Part Two

 

     If the U.S. Navy was being trounced by the Japanese, the pilots and troops defending Henderson Field were not.  By late October, the Americans were wondering what happened to the thousands of Japanese soldiers that were landed by the Tokyo Express in mid October.  Also wondering where the troops were, was Japanese General Hyakutake who reached the island on October 10th and soon found that the five 600-man infantry battalions that were the core of Ichiki's and Kawaguchi's commands mustered scarcely the numerical strength of one.  The five infantry battalions of the 2nd Division had shriveled to one-third of their authorized compliment.  The serviceable artillery and supplies of ammunition were almost nonexistent.  As one of his first acts, he ordered the 38th Division and the 228th Regiment to join the flow of reinforcements south.

    The staffs of both the Japanese 17th Army and the 2nd Division concurred that the forthcoming offensive must be aimed at Henderson Field and that the plan must be put into effect as soon as possible.  That was about the limits of their agreement however.  Adding to the problems that faced the staff was that Imperial Headquarters had estimated that the total number of American troops on the islands was about 10,000 when actually there were almost 28,000.  And along came the Imperial Navy report stating scout planes had spotted another newly constructed airfield a short distance from Henderson Field near Koli Point along the coast.  Koli Point and the area around it was under Japanese control.

    So while the Japanese Navy was trouncing the American, Australian and British Navies, the Cactus (Code name for Henderson Field) pilots with their second rate planes were holding their own and then some.  The Marines and Army troops were actually pushing the Japanese troops back.  The Japanese High Command realized their  troops would soon be annihilated if reinforcements weren't forthcoming.

    By mid October, the 17th Army had come up with a new plan.  This plan was built around information obtained October 11th by Colonel's Tamaoki and Matsumoto of the 2nd Division who clambered up to an observation post on Mount Austen (a high ridge behind the field).  From this high point they were able to peer down the dusty runway of Henderson Field and were delighted to see that the island's interior appeared more accessible than had been supposed.  Using an old British Admiralty chart and good field glasses, they thought they had even found an undefended area south of the field.  They did not realize that the chart they were looking at was only accurate in the coastal areas and was only a rough approximation away from the coast.

    Unfortunately for them, they were unable to make out the American troops south of the field who were spread out across low ground and hidden by a ridge.  The colonels scrambled back to headquarters with what they thought was exciting news.  To verify this wonderful discovery, Colonel Konuma of the 17th Army climbed to the observation post and verified their views that there were no troops on the south side of the field.  Konumba presented these findings and, perhaps with a bit of wishful thinking, Commanding General Hyakutake accepted it.

     At 0900, October 15th, the 17th Army issued formal orders.   On the same morning, Lt. General Maruyama briefed a sweaty gathering of commanders on the details.  The attack would come from three directions.  The first would be headed by Major General Tadashi Sumiyoshi, artillery commander of the 17th Army, and would be just a feint to distract the Americans and draw troops away from the field.  This attack would advance along the coastal corridor with tanks, heavy artillery and five battalions of infantry.  It would make as much noise as deemed appropriate.

    A second attack group consisting of the 2nd Division with nine battalions of infantry and under the command of General Oka would embark on a jungle march and proceed along the east bank of the Lunga River to reach the airfield on X-Day (day to occupy the field -- tentatively set for Oct. 22).    The 1st Battalion, 228th Infantry with a company of engineers (38th Engineers) would land on the coast in time to march to the field and occupy it at 0200 on X-Day plus one.

    A third attack group, the Sendai Division would advance along the opposite side of the Lunga River on a route laid out a few days earlier by an engineering party accompanied by the 124th Infantry.  This route, Lt. General Maruyama modestly called the Maruyama Road. The Left Wing of this Unit would be under Major General Nasu and built around the 29th Infantry Regiment.  The Right Wing of the Unit would be under Major General Kawaguchi (who already had experience with the Lunga River) who would command the 230th Infantry.

    On October 16, the first soldiers stepped out sharply each carrying a load of ammunition, including an artillery shell and supposedly 12 days of rations (turned out to be more like 6 days).  Artillerymen had to disassemble all of their weapons and hand-carry them.  When the touted Maruyama Road was reached, the soldiers found that it was just a 20 to 24 inch wide foot trail that rambled through the jungle between the trees and eventually seemed to lead to nowhere.  Without maps and using only a compass in the dense jungle, it was obvious to the troops that this was not going to be a fun day.  The shells proved to be a bit heavy to carry on a long march through the dense and steamy jungle.  Many seem to have been misplaced during the occasional short rest periods and the soldiers, not wanting to delay the march, had to proceed without them.

    On October 18, the last elements of the Division began to march.  Eighteen miles ahead the first element of the Division reached the Lunga River.  It seemed the Division was on schedule to make the October 22nd deadline.  The 17th Army radioed Rabaul for more air support however, as about a third of the supplies landed by the High-Speed Convoy had been destroyed by the planes from the supposedly "suppressed" Henderson Field.

    Nevertheless, the 17th Army remained optimistic and predicted to anyone that would listen:  "The victory is already in our hands.  Please rest your minds."  The Imperial Navy forwarded, again to anyone that would listen, excerpts from recent American radio broadcasts filled with doom and gloom about the situation on Guadalcanal.  The 17th Army took consolation from this and concluded that American moral was rotting.  From his headquarters, General Hyakutake announced:  "The time of the decisive battle between Japan and the United States has come."  His staff began detailed planning of how to handle the American surrender.

    Since the overall plan seemed to be proceeding on schedule, General Sumiyoshi kicked off his attack with the feint along the coastal corridor.  This had the American commanders attention but a captured map (or perhaps a clue from the "Code - breakers") indicated a three-pronged attack.  One from the east, one from the west and another from the south.  Marine scouts were sent out but found no trace of Japanese forces to the east and to the south found only "bands of dispirited, half starved, poorly armed stragglers and deserters (remnants of Ichiki and Kawaguchi forces) ."  Air patrols consistently returned with negative reports.  So far, the attackers from those directions had not been detected.  The third group that was advancing noisily along the coast was, of course, noted.

    On October 21, the 11th Air Fleet started what was to be the softening up period prior to X-Day, the 22nd.  25 Zeros and 9 bombers roared over Henderson and were met by 15 Wildcats.  One Zero and two Wildcats fell.  While south of Henderson, the troops of the Japanese Sendai Division were on the sixth day of their march and engaged in heavy battle with the jungle.  Slashing and cutting through the almost solid underbrush in the horrid heat and humidity, the troops thought they should be reaching the southern threshold of the American perimeter.  Instead they went drifting off course and by nightfall were nowhere near their jumping off point for next day's attack.  X-Day had to be postponed 24 hours and General Hyakutake attached his apologies to this news forwarded to Rabaul.

    To retain the American attention during the delay, Sumiyoshi ordered a substantial increase in the artillery barrage along the coast.  At this same time, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Thomas Holcomb, arrived at Henderson Field.  During his tour of the front-line positions on the 22nd, occasional artillery fire came raining down.  Then, to complete his education about Guadalcanal, a raid by 12 Vals and 12 Zero escorts hit the field but then veered off to attack the destroyer Nicholas cruising off shore. The Nicholas adroitly avoided all bombs. Twenty-nine Wildcats were able to intercept the Vals and two were downed. The destroyer Nicholas not only managed to survive the day but actually survived the next two years with a stunning combat record and was to be honored by Halsey himself to be the first American warship to enter Tokyo Bay.

    With the postponement of the attack another day, the 17th Army was confident that the attack would finally be made on the 23rd, but the 23rd of October proved to be a day of major developments.  The Japanese Navy dispatched a major air attack to the field with 12 Zeros as a fighter sweep ahead of 17 other Zeros as a close escort for 16 bombers (Bettys).  The fighter commander of the Cactus Air Force, Lt. Colonel Harold Bauer scrambled everything he had, 24 Wildcats and 4 P-39s at the same time initiating a radical shift in tactics: "When you see Zeros, dog fight 'em."  He had seen a noticeable decline in the quality of Zero pilots while at the same time, American pilots (those who survived) were greatly improving in air combat.  The day's results seem to verify his optimism with claims of 21 Zeros and 2 bombers shot down.  Actual losses were 6 Zeros and 1 bomber with no losses of American pilots although 7 Wildcats sustained damage.

    Early on the 23rd, Japanese soldiers, believing that they were now at the perimeter of Henderson Field, dropped their packs and prepared for the attack (the artillery shells they had been carrying seemed to have been lost on the march).  Scouts radiated out, but many were never seen again and those who managed to make it back moaned that there was nothing but jungle in every direction.  The bayonets the soldiers had carefully honed a few days earlier were now heavily rusted and the slogging through the dense jungle left the soldiers exhausted.  Captain Jiro Katsumata scribbled in his diary:  "I cannot any longer think of anything, the enemy, food, home or even myself.  I am only a spirit drifting toward an undefined, unknowable world."

    Without any visual reference points or patrol reports, the Japanese commanders and their troops were thrashing blindly through the endless jungle.  With compass in hand, they knew the direction they should follow but countless obstacles made this impossible and eventually all commanders were lost except those along the coast.  The commanders along the east and south sides of the field were still miles from the field but believed that they were only a fraction of that distance.

    Using the only communications available to them -- the field telephones -- the various commanders notified General Hyakutake that their troops were still not in position to attack.  Realizing that this new delay would antagonize (and agonize) the Imperial Navy, the General reluctantly informed Yamamoto who issued orders to inform the Combined Fleet that X-Day had been changed to October 24.  On the bright side, the Japanese were delighted that their advancing troops had not been sighted.  This was deduced when Americans were observed playing tennis along side the field.

    If the forces advancing toward the field from the south were having trouble, those coming in from the east under Sumiyoshi's command were not doing any better.  When these troops reached the end of the Maruyama Road, the path beyond was even worse with exceedingly difficult terrain.  Ahead was a deep ravine with cliff like sides.  This took a full day to scale and in the process, two of three of the rifle companies managed to lose themselves in the jungle.  As sunlight dwindled, a request was forwarded for another day's delay.  A delay was ordered but the delay order never reached the commander of the troops along the coastal corridor so those battalions pushed forward.

    At dusk, Japanese artillery fire suddenly intensified and Lt. Colonel Twining , the 1st Marine Operations Officer, snapped, "It looks like this is the night."  The attack had officially started.  Tanks from the group on the west clanked and squeaked as they moved forward to attack.  A 15 ton Type 97 moved up along the coast only to be stopped by a 37 mm anti-tank gun.  A second tank moved out quickly from a hidden trail, crossed a sandbar and smashed through  barbed wires and crushed a 1st Marine machine-gun position.  The tank moved over a heavy stump and reared up momentarily.  Marine private Joseph D. R. Champagne reached out of his foxhole and placed a grenade on one of the tracks.  The track was ruptured and the tank veered toward the beach.  A half-track mounting a 75mm gun came up behind it stopped it with barrage.

