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Citation:
Kenneth R. Conklin, "Fallibilism: A Terrible Mistake," THE EDUCATIONAL FORUM, XXXVI, 1 (November, 1971), pp. 35-42.
Reprinted from
The Educational Forum, November, 1971
Fallibilism: A Terrible Mistake
Kenneth R. Conklin
Introduction
Fallibilism is a firm commitment to
the notion that we should not make
firm commitments. Obviously, fallibilism
is self-contradictory and therefore it
is a mistake. But the case is much more
complex and interesting than that. Fallibilism
is not just an ordinary mistake, it
is a terrible mistake. There are a growing
number of fallibilists. Innocent,
well-meaning people often adopt this
philosophy unknowingly, while a growing
number of scholars deliberately
adopt this philosophy without, perhaps,
realizing its long-range consequences.
The influence of fallibilism is being felt
in our social institutions, including the
schools, and even The Educational Forum.
In the January, 1971 issue of Eoucational Forum
(Vol. 35, No. 2), Henry Perkinson, in an article entitled
"Fallibilism: An Alternative for Now,"
explicitly outlined and endorsed fallibilism.
It is that article which provides a
focus for my attack. However, at least
two other articles in the same issue also "deserve" mention here. Martin A. Bertram's "Education and Absurdism" suggests
that absurdist literature, based on
the claim that life is absurd because
there is no meaningful truth, can be
helpful in provoking us to discover the
limits of rationality and to laugh at ourselves
when we fail to achieve rationality.
If I am correct in trying to show
that fallibilism turns out to be the same
as absurdism, then, much to my chagrin,
I shall have corroborated Bertram's thesis,
since a piece of absurdist literature
(i.e., Perkinson's article on "fallibilism")
will have indeed provoked me to
explore the limits of rationality.
A third article in the January, 1971
Forum, by Joseph Agassi, is entitled, "Qualifying Exams, Do They
Qualify?" I mention this article only to
show the disguised infiltration of fallibilism
into the Forum. Professor Agassi
does not discuss fallibilism in his essay,
but he is well known among philosophers
as a member of the Karl Popper
school of fallibilists. Agassi uses his unstated
fallibilist assumptions to claim
(without proof) that the purpose of examinations
is to help teachers avoid
making the mistake of allowing unqualified
students to get through, and that
the doctoral qualifying exam should be
abolished because it has failed in that
task. Agassi's whole article is based on
the fallibilist assumption that to be rational
means, not to ensure success, but to
correct our mistakes and to plan to avoid
---------
This article speaks for itself , and it nust be noted
that CONKLIN has the courage to speak in a vein
that is not now fashionable. If some of what he
says is rather rough theoretical going, the theme
is important enough for us to make the effort to
undersland what is at issue and the point he is
trying to make. Professor CONKLIN is on the
faculty of Emory University.
[end page 35 / start page 36]
the bad consequences of mistakes that
get made. The task of an exam, then, is
not to ensure that a student has learned
something or will learn something by
studying for it, but rather to protect society
and a profession by eliminating
weak or improperly prepared students
who somehow got that far in the program.
Whether I agree with Agassi's
substantive conclusions regarding the
qualifying exam is unimportant here,
since that conclusion might also be
reachable from different premises. My
point is to cite Agassi's article as an example
of the infiltration of unstated fallibilist
assumptions into arguments over
practical matters affecting educational
procedure.
I hope to show that fallibilism is a
mistake: not only a harmless philosophical
mistake, but also a terrible mistake
in view of its long-range social and educational
consequences. Then we shall see
what can be done to remedy this mistake.
Why Fallibilism is a "Terrible" Mistake
Fallibilism begins with the recognition
of the old maxim that "to be human
is to err." But, this doctrine goes on
to say that since we do make mistakes,
we should organize our social institutions
(and perhaps also our private
lives) in such a way that, if belief or action
turns out to have been mistaken,
then the bad consequences we have suffered
will not have been too frequent or
too severe. Instead of hoping for the
best and gambling on a favorable outcome,
the fallibilist pessimistically assumes
the worst and works to minimize
his losses. All action must be based on
the premise that we cannot be sure we
are right, so we should protect ourselves
from the bad consequences of error by
not going too far in the direction we
consider right.
