Site hosted by Build your free website today!
                      Hockett, Charles F., 1916-2000.
                           Cornell linguist
                           Chaz Hockett
                           Charles Francis Hockett

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Charles F. Hockett (1914-2000) was an important American linguistic theoretician, student of Leonard Bloomfield, who developed many influential ideas of American structuralism.

A celebration in honor of Charles Hockett, professor emeritus of linguistics/anthropology, who died Nov. 3, 2000, will be held Sunday, April 29, at 4 p.m. in the New Recital Hall of the James J. Whalen Music Center at Ithaca College. Much of the music, but not all, was composed by Hockett and, except for one short piece, will be performed by professional musicians from the IC School of Music, the Cayuga Chamber Orchestra and by family members. A reception will follow in the lobby

Graduatelinguistics] FW: Charles Hockett 1916-2000
Goodall, Grant
Thu, 9 Nov 2000 14:27:14 -0700

Charles Hockett, a major figure in 20th-century linguistics, died in Ithaca
NY a few days ago.  What follows is his obituary from the Ithaca Journal:

-----Original Message-----
From: Rudolph C Troike [mailto:rtroike@U.ARIZONA.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, November 09, 2000 2:45 AM
Subject: Charles Hockett 1916-2000

Charles  Francis Hockett of 145 North Sunset Drive, Ithaca, New York
died at the Cayuga Medical Center on November 3, 2000 after a short illness.
He was 84.

Hockett was the fourth child of Homer Carey and Amy Francisco Hockett.  He was born in Columbus, Ohio on January 17, 1916. He was educated in the public schools of Columbus and Worthington, Ohio and graduated from the Ohio State University, receiving both the BA (summa cum laude) and the MA (high distinction in history) in June, 1936. Thereafter he attended Yale University for three years, with financial aid first from the Social Science Research Council and then from the American Council of Learned Societies. He studied under Edward Sapir, George P. Murdock, Leslie Spier, Morris Swadesh, George L. Trager, and Benjamin J. Whorf, majoring in anthropology and linguistics.

He was awarded the PhD in June, 1939, with a dissertation based on fieldwork
with the Potawatomi Indians of Northern Wisconsin.

After  a summer of fieldwork with the Kickapoo Indians of Oklahoma,
an autumn in  Michoacan, Mexico, and two years of postdoctoral study at the
Universities of Chicago and Michigan, the former with Leonard Bloomfield,
Hockett was drafted into the United States Army in February of 1942. On
furlough in April of that year, he married Shirley Orlinoff of Queens, New
York. His basic training in the army was in antiaircraft artillery, followed
by a few months helping to prepare other recruits for Officer Candidate
School.  But then he was transferred to Army Service Forces and given duties that
made use of his civilian expertise: in late 1942 he accompanied a shipment of
officers to General Stillwell s headquarters in Bengal, India, supervising
their learning of Chinese while en route. Returning from that mission,
Hockett was stationed for several years in New York City, preparing
language-training materials for the armed forces. He was commissioned second lieutenant in 1943, and promoted to first lieutenant in 1945. After the surrender of Japan he was dispatched via the Philippines to Tokyo to help train American troops in

In February of 1946 he was separated from  the army, with a terminal-leave promotion to captain. With that rank he was  called back for the summer of 1950 to help in the training of officers in foreign languages at the Praesidio of Monterey, California.

In 1945,  after a summer s work in New York City on Clarence L.
Barnhart's American College Dictionary, Hockett came to Cornell University
as an Assistant Professor of Linguistics in charge of elementary Chinese. He
joined the newly founded Division of Modern Languages under the directorship
of the late J. Milton Cowan. In due time, at Cornell, Hockett was promoted to
Associate Professor, to full Professor, and finally to a Goldwin Smith
Professorship, his rank at the time of retirement in 1982.
While on the Cornell faculty, Hockett headed a team preparing a
basic pattern for a series of textbooks in English as a second language. In 1955
he published an  elementary textbook of linguistics [A Course in Modern
Linguistics] (with  translations into Spanish, Polish, and Chinese) that was the standard in the field for about twenty years. Hockett regarded his introductory textbook in anthropology [Man's Place in Nature] (1973) as his best scholarly work even though it was a commercial failure. He published many technical papers, mostly in
linguistics, and he supervised the work of about 90 graduate students working for an MA or PhD, who are now teaching at universities all  over the world.

