Johnson 6
Thirteen Days of Terror
Powerfully and audaciously, Nikita Khrushchev led the Soviet Union through years of rivalry with the United States. This infamous competition came to be recognized as the Cold War, a war consisting of no bloodshed. However, in 1962, this war took on an entire new meaning. In late August 1962, American U-2 spy planes detected Soviet ballistic weapons on the island of Cuba. After confirmation of these deadly weapons within striking range of the U.S. mainland, the crisis officially began on October 14, 1962. No longer just a competition between two superpowers, countless human lives were now at stake, and quite possibly, a third world war. This event, known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, would prove to be the climax of the Cold War. The crisis also marked the conclusion of KhrushchevÕs political career in the Soviet Union. The United States would prove to be a force to reckon with in this time of uncertainty. The president of the United States, John F. Kennedy, gained much popularity as a result of his suave negotiating, whereas Khrushchev was simply thrown out of office. This troubled leader began the Cuban Missile Crisis with a dominant attitude, but was unsuccessful in handling the brutal aftermath. Khrushchev failed woefully in achieving domination over the United States during the troubling events of the Cuban Missile Crisis; the American response, Fidel CastroÕs immediate reaction, and KhrushchevÕs poor political skills all led to his downfall.
As the events in the Caribbean Sea became more heated, Kennedy ordered a naval blockade of Cuba, threatened an invasion, and agreed to withdraw missiles from Turkey. On October 22, Kennedy publicly announced the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba for the first time and announced a naval blockade surrounding the Cuban coast and stretching 500 nautical miles away from the island (Reference.com). Kennedy also announced that he was prepared for eventualities and condemned the Soviet Union for their secrecy (Reference.com). This summary explains the extent and seriousness of the blockade. A strategic ploy that has been used
Johnson 7
countless times throughout history, a blockade would prevent supply ships from reaching their destination in Cuba. This in turn would halt the Cuban economy and weaken the Soviet stance. Khrushchev immediately became worried about the American blockade, as he did not want to start a ferocious war. ÒThen there was the Soviet reaction to the blockade – would a conflict start out of escalating retaliation?Ó (Reference.com). This quote describes the worries of Khrushchev after the blockade was enacted. This would mean war for both nations and possibly become World War III. The naval blockade harmed KhrushchevÕs political standing immensely not only in the Soviet Union, but also throughout the entire developed world. During thirteen days of terror, the Americans constantly threatened a massive invasion on the island of Cuba. Even though this did not occur, the threat injected peril into the flesh of many Soviet citizens who wanted to avoid war. Many American citizens, on the other hand, rallied for more severe action after the announcement of the blockade. An invasion actually was planned with troops positioned in Florida, however with 40,000 Soviet soldiers in Cuba equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, the plan fell apart (Reference.com). This paraphrase illustrates how real the invasion threat actually was. Toward the conclusion of the crisis, Khrushchev offered Kennedy a two-part deal. Part one of this deal stated that the Soviet Union would withdraw missiles from Cuba on the condition that Kennedy would promise not to invade Cuba or support any invasion (Reference.com). This summary suggests the Khrushchev was troubled by the blockade and worried that the crisis would escalate into a violent war. The second part of the deal involved the presence of American missiles, aimed at the Soviet Union and located in Turkey. Under a secret agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev, Americans would withdraw these missiles from Turkey and in exchange, the Soviets would eliminate missiles in Cuba. KennedyÕs response to the overall pact offered by Khrushchev is addressed in the following quote. Ò[John] Kennedy responded by publicly accepting the first deal and sending Robert Kennedy to the Soviet
Johnson 8
embassy to accept the second [deal] in private – the small number (fifteen) of Jupiter missiles near Izmar, Turkey would be removedÓ (Reference.com). This quote explains the secrecy of the American concession regarding Turkish missiles. As the bargain was signed in secrecy, it went unknown to all media outlets. The news that the Soviets planned to withdraw missiles from Cuba was plastered on the front page of almost every major worldwide newspaper. This headline news created a negative image for Khrushchev as the developments made the Soviets appear as though they had gained nothing in the end. The discreetness of the American missile withdrawal damaged KhrushchevÕs political career dramatically as the Soviet citizens were under the impression that they had received nothing in return for their sacrifice. KhrushchevÕs swift retreat in response to the skillful negotiations of Kennedy angered many Soviet citizens who claimed that he had given in to American authority too quickly.
