Clint,



Thanks again for your truly thought provoking questions and responses. I think it best to tackle them in order.



I'd love to hear your ideas on this if it's not too much of a burden



One of really big problems in kinetic kill vehicles from space(-to-earth) is that the projectiles actually have to slow down?from about 17,500 mph relative to the surface to about 7,500-8,000 mph relative) to make it through the atmosphere without liquifying or burning up completely. Moreover, the atmospheric disturbance itself causes targeting difficulties as the projectiles (the so-called ?rods from god?) have to arc from the spacecraft to the target in order to fire engage directly perpendicular to the surface (for maximum impact and accuracy?please pardon the crude drawing):







If, however, a plasma beam generated from the satellite could ?light? the target a millisecond or so before a tiny metal projectile were pumped from a rail gun at hyper-velocity, it could completely change the dynamic. The plasma beam would punch a hole in the atmosphere, a vacuum corridor if you will, perfectly true to the target. The hole or corridor would stay open long enough for the tiny flechette projectile to travel through it without encountering atmospheric drag, hence no heating or wobbling to target. Total engagement time from satellite to target would be less than two seconds, and the plasma beam would not have to be deadly enough to damage the target (reducing greatly the power generation requirements of the satellite. At the speeds we are talking about, a sewing needle-sized bit of tungsten steel could penetrate 30 meters or more of hardened concrete. As there is no explosive associated with the weapon, collateral damage would be extremely minimal. Like a sabot anti-tank round, the damage is caused be the flechette passing through the armored vehicle at hypersonic speed, killing everyone inside but essentially leaving the tank intact (a very effective weapon in use for two decades, proving the technology for space application).







This is a bit out there, but I think the kind of weapon that one might see within a relatively few years. The point is that whatever weapon that is on the drawing boards today, as we test and develop (not just research) space weapons, unknown variants and capabilities will quickly be discovered.



This suggests to me that Congress would have the power to cripple the executive in this endeavor if they refused to cooperate. I believe there is empirical evidence to back this up. For example, in the case of ASATs, it's my understanding that even after space testing, Congress's refusal to fund the program forced the executive to cancel it. In this sense, might Congress have the ultimate authority over the executive on this issue?



You are correct, but before congress could act two successful US ASAT test engagements of derelict satellites were conducted (a modified air-to-air missile fired from an F-15). In this manner, the power of the purse is used to starve projects rather than kill them, as the DoD is generally able to transfer limited funds between programs to keep pet projects alive even when congress specifically does not fund them (this is in fact a complaint that is routinely brought up by anti-weapons groups, that the Air Force is putting ASAT research into other budgets, but doing so is not illegal, it is inefficient). If, however, congress passes a law stating no ASAT research, development, or testing is allowed (a bill senator Paul Tsongas would introduce annually but that never passed), then the DoD would have to comply. So, the executive is tasked with executing the law. Congress must make a law (that passes the muster of the Supreme Court) to dictate executive limitations. For every law there are exceptions, and for the most part, congress has been loathe to (and the courts unwilling to allow) micro-managing executive decision-making. The power of the purse is still supreme.



Let me suggest, however, that if a proven ASAT technology were suddenly available (what I call ?technology X?), or another state were proven to be pursuing space control technology, congress would fund the program in a heartbeat. Indeed, the executive uses the reverse of the argument above to scuttle congress! Occasionally, congress will fund a program (environmental clean-up or urban renewal) and stipulate that the funds can only be spent on these programs, thus preventing department-to-department fund transfers (remember, the AF moving funds from one space project to another space project is generally not curtailed). The executive can hire officers that have completely different views on how the money is best spent for that program, or that will not work efficiently to implement it, thus making the congressional mandate look wasteful. Politics is a nasty game.



How important do you believe it is for youth, especially those already participating in practice for future policymaking, to be exposed to debate on the creation of a Separate Space Force and on Space Weaponization? Do you believe these issues would have great education benefits, and might their awareness be even more important in their roles as future leaders? Specifically, do you believe that role playing as The US federal government and trying to find an appropriate course of action for space weaponization could be uniquely effective?



I suppose if you do get a copy of my book you will find that energizing the popular will is one of the most important factors in becoming a genuine and benevolent steward of space. It is something called space-mindedness, and as Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote when attempting to convince the American public that its future lay in naval power, without a sea-minded people no possibility existed for America taking its rightful place as a (then) great power.



NASA was built on the foundation of a youthful fascination for space and the exploration of the unknown, a fascination that has been lost not because the youth of America no longer care about space, but because NASA has succumbed to its own bureaucratic weight and is no longer the center of gravity for space-minded engineers and professionals. If a future that really mattered to the youth of America, one in which war and poverty could one day be eliminated (on a global scale), and that future plausibly lay within the (managed and peaceful) exploration and exploitation of outer space, then the world will be a better place for the energies of the young being committed to it.