     As flares illuminated the area, two more tanks moved forward and the battle was on.  Japanese artillery increased only to be matched by Marines bringing up a total of forty howitzers.  SBD dive-bombers flying in the short distance from Henderson added their loads to the pot.  Despite all of this response, Vandergrift believed that Major General Tadashi Sumiyoshi's feint group posed a threat so the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines was deployed to that area along the coast.  This thinned out the line of American troops on the southern approach to the field.  The 17th Army's plan seemed to be working.

    But at the south of Henderson Field, all was still quiet, no sign of an attack.  With the 2nd Battalion gone, Lt. Colonel "Chesty" Puller stretched his single 700-man battalion out to cover the entire regimental front.  His 2,500-yard sector ran from east to west along a grassy plain bordered by thick jungle and then across the already blood-soaked ridge that was the scene of the September battle.  Although the Marine command remained ignorant of the danger from the south, Puller was not complacent and personally walked the entire line checking each firing position and ordering improvements.  All was still quiet but later in the day, a scout who had strayed from a patrol reported seeing a Japanese officer with binoculars studying the ridge along the field.  A second Scout-Sniper reported "many rice fires" several miles up and near the Lunga River.  But it was a little too late to rearrange forces.

    At about 2 pm, the Sendai Division reached what they thought was a point about a mile south of the airfield.  They set the time of attack on the field at 7 pm and began their northern march.  After about two hours of marching, drops of rain started pattering through the leaves.  Within an hour sheets of rain poured onto the heads of the advancing troops.  Soon the riflemen were pushing through waist-deep water and bogs of mud.  The time for the attack came and passed with still no contact with the American line.  By 10 pm, the rain had halted and the troops looked up through breaks in the jungle canopy to see light from a bright moon.  The forward elements of the division were now close to the edge of the field.

   But the Sendai Division was completely exhausted and in a state of confusion after their long march.  The Division (composed of two wings, each composed of three rifle battalions and each the same strength as Puller's total force) was still hewing trails side by side as they advanced toward the American line.  Major General Nasu had the Left Wing and Major General Kawaguchi had the Right Wing.  These troops had behind them the division reserve of three rifle battalions.

    At one of outposts in front of Puller's line, Sergeant Briggs was moving his detachment to a clearing in front of the line held by 164th Infantry (the North Dakota National Guard unit).  At that time, a large group of Japanese troops passed Briggs's well hidden group. The Japanese were so close that one of their soldiers tripped over a marine's helmet that was lying on the ground.  Still the Japanese were unaware of the American presence but Briggs quickly passed word of the Japanese back to Puller.  Thus alerted the Americans were waiting as the first Japanese soldiers stumbled into American line.  Puller directed his troops to withhold fire as long as possible to let Brigg's outpost clear the firing lanes.

    Unfortunately, many of the patrol never made it back.  Like the Japanese, the Americans had problems navigating through the jungle and the last man of the group made it back to the line two weeks later.  Three men were never accounted for and three others were killed and ten wounded.  The jungle proved a real adversary to both sides.

    Confusion reigned in Japanese quarters when the 2nd Division Headquarters received a report that the Kawaguchi's Right Wing group had overrun the defense lines and was moving into the grass clearing on the eastern side of Henderson Field.  The anxious staff of the 17th Army became ecstatic at the news and a little after midnight issued the a news report: "2300 Banzai -- a little before 2300 the Right Wing captured the airfield."  Actually, the Kawaguchi's Right Wing was still wandering around lost in the jungle.

    At the time the 17th Army was busy with their news announcement, five scouts of the Left Wing located the American barbed-wire barricade along a flat area of dense jungle about 60 feet from the edge of the field.  Captain Jiro Katsumata brought the battalion commander, the executive officer and the engineer platoon leader to the wire to assess the situation.  Their activity drew a nervous burst of rifle fire so they hurriedly decided to advance their troops between the two American machinegun emplacements before the American artillery could come into play.

    While engineers were busy cutting the wire, Katsumata brought his company forward crawling quietly through foot high grass.  Unfortunately for most of the troops, and probably due to the extreme fatigue, a few men behaved erratically.  One stood up and started walking, another loosed a war cry and despite Katsumata's orders, others took it up.  This triggered American machine guns and mortars.  With that, the company charged and most of the troops got hung up on the wire entanglements and died in front of Puller's Company A's  location.  It was about an hour into the new day -- September 25.

    Following Katsumata's Company, the 9th Company bearing a little to the left (west), charged straight into the firing lanes of Puller's Company C.  Within about five minutes, almost the entire company lay lifeless largely due to the work of Sergeant John Basilone's machinegun section.  For his heroic action, he was awarded the Medal of Honor.  American artillery was now directed along the path of the entire Left Wing with devastating effect.  Those who stood up were quickly killed by flying splinters or concussion; those who left the trails seeking refuge in the jungle quickly became lost.

    Puller now realized that this was a major attack by seasoned well-disciplined troops and fed in three platoons from his immediate reserves.  More units of the North Dakota National Guard came through after a fast march along a muddy jungle trail in torrential rains and in total darkness.  They headed into a raging battle of unknown dimensions but with a ferocity that was clearly audible.  Two of the companies were fed into the hard-pressed left while one company went to the right.  For the untested troops, this initiation into combat was something to be remembered.

    On the Japanese side of the barbed-wire entanglements, Colonel Furimiya, the commander of the 29th Infantry had made it to the front line with his Headquarters Company and with the 7th Color Escort Company.  A "lost" rifle company staggered in from the jungle at this time and joined with Furimiya.  The Colonel directed two companies to "charge."  Captain Katsumata who, with his troops, was the first to hit the American lines, returned at this time seriously wounded.  But he reported that  he and his men had made it onto the field.

    With this, Colonel Furimaya decided to follow him back into the enemy position.  He mustered what extra men he could find from machine-guners who had exhausted their ammunition and who now wielded bayonets.  Furimiya led the color company with the sacred colors of the 29th Infantry in an assault on the right.  Before leaving, the Colonel directed the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry to add the weight of his unit to the attack.  Most of Furimaya's troops died or where flung back at the wire, but over a hundred men, led by their colonel, made it onto the Field.

    At this time, General Oka's Second Attack group coming in from the east, finally made it the edge of the field.  But before the weight of the Japanese 2nd Battalion could be brought into the action, it was about 4:00 am and the eastern sky was getting bright.  The battalion commander led two of his companies in an assault after sunrise but they were stopped at the edge of the jungle.  With this, the battalion commander decided to postpone any further attacks until the following night.   General Nasu (with the Third Attack group's Left Wing) also decided to pull all troops back into the jungle and prepare his group for another night attack.  Those Japanese troops that had made it onto the field were chased down and killed during the day.

    With the Imperial Army putting maximum effort into their night attack, daylight brought the Imperial Navy to the Guadalcanal area to assess the situation.  A two-engine reconnaissance plane with eight Zero escorts left Rabaul early and was over Henderson by 8 am.  At that time artillery fire was still hitting the field and the heavy rains had inundated the satellite field.  Sweeping in low over the field, the reconnaissance plane had reason to believe that the field was in Japanese hands.  Heavy antiaircraft fire from the field brought the overconfident observers down and they hit the field in embroiled in a large ball of flame. Thus the observers were finally aware that the field was still in American hands but little good it did them.

    Along with the aircraft that the Imperial Navy was sending to the area, Yamamoto dispatched a large number of warships. As Henderson Field dried out in the bright sun and heat, American SBD dive bombers managed to avoid the shell holes and lift off from the muddy field.  They spotted five separate task units heading toward the field.  These were under Admiral Mikawa's very able command.  This admiral seemed to have little fear of the Allied naval units but had great respect for the fly boys of Henderson Field.

    One group under the admirals command was bringing the Koli Troops (freshly named) who were to land at Koli Point on the shoreline and move in to occupy the field that had been earlier reported as captured.  Another group was bringing fuel and supplies.  Three more attack groups were placed in various places along the shore to guard against any attempt at reinforcement by the Americans or any attempt to evacuate the area.  At the 8th Fleet Headquarters, the staff was delighted that the Army, if not on Henderson Field, at least was tottering on the edge of it and hoped that a little shelling of the American positions might nudge them onto the field.  Accordingly, a light cruiser (the Yura) and eight destroyers were detached to move to the shoreline.  Another group of destroyers were already approaching the field.

    A radio warning went out about the approach of these ships and two small American vessels that had just finished unloading supplies at Lunga Point decided it was high time to move on.  They were just getting ready to do a little shelling of Japanese positions themselves ironically.  Before these older ships (with only two 3-inch guns) could clear the area completely, lookouts spotted three Japanese destroyers approaching at high speed.  The two ships were in Sealark Channel when the range between the two forces was reduced to five miles.  Japanese gunners quickly found the range and shells started dropping just "feet not yards" away.

    A 5-inch shell from one of the Japanese destroyers hit one of the American ships (the Zane) killing three men and knocking out one gun.  The captain of the Zane, realizing the two ships could not outrun the Japanese took a hard left and soon entered a dangerous Nagella Channel.  The Japanese commander, not wanting to risk his larger ships choose to turn back and attack the supply ships sitting at Lunga Point.  When the Japanese approached Lunga Point, they spotted two tugs that were busy doing their job of hauling ammunition and gasoline from Tulagi.  The two were quickly blown to pieces and they went down in a puddle of flames.  The Japanese shells pierced the thin wooden hulls so easily that the shells didn't explode.  Luckily only one sailor was killed but three marine passengers were not so lucky.

    The Japanese then initiated a shore bombardment starting at the Lunga beach, but Marine shore batteries plunked a shell into a gun mount on one of the destroyers that started a fire.  The destroyers hid behind a smoke screen but four Wildcats of VMF-21 strafed the ships.  The four Wildcats attracted the attention of 8 Zeros out of a group of 27 Zeros that were heading for the field.  In the air battle that ensued, Lt. J. E. Conger, after a head-on exchange with a Zero pilot, rammed the Zero and both planes headed for the drink with the Zero pilot remaining with his plane.  Conger bailed out and landed in the water and was picked up by a Higgins boat.  Another Japanese pilot (Pilot Officer 2d Class Shiro Ishikawa) splashed down near the Higgins boat.  The crew on the Higgins was prepared to send Ishikawa to his just rewards but Conger insisted that he be saved.  Almost fifty years later the two pilots would meet and dined together as friends.

