CHAPTER VII

current of one and a quarter yards per second. Two boats were available, and supports were extended along the left bank of the stream in order to assist the crossing with their fire should there be any opposition. At 4 A.M. on the morning of the 26th the crossing began. It was dark, and land troops may be excused if they experience some nervous tension on a strange element, approaching for the first time a strange and formidable foe. All was very still except the plash of the oars, which sounded with intolerable loudness in the ears of the little party. Suddenly a long tongue of yellow flame darted upwards out of the opposite bank, reflecting itself in the black water and lighting up the boats packed tight with soldiers of the Guard. Then from the darkness behind the flame rattled out a succession of volleys. The bullets came whizzing past and into the Japanese, killing or wounding some thirty men in the crowded boats, and lashing the water into foam all about them. There is nothing more apt to demoralize the soldier than to have the darkness under which he creeps to his secret mission suddenly dispelled, leaving him exposed, whilst his enemy, whom he means to surprise, quite reverses that process. The Japanese stood the test. The Russian aim was bad, and the rowers never faltered or hung back till they touched land on the bank of the island, when the Guardsmen quickly leaped onshore without further opposition from the enemy, who, well satisfied with their exploit, fell back under cover of the night. It was then found that the sentry on the river bank had been provided with a bundle of dried grass which was fixed to the end of a pole and set by him at the water's edge. This he bad lit on bearing some suspicious sound, and retiring back himself into the shadow had

been joined there by the piquet, who opened fire in comparative safety. If this incident reveals the Russians in an aspect of enterprise and cleverness, it shows the Japanese in what I hope may prove to be an unusual condition of miscalculation and want of thorough preparation. The troops who had been extended along the left bank to support the crossing of their comrades had been posted a few yards below the point whence the boats started. Naturally these drifted; and thus, at the critical moment, masked the fire of the supports, who could not use their rifles, and only served to catch a few of the spare Russian bullets.

Now that the Japanese had gained possession of the islands upon terms so easy, they were able to reconnoitre and to make a bridge to Kinteito, which latter proceeding drew the first shells of the land campaign from the Russians, and the first defiant answering " Banzai " from the Japanese, who were engaged upon the work. This Kinteito bridge was built on trestles, and measured 260 yards in length; it was constructed entirely of local materials, and owing to the delay caused by the shelling it took 45 hours in the making. The interesting point about it is, however, neither the materials of which it was built nor the time occupied in its construction, but in the fact that it was never meant to. be anything more than a blind, to draw the artillery fire of the Russians, disclose the position of their guns, and obtain an advance sample of the skill of the gunners and the power of their weapon. The remaining bridges are shown upon Map II. In all there were ten of them, of an aggregate length of 1660 yards, or 100 yards less than a mile) one‑third of which was of regular pontoon construction, the remaining two‑thirds an improvisation. In making the

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latter it was found that small‑sized Chinese junks served as an admirable substitute for a pontoon, and that the ploughs of the unfortunate Koreans made the best anchors imaginable. Thus did the Japanese plough the waves of the Yalu in sober fact and not by poetical license. It is as well to say here that the Japanese are extremely proud of their bridging feats, and, I think, with justice. They are not quite so well pleased 'with their pontoon. The boats are well enough, they say, but the scantling and wooden platforms are too slight and fragile to stand the knocking about inseparable from service conditions.

It was about time now to issue orders for the attack. A reconnaissance had been made of the mountainous triangle of country through which the Twelfth Division was to maneuver so as to turn the Russians out of Tiger Hill and then operate against their left, and a definite and important decision had been come to regarding its proposed line of advance. The original idea of detaching this division to make a very wide sweep round so as to come down on the left rear of the Russians by the comparatively easy Kuantiencheii road, was at the last moment definitely abandoned. Not without regret; but after a minute study of the conditions under which such a movement must be carried out, it was decided that the plan was too adventurous, and had not sufficiently taken into account either the known obstacles, or the unknown dangers, of following such a route. It would have been almost impracticable, so the Japanese say, to arrange for supply and transport for the three or four days during which the division must depend upon its own resources, and no positive intelligence could be obtained as to the strength of the Russian troops at

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Kuantienchen and Aiyanmen, who, if in any force, would be in a position to fall on the flank of such a wide sweeping line of advance. The division therefore received orders to adopt the alternative scheme, whereby, making a much closer circuit, their left should get into touch with the right of the Imperial Guards on the day of the battle. The route actually followed under these orders is clearly shown upon Map 11.

The chief original objection to this scheme had been that the enemy's cavalry might have come down behind the Twelfth Division from Aiyanmen; crossed the Yalu, and cut the Japanese communications with Pingyang or Chinnampo. Now that the whole army was concentrated at Wiju, covering the short, new, safe line of communications to Chulsan, there was no cause to fear any such enterprise. The other objection was on account of the extremely broken and difficult country which the division would have to traverse. The triangle of country between the Aibo and the Yalu was not, however, found to be as impracticable as it bad presented itself to the memories of the veterans of the Chinese War, who had traversed it with a similar purpose ten years previously. From this it would appear that old soldiers in Japan are like old soldiers elsewhere, and that their exploits are in no danger of diminishing or dwindling away in importance by lapse of time! Once the Twelfth Division succeeded in crossing the Aiho, however, it would find itself confronted by a great and rugged mountain 1000 feet high. It was called Hodaicboshi, and as it was impossible to reconnoitre across the Aiho, it was also impossible to foretell in what way it would be best to surmount or circumvent it.