I do believe that the first quarter of the 21st century will be referred to by policy historians as the age of space-power debate?much as the latter half of the 20th will be forever known as the age of the nuclear debate. The issue is that important.



Are there are any other nations whose development of space weapons would be uniquely destabilizing?



You mention India, and that is a candidate akin to the same effects as a space-aggressive China, as both will be more concerned with regional dominance and global acceptance. We have to wait and see how the two state?s economies (and politics) are able to support expensive space programs to see which is the more likely near to mid-term challenger, but the smart money is still on China. A myriad of third-tier space states, including Iran, Brazil, and most especially Israel would have extremely destabilizing global impacts if they were to develop and deploy even limited space weapons capabilities. Except for Israel, the possibility is remote in the near term. What is oft overlooked are two of America?s great allies developing and deploying space weapons should the technology become available and the status quo become onerous (and the longer the US is in Iraq, the more onerous it becomes to): The EU and Japan. Both have sound infrastructures and both are pursuing microsatellite technology that is quickly adaptable to at least ASAT use. The EU is further pursuing expensive military satellite systems (navigation, communication, and earth-sensing) that will ensure they have a comprehensive military space capability. Who knows what relations will be with these allies in 25 years?



Specifically, I'm curious how devastating a super power war over energy resources would be. I'm currently working on an argument about the US having to face Russia and/or China in just such a conflict. I realize you believe the prospects for it are slim to none, something that I agree on. But if such a conflict did occur, do you believe it could crash the global economy/cripple American hegemony/escalate to WMD use?



I actually liked Red Storm Rising a lot. When it was written, it was about as plausible a scenario as we had. Today it seems a bit over the top. Nonetheless, a war over oil resources, increasingly likely in the current international environment (though still, thankfully, far from a sure thing) would be absolutely devastating, and the most likely plausible scenario that would result in widespread WMD use (the War on Terror will generate isolated and ad hoc WMD use at some point, though arguably less than might have occurred without the WoT?there?s a nifty paradox). By the way, Cardinal of the Kremlin was a very good book, too. After that, they are all crap. The post-Cold War and Clancy do not get along well, in my opinion.



From your other emails:



You have written that reorienting US force structures to accommodate space weaponization will reassure other nations by degrading our ability to violate their sovereignty. How would you respond to critics who claim that the US must maintain a strong "boots on the ground" capability to project power by pointing to recent conflicts like the Iraq War?



You are getting dangerously close to the fact that I am far more liberal in my views than I am generally given credit for (see also the answer to the next question). Of course the critics are right! If we want to invade and topple governments, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is impossible to do so without a significant boots on the ground capability. The problem is, I don?t generally want to invade other states (Afghanistan and Iraq were clear exceptions to my preference). But we don?t need a great deal of boots on the ground (or ?oars in the water? to do so in today?s transformed military). The recent war in Iraq was one in historic fashion, with the equivalent of just four brigades of combatants on the ground. The great bulk of the 270,000 or so personnel committed to Gulf War II (about 40% as many as were committed to Gulf War I, which had vastly smaller aims) were support personnel and technicians, and fliers. So I think we have a pretty strong ?boots on the ground? capability right now, a capability that is growing daily as our individual soldiers get more and more deadly with every technological breakthrough.



With the ?boots? capability we have today, coupled with our tremendous advantages in air, sea, space, and cyber power, we could invade and topple just about any government on the planet ? if our boots weren?t tied up occupying and pacifying Iraq and Afghanistan! Our unprecedented ?boots? are doing police work rather than military work, and that is a shame.



I don?t want to liberate countries and then dictate the terms of liberation to them. It was a commendable thing that we gave Iraqi?s and Afghani?s the first real taste of Western freedom they may have ever had, but we have no business forcing it down their throats. They cannot be forced to be free, and so long as whatever form of rule they choose is not inimitable to our interests, we should not be displeased. If that new government is a threat, or proves more brutal than the last, it is far less expensive in blood and treasure simply to invade again and let them start over (the bills are coming due, and I can easily prove the assertion). In fact, occupation directly reduces the chances that these nations will choose and maintain democracy! The liberators have become the oppressors, and that is not a legacy I want.



So, if America?s goal is to project power abroad as we see fit (and it is), and in addition to guarantee our own sovereignty and to spread the principles of democracy and free trade around the globe, then we must begin by restructuring our military force to maximize those missions.



Do you believe the creation of such a force would be viable or beneficial? Would it be mutually exclusive with a US space force, or would a US Space Force be a precondition for the US to be able to participate? I'm concerned about other teams presenting a counter proposal to create an international Space Force instead of a US one and claim that multilateralism in space is good, and that it would help prevent counterbalancing. What problems would you see with such a proposal?



Alright, this may sting a bit. It is not going to help your argument directly, but in the end I think it is the only way to practically resolve the issue (and it has some added benefits).