    The morning of October 15th, 1942 was proving to be busiest day so far for Cactus Air Force.  The afternoon would get even worse.  As the field continued to dry out, Wildcats continuously roared of, engaged flights of Zeros and bombers, then landed, rearmed and refueled and took off again.  By 2:30 that afternoon, a major raid of 16 Betty bombers with 12 Zeros as escort reached the field.  Thirty minutes later, Japanese carrier planes appeared and dropped their bombs along the beach.  Yamamoto had Carrier Division 2 launch 24 more planes to hit the field.  They arrived at 3:00 and 9 dive-bombers bombed what was called the "graveyard" of planes that were just used for parts.  Additional flights of Zeros continued to strafe the field.

    As the cruiser Yura and her five destroyers approached the field, Lt. Commander John Eldridge of VS-71 with five dive-bombers dropped out of the clouds.  Eldridge placed a 1,000-pound bomb near the Yura's after engine room while another of his dive-bombers hit the ship with a 500-pound bomb.  Another SBD bomber had a near-miss on the flagship of the destroyer group, the Akizuki, knocking out her starboard screw and flooding her after engine room.  With that, Admiral Mikawa (the admiral that had given the U.S. Navy its most humiliating defeat at Savo Island) called off the bombardment and ordered his ships out of the area.

    But Eldridge reappeared with four SBD's and four bomb-clutching P-39s, with three Wildcat escorts.  As these planes attacked, 6 B-17s of the Army Air Force made a bombing run and released their bombs on the distressed cruiser.  Bomb splinters seriously damaged two of the escorting destroyers and the Yura was now completely in flames.  Two of the remaining destroyers put the Yura out of her misery with torpedoes and the ship sank a few hours later.

    With the air and naval forces at center stage for most of the day, the ground commanders on both sides redeployed their men and geared themselves for the night action.  The 5th Marines were brought in to close the gap along the southern perimeter.  Most troops were put on the line to avoid having to move them along trails knee high in mud.  To "Chesty" Puller it was obvious that most of the Japanese were massed opposite his position.  The Marine and Army battalions were "disentwined" from the previous night and Puller's men took the eastern 1,400 yard segment while the Army troops (the boys from North Dakota) under Lt. Colonel Robert Hall took the 1,100 yard western segment.

    At the jungle headquarters of the Japanese Sendai Division, it was recognized that many stalwart soldiers had fallen during the night, but it was decided to build on the "success" of Furimiya who had planted his regimental colors within the enemy perimeter.  Accordingly, General Maruyama announced to his command that the "main force" of the Left Wing had pierced deeply into the American lines.  He ordered the attack to be resumed after dark and handed over control of his reserve, the 16th Infantry Regiment, and the 2nd Engineer Battalion to Major General Nasu.  The 17th Army Headquarters issued the necessary orders for reinforcements and supplies.  The Koli Division was set to land on the morning of the 26th and move to take control of the airport.

    After dark on the 25th, the guns of the Sendai Division's artillery started hammering the south end of the field along the lines occupied by Puller's Marines and Hall's Army troops.  From then until midnight fights flared mainly on the sector held by the National Guard from North Dakota.  The Japanese troops were attacking in groups ranging in size from 30 to 200 under cover of heavy machinegun fire.  In the early morning hours of October 26th, the Japanese 16th Infantry stormed forward in huge numbers under the cover from heavy infantry weapons.  The 7th Marines Weapons Company answered with a heavy barrage of 37mm guns against the advance troops but some Sendai broke through Hall's lines and into the field.  But the soldiers, with the help of a company of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, stopped the breakthrough.  The carnage was heavy on both sides.

    During the night, the casualty list of the Nasu's Left Wing mounted.  Flying steel killed Colonel Hiroyasu of the 16th Infantry and most of his officers and mortally wounded Major General Nasu.  While the Left Wing of the Sendai Division was taking horrible losses, the Right Wing under Major General Kawaguchi was missing all the action.  It was still somewhere wandering about in the endless jungle looking for and guarding against some illusory threat that never materialized.

    Another part of this grand assault finally came to life as General Oka's division finally made itself known on the eastern side of the field.  Better late than never.  For 40 minutes, Oka's artillery poured heavy fire into 7th Marines and just before midnight, heavy thrashing of an enemy column became audible to those who were unfortunate enough to hear it.  At 3:00 am, the Japanese struck all along the line of Colonel Hanneken's 7th Marines but particularly against Company F.  Japanese riflemen delivered fire from trees on the opposite heights and down onto Marine positions.  A machinegun section under Platoon Sergeant Mitchell Paige exacted a heavy toll, but gradually all of Paige's men fell victims to the heavy fire.  After two hours of heavy fighting, the Japanese 3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry drove the survivors of Company F from the ridge.

    Gathering a group of mess-men, bandsmen, a cook, radiomen, and a few riflemen, Major Odell M. Conoley, executive officer of 2nd Marines, organized a counterattack.  He was joined by elements of various other companies and two platoons from Company C, 5th Marines.  Before the Japanese could consolidate their position on the ridge, the major and his rather motley group charged back up the ridge and by early morning the report "the situation was in hand" was passed to headquarters.

    At the Japanese  2nd Division Headquarters group, they had been relying mostly on their ears to inform them of the progress of their attack.  Finally a staff officer was sent forward to check on the progress of the battle but when arriving just before dawn, he immediately realized the attack had failed.  Without any additional reserves that he thought he could commit, General Maruyama notified 17th Army Headquarters that the 2nd Division in its present condition could not hope to break through.  At eight that morning, General Hyakutake called off the attack.  This attack was over.  While the Americans loses were less than one hundred killed, the Japanese losses were estimated to be as high as four thousand when the losses for the three attacks groups were counted.

    At the jungle headquarters for the 17th Army, the defeat administered a severe psychological blow.  The Headquarters Staff enjoyed no privileges over the rest of the troops.  They lived in rain-soaked clothes, ate small amounts of rice with only rare additions of soybean paste or a few crackers.  Most were so weak that they needed the aid of canes to walk.  They viewed their failure to take the field was caused simply by the lack of air cover (Navy), very short supplies of all items (caused by lack of air cover) and insufficient time for adequate planning.

    The Imperial Navy's view of this defeat did not coincide with the Army's assessment.  When Naval Commander Ohmai came ashore to determine the cause of this failure, his assessment was, like the Army's, simple and brief.  However, the failure as he saw it, was caused by "the Army's faulty assessment of the enemy's disposition, leadership failures beginning with Maruyama's chronic illness (neuralgia), Kawaguchi's chronic insubordination, Oka's chronic indifference to orders and the sheer incompetence of General Nasu and his regimental commanders who knew nothing but charging.  The Japanese Army and Navy were not seeing eye-to-eye.  The Imperial Japanese Navy was ready to make things right.

    On October 26th,  the Japanese Navy made its move.  This time they would test the strength of the American Navy in preparation for the "Grand Assault" to regain Henderson Field.  The attack group heading south consisted of two heavy and one light aircraft carriers backed by the battleships Hiei and Kirishima, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, seventeen destroyers and fourteen submarines.

    Admiral Yamamoto, aboard the monstrous battleship Yamato in Truk lagoon, directed Admiral Kondo to proceed to the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area and destroy the remaining ships of the American Navy.  The Japanese would enjoy a nearly 3 to 2 advantage in aircraft numbers and their pilots were the remaining core of superbly skilled first-line carrier fliers.

    Admiral "Bull" Halsey could throw only two heavy carriers, (the Enterprise and Hornet), two battleships (the Washington and North Dakota), four heavy cruisers, five light cruisers and twenty destroyers.  Many of the American fliers had only three months training and on the Hornet and the torpedo group was reformed in June from all-new personnel.  Nor were any of the American planes a match for their Japanese counterparts.

    Halsey, in his first action since his new appointment, issued Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid  "taut orders bereft of timidity: 'make a sweep around north Santa Cruz Islands thence southwesterly east of San Cristobal to area in Coral Sea in position to intercept enemy forces approaching Cactus-Ringbolt [Guadalcanal-Tulagi].' " Kinkaid, perhaps a little intimidated by this order, launched attack groups from the Enterprise at the first report on the location of the Japanese Forces.  As his planes disappeared over the horizon, a second report came in telling that the Japanese had turned north and were heading away.  With radio silence in effect, he could not notify the attackers to return to the ship.  This was just the start of the kind of luck that was to plague the Americans this day.

    In this two day air battle, known as the Battle of Santa Cruz, the Japanese managed to sink the Hornet and seriously damage the Enterprise sending it back to Pearl Harbor for repairs.  Although the Americans were able to damage two of the three Japanese carriers, one light and one heavy, they would be back in action in a matter of weeks.  Given the distinct edge that the Japanese had in numbers and quality of their forces, the Americans could have used a little luck in this battle.  They had none.  In this battle, the Japanese with superb scouting and tactics managed to reduce Halsey's carrier force to zero.

    Though the Imperial Navy lost no ships in the battle, their loss in planes and highly trained pilots was heavy.  Entering the engagement with 199 carrier planes, only 86 remained flyable at the end of the day.  Of the 148 aircrews lost, two of three dive-bomber leaders, three torpedo leaders and most section leaders died that day. Their replacements would not match the excellence of those who sacrificed their lives for the victory at Santa Cruz.

    It was estimated that over half of the Japanese dive - bombers and torpedo planes fell victim to the ship gunfire.  The heavy five - inch guns with their elaborate radar and director systems accounted for very few, perhaps only 5 percent, while the new Bofors 40mm and 20mm accounted for the rest.  After the battle Admiral Kinkaid wrote, "There cannot be too many 40mm and 20mm guns on any type of ship.  They knock down planes."

    Admiral Nimitz assessed the battle as follows:  "This battle cost us the lives of many gallant men, many planes and two ships that could ill be spared.  Despite the loss of about three carrier air groups and damage to a number of ships, the enemy retired with all his ships.  We nevertheless turned back the Japanese again in their offensive to regain Guadalcanal and shattered their carrier air strength on the eve of the critical days of mid November.

    The Japanese Navy saw this battle as a great victory and believed the way had been prepared for their "Grand Assault" which would lead to the capture of Henderson Field and ultimately to victory.
 
 

    In the New York Times of October 26th, 1942,  it was reported : "An atmosphere of tense expectation was apparent in some Washington quarters."  At the center of this tense situation was President Roosevelt's memorandum to his Joint Chiefs, which said in part: "My anxiety about the Southwest Pacific is to make sure that every possible weapon gets into that area to hold Guadalcanal.... We will soon find ourselves engaged on two active fronts and we must have adequate air support in both places even though it means delay in our other commitments, particularly to England...."