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The only other, objection to the movement now ordered was one which applied with twofold force to the first idea, which had been abandoned. It was the objection to almost all turning movements, namely, that the force which has to be detached for the purpose must run the risks which are always involved in a temporary isolation. According to the instructions issued, the Twelfth Division would have to cross the river Yalu at Suikaochin one clear day in advance of the other two divisions. One‑third of the army would thus be divided from the remainder by a broad river, and would risk being overwhelmed by the Russians before assistance could come to it.

I mention this theoretical objection as its existence has always been carefully impressed on me by the Japanese, with a view, I think, of lending a dash of adventure to their strategy, which erred, they instinctively recognise, on the side of too much deliberation and slowness. I do not myself believe that the Twelfth Division ever ran the slightest danger of any such counter‑stroke from the Russians. Was it likely that General Sassulitch, who had, until now, shown but little enterprise, would risk having his army cut in two by thrusting a large portion of it eastwards across the Aiho, leaving two Japanese divisions a free opening to cut in and sever its line of communications and retreat on Fenghuangcheng ? I think not. I go further. I believe history will consider that the First Army commander was over‑ cautious. Considering the operations from the point of view of the arm‑chair, it seems clear that he should have hardened his heart and sent the Twelfth Division right round by Changsong and thence by the Kuantienchen road, as first suggested. He had a magnificent chance of doing

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something great‑he preferred the certainty of doing something good.

The plan being settled and preparations being complete, demonstrations were made by gunboats on the 25th and 26th at Yongampbo, and some junks laden with timber in the estuary of the Yalu were manceuvred so as to help to confirm Sassulitch in his impression that a disembarkation or crossing might take place at Antung. The actual attack orders were issued at 10 A. M. on April 28th. Under these orders the Twelfth Division had to cross the Yalu at Suikaoch‑in at 3 A.M. on the 30th, and move as shown on the map. Their special duty was to cover the passage of the main army over the river. A detachment of this division, consisting of one battalion and one squadron, was to make a very pronounced turning movement by Kyokaku and to threaten the enemy's left rear, but so weak a column could not be expected to produce any serious effect. By the evening of the 30th the division was to take up a line as shown on the map (for the orders were

Carried out to the letter), and, continuing to march the next day, it was to form up on the right of the Imperial Guards on the east bank of the Aiho before dawn on May 1st. The Second Division, starting at midnight was to march wia bridges " c," " d," " e," and " f," and deploy for attack on Chukodai island before dawn on May 1st.

The Imperial Guards were to follow the Second Division over the same bridges, and deploy between that Division and the Twelfth Division.

The artillery and the reserves were to take post as shown on the map.

Although these orders were issued three days in advance, nothing occurred in the interval to cause any

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modifications, which is, in itself, significant of the quiescence of the Russians. There was, however, one small outburst of activity on their part which at least threatened to disturb the cut and dried monotony of the programme. When, on the 26th, the Russians had evacuated Kyurito island they had also thought fit to clear out of Tiger Hill, exactly as the Boers evacuated Hlangwane, its Natal prototype, on the first approach of Buller. Just as in the South African instance Louis Botha, recognising the predominating tactical value of the place, took heart of grace and reoccupied it at the very last moment, so also Kaschtalinsky with his mountain; and there the parallel ends. Tiger Hill, it may be remembered, is the rock which composes the apex of the angle whose two sides are formed by the Yalu and Aiho rivers. It was held by one company of Guards, who were covering reconnoitring parties engaged in fixing the routes to be taken by their respective divisions when marching by night to take up their positions for the battle. At 4 P.m. on the 29th a battalion of Russian infantry crossed the Aiho with four guns, near Isbiko, and attacked this company. It fell back without much loss, and the Russians occupied Tiger Hill. The map shows even more clearly than my previous argument that these Russians had come to quite the wrong place from the point of view of Kuroki. Their force was so weak, however (so was Botha's), in comparison with the weighty masses of troops which were about to march over and in the rear of Tiger Hill, that the Japanese determined they could afford to leave them to be dealt with by the Twelfth Division, especially as their tardy efforts to entrench themselves were easily frustrated by the artillery of the Guards.

The morning of the 30th arrived, and with it the

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moment for the Twelfth Division to make a difficult, and, to some extent, a hazardous advance. Some Japanese officers of my acquaintance say that it was to assist this advance that it was determined to force on the "artillery fight; others, that it was to place their own superiority beyond question, and, if possible, crush the enemy's guns definitely in an artillery duel the day before the battle; others again, that it was a combination of these reasons. Curiously enough, I, a foreign if allied officer, have been placed, by the kindness of a powerful friend, in possession of the exact truth concerning this interesting point, a knowledge which is not, I believe, shared by many others.