Absolutely I would prefer a multilateral space force (over unilateral American or any other state action) to conduct the business of space weaponization I am advocating. But guess what? It ain?t gonna happen. The UN?s Committee On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has been deadlocked for more than 12 years because it cannot come up with an international space plan that is acceptable to the US. The proposals simply aren?t realistic. Russia and China have agreed because they see the COPUOS and PAROS (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) proposals castrating to the US military space effort, which would allow them to catch up (and, if someday possible, take space for themselves).



If, however, the United States were to announce a unilateral seizure of LEO (as I have outlined), beginning in six months or one year, you can bet that COPUOS would come up with a realistic plan that would include the US as a partner in an effective, multilateral space control regime. This would overthrow the extant treaties and allow for a new regime based on commercial (and, I believe, clean) exploitation of outer space for the benefit of all humanity.



A rule of thumb in negotiations is that you cannot start at the middle in the hopes of pulling the other side to your point of view. You have to start at the extreme so that the middle looks like a promising compromise. This only works, of course, if the extreme point you are making is plausible and believable. Thus my preference is for a multilateral, international space security force (emphasis on force, more in a minute) that does not decrease the security of the US or any other state. The possibility of that happening without the plausible threat of the US doing so unilaterally, however, is zero. Notice I said possibility. It is still likely that the US would have to make good on its promise and take LEO. At that point, the offers of a multilateral regime, or partnership amongst space-faring nations becomes vital to the interest of other states and then a realistic plan will come forward, one that the US may accept. After having actually seized LEO, the US may not give it up, however, and this is why it is so important that my argument carries with it the structural constraints that will lead to the US developing space in an internationally responsible way.



Thus my preference is for a multilateral solution acceptable to the US. My second choice is a unilateral US action. Since the first is unlikely, and the second is acceptable, I prefer the second to any other option. In order of likelihood, they are: nothing happens, we continue limping along under the current dysfunctional regime; another state seizes LEO in our absence; a new international regime is established that does not ensure US interests.



Ah, the devious (yet altruistic) mind of the theoretician.



Gotta go, hope this gives you lots of food for thought.



Ev



Clint,



Once again, you’ve asked some spot on questions.



First, hit-to-kill (kinetic) weapons are the first option for taking LEO, as all the technology is proven and available. Space-to-space ASAT is no harder than maneuvering a microsatellite into the path of an orbiting target, and, if the trajectory is earthward, the debris will quickly fall into the atmosphere and burn up (this is the tactic the Russians used for their twenty ASAT tests, and no debris or environmental damage has been noted). A laser in orbit is actually much more viable as an ASAT than as a ground or air targeting weapon. Since there is no atmospheric attenuation or perturbation, very small energy requirements are needed. Moreover, as the satellite targeted is probably unaware of the low-energy burn until its systems begin to shut down, dwell time on the target can be significant. So small power lasers that might have minimal effects on a missile or spacecraft that used countermeasures (a mirrored surface or a spinning trajectory, for example, would make power requirements much higher) would be extremely useful space-to-space.



The problem with kinetic weapons is that they will be limited to high value targets – as they are expensive to launch and maintain. Like bullets, once used they are used up. An electric-powered laser (solar panels could provide enough power for a very small laser, nuclear reactors, already developed for US scientific and Russian military satellites, could provide essentially unlimited power generation) would get cheaper the more it was used.



So, a mix of weapons is ideal. Start with kinetic to get command early, develop the tactical parameters to avoid cluttering the usable orbits with debris. Bring on lasers as concepts are developed and tested, gradually replacing kinetic kill vehicles as power constraints are reduced, and look into various combinations of pulsed or plasma directed energy weapons in conjunction with very small (sewing needle size) kinetic projectiles (I have some interesting thoughts on how these could be used, but the technology has a ways to go).



In strategy, there is no “end state.” Taking LEO for the good of all is only useful if the technology progresses.



When conducting an inspection, one doesn’t look for weapons per se. The obvious will be found. Satellites with excessive maneuver fuel, heavy shielding, and the like would be suspect. In all cases, a tracking (and I suggest disabling) device would be placed on the satellite to ensure that it does not interfere with or threaten other space operations (if it does, a quick destruct signal could be sent to the device, and a tiny amount of explosive should do the trick). The details of the inspection regime would have to be worked out, and the launching state would have to submit or accept the probability of destruction of the satellite, launch vehicle, and probably launch facility upon launch attempt.



As to your second question, the Russian response will not be to preemptively launch a massive attack against the US before deployment. That would be suicide, as our second-strike deterrent force remains intact. Nonetheless, they will try to make our decision-makers think that they will, in the hopes of forestalling through threats what they cannot stop in action. Think of it this way, however. The US is currently the world’s sole superpower (hyperpower, the French call it). Our attempts to seize LEO would be an extension of the current status quo. The Russians have been living with their second-tier status for some fifteen years now, and while they don’t like it they are used to it. They will find an alternative method to compete and one day regain top tier status, but they will not opt to destroy the earth in a fit of pique. On the other hand, should another state attempt to seize LEO, the US may well be forced to respond militarily (though not, I would think, with a nuclear assault). This is because any other state taking LEO would be an overthrow of the status quo, the results of which are unpredictable. The US, facing the possibility of a move to the second tier, will defend its position at the top. Stability in the international system is important – and like the status quo or not, it is tolerable (or, at the very least, all the world’s states are currently tolerating it).