During the fifties, Hockett was on the staff of the Linguistic
Institutes of the Linguistic Society of America at Indiana University and
the University of Michigan. He taught at the Canadian Summer School of
Linguistics in Edmonton, Alberta in 1960. In 1960-1961 he was Carnegie Visiting
Professor of Linguistics at the University of Hawaii. At various times he gave
lectures at Freiburg im Breisgau; in D=FCsseldorf; twice, at an interval of thirty
years, in Grenoble; in 1972 at the Linguistic Institute held at the
University of Illinois; in 1991 in Denton, Texas, to the Linguistic Association of the
Southwest. For four months in the fall of 1986 Hockett lectured on
linguistics at the Beijing Foreign Studies University. He was president of the
Linguistic Society of America in  1972, president of the Linguistic Association of
Canada and the United States in 1982, and Distinguished Lecturer of the American
Anthropological  Association in 1986. Beginning in 1986, he was first
Visiting Professor, then Adjunct Professor of Linguistics, at Rice University in
Houston, Texas, an appointment still in effect at the time of his death.

Hockett was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in
1972 and to the National Academy of Science in 1973.

Hockett was a well trained musician, playing flute and piccolo in
high school and college, later switching to  bass clarinet, which he played for
many years in the Ithaca Concert Band. As  a composer, he produced piano music,
songs, several marches, an opera (given two performances by the Ithaca Opera
Association in 1973 at Ithaca College),  a concertino for cello and wind
ensemble, and chamber music, the last  especially for combinations including
oboe or cello. In April of 2000 a  concert of his music was performed at
Ithaca College by his daughter, pianist Alpha Hockett Walker, and her
husband David Weiss, principal oboist of the Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra.

Hockett is survived by a loving family: his wife Shirley Hockett,
daughter Alpha Hockett Walker and husband David Weiss (now of Los Angeles),
son Asher Orlinoff Hockett and wife Jane McLarty (of Ithaca), daughter Amy
Robin Rose and husband Eddie Sackett (now of Detroit), daughter Rachel
Hockett Youngman and husband  Richard Youngman (now of Cambria, California), and daughter Carey Beth Hockett (now of London, England). There are also five
grandchildren: Rachel's children Charles H. and Annie H. Kee; and Alpha s children Carly, Luke, and Hannah Walker.

A celebration of Hockett's life is planned for  the spring of 2001.
Anyone wishing to make a contribution in his memory should direct it to the
School of Music of Ithaca College, which he  enthusiastically supported.

(Text as it appeared in the Ithaca Journal,  6 November 2000)


Charles F. Hockett, known to his friends as Chaz, was a star
of Bloomfieldian linguistics, and was also well known for his Manual
of Phonology and a textbook, A Course in Modern Linguistics (1955).
The writer,as a member of the Society of Fellows at Harvard
University, was once privileged to read a reference written for Chaz
by Bloomfield.  Bloomfield relates how Hockett came to see him and
asked what native American language badly needed study.  Bloomfield
told him Potawatomi and the "next summer he came to see me and placed
on my desk a large pile of notebooks he had used to study Potawatomi;
apparently he just does this sort of thing".  Chaz later edited
Bloomfield's posthumous Menomini Grammar and collaborated with Ives
Goddard and me on a study on errata which had crept into his edition.
         He later became well known as an opponent to Chomsky's work,
and published a monograph Lanuage, Mathematics, and Linguistics with
Mouton to show his own point of view on the application of
mathematics.  Eventually, in the later years of his life, he tired of
doing linguistics and became a composer of music.  Hockett, a native
of Ohio, spent his career at Cornell after receiving a Yale Ph.D., and
died in Ithaca on November 3, 2000.  He leaves his wife Shirley, four
daughters and a son, and five grandchildren.  He was a past president
of the Linguistic Society of America.

