Clint,



Thanks again for your truly thought provoking questions and responses. I think it best to tackle them in order.



I'd love to hear your ideas on this if it's not too much of a burden



One of really big problems in kinetic kill vehicles from space(-to-earth) is that the projectiles actually have to slow down?from about 17,500 mph relative to the surface to about 7,500-8,000 mph relative) to make it through the atmosphere without liquifying or burning up completely. Moreover, the atmospheric disturbance itself causes targeting difficulties as the projectiles (the so-called ?rods from god?) have to arc from the spacecraft to the target in order to fire engage directly perpendicular to the surface (for maximum impact and accuracy?please pardon the crude drawing):







If, however, a plasma beam generated from the satellite could ?light? the target a millisecond or so before a tiny metal projectile were pumped from a rail gun at hyper-velocity, it could completely change the dynamic. The plasma beam would punch a hole in the atmosphere, a vacuum corridor if you will, perfectly true to the target. The hole or corridor would stay open long enough for the tiny flechette projectile to travel through it without encountering atmospheric drag, hence no heating or wobbling to target. Total engagement time from satellite to target would be less than two seconds, and the plasma beam would not have to be deadly enough to damage the target (reducing greatly the power generation requirements of the satellite. At the speeds we are talking about, a sewing needle-sized bit of tungsten steel could penetrate 30 meters or more of hardened concrete. As there is no explosive associated with the weapon, collateral damage would be extremely minimal. Like a sabot anti-tank round, the damage is caused be the flechette passing through the armored vehicle at hypersonic speed, killing everyone inside but essentially leaving the tank intact (a very effective weapon in use for two decades, proving the technology for space application).







This is a bit out there, but I think the kind of weapon that one might see within a relatively few years. The point is that whatever weapon that is on the drawing boards today, as we test and develop (not just research) space weapons, unknown variants and capabilities will quickly be discovered.



This suggests to me that Congress would have the power to cripple the executive in this endeavor if they refused to cooperate. I believe there is empirical evidence to back this up. For example, in the case of ASATs, it's my understanding that even after space testing, Congress's refusal to fund the program forced the executive to cancel it. In this sense, might Congress have the ultimate authority over the executive on this issue?



You are correct, but before congress could act two successful US ASAT test engagements of derelict satellites were conducted (a modified air-to-air missile fired from an F-15). In this manner, the power of the purse is used to starve projects rather than kill them, as the DoD is generally able to transfer limited funds between programs to keep pet projects alive even when congress specifically does not fund them (this is in fact a complaint that is routinely brought up by anti-weapons groups, that the Air Force is putting ASAT research into other budgets, but doing so is not illegal, it is inefficient). If, however, congress passes a law stating no ASAT research, development, or testing is allowed (a bill senator Paul Tsongas would introduce annually but that never passed), then the DoD would have to comply. So, the executive is tasked with executing the law. Congress must make a law (that passes the muster of the Supreme Court) to dictate executive limitations. For every law there are exceptions, and for the most part, congress has been loathe to (and the courts unwilling to allow) micro-managing executive decision-making. The power of the purse is still supreme.



Let me suggest, however, that if a proven ASAT technology were suddenly available (what I call ?technology X?), or another state were proven to be pursuing space control technology, congress would fund the program in a heartbeat. Indeed, the executive uses the reverse of the argument above to scuttle congress! Occasionally, congress will fund a program (environmental clean-up or urban renewal) and stipulate that the funds can only be spent on these programs, thus preventing department-to-department fund transfers (remember, the AF moving funds from one space project to another space project is generally not curtailed). The executive can hire officers that have completely different views on how the money is best spent for that program, or that will not work efficiently to implement it, thus making the congressional mandate look wasteful. Politics is a nasty game.



How important do you believe it is for youth, especially those already participating in practice for future policymaking, to be exposed to debate on the creation of a Separate Space Force and on Space Weaponization? Do you believe these issues would have great education benefits, and might their awareness be even more important in their roles as future leaders? Specifically, do you believe that role playing as The US federal government and trying to find an appropriate course of action for space weaponization could be uniquely effective?



I suppose if you do get a copy of my book you will find that energizing the popular will is one of the most important factors in becoming a genuine and benevolent steward of space. It is something called space-mindedness, and as Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote when attempting to convince the American public that its future lay in naval power, without a sea-minded people no possibility existed for America taking its rightful place as a (then) great power.