Your third question is not strange, indeed it is extremely thought provoking. The most effective means to get the US into space would be by executive order. The president, as commander-in-chief, has the authority to deploy the military as he or she sees fit in response to the nation’s security needs. Here is the key, only if the president goes to war (or violates the sovereignty of another state) does congress have the right of review, and then only after 60 days (see the war powers act). The problem will be one of definition. The president will have to claim space is being secured in the same manner that the US occupies the high seas, and then argue that the US has the right to fire upon any vessel that threatens its free operations there (using very broad interpretations of what constitutes “innocent passage”). If the executive is smart, he/she will coordinate closely with congress, as the power of congress is the power of the purse. This is, in fact, how congress enforces its executive oversight. The more immediate problem would be the senate claiming a right to trump the president on the basis of the ratification of international treaties powers as they concern the current outer space treaty (the 1967 OST, be sure and read through this, available at the COPUOS section of the UN web page). That treaty must be abrogated as an initial step in the seizing of LEO. Fortunately, this is a relatively easy thing to do, and does not require senate approval. Just as the US quit the now-defunct anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty by providing one-year’s notice of intent, the OST allows any nation to withdraw from it with six-month’s notice. It will take that long to get the first military space-control asset into space anyway. I suspect this topic requires much more research on my part as well, thanks for bringing it up.



As for your last question, the creation of a space force, whether or not space control and weaponization is part of the plan, should not be a problem at all for the executive. It would not be the rousing call to action that Kennedy’s 1961 speech turned out to be, but neither will it be attacked in the same manner as Bush’s “back to the moon, on to mars” initiative for NASA. There is even a growing space contingency in congress (particularly in the House, where about 60 congresspersons meet regularly as a space caucus) that would provide critical support. Moderate goals would need to be outlined, but the proposal could easily go forward. Since the proclamation would be seen as more symbolic than effective, and the spin-doctors could prepare the message for maximum effect, it could even be a boon to the president who does so.



Now, practically, I don’t think the current president should try it (at least not this year). This is the kind of thing that needs to be done early in a first term, and so the best time would be at the beginning of the ne4xt president’s term, to demonstrate decisive leadership and vision (again, see Kennedy in 1961). If it doesn’t work out, voters will forget about it by the next election, and if it does work out, all the better. The second best time would be in the last year of a lame duck term (as is coming up next year). This way the reorganization can be slipped in and effectively accomplished before the next president comes in—who will have bigger promises to fill from the campaign—and probably doesn’t care much about military structure anyway. But if the next president (or congress, who funds the budget) wants to kill the space force, it will at least have some inertia behind it. At any rate, the current president has way too much baggage to saddle the next republican candidate with yet another big spending proposal, so I would look to 2009-2010 and then 2013 or 2016 for a space force announcement (at the earliest).



BTW, the current Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, is the most knowledgeable and pro-space advocate we have ever had in the position and George H. Bush was the first vice-president to have a space job in the executive branch. Were it not for 911, and the miserable occupation of Iraq, we might very well have had space weaponization by now, and quite possibly a space force, too. Ah well, life keeps getting in the way of preferences.



Hope this helps, Ev

Clint,



Very good questions, I will attempt to answer them as they come:



In regards to Astropolitik, do you discuss the viability of seizing low earth orbit?



Yes, though as you point out it is not a particularly deep discussion. Still, it may be enough for your needs. The only issue that makes it unlikely the US could seize LEO is the political will to hold onto it. From a position atop the gravity well of Earth, a satellite firing ?down? has a tremendous time and kinetic advantage over any attempt to engage ?up? (see response on directed energy weapons further down). Saturating LEO with several hundred coordinated satellites would provide real-time engagement capabilities over any point on the earth, and the US would have to be willing to shoot down any attempt to place weapons in space (an expensive endeavor that limits the number of potential targets quite nicely). As you can quickly see, the US would have to establish an inspection regime to complement the effort. Something like demanding that any space launch (or current spacecraft) is subject to inspection by the US. Any attempt to place into orbit an object that has not been inspected would be shot down. As such, space capability is a defense, not a deterrence.



I've found reference to this in some of your work that I have already read, but have been unable to find a deep discussion. It seems like a key point in answering anti-space weaponization arguments predicated on the creation of a space arms race.