    General Marshall and Admiral King diagnosed the problem as not a lack of air or ground forces but a want of shipping.  Accordingly, President Roosevelt ordered twenty more ships released immediately.

    In the same time period at the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo, the Army Section finally and fully recognized the position that  the Navy Section had held for some time -- that the fighting in the Solomons was developing into the decisive battle between Japan and the United States.  The Imperial Headquarters prepared confidently for the next offensive, for two reasons.  First was that the it believed the Battle of Santa Cruz had tilted the balance of naval power decisively in Japan's favor.  And  second, the attack in October had teetered on the very brink of success.

    A perplexed staff at the headquarters of the 17th Army in Tokyo was wrestling with the complex problem of dealing with the immediate defeat of the Army at Henderson Field while preparing for the new grand offensive there.  New plans were drawn up, reviewed and thrown out before the ink could dry.  The Army planned to land the rest of the 38th Division and bring the total force up to 30,000 troops.  Or perhaps, in addition to the 38th Division, the 51st Division and the 21st Independent Mixed Brigade could be brought in with 30,000 more troops bringing the total to 60,000.  Good plans, of course, but creating supply problems requiring the Navy to have available fifty transports or 800 destroyers.

    The Imperial Army wanted a constant supply of fuel, ammunition, food, reinforcements, etc. to the field.  The Imperial Navy, citing that the best that could be hoped for in "suppressing" Henderson Field was two days, suggested that large convoys be used on an intermittent basis.  The Army and Navy were having trouble seeing eye to eye.

    Admiral Yamamoto, after examining the 17th Army's latest plan, commented that the plan was so unrealistic that success might be unattainable with such brains in charge of the Imperial Army's forces on Guadalcanal.  Yamamoto's staff suggested that the Cactus Air Force could be neutralized with shore-based artillery, and began planning to move long-range naval guns to the island.

    The Combined Fleet staff, sensing that a turning point had been reached, pushed for immediate answers.  It commenced an urgent study on November 4th and after three days of labor produced the outline of plan on November 7th.  The plan to retake the airfield was as follows:

        On Z-Day minus three and continuing each day, the 11th Air Fleet would wrestle for air superiority.

        On Z-Day minus one, the Advanced Force would take position north of Guadalcanal and the battleships Hiei and Kirishima would hammer the American airfield.

        On Z-Day, heavy cruisers would pound the airfield.  The convoy would bring in supplies for 20 days during which time the long-range guns would be positioned and the airfield would be ground to impotence.  The huge convoy would then deliver the rest of the men and material needed to recapture the island.

        On Z-Day, a large convoy would head for Guadalcanal escorted by the 8th Fleet.

        Z-Day was tentatively set for November the 13th. (Friday)

    The waning days of October and the early days of November found the Americans striving desperately to get prepared for the next round in the battle to hold Henderson Field.  The airstrips, now three of them, were being lengthened and repaired.  The original strip was lengthened to 5,400 feet with 3500 feet of metal matting.  The second strip, Fighter One, was now 4,600 feet of rolled grass (but usually soggy) and Fighter Two was 3,200 feet of graded earth.  New squadrons of fighters and bombers arrived to replace squadrons drained by exhaustion and losses.  Operational aircraft sitting on the field reached the rather comfortable total of 95.  The head of the Cactus Air Force, General Geiger who was seriously fatigued both physically and mentally, was replaced the first week of November by Louis Woods who was promoted into the job and changed from a "kindly colonel to a bloodthirsty brigadier general."

    The Japanese were making similar adjustments to their air crews.  During October, the 11th Air Fleet had lost no less than one-third of its strength, including many highly skilled crews.  With such great hopes pinned on the October attacks, the severe losses caused a slump in morale.  The hard fighting 25th Air Flotilla, which had been slugging it out in the South Pacific since April, was spent.  It flew its last sorties on November 9th and was withdrawn to Japan.   Rear Admiral Ichimaru brought his 21st Air Flotilla to replace it.  Other groups were also replaced and by October 31st, 158 aircraft were ready for the November offensive.

    Bad weather in early November (and the exhaustion of the air crews) kept air activities around the Field at a rather low level.  But, on the ground, the American troops were receiving "riches beyond their dreams." Admiral Halsey had promised Vandergrift that he would forward everything that he had available which included much food and supplies, ammunition, and additional troops.  President Roosevelt's release of twenty merchant ships from the Atlantic Theater to the Pacific Theater made this possible. The Marines were in seventh heaven.

    The additional troops and supplies gave Vandergrift the potential of ridding the field of the constant annoyance of "pistol pete" who was lobbing shells onto the field at the most inopportune times.  Also Vandergrift wanted to exploit the October defensive victory, so he set the 5th Marines forward to lead in the attack.  The plentiful fire support included the skilled 11th Marines, Army artillery, the Cactus Air Force, and naval gunfire.

    The Japanese Army faced the Marine attack with only two threadbare regiments.  General Oka described his command as wearied and at only half strength.  The 5th Marines were attempting to drive the Japanese back to the coastal corridor at Point Cruz.  Sensing a possible disaster in the making, General Sumiyoshi ordered heavy reinforcements to Point Cruz.  The American 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, after an overture by nine artillery batteries and a bombing which included nineteen B-17s, battered their way to the first objective line to a ridge south of Point Cruz.  But, the attack was proving more difficult and savage than expected.  The Marines ran into heavy machine gun fire and artillery barrages causing heavy losses in both troops and officers.  The Marine offensive ground to a halt and then was driven back by a Japanese counterattack.

    Considering the heavy use of artillery and bombing by planes from the field as well as the B-17s, the 1st Marine Headquarters was disgruntled with the progress of the attack.  For the Japanese, they were more than disgruntled.  Major Tamura wrote in his diary that night that his battalion had "vanished."  The 7th Company, after a strong defense and several counterattacks, was down to slightly more than ten men, and the 5th Company counted only fifteen.  The Regimental Gun Company was wiped out, and its remaining field piece, destroyed.  Recognizing the mortal peril that a breakthrough posed, the 17th Army brought up the 2nd Anti-Tank Gun Battalion with a dozen guns and even drafted the 39th Field Road Construction Unit.

    As the Marines slowly moved forward again, they gradually compressed the remaining Japanese troops of the 2nd Division into a smaller area, late in the day, Captain Erskine Wells of Company I led the only authenticated American bayonet charge of the campaign.  The Marines sliced through the northern portion of the enemy position.  While the 5th Marines dealt with this pocket, the 2nd Marines continued to advance to a line well west of Point Cruz.

    But darkness brought heavy reinforcements by a major run of the Tokyo Express.  Sixteen destroyers and a light cruiser brought fresh troops and supplies.  At Koli Point, 300 soldiers with guns, provisions and ammunition were landed.  240 more soldiers with food, fuel and ammunition were landed nearby.  Among those setting foot on Guadalcanal for the first time was General Takushiro Hattori, chief of the Operations Division of the Army Section of Imperial General Headquarters.  He heard the accounts of battalions crushed by one or two hours of shelling, observed the pathetic appearance of the simple soldiers as well as their officers, and witnessed himself displays of American air mastery.  In a message to Tokyo, he reported:  "..the actual situation is beyond imagination."  He reported further: "..above all on the need to take every measure to redress the balance of airpower."  His grim conclusion was that no contribution from the 2nd Division should be counted upon in the upcoming offensive.

    But, the Japanese were in for a bit of luck.  A document captured by the 5th Marines revealed the plans of a landing of the Japanese 38th Division at Koli Point.  The plans had been canceled but Vandergrift had no way of knowing this and chose to redeploy his troops rather than to advance on the Japanese 2nd Division.  The offensive was abandoned and the 2nd Division lived on.

    On November 8th, Admiral Halsey came ashore to assess the situation himself.  This was something that his predecessor Admiral Ghormley never experienced.  Vandergrift said of Halsey: "..he was like a wonderful breath of fresh air, full of interest and enthusiasm."  The admiral talked to a great many marines of all ranks, but more important, he saw "their gaunt, malaria-ridden bodies -- their faces lined from what seemed like a nightmare of years."  He got the real "feel" of the place as he dove into a foxhole that night when his sleep was interrupted by the shelling of the airfield by the routine run of the Tokyo Express.

    When Halsey returned to his headquarters at Noumea, New Caldonia on November 9th, his staff informed him that the Intelligence Group at Hawaii had broken the Japanese code enabling them to present Halsey with complete plans of the upcoming Japanese offensive. What to do about it would by up to him.  The attack was to commence the following day, November 10th.  In Washington, there was an atmosphere of tense expectation that would not be matched until the eve of the Normandy Invasion.   In Washington and Tokyo, it was sensed that the turning point of the campaign was at hand.

    On schedule, November 10th (Z-Day minus 3), Australian coast watchers reported the masts of sixty-one ships (the 8th Fleet under Admiral Mikawa) assembled at the Japanese Shortland Island base in the northern Solomons.  On schedule, the Japanese 11th Air Fleet took to the air to try to wrestle control of the air over Henderson Field.  Out of Truk, the Combined Fleet (under Admiral Kondo) added their two cents with 2 carriers, 3 escort carriers, 4 battleships, 5 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers and 21 destroyers.  Battleships Kongo and Haruna, part of the Strike Unit (under Admiral Kondo), would remain behind while the battleships Hiei and Kirishima (under Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe) Battleship Division 11 would move out to shell Henderson Field (Z-Day minus 1).

    November 11th, (Z-Day minus 2), in the harbor at Shortland, Admiral Tanaka surveyed his task group. He was able to gaze upon the ungainly outlines of 11 transports loaded with supplies for 30,000 men for twenty days.  In their holds were 31,500 artillery shells.  On deck were 83 landing craft along with 7,000 khaki-green clad soldiers.  In charge of the Army troops was Major General Suketomo Tanabe. Providing close escort for this group was Destroyer Squadron 2 consisting of 12 ships.

    The troops were to be landed at Tassafaronga and Cape Esperance on the southern coastline of Guadalcanal.  Air cover for this group had been seriously depleted as three carriers had to return to Japan after the Battle of Santa Cruz because of the heavy loss of air crews.  This left only the carrier Junyo for seagoing air-cover.

    For Admiral Halsey, planning for the upcoming battle was going to be difficult but not complex as there were few ships to worry about.  The only aircraft carrier he had under his command was sitting back at Honolulu under going repairs but the ship was operable except for one of the plane elevators.  Halsey decided it was really needed so he ordered it underway even though repairs had not been completed.

