Specified complexity and the failure of Darwinism. –
William Dembski presents another failure of Darwinism, a phenomenon which its evolutionary algorithms cannot account for: specified complexity. Some definitions are in order. The word “cat” is specified but not complex. A random sequence of letters such as “qwpzklergifrjskelbmizyckthxs” is complex but not specified. A passage from Homer’s Iliad is an example of specified complexity, for it is both specified and complex:
Dembski points out that laws of nature explain specification but not complexity, while chance or accidental processes of nature explain complexity but not specification. But how can one explain the genetic code, which is both specified and complex? The scientific community usually uses an evolutionary algorithm, and specified complexity is considered a type of information. An evolutionary algorithm is “any well-defined mathematical procedure that generates contingency via some chance process and then sifts it via some lawlike process” (“CEAGSC?” in Gregersen, ed., FCL, 94). Probability is involved in such algorithms—the more complexity, the less probability. Now, there is a problem with these evolutionary algorithms. They are unable to explain the specified complexity at the origin of life, as well as in the history of life. Some scientists such as Richard Dawkins have tried to formulate algorithms that do generate specified complexity, but Dembski argues that “invariably when evolutionary algorithms appear to generate specified complexity, what they actually do is smuggle in preexisting specified complexity. Indeed, evolutionary algorithms are inherently incapable of generating specified complexity” (ibid., 95).
Also, not only does Darwin’s theory presuppose cosmological fine-tuning and the various anthropic principles, but as Dembski demonstrates, “Cosmology, astrophysics, and geology fail to exhaust the conditions that a fitness function must satisfy if it is to render not just biological evolution but specifically a Darwinian form of it, the grand success we see on planet Earth” (ibid., 111). Dembski concludes,
It is safe to say that if one decides to hold onto the theory of Darwinian evolution (which the rational person is not at all constrained to do), one still has not accounted for the specified complexity found in nature. Chance badly lacks the explanatory power necessary, and Darwinism has also been found wanting.
Meanwhile, specified complexity points unequivocally to design, and to the intelligence of the One in whom all have being.
Self-organization and the Teleological Argument. –
Critics of the Teleological Argument point out that self-organization, the interesting phenomenon that systems tend toward order when left to themselves, seems to diminish the power of the argument, for if things tend toward order already, who needs a Personal Intelligence to order things? But it is actually rather short-sighted to declare that if it is observed that things tend toward order, the Orderer of all things is in no way responsible for this tendency. Niels H. Gregersen argues that if [this Being] is a generous and benevolent Being, then “we should naturally be inclined to think of self-organization as the apex of divine purpose,” for “making the creatures make themselves can be seen as a further emphasis on the autonomy generously bestowed on creatures” (“FADSOC” in Gregersen, ed., FCL, 207).
Now, Gregersen claims that divine design and self-organized complexity are compatible, but says that they must stay contained within two separate spheres. First off,
And secondly,
The Designer has designed the warp and woof of the world, as it were, and self-organization does not negate this. It operates on another level. Others agree. As Gregersen notes, “Even strong critics of religion such as Steven Weinberg admit that ‘if we were to see the hand of the designer anywhere, it would be in the fundamental principles, the final laws of nature, the book of rules that govern all natural phenomena’” (ibid., 209). It seems dogmatic, then, to assert that the Orderer of the universe must order it according to this or that method. Given all this, it would appear that God is not only a Sustainer, Orderer, and Designer, but also an Artist, though one that allows some ugliness in the world. In an age of moral relativism, where diversity of moral positions is supposed to reflect the absence of a natural law of morality inscribed on the hearts of humankind, it is difficult to convince anyone of the truth of premise (1), which Paul in Romans 2:14-15 proclaims. He holds that even apart from the law revealed by God through Scripture, human beings have “the requirements of the law…written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness” (v. 15). The copious objections to this premise all rest on faulty logic. First, some object to the theory of natural law, and say that because the natural law is supposedly made up of objective moral principles, everyone should agree to the same theory about it. But while the secondary elements of the theory are disputed over, the basic content is agreed upon. For example, there are disagreements about whence the moral law originates, whether it is from instinct, operant conditioning, observational learning, or some direct spiritual awareness from God, but that is not relevant. The question of existence and origination are separate. Third, some object that the diversity of moral conduct from culture to culture is proof against the moral law. However, while cultural behavior is diverse, the ethical creeds that every culture holds are substantively similar. Geisler is quick to add that although “there is also diversity of ethical expression among the great cultures,” this fact “no more negates their essential unanimity regarding natural law than diversity of belief among evangelicals negates their unity on the essential Christian teachings” (ibid., 76). He says that it is “natural for man to project his guilt upon other people and upon God. But he does not thereby get rid of it, and the rebellion against others and against God which results becomes in turn a source of fresh impulsions to evil, and therefore of more guilt” (ibid., 141).
