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Intelligence and the Cuban
Missile Crisis
E. R. Anders
4 January 2004
Introduction
The
“Cuban Missile Crisis” has been described as one of the most
studied events in history, or at least the most studied historic example of
crisis management at the highest level of government when in 1962 the U.S.
and the Soviet Union stood on the “brink”
(Arana-Barradas 8-20). While such is the hyperbole, it is true that
those “Thirteen Days” provide and unparalleled opportunity to
evaluate the performance of the intelligence agencies of the three countries
involved (Garthoff). The “Cuban Missile
Crisis” as it is called in the United States, the
“Caribbean Crisis” as it is called by the Soviets, and the
“October Crisis” as it is called by the Cubans, caught all
parties by surprise including their respective intelligence agencies
(Hansen). The failures of all three to foresee the crisis can be found in not
only “what” they knew, but in “why” they thought
they knew what the “other guy” was thinking. In each and every
case, the leadership played the key role in defining what was to be concluded
from the intelligence, established “conventional wisdom” or
prevailing thought on what was known, or believed to be true (Blight
et al.). Analysis from intelligence agencies was not
the only source of information that Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro relied
upon when making decisions that ultimately resolved the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Robarge says of President Kennedy:
“He
and other presidents weigh analyses from the CIA
and other intelligence agencies against other sources of information that are
often highly subjective, and they consider this ‘intelligence’ in
a highly politicized environment where the value of objective analysis is
often deprecated.”(Robarge)
The
observations made of Castro and Khrushchev by Amuchastegui, and Fursenko and Naftali
respectively, clearly apply to Kennedy as well, if to a lesser degree. Kennedy, however, had the benefit of U-2
photographs which provided the “evidence’ that proved the Soviets
were indeed placing offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba. Fischer attends to the matter, somewhat
differently, from a psychological perspective when evaluating
“motivational” and “cognitive” errors which probably
played the most important role in the thinking of Castro, Khrushchev and
Kennedy. The question then becomes, what did they know, and why?
Estimates
A
great deal has been written about the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
that was published just prior to the discovery of offensive nuclear missiles
in Cuba. In fact, Sherman Kent, author of the estimate,
defended the analysis after the “Crisis” was long over. Kent
makes and interesting case that the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) had good
reason to believe that the Soviets would not introduce ballistic nuclear
missiles in the Western Hemisphere by basing then in Cuba (Kent). The logic was without flaw,
considering what the Soviets had done in the past it would seem improbable
that they would resort to such risky behavior. Previous behavior is what
intelligence analysts rely upon to be predictive. While the past may indeed be prologue, it
does not always follow that what has been the habit will always be,
particularly in the realm of International Relations and National Security
Policy (Scott et al.).
Analyses
According to Furensko
and Naftali, Khrushchev did his own analyses of
what the U.S. would do
when faced with a “fait accompli”of
nuclear missiles in Cuba.
Once it was confirmed that the missiles were there, Kennedy considered the
options: pre-emptive invasion, air
strikes, or an air and sea blockade (Brams). In the end, Kennedy opted for the
quarantine and six days later Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles, but
only after getting a deal in return; a pledge the U.S.
would not invade Cuba, and
that ballistic missiles “secretly” based in Turkey and aimed at the Soviet
Union be removed (Marquis).
Castro was convinced the U.S. was about to invade Cuba and was none too pleased at
being left out of the negotiations that lead to the resolution of the crisis
(Green). Castro relied on his own intelligence contacts instead of the conclusions
of Cuban intelligence analysts that a U.S.
invasion of Cuba
was unlikely (Amuchastegui 88). Both
Castro and Khrushchev had taken the measure of the newly elected President of
the United States
and both had misjudged him. Kennedy failed to understand Khrushchev’s
position and never grasped the fact the Soviets might feel intimidated and
fearful of the United
States nuclear threat (Blanton).
Conclusion
The
Cuban Missile Crisis clearly shows the impact the ultimate intelligence
consumer, in this case, the individual leaders of the three countries
involved, have on shaping the behavior and affecting the performance of their
intelligence agencies. The mistakes
made prior to the crisis the successes that followed were as much those of
Kennedy, Castro and Khrushchev as they were of their intelligence agencies.
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 8-3-62) of 19 September 1962 was
briefed and accepted at the White House. Castro kept his council when it came
to his own intelligence sources. Khrushchev
distrusted analyses other than his own, relying too much on secret
intelligence (i.e., espionage) to guide his decisions. Ironically, it was openness, trust and
communication between Kennedy and Khrushchev that ended up resolving the
Cuban Missile Crisis; helped of course by confirmation from information
supplied by intelligence professionals of the United
States, the Soviet Union and Cuba.
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Works Cited or Referenced
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