Reforming Intelligence
E. R. Anders- 12/23/03

The September 11^th surprise attack on the United States resulted in charges of "intelligence failure" and shrill rebuke of the Intelligence Community from critics inside and outside the US government (Harris). Calls for "Intelligence Reform" including far-reaching restructuring of the CIA and FBI were many. Democrats in the US Senate, for example, introduced legislation to create a Cabinet-level Director of National Intelligence to oversee and direct the work of the CIA, FBI and the dozens of other agencies that collect information and produce intelligence (Sataline). Suggestions for reform of the Intelligence Community are not new. 

At least a dozen studies or reports by government commissions have been published since 1996; all focusing on some aspect of intelligence reform (Hill). The purpose of this paper is to examine and compare the results of the 1997 study chaired by General William E. Odom, entitled Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21^st Century, (hereafter the "Odom Study") with the findings and recommendations of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, Final Report of the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into September 11, released July 24, 2002 (hereafter the "Joint Inquiry", or "Joint Inquiry Report").

General William E. Odom, a retired army lieutenant general, former director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and assistant chief of staff for intelligence in the Department of the Army was considered well qualified to chair a panel to study reform of the United States Intelligence Community (IC) (Freedman). First published in 1997, the "Odom Study" received praise for the candor of its recommendations. Similar acclaim followed publication by National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) in January 2002 as Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century with a Note from the Study Chairman. Asked to testifying before the Joint Intelligence Committee in October 2002, General Odom identified three "overarching" issues for structural reform of the Intelligence Community he felt were most relevant to the Committee's work:

"The first concerns the orchestration of the intelligence process within the Intelligence Community. The second concerns management of resources, i.e., getting more intelligence for the dollar, and the third concerns counterintelligence, which is key for dealing with terrorism as well as hostile intelligence services." (Odom, "Testimony", 2).

The Odom Study is primarily an examination of the structure and management of the Intelligence Community (IC) at large, and not just the CIA and FBI. Odom identified as a major concern, however, the role of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Odom concluded as long as the DCI was "double-hatted" as the director of the CIA, he or she could not "stand above the Intelligence Community" and manage the IC accordingly (Odom, "Testimony" 2). In his testimony before the Joint Intelligence Committee, Odom proposed three major reforms, one pertaining to program planning and budget, and two recommending changes in the current role of the DCI.

". . . separate the DCI from the Director of Central Intelligence, giving him organizational support, and create national managers for the three collection disciplines. . . . create a National Counterintelligence Service under the DCI." (Odom, "Testimony" 4).

". . . create a National Counterintelligence Service under the DCI." (Odom, "Testimony" 4).

Odom was specific in recommending the creation of "national managers" for Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and Counterintelligence (CI), all answering to the DCI. Odom, in his testimony before the Joint Intelligence Committee, stated this arrangement would be a solution to a critical managerial problem.

"His (DCI) executive management organ, the Intelligence Executive Committee, includes senior intelligence managers, but none have the control over programs that allow the DCI to hold them accountable for presenting and ‘Planning Program Budget’ analysis, the kind that has been used in the Pentagon for forty years." (Odom, "Testimony", 3").

In his review of the Intelligence Community, Odom singled out Counterintelligence (CI) as being, "in the worst shape of all," stating five different organizations--CIA, FBI and three military services of the DoD, run counterintelligence operations with no overall manager in charge (Odom, "Testimony", 3). Odom told the Joint Intelligence Committee that, "The parochialism, fragmentation and incompetence are difficult to exaggerate in the US counterintelligence world." The Odom Study itself was particularly critical of the FBI’s performance during the 1980’s and 1990’s remarking that while there was no steady decline, the performance overall was poor (Odom, "Testimony", 3).

Odom’s solution was to pull CI out of the FBI and create a National Counterintelligence Service (NCIS). This new service would be headed by a National Director for Counterintelligence (NDCI) and placed under the DCI, would have operational oversight of CI operations of the CIA and the three military services of the DoD (Odom, "Testimony"). Odom made clear, however, that he was not recommending a so-called "MI-5" solution, stressing the national counterintelligence oversight role of his NCIS and the fact it would not have arrest powers, "That can be left to the FBI and other law enforcement organizations." (Odom, "Testimony" 3).

In February 2002, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence conducted a Joint Inquiry into U.S. Intelligence Community activities leading up to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. Although there are differences, particularly with respect to the role of DCI, the Joint Inquiry drew heavily on the previous work of General Odom when it considered recommendations for reforming the Intelligence Community. The following key recommendations of the Joint Inquiry have significant implications for the organizational structure of the CIA and FBI.

1. Amend the National Security Act of 1947 to create a Director of National Intelligence as a Cabinet level position.

2. Require that no one serve simultaneously as Director of National Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or any other intelligence agency.

3. Strengthen and improve the domestic intelligence capability of the FBI.

4. Maximize the exchange of counterterrorism information between the FBI and other state, local and federal agencies.

5. Ensure that "the FBI disseminates results of searches and surveillance authorized under FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) to appropriate personnel within the FBI and Intelligence Community on a timely basis so they may be used for analysis and operations that address terrorist threats to the United States;" (Joint Inquiry, "Final Report", 9).

The Joint Inquiry also recommended ways to improve intelligence infrastructure and personnel training of the FBI and suggested efforts be made to improve the basic education and career management of intelligence analysts throughout the IC (Joint Inquiry, "Final Report", 7).

