Action Reports do not require an exchange of gunfire with the hostile force.  Incidents that involve land mines, forms of harassment or intimidation, and infiltrator engagements are also very important to our studies.  Any and all accounts of incidents precipitated by North Korean or Chinese Forces are relevant.

All reports must contain the following information:

1. Title (Your name for this report)

2. Your name and rank

3. Your service branch (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard)

4. Your unit/ship

5. Incident date and time (time may be approximate, or early morning, midnight, etc.)

6. Incident location (DMZ, off the coast of, OP Ouellette, Town of Munsan ni, Div. HQ, etc.)

7. Casualty counts and type ( 1 KIA and 2 WIA - if not certain, give approximate)

8. Names of commander, patrol leader, other personnel involved (if not known, state that)

9. Your description as best you remember

10. Contact information (how you want to be contacted if it becomes necessary, i.e., email address, telephone number, surface mail address)

     These reports are important for their content and not any literary style.  The Service Studies group is not looking for a college term paper or thesis.  Simple style is all that is required and grammar will not be graded.

     Action reports can be sent to the KDSS group by email, Fax or surface mail.  Use the following address to forward your report:

Email:  ActionReports

Fax:     732-752-6436

Surface mail:  Korea Defense Service Studies
                       P.O. Box 631
                       Middlesex, NJ 08846

Example No. 1

U.S. Armed Forces Hostile Incident Official Studies Report
Post 27 July 1953 Armistice Agreement

 Action Report Form Details 

 Description of Incidence:  I was stationed at Camp Howze along MSR 1, a few miles south of the DMZ’s in the Western Corridor, near Munsan-ni. On May 5th 1980 my unit moved north and crossed over the Imjin River and proceeded towards Panmunjom to assume the Battalion's rotation for its DMZ mission (a 60 day combat/hostile fire mission) and specifically to Warrior Base / Camp Liberty Bell (a fortified, sandbagged tent city for the 2^nd Infantry Division’s rotating Battalions).  There were two Firebases/UN Guard Posts which flew both the U.S. and UN flags. I assumed Command of one of these firebases, UN Guard Post Ouellette on 6 May 1980. When a battalion rotates to the DMZ, one company mans the Guard Posts (Ouellette and Collier) which over-watch Panmunjom inside the DMZ. The Firebases were setup just like the Viet Nam firebases, similar to what was depicted in the movie the "Green Berets".  Each was ringed in by claymore mines.  A series of Bunkers with inter-connecting trenches, weapons emplacements, a command bunker / Tactical Operations Center (TOC), an under ground mess-hall and aid station, out door slit trenches for one to execute their natural body functions without privacy completed the structure of the bases.  Normal compliment was about 75-100 troops.   Every morning I would send out two patrols at first light. One patrol swept the dirt road running up to the firebase to ensure that North Koreans had not planted booby traps and / or mines in the road to destroy any vehicles re supplying the firebases. The perimeter swing patrols went outside the perimeter to check for any breach in the barbed wire and to insure our claymores were not tampered with.  In direct support of each firebase were both a platoon of 4.2 Mortars and a firing battery of 105 MM Howitzers at Camp Liberty Bell and 4 Pappa-one respectively.
      On 13 May 1980 one of the U.S. Forces ambush patrols (from my patrolling company) ran into an NK infiltration patrol. An exchange of gunfire resulted for the next two hours.  From Ouellette, I and my soldiers, observed both green (WARSAW Pact ammo) tracers and orange (US ammo) tracers fire towards each other. I was then ordered to mount and lead a patrol out of the U.S. compound to establish a hasty ambush position to cut off the NK withdraw. The NKs were picked up via radar withdrawing underneath a ROK firebase 500-600 meters away. The ROKs engaged them for a short period as they withdrew.  This was essentially the last night of semi clear weather. After the firefight on the 13^th, the weather got worse and the monsoons brought rain darkness and fog, lots of fog. From first light on the 14th through first light on the 15th U.S. perimeter swing patrols found communist lesson books, "Red Books", placed on top of our claymores--a calling card!! They were getting in!! The patrols and troops stationed in the guard posts were scared and Maj. Gen. Kinston, the 2nd Div Commander, said he wanted these infiltrators stopped, and he wanted a body count.
      In the early morning hours of the 15^th (0100 hr), bunker number 8 informed me that they saw an object near a grouping of claymores. I moved out from my underground TOC/bunker and headed for bunker number 8. The fog was intermittent, but too soupy for the night vision devices to work well. Via land-line, I talked to the Battalion Commander who was located outside of the DMZ’s south Barrier Fence at Camp Liberty Bell (just inches outside the DMZ proper). I informed the Battalion Commander that I was going to 100 percent alert. I then informed the troops in the bunkers, who had orientation to the engagement area, of the plan-coordinated effort; also ensuring no other patrols were potentially close by as not to risk friendly fire, and I then prepared hand held illumination. Before I could fire the illumination, several trip flares went off that U.S. Forces had planted in the wood line just on the MDL between North and South Korea. It appeared that figures were momentarily silhouetted against the light projected from the trip flares. I was standing outside of the bunker so that I could fire my illumination. I fired the first illumination, but the winds made it ineffective. I fired the second and the light spot traveled in the correct direction. I called to my bunkers who had view of the area and told them to get ready and I would initiate the fire. Suddenly the object moved and began to run leaving no doubt that it was a man. I opened fire with my 45 cal. pistol and my troops immediately engaged. While firing I ran to the other bunkers which exposed me to enemy fire. During this engagement I changed three magazines and watched the running NK soldier/infiltrator get hit with fire across the back of his legs. Instantly, as soon as U.S. Forces opened fire, the NK covering fire was returned. I was noted for bravery under fire by my Battalion Commander in my efficiency report. 

A letter to the President has been prepared showing evidence of this incident. The case will show:

1. The incidents of fire fights on 13 &15 May 1980 happened by providing extracts from ABC, CBS, NBC evening news broadcasts

2. The incidents happened by providing news paper clippings that reported about the incidents including the Washington Post, New York Times and Pacific Stars and Stripes

3. Documented evidence of my command of Guardpost/FireBase Ouellette during this period including statements from some of the troops recounting what happened and my actions

4. A copy of my official Officers Efficiency Report whereby my Battalion Commander talks about my bravery in the firefights while I was Commanding Officer of Ouellette. 
   

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