The immediate reaction of the Cuban leader Castro possibly caused the most political damage for Khrushchev; KhrushchevÕs betrayal of Cuba, the disruption of relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba, and KhrushchevÕs negotiations with Castro all angered Cuba immensely and contributed to the demise of KhrushchevÕs career. When the Cuban Missile Crisis abruptly came to a close, the Soviets departed Cuba expeditiously. Castro, who had lost all missile protection given to him by the Soviet Union in exchange for a promise from the United States that it would not invade Cuba, felt as though he had been abandoned by Khrushchev (Brubacker 108). CastroÕs anger is expressed as he first learns of the Soviet betrayal from his friend in the following quote. ÒCastro was infuriated to discover that the Soviet Union would treat Cuba just as the United States had – as an insignificant island in the middle of the CaribbeanÓ (American Experience). This quote expresses the anger of Castro after hearing of the betrayal. As a result of Khrushchev abandoning Cuba, Castro broke off all relations with the Soviet Union. As Cuba was one of the Soviet UnionÕs allies, other USSR leaders became angry with Khrushchev. ÒThe
Johnson 9
crisis led to a temporary strain in relations between the USSR and Cuba. However, with the threat of invasion removed by the U.S. pledge and with Cuba badly in need of Soviet financial aid, relations between Cuba and the USSR soon grew closerÓ (Microsoft Corporation). This quote explains the relations between Castro and Khrushchev following the crisis. This breakage of relations only lasted temporarily and on October 29, 1962, Castro re-allied himself with the Soviets (Brubacker 109). This summary discusses the length of the disruption of relations between the nations. Khrushchev also failed to effectively communicate with Castro. Having already negotiated a deal with the United States, Khrushchev never discussed his plans with Castro. ÒCastro felt he had been unfairly excluded from the negotiations over the fate of the missiles, which he thought Cuba needed to discourage a potential invasion from the United StatesÓ (Microsoft Corporation). This quote illustrates how Castro felt after the Soviet UnionÕs withdrawal from Cuba. KhrushchevÕs rapid withdrawal from Cuba led Castro to believe that he had strictly been used by the Soviet Union for political gain. After being excluded from discussions, Castro alone created the largest obstacle for Khrushchev following the crisis. The Soviet leaderÕs carelessness in handling the talks with the Cuban leader created a temporary enemy for the Soviets. These extensive reasons proved to be negative factors for the Soviet leader, Khrushchev.
Khrushchev recklessly handled the political aspects of the missile crisis; his nuclear game with the United States, his discussions with worldwide leaders, and his relations with other Soviet leaders all proved to be KhrushchevÕs downfalls. Many people severely criticized KhrushchevÕs decision to place ballistic weapons on the island of Cuba. These people claimed that this would achieve nothing but to further complicate relations between the two countries. Many citizens blamed Khrushchev for leading the Soviet Union into a senseless nuclear gamble with the United States (Brubacker 108). This paraphrase explains how countless Soviet citizens
Johnson 10
felt as though they were being led through a disastrous event. Had Khrushchev not entered into this deadly game, his political career following the crisis might have been completely different. His numerous discussions with worldwide leaders proved to be ineffective and accomplish nothing except for creating new enemies. Khrushchev failed miserably as a negotiator, not only with the United States and Cuba, but also with leaders of several other nations. However, the largest factor in KhrushchevÕs downfall was his inability to communicate with other Soviet leaders toward the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis. These leaders ultimately forced Khrushchev out of office on October 14, 1964, citing a reckless handling of relations with worldwide leaders (Brubacker 109). This paraphrase explains the actual diminishment of Khrushchev as a political leader as he is exiled to a residence outside of Moscow. The leaders of the Soviet Union believed Khrushchev to be a terrible leader throughout the entire 13-day crisis. ÒThe younger Soviet leaders who ousted Khrushchev perceived his action during the crisis as weak and indecisiveÓ (Microsoft Corporation). The quote illustrates the disappointment of the Soviet leaders with his handling of the situation. His irresponsible nuclear gamble, his horrific negotiation skills, and his inability to cooperate with other Soviet leaders proved to be catastrophic in obtaining political success in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
As a political leader, Khrushchev demonstrated feebleness and fragility during the duration of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Three primary factors combined to derail any hope of a political future for Khrushchev in the Soviet Union: the American response, CastroÕs immediate reaction, and KhrushchevÕs political mis-handling. Replaced by the younger Leonid Brezhnev only two years after the conclusion of the crisis, Khrushchev was confined to an abode outside of Moscow (Frankel 299). This paraphrase discusses the replacement of Khrushchev. It was here where he authored two books regarding his memories of establishing and leading the Soviet Union (Brubacker 108). His dramatic life came to a close on September 11, 1971, nearly 10
Johnson 11
years after the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis (CNN Interactive). The after-shocks of the Cuban Missile Crisis can still be felt today. The strategies demonstrated in the narrow avoidance of a third world war are still used to this day. The thirteen-day crisis in 1962 will not soon be forgotten; the terror and peril amplified across the world will always be remembered. In response to the Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba, Dean Rusk, the American Secretary of State, observed, ÒWe went eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinkedÓ (Reference.com).
Johnson 12
Works Cited
Brubaker, Paul. The Cuban Missile Crisis. United States: Enslow Publishers, Inc.,
2001.
ÒCastro and the Cold War.Ó 21 February 2004. American Experience Online. PBS. 27
February 2006. <http//www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/castro/peoplevents/e_coldwar.html>
ÒCuban Missile Crisis.Ó Reference.com. Lexco Publishing Group LLC. 26 February 2006.
<http//www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis>
ÒCuban Missile Crisis.Ó 1997. Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft. 24 February 2006.
<http//www.jfkin61.com/presidency/Cuban_missile_crisis.htm/>
Frankel, Max. High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy,
Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile
Crisis. New York: Ballantine Books, 2004
ÒNikita Sergeyevich Khruschev: Soviet Premier.Ó CNN Interactive.
7 February 2006. <www.cnn.com/specials/cold.war>.