And this is a key point for the argument. If the US were to announce such a program and begin placing operational weapon in space with (first) kinetic then directed energy/laser capability, with its tremendous current lead in space technology and lift capability it could get a minimally operational system into orbit (with current technology) in just one to three years. Once ensconced at the top of the gravity well, it could not be dislodged by attempts to engage the on-orbit assets with ground or air-fired kinetic weapons (the analogy would be like shooting slow-moving fish in a very restricted barrel).



You wrote that the threat of nuclear attack from Russia and China is small in the status quo, because of our ability to deter them.



Nuclear deterrence works against rational states.



Would such be the case if we allowed one of them to establish Space Dominance?



Very good. No it would not. In fact, should China, Russia, or any currently space faring nation get to LEO with sufficient space weapons (a 5-10 year crash program for China or Russia, perhaps 15-25 years without any effort should the US stand idly by), it would gain the same advantages of occupying the unflankable high ground as would the US. Like the US, however, neither could deter a massive nuclear attack from the US with space weapons alone, as even if just a few weapons get through the space screen it would be devastating to an enemy. Still, I don?t lay awake at night wondering if China or Russia is just waiting for a moment of weakness in order to nuke us back to the stone age?and I don?t believe the Chinese and Russians sleep poorly thinking that is the American goal.



Could the same space NMD that would be a global asset under American control potentially plunge the world into chaos or extinction in the wrong hands?



Yes. If China, for instance, were to seize LEO and hold it, it would not be for global empire?the Chinese concept of the ?Middle Kingdom? does not desire such power?but for guaranteed sovereignty (for itself) and recognition as the world?s preeminent military, technical, and cultural power. This is why China is in fact working to gain space force protection. With just a few space-to-earth weapons it could become an unfettered regional hegemon, seizing Taiwan and demanding deference from all its neighbors. The US would have to back down from regional engagements that China disapproved, and the tension for a return to isolation would become palpable. Similar would be expected.



America is not perfect, but with its introspection and sound democratic values and institutions, it is perhaps perfectible. The question you must pose is this: If a state can gain global dominance, by seizing and holding LEO, if not the US who should do so? Who would do so? The US is already the hegemon; seizing LEO would do nothing to change the status quo, though it would extend it for some time in my analysis. But this has been at least tolerable to the vast majority of the world and its people, if not desirable. We are not talking about getting rid of the US as the world?s cop and leaving no state in its stead, we are talking about replacing the US in this role. Who would be better for the world?



I realize that you may not believe any foreign power will develop the capabilities to create such a system. But for the purposes of debate, there are some individuals who do, so I'd ask you to indulge me. What would the adverse impacts of another power invalidating American nuclear threats be?



As I said, LEO dominance would not guarantee US nuclear castration?at least not yet. And US LEO dominance would not invalidate the Russian, French, or British current nuclear options, though the Chinese would no doubt have to increase its current arsenal from 40 or so weapons, and India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel would be likely to increase the variety and survivability of their weapons in response.



What other capabilities (such as the potential to destroy our entire Navy) would be destabilizing?



Only if our own navy, which is globally dominant and faces no peer competitor for the foreseeable future, fails to realize that the day the first space-to-earth is deployed, the traditional surface fleet is obsolete, and fails to make changes now. The deep-sea submarine fleet will retain its dominance under the sea, and due to the expense of space weapons, naval air will still be dominant on the oceans?though these should be based on land rather than carriers?for the time being. The Coast Guard will have the bulk of importance in this new structure, as the traditional military means of infiltration will be phased out (as space defense makes limited nuclear or air attacks unviable), and smuggling weapons of mass destruction into enemy territory becomes the preferred delivery means. A surface navy of fast destroyers will be needed for deep ocean and deployed boarding and inspection for these same threats?so I am not advocating the end of the navy, far from it. The bulk of the world?s interstate commerce and the US?s military supply and deployment must still be shipped by sea. I am just saying that major surface combatants, sea-based convoy escort, and carrier battle groups will have seen the end of their eras. Since the US has dominated the world?s oceans since 1943, and American air power has had similar global dominance for at least fifteen years, should the US dominate LEO, one should expect little or no destabilization. Should another state take LEO, the rest of the world might join in a scramble for regional sea and air hegemony. Thus, if you really want an arms race, and not just in space, let China or Russia (or whomever) take LEO.



Even if you believe they would not launch a preemptive attack, could they perhaps be emboldened into military expansionism that would potentially escalate with devastating consequences?



These arguments were pretty well demolished in the Cold War.



You write in your attached Op-Ed that our military would "would hunker down in defensive crouch while it prepared to withdraw from dozens of then-untenable foreign deployments." What do you believe the terminal impacts of this neo-isolationism would be? Many have said it could spawn genocides, world conflict, and even nuclear wars. Do you agree?



Yes, to an extent. The US seems to get blamed for every thing it does ? and everything it does not do. And to a certain extent, rightly so. But the US does attempt to limit suffering around the world, to remove evil dictators where it has a reasonable hope of success, and to starve illegitimate regimes like the Soviet Union into extinction. It hasn?t got a perfect record, but I cannot imagine another state being so consciously helpful, even when the help is not appreciated.



