Practical Intelligence
Compromised: Bay of Pigs and Ibril, Iraq War in Iraq
E. R. Anders - 4/21/04
There are only a few things worse than learning the covert operation you are about to launch has been compromised—particularly if you are the CIA’s man in-charge. Robert Baer, head of the CIA Iraq Operations Group in Kurdish Iraq, was so informed in March 1995 in a cable from the White House sent by National Security Council Chief Anthony Lake (Baer, p173).
THE ACTION YOU HAVE PLANNED FOR THIS WEEKEND HAS BEEN TOTALLY COMPROMISED. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A HIGH RISK OF FAILURE
Stunned, Baer broke the news to Ahmad Chalabi, founder of the fractious Iraqi National Congress, who was to lead the attack against Saddam Hussein’s troops the very next morning. Baer told Chalabi that as far as official Washington was concerned he was on his own. Chalabi’s reaction was one of shock and disbelief.
“Has Mr. Lake never heard of the Bay of Pigs?” He asked (Baer, p200).
Chalabi knew his history. He also knew it was too late to call off the attack despite evaporation of support from the United States at the highest level of executive government. Consequently, what began as a CIA backed attempt to topple Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 1995 proved to be as disastrous as the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion to overthrow Cuba’s Fidel Castro (Dickey, p36). Not surprisingly, the finger-pointing and recrimination in the aftermath of both failed operations were similar if not the same—the plan was flawed, the operation never had a chance, the CIA was duped into believing there would be a general uprising of the people in the wake of the attacks. What is rarely mentioned was the fact efforts to protect the operation from penetration by enemy agents failed in both cases.
Counterintelligence and “Covertness”
Counterintelligence is not limited to “catching spies” Covert operations need good counterintelligence to be successful. Covert activities usually begin where diplomacy leaves off and stops short of outright declaration of war. Covert operations include propaganda and paramilitary operations that are conducted in a manner so as to conceal the sponsor’s identity and provide some degree of “plausible denial.” (Isenberg). Counterintelligence can be the key to maintaining such denial. Simply put, in the case of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Iraq disaster, counterintelligence failed.
Propaganda Wars
Following the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the White House authorized the CIA to "create the conditions" that would, hopefully, lead to the overthrow of Iraq's Saddam Hussein. The CIA contracted with the Rendon Group, a Washington public relations firm, to organize and begin an anti-Saddam propaganda campaign inside Iraq (Kucinich). The Rendon Group worked closely with Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress and was involved in not only producing anti-Saddam pamphlets, but in the production of anti-Saddam radio broadcasts as well (Miller and Rampton).
Similarly, in 1961 “Operation Zapata” began with a propaganda phase in the name of the Cuban opposition. The plan included short wave broadcasts from what became known as “Radio Swan” aimed at supporting a general uprising and thereby provide cover for the operation as explained in the CIA Inspector General’s Report into the disaster.
“The Cuban exile council would serve as cover for the action which became publicly known. Agency personnel in contact with the Cuban exiles would be documented as representatives of a group of private American businessmen. The hand of the U. S. Government would not appear.” (Inspector General’s Report, 1962).
Knowledge of what began as “covert” actions quickly became public knowledge. Unfortunately for Iraqi opposition and Cuban resistance forces the counterintelligence failure proved fatal. Only through the passage of time has awareness of the success of Iraq’s intelligence agency and Castro’s secret police counterintelligence activities become known.
Deceit and Betrayal
Initially backed by covert CIA funds, the Iraqi National Congress (INC) was founded and grew to include Sunni and Shiite Arabs and others opposed to the Saddam regime--bringing together, for the first time, the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). INC forces lead by Chalabi would retake the Kurdish cities of Kirkuk and Mosul and trigger a CIA-backed coup among Iraqi troops. The INC was not the only exile group working to overthrow Saddam. The CIA recruited former Iraqi Gen. Adnan Nuri to lead a second opposition group based in London, The Iraqi National Accord.
On the eve of the March 1995 offensive, Nuri flew to Washington and told the White House that the INC had duped the CIA and planned to draw the United States into a new ground war with Iraq. The White House cabled Baer to inform Chalabi that the United States "will not support this operation militarily or in any other way.” (Stearns, 27). The attack went forward nonetheless but stalled due to a lack of air cover and logistics support thereby repeating the Bay of Pigs.
The 1960s Bay of Pigs invasion was inherited by President John F. Kennedy from the previous Eisenhower administration. Kennedy is blamed for much of the failure of the Cuban invasion and while his decision to withdraw air cover over the landing beaches certainly did not help, penetration by Castro’s intelligence agents probably doomed the operation before the first shot was fired. Newspapers all over Latin American published stories of Cuban exiles training in Guatemala as guerillas. Miami was rife with news of a pending invasion all but obliterating any possible “plausible denial” of U.S. involvement (Polmar and Allen, Espionage)
Aftermath
After the failed attempt at “regime change” in 1995, a falling out between the KDP and PUK in 1996 erupted in fighting in the Iraqi Kurdistan City of Abril (Gunter, p135). The dispute prompted intervention by the Iraqi Army that resulted in the destruction of INC bases and the end to CIA backed opposition in Northern Iraq. According to some press accounts, hundreds of Iraqi's were murdered by Saddam in the years between 1991 and 2003 just on suspicion of working with the CIA. The largest bloodbath, however, occurred in August 1996.
