to return to the zone of responsibility. And already on the 15th (20)of July the commander of the Zvornik Brigade reached the zone of responsibility with the men he had brought from Zepa, and that is when a very serious settling of accounts began with the 28th Division. And that was a life-and-death -- they fought to the death. It was a life-and-death situation.

(25) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] May we have Prosecution Exhibit 550

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(1)placed on the ELMO now, please. It is a daily combat report, that is to say, an extraordinary report of the Zvornik Brigade, an interim report, an interim report which illustrates the position that the Zvornik Brigade found itself in.

(5) • Q.: General Radinovic, when did the commander of the Zvornik Brigade return to his area of responsibility and what kind of steps did he take in order to improve the situation in his area of responsibility?

• A.: This report also comes from the Chief of Staff acting as commander. It is dated the 14th of July, 1995 and it is a consequence of (10)an ambush which took place in his area of responsibility. He is informing the Drina Corps command that a group -- that is, that the column of Muslims is 3 kilometres long and that he is expecting that they should attempt to have contact with the forces of his brigade. He further on states: "Try to find some means of bringing in more intervention forces (15)early in the morning," otherwise he would be unable to defend his area of responsibility. This is an appeal issued by the brigade commander, and the Drina Corps command replied to his request by pulling out the forces of the Zvornik Brigade from the Zepa area and sending those forces back to the (20)area of responsibility of that brigade. And the commander in question is beginning to deal with the situation in his area of responsibility. This turned out not to be enough, and what ensued was a very complex operational situation which might have led to the separation -- to the splitting of the area of responsibility of that brigade in two parts.

(25) • Q.: How do you assess the situation in the area of the Zvornik Brigade

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(1)and what kind of consequences could be expected from the intensity of the combat activities?

• A.: The intensity of the combat activities in the area of the Zvornik Brigade from the 14th of July, then going on to the 15th, the 16th, and (5)the 17th of July, is something that I can qualify as very high intensity. So the highest level of intensity took place in the area where we can read the date, the 16th of July, 1995, at the tip of the arrow there, in that particular area. Those activities were taking place at such an intensity that it was -- it could be expected that the 28th Division would suffer (10)great losses. During those activities the Zvornik Brigade suffered losses amongst their members. They had 39 killed in combat, 5 missing, who were also probably killed, and over 200 men were placed en ordre de combat. Let me give you an illustration to try to describe for you how intense the attack was. It was the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade (15)who found itself in the most difficult situation, where this arrow is on the map. The forces of the 28th Division managed to pierce through the positions of the 4th Battalion and to take up control of three trenches and to capture a Howitzer battery and three mortars, and practically speaking they were faced with the possibility of being wiped out from that (20)particular area, the members of the 4th Battalion. The brigade commander did something unusual. He opened up the corridor for the members of the 28th Division to pass, and until the main forces of the column had passed through, the corridor was not closed again. The corridor would be closed again only on the 17th of July. And (25)one can say that by the 17th of July, the main forces of the 28th Division

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(1)left the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps and managed to reach the area of Nezuk, which was their objective, that is, the territory which was under the control of the forces of the 2nd Corps -- 2nd Tuzla Corps of the BH army.

(5) • Q.: General Radinovic, do you have any information as to the type of losses of the 28th Division in the area of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade at that time?

• A.: From the documents that I had access to, from the material that I studied, I was not able to establish the exact number of individuals (10)killed in action. However, in view of the intensity of activities and the depth of the territory and the situation in which the members of the 28th Division found themselves, it is perfectly realistic to expect such losses to be very high. I would measure them in thousands, not in hundreds. But I cannot refer you to any specific document to that effect. (15)As regards the books that I studied and the testimony of the witnesses that took part in that pull-out, mention is made of very high casualties at at least two locations: the village of Bare and also at the location just above Snagovo, where you can again read this date, the 16th of July, 1995. So at those two locations, according to what I was able to (20)see from the documents that I studied, the 28th Division suffered greatest losses.