This is indeed an anxious age we live
in. Young people afraid of being rejected
decide to play safe and not commit
themselves to loving someone; citizens
decide not to participate in social action
groups because the problems are too
complex to be understood and because
the citizens fear they might support the
wrong group or policy; spectators remain
on the sidelines and watch mayhem
rather than getting involved or
committed. Teachers (especially at the
college level) decide not to give grades,
or else to give the same grade to everyone.
Impartial testing procedures, which
teachers traditionally used to shift the
responsibility for judging grades, have
been shown to have limited reliability
and validity, and the teachers are afraid
to make intuitive judgments. Whether
they know it or not, these people are all
behaving in conformitv with fallibilist
theory.
The fallibilists warn us of the dire
consequences of totalitarianism. Typically,
when one group forces its will
upon another, the ruling group justifies
its use of force by claiming that it possesses
Truth so its judgments are Right.
Such claims are usually mistaken, and
tyrants typically make such claims cynically
with full awareness of pulling a
hoax. Given the present moral vacuum
and the absence of trust and community,
we are indeed vulnerable to a totalitarian
takeover. But the fallibilist remedy
[end page 36 / start page 37]
is too sweeping and is itself totalitarian.
The fallibilist remedy is either to deny
that there is Truth or to deny that anyone
could possess and implement it. If
such a doctrine is adopted, the practical
result will be a further erosion of trust
and community without hope of restoration.
Hope is predicated on the assumption
that there is an answer and we
might find it, but fallibilism would refuse
to acknowledge Truth even if it
were discovered and proclaimed. The
way to refute a totalitarian is to show
that his conception of Truth or Right is
mistaken, not to deny that there are such
things. If someone really does know the
Truth and is benevolent, then we should
follow him. The proper question is "Does he really know the Truth?" or "Is he really benevolent?"
In the absence of faith, trust, and
community, the fallibilist relies upon
empirical data, methodology, and due
process. Unwilling to trust an intuitive
judgment, he demands evidence or a
method for producing evidence. The result
is that our society has come to define
truth as whatever works, or whatever
science proves to us. For example, in the
area of law, we may know intuitively or
even from scientific evidence that someone
is guilty of a crime, but because we
do not trust ourselves or others to determine
guilt, we set up a method known
as "due process of law." If a truly guilty
person can hire a sufficiently skillful
lawyer to play the game of due process,
the criminal may be judged "not
guilty." Likewise, truly innocent people
may be judged "guilty." If we rely entirely
upon methodology and proof, the
result is that, so far as the social system
is concerned, a person is what he is
judged to be according to the rules of
due process. A person ls what he is
treated as, and how he is treated depends
upon his skill in manipulating the
system (or the skill of those he hires to
help him). An idea which has been
shown to be false by the scientific
method ls false. A student whose record
is poor is a poor student. Someone's I.Q.
is the adjusted score he gets on the I.Q.
test. Motives are actions, concepts are
operations, and the message ls the medium.
C. S. Lewis in The Abolition of Man
shows how this orientation has penetrated
into the school curriculum. Children
are taught that values are nothing
more than superstitious private sentiments,
and that value statements are
nothing more than meaningless mumblings
or propaganda aimed at making
someone else have the same sentiments.
Lewis points out that two choices are
open if this view is correct: either abolish
value commitments, in which case society
will fall apart due to lack of community,
or else those in power may cynically
adopt and propagandize some
value for private motives. Lewis demonstrates
that if science succeeds in giving
us more powerful controls over natural
forces while education teaches people to
debunk values, man will destroy his own
humanity to become an efficient slave of
his crudest and strongest passions. We
are already seeing the beginnings of
such outcomes in our own society as fallibilism
is more pervasively adopted.
Strictly speaking, it is relativism that
is to blame for the present chaos. Relativism
is the befief that there are no
[end page 37 / start page 38]
Truths, so that each person has a legitimate
right to create his own beliefs and
make his own choices. Relativism is one
face of a two-faced Janus whose other
side is called "absurdism": the belief that
life has no inherent meaning and that we
must create our own meanings in the face
of chaos. Pure fallibilism is neutral on
the question whether there is Truth. Perhaps
there are fallibilists who believe
there is Truth, but in any event all fallibilists
emphasize the importance of
doubting, hedging one's bets, and living
in fear of error. The point is that a fallibilist
is committed to the idea that we
should not make commitments. He believes
that Truth is not yet known (or
known to be Truth), and he would refuse
to pledge his total allegiance to any
particular Truth even if it came right up
and punched him in the nose, for fear
that it might be Error instead. Fallibilists
have a kind of paranoia, which they
share with the philosopher Descartes,
who wondered whether we can ever be
sure the Devil isn't fooling us.