NASA was built on the foundation of a youthful fascination for space and the exploration of the unknown, a fascination that has been lost not because the youth of America no longer care about space, but because NASA has succumbed to its own bureaucratic weight and is no longer the center of gravity for space-minded engineers and professionals. If a future that really mattered to the youth of America, one in which war and poverty could one day be eliminated (on a global scale), and that future plausibly lay within the (managed and peaceful) exploration and exploitation of outer space, then the world will be a better place for the energies of the young being committed to it.



I do believe that the first quarter of the 21st century will be referred to by policy historians as the age of space-power debate?much as the latter half of the 20th will be forever known as the age of the nuclear debate. The issue is that important.



Are there are any other nations whose development of space weapons would be uniquely destabilizing?



You mention India, and that is a candidate akin to the same effects as a space-aggressive China, as both will be more concerned with regional dominance and global acceptance. We have to wait and see how the two state?s economies (and politics) are able to support expensive space programs to see which is the more likely near to mid-term challenger, but the smart money is still on China. A myriad of third-tier space states, including Iran, Brazil, and most especially Israel would have extremely destabilizing global impacts if they were to develop and deploy even limited space weapons capabilities. Except for Israel, the possibility is remote in the near term. What is oft overlooked are two of America?s great allies developing and deploying space weapons should the technology become available and the status quo become onerous (and the longer the US is in Iraq, the more onerous it becomes to): The EU and Japan. Both have sound infrastructures and both are pursuing microsatellite technology that is quickly adaptable to at least ASAT use. The EU is further pursuing expensive military satellite systems (navigation, communication, and earth-sensing) that will ensure they have a comprehensive military space capability. Who knows what relations will be with these allies in 25 years?



Specifically, I'm curious how devastating a super power war over energy resources would be. I'm currently working on an argument about the US having to face Russia and/or China in just such a conflict. I realize you believe the prospects for it are slim to none, something that I agree on. But if such a conflict did occur, do you believe it could crash the global economy/cripple American hegemony/escalate to WMD use?



I actually liked Red Storm Rising a lot. When it was written, it was about as plausible a scenario as we had. Today it seems a bit over the top. Nonetheless, a war over oil resources, increasingly likely in the current international environment (though still, thankfully, far from a sure thing) would be absolutely devastating, and the most likely plausible scenario that would result in widespread WMD use (the War on Terror will generate isolated and ad hoc WMD use at some point, though arguably less than might have occurred without the WoT?there?s a nifty paradox). By the way, Cardinal of the Kremlin was a very good book, too. After that, they are all crap. The post-Cold War and Clancy do not get along well, in my opinion.



From your other emails:



You have written that reorienting US force structures to accommodate space weaponization will reassure other nations by degrading our ability to violate their sovereignty. How would you respond to critics who claim that the US must maintain a strong "boots on the ground" capability to project power by pointing to recent conflicts like the Iraq War?



You are getting dangerously close to the fact that I am far more liberal in my views than I am generally given credit for (see also the answer to the next question). Of course the critics are right! If we want to invade and topple governments, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is impossible to do so without a significant boots on the ground capability. The problem is, I don?t generally want to invade other states (Afghanistan and Iraq were clear exceptions to my preference). But we don?t need a great deal of boots on the ground (or ?oars in the water? to do so in today?s transformed military). The recent war in Iraq was one in historic fashion, with the equivalent of just four brigades of combatants on the ground. The great bulk of the 270,000 or so personnel committed to Gulf War II (about 40% as many as were committed to Gulf War I, which had vastly smaller aims) were support personnel and technicians, and fliers. So I think we have a pretty strong ?boots on the ground? capability right now, a capability that is growing daily as our individual soldiers get more and more deadly with every technological breakthrough.



With the ?boots? capability we have today, coupled with our tremendous advantages in air, sea, space, and cyber power, we could invade and topple just about any government on the planet ? if our boots weren?t tied up occupying and pacifying Iraq and Afghanistan! Our unprecedented ?boots? are doing police work rather than military work, and that is a shame.



I don?t want to liberate countries and then dictate the terms of liberation to them. It was a commendable thing that we gave Iraqi?s and Afghani?s the first real taste of Western freedom they may have ever had, but we have no business forcing it down their throats. They cannot be forced to be free, and so long as whatever form of rule they choose is not inimitable to our interests, we should not be displeased. If that new government is a threat, or proves more brutal than the last, it is far less expensive in blood and treasure simply to invade again and let them start over (the bills are coming due, and I can easily prove the assertion). In fact, occupation directly reduces the chances that these nations will choose and maintain democracy! The liberators have become the oppressors, and that is not a legacy I want.



So, if America?s goal is to project power abroad as we see fit (and it is), and in addition to guarantee our own sovereignty and to spread the principles of democracy and free trade around the globe, then we must begin by restructuring our military force to maximize those missions.