• Q.: General Radinovic, as regards the issuing of the order to break through, what could the command of the 28th Division realistically expect if there had been such a decision, that is, the decision to attempt a (25)breakthrough? What could they realistically expect?

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(1) • A.: Well, I think you would be best assisted in your question if I tell you that it all depended on the individual who made such a decision, and practically speaking I think that he sacrificed the 28th Division by making such a decision. We have had numerous examples in history of (5)warfare of that kind. The Liberation Army of Yugoslavia in the valley of the Sutjeska River in 1943 sacrificed their 7th Banja Division in order to defend themselves from -- in order to protect 4.000 wounded combatants from the German troops. Practically speaking, that division was destroyed. I don't know what were the objectives of the Supreme Command (10)of the BH army concerning the 28th Division. Why would they sacrifice them? That was an operation that had been ordered by them to the 28th Division, and in view of the conditions and circumstances for the execution of such an operation, the objective was, practically speaking, unrealistic and unfathomable. It is hard to imagine for a command who was (15)aware of the consequences that could ensue from such an operation to actually order the execution of it. Once again, I have to repeat that had the forces of the Drina Corps had carried out a proper pursuit, there would be no members of the 28th Division any more, and they did not engage in that pursuit because (20)they were busy with the Zepa operations. I cannot believe that the officers of the supreme command of the BiH army were unable to foresee the consequences of their steps. They are professional officers; they went to the same schools as I did; and they were, in my opinion, perfectly aware of the consequences. As to why they (25)still went ahead with the decision, I really don't know.

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(1) • Q.: After the pullout of the members of the 28th Division, there was a lot of discussion regarding the composition of that division, and members who went across and managed to reach the territory under the BiH army control. Could you tell us something about that?

(5) • A.: I had an opportunity to read what General Sefer Halilovic said about it who was the Commander-in-Chief before General Delic. I think that he was actually right when he spoke about the behaviour and the conduct of the commander of the 2nd Corps and the Supreme Command of the BiH army. (10)The only permissible action when the 28th Division was ordered to attempt a breakthrough, and actually the only justified and possible method and approach was to find free forces and to have them launch an attack from the area, from the direction of Tuzla, and to start moving towards the forces of the 28th Division. (15)I know quite a few things about that matter, and I can say that if that had not been ordered, and if the 28th Division had indeed been ordered to attempt a breakthrough, the only thing that I can conclude is that they were actually sacrificed. And it was -- they were lucky to the extent that the Drina Corps forces were busy with the Zepa operation; (20)otherwise, had that not been the case, the consequences would be far worse. They would be annihilated.

• Q.: General Radinovic, you already told us that it was impossible to establish the accurate number of Muslim combatants who were killed during the breakthrough. What happened with the terrain afterwards? Was a (25)proper clearing operation of the battlefield taken up? What is your

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(1)knowledge to that effect, and what can you tell us about that?

• A.: Well, I have to be very critical about the conduct of the forces of the VRS and the units of the Drina Corps in that respect. There is an obligation which is incumbent on the commanders of the local units which (5)consists of proper searches of the terrain with the objective to locate and find the remaining groups of the enemy forces, and also for the purposes of discovering all kinds of obstacles that can be expected in the theatre of operations. As part of that action, the searching of the terrain, there is (10)something that we call clearing up the battlefield. It is an action which is designed to restore the terrain in question and to bring it back into its former state. It also includes the location of bodies, first of all bodies of people, and then corpses of cattle, and then it includes subsequent burial of those bodies. Whether it was done or not I don't (15)know. I believe it was. However, and this is quite important, that there is no -- there are no documents, there are no reports which would with a certain amount of certainty tell us something about that particular activity. I haven't crossed -- I haven't come across any single report which would contain (20)data about the number of bodies collected and buried as a part of the clearing up of the battlefield. So that is a very serious obstacle when it comes to the need to establish what happened in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, in particular, in that part of the terrain where the members of the 28th (25)Division attempted a breakthrough.