The question as to whether the bombardment should begin on the 30th, or be deferred until the 1st, was very keenly, and even hotly, debated at the headquarters of the First Army. By one side it was urged that it was Most desirable to make the enemy show his hand, as the only certain information about his artillery was the position of the twelve guns north of Chiuliencheng. By the other, it was strongly insisted that it was not worth the while of the Japanese to gain this certitude at the cost of prematurely divulging the howitzers. There was a real danger, it was argued, that, on learning the full strength of the Japanese artillery, the Russians might withdraw their own guns northwards out of range of the howitzers. If the Yalu bed had been an .ordinary valley this would not have mattered very much, but as the river was there, it would be impossible, .to advance the howitzers next day, to follow up the ,enemy. Thus the battle would have to be delayed or fought without the howitzers. So evenly divided were opinions, that it was actually decided to leave the matter to chance. Those who best know the Japanese

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are the very people who will find it most difficult to credit this statement. Nevertheless, I cannot be mistaken, for my information on this point is absolutely authentic.

Until midday the sun was at the backs of the howitzers. After that it would be in their eyes. The artillery were given orders to mass on Kinteito island during the night of the 29th‑30th. They were to open fire at the first good opportunity given them by the Russian guns. If the Russian guns gave them no opening they were not to fire at all.

It was further the secret intention of the small group who control the destinies of the First Army, that if their guns had not opened fire by noon, an order should be sent down to them forbidding them to fire on that day under any circumstances. By daybreak on the 30th the whole of the artillery of the Second Division, together with the five batteries of twelve centimetre howitzers, in all thirty‑six field guns and twenty howitzers, were admirably entrenched on the soft, sandy soil of Kinteito, which lent itself well to the purpose. Every advantage was taken of the natural lie of the ground, and much artifice was employed to conceal the position from the Russian gunners on the north bank of the river. Trees were transplanted a short distance in front of the batteries to hide the telltale flash of discharge, and were carefully chosen from amongst those which were growing either directly in front or directly behind the entrenchment which was to be concealed. Thus next morning the landscape appeared unchanged from the Russian side of the river, as the fact that a tree of a particular shape had advanced or retired 200 or 300 yards during the night, was naturally imperceptible. Poles were stuck into the

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sand and connected by a string on which branches were suspended. The earth dug out of the deep gun‑pits was most carefully, and with great labour, scattered broadcast, so as not to disclose any irregularity of terrain. The howitzer pits and epaulements were connected by trenches, and numbers of covered ways leading down to the river bank showed the trouble that had been taken to ensure a plentiful supply of water for laying the dust, which is otherwise so apt to rise with the shock of discharge and give away the position.

When all had been done that could be done to ensure concealment, then all was done that could be done in the time to ensure safety if concealment should chance to fail. Bomb‑proof shelters were made for the men, and were dug so deep and so strongly roofed over with heavy baulks of timber and earth, that they would have resisted heavy siege artillery, let alone the field guns, which were all that they had to fear. Telephone stations, depots for reserve ammunition, &c., were all strongly fortified with earthworks and heavy timber baulks, so arranged as to be invisible from the other side of the river, whence we, when we rode over after inspecting them, were unable to locate them, although, of course, we knew their approximate position. Thus, screened from observation and protected against fire, every possible precaution had been taken towards minimising the effect of the enemy's guns. It now only remained to perfect the arrangements for offensive action. With this object, two observation stations (marked on the map) were established on the high ground some 3000 or 4000 yards in rear of the batteries, from whence a good view could be obtained of the Russian camp behind Chiuliencbeng, and ot the lateral communications, such as they were, which

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ran in rear of the Russian entrenchments. These observation stations were connected with the howitzer batteries by telephone, and both batteries and observation stations having duplicate maps of the enemy's position marked out in small squares, the observers on the southern heights were able, by merely telephoning down the number of a square, to switch the whole fire effect of the masked batteries on to any spot where they from their elevation could see a suitable mark present itself Platforms were also erected in trees on the flanks of the batteries, from whence officers would be able to make local observations of the effect of their fire. All this was accomplished in one night, and, although the soil was light and easy to dig, yet, when I saw those deep trenches, the platforms, and the enormous baulks of timber, and recognised that the very trees had been shifted about as unconcernedly as a gardener transplants a rose‑bush I confess I was fairly surprised.

By daybreak all was in order. The old Hanoverian Colonel who taught me what little I know, used always to insist that " Ordnung und Punktlichtkeit " were the only secure foundations for military genius; and here, if anywhere, were Ordnung, and Punktlichtkeit in the highest degree. The artillery, as I have already explained, had merely been told they were free to open if the enemy's guns took the initiative, but that otherwise they must remain silent. They had of course not the vestige of an idea that even this qualified permission would be withdrawn at midday. Indeed, they do not know this now, and they probably never will know it.

