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Jonathan Lepolt

Roger Daniels

History 396H, Section 1

20 November 2001

The Great Employment Problem in Cincinnati

          The year was 1929 and Americans were at the end of one of the greatest decades of all time; the Roaring Twenties.  Things were going well in the United States, and nobody could have predicted the terrible day that was about to erupt, October 24, 1929.  This infamous day would remain in the minds of millions of people throughout the United States forever.  With the New York Stock Exchange dropping an excessive amount,1 billions upon billions of dollars were lost.  The excessive speculation in the late 1920's kept the stock market artificially high, but eventually lead to large market crashes. These market crashes, combined with the maldistribution of wealth, caused the American financial system to capsize.  If this situation was not bad enough for the economy, many people were forced to leave their jobs, and the country sank deeper into a depression.  This unemployment situation affected all classes of workers.  During the 1930s, unemployment was the leading cause of problems in the Cincinnati.

          

          Beginning in 1928, a yearly school census took place in Cincinnati.  The census was made possible through coordination with the board of education and the division of public welfare for the permanent committee of stabilizing employment.  Each year in the month of May there was a house-to-house survey made by the regular school census enumerators.  These enumerators would take a poll of the children of school age in Cincinnati, and would also gather data on employment and unemployment.2  In May 1929, employment did not seem to be a problem in Cincinnati, the percent of people that were completely unemployed was 5.94%, those only working part time was 5.27%, and those that had full time employment was 88.56%.3  At this time part time was defined as one who was not working full time, but working at least one day a week, and the numbers did not represent people who could not work because of old age, illness, or a mental or physical handicap.4  Cincinnatians in late 1929 could not foresee the Great Depression. 

          Cincinnatians were feeling that the stock market crash was doing the community more good than harm, for now           money would be diverted from the buying of stocks and bonds to the purchasing of such things as school bonds for           the building of badly-needed new schools.5

In 1930 the number of persons who were working part time and totally unemployed increased somewhat to 9.83% and 8.28%, respectively.6

          As Dorothy Donahue was a student at the University of Cincinnati during the 1930s, she stated that “perhaps the most popular word in everyone’s vocabulary was the term, ‘depression.’  It entered into almost every conversation.”7  This was a circumstance that the city of Cincinnati was not familiar with during the 1920s.  The employment rate was at a respectable level, and a market crash was unimaginable.  While the actual depression started in 1930, Cincinnati began to feel some troubles moving to the surface as early as July of 1928; subtle at first, but later it became quite obvious.  A headline in the Cincinnati Enquirer on July 28, read: “Labor Problem to be Serious Soon.”8  At that time the director of the Department of Public Welfare, Fred K. Hoehler, was anticipating a serious employment problem in the upcoming fall and winter months.  Hoehler was attempting to make plans to alleviate such stress and cope with the situation.  He said that “the year 1928 ushered in a volume of unemployment not only local but national in its scope.”9  A study by the State-City Employment Bureau found that it could place one man in ten reporting for work, and also showed a significant drop in the number of jobs available, but assured workers that conditions would improve within the next few months.  “Except for a slight shortage of highly skilled mechanics, there was a surplus of labor apparent at the close of May, principally unskilled workers and clerical help, in the Cincinnati industrial district, including Norwood, the report showed,” Hoehler said.10

          Between 1929 and 1932, wages in Cincinnati dropped from $256 million to $149 million.11  In this drought of employment and plummet of wages, the city of Cincinnati knew that it had to do something, or the surrounding areas would never come through this terrible time.  Adjoining cities in Ohio and Kentucky combined their efforts to in hope to utilize men on public work;12 certain associations stepped up to help, as others were born to assist with unemployment.  In January of 1929, the Department of Public Welfare was preparing a study of employment conditions, which would depict Cincinnati as it really was.  The Department was to create a chart that forecasted the future of unemployment in Cincinnati.  With this, social agencies and industrial plants would be able to anticipate trends with workers, and would also enable them to meet in advance any conditions that might become a serious employment problem.13  Unfortunately with the great task placed in front of them, the City Welfare Department was spending approximately all its appropriations for 1930 in the first six months of the year.14

          “On the part of those who could give, there was an immediate and spontaneous desire to help the unfortunate.”15  Early in May of 1929, a permanent committee on stabilizing employment was appointed by the city manager of Cincinnati.  The purpose of this organization was to study the unemployment problem and then be prepared for an unemployment crisis should one arise.  The members of this committee were men widely representative of the city’s governmental, business, and social-service forces.  There were also a number of subcommittees that were created including a subcommittee on temporary employment, which included nearly 100 members who tried to find a number of temporary jobs for the unemployed.  Through this, 500 heads of families were given employment each week at a fair rate per hours, for a sufficient number of hours to enable them to supply their families with necessaries.  The city manager’s committee on stabilizing employment had a very definite part in reducing the seriousness of the unemployment emergency which came to this, as well as other cities, during previous months.16