    He had two new battleships at New Caledonia (the South Dakota and the Washington) but he hesitated to get them underway without air cover.  Already on the scene at the eve of this massive attack by the Japanese, were two transport groups (one under Rear Admiral Scott and one under Admiral Turner).  The two groups were unloading over 5,500 troop reinforcements (the 4th Marines and the 182 Infantry Regiment).  Turner had 3 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 10 destroyers (Task Group 67.1) as protection for his transport group.  Scott's group (as additional protection) was made up of 2 light cruisers and 3 destroyers.   Japanese observers who had climbed high on Mt. Austin (not far from the field) were watching this feverish activity along the shoreline and quickly radioed this information to Rabaul.

    This prompted the Japanese 11th Air Fleet to launch a strike of 16 torpedo-armed Bettys shepherded  by 30 Zeros.  With an early warning by coast watcher Mason and then by radar, Turner got the transports underway and headed for home.  At Henderson Field, 20 Wildcats and 8 P-39s scrambled.  At a little after 2 in the afternoon, Japanese planes shattered the peace of the harbor.  The planes came in two groups and from different directions in what was to be a coordinated attack.  The first group was in position before the second group had quite reached their jumping off point.  Sensing that a golden opportunity had been presented to him, Turner presented a broadside of his force to the first group assuming it could be an irresistible target.  It was.  Turner had his ships turn hard to port so that the attacking planes had only a narrow stern to fire at.  All torpedoes missed.

    The second attack group arrived after being worked over by the fighter planes of Henderson. Individual ship movements and heavy anti-aircraft fire defeated the slow moving torpedo planes of the second group.  But all the luck was not on the American side as friendly fire killed five men on the destroyer Buchanan and a Japanese plane crashing into the cruiser San Francisco killed twenty-four and wounded forty-five. The entire attack lasted only eight minutes with the boys from Henderson claiming 17 bombers and 6 fighters with the ships claiming 9 more bombers.  The Japanese actually lost 11 bombers and 1 Zero at a cost of 3 Wildcats (whose pilots survived) and one P-39 with pilot.

    Later in the afternoon, Henderson Field welcomed a flight of the much sought after P-38s.  Major Dale Brannon led in the flight of 8.  Also, flying in were 6 F4Fs, 6 TBF's and 10 SBD's.  Backing up the boys at Henderson were two squadrons (the 69th and 70th) of Army Air Force B-26s rigged to carry torpedoes.

    American reconnaissance planes were doing their job well as they spotted and radioed in the locations and speed of Admiral Abe's bombardment group as it headed south at 25 knots.  Also spotted was the locations of the troop transports and the destroyer squadron.  For Turner, it was time to make the decision that would have great affect on the lives of all the Americans in the upcoming battle.  He concluded correctly that the Japanese strength would be at least 2 battleships, possibly 4, 2 to 4 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 10 to 12 destroyers.  He knew that Halsey's ships (Task Force 16) with the 2 battleships and a carrier were too far south to intervene and probably wondered why Halsey did not have that force close enough to help since Halsey had the radio information in ample time.

    With little time to dilly-dally, Admiral Turner made the decision to provide a minimum number of ships as convoy for the troop and supply ships heading south and retain as many ships as possible to meet the oncoming Japanese juggernaut.  He choose Admiral Callaghan over Admiral Scott (Callaghan had 15 days seniority over Scott) to head up the newly formed Task Group 67.4 composed of 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers and 8 destroyers.  Turner (wisely) headed south with his Task Group.

    In a battle that was aptly called a Midnight Collision (also, The Battle of Guadalcanal, Friday the 13th Battle), the remainder of Admiral Halsey's South Pacific Fleet was essentially wiped out.  In a battle that lasted only 38 minutes, 4 U.S. destroyers and 2 cruisers were sent to the bottom with the remaining ships all damaged except for one destroyer, the Fletcher.  The large Japanese force lost only two destroyers with another moderately damaged and one seriously damaged.  The battleship Hiei was seriously damaged but was in no danger of sinking but did have a steering problem that kept her from making a fast exit from the area.  An 8-inch shell, probably from the San Francisco, had damaged her rudder and flooded her steering compartment so the Hiei could only travel in circles.  Not a good situation for a Japanese battleship sitting a few miles from Henderson Field.

    At 3:44 am on the 13th, the Kirishima canceled the shelling that was planned for the field and gave the orders to head away from Henderson to put some distance from the field before daylight when the planes would be stirring.  Yamamoto postponed the landings until the 14th and ordered the troopships to put some distance between them and the field.  The sailors on the Hiei struggled to restore steering with the rudder jammed full right with manual steering shot out and a flooded steering compartment.  All fires had been put out however and the cruiser Nagara and five destroyers were standing by to help.

    With dawn's early light, the remnants of the previous night's battle could be seen in the waters off Guadalcanal.  The hulks of American destroyers Cushing and Monssen were listing heavily under columns of smoke.  Japanese destroyer Yudachi presented a similar scene.  The crippled cruiser Portland circled and a little to the south the shattered cruiser Atlanta drifted.  The Japanese battleship Hiei circled a little to the north accompanied by her attendants.  The destroyer Aaron Ward was being towed by the tug Bobolink into the Tulagi harbor.  The Portland would eventually make it to Tulagi harbor also but the Atlanta would have to be scuttled.  The number of dead American seamen for this night came to at least 1,439.  Swimming in the harbor were more than 1400 American sailors who had lost their mounts but would eventually reach dry land.

    For the Hiei, it never had a chance although it survived the attack of 56 sorties by planes from Henderson and from the carrier Enterprise which finally arrived in the area.  It survived an attack by 14 B-17s that dropped fifty-six  500-pound bombs one of which hit.  The Japanese carrier Junyo sent 23 Zeros and the 11th Air Fleet sent 12 more to defend the Hiei.  With dogfights overhead and bombs landing all around, the Hiei crew had an exciting day.  With all the dogfights, only one Wildcat was lost to the loss of three Zeros however eight Zeros were operational losses due to weather.  But the ship was doomed and when Abe feared his escorting ships could soon be in trouble, he ordered the Kingston valve opened.  He and the Hiei crew transferred to the escort vessels and this battle was over.  Losses to the Hiei crew came to about 300.

    Sometime during the early morning hours of November 13th, both Admiral Halsey and Admiral Yamamoto had to come to the realization that the Japanese attack had been deflected but not stopped.  For Yamamoto, he decided to reset Z-Day to the 14th.  This meant that the planned shelling of Henderson by the cruiser force would commence in the early hours of the 14th.  Halsey ordered Admiral Lee to take his Task Force 64 north to block this shelling but the force was to far south to make it on the 14th.

    The Japanese heavy cruisers Suzuya and Maya supported by a light cruiser and three destroyers moved in off Henderson Field.  At 1:30 am, after float planes dropped flares over the area, the two heavy cruisers began a thirty-one minute bombardment.  Alas, unfortunately for the Japanese, Henderson Field was missed entirely and only one Wildcat and one SBD's were destroyed.  The cruisers fired 989 8-inch shells.  Two PT boats came across the channel from Tulagi to challenge this force but since there was not much they could do, no one took them seriously and they retired uneventfully.

    The Japanese force moved out quickly when they finished the bombardment.  They knew that when daylight arrived, the farther from the field, the better.  By 7:50 am on the 14th, the force rejoined Admiral Mikawa somewhat south of the island of New Georgia.  But the pilots of Henderson did not take too well to having their sleep interrupted and had located the Admiral's force by 8:30 in the morning.  Five SBD dive-bombers and 3 TBF torpedo bombers, with 8 Wildcats above them for cover, bore in for the kill.  Clever maneuvering at high speed kept the Japanese ships from serious damage however.

    During the time the Japanese cruisers had been shelling Henderson Field, the USS Enterprise (with battle damage) poured on the coals and by dawn was 200 miles south of the field.  Heavy rain squalls kept search planes on the deck for over an hour but then two SBDs took off scouting for Mikawa's fleet.  Four other pairs followed scouting different sectors.  The first sighting of Mikawa's ships was at 08:15 am.  The two SBDs after making their discovery, followed this force for nearly an hour and a half forwarding a continuous stream of information about the force and its location.

    Then at 9:30, Lt.(jg) Robert D. Gibson made a dive-bombing attack on the Kinugasa (a large transport).  His bomb smashed into the bridge killing the captain and executive officer and exploded deep in the bowels of the ship opening plates in the hull giving the ship a 10-degree list.  Fires also raged on the bow but these fires were contained and within a half hour the ship was making good headway.

    The second set of search planes now roared in on Mikawa's ships.  Ensign R. A. Hoogerwerf placed a bomb as a near miss on the heavy cruiser Suzuya while his wingman Ensign P. M. Halloran missed the cruiser Maya with his bomb but was hit by anti-aircraft fire causing his wing of his plane to clip the ships mainmast which in turn caused his plane to crash onto the cruiser amidships.  Halloran was killed instantly but when the news of his attack reached the papers back in the States, he became an instant hero.  There was the hint that he had purposely dove into the ship becoming an early American kamikaze but this did not seem likely -- but it did make a good story, especially since it was reported that he had sunk the ship.  Actually, he almost did as his plane crashed into a stack of 4.7 inch shells stored on deck.  This explosion knocked out the cruiser's port secondary guns and searchlights and started a vicious fire.  The crew managed to extinguish the fire but with a loss of thirty-seven crewmembers.

    The information radioed out by Gibson's search team earlier enabled another group of seventeen SBDs from the Enterprise to find another group of Mikawa's force.  The divebombers peeled off in beautiful formation and came roaring in on the Chokai and Isuzu scoring near misses which knocked out two of the boiler rooms on both of the ships.  The Isuzu lost steering for awhile and a fire raged on the Chokai but was soon extinguished.  Other Dauntlesses scored near misses on the Kinugasa which had been hit earlier and more compartments were flooded.  Finally, uncontrollable flooding caused the ship to capsize at a little before noon taking 511 of her compliment down with her.  Destroyers Makikumo and Kazegumo picked up 146 survivors and headed back with the rest of the 8th Fleet to Shortland.

    Sailing merrily along over the horizon and untouched and undetected so far was Admiral Tanaka's twenty-three ship troop convoy which was moving slowly down the slot for a major troop landing.  Admiral Tanaka and fellow officers were in high spirits after receiving the good news that "thought that the bombardment group had succeeded in destroying the American planes the night before."  This news seemed accurate as no ship in the force had seen any American planes -- so far.  As the convoy drew east of New Georgia, radiomen to the north at Combined Fleet Headquarters began picking plain language contact reports from American planes.  This was not good news for the Japanese but so far the Americans had not spotted the troop transport group.  Their luck was about to run out.