Still they were burning with eagerness to begin, and lay there anxiously awaiting the challenge of the Russian cannon. On the previous mornings these guns had commenced firing at the bridges at seven o'clock

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precisely, but as luck would have it they left them alone on this fateful day. The language used in the batteries would have rivalled that of our army in Flanders if the Japanese possessed any stock of bad words, which, by the way, they do not. Minutes dragged themselves out into hours, and up to 10 A.m. no one had made an attempt to tread on the tail of the Japanese coat. It had become necessary therefore to trail it a little more ostentatiously and defiantly.

I find, it impossible to believe that the two boatloads of Japanese engineers who chose that hour to paddle up and down the main channel of the Yalu opposite Chukodai were engaged in a bond fide attempt to survey the river, as I have been officially informed. I prefer to remember the traditional camaraderie between gunners and sappers, and to assume that some sporting artilleryman persuaded some equally sporting engineer to take a step which must set the cannon balls rolling. For no guns in the world could resist a couple of large pontoon boats full of men rowing quietly about on a broad river within very easy range of their muzzles. Therefore inevitably the Russians opened on the boats, and instantly seventy‑two guns and twenty howitzers were at them. The Russians never had a chance, but just for the first ten minutes the rafale of their quick‑firing artillery enabled them to look dangerous to the anxious headquarters staff and infantry looking on at a distance. After that, not only the overwhelming superiority of the Japanese in batteries and in weight of metal, but also all their careful preparations told with crushing effect. The Japanese were invisible and comparatively invulnerable, the Russians were conspicuous and everywhere most vulnerable. In thirty minutes the Russian guns were silenced. At 11 A.M.

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they brought up a fresh battery on to the knoll east of Makau and opened fire, but these guns were also silenced in a couple of minutes by two or three batteries of Guards artillery, which had that morning advanced on to Kyurito island. Thus, in an easy triumph ended the anxiously anticipated artillery duel, probably the last of its sort that will ever take place. Why, why did the Russian great general staff disdain to take a lesson from the Boers, who had so recently repeated for the benefit of the British, and for that of all the world as well if it chose to take heed, the lesson of how an inferior artillery should be worked ?

During the artillery fight, the Twelfth Division had taken up the position assigned to it without any contretemps, and by their presence there forced the Russian battalion on Tiger Hill to fall back hastily with its four guns, so as to avoid being cut off from the main body. The hill was reoccupied by a battalion of Guards as a garrison, as well as by a second battalion who were employed in preparing a road across the islands for the guns. Simultaneously with the evacuation of Tiger Hill by the Russians, i.e., at noon, the bridging of the main stream was put in hand by the Japanese, as shown on the map at " e " and " g," as well as the bridging of the lesser branch at " f " just under Tiger Hill. These bridges were all completed soon after dark. During the day arrangements had to be made to get the Second Division artillery across the main stream of the Yalu to support the infantry attack more vigorously than would be possible if it contented itself with doing so from the position it had fought from during the artillery duel. The river was 500 yards wide at this spot, and a bridge was out of the question, so it was decided that the

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guns should be ferried across during the night. In the darkness this proved a very slow and awkward business, so much so that by daybreak on May 1st, only three batteries and the escorting battalion of infantry bad got across and entrenched themselves near Chukodai village, although by that time all three infantry divisions had reached their allotted positions. These positions are clearly shown on the map, likewise that of the artillery belonging to the several divisions. In frontage, extension, depth, brigade reserves, divisional reserves and army reserves, the arrangements were exactly those of a German army corps attacking a skeleton enemy.

It was 7 A.M. when the infantry began to move forward, drawing no sign from the enemy, for neither from Suribachiyama* nor from the hill to the north of it was a shot fired. The formidable Russian position became yet more impressively formidable from its silence. A Japanese officer, speaking to me of this advance, said, "When the enemy fires very heavily, it is unpleasant; but when he does not fire at all, it is terrible." The chief of the staff also said to me, " No one knew whether it was the intention of the Russians to tempt us to come closer in before beginning, or whether they bad altogether retreated, but the majority held to the former opinion he added, " the silence was very trying."

Then, at last, six guns of the Russian battery near Makau appeared in action and fired a few rounds. At this the whole of the attacking force breathed more freely and stepped forward with gay alacrity. The

* The hill was called Suribachiyama by the Japanese soldiers owing to its resemblance to an inverted bowl of a description used in Japan for pounding beans for soup.

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artillery of the Guards was upon the battery like a cat springing on a mouse, and in two or three minutes, had reduced it to silence. The Russians then tried to withdraw, and were smashed and ruined in so doing, a high explosive shell by an extraordinarily lucky fluke hitting the leading limber and halting the battery under fire, as it was coming down a path so narrow that the rear teams could not pass the disabled limber. It took about eight minutes to destroy this battery completely.

It was not until the Japanese reached the Aiho that the Russian infantry joined in, and then they opened with volleys. The river should have been filled with dead and wounded. The defenders had the precise range, and it was only 300 to 800 yards from their trenches. Actually, however, no very serious damage was done.