          As early as January 1, 1930, Walter A. Draper, president of the Cincinnati Street Railway Company, admitted a general softening of business than the previous year.  Business in 1930 was not expected to be less than the business in 1928, but would prove to worse regardless.17 

 

          The winter of 1930 was a significant time for many people.  The depression was finally considered an economic problem that must be dealt with.  300 people were thrown out of work by discontinuation of a single cigar factory which moved to Louisville for the sake of better tax allowances in January.18  Thus, the depression was starting to take its toll in Cincinnati.

 

          Not only were adults hurt by this downward trend, but children also saw the shortcoming of unemployment.  In statistics released in December, 1930 by Miss Alice E. Richard, Executive Secretary of the Associated Charities, it was indicated that there were 8,224 children under 16 years old in the 3,840 families that have appealed to the Associated Charities since the first of the year, and who are receiving more or less continuous care.  These numbers represented almost one-sixth of the children attending the schools of the city.19  Notably, the children being hurt by unemployment now will represent a large group of the future citizens of the city.  In 1931 Cincinnati government passed legislation which enabled Ohio school boards to provide clothing, food, and medical attention to any child deemed needy.  There were, however, certain requirements that must be met:  only enrolled students could be helped by this attention, and applicants also had to show that unemployment was hindering the child’s educational progress.20  This was one additional way that the city attempted to help families who were contributing to unemployment against their will. 

 

          In 1929 Frederick G. Hicks, retired president of the University of Cincinnati and noted economist, began to “urge employers in all industries to provide work for as many as possible, either by reducing hours of employment or by staggering employment so that more men could be employed, though at reduced wages.”21  William Proctor had much influence on this statement, and of the Cincinnati employers that did not already have continuous employment, over 50% accepted the principle of the plan.  In 1930, city manager Lieutenant Colonel Clarence O. Sherrill explained that “all improvement projects are being ‘pushed to the limit’ to relieve the unemployment situation and that it his purpose, with the cooperation of City Council, to accelerate the highway and sewer programs so that contracts may be awarded at the earliest possible moment.”22

          Midway through 1930, there was a slight improvement in industrial employment and construction with help of the Cincinnati Committee on Stabilization of Employment.23  However, in the summer and fall there was a shortage of labor for the vast amount of construction, as well as in other areas.  By May, 1931, the number of total workers employed full time had dropped nearly 20% to a painful 62.83%.  18.79% of the labor force in Cincinnati was completely unemployed, while 18.38% more were working part time.24  The problems with the percentages were the decreasing employment numbers with the rise of company shutdowns.  In 1931 the Committee on Stabilization of Employment helped to employ 12,163 people.25  With this program, there were certain guidelines that must be followed.  For instance, only resident heads of families were able to receive this employment, and cash wages began at $.30 per hour, with $7.20 maximum wages per week in a 24 hour work week.  These numbers were later changed to $.40 per hour, for an 18 hour work week in fear that these numbers would reduce the general hourly wage rate in the rest of the city.26  The committee also made some recommendations to keep as many people on the payroll as possible.  Doing this would give more jobs to more families rather than keeping the jobs between only a few families.  Also, spreading the employment out would keep up the buying power of the public, helping with the city depression somewhat.  The committee also thought that more money should be put into stepped-up public works programs, which would then absorb overflow of men who were jobless.  If this happened, no deficit spending would result.27

          This plan of keeping many people on the payroll, known as continuous employment, was given the title of the Cincinnati Plan.  This idea, however, was not brand new.  In fact, it had been used by Proctor and Gamble since 1923.  It worked so well for Proctor and Gamble that president William Cooper Proctor was asked to speak in New York City in April of 1930 in front of more than 300 industrial leaders, financiers, and publishers to outline this plan.  This plan was to “guarantee to each employee a given number of weeks of employment throughout each year as long as he was an employee in good standing in the company.”28  This plan, however, did not come without some sacrifices made by companies as well as some elements of the community.  Employers were told to “keep men on the job, even at sacrifice of profits; and at the same time, …create additional jobs if at all possible.”29  Employees had to know that they probably were not going to receive full time work, but were to accept what was given to them.  This would then allow their fellow workers to obtain jobs as well.  Even the government was asked to take some sacrifices when it came to the Cincinnati Plan.  It was to add additional public works programs if possible, and cut administrative costs to make money for more public works programs.30  Also under the Cincinnati Plan the actual facts and conditions regarding unemployment were made available to business establishments and citizens, with no attempt being made to exaggerate or minimize the situation.31  In November of 1931, John L. Spence submitted a petition to Council requesting that city employees be allowed to work part time so that more of them could be kept on the job.32 

