Obituary in Sunday, October 8,
1972, New York Times:

ADM. KIRTLAND, 79,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
ALABAMA SKIPPER

Commander of World War II Battleship in Pacific Dies

ROSLYN, L. I. Oct. 7 - Vice Adm. Fred D. Kirtland, retired, who commanded the Battleship Alabama during World War II, died yesterday in St. Francis Hospital. He was 79 years old and lived at - - - - - - in Port Washington.


Admiral Kirtland became captain of the Alabama shortly after her commissioning in 1943. When the ship was hurriedly outfitted, there was no time to install a new type of air-search radar, so he took it along in a crate. At an advanced base in the South Pacific, he succeeded in installing the new radar on the Alabama's masthead by means of a slide built by his crew. A report on this incident noted: "With this radar, the Alabama made original contact on a large group of enemy based aircraft in the battle of the Marianas. This early detection was of incalculable value in turning a serious threat.... into an air battle disastrous for the enemy." Admiral Kirtland received the Legion of Merit with Combat V for outstanding service as commanding officer of the Alabama.

In the 1960's, USS Alabama BB60 was released to the state of Alabama. The ship was moved to Mobile, to serve as a state war memorial. The late Mr. Stephens Croom, Lt. Col, U. S. Army Ret., a member and secretary of the state's USS Alabama Battleship Commission, became interested in "the initial contact" stories. He performed extensive research and made numerous inquiries seeking confirmation and recognition of Alabama's "initial contact" report.

In Paragraph 2 of a 22 October 1973 letter to the then Head, Curator Branch, Naval History Division, Washington Navy Yard, Mr. Croom states: "Your suggestion that we have erred in our claim that ALABAMA provided "the early warning" of the enemy's approach has caused us some concern." Mr. Croom's letter then goes on to make several statements, advancing his argument as follows:

"With all due respect to Admiral Morrison in his decision not to credit a single ship (Alabama) as the source of the early warning, we submit, in support of our posture, two items of official documentary evidence, plus two living eye witnesses who were on the scene, viz:"

"ITEM - Recommendation that the Legion of Merit be awarded Capt, Fred D, Kirtland, USN in a communication dated 26 June 44 from RAdm E. W. Hansen(sic), Commander of Battleship Division Nine (copy attached), where on page 2 we find paragraph 3, (c), (7) reading as follows:"

"(7) With this SK radar, the ALABAMA made the original radar contact for the entire task force on the large group of enemy carrier-based aircraft at 130 miles in the Battle of the Mariannas. This early detection was of incalculable value in turning a most serious threat to our fleet into an air battle disastrous for the enemy. Such performance is normal for the ALABAMA. The incident is unusual only in the magnitude of the issue involved."

"COMMENT: This recommendation was made only seven days after the now-famous action. obviously, the admiral was impressed with the performance of ALABAMA and her captain and he wanted to make the recommendation while he had such a fresh recollection of the events... and this was even before a complete assessment of the damage to the enemy could have been made."

"ITEM - ALABAMA's Action Report of Engagement with Enemy Planes off Saipan, Mariannas Islands, 19 June 1944. On page 8 is a portion of the chronological account of action and we find:"

"1247 - TBS transmission from CTG 58.7 to TG 58.7: "In the matter of reporting initial bogies: to IOWA well done, to ALABAMA very well done."

"COMMENT: This single item of documentary evidence should be sufficient in itself to prove our claim, and it substantiates the testimony of ALABAMA's radar officer Lt. John Henry that IOWA was asked to confirm the radar signal reported by ALABAMA."

"ITEM - Captain John Henry, USN (Ret.) has testified by telephone his very vivid account of the performance of his radar on that eventful morning. He stated that the first bogey appeared about 0945 in the westward direction about 190 miles distant. His report to Captain Kirtland was received with serious doubt, About ten minutes later the bogey was larger and at an indicated 150 miles, and Lt. Henry insisted that he had a bonafide signal. This time the Captain reported it to CTG 58.7, and true to Navy traditions, the CTG requested a confirmation . . . by IOWA. Moments later, IOWA's response was affirmative."