The Russian soldier is the worst shot existing in any great army in Europe. This came within my cognisance whilst I was Commandant of the Musketry School at Hythe. He gets but few rounds for practice, and these are fired mostly in volleys. A volley is the negation of marksmanship as far as the individual is concerned, for he never knows, and never can know, whether his bullet was one of those that missed, or one of those that hit, the target. Moreover, the volley method is incompatible with the attainment of the maximum rapidity of fire possible with the modern magazine rifle, for each man has to wait until the slowest soldier is ready before he can come to the present, and even then cannot fire as soon as he has drawn a bead on his object, but must pull the trigger when his commander thinks he has done so, which is a very different matter. The volley is not only the

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negation of accuracy, but also the negation of individualism and wide extensions. Occasionally it has its use as a reassertion of discipline on rallied troops; for very deliberate very long range fire at a large, slowly moving, or stationary object, and for both offence and defence in night attacks, but for the general purposes of war it is dead as the dodo.

Altogether, I take it then, the Japanese were in luck to have had volley‑firing Russians behind the parapets, instead of a few hundred Boer sharpshooters. The Russian trenches were similarly placed to those from which the old Boer warned his little nephew firing at his side not to hurry, and to continue still to take careful aim; " for," said he, " notwithstanding the Rooineks are now only 400 paces from us, and are coming on bravely enough, not a man of them can ever reach you here if you hit one with every three cartridges, as you were taught to do with the springbok under pain Of a whipping." The Boers, it must be allowed, would have been invisible, whereas the Russians were plainly to be seen, not only by the infantry of the attack, but also by its artillery, which makes a considerable difference. There can be no doubt that showers of shrapnel and ceaseless hairbreadth escapes from bullets tend to make the aim of even the best soldier considerably less accurate than when he is well concealed and firing through a good loophole, whereas the indifferent soldier is only too apt to stick his head down and fire at random, if he fires at all.

Bad as the Russian marksmanship is acknowledged on all hands to have been, still the ground was so open and showed up so well the dark uniforms of the Japanese in their close formations that they suffered

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some loss, especially when crossing the Aiho. Not very much, but enough to make them halt and, in some instances, fall back. The Japanese of preYalu days were not the same as the Japanese who are going to march some day soon‑I hope very soon‑on Liaoyang. At least, their own officers tell me that all ranks have now doubled in self‑confidence and assurance of eventual victory. They fell back, but quietly and not very far. The idea had been to hold off from the assault and to continue the fight at indecisive range until the turning movement of the Twelfth Division should make itself felt. Just as with the Gordon Highlanders at Doornkop, however, it was quickly realized by regimental officers and men that the fire was too hot to admit of a prolonged duel between troops in the open and troops under cover, and that the only alternative to going back was to go forward. Instinctively the whole line endeavoured to press on, the Guards without success, until the Second Division on the left, which is by the way quite the finest body of troops with the First Army, carried Chiuliencheng and the west side of Suribachiyama. The troops in front of the Guards bad then to beat a hurried retreat, and at the same time the Russian left at Sekijo began to fall back south on Hamaton, and south‑west to the Pekin road.

In such accounts of this battle as have so far come to hand in Japanese newspapers, it appears to be believed that the Russians quitted the field because of their left being turned by the Twelfth Division. On the contrary, it was the assault and capture of the position held by the Russian right which forced on the general retirement.

When the Twelfth Division advanced to cross the Aiho

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they at first experienced very, little opposition. They were not even fired at during their passage of the river except by the guns from Seki jo, which were very speedily silenced. The weak Russian outposts along the right bank of this section of the river had already fallen back, partly, no doubt, because they had nothing with which to reply to the Japanese thirty‑six mountain guns, partly, perhaps, because they may have already got some inkling that the advance of the Japanese centre and left might cut them off from the Pekin road. The Russian forces afterwards encountered by the Twelfth Division were not opposite their point of crossing, but were posted near Sekijo, facing north, and awaiting an advance of the Japanese by the route they had originally intended to follow, viz., from Changsong by the Kuantienchen road. Had the Sekijo troops been judiciously posted on the lower slopes of Hodaichoshi opposite Shiroshiko, the Twelfth Division could hardly, I think, have got across without much loss and considerable delay, as the Aiho was much deeper here than further down stream, and it was all the men could do to ford it, even though practically unopposed.

The famous Russian position on the Yalu was fairly in Japanese hands by 9 A.M., at the surprisingly small cost of some 300 casualties. I repeat that if the Russians had been marksmen, and had so posted themselves as to offer a less perfect target for the Japanese artillery, they should have accounted for, at the very least, five times as many of their opponents. Their general line of defence had several faults, but it did possess that merit which compensates for many faults ‑an unrivalled field of fire, which could not have been filled in with a more desirable mark than the German formations and dark blue uniforms of the Japanese

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infantry. Or, to take another supposition, had the remnants of the Russian artillery fallen back during the night out of range of the Japanese howitzers and field guns, but within range of the Aiho, they might, and would, by indirect fire, have made their enemy pay much more heavily for their crossing. But the God of War does not seem to ‑have been suggesting many brilliant ideas to the defenders on the north bank of the river.