 

          Many charity events were sponsored during the 1930s to help raise the self-esteem of the unemployed, and to give them hope for the future.  Many public as well as private organizations were stepping up to do what they could.  In Cincinnati, the traditional soup kitchens for the less fortunate were discouraged, however the Robinson Opera House in downtown had proved to be a socially accepted means to feed people most in need, an operation similar to Dayton’s free restaurant.  This outfit was run by the local Welfare Department to provide a large number of free meals at a low cost to the city.  The Robinson Opera House had provided 194,890 meals at a cost of only $10,665 to the city.33  Also in 1930 during the winter holiday season, the Cincinnati Institute of Fine Arts and Public Recreation Commission sponsored a Christmas festival concert in Music Hall, while other groups including Oola Khan Grotto sponsored matinee performances.  One-half the proceeds from this event were to go to the unemployment fund of the city.34

 

          Even the Boy Scouts of America did their part to help the unemployed.  In Cleveland local scouts went door-to-door hoping to find donations of food, clothing, and also pledges of employment.35  Garments for the unemployed were produced in Cincinnati, for those who could not afford to purchase clothes themselves.  In 1932, Cincinnati’s output of these garments for the unemployed led the nation.  In September, 1932, there were 145 different groups making these garments to help the jobless, and in December that number had increased to 295.36

          In 1932 the relief projections of cities, townships, and counties increasingly fell short of reality.  By this time the unemployment levels had reached crisis levels in Ohio in January.37  By May, 1932, only 52.55% of the able citizens of Cincinnati were employed full time, 19.38% were working at least part time, and 28.07% were completely unemployed.  The city decided to find work for as many unemployed as they could.  An idea was created to have people develop gardens throughout the Cincinnati area, as well in other cities throughout the nation.  These garden projects gave the unemployed a sense of accomplishment, because they were able to see what progress had been done once everything was finished.  By July of 1932, more than 3000 persons were given these part time jobs.38  By the third winter of the depression, it could be said that Cincinnati had so coordinated its efforts to relieve unemployment that there had been a minimum of difficulty and dislocation among the populace.39

          Cincinnati refused to quit fighting for normality in the city.  1932 proved to be a harsh year, wage cutting was becoming a growing concern among unions, and industries felt this was necessary and “justified in the face of continuing lower prices.”40  The winter months were marked by a growing number of transients and unemployed, and leading citizens were continually searching for new projects which might take any number of men off the lists of the idle unemployed.  At this point in the depression, people were willing to accept four and a half day work weeks rather than layoffs.41  The purpose of one small volunteer organization, the Westwood Employment Exchange, was to help find jobs in that section of the city.  In four weeks, out of 87 applicants, it had placed more than half.42 

          On the other hand was the benevolent “Penny Pound” campaign begun in the city on an entirely volunteer basis in           March, 1932.  The idea, suggested by Douglas Allen, and directed by Timothy Goodman, was to put tin containers           in public buildings, stores, and other public places, into which passersby would drop their pennies.  The resultant           accumulation of money would go into make up part of the deficit in welfare funds.  It had been successful in Atlanta,           Georgia, so why not in Cincinnati?  The Plan was to yield $5,000 a month.43

In October, 1932, there was a gain in employment within certain industries.  Those industries largely responsible for the increase in employment were textile, lumber, furniture, shoe, printing and publishing.  There was also some improvement in the metal trades industries brought by the increased demand for stoves, pipes, and sheet metal.  The construction industry, however, showed no significant change from the previous month.44 

 

          When the banking crisis in Ohio reached its peak in the beginning months of 1933, unemployment was still beginning to rise.  Difficulties were compounded by the severe banking crisis, resulting in high unemployment numbers.45  Employment numbers were only 51.67%, part time employment was 17.90%, and unemployment was at 30.43%.46  Even though the numbers in Cincinnati were so high, the city was considered somewhat a success because the National unemployment rate was at 38%.47  1933 numbers would be the worse to come about during the entire years of the Great Depression, as Cincinnati continued to coordinate relief efforts between local government and private agencies.48  In November of 1933, the President finally stepped up to help with nationwide unemployment.  On November 9, 1933, the Civil Works Administration (CWA) was founded.  Harry L. Hopkins, Federal Emergency Relief Administrator, was appointed to act as Administrator for the newly established agency.  The purpose of the CWA was to “provide immediately ‘regular work at regular wages’ for able-bodied unemployed persons now on relief.”49  Hopkins was in charge of financing local civil works projects, when at the time, in order to insure speed, local relief administrations will be designated as civil works administrations and will be given authority to pass upon projects submitted for approval, up to a certain amount.  The maximum money limits on projects were not set at first, but were to be decided. 