"COMMENT: On page 263 of VIII, Morrison says: "At one minute before ten o'clock. . . . . . task force radar picked up a flock of bogies to the west. . . . . Then again on page 265 Morrison describes the enemy's Raid I as consisting of 16 Zeke fighters, 45 Zekes carrying bombs, and 8 torpedo carrying Jills, and goes on to say "They were picked up by radar in Lee's battle line at 1000 when over 150 miles distant". ALABAMA was part of Lee's battle line. It was at 1019 that Mitscher gave the "execute" which triggered the launching of our Hellcats who were destined to make such history."

"ITEM - Captain Frank H. Brumby, Jr., USN (Ret.) (currently (at that time)) the Executive Director of the USS Alabama Battleship Commission) was serving in INDIANA as Gunnery Officer on 19 June and he has testified that when he responded to the Air Defense call, his captain informed him that "ALABAMA picked up a large raid of Japanese planes and we can expect a busy morning." About three hours later, when the message from CTG 58.7 came on the air, INDIANA's Communications Officer repeated it verbatim on the loud speakers all over the ship. The Captain reacted in a moment of pique: "Dammit, why the devil does he have to tell what other ships have done; we have our own ship to think about.."
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Note: In Mr. Croom's letter above, the first item cited, noting the "original radar contact", is seventh of eight "Outstanding acts of service" cited in Admiral Hanson's 26 June 1944 letter recommending award of the Legion of Merit to Captain Kirtland. The fifth and sixth acts cited in that letter briefly describe two other very unique actions by Captain Kirtland and his crew to maintain the ship's effectiveness. The acts were cited as follows:

(5) At anchor at MAJURO ATOLL, the ALABAMA ship's forces repaired and placed in full commission a five-inch mount, which had been adjudged and officially reported by the assigned tender as beyond repair by forces afloat and requiring the services of a navy yard. This mount was an effective unit of the battery, which shot down at least one enemy aircraft in the following operation.

Note: The five-inch gun mount was badly damaged in February 1944, during an earlier raid into the Marianas. It's repair by crewmen is indicative of Captain Kirtland's initiative and his confidence in the training and abilities of his crew.

(6) During a ten-day availability at a navy yard, her SK radar was not installed because the time estimated by the yard for installation was two weeks. The ALABAMA took the equipment on board and installed it by ship's force in one week at an advanced base in the Pacific.

Note: Above (item 5) entry ( is documentary evidence of installation of the SK radar by ship's force. Accomplished in the autumn of 1943, which in turn, made the 19 June 1944 "Initial Contact" possible.

A 1975 article in the Mobile Alabama newspaper, Mobile Press, described the efforts of Mr. Stephens Croom's to confirm Alabama's Initial Contact claim, and data he had presented towards that end. It resulted in a local lady asking why only Captain Kirtland was credited with the installation of the SK radar. In a letter to the editor, former ALABAMA crewman, Captain Frank H. Brumby, Jr., USN, (Ret) explained in one sentence the crediting of Captain Kirtland with this feat; "This was an outstanding team effort for which the "captain of the team" got the credit as he would have received the blame had it failed".

In the late 1970's, Mr, Croom distributed to crewmen reunion attendees, copies of two letters he had received in response to his inquiries seeking confirmation of Alabama's initial contact.

A 6 December 1974 letter from Mr. Samuel Eliot Morrison responding to inquires by Mr. Stephens G. Croom, stated: "All that I know and have written about USS Alabama in the Battle of the Philippine Sea is in volume VIII of my naval history, New Guinea and the Marianas, to which you refer in your letter. Owing to my great age and occupation with other projects I cannot go into this now. I am quite willing to admit that I was wrong." 

 A 20 May 1975 letter from the Director of Naval History and Curator for the Navy Department was more positive than the fore mentioned 22 October 1973 letter from the (then) Head, Curator Branch, Naval History Division, Washington Navy Yard. The director could not provide confirmation but stated: "I can understand how there might be some caution in confirming ALABAMA's claim to have given "the" early warning on the morning of 19 June. However, the existing evidence points very strongly in that direction. My people have done further research on the subject without uncovering contrary information. Unless or until such information comes to light, I believe it is safe to assume that Alabama was the first to detect the Japanese aircraft on this occasion".