It was now 9 A.M., and lest the Japanese staff be too much crammed down the throat of the unfortunate alwaysweighed‑in ‑civilian‑balances‑and‑found‑wanting British subaltern, I should like to tell him that, although all the world has heard of the eagerness of the victors to get their guns over the Yalu, they were, I will not say more eager, but certainly more successful with their champagne which arrived in the Russian trenches at that hour. Thus, hardly had the stern and deadly rattle of musketry receded into the mountains than it was joyously replaced by the slight and frivolous pop which salutes the arrival on the scene of The subtle alchemist that in a trice Life's leaden metal into gold transmutes."

The battle was won but the harvest was not reaped, and "What scoundrel cried 'Halt'? Now is no time for halting! " as the bolting Madrassee cavalrymen called out to the unfortunate officer who was trying to rally their squadron. Whether the Japanese will ever give the exact particulars of what passed between 9 A.M. and 2 P.m. that day I do not know. At present any staff officer speaking on the subject slurs over the whole period with the somewhat unconvincing explanation that the Guards and the Second Division were very tired and hungry and needed rest and refreshment. If this

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is to be taken literally, as meaning that these troops were so exhausted that they could not march a mile or two further to keep at close grip with the enemy, then the statement is nothing less than a libel on the sturdy Japanese infantry; but if it means that the minds and energies of the Generals and Staff were fairly used up, then, I believe, we have here the secret not only of this, but of many another, strangely inconclusive ending to a very decisive initial success.

It is perhaps necessary to have been a responsible commander during an attack to realise the immense reaction of relief when success is attained, a reaction coincident with an intense longing to tempt fate no further. " You have won your battle," a voice seems to whisper in your ear; " the enemy are going ; for God's sake let them go; what right have you to order still more men to lose their lives this day ? "

However this may be, I believe I have by constant inquiries and by the special kindness of one of the most accomplished and charming of the Japanese officers, whose name I need not give, gained possession now of a fairly clear and true account of what actually did happen at, and previous to, the Hamaton fight. It is very slight, but I suspect it contains certain points of interest which may never reach the world in any official version issued by the Japanese general staff after the war. Such as it is, here it is: The reserves had been ordered at 8 A.M. to march with all speed on Suribachiyama, and at 9 A.M, a bridge was thrown across the Aiho to enable two batteries to cross over and co‑operate with these reserves. The Russians had for the most part slipped out of their trenches in good time, and had not, therefore, suffered very heavy loss in getting clear. Two battalions of their reserves had come up from the north‑west of

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Antung, and with three Maxims had taken up a position on a hill some 3000 yards west of Chiuliencheng, from which they were covering the retirement of their defeated comrades. As previously stated, the Japanese scheme of operations had contemplated a containing action in front by the Guards and Second Division,whilst the Twelfth Division turned the enemy's left. By crossing the Aiho, however, the containing part of the line had come within decisive range and had to go on, go back, or perish. They went on, and carried the breastworks without waiting for the Twelfth Division to make its‑elf felt.

Now that the Russians had taken up another position not very far back, there was an opportunity of reverting to the original idea by giving time for the Twelfth Division to envelop the left flank of the Russian second line of defence. Unfortunately, this division bad not been able to make a wide enough sweep to clear the enemy's left, and the presence of a Russian force at Sekijo had transformed their turning movement into another frontal attack. The resistance of the enemy was, indeed, so strong at Sekijo, )n the right of the Twelfth Division, that it had the result of causing their commander to bring up his left in a northerly direction with a view to enveloping the Russians, who were holding his right in check and cutting them off from the Pekin road Instead, therefore, of having wheeled somewhat to the left so as to face west towards Hamaton, the Twelfth Division at 10 A.M. had wheeled somewhat to the right, and were facing and moving in a northerly direction. Orders were sent telling them to march on Hamaton, and beyond this nothingmuch was done until about 11.30 a.m. Atthathour Kuroki ordered the Second Division to advance towards

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Antung by the road which runs along the Yalu. It was to be preceded by the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. The four reserve battalions, consisting of two battalions of the Imperial Guards and two of the 30th Regiment, were ordered to pursue down the Pekin road, preceded by the Guards' cavalry. It will be seen from Map II. that the effect of this order would be to direct the reserves and Guards' cavalry straight upon the left of the enemy's rear‑guard.

At midday Major‑General Baron Nishi, the commander of the Second Division, rode up to Suribacbiyama, where the army headquarters commander and staff were assembled, and reported that he hesitated to carry out his orders without further reference, as be felt bound to point out that they could only be obeyed at a cost of life which might, for all he knew, be disproportionate to the advantage to be gained by forcing his way past. The Russian rear‑guard, be said, commanded the only practicable road to Antung so completely that, if he was to march to that place, the only method of doing so would be to first make a frontal attack on the Russians and drive them out of their position. He added that he would have done this without reference were it not that he had no guns to help him. The howitzers could not come up for a long time yet, and the ground was so broken that there was no position from which the Second Division Field Artillery could be brought into action against the enemy.