The most noticeable difference between recommendations in the Joint Inquiry Report and those of the Odom Study concern the role of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The Joint Inquiry called for the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a Cabinet level position, appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation (Joint Inquiry, "Final Report", 2). The Odom Study recommended strengthening the role of the DCI through a restructuring of the IC, and suggested that no statutory changes be made with respect to the DCI’s authority (Odom, "Study, Executive Summary" 2). The Odom Study suggested instead strengthening the role of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and making the NIC the DCI’s "instrument" for collection management and national intelligence analysis (Odom, "Study: Executive Summary" 2). Missing also from the Odom recommendations is one calling for the creation of a National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism, a position whose creation was recommended by the Joint Inquiry.

Odom and the Joint Inquiry agreed that something must be done about the FBI and counterintelligence, but what? Odom suggested creation of a National Counterintelligence Service (NCIS) headed by a National Director for Counterintelligence (NDCI) to solve the problem. The Joint Inquiry agreed the FBI needs to do more with respect to counterterrorism but left unanswered the question of whether creation of a "national manager" for counterintelligence is the solution.

". . . the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of the Congress, as appropriate, should consider promptly, in consultation with the Administration, whether the FBI should continue to perform the domestic intelligence functions of the United States Government or whether legislation is necessary to remedy this problem, including the possibility of creating a new agency to perform those functions." (Joint Inquiry, "Final Report", 10).

After reviewing recommendations for reforming the Intelligence Community, suggested in the Odom Study and Joint Inquiry, several seem to warrant most serious consideration. Nearly all of them deal in some way with structural reorganization of the intelligence, counterintelligence and counterterrorism offices, departments or divisions of the FBI, CIA and the Department of Defense (DoD).

Odom is right in suggesting that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) remain the principal intelligence adviser to the presidentPresident of the United States. Odom again is right when he suggests the DCI should be the program manager for all budgets in the IC (Odom, "Testimony", 3). Although much can be accomplished through Presidential Directive, ensuring the DCI becomes the true head of the Intelligence Community may require statutory changes in the law particularly with respect to budget authority over the IC. The Joint Inquiry would rather create a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). There is no need to do so as long as the DCI has the planning and budgetary authority necessary to manage the resources and activities of the IC. A further beneficial restructuring would have the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) report to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), thereby doing away with what Odom calls the "double-hatted" DCI. Another positive change would be to fill the Director of Central Intelligence (DCIA) position with a political appointee, and reserve the Director of the CIA (DCIA) position for career intelligence professionals; perhaps promoted up from the ranks of the CIA. Placing the CIA Directorate of Intelligence (DI) directly under the DCI would further assist in consolidating intelligence analysis to include production of National Intelligence Estimates (AFSA, "Roles"). The DCI would also be responsible for advising the Ppresident on counterintelligence and counterterrorism matters. A Director of Counterintelligence (CI) reporting directly to the DCI would ensure any findings developed from analysis of terrorism or terrorist activity would be reported to the Department of Homeland Security.

A further recommendation would be to give the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) operational and tasking authority over the National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The DCIA would still be responsible for the conduct of foreign intelligence operations keeping the role of the CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) largely unchanged. The key to making such a change work would be to ensure the military services receive operational and tactical intelligence the regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINC’s) need to do their jobs. The DoD does not need to "own" the assets that collect SIGINT, IMINT and national-level HUMINT information, what commanders need at all levels of command is accurate, reliable and timely "military" intelligence. It would therefore be the responsibility of the DCI to make sure that happens, otherwise the services might make a good case to take back the national-level assets and resources for SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT they would necessarily have to give up. Currently, the new Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) is responsible for the organization, planning and execution of military intelligence missions between and among the military services (Ricks). Additionally, the USDI should be allowed, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, to take DoD’s concerns with respect to National-level intelligence directly to the DCI. The USDI would by necessity continue to be responsible for insuring cooperation between CIA's paramilitary Special Activities Division and the DoD’s Joint Special Operations Command.

The FBI would also undergo fundamental organizational changes. The FBI Counterintelligence Division would form the core of a newly created National Counterintelligence Directorate (or, National Counterintelligence Service as recommended by Odom) headed by a National Director of Counterintelligence (NCI) who would report to the DCI. FBI Counterterrorism Division would continue to work through the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). The FBI Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence should continue to head the FBI Office of Intelligence with no change in mission.

Whatever structural reforms are made to improve the performance of the Intelligence Community, there will always be the need for strong personalities and competent people to hold the top executive and managerial positions in the CIA and FBI. Who holds the job of DCI will still be key to reform. The effectiveness of the Intelligence Community has always depended, to a greater or lesser degree, on what value the sitting President puts on intelligence. Although Odom emphasized the neutralizing effect of poor organizational structure on leadership, he is correct when he says organizational reform can not overcome the absence of good leadership (Odom, "Modernization").

Regardless of the waxing and waning intensity of the ongoing intelligence reform debate, it is useful to keep in mind that there are limits to what improvements in performance can be gained from organizational restructuring (Betts). Writing collaboratively in the Winter 2002 edition of The Washington Quarterly magazine, Frank J. Cilluffo, Ronald A. Marks, and George C. Salmoiraghi remind again that intelligence analysts, no matter how good, are not mind readers:

"Analysts are estimators, not clairvoyants. In the best of circumstances, a well-trained analyst cannot read an opponent's mind. Analysts can explain a trend or understand a motive, but they will not know everything" (Cilluffo, Marks and Salmoiraghi).

There are limits to what reasonably can be expected from Intelligence, a discipline that will continue to work best in the shadows.

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