In the fall of 2001, a new inquiry to the Naval History Center led to obtaining excerpts of action/war diary reports for 19 June 1944, submitted by Task Force 58 Battleship Division Commanders. In the excerpts obtained, each war diary of the Task Force 58 Battleship Division Commanders cite Alabama by name, as having made the initial contact report of 19 June 44.


Rear Admiral E. W. Hanson, Commander Battleship Division Nine (untitled chronology), two pages, each page signed by Admiral Hanson. For 19 June 1944 cites positions at 0800, 1200 and 2000. First sentence for the days events is as follows: "At 0621 after standing eastward for 10 hours (about 160 miles) reversed course to 250 and with occasional turn to the eastward for launching continued westward until large bogie picked up at 1006, bearing 265, distance 130 by Alabama."

 

Rear Admiral G. B. Davis, Commander Battleship Division Eight War Diary entry is as follows:

"GCT 0002, LZT 1002 ALABAMA reported large bogey bearing 265, distance 130 miles."


Rear Admiral O. M. Hustvedt, Commander Battleship Division Seven War Diary, entry is as follows:

"At 1006 ALABAMA reported a radar contact, which was immediately confirmed by IOWA, of a large group of
enemy planes bearing 265, distance 125 miles."


Also included with the division reports were excerpts of an interview of Rear Admiral O. M. Hustvedt, USN Commander, Battleship Division Seven. Among comments on the 19 June 44 battle, the "initial contact is noted as follows:

"On the morning of the 19th of June, a radar contact was made by ALABAMA on a large group of enemy planes to the westward at a distance of something more than 100 miles. The IOWA had also picked up this group by radar and was at that moment checking and verifying the radar indications. When the radar contact was reported by ALABAMA, IOWA was therefore, able immediately to confirm the contact. The distance to the enemy air groups at this time was approximately 105 miles. This early warning enabled the task force commander to take immediate appropriate action and as is well known, the carrier fighter squadrons intercepted the enemy air groups in force at a considerable distance from Task Force 58 formations".

In March 2002, the majority of the preceding material was e-mailed to a number of former Alabama crewmen. Excerpt of E. Wayne Bundy's e-mail response on Mon, 18 Mar 2002 is as follows: "I think the time/distance discrepancies are due to 3 separate ALABAMA bogey reports. I was on the VHF reporting to CTG and CTF. "I" Div operators Joe Cook and Cliff O'Brien spotted them. Knowing Joe and Cliff's skill, the CIC officer had no hesitancy and directed me to report. The 141 distance sounds right for the first report. Nobody else had them, which didn't surprise us since we had long known our SK had greater range than any other in the TF. (This was the one we took from Norfolk in crates on the fan tail and installed at Efate with help from a repair ship whose name escapes me). The flag didn't believe contact at that distance (it was pretty incredible, much the farthest we ever had one. The second distance closing would be our second report (I believe after an intervening "fade"zone, appropriate for a high altitude contact). Still no confirmation from anybody. The 105 distance then was our 3rd report (again after appropriate "fade") and was the one "immediately" confirmed by IOWA. Cliff, Joe and our senior tech officer LCdr Lenoir were officially honored for the outstanding performance of both equipment and personnel. - - - - - - - research to document this matter. It seems conclusive to me, and I don't think the varying distances are discrepancies or inconsistent with the sequence of events."

On 30 May 2002, an outline of this article was mailed to the two Alabama radar operators on watch the morning of 19 June 1944, (Joseph G. Cook and Clifford R. O'Brien). In a 4 June 2002 phone conversation Joseph G. Cook, commented on his memory of the incident. He remembered the distance for the first contact as being approximately 175 to 178 miles distant. From first contact on, Joe and Cliff observed the blips of individual enemy planes as they flew up to an assembly point, at an altitude of about 25,000 feet. The size of the bogey enlarged. Then, they watched as the massive image on the scope moved in our direction, closing on the task force. With the very first informal word about the bogey, from open communication over battle circuits, CIC's on the other ships knew of Alabama's initial contact and on-going observations. Few believed the contact, due to the distance, but radar operators on the other ships were alerted. However, their radar couldn't pick up the image. At about 150 miles distant and the contact tracking ever closer, Captain Kirtland became convinced of it's validity and qualified it as an official report at a distance of 141miles. When Iowa confirmed, everyone became a believer. A short time later, other ships also picked up on the bogie.

