Postwar Iraq : A Regional Analysis

By E. R. Anders - 8/21/03

The purpose here is to assess what Iraq’s neighbors will do in response to the establishment (to a greater or lesser degree) of a pro-Western, democratically oriented government in Baghdad. The Lockwood Analytical Method of Prediction (LAMP) is the primary tool involved in this analysis. Other analysts are encouraged to use LAMP to further their work and come to an even better understanding of the issues involved than I have presented here.

Also presented here is an effort to assess the utility of Bayesian analysis to supplement LAMP. Software from Bayesia S. A. was selected for evaluation and explanation of how to use the tool is presented in ANNEX A. The incorporation of BayesiaLab in this analysis allows for continued analysis of the situation in Iraq as circumstances and "actors" change. Consequently, this paper can be seen as a starting-point for assessment with LAMP and BayesiaLab as the primary analytical tools.

Lastly, whatever fault or failings there may be in the findings of the analysis presented here, they are solely those of the author.

STEP 1: Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future.

How will Iraq’s neighbors react to the establishment of a pro-Western, democratically oriented state in Iraq?

Turkey, Syria, and Iran all have an enormous stake, politically and economically, in post-war Iraq. According to one observer, Iraq’s neighbors in the Arab World are already in conditions of acute political and economic crisis:

An exploding population (38 percent is under 14 years of age) will have to fight for scarce resources: The 22 Arab countries have a combined gross domestic product less than Spain's.... Labor productivity fell between 1960 and 1990, while it soared elsewhere. Even Africa outperformed the Arab world in rates of economic growth and the incidence of constitutional government between 1975 and 1990. Hanson.

Worse still is the failure of Islamists throughout the Arab world to successfully resolve conflicts with "modern notions of democracy, liberty, justice, and gender equality." This failure figures large in what the autocratic governments in the Middle East are likely to do in response to the prospect of a democratic Iraq. Furthermore, few Arab States have made any genuine attempt at securing political and social freedom for their people:

The area is rich in all the outward trappings of democracy. Elections are held and human-rights conventions are signed. But the great wave of democratization that has opened up so much of the world over the past 15 years seems to have left the Arabs untouched. Democracy is occasionally offered, but as a concession, not as a right. The Economist

One might argue that the poor record of democratization in the region is a good indication of how Iraq’s neighbors will respond. They are likely to perceive, when faced with a pro-Western, democratically oriented Iraq in their midst, that their options are severely limited; use military force, or rely solely on diplomacy and hope for the best.

STEP 2: Specify the national "actors" involved.

Six nations surround Iraq, however, the national "actors" that might influence future events in any significant way are Turkey, Syria, and Iran. While, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait can be seen as supporting players, they are more likely to be supporters of the of a pro-Western, democratically oriented government in Iraq. Nothing before or after the U.S. victory of Saddam’s regime would seem to indicate otherwise (No doubt some analysts will dispute this observation–although carefully considered–it remains a basic assumption in this analysis).

STEP 3: Perform an in-depth study of how each national actor perceives the issue in question.

Turkey

The prospect of Turkish troops pouring across the border and into the rugged mountains of northern Iraq raised alarms among the Kurds even before the Allies closed in on Baghdad, sealing the fate of Saddam’s doomed regime. Turkey fears an independent Kurdish state in Iraq will encourage its large Kurdish ethnic minority to call for a separate state of their own. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) deny they have any intentions of seeking national independence, and instead are working together to exert influence in Iraqi national politics. Turkey’s concerns, however, remain strong. Due to diplomatic pressure from Turkey Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, who had seized Kirkuk in Northern Iraq, were forced to leave and hand over the city to US troops. With an estimated 2000 troops in Iraqi Kurdistan, mostly near Bamarni Airport, Turkey can quickly increase the number of its forces in Northern Iraq and change its mission from one of a "Peacekeeping Force" to one of permanent occupation. Such a step, however, would likely not be without considerable bloodshed. Both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have sworn to fight any such occupation.