Do you believe the creation of such a force would be viable or beneficial? Would it be mutually exclusive with a US space force, or would a US Space Force be a precondition for the US to be able to participate? I'm concerned about other teams presenting a counter proposal to create an international Space Force instead of a US one and claim that multilateralism in space is good, and that it would help prevent counterbalancing. What problems would you see with such a proposal?



Alright, this may sting a bit. It is not going to help your argument directly, but in the end I think it is the only way to practically resolve the issue (and it has some added benefits).



Absolutely I would prefer a multilateral space force (over unilateral American or any other state action) to conduct the business of space weaponization I am advocating. But guess what? It ain?t gonna happen. The UN?s Committee On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has been deadlocked for more than 12 years because it cannot come up with an international space plan that is acceptable to the US. The proposals simply aren?t realistic. Russia and China have agreed because they see the COPUOS and PAROS (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space) proposals castrating to the US military space effort, which would allow them to catch up (and, if someday possible, take space for themselves).



If, however, the United States were to announce a unilateral seizure of LEO (as I have outlined), beginning in six months or one year, you can bet that COPUOS would come up with a realistic plan that would include the US as a partner in an effective, multilateral space control regime. This would overthrow the extant treaties and allow for a new regime based on commercial (and, I believe, clean) exploitation of outer space for the benefit of all humanity.



A rule of thumb in negotiations is that you cannot start at the middle in the hopes of pulling the other side to your point of view. You have to start at the extreme so that the middle looks like a promising compromise. This only works, of course, if the extreme point you are making is plausible and believable. Thus my preference is for a multilateral, international space security force (emphasis on force, more in a minute) that does not decrease the security of the US or any other state. The possibility of that happening without the plausible threat of the US doing so unilaterally, however, is zero. Notice I said possibility. It is still likely that the US would have to make good on its promise and take LEO. At that point, the offers of a multilateral regime, or partnership amongst space-faring nations becomes vital to the interest of other states and then a realistic plan will come forward, one that the US may accept. After having actually seized LEO, the US may not give it up, however, and this is why it is so important that my argument carries with it the structural constraints that will lead to the US developing space in an internationally responsible way.



Thus my preference is for a multilateral solution acceptable to the US. My second choice is a unilateral US action. Since the first is unlikely, and the second is acceptable, I prefer the second to any other option. In order of likelihood, they are: nothing happens, we continue limping along under the current dysfunctional regime; another state seizes LEO in our absence; a new international regime is established that does not ensure US interests.



Ah, the devious (yet altruistic) mind of the theoretician.



Gotta go, hope this gives you lots of food for thought.



Ev



Clint,



Once again, you’ve asked some spot on questions.



First, hit-to-kill (kinetic) weapons are the first option for taking LEO, as all the technology is proven and available. Space-to-space ASAT is no harder than maneuvering a microsatellite into the path of an orbiting target, and, if the trajectory is earthward, the debris will quickly fall into the atmosphere and burn up (this is the tactic the Russians used for their twenty ASAT tests, and no debris or environmental damage has been noted). A laser in orbit is actually much more viable as an ASAT than as a ground or air targeting weapon. Since there is no atmospheric attenuation or perturbation, very small energy requirements are needed. Moreover, as the satellite targeted is probably unaware of the low-energy burn until its systems begin to shut down, dwell time on the target can be significant. So small power lasers that might have minimal effects on a missile or spacecraft that used countermeasures (a mirrored surface or a spinning trajectory, for example, would make power requirements much higher) would be extremely useful space-to-space.



The problem with kinetic weapons is that they will be limited to high value targets – as they are expensive to launch and maintain. Like bullets, once used they are used up. An electric-powered laser (solar panels could provide enough power for a very small laser, nuclear reactors, already developed for US scientific and Russian military satellites, could provide essentially unlimited power generation) would get cheaper the more it was used.



So, a mix of weapons is ideal. Start with kinetic to get command early, develop the tactical parameters to avoid cluttering the usable orbits with debris. Bring on lasers as concepts are developed and tested, gradually replacing kinetic kill vehicles as power constraints are reduced, and look into various combinations of pulsed or plasma directed energy weapons in conjunction with very small (sewing needle size) kinetic projectiles (I have some interesting thoughts on how these could be used, but the technology has a ways to go).



In strategy, there is no “end state.” Taking LEO for the good of all is only useful if the technology progresses.