Charles Hockett Critiques Noam Chomsky

Charles Hockett, The State of the Art, 1968 (The Hague: Mouton).

Hockett critically reviews the view of Noam Chomsky. His general approach: "those views are largely in error, but they are two powerful to be shrugged aside. It is necessary to meet Chomsky on his own ground. When we do this, we discover that, even if he is wrong, his particular pattern of error tells us some things about language were were formerly unknown" (from the preface).

Chomsky's central fallacy: "gazing on stability and seeing well-definition."


Chapter 1: Surveys development of linguistic theory in the US from 1900-1950.

Chapter 3: Discusses the background framework for Chomsky's central assumption, whether Language is, as Chomsky claims, a well-defined formal system.

Chapter 4: Even accepting the framework discussed in Chapter 3, there are alternatives to the view that language is a well-defined system.

Chapter 5: Critique of the Chomskyan view.

Chapter 6: What Hockett believes is the correct approach.
A condensation of key ideas, mostly in the form of direct excerpts, with some paraphrasing, follows. (As this book appears to be out of print, I made these excerpts from the library's copy rather than dog-earing and highlighting a personal copy as I would have preferred.)

Page numbers should help readers find the original paragraphs, as these should be consulted for quotation purposes.

(From middle of Chapter 3) Is language a well-defined formal system?

Hockett summarizes the Chomskyan view in 19 statements, labeled c1-c19. Repeated here are the 2 he refers to most frequently.

C10. The grammar of a language is a finite system that characterizes an infinite set of (well-formed) sentences. More specifically, the grammar of a language is a well-defined system.

C14. The innate grammar-producing system is a well-defined system in the sense of C10, just as is the grammar of any single language.

p. 47 Hockett gives examples of what can and can not be characterized as a formal system.

Chess can be characterized as a formal system.

Why? A given distribution of pieces on a board is a state. The rules specify a fixed initial state. They specify the means of moves and captures, and exactly what states can immediately follow any given state (the permissible state-transitions). They specify what states are terminal, and assign all states to three pairwise disjunct classes: white wins, black wins, and draw. A game of chess is a finite sequence of states of which fir first is the initial state, the last is a terminal state, an each state-transition is permissible. Two games are formally identical if they are identical state by state.

Baseball can be characterized as a formal system.

Why? Because the rules and umpires quantize balls, strikes, fouls, outs etc. very sharply. Ignoring points of audience interest and the demeanor of players, we can define formal identity between actual games, and enumerate all possible district games. The set of all possible baseball scores (earned by one team in one game) is also known: the set of non-negative integers.

American football can not be characterized as a formal system. (p. 47) Why not?

The set of all possible scores that can be earned by a single team in a single completed game is undefined. A safety wins 2 points, a field goal 3, a touchdown 6, a conversion after a touchdown 1 or 2. Any sore then must be of the form a + 2b + 3 + 6d, where a, b, c, and d are nonnegative integers and a <= d.

But scoring requires time and play is confined, at most, to slightly more than 60 minutes of time. A score of 1 million is impossible. The highest score on record is 227. Could it be higher? We have no way of saying what the maximum score could be. This set of all possible scores is thus ill-defined.

American table manners (p. 51) can not be characterized as a formal system. Although we can codify "rules" of proper manners, these don't meet the criteria of a formal system, and must be considered guidelines or heuristics.

p. 52. Hockett asserts that no physical system is well-defined.

Physical systems have moving parts. Moving parts mean random wear an tear ("thermodynamic indeterminacy"), the effects of which are predictable only in a gross statistical way. If the system is not isolated, then unforeseeable influences from outside will impinge, whose effects are again only statistically predictable.

p. 54. Hockett provides an interesting comparison of a physical system (not well defined) and the well-defined notational system which is used to describe it.

Consider the relationship between hydrocarbon molecules of the methane series, and the structural formulae which describe the hydrocarbons. To construct a formula of this set, take N c's, 2n+2H's, and 3n+1 short line segments, which n is any positive integer. Arrange the C' sin a row and insert a line segment after each bu the last. Attaching H at each end, one one H above an done H below each C. Thus, for n=1, 2, 3 we get the formulae for methane, ethane and propane.