There are not many commanders who have resolution enough at the end of a terribly anxious night and morning to reject a series of plausible arguments for leaving well alone. I have heard Lord Kitchener remark under similar circumstances: " Your reasons for not doing what you were told to do are

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the best I ever heard; now go and do it! " Kuroki, however, determined that, as the main position had been carried, it was not desirable that further heavy sacrifices should be imposed upon the troops by a direct attack upon the rear‑guard, and he authorised Major‑General Nishi to stand by and do nothing pending further orders. ‑ It was a pity, but no doubt it is a very exceptional man who is able to detach his mind from the terribly impressive now of a hardfought field into the then of the far future. Yet this is necessary to a full comprehension that what may seem heavy further sacrifices at such a moment may be literally trifling compared to the ultimate sacrifices which may have to be paid for an incomplete victoryfor a thrust only half driven home.

To return from general principles to their application. On May I st Nishi stood fast, and the four battalions of the reserve also made no progress. Whether, like the Second Division, they were restrained with the acquiescence or under the orders of superior authority, or whether they found the task too difficult, they merely skirmished with the enemy, and up to 2 P.m. had not advanced more than a few hundred yards from Suribachiyama. Meanwhile the Twelfth Division was advancing but slowly, owing to the constant resistance of the enemy and the extreme fatigue of the men. The fact that the Twelfth were able to move on is proof that the Guards and Second could have done so also, and disposes of the official theory that they were too exhausted. For a reference to the map will show that neither of them had done so much marching over valleys and mountains as their comrades on the right.

At last the advance troops of the Twelfth reached

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a point whence they threatened to cut off the two battalions of the Russian rear‑guard from their line of retreat by the Pekin road to FenghuangeheDg. By this time (2 P.m.) the bulk of the defeated Russians, with their baggage, had got clear away under cover of the rear‑guard, and were marching, safe from anything but cavalry, on Fenghuangcheng. It was full time then for these Russian battalions to begin to fall back. Unfortunately for them, two batteries of artillery, with their escort, were still blocked on the bad mountain track leading just behind the position to Hamaton. I have asked many officers to give me their ideas as to why these guns were so belated. It might have been well worth while to lose the two batteries for the sake of the effect of even five minutes of their fire on the Japanese troops struggling through the Aiho. Or, if the rearguard had been employing them to keep the Japanese at a distance, and to cause them loss during their occupation of Chiuliencheng, then also they might have been sacrificed with a clear conscience. Seeing, however, that they did not fire a shot during all this period it seems strange that measures had not been taken to remove them altogether from the danger‑zone of the battle‑field. The most plausible explanation I have heard is, that the Russians did mean to employ them with the rear‑guard, but that, owing to bad 9rrouiid and losses amongst the teams, they were at the last moment unable to bring them into position on such bad ground. Waggons, travelling soup‑kitchens, and such like impedimenta, rendered the track to their front almost impassable. The Twelfth Division advance troops were getting uncomfortably close to Hamaton on the only line of retreat. The moment had come when

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the commander of the rear‑guard had to fall back and leave the guns to their fate, or else make up his mind to lose both rear‑guard and batteries. He decided to try and extricate his infantry, and shortly after 2 P.m. the evacuation of the hill 3000 yards west of Chiuliencheng was begun. Directly he saw this movement, orders were issued by Kuroki to the whole of his army to advance and pursue.

Reference should now be made to the map of the Hamaton fight (No. III.), which not only shows what happened more clearly than any description, but is in itself a most interesting document, being a facsimile of the original map given me by Major‑General Watanabe, who commanded the Japanese troops at the engagement in this part of the field. It was drawn during, and immediately after, the battle for his own use ; and when it is remembered that the days are not very long in early May, it is proof of quick draughtsmanship on the part of his staff. The first troops to get to close touch with the enemy were the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 4th Guards, and the 1st battalion 30th Regiment. This was about 2.45 P.m., and simultaneously the leading troops of the Twelfth Division began to appear on the scene. At first‑and, indeed, for a considerable time‑the Division was only represented by one company, since become famous in the First Army, the 5th company of the 24th Regiment.

Had the Twelfth Division been turning the Russian left by the ordinary wheel inwards, this company, being on the extreme left of the left battalion of the line, must have been the last of the whole force to find itself in a position to cut off the enemy's retreat. As already explained, however, the Division had been forced by the conditions prevailing in its own section of the battle‑field to

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bring up its left shoulders and move for some distance northwards. When pursuit was ordered, then the left of the line was just about level and east of Hamaton, and thus the left company got a bit of a start in the race for that point‑a start of which they made the very best use.

The map is eloquent concerning the vital and urgent necessity to the Russians of driving off this company. It will be observed that it directly menaced their line of retreat, as it was already nearer to Hamaton than they were, on a rise commanding, at short rifle range, the road up which the artillery were now retiring. Accordingly a strong effort was made by the Russians to shake off the 5th company, in the course of which the main part of their force took up the following position to resist the troops directly pressing upon their rear. Their left was then holding the point which is marked 11/3 on the map, and their line at this stage of the conflict stood upon the same ground as that on which the Japanese are shown, as far as the point marked 11/4, which is where their right appears to have rested.