A stable, pro-Western, democratically oriented Iraq, with a fully engaged and participating Kurdish population would help alleviate Ankara’s worst fears and make military intervention unlikely. Along with political stability in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey would benefit from much needed revitalized economic trade in the region.

Syria

Although Syria voted in favor of United Nations Resolution 1441, calling on Saddam to give up his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Syria vehemently opposed any initiative leading to a U.S. invasion of Iraq. On the surface, Syria’s response to Allied success in the war against Iraq seems to be unexpected conciliatory. Syria denies sheltering former members of the Iraqi regime, despite U.S. accusations to the contrary. Syria has taken strong measures to tone down somewhat anti-American rhetoric in the government-controlled press. Damascus also indicated it would not interfere in Iraq's internal affairs as the U.S. struggles against radical Islamist opposition to building a pro-Western, democratically oriented government in Baghdad. Whether, Syrian leaders make good on their promise remains to be seen. According to one report, Operation Peninsula Strike uncovered a mix of "foreign fighters," believed recruited and supplied by Syrian military intelligence. Clearly, Syria’s actions will be governed, in part, on the fate of the Sunni population in Iraq and to the degree that population feels threatened by the Kurds in the North and the Shi’a in the South of Iraq.

Iran

Troubling reports that Iran is allowing Islamic militants sanctuary indicate Iran very well might favor covert operations to destabilize Iraq despite any Allied success in creating a pro-Western, Democratically oriented, secular government in Iraq. The likelihood of Iranian involvement would certainly increase should Shi’a clerics in Iraq, urged and supported by radical Islamists, launch a general uprising in an attempt to overthrow the secular, democratic government in Baghdad.

STEP 4: Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.

History shows that in the clash of wills that is international politics in the raw, nation-states have only two real possible courses of action-- military force and diplomacy. Military action can be anywhere along the spectrum from overt activities (e.g., mobilization and deployment of armed forces) to covert activities (e.g., espionage, sabotage, and assassination). In the later part of the 20^th Century, with the rise of international political institutions like the United Nations, the World Bank and other non-state organizations (e.g., NATO, Arab League, OPEC) diplomacy and the court of international opinion offer a possible satisfactory alternative to outright military conflict. Consequently, these two possible courses of action are examined for each "actor":

Turkey:

1. Decides to become militarily involved (M).

2. Decides to rely on diplomacy to protect Turkey’s interests (D).

Syria:

1. Decides to step-up covert military involvement (M).

2. Decides to rely on diplomacy to protect Iran’s interest (D).

Iran:

1. Decides to step-up covert military involvement (M).

2. Decides to rely on diplomacy to protect Iran’s interests (D).

STEP 5: Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternate futures.

One must argue that each of the five states surrounding Iraq have some potential to employ some form of military action to secure their political and economic interests. How likely they may be to use armed force and as to what success one or any might have compared are questions for another and separate analysis. Considering each of Iraq’s neighbors and the likelihood that they would actually employ military means as a response to the creation of a pro-Western, democratically oriented Iraq--all but three can be eliminated.

Jordan can be eliminated because establishment of a pro-Western, democratically oriented Iraq would be very much to Amman’s benefit. Should circumstances in Iraq change and civil war breakout between or among Kurds, Shi’a and Sunni, (perhaps with U.S. troops caught in the middle) Jordan would have already prepared the diplomatic foundation for making a bid to join Jordan and Sunni-populated areas in Iraq to form a united "Hashemite" kingdom. According to at least one analysis:

King Abdullah will vastly expand his role and prominence in the region with a joint Hashemite state, becoming the second-most important US ally after Israel. In addition to his huge territorial gains, he also will get a chunk of Iraqi oil.

Saudi Arabia can be eliminated because Riyadh would hardly benefit from using its military against an U.S. backed Iraq. Countering criticism from some quarters, the Saudi’s are very eager to publicize government efforts to crackdown on terrorists, particularly following the May 2003 bombing in Riyadh. As long as the Saudi Royal family remains in power, a military threat from Riyadh is unlikely. Kuwait, a long time U.S. ally in the region, can be eliminated as a military threat for the same reason. Turkey, Syria and Iran might find justification for threatening military action and all for the same reason. How fairly each of the major ethnic groups in Iraq feel they are being treated by the new Baghdad government will determine in a very large degree how each, any or all of Iraq’s neighbors respond.