Nothing (but time and motivation) prevents us from writing down the formula for the case of n=1,000,000 or more. The set of formulae is well-defined, and infinite.

Not so the hydrocarbons themselves. As n increases, the chain twists in space more and more and stability decreases. The probability that a methane-series hydrocarbon molecule with large N will actually form decreases as n increases, as does the life-expectancy of such a molecule if it does form. There is no well-defined "longest possible" methane-series hydrocarbon molecule; yet the number of chemically possible distinct hydrocarbon molecules is not infinite. This is a fact left out of account in the chemist's system of notation, just as that notation requires only two dimensions as over against the three occupied by the molecules, and just as it represents, say, a carbon atom by the completely nonpictorial symbol C.

This pair of examples is instructive in that it shows us a useful, though only approximate, matching between a well-defined system and an ill-defined system. The organic chemist manipulates hydrocarbons in test tubes; he manipulates formulae on paper or blackboard. The second kind of manipulation enables him to work out hypotheses, which can then be tested in the laboratory with the actual substances. Only the latter qualify as findings. If a hypothesis and a finding conflict, it is the hypothesis that is modified or discarded. If the chemist's terminology and notation yield too many hypotheses falsified by experiment, they are revised. The fact that the set of all formulae for hydrocarbons of the methane series is a well-defined system is a discrepancy between notational system and reality; but it is a harmless discrepancy that has probably never mislead any working chemist.

Chapter 4
p. 56 Consider the relation between notational system and subject matter in different scholarly disciplines.

In chemistry and physics, no one confuses these.

Consider logic and pure mathematics. Here there is also no confusion of terminology and subject matter, but for a different reason. In these disciplines, the terminology/notational system *is* the subject matter. (But note exceptions below)

Is linguistics an empirical science like chemistry, or a formal discipline like logic and mathematics?

Hockett's firm conviction is that linguistics is an empirical science. He notes that the alternative was/is attractive to some temperaments. Chomskyan linguistics is only rendered plausible if one accepts that language is a well-defined (ie, formal) system.

Let's not take this proposal on faith, but instead, seriously entertain it is as hypothesis. Are the consequences in accord with experiential and experimental fact? p. 57.

Some reasons to believe that language might be a well-defined system:

1. The only existing well-defined systems are the inventions of human intelligence. One proposal about such systems is that they arise through certain uses of language and its immediate derivates such as writing. This proposal requires that language be a well-defined system. Let us call this hypothesis the "Law of Conservation of Well-Definition" i.e., "only a well-defined system can give rise to a well-defined system."

If true, then a language in term must come from a well-defined source. But neither genes nor cultural transmission are well-defined.

Rejecting the Law of Conservation of Well-definition, let's look for ways in which well-definition can arise from ill-definition. Where is the step from ill-definition to well-definition? Three possibilities: (described on p. 59.)

1. Even though physical genetic transmission and cultural transmission are ill-defined, they still give rise to a well-defined grammar producing system in the child (so C10 and C14 both hold).

2. The grammar-producing system of the child is ill-defined, but it can yield well-defined grammars (so only C10 holds).

3. Languages themselves are ill-defined, and well-definition *only* appears through special uses of language that give rise to things like mathematics.

These 3 categories collapse to two: either language is well-defined or it isn't. Chomsky has chosen the former; Hockett choses the latter.

Chapter 5.
Hockett argued against 17 of the 19 points he developed to concisely summarize Chomsky's view (as stated in 1965). (Chomsky did read through the 19 points and basically agreed that those were in fact his points, although see qualifications on p. 38.)

C1. The vast majority of sentences encountered in everyday life are encountered only once; that is, most sentences are novel. (Hockett does not dispute this one.)

C2. Any user has access, in principle, to an infinite set of sentences. In practice, all but a finite subset of these are not usable to the listeners, either because they require too much production time, are too complex, are false or are meaningless.