Also, how would you respond to critics like Theresa Hitchens who claim that space weaponization will be ineffective because our systems will be like "sitting ducks" for anyone with a ground based laser to pick off?



Theresa and I get along quite well, despite our myriad differences. On this one she is just dead wrong. In order for a ground laser to hit a satellite moving at relative velocity 17,000 mph, it would have to be extremely powerful and large (to break through the atmospheric distortion ? this is not as big a problem going the other direction, space-to-earth, by the way) and thus its construction



Notice that Theresa and her crowd like to have their cake and eat it too. They will say that it is really easy to shoot down a satellite; anyone could do it ? except the US! We could not possibly take down an ICBM traveling at much slower relative velocities. First of all, the only reason that other states know where satellites are is because we (the US) publish the data free (from Air Force Space Command in Colorado Springs). Only the US has the capacity (today) to track and monitor all satellites in orbit. A small orbital maneuver would render the satellite effectively invisible (try finding a satellite with a telescope if you have no idea where to look!). Even if the shooter got lucky, and found the satellite (or it did not maneuver), it would be very difficult to engage that satellite with optical targeting sensors unless it was nearly directly overhead. Again, this is due to the distortion caused by the atmosphere. The most powerful telescopes located on the highest mountains can only get a clear enough view of a satellite to identify it (much less hit it with a tight beam laser) for a few seconds, and then only if it is directly overhead. [P.S. it is a distortion caused by going from a heavier density medium to a lighter density one. Have you ever wondered why satellite photos of the earth are so clear, yet photos of satellites from the earth or just nebulous blobs? Think about looking at someone swimming in a pool. They are quite clear as you are standing in the atmosphere, but try looking at a person standing on the side of a pool from under water. This is why satellites in space would have an easier time targeting with effective energy on the earth yet it requires much more powerful lasers with a longer dwell time to do it from the earth to space] So, knowing within a few kilometers where a satellite is supposed to be is not the same as shooting a sitting duck.



It is also much more expensive and difficult to do than Hitchens will admit. The Soviet Union, at the height of its space prowess and with hundreds of billions of dollars (equivalent) invested, attempted to engage and destroy a satellite 20 times (there own, in tests of the concept). They were successful 10 times, or just fifty percent (by the way, the US went two for two in its own tests).



Still, my ultimate solution to the ground based directed energy attack is simple. If a state builds such a laser (like the US MIRACL in New Mexico or the old Soviet laser in Kazakhistan in the 1980s, which ar eeasily detected from outer space reconnaissance), then it is obvious the state is preparing to use it to attack space (it would have no other purpose). The state has a right to defend itself, of course, but so do we. So, similar to the Israeli destruction of the almost completed Iraqi nuclear plant in 1980, the US must be willing to destroy a ground based laser (from space would be the best way) before it comes on line. Of course, this would be an act of war should the state decide to take it as such (Slobodan Milosovic never declared war on the US as we were bombing Belgrade, so it is only an act of war if the other side wants it to be). It would also be consistent with our stated goal of guaranteeing space for peaceful uses but no opposing weapons in the declaration that uninspected space launches would be shot down. Again, I do not think the US has the will to act in such a manner should China or Russia spend the billions necessary to build such a weapon ? but if it did, the opposing state would be unlikely to see a similar investment go down the drain by trying it again. And for those who claim boost phase intercept is too hard (and thus states are likely to get weapons into space anyway), target the launch pad just before launch. Easy to do, hard to have the political hutzpah to order it done.



Another of the anti-weapons crowd?s paradoxes always gets me: we are told that space weapons are too expensive and won?t work, thus the anti-weapons crowd is patriotically trying to save the US military from making billions of wasteful investments that would be better spent elsewhere and ultimately will hasten the US?s ultimate decline. On the other hand, if the US does go forward with a space weapons program, all the other nations of the world will rush headlong into an arms race to prevent the US from doing so or forever be under its imperial thumb. Well, which one is it?space weapons production will weaken the US or strengthen to the point of global empire?



Furthermore, would the development of space weapons allow us to protect our satellites?



Space weapons alone won?t. But shooting a satellite in a space-to-space engagement is a much easier thing than earth-to-space, all sides of the issue agree. Thus it can help, and would be extremely helpful in a limited attack (or as I mentioned earlier, to take out a ground-based weapon deep within protected territory). But satellites should also be hardened where effective, and the US should move its military satellite capabilities from a few large, expensive, and fragile satellites to networks of small microsatellites with redundant capabilities. This would do more to bring down the cost of space operations and guarantee space support regardless of future weapons program?s fates.