NOTE: During a reunion conversation with one of the Alabama radar operators, he remembered the wait for confirmation as "some of the longest minutes of my life". Those minutes being the ones between the very first indication of a massive bogie at approximately 190 miles distant, the 1006 report at 141 miles distant and until finally confirmed by Iowa.

Alabama crewmen and others, have been mystified by the lack of any other mention of this historic incident. We frequently would see the phrases "our radar provided early warning" and "at a distance of about 140 miles" as the lead sentences in descriptions of the Turkey Shoot. However, other than CinC Pac's Press Release 182, battle accounts omit comment on the considerable evidence that Alabama had made and reported the Initial Contact.

Alabama's action report for 19 June 1944 cited Initial Contact at 1006, and also indicated Iowa had substantiated. It also cited Vice Admiral Lee's comment "In the Matter of Reporting Initial bogies, to Iowa well done, to Alabama very well done" at 1247. The report and it's review for endorsement, was to a chain of command that included key senior participants in the battle. Such a command route served to validate contents of the report, including those related to the initial contact. Errors or false claims would have received critical attention. Actions of CinC Pac and subordinate Commanders to support and authorize the Legion of Merit with Combat Clasp to Captain Kirtland, commendations to the radar personnel and issuance of Press Release No. 182 indicate general Pacific Fleet awareness and concurrence in crediting Alabama in the "Reporting of Initial Bogies". The incident was substantially significant in the view of many Pacific Fleet personnel, who had vivid memories associated with the results of the lack of an alert on 7 December1941;

Captain Kirtland's obituary made reference to the Initial Contact and did so in one of our nation's major newspapers.

Mr. Croom's 22 October 1973 letter to the Head, Curator Branch, Naval History Division, attributes the "decision not to credit a single ship (Alabama) as the source of the early warning, etc." to S. E. Morrison. Documentation of any basis for attributing a 'purposeful' decision to him is not at hand.. It is doubtful he would have made such a decision, if the available documentation had included the Alabama and battleship division commander action reports, the awards, and commendations. However, if Mr. Morrison did have access to all the documentation, such a decision would seem an unusual one. The single ship, Alabama, had already been credited, on the scene by Vice Admiral Lee, and concurred in by Vice Admiral Mitscher and by CinC Pac, whose award actions indicated an awareness of Alabama's act. And, very unusual from today's perspective, from the now available, and unassailable documentation indicating the on-the-scene, combat Admirals of the Battle Line had themselves credited a "single ship", "Alabama".

The 20 May 1975 letter to Mr. Croom from the Head, Curator Branch Naval History Division could not confirm nor deny Alabama's Claim, although further research had been performed. Presumably the reports of the battle line division commanders were not yet accessible.. Extended delay of access to the entirety of documentation related to an event of the magnitude of WW II is reasonable.

It would seem Mr. Morrison was aware not only of Alabama's report, it's time and distance, but also of Alabama's very first contact at about 190 miles distant. By Captain John Henry's statement it occurred at about 0945. Today, with the detailed perspective of each of the battle line division commanders, substantiation is lacking for Samuel E. Morrison's Volume VIII, page 263 citation of "one minute before ten o'clock .....task force radar picked up a flock of bogies". Battle Line Commanders do not mention any such radar report.

Except for the cited time, their reports do parallel to some degree, his page 265 citation of Lee's battle line picking up the massive bogey "at 1000 when over 150 miles distant". Alabama reported at 1006 and at 141 miles distant, Iowa confirmed at 125 miles.

With no other on-the-scene Battle line reference to earlier contacts, Morrison's scenario citing times before 1006, yet including the phrase "over 150 miles distant", had to have some basis in fact to provide for his extrapolation.
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Minor disparities of time and distance apparent in pertinent entries of the various action reports could have resulted from factors such as: chaos of battle; each ship's maintenance of their own clock time; power of each ship's radar system: and position of an observers ship in widely dispersed formations.

Historians exercise some latitude in describing the overview of a major event, such as a war. When the subject is an important episode within that overview, such as a battle, very unique actions by an individual unit that contributes significantly to the outcome, would seem an important part of any description. In Mr. Morrison's letter of 6 December 1974 to Mr. Croom, he included the statement: "I am quite willing to admit that I was wrong". At minimum his report was incomplete.

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