When conducting an inspection, one doesn’t look for weapons per se. The obvious will be found. Satellites with excessive maneuver fuel, heavy shielding, and the like would be suspect. In all cases, a tracking (and I suggest disabling) device would be placed on the satellite to ensure that it does not interfere with or threaten other space operations (if it does, a quick destruct signal could be sent to the device, and a tiny amount of explosive should do the trick). The details of the inspection regime would have to be worked out, and the launching state would have to submit or accept the probability of destruction of the satellite, launch vehicle, and probably launch facility upon launch attempt.



As to your second question, the Russian response will not be to preemptively launch a massive attack against the US before deployment. That would be suicide, as our second-strike deterrent force remains intact. Nonetheless, they will try to make our decision-makers think that they will, in the hopes of forestalling through threats what they cannot stop in action. Think of it this way, however. The US is currently the world’s sole superpower (hyperpower, the French call it). Our attempts to seize LEO would be an extension of the current status quo. The Russians have been living with their second-tier status for some fifteen years now, and while they don’t like it they are used to it. They will find an alternative method to compete and one day regain top tier status, but they will not opt to destroy the earth in a fit of pique. On the other hand, should another state attempt to seize LEO, the US may well be forced to respond militarily (though not, I would think, with a nuclear assault). This is because any other state taking LEO would be an overthrow of the status quo, the results of which are unpredictable. The US, facing the possibility of a move to the second tier, will defend its position at the top. Stability in the international system is important – and like the status quo or not, it is tolerable (or, at the very least, all the world’s states are currently tolerating it).



Your third question is not strange, indeed it is extremely thought provoking. The most effective means to get the US into space would be by executive order. The president, as commander-in-chief, has the authority to deploy the military as he or she sees fit in response to the nation’s security needs. Here is the key, only if the president goes to war (or violates the sovereignty of another state) does congress have the right of review, and then only after 60 days (see the war powers act). The problem will be one of definition. The president will have to claim space is being secured in the same manner that the US occupies the high seas, and then argue that the US has the right to fire upon any vessel that threatens its free operations there (using very broad interpretations of what constitutes “innocent passage”). If the executive is smart, he/she will coordinate closely with congress, as the power of congress is the power of the purse. This is, in fact, how congress enforces its executive oversight. The more immediate problem would be the senate claiming a right to trump the president on the basis of the ratification of international treaties powers as they concern the current outer space treaty (the 1967 OST, be sure and read through this, available at the COPUOS section of the UN web page). That treaty must be abrogated as an initial step in the seizing of LEO. Fortunately, this is a relatively easy thing to do, and does not require senate approval. Just as the US quit the now-defunct anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty by providing one-year’s notice of intent, the OST allows any nation to withdraw from it with six-month’s notice. It will take that long to get the first military space-control asset into space anyway. I suspect this topic requires much more research on my part as well, thanks for bringing it up.



As for your last question, the creation of a space force, whether or not space control and weaponization is part of the plan, should not be a problem at all for the executive. It would not be the rousing call to action that Kennedy’s 1961 speech turned out to be, but neither will it be attacked in the same manner as Bush’s “back to the moon, on to mars” initiative for NASA. There is even a growing space contingency in congress (particularly in the House, where about 60 congresspersons meet regularly as a space caucus) that would provide critical support. Moderate goals would need to be outlined, but the proposal could easily go forward. Since the proclamation would be seen as more symbolic than effective, and the spin-doctors could prepare the message for maximum effect, it could even be a boon to the president who does so.



Now, practically, I don’t think the current president should try it (at least not this year). This is the kind of thing that needs to be done early in a first term, and so the best time would be at the beginning of the ne4xt president’s term, to demonstrate decisive leadership and vision (again, see Kennedy in 1961). If it doesn’t work out, voters will forget about it by the next election, and if it does work out, all the better. The second best time would be in the last year of a lame duck term (as is coming up next year). This way the reorganization can be slipped in and effectively accomplished before the next president comes in—who will have bigger promises to fill from the campaign—and probably doesn’t care much about military structure anyway. But if the next president (or congress, who funds the budget) wants to kill the space force, it will at least have some inertia behind it. At any rate, the current president has way too much baggage to saddle the next republican candidate with yet another big spending proposal, so I would look to 2009-2010 and then 2013 or 2016 for a space force announcement (at the earliest).



BTW, the current Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, is the most knowledgeable and pro-space advocate we have ever had in the position and George H. Bush was the first vice-president to have a space job in the executive branch. Were it not for 911, and the miserable occupation of Iraq, we might very well have had space weaponization by now, and quite possibly a space force, too. Ah well, life keeps getting in the way of preferences.



Hope this helps, Ev