Here?s a thought. Many on the Hitchens side of the aisle lament the US getting ASAT capability and thus threatening Russia?s fragile ability to detect nuclear ICBM attacks from the US (you will hear this a lot). Isn?t transparency the most valuable space asset? Yes, it is, and I agree. So important that should the US attack the Russian nuclear detection satellites (in Molniya orbit), the Russians would have to believe it was a preemptive blinding precedent to a nuclear attack, and may consider a massive strike against the US in response. Therefore, the US has a stated national policy not to interfere with these satellites in times of peace. Yikes. If I hated the US enough, I would develop an ASAT capability and attack not the US satellites, but the Russian ones. If they were blinded, the Russians might do the dirty work for me and launch a massive nuclear attack against America. If the US had ASAT capability, however, it may be able to protect the Russian satellites from attack, thus enhancing its own security in a way that is rarely thought of, and again a boon to the world?s security.



I'm particularly worried about China's ability to destroy our space assets. I could see them destroying our military and communications satellites, and in doing so, emboldening themselves into making a power play to snatch up Taiwan or perhaps even to expand into Russia or the Middle East. Blind, deaf, and dumb, America would have little hope of responding conventionally. I could see this as a scenario where we are pushed to the brink of nuclear war, and at the very least, a great power confrontation. What do you think of this?



Right on, see above. The Chinese see space weapons as one of the few realistic scenarios that would ensure repatriation of Taiwan.



As part of my proposal for a Space Force, I believe I will transfer Non-NASA space labs into the DOD. Do you believe that would constitute an immediate increase in the size of the armed forces?



Actually, cooperation between NASA and the military in tech research is not as separate as most people think. I don?t know that you would have to transfer the labs, though I would lean toward doing so.



As far as increasing the size of the armed forces, I don?t know if this would be an increase so much as a redistribution, a thought that occurred to me after I sent the last note. More people may desire to sign up for the space force, but this may be at the expense of recruiting in the other services.



I've already asked you a great deal of questions which you graciously answered in depth, so please don't feel compelled to spend any time that you don't have, as you are undoubtedly busy. Thank you so much for your assistance and encouragement. I'm very eager to read your response.



I am quite impressed with your depth of knowledge and writing skills, so I have responded quite happily and at a high-level of discourse. I trust we will have more of these dialogues in the future, and I suspect you will be teaching me some things very soon. Contact me any time.



Cheers, Ev








Clinton,



It is good to hear from you, and I trust you will do very well in your debate. I am not sure Astropolitik will give you a great deal of insight in a separate Space Force (SF), but it is nice to read of such interest from a (Model UN?) student. Perhaps you should get a copy through inter-library loan before shelling out the bucks for an e-copy.



While a separate space force is probably inevitable in the long term, the short term prospects are in doubt. Understandably, the Air Force officers I have met are split on the issue. The arguments for SF include the negative complaint of traditional airpower advocates that space is sucking away too much money and capability from the “real” Air Force. Moreover, the Air Force is paying for capabilities that all the services use—arguably the Army is the biggest beneficiary of space support—yet the Army, Navy, and Marines contribute very little of their DoD budgets to space. Even GPS is an Air Force system, paid for out of the AF budget, and the whole world uses it for free! So dependent has the world become on GPS that the AF is no longer able to reduce capabilities (much less turn the system off) in crisis.



Of course, a good debater needs to know the most damaging counterarguments so that a proper rebuttal is readily available when your opponent makes them. Those who oppose a separate space force cite the trend toward “joint” operations as standing in the way. A separate force would create a new, overlapping military bureaucracy and would cause less cooperation than is currently the case. This argument sounds reasonable, so be careful. While a separate force could be more costly than is the case now, it does not have to be so. Efficiencies in military training and education, expertise, base consolidation, and the like, would more than make up for the new bureaucracy. Indeed, most of the necessary bureaucracy already exists as Air Force Space Command in Colorado Springs—a transfer to a Space Force would be a mere paper exercise. The issue of integration into all-force or joint operations is also misplaced. Today, space support is seen as an Air Force mission, and the traditional and historical prejudices of supporting Army, Navy, Marine, and Special Forces (sometimes called the nation’s de facto fifth service because of the relative autonomy of Special Operations Command in Tampa) are attendant. A new Space Force, unburdened by standing service rivalries, could (and I think would) be seen as a move in the right direction toward accelerating cooperative operational planning and execution.



Do you believe that the creation of a Space Force would further American Space dominance? Yes, I do. Nonetheless, I am concerned that a new SF could come too soon. One of the arguments against a separate space force now is that current US space capability does not include independent operations. Until there are weapons in or from space, and here you need to look at the precedence of waiting to create an Air Force (out of the old Army Air Corps in 1946) as the precedent setting process. The Air Force was formed fully mature, with a requirement for at least an equal percentage of the DoD budget (relative to other services) immediately. If, however, one example does not make a trend (and it doesn’t, except in law), then perhaps the model for SF expansion is the one of Special Operations Command (SOC, mentioned above) is the pertinent example. A gradual exodus of capabilities and funding to AF Space until it is the de facto, if not de jure, sixth service. Possibly this is what General Lord, the just retired Commander of AF Space has been doing over the last half decade—establishing a space service culture among specialists, consolidating missions, and asserting independent control of several systems—creating a mature space capability that can survive the transition to independent military force.