 

          From 1930 to midway through 1933, Cincinnati attempted to help the unemployment problem alone.50  There was a strong agreement beginning to emerge within the city and finally in March, 1934, Fred Hoehler called for more federal involvement.51  In May 1934, the numbers on employment and unemployment were improving slightly.  There were 62.58% employed full time, 12.22% employed part time, and 25.20% that were still totally unemployed.52  Throughout the Great Depression in Cincinnati, the city itself performed relatively well, given the circumstances.  There were many layoffs in automobiles, machine tools, clothing, and furniture manufacturing.  Despite the large quantity of individuals out of work, it was stated that Cincinnati operated through the worse depression years without a deficit.53  During the time construction gains were also among the top 11 in the entire country.54 

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, “those with the largest need had the least with which to meet that need.”55  Cincinnati had to cope with what they were given, and for the most part the city performed well.  There was an amazing unity that emerged within the city which helped to find jobs for as many people as possible.  The unemployment rate starting rising in 1929 until 1933, but after 1933 the rate dropped incredibly until 1937.  By 1973 the percentage of people totally unemployed was only 10.36%, which was down 20% from 1933.56  The many companies that followed the Cincinnati Plan also helped to add jobs to the community, and fellow workers were willing to sacrifice a little time and money to gain a lot in additional jobs.  Overall, the city was able to manage with unemployment, make changes, and help the city remain in line during the Great Depression.

Endnotes

1) Gusmorino, Paul A., III. "Main Causes of the Great Depression." Gusmorino World (May 13, 1996). Online. Internet: http://www.escape.com/~paulg53/politics/great_depression.shtml. November 16, 2001.

2) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 33, No. 1.  July, 1931.  65.

3) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 45, No. 4.  October, 1933.  871.

4) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 33, No. 1.  July, 1931.  66.

5) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  33.

6) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 45, No. 4.  October, 1933.  871.

7) Donahue, Dorothy M.  “Financial Aspects of the Depression.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1933.  1.

8) “Labor Problem to be Serious Soon.”  Cincinnati Enquirer 28 Jul. 1928: 14.

9) “Labor Problem to be Serious Soon.”  Cincinnati Enquirer 28 Jul. 1928: 14.

10) “Labor Problem to be Serious Soon.”  Cincinnati Enquirer 28 Jul. 1928: 14.

11) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  200.

12) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 30, No. 5.  May, 1930.  32.

13) “Committee is Named by Sherrill.”  Cincinnati Enquirer 9 Jan. 1929: 26.

14) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  82.

15) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  127.

16) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 30, No. 5.  May, 1930.  32-3.

17) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  31-2.

18) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  34.

19) “Unemployment Affects 8224 Children.”  Cincinnati Enquirer 16 Dec. 1930: 21.

20) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  99.

21) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  77.

22) “Contracts Double Those of 1929.”  Cincinnati Enquirer 20 Feb. 1930: 16.

23) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  84.

24) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 45, No. 4.  October, 1933.  871.

25) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  103.

26) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  104.

27) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  35-36.

28) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  35-36.

29) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  115.

30) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  115.

31) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 30, No. 5.  May, 1930.  33.

32) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  67.

33) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  101.

34) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  88.

35) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  169.

36) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  192-3.

37) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  138.

38) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  167-8.

39) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  94.

40) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  58.

41) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  62-3.

42) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  36.

43) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  96.

44) “Employment Gains in September.”  Cincinnati Enquirer 18 Oct. 1932: 8.

45) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  201-2.

46) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 45, No. 4.  October, 1933.  871.

47) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  106.

48) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  209.

49) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 37, No. 6.  December, 1933.  1332.

50) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  76.

51) Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These?  The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.  211.

52) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 45, No. 4.  October, 1933.  871.

53) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  38-40.

54) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  48.

55) Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1963.  85.

56) U.S. Department of Labor.  Monthly Labor Review.  Vol. 45, No. 4.  October, 1933.  871.

 

Bibliography

Cincinnati Enquirer.  Numerous articles from July 28, 1928 to October 12, 1937.

Deets, Samuel E.  “Cincinnati’s Response to the Great Depression, 1929-1933.”  Diss. University of Cincinnati, 1963.

Donahue, Dorothy M.  “Financial Aspects of the Depression.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1933.

Gusmorino, Paul A., III. "Main Causes of the Great Depression." Gusmorino World (May 13, 1996). Online. Internet: http://www.escape.com/~paulg53/politics/great_depression.shtml. November 16, 2001.

Sauer, Matthew J.  “Who Will Care for These? The Unemployed in Ohio, 1870-1933.”  Diss.  University of Cincinnati, 1995.