    It was almost nine in the morning when Lt. (jg) M. D. Carmody and Lt. (jg) W. E. Johnson from the Enterprise found what they thought was a very impressive collection of shipping.  Each dive-bombed a transport but each missed.  Johnson was not so lucky as defending Zeros shot him down.  The convoy confidently kept moving south.  It was early afternoon and all was still going well until Japanese lookouts spotted silver specks dropping out of a bright blue sky.  This time, eighteen SBD's headed up by Major Sailor and Major Robert Richard along with seven torpedo bombers under Lt. Coffin dropped out of the sky to put 12 bombs into the transports with the torpedo planes putting two "fish" into one ship and one "fish" into another.

    The two torpedoes that hit the Nagara Maru doomed the ship and bombs severely damaged the Sado Maru and finished the Canberra Maru.  Japanese destroyers had their work cut out for them as they pulled passengers and crews from the two doomed ships and then escorted the damaged Sado Maru out of the area.  Transferring off the Sado Maru was General Tanabe who decided it was time to forsake his comfortable quarters to join the lean fare of the destroyer crew.

    The battle was heating up as another major strike headed up by Lt. Commander Lee began in his second sortie of the day. He was joined another SBD from the Enterprise and seven marines of VMSB-141.  Lt. Richey of VS-10 and three additional Marine SBD's from VMSB-141.  This group found the convoy in mid-afternoon and soon the Brisbane Maru was an inferno that burned until the ship sank.  At this time the first of two flights of B-17s from Colonel Saunder's 11th Bomb Group droned into sight.  The first group dropped a lot of bombs but with no hits.  The second group of 8 fortresses arrived 15 minutes later and had to push aside some 15 Zeros (claiming 6) to make their run.  For General Tanaka, the site of all those bombs "wobbling down from high-flying B-17s" was an image that he would never forget.

    By late afternoon, the battle was turning nasty.  The Enterprise initiated another major attack with 12 Wildcats taking off the flight deck followed by the last 8 SBD's each armed with a 1,000 pound bomb and instructions to put one into every undamaged ship.  At 3:30 that afternoon, Lt. Commander James Flatley, the strike group leader, assigned targets.  These skilled pilots crippled the Shinano Maru and the Arizona Maru which were then abandoned.  Destroyers remained busy pulling survivors from the ship's hulks and from the sea.  With the Enterprise left with only 18 Wildcats to protect it, Admiral Kinkaid wisely decided to move this last remaining American carrier south and out of the area.  The carriers planes still in the lower Solomon's area would have a new home at Henderson Field.

    As the carrier Enterprise moved to the south and out of immediate danger, Henderson Field became the center of all American aerial activity.  Pilots returning from the battle over the Japanese combat and troopships taxied with abandon to the dispersal area with squealing brakes and in clouds of dust.  Sweating ground crews hosted bombs into place while other crews replenished gasoline and oil.  Staff officers huddled with pilots and air crews from all three services to absorb the latest information as to the convoys whereabouts and condition.  Bomber pilots found their wingman for the next flight was frequently from a different squadron and, often as not, a different service.

    In late afternoon, the last three strikes of the day by the Cactus Air Force roared off the field.  First was Major Sailor with 5 dive-bombers with 3 of Lt. Coffin's torpedo planes packing bombs.  Right behind this group was a mixed group of 4 Navy and Marine dive-bombers, followed by 7 more of the Enterprise dive-bombers from VB-10.  Seven Wildcats from VMF-121 provided cover one of which was flown by Lt. Colonel Harold Bauer, the fighter commander of the Cactus Air Force.  In short order, they found the Nako Maru and watched it take the plunge.

    But Zero fighters from the 11th Air Fleet made one of their rare appearances of the day and found the flight of 7 dive-bombers headed by Lt. Commander John Thomas without cover and quickly carved it up.  Three of the planes were shot down and forcing two others to turn back due to damage.  But Thomas and another pilot pressed on to make attacks.  Zeros and Wildcats fought a savage low-level battle just above the sprawled survivors of the convoy.  Lt. Colonel Bauer destroyed one Zero but then was shot down himself.  Captain Joe Foss swept down and saw this inspiring leader alive in the water but before any rescue could be made Bauer had disappeared.  One of the other pilots, Ensign Jefferson Carroum from the Enterprise was picked up after a 73 hour swim.

    American plane losses for the day were 5 dive-bombers from the Enterprise and two Marine Wildcats.  Of the 45 Zeros that were sent to defend the convoys, 9 were lost in combat and 4 failed to return to their base.  Darkness finally ended the day of torment for the convoys.  For seven hours, Tanaka's destroyers had fought without let-up to fend off attacks on the troop transports.  They maneuvered at high speeds blackening the sky with antiaircraft fire and pouring out smoke screens around the ships.  But transport after transport was hit and fires raced across decks loaded with ammunition.  From his flagship, Tanaka directed destroyers to pick up troops from the sagging ships and from the calm waters.

     Of the 23 ships that Tanaka started with two days before, by sundown of the 14th, only nine were still near his flagship.  Six of the transports were either sunk or abandoned, and the Sado Maru was returning to base escorted by two destroyers carrying 1,562 survivors.  Four other destroyers returned to pick up the remaining 3,200 survivors.  For all of the devastation dished out to the troopships, only 450 men were lost, a figure that American airmen would find hard to believe.

    When Tanaka learned of the American task force that was reported as moving north, it seemed to him that "Prospects looked poor for the operation" and Tanaka was in a quandary.  Was it better "to await a more favorable opportunity." His problem was solved when in the early evening hours he was ordered by the Combined Fleet to steer toward Guadalcanal.  Yamamoto was not ready to give up the fight.

    Earlier in the day, Japanese search plans had spotted a new group of American ships moving toward Guadalcanal but these ships were incorrectly identified as 4 destroyers and 2 cruisers rather than the 2 new battleships, the South Dakota and the Washington.  Tanaka was maneuvering to place his remaining troopships behind the protection of Admiral Kondo's force which was also moving into the Guadalcanal area.  Kondo had to come up quickly with the plans for the evening.  He had under his command 3 fast battleships but decided that only one would be needed.  The bombardment group that would shell Henderson would be made up of the battleship Kirishima, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 6 destroyers.  A sweep unit of 1 light cruiser and 3 destroyers would be out ahead as an advance group.  Kondo affirmed orders to Tanaka that a path would be cleared for him to follow and he should move the convoy smartly into anchorage at the proper time.

    Admiral Lee's group was also moving smartly toward Guadalcanal and he had information from the submarine Flying Fish detailing what he could expect to encounter.  The Flying Fish had observed the Japanese task force and then had provided "thrills" for the crew of the heavy cruiser Atago forcing it to maneuver sharply to avoid a spread of fish sent their way.  Another thrill was provided by the American submarine when it fired a torpedo went under the keel of Rear Admiral Takama's flagship Asagumo.  And the day was far from over.

    As Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee worked north during the day of November 14th, his problems were spelled out for him. The reports indicated that he might be facing as many as 3 battleships, 8 to 10 cruisers, 12 or more destroyers and 9 transports.  To meet this force, Lee's force would consist of 2 battleships (the USS South Dakota and the USS Washington) that had never operated together before and 4 destroyers from four different divisions and picked because they happen to have the most fuel on board and were ready to go.  The 4 destroyers, the USS Walke, USS Benham, USS Preston  and USS Gwin, were doomed and only the Gwin would survive although it would be badly damaged.

    On the bright side, Lee had available the latest SG radar and a he knew how to use it.  His two battlewagons could shrug off hits from any of the ships that Kondo had and Lee's wagons had 16-inch guns that would pulverize anything they hit.  But his battlewagons were not immune to the torpedoes that would surely be coming his way.  The Japanese forces had 90 of these deadly things ready to go and even had reloads.

The Battle is On

    In the dark of early evening, American sailors watched the dull glow of fires on the western horizon coming from the burning hulks of Tanaka's transports as Lee took his ships past Cape Esperance to a point 21 miles northwest of Savo Island.  This was the beginning of the last great battle in World War II in which the Japanese were the favorites to win.  It was a little after nine p.m. when Lee swung his ships to the east.  After traveling in this direction for about a half hour, he turned the group south traveling at 17 knots.  Low cirrus clouds moved across Iron Bottom Sound with an occasional heavy scent of flowers and vegetation.  The battleship men topside were a little nervous to see land and in every direction not all that far away.

    Some idea as to the type of planning that had gone into this operation could be gained when Lee requested information from Cactus base for any information or late intelligence.  A stiff reply came back, "We do not recognize you."  Since Lee and Vandergrift were well acquainted in earlier days, an exchange of small talk provided means for identification.  This was good news for a group of PT boats that were slithering along the waters northeast of Savo and were following Lee's activities.  Lee was warned to expect the Japanese to arrive off Savo between 0030 and 0230.

    About the time that Lee was talking to Cactus, Admiral Kondo was in the process of splitting his 14 ships into three separate groups with Admiral Hashimoto on the cruiser Sendai accompanied by 3 destroyers to carry out sweep duties.  This group separated quickly from Kondo's bombardment force.  Admiral Kimura was to operate as an independent group with the cruiser Nagara and 4 destroyers.  His group also quickly departed.  Almost immediately the sweep group's incredibly keen-eyed lookouts were startled to see hostile ships to the south.  Very soon after, the independent group as well as a search float plane spotted Lee.  But, all but one of the spotters identified Lee's ships as 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers.  This was a big break for Lee.

    With this misinformation, Kondo believed he would be able to go forward with his primary mission which was to bombard the airfield.  He instructed Hashimoto and Kimura to "follow the enemy around the east side of Savo and engage and sink them."  Later, he redirected Kimura to round the west side of Savo.  But the radars of both the Washington and South Dakota picked up Hashimoto's three ships at the range of about 9 miles.  The American destroyers that were equipped with search radars were unable to detect or see the Japanese forces.  Lee instructed all captains to "open fire when you are ready."  One minute later the Washington discharged a salvo from the main battery at Hashimoto with the five inch guns firing star shells to illuminate his ships.  The range was 18,500 yards.  One minute later the South Dakota opened up with her 16-inch guns.

    Spotters on both battleships reported hits and radar operators believed some vanishing "blips" told of sinking ships.  But, alas for the Americans, all shells missed.  Radiomen on the South Dakota heard excited Japanese voices chattering back and forth on thirteen different channels.  Huge columns of water shot into the sky around the Japanese ships which should have been a tip off as to the size of the shells coming their way but this clue was missed by Kondo.  Hashimoto calmly maneuvered for a better position for his attack while he had his destroyers lay down smoke screen.