Apologetics pg. 1
Design qua beauty and God qua Artist. –
Some think that beauty is a purely subjective notion, but there are reasons to think that beauty has an objective dimension as well. First, if there were no objective criterion for what passes as beautiful, a painting by Vincent Van Gogh would not actually have any more beauty or aesthetic value than a four-year-old’s finger painting. Aesthetic relativism is unfounded, and should be rejected in favor of aesthetic realism (which does not, as some might think it would, necessitate the denial of the subjective element of beauty). Second, cross-cultural studies have shown that people generally agree about what is beautiful, even if they cannot always describe what makes a thing beautiful. Third, the contention that people merely learn what is beautiful observationally may be rejected on the basis of studies in which infants, when presented with the image of two faces of noticeable aesthetic inequality, spend more time looking upon the face of greater beauty. Again, this is not to say that there is no learning in regard to beauty, just that beauty is not wholly learned.
Beauty may be roughly defined as “A quality associated with harmony of form and color, excellence of craftsmanship, and originality.” Now, the world contains an abundance of beauty, much more than one might expect if one picked a possible universe at random. Says Swinburne, “A priori…there is no particular reason for expecting a basically beautiful rather than a basically ugly world. In consequence, that fact would be evidence for God’s existence.” (Since God’s existence has been established, one could use the argument from design qua beauty as further corroboration of God’s personal intelligence.) He continues,
Few…would deny that our universe (apart from its animal and human inhabitants, and aspects subject to their immediate control) has beauty. Poets and painters and ordinary men down the centuries have long admired the beauty of the orderly procession of the heavenly bodies, the scattering of the galaxies through the heavens (in some ways random, in some ways orderly), and the rocks, sea, and wind interacting on earth,…and the plants of the jungle and of temperate climates, contrasting with the desert and the Arctic wastes. Who in his senses would deny that here is beauty in abundance? If we confine ourselves to the argument from the beauty of the inanimate and plant worlds, the argument surely works (op cit., 68).
The Moral Argument, natural law, and God qua Moral Lawgiver. –
God’s existence has already been established. Now the attributes of God are being established. This argument shows God to be a Divine Lawgiver. This is, to be sure, a very simple argument, but as it relies on the truth of natural law, if it is conclusively demonstrated that such a concept is merely a concoction of St. Paul and irrationally promoted by later thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and John Locke, then this argument should fail miserably. But even if it is shown that there is such a thing as natural law, the argument could still come to grief if it is poorly constructed or improperly utilized. It must be noted that the Moral Argument proceeds from the foundation laid by the vertical Cosmological Argument, and in this way is very similar to the Teleological Argument in form:
(1) Humans have a natural law of morality written on their hearts (they have consciences and experience psychological guilt for wrongdoing, etc.).
(2) God, as the First Cause of existence, has ordered and designed creation in a purposive fashion.
(3) Hence, the moral law on the hearts of humankind is not accidental, but purposeful. (1-2)
(4) What comes from God participates to some extent in God’s nature.