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(1) • Q.: General Radinovic, while studying these materials, you have probably come across a number of documents which indicate that during the breakthrough of the 28th Division through the territory of the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, that there was a certain number of (5)Muslim prisoners of war at that time in that particular area.

• A.: I had an opportunity to study an interim combat report of the commander of the Zvornik Brigade which was dated the 15th of July.

• Q.: We will spend some more time discussing this particular document, if you can be brief and just tell me whether you know about it.

(10) • A.: Yes, I know about the document, and I studied it.

• Q.: Could you tell us if it was in the interest of the VRS to liquidate as many war prisoners as possible?

• A.: No.

• Q.: Why?

(15) • A.: That would be completely contrary to the interests of the VRS. I'm now not talking about humanitarian and legal considerations which are self-implied and understood; I'm talking about the operational aspect of the operation. At the time of the capture of the members of the 28th Division, (20)the VRS had a number of prisoners at the Muslim side, prisoners of their own. So the only factor which would force the Muslim side to accept an exchange was the fact that there were as many war prisoners as possible on the other side, so they needed to have enough people for an exchange. So that would have been the main interest of the VRS, to have as (25)many of prisoners of war as possible for the purposes of an exchange and

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(1)not to liquidate all of them. Once again, I'm not talking about the legal aspects of the -- that particular portion of the operation. That goes without saying.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I think that this (5)would be the convenient moment to adjourn for the day.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, indeed, Mr. Visnjic. We will call it a day, but I have to ask you before we finish how much time do you think you will still need to complete the examination-in-chief?

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I'm running a little (10)late, but I hope that we will be able to finish the examination-in-chief tomorrow. At this point, I cannot tell you whether we'll be able to wind up by 1.00 or 2.00, but we will do our best to complete, to finish the examination-in-chief tomorrow.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We will see. Are you sure that (15)we will be able to finish this tomorrow this week, because if the Prosecutor is going to dedicate the same amount of time as the Defence, I don't think that we will be able to finish with this testimony by the end of the week, but we will see about that tomorrow. Mr. Cayley, do you have any ideas as regards to time that you (20)think you will need for your cross-examination?

MR. CAYLEY: Well, I have to say, Your Honour, based on practice, at least as much time as the Defence has taken; but I hope to try and move to some of the more fundamental issues that the witness has spoken about rather than spending a lot of time on the periphery, but probably at least (25)three days.

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(1) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, because we have one more witness for this week that was supposed to be heard on Monday, the one who was supposed to arrive on Monday. Is he still travelling?

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I believe that (5)Mr. Petrusic has more information about that.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you. You know that we always try to make a programme and not to be caught by surprise at the end of the week.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, the witness who was (10)supposed to arrive last week did not arrive on time because the flight was cancelled; however, yesterday afternoon I was informed that even that flight, due to weather conditions, had to be cancelled for today. So it will be only tonight that I will have information as to when he will arrive. (15)We will discuss the issue with the Prosecution. I don't know how long they intend to cross-examine this witness and the following witness. I don't know whether we should -- whether the whole matter will be -- will go over, will spill over next week, but I'm afraid that I will be able only tomorrow afternoon to inform you on the situation. (20)If we have only that witness next week, if he's the only witness that we would have for next week, maybe it would be a better idea to bring it back in January, but please allow me some time to try and find the reasonable solution together with my colleagues from the Prosecution this afternoon.

(25) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, the reason I asked that

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(1)question was because I was hoping that we would be able to finish, and if necessary, that we could sit tomorrow afternoon if we can hear both witnesses. If that is not possible, we can, I don't know, call him in January or perhaps on Monday. But I have imparted to you our concerns, (5)and I hope that you will be able to give us some information tomorrow. We will continue tomorrow morning at 9.20. The hearing is adjourned for the day.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3:02 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 6th day of December, (10)2000, at 9:20 a.m.