Hockett: Absurd. Just as a million is not a possible football score, a sentence containing a million repeats of "one and one and" is not a possible sentence in English.

Recall the hydrocarbon series example. As one attempts to stick more legal language pieces onto the sentence, one encounters flexible constraints. These constraints are *part of the language*, just as the time limits of a football game are part of football. Moreover, it seems that *all* constraints in language are of this more or less rubbery sort.

Hockett envisions a reader who might ask: Even if languages are not well-defined, isn't it useful to create a formal approximation to it, as in the notational system used to describe hydrocarbons.

p. 62 Hockett replies: This depends on your goals. An approximation always requires leaving somethings out of account. The approximations we when we characterize natural language as a formal system leave out just the most important properties of human language, in particular, they leave out the source of language's "openness" (what allow novel sentences to be generated and understood).

p. 63.

Why have linguists traditionally (pre-Chomsky) spoken of skills and habits, rather than of knowledge?

The English verb "know" means two things: *Know how to* (know how to walk, know how to speak), and "have knowledge of" (have knowledge of facts, rules or principles in some domain).

The average man has little knowledge of the muscular mechanisms of walking, yet knows how to walk. Why claim that native speakers "have knowledge of" their language, when they have no knowledge of the rules or principles that underlie language habits?

Chomsky inveighs against habit on the grounds that is has no established sense in which it can explain language competence of the acquisition thereof.

p. 64

Competence-performance distinction

Chomsky notes that his C-P distinction is similar to the classical langue-parole (language-speech) contrast.

The classical view is that speech is what speakers actually produce. Language is the system of skills which produces speech.

Chomsky posited that speech and language are independent entities, each of which is worthy of study in its own right. Hockett views this to be preposterous.

When we observe a specific historic event, be it a speech act or otherwise, we can talk about it in two ways. We can be specific, or we can try to generalize. But there is only one "object of study": specific acts of speech, as historic events, in their behavioral settings, observable in part overtly and in different part introspectively.

Accurate reports of observations are not theories: their sole importance for theory is that they enable the theorist to examine the evidence at leisure. The linguist seeks theories, which are generalizations from observations, and are about speech. They yield predictions, and are corrected by subsequent observations.

Is Chomsky's C-P distinction different from this? No. (p. 66)

Empirically, we might be led by our observations of speech to propose that the underlying system, the set of habits we call the language, is well defined. But Chomsky was not led to this conclusion empirically, nor has anyone proposed this as an empirical hypothesis.

The assumption of well-definition can be retained in the face of the evidence if one posits an obscure sort of "underlying" system that by definition meets the requirements of the assumption, and then explains (or explains away) the vagaries of actual speech as due to the participation of other factors. But this step moves the underlying system completely out of the reach of the methods of empirical science. The notion thereby ceases to be a hypothesis.

What about Chomsky's "Ideal speaker-listener"?

p. 66

There is nothing wrong with employing idealizations in a theory, but we must remember what an idealization is. It is not what we are analyzing, not part of our subject-matter; rather it is part of the terminological apparatus with which we analyze and discuss real objects and systems.

Once we abandon the notion that a language is well-defined, the idealization of a speaker becomes useless. Much more useful would be to refer to the average or typical user of a language, who has, in full measure, all the `faults' of which Chomsky divests his imaginary ideal.

The relevance of probabilistic considerations

Hockett (p. 39) puts forward Chomsky's claims as follows:

Probabilistic considerations pertain to performance, not to competence. Surely the user of a language has knowledge of probabilities, but this knowledge constitutes a mental reality distinct from the grammar of the language. Knowledge of probabilities may influence performance, but there is no reason to believe it has anything to do with the organization of grammar.

Hockett's response: (p. 67)

Linguists have rarely used formal statistics, but in generalizing from observed speech they usual distinguish between varying degrees of productivity of patterns -- in Sapir's phrase, differing configurational pressures.

How is this relevant for understanding how people can say new things?

Consider the situation in which various partly incompatible patterns are all apt. Their interplay and the resolution of incompatibilities can lead to a sentence that has not been said before.