    The 4 American destroyers were almost two miles ahead of the battleships but were having trouble spotting the Japanese ships located dead ahead.  The backdrop of Savo Island obscured the Japanese ships.  The only radar was on the lead destroyer the USS Walke and it was only for fire directing but it finally detected the oncoming destroyer Ayanami boldly advancing straight into the American destroyers.  The Walke opened up with its 5-inch guns and was joined in the shooting by the USS Benham located directly behind the Walke.  The third American destroyer in line was the USS Preston whose lookouts spotted the other group of ships rounding the southwest tip of Savo and quickly opened fire and was joined in the shooting by the last destroyer in line, the USS Gwin.

    The ships that the Preston had spotted were Admiral Kimura's group made up of the cruiser Nagara and 5 destroyers.  The Nagara opened fire with its 5.5-inch guns immediately and was joined by the 5-inch guns of the destroyer Ayanami which also sent a spread of torpedoes to greet the Americans.  The excellent flashless powder of the Japanese and the backdrop of Savo gave the Japanese a great advantage.

    The first casualty in the battle was the Preston which was probably battered by the Nagara.  The first shell struck between the fire-rooms killing all hands in both and throwing firebrick and debris over the amidships section.  The ship's second stack toppled over into the searchlight platform, collapsing it onto the torpedo tubes, ripping open torpedo warheads and igniting their contents.  More shells hit in the engine rooms and the after gun mounts turning that area into a mass of blazing red-hot  wreckage.  The shells killed everyone in the there including the executive officer.  The gunnery officer tried to continue the fight with the forward guns but the ship was already settling by the stern and twisting to starboard.  The captain, Commander Stormes, gave the order to abandon ship and within a half a minute the ship rolled over and to the bottom taking Stormes and 117 men (45 percent of the crew) with her.

    Directly behind the ship, the crew of the Gwin was witnessing this devastation just before two shells hit the after engine room.  Torrents of superheated steam drove everyone from the area as the Gwin's torpedoes were knocked out of their tubes by the explosion and left dangling with three of them sliding harmlessly into the sea.  Another shell bounced into the depth charges splitting them open.  The Walke also was being hammered by heavy shellfire when a Long Lance torpedo hit just forward of the bridge and detonated the number two magazine.  The blast lifted the whole ship out of the water snapping off the bow and knocking out all power and communications and pouring several inches of oil over the main deck.  Flames raced up and down what was left of the deck.  With ammunition exploding and the ship rapidly sinking, the captain, Commander Fraser, gave the order to abandon ship.  Four life rafts got off, but as the ship sank, depth charges exploded killing more men and bringing the death total to eighty including Fraser.

    Directly behind the Walke was the Benham and it too was hit by a Long Lance torpedo but at the very tip of the bow.  The explosion killed no one but sent a shock wave down the main deck that seriously injured seven men and washed one overboard.  The Benham circled to avoid torpedoes and resumed course at 10 knots.  While Kimura moved off with little, if any, damage, the Ayanami was not so lucky.  While she was firing, the Washington was able to spot her and sent a salvo her way which left her dead in the water and in flames.

    While this heavy exchange of gunfire was in progress, the South Dakota sat nearby contributing nothing to the battle nor doing anything to help the destroyers which were being pounded to pieces.  While the Dakota's fire control people were busy picking targets from the great array of Japanese ships nearby and, at the same time, making sure that no friendly ships were being selected, suddenly all power was lost.  Someone at the engine room control switchboard made as serious an error as it is humanly possible to make and killed all power.  The psychological effect on officers and crew was devastating.  For six long minutes the crew sat dumbfounded before power was restored.  The crew returned to action quickly however and sailors on deck soon heard cries from Preston survivors who were waving flashlights and calling for life jackets as the battlewagon swept on by.

    The South Dakota now, unfortunately, made a course change that placed her large silhouette in front of the flaming American destroyers thus presenting the Japanese with a wonderful target.  With the restoration of power though the ship was able to lash out with her 16-inch guns.  Her first salvo, dead astern, caused her three planes on the quarterdeck to burst into flames.  If there were any Japanese ships that had not already spotted the ship, they were given another chance.  The next salvo fired however, extinguished the flames on one plane and blew the other two planes over the side.  Her three planes were now a total loss and there were no indications that her shells had hit anything.  However it was now noted that the Japanese destroyers were laying down a smoke screen.

    With the remaining American destroyers now in the way and of no further help, Lee ordered them, as best they could, to head south out of the battle.  Aboard the cruiser Atago with the bombardment group, Admiral Kondo waited patiently for his attack group and screening group to dispose of the Americans as he was anxious to start the shore bombardment.  Kondo moved his force in a more westerly direction to insure convoy was adequately protected.  He then he decided to give Admirals Kimura and Hashimoto a little more time to dispose of the Americans.  Aboard Kondo's flagship, lookouts were now able to make out the silhouettes of the three enemy destroyers and the one "cruiser."

    Lookouts on the Atago also reported ship sightings off the starboard bow which alarmed Kondo.  Maybe there was something to the confusing search plane report that another enemy unit might be present.  But, soon the dark outlines were made out to be the convoy unit moving in for landing.  Kondo now ordered the bombardment group to move into position as the landing group was pushing the time schedule.  Now, alarmingly, lookouts on the Atago added comments that they saw what "looked like a battleship,"  but Kondo was convinced from a dispatch that arrived from the destroyer Ayanami that the battle had evolved so auspiciously that it was time to shell Henderson Field.  Seven minutes later the cruiser Nagara signaled that two enemy battleships were moving north of Cape Esperance.

    But Kondo was still not convinced.  There was always the tendency for lookouts to exaggerate sightings a bit.  While Kondo mauled this over, the Washington's efficient SG radar picked up the Bombardment Unit and began tracking it.  The South Dakota now unintentionally steamed into a position that blocked Washington's view line thus adding more confusion.  This happened just as the South Dakota's radar went dead for a second time.  When the radar finally snapped back on,  it immediately showed what looked like the entire Japanese Navy just three miles ahead.

    And directly ahead was Kondo whose lookouts now shouted quite loudly that what had looked like a cruiser now had morphed into a battleship.  At 0000, November 15th, the Japanese cruiser Atago snapped on its search lights, adjusted the beams to reveal a huge American battleship.  For Admiral Kondo who had been insisting that only a cruiser or two lay ahead, it was a moment of truth.  What the Admiral may have blurted out at that moment was not recorded and maybe it was just as well.

    More shafts of lights were focusing on the South Dakota and down these bright shafts Japanese poured salvo after salvo.  Everything but the kitchen sink perhaps, as 3.9 to 14 inch shells came to test the ship's armor.  If these shells were not enough, "schools" of fish were churning the waters.  In a span of four minutes, 27 shells hit the ship with many of the torpedoes coming close but with no hits.  Quite a number of shells perforated her unarmored upper works crashing into cables, guns and superstructure.   One of America's finest new battleships was now deaf, dumb and blind as all radios and all but one radar were knocked out.  One shell demolished radar plot, felling many fire control-men and disabling gun directors.  The main battery got off only four to five salvos but her four starboard twin 5-inch mounts were roaring back "very fiercely."

    Kondo and his forces were so preoccupied pouring shells into the South Dakota that they were completely unaware of the Washington which now had perfect visual sightings on all the ships that were using searchlights and, in addition, had perfect radar sightings.  Completely undetected as yet, the Washington swung all nine barrels of her main battery and her starboard pair of 5-inch twins on the battleship Kirishima at a range of only 8,400 yards.  Another pair of 5-inch twins was swung to the Atago while the remaining 5-inchers were loaded with star shells.

    The Japanese watched as the South Dakota started to glow a dull red after enduring so many hits.  The silence of her main batteries convinced Kondo that the South Dakota was finished so he ordered a cease fire.  On the South Dakota there were 23 major fires gnawing toward each other and the superstructure.  Firefighters were struggling through smashed and twisted ladders and superstructure.  The deck was littered with 39 dead or dying and 59 wounded many of whose life jackets were on fire. For the Americans though, it was time for a little revenge.

    The order "commence fire" was finally given on the Washington and its huge guns lashed out.  Immediately the Kirishima was "buried in water columns" and battered by crushing blows from nine 16-inch shells and 40 or more 5-inch shells.  These hits disabled two main battery turrets, ignited internal fires, drilled holes below the water line and jammed the rudder.  Water gushed in the starboard side pulling it down and caused the ship to start circling as dense smoke poured out from the holes.  But Admiral Kondo on board his flagship, the Atago, was some distant from the Kirishima and unaware of the ship's mortal wounds.

    Aboard the cruisers of the Attack Force, there was little damage on the Atago and none on the Takao but the great number of American shells coming in were causing huge fountains in the water.  The bright searchlights of the Japanese ship's were being reflected by these columns of water which were creating some dazzling displays of light.  The cruisers decided to extinguish their searchlights.

    For all the damage that was dished out to the South Dakota by shellfire, the dozens of torpedoes from cruisers as well as destroyers all missed.  Some torpedoes exploded prematurely and there was speculation that the American battleships had some fiendish new "torpedo defense" gear.  Luckily too was the fact that the Japanese ships again were caught with ammunition hosts full of bombardment shells when armor piercing shells were needed.  And there was no damage or impairment in the South Dakota's engine rooms so when her captain decided it was time to head for a safer climate, the ship was able to move south at a fast clip.

    As the South Dakota headed south, Kondo began to wheel his ships to starboard to come up with a better firing angle to launch another round of torpedoes.  It was then his lookouts spotted a second battleship beyond the first which obviously was the Washington.  The cruisers Atago and Takao each fired 8 torpedoes at the Washington at a range of 4000 yards.  All missed as the Washington quickly changed course to continue the action.  "This move by Washington appeared to set the whole enemy field in motion to the north and northeast."  Washington lookouts noted flashes off the starboard quarter as Kondo's pursuing cruisers fired their main batteries briefly as the Atago dispensed three more torpedoes.  All missed.

    For awhile, Kondo believed Lee's course changes were made to continue the battle so he believed more maneuvering on his part was in order.  Kimura's group commenced to close in on the Washington with two of the destroyers putting down a smoke screen.  Captain Davis put the Washington into a sharp starboard swing to avoid the risk of a sudden close-range torpedo attack amid the drifting smoke.  Lee ordered the Washington to continue the turn and retire to the south figuring it was already to late for any shore bombardment this night.  As the fast galloping American Flagship headed south, the destroyer Oyashio fired a spread of torpedoes and six minutes later the Samidare uncorked another salvo of Long Lancers.  Despite the poor firing positions of both destroyers, the Washington reported that four or five torpedoes came "uncomfortably close."