These three scenarios are considered here:

1. The Iranian Opening (IO): Iraq’s Shi’a majority calls for the overthrow the new government in Baghdad. Fearing erosion of their political position the Shi’a see no benefit in relying on diplomatic means to secure their place in the new Iraq. Among growing fears of a strategic shift in favor of the U.S. in the region, some form of overt military action involving ground troops crossing the border into Iraq, begins to seem the only logical alternative to the prospect of a secular, economically successful, pro-Western, democratically oriented government remaining in control in Iraq. Internal discord further fostered by the more radical Islamists, along with a growing and restless population, and continued economic strife, all figure heavily in the minds of the ruling clerics in Tehran.

2. The Turkish Gambit (TG): Iraqi Kurds, now in de facto control of large areas of northern Iraq, petition the new government in Iraq for full political. The Kurds point to what they see as the continued "occupation" of Turkish "peacekeeping" troops in northern region of Iraq as justification. Ruling out unconventional military action and continued diplomacy to protect, and with troops on the ground, and growing political pressure at home to do something, Ankara begins to consider moves to seize Kirkuk and the rich oil fields in Kurdish Iraq.

3. The Syrian Stalemate (SC): A great deal is at stake for Damascus and with its back against the wall with Israel over Lebanon, Syria’s ruling Ba ‘ath socialists may be tempted to increase the use of military force (conventional or unconventional) in hopes of destabilizing the new democratic government in Iraq. Such action might prove a useful distraction and a means to boost Syrian prominence in the region. The shock of Allied success in defeating Iraq’s military so quickly and completely, however, still resonates loudly in the minds of leaders and people in throughout the Middle East including Syria. Further covert actions might be deemed too risky, politically and militarily. The U.S. did not hesitate to put both Iran and Syria on notice about interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq. These warnings and the presence of Coalition Forces in the region, and the success of Operation Peninsula Strike, may be enough to convince Syria, if not Iran that diplomacy is still the best policy.

STEP 6: Calculate the total number of permutations of possible "alternate futures" for each scenario.

Using the formula X^y = Z, where X equals the total number of courses of action available, ^y equals the total number of actors and Z equals the total number of alternate futures for comparison.

Scenario 1 (IO): 2³ = 8

Scenario 2 (TG): 2³ = 8

Scenario 3 (SS): 2³ = 8

STEP 7: Perform a pairwise comparison of all "alternate futures" to determine their relative probability.

Scenario 1: Iranian Opening (IO)

Alternate Future	Iran	Turkey	Syria	Votes
1	M	M	M	0
2	M	M	D	4
3	M	D	D	7
4	D	D	D	6
5	D	D	M	3
6	D	M	M	1
7	D	M	D	2
8	M	D	M	4

Scenario 2: Turkish Gambit (TG)

Alternate Future	Iran	Turkey	Syria	Votes
1	M	M	M	0
2	M	M	D	4
3	M	D	D	1
4	D	D	D	5
5	D	D	M	3
6	D	M	M	6
7	D	M	D	7
8	M	D	M	2

Scenario 3: Syrian Stalemate (SS)

Alternate Future	Iran	Turkey	Syria	Votes
1	M	M	M	0
2	M	M	D	1
3	M	D	D	2
4	D	D	D	7
5	D	D	M	5
6	D	M	M	3
7	D	M	D	6
8	M	D	M	3

STEP 8: Rank the "alternate futures" for each scenario from highest relative probability to the lowest based on the number of "votes" received.