The practical result is that fallibilists
who are true to their doctrine of fallibilism
always behave exactly like relativists
and nervous absurdists -- they always
choose without hope of being sure that
their choice is really right. Fallibilists
who do believe there is Truth may be
nervous about making a choice, while
those who are out-and-out absurdists
may gleefully or cynically grab the
golden ring. But fallibilists make choices
the same way relativists do, and are
committed to keeping it that way.
Hence, according to his own Pragmatist
criterion that truth is what happens (as
discussed above), or that what is true
for all practical purposes is true, the fallibilist
ls a relativist. Accordingly, the
fallibilist must accept blame for the evil
consequences of relativism. In addition,
the fallibilist must accept special blame
for robbing people of hope that Truth
might be found and acted upon with
commitment. And since, according to
the fallibilists, a doctrine is to be rejected
if it leads to bad consequences,
then by this very criterion of their own
they must reject their doctrine of fallibilism
on account of the bad consequences
it has already led to and the
worse consequences that lie ahead if the
doctrine spreads further.
Why Fallibilism Is A False Doctrine
It is important to realize that fallibilism
is a normative theory of methodology.
That is, fallibilism is a theory
which tries to tell us how we should behave,
and how we should go about accepting
or rejecting beliefs. In the area
of fact, fallibilism says that we should
use scientific method to disprove theories
that are are false, and we should
temporarily accept as working hypotheses
those theories which have been
well tested but have not yet been disproved.
We accept such corroborated,
un-disproved theories without strong
commitment, however, and we never
have any way of being sure they are
true, since tomorrow may bring new evidence
which would refute them. In the
area of value, fallibilism is less clear
about the details of how we should
choose our preferences, although the
general idea remains the same: if action
[end page 38 / start page 39]
based on a given value leads to grief,
then the value should be rejected; also,
no value should ever be the object of
permanent commitment, because tomorrow
it may lead us to undesirable
consequences.
Since fallibilism is itself a value prescription
(about how we should conduct
the activities of theory-construction and
commitment-making), and since fallibilism
leads to disastrous consequences
(as shown previously), and since fallibilism
tells us to reject values that lead
to bad consequences, therefore fallibilism
tells us that fallibilism should be rejected.
There are some philosophers
who would not agree with fallibilism's
contention that theories leading to bad
consequences should be rejected. Perhaps
a theory may be true or acceptable
even though it does lead to bad consequences.
Thus, it is important to find additional
reasons to reject fallibilism, not
by showing that it leads to bad consequences,
but by showing that there is
something intrinsically wrong with the
theory apart from its consequences.
As a matter of fact, we have already
shown some reasons why fallibilism is
intrinsically unacceptable. Virtually everyone
agrees that a theory must be internally
consistent if it is to be acceptable.
Yet, we have just now seen how
the theory of fallibilism rejects itself according
to its own criterion for rejecting
theories (i.e., we should reject theories
that lead to bad consequences). Perhaps
some will think that this self-rejection is
not truly a case of internal self-contradiction
because it depends upon a judgment
of contingent fact. Very well, then, we recall the opening sentence in
this paper: fallibilism is a firm commitment
to the notion that we should not
make firm commitments. Now, that is
obviously a most blatant case of internal
self-contradiction!
However, the fallibilist may say that
we have not represented his theory accurately.
He may say that his theory
should be defined as follows: fallibilism
is the temporarily accepted working
principle that we should not make firm
commitments. Another way of saying
the same thing is: hold everything open
to criticism and possible rejection (including
this principle itself), and accept
temporarily whatever can be tested, has
been well tested, and has not been rejected.
According to this new characterization,
known as "comprehensively
critical rationalism" (CCR), fallibilism
appears to be self consistent, because it
holds even fallibilism itself open to criticism
and possible rejection. We might
well question whether in practice the
fallibilists hold their own theory only
tentatively. In fact, every fallibilist I
know of is extremely dogmatic about his
commitment to fallibilism. Nevertheless,
we must now consider whether
CCR (comprehensively critical rationalist)
fallibilism is theoretically possible.