    So ended the second Battle of Guadalcanal for the Americans.  The two American battleships were fast and quickly left the Japanese behind.  For the Japanese, the night was not yet over.  With Lee now vacating the field, Kondo saw the "coast was clear" for the convoy to move in to land their troops while lingering any longer on his part could run the risk of having to deal with land and carrier based aircraft in the morning.  Kondo also believed that the preservation of his warships was his most important task.  All ships were ordered to retire to the north.  When Kondo's explicit order for the Kirishima to retire produced no response he sent three destroyers to find her.

    At 0143 some five miles west of Savo the destroyers came upon the battleship with tremendous fires that could not be controlled and that were creeping toward the magazines.  Captain Iwabuchi ordered the magazines flooded but orders to evacuate the engineering spaces came too late resulting in drowning the crew members in those quarters.  Sea water was pouring into the ship's steering compartment and the rudder was jammed.

    When counter flooding failed to check the increasing heel to starboard, the crew was ordered to gather on the bow for the rituals held preceding the abandonment of ship.  With three banzais, the ensign was lowered, the Emperor's portrait was transferred and, with the ship at such an angle that it was no longer possible for anyone to stand erect, the ship was abandon.  It took another hour for the rescue ships to finish picking up the crew and then to finally head north and away from Henderson Field.

    Five miles south of Savo Island during the same time period, the destroyer Ayanami blew up after two major explosions.  The destroyer Uranami had taken off most of the crew while another thirty, including the skipper, took one of the ship's whaleboats and made it to the Japanese shoreline on Guadalcanal.  About 40 of the crew were either killed or missing.  The two battered American destroyers were also having problems as they steamed south.

    The Benham started creaking and groaning as the ship started breaking up as a result of its earlier torpedo hit.  The Gwin rescued the crew but when she tried to scuttle the Benham with torpedoes she ran into problems.  Her first torpedo exploded prematurely, she then fired another which missed and a third ran erratically.  It was necessary to resort to shellfire and when a 5inch shell hit the ships magazines, the Benham exploded and sank.

    When Kondo reached Truk (after leaving the convoy at Guadalcanal), he reported that his forces had sunk 2 battleships, 4 cruisers and 2 destroyers.  Actually, he could have taken credit for 3 destroyers sunk but since there were no cruisers in the battle and both battleships survived, his claims seemed a bit  bloated.  Casualties were about even with 242 American dead with 142 wounded.  Japanese dead numbered at least 249 and the number of wounded would have probably been close to that figure given the amount of punishment that the Kirishima had absorbed.

    With the naval battle concluded, the last phase of the operation was ready to unfold -- the troop landings.  Just before Kondo had taken his ships north, he directed Admiral Tanaka to immediately take his supply ships and beach them.  Some delay was caused by rain squalls but by 0400 all four ships were beached and were landing their troops and supplies.  With that completed, Admiral Tanaka assembled his squadron and headed north to distance his ships as far from Henderson Field as possible.

    Survivors from the destroyers Walke and Preston floating and swimming in the waters nearby were watching these maneuvers and the beaching of the ships caused special interest.  The sight of four explosions marking the end of the Kirishima boosted their spirits.  With daylight, the attacks on the transports kept their spirits high.

    For those unfortunate sailors who were unable to make it through the night to await rescue with daylight, it might be proper to devote a moment to their plight.  Accounts from Japanese sources indicate that their sailors faced death in much the same manner as the Americans and there were plenty of Japanese sailors in the water also.   First, there was the disbelief that this could happen to you, but if you happened to have been wearing your life jacket as you were told to do, rescue seemed assured.  Although the very young sailors initially faced the situation with sometimes even lightheartedness, that attitude could change quickly as they grasped their predicament.

    If they couldn't swim or were hurt or burned, the really young could be crying for their mothers which really pulled on the heartstrings of the older sailors.  Older sailors had less trouble in accepting the fact that "this was the way it was."  Undoubtedly, one of the worst thoughts to bare was that most sailors hated the thought of dying so far from home.  Somehow if your body could be returned to where your family and friends were and near where you used to hang out as a teenager, that would help.  But, even this wish was not to be.

    With daylight, the planes from Henderson Field took to the air and plummeted the transports sitting on the beach.  Although most troops were already ashore, most supplies had not been unloaded or, if unloaded, were still sitting on the beach.  Major Joseph Sailor and seven pilots that followed him claimed three hits.  The visiting pilots from the Enterprise joined in the fray.  The Japanese dispatched six float planes to protect the transports but against so many American planes they were ineffective.  American shore batteries were repeatedly hitting the transports also.  Finally the destroyer Meade arrived on the scene after escorting a supply ship to Tulagi Harbor.  After a thorough shelling of the transports (for 42 minutes), the Meade moved away from the shoreline and commenced picking up survivors from the Walke and Preston.

    With this last action, it could be said that the battle for battle for Guadalcanal, or really, the battle for Henderson Field was over, though for most everyone there, they really didn't know it.  The Japanese didn't know it as they still had enormous naval power available with the largest battleships in the world sitting at the naval base at Truk anxious to get into the action.  These ships were able and eager to do battle with the American Navy but they didn't want tangle with the boys of Henderson.

    The battle had been over only a few hours when both Tokyo and Washington announced their great victories.  Although the claims of enemy ships sunk were exaggerated by both sides, the admission of losses by both sides were unusually accurate.  It was a battle in which both sides could claim a legitimate victory.  For the Japanese, in the two night naval battles, they had eliminated most of the remaining American naval units in the Pacific leaving Halsey with a desperate shortage of ships.  For the Americans, they still had Henderson Field.

    At the conclusion of the battle, the Americans could boast 5,529 men had been brought ashore with many tons of supplies.  The Japanese put only 2000 men ashore with only a four day supply of rice and only 260 boxes of shells.  It was the American airmen who sank the battleship Hiei and the transports.  It was the boys at Henderson Field that forced the Japanese Navy to have to sneak into battle and then to leave before they could take advantage of their victories.

    On the beaches and around the field, there was the feeling that a milestone had been reached.  Henderson now belonged to the Americans and they would never give it up.  There were still many areas around the field where the Japanese were in abundance but it was felt that this situation would soon be changed.  The Navy High Command believed it was about time to relieve the Marine amphibian troops and replace them with Army troops.  On November 16th, Brigadier General Raymond Williamson was brought in and given the job of replacement and reinforcement of American ground forces and the final destruction of Japanese forces on the island.  He would work with Vandergrift during a transition period before taking over.  Not an easy assignment.

   For the Japanese, the Imperial Headquarters recognized that while their navy was doing a bang-up job in eliminating the American Navy, the Imperial Army and the Air Group could stand some help.  Also, it was being recognized that the Southeast Area was developing into a decisive battle and that a modest increase in effort would purchase the victory that was only narrowly missed in October.  Accordingly, orders were issued to bring in additional forces from the 8th Army in China to include the 65th Brigade and to bring in the 6th Air Division of the Japanese Army Air Force with 110 aircraft.  Heretofore only naval aircraft had been used.  Bringing in Army aircraft was a major change in policy.

    Additionally, the Japanese would expand airfield facilities, regain air superiority, reinforce the 17th Army and launch an attack to seize the airfield on about January 20, 1943.  The Imperial Navy would move in 135 more aircraft and divert a large amount of shipping to the Southwest Area.  General Hyakutake who had control of operations for both Guadalcanal and New Guinea would be relieved of his New Guinea responsibilities so that he would be able to concentrate solely on Guadalcanal.  Operations in New Guinea would be curtailed to securing "important areas" in preparation for future operations.

    However, General MacArthur was not cooperating as he launched a new attack at Buna in New Guinea which severely jolted Combined Fleet Headquarters.  If Buna could be taken, Allied planes would be only 340 miles from Rabaul, the hub of Japanese operations in the South Pacific and the key to Truk.  This planted the first seeds of doubt in the wisdom of trying to retake Henderson Field.

     The Japanese Army instituted a major command change at Rabaul by assigning General Imamura to this top position and he formally assumed command on November 26th.   As he was making himself comfortable in his new quarters he was delivered a hand carried message disclosing the status of the 17th Army.  It was a stinging critique of support of the Imperial Navy and air operations and stressed that stocks of meat and vegetables stood nearly exhausted, and even rice and barley would be entirely consumed by that very day, November 26th.  The General's first day on the job was going to be anything but pleasant.

    As his staff introduced themselves and mingled with the "old hands," one of the latter presented a paper outlining the current situation which suggested the wisdom of withdrawal from Guadalcanal.  Imamura refused to accept the report formally, and the fresh new officers chided the "old hands" as defeatist.  This chiding was taken in good humor but with the confidence that Imamura and his entourage would soon grasp reality.

    While the Japanese Navy could boost of their prowess in combat, their ability when functioning in other naval rolls could be open to question.  To show that they could supply the troops on the island, the navy instituted a new procedure for carrying much needed medical supplies and foodstuffs.  Submarines were pulled from combat patrols and given the mission of being supply vehicles.  By mid - November, sixteen subs were loaded with 20 to 30 tons each for the trip south.  Each sub represented about one day's worth of food for the 17th Army.  Submariners hated this duty and considered it as having been reduced to the roll of a delivery service.

    Since success was limited another try was made using midget submarines that were transported  into the area by larger submarines and released near Guadalcanal to attack the American supply line.  Again, some success but not worth the cost.  A switch was made to using destroyers again but there was a great fear in the Imperial Navy that when the time came for the great decisive naval battle, destroyers would be lacking.  Another great concept was tried called "Chain Transportation."  It seemed like a great idea wherein smaller ships carried supplies each night from one island to the next link of the chain.  The small ships hid during the day and started out again after dark.  This plan also failed to bear fruit.

    The next plan placed in operation was probably the most "brilliant." It was called "Rat Transportation" and perhaps came the closest to being practical.  Sailors cleaned heavy drums (normally used for oil and gasoline) and half - filled them with 330 pounds of rice and barley.  They loaded about 220 of them (joined in clusters by ropes) onto the decks of destroyers to be dropped off close to the Japanese controlled shoreline.  This plan could have worked quite well except for some spoil-sports flying "klunkers" from Henderson who would shoot them full of holes until they sank.

    For the American Navy in the Pacific, it was a troublesome time.  While announcing a great victory in the mid - November battles, Halsey was left with practically no ships, and a navy without ships is like, - Pearl Harbor.  So back in Washington, Admiral King marched to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Admiral Leahy's words, "with his sword in his hand."  He needed some ships.

    He won immediate authorization to transfer two cruisers, three escort carriers, and five destroyers from the Atlantic to the Pacific.  Luckily, someone had thought to build the Panama canal sometime earlier.  Also, a refurbished Saratoga and the North Carolina, with torpedo damage repaired, were now ready for action and a new battlewagon, the USS Indiana would be heading out.  Their job would be to stop the troop landings at Guadalcanal.

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