Scenario 1: Iranian Opening (OL)

Alternate Future	Iran	Turkey	Syria	Votes
3	M	D	D	7
4	D	D	D	6
2	M	M	D	4
8	M	D	M	4
5	D	D	M	3
7	D	M	D	2
6	D	M	M	1
1	M	M	M	0

Scenario 2: Turkish Gambit (TG)

Alternate Future	Iran	Turkey	Syria	Votes
7	D	M	D	7
6	D	M	M	6
4	D	D	D	5
2	M	M	D	4
5	D	D	M	3
8	M	D	M	2
3	M	D	D	1
1	M	M	M	0

Scenario 3: Syrian Stalemate (SS)

Alternate Future	Iran	Turkey	Syria	Votes
4	D	D	D	7
7	D	M	D	6
5	D	D	M	5
6	D	M	M	3
8	M	D	M	3
3	M	D	D	2
2	M	M	D	1
1	M	M	M	0

STEP 9: Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each "alternate future" in terms of its consequences for the issue in question.

What will they do?

Based on the analysis of the voting, it seems unlikely that Syria, Iran and Turkey will select, all at the same time, the military option in response to any of the three scenarios examined (Alternate Future 1). Given all things being equal, it would seem all three will pursue the diplomatic course if each of the others do so as well (Alternate Future 4). If one or more of Iraq’s neighbors responds to the appeal from their respective client or ethnic affiliate, only Syria would most likely not respond in kind to address what may perceived as an imbalance of power in Iraq. Also based on the analysis should Turkey seem ready and willing to initiate military action (Turkish Gambit) then all bets are off, as to what the others might do.

STEP 10: State the potential of a given alternate future to "transpose" into another alternate future.

The key factor in the analysis seems to be the role Radical Islamists in Syria, Iran and Iraq might play with regard to any of the alternate futures where military force is employed. The religious, ethnic, political and economic competition between and among the Shi’a in Southern Iraq, the Sunni in Central Iraq and as well as the Kurds in Northern Iraq create the dynamics for one or more of Iraq’s neighbors to intervene. Based on pairwise comparisons, a Shi’a uprising against the new, democratic government in Iraq may very well draw Iran into the action. The minority Sunni’s may appeal to Syria for help but are unlikely to receive anything other than sympathy. Turkey on the other hand, intervening strongly in the oil rich Iraqi Kurdistan is another matter. More the response from the international community is likely to send the signal as to whether intervention by Syria and Iran, to protect their ethnic clients, would be tolerated. Although, the voting seems to favor a diplomatic response should either Turkey or Iran intervene militarily, "transposing" into circumstances where either Syria on the one hand or either Iran on the other doing likewise can not be entirely ruled out. Again, the determining factor is to what degree Iraq’s neighbors feel their religious, political and ethnic affiliates are threatened.

STEP 11: Determine the "focal events" that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given "alternate future".

Scenario 1: Iranian Opening (OL)

Alternate Future	Iran	Turkey	Syria	Votes
3	M	D	D	7

Alternate Future 3.

Focal Event 1.

A crackdown by the police and military of the newly formed Iraqi government against Shi’a Islamists would be a key focal event to bring about the Iranian Opening.

Focal Event 2.

A sudden "Iraqi Revolt" against the new representative government in post-Saddam Iraq. The crisis, probably inflamed by Shi’a Islamists would provide an opening for Iran to send ground troops into Basrah.

Focal Event 3

Attempts to stem the flow of refugees into Iran fail. Already burdened with more than 200,000 Iraqi refugees, the prospect of even more prompts Iran to send in ground troops to create a "buffer" to deal with the flow.

Scenario 2: Turkish Gambit (TG)

Alternate Future	Iran	Turkey	Syria	Votes
7	D	M	D	7

Alternate Future 7.

Focal Event 1.

A joint declaration by the PUK and KDP calling for the creation of an independent Kurdistan.

Focal Event 2.

Iraqi Kurds begin attacking Turkish troops in northern Iraq attempt to provoke a reaction from Ankara and thereby focus international attention on their stateless plight.

Scenario 3: Syrian Stalemate (SS)

Alternate Future	Iran	Turkey	Syria	Votes
4	D	D	D	7

Alternate Future 3.

Focal Event 1.

Growing numbers of Sunni refugee’s fleeing across the becomes excessively burdensome. Syria asks the United Nations Security Council for help in stabilizing the refugee flow.

Focal Event 2.

A sudden new political assertiveness of Shi’a Muslims worries Syria sufficiently to call on other Arab states, possibly the Arab League itself, to step in and moderate the crisis.