(5) God is essentially immutable, eternal and perfect.
(6) Therefore, the moral law fashioned by God is immutable, eternal and perfect. (4-5)
A second objection is the very fact that some deny the moral law, but this is just what Paul said people would do, on account of their fallen nature. In Romans 1:18 he writes that fallen human beings “suppress the truth by their wickedness” (“hold the truth in unrighteousness” in the KJV). J. Budziszewski says that “we pretend to ourselves that we do not know what we really do know,” and that “[p]ersistence in such pretense darkens or perverts such natural knowledge as God has given us” (WH, 183). Geisler elaborates:
In the same way that we know God’s external natural revelation, we also come to know God’s natural revelation in our internal moral nature, the one “written on our hearts.”…Natural law can be seen “instinctively” (Rom. 2:14 NASB). We know what is right and wrong by our own natural intuitions; our very nature predisposes us in that direction.
The most basic key to…moral law is found in human inclinations.…[W]e have in our very nature a natural inclination toward knowing what is morally right. To be sure, as fallen beings we do not always follow it (Rom. 7) and, thus, have a natural tendency toward doing what is wrong. However, we know what is right instinctively, even when we do not do it. We know it by way of inclination, even when we do not perform it by way of action. Further, we know what is wrong deep down inside, even when we do not think it is wrong, for we know things by inclination even when we sometimes reject them by cognition [or rationalization]. This is because our cognition is influenced by our depraved condition. Our choosing obscures our knowing.…
Our moral inclinations are manifested in our reactions when others violate our rights; we don’t see the moral law nearly as clearly when we violate others’ rights. Herein is revealed our depravity. But again our sinfulness is not found in our inability to know what the moral duty is but in our unwillingness to do it to others. (ST, vol. 1, 74-5)
The fourth objection brought against proponents of natural law is that virtually every moral principle it is said to include can be denied by someone. But as has been noted above, one can suppress the knowledge of the moral law. Furthermore, this suppression can be a form of repression, as noted by Budziszewski. He points that repressed guilt can take many forms, such as the compulsion to rationalize or unexplainable emotional distress. He cites the symptoms of women who experience postabortion stress as one example of the latter. In thousands of recovery groups symptoms such as these are reported: “anxiety, compulsive promiscuity, inability to bond even with wanted children, resentment of other women’s children, and depression, especially around the anniversary of the abortion or the day on which the baby would have been born” (op. cit., 67). Dr. Paul Tournier writes, “Guilt is no invention of the Bible or of the Church. It is present universally in the human soul. Modern psychology confirms this Christian dogma without any reservations” (GG, 135). He expresses his gladness when professed unbelievers voice their complaints against God. Says Tournier,
It seems to me,” he says, “such a man honours God more truly than many believers who accept the drama of human life too superficially. He takes the omnipotence and holiness of God seriously; and he also indirectly reveals the sensitivity of his conscience and his own personal feeling of guilt, because he experiences the need to project it upon God. (ibid., 140)
The second premise of this argument is supported by the argumentation in the preceding six sections in which it was demonstrated that God appears to have created the design inherent in the universe: design qua order, complexity, simplicity, artistry, etc. It can be denied, but not without proper reasoning. Fortunately, if it is denied, there are other arguments leading back to the truth of natural law waiting some distance up ahead some.
Premise (3) follows from (1) and (2), but it is possible to conceive some objections to it. However, most conceivable objections can be responded to, and it appears a reasonable enough premise.
The fourth premise is, to be sure, controversial, and shall be argued for in the next section. If it is successfully defended, then (6) follows, because (5) is shown true by the vertical Cosmological Argument. The conclusion, then, is that there is an immutable, eternal, perfect natural law given by a God who is seen now to be a Moral Lawgiver. The consequences of this moral law shall be addressed later in this comprehensive apologetic.
Apologetics pg. 2
Apologetics pg. 3
Apologetics pg. 4
References for Apologetics
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Reasons to Believe