Chomsky's idea of "explanation" p. 67

Chomsky has a tendency to `explain' complexities by positing, ad hoc, more or less independent pieces of mental furniture. As in nineteenth century German `Greistewissenschaft' this actually explains nothing at all, but merely forestalls inquiry; though in fairness we must admit that in Chomsky's case the practice may simply be a device for filling various difficult matters for later consideration.

Chomsky's separation of grammar and semantics

p. 68

Here Chomsky prolongs an error of the 1940s.

Hockett gives the standard examples against this separation, including some interesting historical examples. Intersting Bloomfield quite on page 71.

Chomsky's notion of meaningfulness (p 72)

Looking for his guidelines in logic and philosophy, Chomsky has imposed on language a definition of `meaningfulness' that is entirely out of place.

In logic, *two plus two is yellow* is meaningless, unless yellow has been assigned the the value 4.

What has all of this got to do with ordinary utterances? Practically nothing. In everyday use of language, people find it risky to decide whether an utterance is true until *after* they find out what it means.

Hockett's own views

p. 82

One of Hockett's main reasons for becoming suspicious of Chomsky's views was that they conflicted with what had been disovered about linguistic change.

"This is not mere ancestor-worship on my part. We all reject alchemy and astrology, despite the fact hat hundreds of brilliant scholars devoted their lives to those subjects. At the same time, the fact that Tycho Brahe and Sir Isaac Newton retained astrological beliefs does not prevent us from accepting their real discoveries. Science is cumulative; this does not mean that we accept the findings of predecessors uncritically. My conviction that analogy, borrowing and sound change are the major mechanisms of linguistic change is no predicated on a blind faith in Brugmann, Leskien and company. Rather, my respect for them is based on the fact that, by paying honest attention to the evidence, even it forced them to set their own personal predilections aside, they found that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the hypothesis -- as, indeed, it still does."

more direct quotes from p. 83

A language is a kind of system in which every actual utterance, whether spoken aloud or merely thought to oneself, at one and the same time by and large confirms to (or manifests) the system, and changes te system.

If a man takes a snapshot of a horse race, he must not be surprised that the horses in the picture are not moving. We get a stable picture of the language because that is what we have sought. Even if our work is very expertly done, we must not promote our more or less standardized by-and-large characterization of the language to the status of a monolithic ideal, nor infer that because we can achieve a fixed characterization some such monolithic ideal exists, in the lap of Bod or in the brain of each individual speaker.

p. 85. "sand lot chess" -- inhabits of an isolated village play chess their whole life, only the rules are never written down and all learning is via observation and participation. Furthermore, the "rules" can be changed -- they are whatever you can get your partner to accept.

"To our way of thinking, sand lot chess is not nearly so desirable a game as real chess. It is not very much like a language. But it is much more like a language than is real chess."

Charles F. Hockett

Charles F. Hockett earned a Ph.D. He was a college professor and an author. All of these tasks were related to one thing, the study of language. Linguistics is the study of human speech including the units, nature, structure, and modification of language. Language is a system that relates sounds and gestures to meanings, something animals do not possess. (1)

Charles F. Hockett has written a book called a Course In Modern Linguistics, published in 1958. In this book he spoke of the stringing together of words and how the letters of word, such as "ouch" when strung together form a word, but when the letters O-U-C-H are by themselves, they don't have much meaning behind them. Charles Hockett also wrote in the International Journal of American Linguistics, in 1988. (2) Charles Hockett's family religion is Quaker. He has five children. Alpha was born in 1942, Asher was born in 1947, Amy Robin Rose was born in 1949, Rachel born in 1951, and Carey Beth who was born in 1953. (2)

(1) Charles Hockett Critiques Noam Chomsky

(2) Charles Francis Hockett Ph.D.

By Keith Blevins



The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language: Fourth Edition.  2000.
Hockett, Charles
DATES: Born 1916
 American linguist and anthropologist whose works include A Manual of Psychology (1955). He is also a composer of opera and orchestral works.