“Saddam's security forces infiltrated a U.S.-backed coup plot and rounded up 200 Iraqis on charges of participating in the plot and executed 80 of them immediately, according to reports published at the time.” (Diamond, Purge, 3)
The toll was much higher than initial press accounts reported. Two hundred oppositionists were executed and as many as 2,000 arrested. Six hundred fifty oppositionists (mostly INC) were evacuated and resettled in the United States (CRS Issues Brief, Katzman).
The failed 1995 operation was not without political bloodletting within the U.S. Intelligence Community at home; resulting in some bad feeling between the FBI and CIA that lasts to this day. The FBI was tasked to investigate the operation as an alleged attempt by the CIA to assassinate Saddam Hussein (Pincus). At least five CIA agents were obliged to undergo FBI polygraph tests—including Robert Baer—to determine whether they had been part of a “rogue” operation to assassinate Saddam (Reuters, 6). Baer and all the other agents passed the tests but the incident is hardly forgotten within either agency.
Lesson Learned
At least one lesson can be drawn from the history of both failed attempts at overthrowing a foreign leader through covert military action. Ahmed Chalabi learned the lesson from bitter experience.
AHMAD CHALABI: They came and told us, "You are on your own.” They thought they're going to face a Bay of Pigs situation where Saddam would massacre us, and then they'd look bad (FRONTLINE).
Only with close co-operation and full tactical support of the U.S. military do covert operations gain any real chance of success today when it comes to “regime change.” Efforts to place CIA agents deep inside Iraq were always difficult in the extreme and only recently modestly successful (Diamond, Spy Network, 2). The CIA's paramilitary arm--, the Special Activities Division, successfully deployed covert operations teams inside Iraq beginning in June 2002 (Bowers, 14). Very early in the recent 2003 Anglo-Iraq war, CIA paramilitary teams worked closely with U.S. military Special Operations Forces and Kurdish tribal fighters in Northern Iraq. CIA covert teams continue to track down, capture or kill members of Saddam's inner circle (Priest).
Conclusion
In both the Bay of Pigs invasion and the CIA operation in Northern Iraq, vital U.S. air and logistics support was withdrawn just when most needed. Clearly, keeping the covert operation “covert” should be considered more than just an Operations Security (OPSEC) necessity. History shows as plausible deniability evaporates, so can backing for covert action regardless of initial approval from the White House.
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Works Cited or Consulted
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Baer, Robert. See No Evil. Three Rivers Press, New York: 2002, p173. and p200.
Barker, Gregory. FRONTLINE. The Survival of Saddam. WGBH/PBS. Broadcast date: January 25, 2000.
Betts, Richard K. “Fixing Intelligence.” Foreign Affairs. January/February, 2002. 26 November 2003.
Diamond, John. Weak spy network hurt hunt for arms. USAToday.com. 16 June 2003. 7 October 2003. Para 2. 28 March 2004. < http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-06-16-spy-usat_x.htm >
Diamond, John. Broad purges wiped out most Iraqis helping CIA. USAToday.com. 16 June 2003. 28 March 2004. Para 2. < http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-06-16-insidespy-usat_x.htm >
Dickey, Christopher and Evan Thomas. Bay of Pigs Redux: How the CIA’s secret war in Iraq turned into utter fiasco. Newsweek. Vol. 131 Issue 12, p36, 5p. 23 March 1998. 18 March 2004.
Gunter, Michael. The Iraqi Opposition and the Failure of U.S. Intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence & Counter Intelligence. April 1999, Vol. 12 Issue 2, p135, 33p 19 March 2004.
Inspector General’s Report of the Cuban Operation. Central Intelligence Agency. 16 February 1962.
Isenberg, David. Policy Analysis: The Pitfalls of U.S. Covert Operations Policy Analysis No. 118. 7 April 1989. 28 March 2004. < http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA118.HTML >
Kucinich, Dennis. U.S. Congressman (D-OH). Letter To Rumsfled Demanding Answers On His Role In Promoting Misinformation In The Lead Up To The War Against Iraq. Press Release. 5 December 2003. 28 March 2004. < http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/oh10_kucinich/031205rumsfeldltr.html >
Miller, Laura and Sheldon Rampton. The Pentagon's Information Warrior: Rendon to the Rescue. P.R. Watch. Volume 8. Number 4. Fourth Quarter 2001. 28 March 2004. < http://www.prwatch.org/prwissues/2001Q4/rendon.html >
Polmar, Norman and Thomas B. Allen. The Encyclopedia of Espionage. Random House. 1998 Edition. p145-148.
Priest, Dana. U.S. Commandos Active in Iraq. Washington Post. 29 March 2003. 8 October 2003. 28 March 2004. < http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/world/5511889.htm >
Reuters Wire Services. FBI Probed Alleged CIA Plot to Kill Saddam. Reuters, para 6. 15 February 1998. 28 March 2004. < http://www.serendipity.li/cia/saddam.html >
Stearns, Randy. The CIA’s Secret War in Iraq. ABC News. February 1998. 27 March 2004. < http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/cia/plot.html >
E. R. Anders is a veteran Broadcast Journalist who has worked as a Reporter and News Editor for Associated Press Radio, Mutual News, and WMAL Radio in Washington DC. Mr. Anders is currently an Intelligence Analyst with Northrop-Grumman Mission Systems.