STEP 12: Develop indicators for the focal events.

Indication of Iranian intentions to intervene militarily would be an obvious build-up of conventional forces along the border with Iraq. Large-scale infiltration of regular army troops into Basra would be tantamount to a declaration of war against the new government in Baghdad. Iranian propaganda, registering in all the media, particularly television, would be used to counter any complaint from the international community and would be used to gain support from the Shi’a community at large.

Indication of Turkish intentions would be equally clear. An increase in the number and types of regular army troops already in Northern Iraq, and expanding deployment of forces from and outside of Bamarni Airport would be the most visible indicator. Further build-up of military forces and the seizure of Kirkuk and the oil rich regions in Northern Iraq would leave no doubt. All of the indicators would certainly be attended by vocal and violent opposition from the Kurds in the region.

Indication of Syria’s intentions is more problematical. . Already, deeply involved in sending so-called "foreign fighters" across the border to attack U.S. troops, any identifiable, Syrian regular army troops caught or killed by Coalition forces would be a clear indication of stepped-up military involvement by Damascus. On the other hand, appeal to the United Nations would be the first indicator for seeking a diplomatic solution should the situation in Iraq warrant. Damascus could also try to make a case to the U.S., both in open diplomatic consultation and back-channel discussions.

Future Analysis

The current assessment presumes the development of a vibrant and successful pro-Western, democratically oriented government in Iraq; within the confines of the usual turmoil that surrounds the creation of a new nation. Such may not be the reality. One scenario that merits a separate analysis is the failure to create a pro-Western, democratically oriented government at all in Iraq. Ethnic strife between and among Iraqi Kurds, Sunni's and Shiites can not be ruled out. One or more of Iraq's neighbors might use such discord to justify resorting to military force; perhaps preemptively. In the face of a sudden and rapidly accelerating crisis, and regardless of how painful the memory of previous historical attempts in the Middle East, partitioning may be the best "alternative" future of all for Iraq.

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ANNEX A

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According to Lionel Jouffe (see: http://www.bayesiaLab.com), BayesiaLab is well suited for augmenting and extending a LAMP analysis. Attached are network set-up files he developed for the Iraq analysis presented here. However, Jouffe, in an email correspondence to this author, suggested a much more illustrative example, offering more interaction between and among "actors" in the LAMP analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian problem by Alex Corbin. (see: http://www.lamp-method.com/Alex_Corbin.doc).

Jouffe offered the following instructions:

"I have attached to this mail the network I have designed to partially model this problem (you need BayesiaLab 1.3.1 to be able to load it as it has an attached map and tagged nodes. If you have BayesiaLab 1.3, you can download the release 1.3.1 on our web site www.bayesia.com ).

Indeed, BayesiaLab is well suited to model these kinds of problems. Here is the methodology I used:

1. Go directly to the step 11 of the Lamp method to define what the Indicators are (green nodes in the network). These nodes have a modality for each possible value. For example, Ind Israel has two modalities: Hard-liner Ariel Sharon leads polls by a 20 point margin in January 2001 Ehud Barak’s last minute emphasis and drive on the peace process appeals to the populace

2. Go to step 10 to determine what the Focal Events are. These nodes have direct probabilistic dependencies with the Indicators. For example, the victory of Sharon depends on the poll and the violence.

3. Finally, you have to define the Courses of Actions nodes (white nodes). These nodes depend directly of the Focal Events. If you want to implement the Alternate Futures of the Lamp method, these nodes are deterministic and you associate to each combination of Focal Events the Course of Action of the winning Alternate Feature. Otherwise, you can put probabilities on COA to be more precise.

You can then observe the green nodes, the indicators (sensors of the world), and BayesiaLab then computes the probability distributions of the Courses of Action of each actor. Actually, you can use BayesiaLab to do inference in every direction, i.e. you can observe some Courses of Action to see their impacts.... You can also play with your model with "What if" scenarios."

Further experimentation in using BayesiaLab in conjunction with LAMP is clearly warranted and as analysts gain experience in using both; the resulting analyses can only benefit.

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