At 3 P.m. General Watanabe appeared on the scene with the 1st battalion of the 4th Regiment of the Guards, and took command of the Japanese forces. A few minutes before 4 P.m. he ordered the 30th Regiment to attack the enemy's front vigorously, whilst the 10th company, 4th Guards, was directed to turn the Russian right flank. This turning movement was successful, and the Russian right retired across the narrow valley and toiled painfully up on to the long, bare, razorbacked hill to the position in which it is shown in the sketch. I say " painfully " advisedly, for I have climbed the hill, and it is very nearly a hands and knees

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business, even for an unencumbered man, the slope being 45 degrees, and covered with loose pebbles and disintegrated rock, giving but poor foothold.

It was now too late for the Russian artillery to hope to escape, yet still there was time for the infantry to get clear were it not that the heroic self‑devotion of the 5th company of the 24th Regiment interposed a fatal obstacle. On its left the Russians, in greatly superior force, were within 300 yards on its front, i.e., a little north of the road they were within 200 yards. The captain of the company was shot, and the subaltern who succeeded him in command very shortly met with the same fate. Half the company were killed or wounded, and their ammunition was running short; still they held on, and in doing so held, the Russians in check. At 4.30 P.m. the position of affairs was like this: The Russian left and centre were still in their old position, from 11/3 to 1 on the road. A party had been detached from the extreme left at 11/3, and had reached the vicinity of 9/3, where they were attacking the left of the 5th company, 24th Regiment. The Russian right had been driven from 30/i and II/4 back to where it is shown on the summit of the long razor‑backed hill. The loth and 12th companies had climbed the hill after them where they are shown on the map by the figures 10/4 and 12/4. From thence these two companies were able to shoot across the narrow valley into the backs of the Russian left at, and about, the point marked 11/4. The Russians stood this punishment for a few minutes, and then, being at the same time vigorously pressed in front, they gave way all along the eastern hill and ran down into the valley between it and the razor‑backed hill. The attacking Japanese immediately pressed into the

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ridge they had evacuated, and the local situation was then exactly as shown on the map. I say " local situation" because just at that moment, 4.40 p.m., the remainder of the 24th Regiment and some of the mountain guns and men of the Twelfth Division were coming on to the field in support of their 5th company in time, and barely in time, to wipe out 300 Russians who were in the act of making a bayonet attack upon its shattered remnants.

Rarely in modern war have troops found themselves in so utterly hopeless a plight as did the unfortunate Russians at 4.45 P.m. Even with the aid of General Watanabe's excellent map it is difficult to convey a full conception of this hopelessness to one who has not seen the ground. The western or razor‑backed hill was, as I have said, exceedingly steep, with a slope of 45 degrees. It was absolutely bare of any sort of cover, and rose about 4 5 0 feet above the valley through which the road ran. The valley was dead‑level plough, also without cover to bide as much as a mouse. The eastern hill, off which the Russians had just been driven, was 550 feet in height, and also very steep. There was no cover. The shattered but undaunted wreck of the 5th company of the 24th Regiment still barred the exit from the trap, and it was now being reinforced every moment by guns and infantry from the Twelfth Division. Once the Russians had been forced down into this pit they seemed so completely finished that Major‑General Watanabe and his staff thought the fighting was over.

The greatest breadth of the valley was only some 800 yards. The guns, waggons and infantry, with which it was filled, were all in the most inextricable confusion, and commanded by the Japanese as people

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in the stalls of a theatre are commanded by the people in the gallery. Nevertheless (to their everlasting credit be it said), the Russians refused to give in, and whilst some dug to try and get cover, others fired, and some, again, tried to escape over the northern spur of therazor‑back. These last were all killed. A Japanese officer told me that he hated seeing the poor fellows bowled over. They could only walk very, very slowly up the steep incline, and there were hundreds of rifles on them from the top of the big hill east of the road. Every good sportsman would disdain to kill game under such conditions and yet, where fellow creatures are concerned, there is no alternative but to take prisoners or to kill. How many lives, both British and Dutch, may not the squeamishness of our guns after the storming of Talana Hill have cost us? The Russian guns were pointed in every direction and gallantly kept up their fire for a time, but the discharges were becoming less and less frequent as the layers were shot down. The rifle fire also slackened down, but the digging still went on, and it was time to make an end. General Watanabe therefore ordered the 10th company of the 4th Guards to charge with the bayonet. At that moment up went the white flag!

I wonder if I have written out this story so as to render comment superriuous? There is not, as a matter of fact, very much scope for it. The certainty that seventy‑two guns, some of them 12 centimetres, would silence the sixteen field guns north of Chiuliencheng and Suribachiyama detracts from the interest of the contest and tends to obscure rather than illuminate the archaic artillery tactics of the Russians. None the less, it is impossible to refrain from considering what might have happened had they withdrawn their artil