One of the things emphasized in the
CCR theory of fallibilism is testability.
Any statement or theory must be meaningful
before it can even be considered
as a candidate for a temporarily accepted
working hypothesis, and in order to be
meaningful it is necessary that a statement
or theory be testable (i.e., capable
[end page 39 / start page 40]
of being shown to be false if it is false).
But CCR is not itself testoble. If everything
is held open to criticism and possible
rejection, then nothing is ever completely
accepted. This means that when
a statement is criticized, the criticism itself
must be forever held open to criticism
and possible rejection. Therefore
no criticism (and no number of criticisms)
can ever fully succeed in overturning
any statement or theory. This
means that CCR is unworkable in practice
as applied to other theories. It also
means that CCR is itself unfalsifiable,
since CCR would require that all criticisms
of CCR must remain open to
doubt, no criticism of CCR could ever
be completely accepted, and nothing
could ever succeed in overturning CCR.
But if CCR is unfalsifiable and untestable,
then according to its own criterion
for meaningfulness and temporary acceptability,
CCR is not meaningful and
should not be entertained as even a temporary
working hypothesis. Thus we
have shown that the CCR theory of fallibilism
is internally self-contradictory.
Faith, Hope, and Charity
There is a famous old proverb of unknown
origin, which is obviously relevant
to our concerns here. According to
this proverb, there are four kinds of people:
He who knows not, and knows not he knows not:
He is a fool -- shun him;
He who knows not, and knows he knows not:
He is simple -- teach him;
He who knows and knows not he knows:
He is asleep -- wake him;
He who knows and knows he knows:
He is wise -- follow him.
Fallibilists are people who claim that
nobody knows anything for certain, but
that they, the fallibilists, are at least
aware of their own ignorance and are
seeking to alert the rest of us to our
common ignorance. According to a fallibilist
interpretation of the proverb, then,
most people are fools and should be
shunned, while fallibilists are simple
and are open to instruction. The trouble
is that fallibilists may be simple, but
they are also extremely full of pride and
are therefore unteachable. The plain
fact is that fallibilists are proud of knowing
that they are ignorant, for they feel
that this is what distinguishes them
from everyone else who is ignorant. Fallibilists
dogmatically refuse to give up
ignorance -- their doctrine requires them
always to doubt everything, and they
would never make a commitment even
if Truth came riding down the street
heralded by trumpets.
As Plato shows in Meno, a student is
not ready for instruction until he has
recognized his own ignorance and has
enough humility to make a genuine and
contrite confession of ignorance. A student
must beg for enlightenment. But
begging for enlightenment, or seeking
the Truth, is based on the assumption
that enlightenment or Truth exists and
and can be known. A student must have
faith that there is something for him to
discover, and that he is capable of discovering
it. Also, a student must trust
[end page 40 / start page 41]
his teacher to help him. Finally, when
truth is discovered, the student knows
he has discovered it and makes a firm
personal commitment to what he knows.
Fallibilists are not at all humble, they
are proud of knowing that they are ignorant,
they have no faith that Truth can
be known (if indeed it exists at all),
they trust nobody, and they are unwilling
to make firm commitments to beliefs.
Fallibilists would make very bad
students.
But the last half of the proverb gives
us cause for hope, especially in view of
Plato's theory. According to Plato, everyone
begins life asleep. The great
Truths are present in all of us, but are
buried and forgotten. The task of the
teacher is to help us remember them.
We know, but heve forgotten that we
know, and the teacher can help us come
to know that we know. Those who not
only have knowledge but are also aware
of their knowledge are wise. The rest of
us, in the absence of wisdom, have the
duty to follow the teachings of wise men
while seeking wisdom for ourselves.
The fallibilists observed that nothing
can be successfully proved by justification,
and correctly concluded that justificational
rationalism should be abandoned.
But then they mistakenly drew
the further conclusion that firm commitments
should not be made. Likewise, we
have seen in this paper that nothing can
be successfully disproved by criticism,
and we have concluded that (comprehensively)
critical rationalism should be
abandoned. But it would be a mistake to
draw the further conclusion that firm rejections
should not be made. There can
be knowledge, commitment, and rejection
without justificational or critical
proof. Truth is its own credential, and
requires no proof to the knower. But
knowledge is ineffable. The task of so-called
"proof" (either justification or
criticism) is to explain the unexplainable
to someone eise. Obviously, proof must
always fail to be complete. But it can
help lead someone to the point where he
can take a leap bevond the proof to understand
Truth. Although proof technically
fails, Truth exists and can be discovered.
