Sherman Kent, Analysis and National Intelligence
Estimates (NIE)
E. R. Anders - 5/25/03
The
purpose of this essay is to describe the current predictive analytical
approach of the National Intelligence Council, as was described by
Sherman
Kent
in his
Collected Essays, and to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
his approach. Kent is
cited as one of the founding members of the Office of National
Estimates and National Estimates serving as the deputy head and
then chairman of both (McDonald, par. 6).
From the very beginning and throughout the two decades of his
distinguished CIA career,
Kent
championed the
“Scientific Method” as the best approach to production of the
scenario based National Intelligence Estimates (NIE).
His method is still used today to analyze intelligence
information (Marrin, p. 29).
Kent
described his
approach in a series of essays published in the CIA’s
Studies In Intelligence, a professional Journal, which he
founded (Ford, par 5).
According to
Kent
there were
three basic “kinds” of information:
“The
first is ... the statement of indisputable fact… The second and
third kinds do not carry any such certainty; each rests upon a
varying degree of uncertainty. They relate respectively (a) to
things which are knowable but happen to be unknown to us, and (b)
to things which are not known to anyone at all.” (
Kent
, Crucial, par. 16).
Kent
visualized his
analyical method as a pyramid whose wide base of known facts was
the foundation and the sides the knowable information, that when
collected and analyzed, revealed the final results.
Kent saw his “pyramid” as a work in continuing progress
whose peak sometimes did not meet neatly at the top where
expected. In such
cases he suggested that “things not known to anyone at all”
were usually responsible for failure to complete the construct.
Unfortunately, according to
Kent
, such failures
could not always be predicted nor avoided (
Kent
, Estimates,
par. 16).
The
National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) are forecasts subject to the
same strengths and weaknesses of the scenario model or scenario
based approach to predictive analysis.
Scenarios are the result of very natural “what if”
thinking. The process
of developing and evaluating “what if” scenarios from the
facts--the known, the knowable unknowns and the unknowable
unknowns, to use Kent’s description can reveal alternative and
competing hypothesis that are then subjected to further deductive
analysis. However, in
practice the scenario approach has produced analysis resulting in
the “so-called most-likely” scenario being the least-likely to
occur. Other problems
that plague the scenario approach include the psychological.
Nothing inherent in the scenario model reduces or protects
against the affects of bias and inflexible “mind-sets” when
considering alternate and competing futures (Heurer, Chapter 14.
par 4). These
weaknesses, revealed in practice, drew Congressional scrutiny
after failure of the U.S. Intelligence Community to predict
India
’s 1998
nuclear weapon test. Investigation
into the failure found that “contrarian” views were often
disregarded by CIA officials, a problem that produced a chilling
effect on creative or “new thinking.” (Weiner,
par. 7).
Despite
weaknesses in application of scenario based analysis in practice,
the method is likely to remain a mainstay in the Intelligence
Community. The model
continues to be intergal to production of the National
Intelligence Estimates (NIE) despite criticism of the methods used
by analysts to produce finished intelligence. (Medina. par.
6 ).
Interestingly,
criticisms of NIE tend to focus more on predictive failures and
lack of relevance to the needs of policymakers than on
the use of the “Scientific Method” or application of
academic rigor in the analyses.
In its 1996 report, the Commission on the Roles and
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community
recommended that the National Intelligence Council be recast as a
"National Assessments Center."
(Commission. Chapter 8. Sec. 8-3). The Commission also
called for closer ties between intelligence providers and
intelligence consumers in an attempt to improve quality of
analysis. Unfortunately, none of the attentive criticsms nor the
recommendations put in practice were enough to prevent or forsee
the terrorist events of September 11, 2001.
_________________________________________________________________
Works Cited or Referenced
Commission
on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence
Community. Preparing for the 21st Century: An
Appraisal of the U.S. Intelligence.
19
January 1996. 25 May 2003. < http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/int012.html
>
Director
of Central Intelligence Directive 3/23.
The National Intelligence Council and the National
Intelligence Officer. 1 June 1992.
21 May 2003. < http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid3-23.htm
>
Ford,
Harold P. “A Tribute to Sherman Kent."
Studies in Intelligence.
Fall 1980.
25 May 2003. <
http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/shermankent/1tribute.html#rft*
>
Heuer
Jr., Richards J. “Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.” Studies
in Intelligence. 1999. 25
May 2003 < http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/
>
Kent,
Sherman. “A Crucial Estimate Relived.” Studies in
Intelligence. Spring 1964.
25 May 2003. < http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/shermankent/9crucial.html
>
Kent,
Sherman. “Estimates and Influence.” Studies in Intelligence.
Summer 1968.
25 May 2003. < http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/shermankent/4estimates.html#rft1
>
McDonald,
Kenneth J. “Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates
Collected Essays. Introduction.”
Studies in Intelligence.
Fall 1980.
25 May 2003 < http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/shermankent/intro.html
Medina
Carmen A. “The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis.” Studies
in Intelligence. Unclassified Studies Volume 46, Number 3,
2002.
25 May 2003. <http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol46no3/article03.html
>
Weiner,
Tim. “Report Finds Basic Flaws in U.S.
Intelligence Operations," New York Times, June
3, 1998. 25 May 2003 < http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/intflaw.htm >
E. R. Anders is retired Intelligence Analyst
currently living the the Wash DC/VA/MD area.
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