Would it send the kind of signal that would deter any potential peer competitors from entering a space arms race with us? I think it would help, but only if the US committed to a space dominance strategy and began testing space weapons capabilities (at the least). Just establishing a separate space force would be provocative without any backing. In a twisting of Teddy Roosevelt’s famous quote, a SF without weapons would be: “Walking loudly and carrying no stick.” I am attaching a recent commentary I wrote for Space News, the foremost weekly on space issues, to show the necessity of space dominance.



What potential conflicts do you think could develop from a failure to develop space dominance and to project American power? Could they escalate towards the use of nuclear or biological weapons? Clearly one of—of not the—initial missions of a SF would be space-based missile defense. It is also possible that a space weapon could neutralize enemy nuclear capabilities (including production, storage) before capabilities exist, without causing war (here is where my book may be useful to you).



Today, the probability of a nuclear attack does not come from Russia or China. These are deterred by our existing nuclear retaliatory capability. The most likely sources of nuclear attack today are undeterrable: an accidental launch, a rogue state or “mad boat captain” scenario (see Tom Clancy’s Hunt for Red October), and terrorist launch of a nuclear missile or placement of a nuclear bomb on a conventional vehicle (ship or truck). Since these very limited strikes could come from anywhere in the world, only a space-based defense could potentially protect all of America. More realistic is the possibility that third party states may initiate a nuclear war that could suck in the major power. What if India were to launch against Pakistan, or Iran against Israel? Only a space-based system could stop such a limited strike that could come without warning. In this way, the whole world (not just America) would be protected by the common good of an American space-based defense system Such a policy of defending any aggressive attack across national borders could include ships at sea and bomber aircraft, once the space weapons capability is developed. So persuasive is the capability (to me), that I suggest space weapons could be effective in preventing terrorist mass-destruction attacks. The capability to engage a target anywhere on the ground in minutes, perhaps seconds, could even be used against low-tech attempts to infiltrate sovereign states with dirty bombs or biological/chemical weapons. It would not be a guarantee, but it is the only possibility that the US could respond quickly enough to an attack anywhere on the world once the intent or target is determined. The first plane that hit the World Trade Center would not have been stopped. No one could imagine such a ruthless method. But the second plane, and the one that hit the Pentagon, might have been. Certainly our own airpower assets were not able to engage these two aircraft once their intentions were known.



And finally, would creating a Space Force substantially increase the number of persons serving in the Armed Forces as the High School Topic mandates? I don’t know, but I think it could. In the 1960s, every engineer wanted to work for NASA, even though they could make much more money in private industry, because NASA was where it was at in space! Today, the private companies and the military do more in space, and NASA cannot fill all of its technical positions with qualified people. If the US were to invigorate it military organization with an SF, it might encourage a generation of technology and space minded high-schoolers to enlist. I ended up enlisting in the Army when I couldn’t find a job after I graduated from college (it was 1981 and we were in the depths of recession). But I may very well have gone into the space force, had it existed, before I went to college … and would have ended up with a lot less debt!



I hope this helps. Most of the above are ad hoc thoughts, but I appreciate your interest and hope you maintain it well into the future. This nation needs young thinkers with vision to move it fully into the new century. Best of luck, and contact me any time.



Cheers, Ev





Dr. Everett Carl Dolman

Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

600 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6424

Hi Clinton:

Thanks for the email. I'm so very glad to hear that you enjoy my articles. Sorry for the tardy response. I hope I'm not too late.

I believe we are already deeply involved in a space race with a group of anti-West and anti-American countries led by Russia, China and Iran. Therefore, it is imperative that the U.S. maintain its technological edge over this evil group of countries. They are gathering their strength to confront the U.S. economically, militarily and politically.

The development of a space corp may initially result in an increase in the number of people serving in the U.S. armed forces, but over time the novelty would wear off, given the enormous training and long-term commitment involved. I also cannot see the U.S. or its adversaries putting an army in space -- too costly. Instead, killer U.S. satellites will do battle with Chinese satellites. China, Russia and Iran will try to wipe out America's GPS leaving U.S. commanders "blind" in the field. At that time, all three countries will attempt to use their numerical superiority to overwhelm our overextended Middle East forces. The end result could be a world of chaos. A space war is only part of a larger picture, but as you have already surmised, an important one.

Its funny, I'm writing an article right now on the idea of China's global strategy and the true, unspoken goals of the authoritarian Beijing regime. When it comes out, I forward it to you. Fell free to email or call me with any other questions at 215-574-6422.

Take care.

Fred