The existence of Truth and its
discoverability give us hope for finding
it, and we should commit ourselves to
search for it.
Of course we must take precautions in
the absence of wisdom. If everyone is
completely ignorant about something,
then the only sane thing to do is to
adopt fallibilist techniques for minimizing
the effects of decisions that might
turn out to be bad. When total ignorance
prevails, an ounce of fallibilism
can prevent a pound of dangerous, vacuum-filling over-commitment. But the
use of fallibilist techniques for curbing
speculative excesses must be carefully
separated from the vicious, dogmatic
commitment to fallibilism described
earlier as a terrible mistake. If fallibilism
succeeds in robbing us of hope that
truth might yet be discovered and implemented,
then all is lost. This is the
great danger of modern times.
Very seldom is everyone totally ignorant.
Even when a puzzle or mystery remains
unsolved, we can tell whether we
are getting closer to a solution, and
some people make progress faster than
[end page 41 / start page 42]
others. There are degrees of wisdom,
and those who have more wisdom
should be in positions of greater social
power and pedagogical infuence. Let us
have faith that Truth exists, let us hope
to find, teach, and implement it, and let
us be charitable in helping those less
wise than ourselves.
ANNOTATED REFERENCES
A newly published book describes fallibilism
simply and tells how curriculum, school organization,
and teaching methods should be changed
according to a fallibilist philosophy of education.
See Henry J. Perkinson, The Possibilities
ol Error: An Approach to Education (New
York: David McKay, 1972).
The modern classics of fallibilism are four books
by Karl R. Popper:
Conjectures and Refutations, and, The Logic
of Scientific Discotsery, make dificult reading,
and are concerned mainly with scientific
method and the nature of scientific knowledge.
The Open Society and its Enemies (in two
volumes) is a study of traditional utopias and
what is wrong with them from a fallibilist
viewpoint.
The Poverty of Historicism is an
excellent little book which claims to refute
some of the basic assumptions underlying holist
approaches to history and social change.
For a readable explicit statement of comprehensively
critical rationalism, see
William Warren Bartley lll, The Retreat to Commitment,
chapters 4 and 5.
For a more technical discussion of CCR, see Bartley's essay "Rationality and the Theory of Rationality" in
The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, edited by Mario Bunge. This entire anthology is dedicated to fallibilism, and the authors appearing there (especially Bunge) have written numerous other fallibilist treatises.
The best classical author to read for an antidote
to fallibilism is Plato. ln the Republic Plato
affirms that there is Truth, it is prescnt in all
of us, some people are wiser than others, those
who are wise should be given power to govern
in the best interests of all, and those who are
capable should receive special education designed
to lead them to wisdom. In Meno
Plato illustrates how a teacher can help awaken
the wisdom lying dormant within a student.
As mentioned in the present article, The Abolition
of Man, by C. S. Lewis, exposes the infiltration
of relativism and fallibilism into the
school curriculum, where children are indoctrinated
with such views before they are
old enough to choose. Lewis shows the long-range
disaster mankind faces if scientific and
ethical relativism go unchecked.
The following books are also useful as antidotes
to specific fallibilist errors:
Michael Polanyi in Personal Knowledge shows
that firm commitment is procedurally necessary
to scientists and justifiable for everyone. In
The Tacit Dimcnsion he tells how discovery
and commitment come about, and he explains
why Truth cannot be explained.
Jacques Maritain's many writings are all excellent
antidotes to fallibilism. Specifcally, The
Degrees of Wisdom describes what it means to
say that different people have attained different
levels of wisdom.
Pitirim Sorokin's Sccial and Cultural Dynamics
(4 vols.) describes historical cycles in a way
that Popper opposes. Sorokin's semi-popular
work, The Crisis of our Age, shows the decline of civilization presently being caused by relativism, and describes the coming revival of Truth-seeking.
Charles Reich, The Greening ol Anerica, is a best-selling current description of the quiet revolution now underway, in which people are beginning to re-cultivate the gentle, benevolent consciousness of Truth.
[end of article]
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