Hockett, Charles F., editor A Manual of Phonology. (International Journal of American Linguistics, 21: 4, Part 1, Memoir 11). vi, 245 p. 1988
University of Chicago Press

Hockett, Charles Francis.
A course in modern linguistics.
New York, Macmillan [1958]
621 p. illus. 22 cm.

Essays in honor of Charles F. Hockett / edited by Frederick B. Agard ... [et al.].
E.J. Brill, 1983.
xi, 601 p. : map, port. ; 25 cm.

Hockett, Charles Francis.
Language, mathematics, and linguistics, by Charles F. Hockett.
The Hague, Mouton, 1967.
243 p. illus. 23 cm.

Bloomfield, Leonard, 1887-1949.
A Leonard Bloomfield anthology / edited by Charles F. Hockett.
Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1987.
Abridged ed.
x, 314 p. : port. ; 23

Bloomfield, Leonard, 1887-1949.
A Leonard Bloomfield anthology. Edited by Charles F. Hockett.
Bloomington, Indiana University Press [1970]
xxix, 553 p. port. 25 cm.

Hockett, Charles Francis.
Title: Man's place in nature [by] C. F. Hockett.
New York, McGraw-Hill [1973]
739 p. illus. 24 cm.

Hockett, Charles Francis.
A manual of phonology.
Baltimore [Published at the] Waverly Press [by Indiana University] 1955.
v, 246 p. diagrs., tables. 25 cm.

Hockett, Charles Francis.
A manual of phonology / by Charles F. Hockett.
Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1974.
v, 246 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.

The phonological history of Menominee / C. F. Hockett.
[Ithaca] : Cornell University, [n.d.]
1 v. (unpaged) ; 30 cm

Hockett, Charles Francis.
Progressive exercises in Chinese pronunciation / by Charles Francis Hockett.
New Haven : Institute of Far Eastern Languages, Yale University, 1951.

Hockett, Charles Francis.
Refurbishing our foundations : elementary linguistics from an advanced point of view / C.F. Hockett.
Amsterdam ; Philadelphia : J. Benjamins, 1987.
ix, 181 p. : ill. ; 24 cm

Hockett, Charles Francis.
Title: Spoken Chinese : basic course.
[Madison, WI] : Pub. for the United States Armed forces institute by the Linguistic society of America and the Intensive language program, American council of learned societies, [1944-45]
2 v. ; 14 x 21 cm.

Hockett, Charles Francis.
Spoken Chinese; basic course, units 1-12, by Charles F. Hockett ... and Chaoying Fang. Published for the United States Armed forces institute by the Linguistic society of America and the Intensive language program, American council of learned societies.
[Baltimore, Waverly press, 1944]
v, 231 p. 14 x 21 cm.

Hockett, Charles Francis.
Spoken Chinese / by Charles F. Hockett and Chaoying Fang.
[New York] : Henry Holt and Company, c1944-1945.
2 v. in 1 (617 p.) ; 15 x 22 cm.

Hockett, Charles Francis.
Guide's manual for Spoken Chinese, by Charles F. Hockett and Chaoying Fang.
[New York] H. Holt and Company [1945]
231 p. 21 cm

Hockett, Charles Francis.
The state of the art, by Charles F. Hockett.
The Hague, Paris, Mouton, 1968.
128 p. 23 cm.

Hockett, Charles Francis.
The view from language : selected essays, 1948-1974 / by C. F. Hockett.
Athens : University of Georgia Press, c1977.
338 p. ; 24 cm.

Hockett, Charles Francis.
[n.p., 1948]
4 pts. in 1 v. 25 cm.
"Substantially what constituted the writer's doctoral dissertation at Yale."
Reprinted from International journal of American linguistics, v. 14, no. 1-4, Jan.-Oct. 1948.

Hockett, Charles Francis.
Potawatomi syntax [by] Charles Hockett.
[Baltimore, 1939]
235-248 p. 26 cm
Extract from thesis (Ph. D.)--Yale University, 1939.
"Reprinted from Language, vol. 15, no. 4, October-December, 1939

"History of the Hockett Family" by Chaz Hockett, 1997

Charles Hockett, "The Origin of Speech," Scientific American, Sept. 1960.