August 1993

by Edward J. Arlt,

edited by Robert W. Wangrud.

"Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh." Genesis 2:24.

"Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee." Genesis 3:16.

These Scriptures, along with many others, point to the Divinely ordained status and place of women in a Godly society. Essential-ly, the Scriptures proclaim that every woman must be under the protection of a man...and woe unto the man who refuses or shirks his responsibilities unto the women and children of his house. That man may be her father, either before or after marriage, her brother, her uncle, or her fiancee. But during marriage, she is utterly and totally under the protection of her husband and her identity is merged in his. That is why she takes on a new name...that of her husband. Her status and place in society is determined by that of her husband and unto him she owes, as a matter of Divine obligation, obedience, respect, and love. He, likewise, has obligations mandated by the Law of God, which include protection, sustenance, rainment, shelter, and Godly instruction. These principles are the foundation of the common-law status of women.

"Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church: and he is the saviour of the body. Therefore, as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in every thing. Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it;...So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself...For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall be joined unto his wife, and they two shall be one flesh...Nevertheless let every one of you in particular so love his wife even as himself; and the wife see that she reverence her husband." Ephesians 5:22-23.

"Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord." Colossians 3:18.

"But if any not provide for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." I Timothy 5:8.

"To be discreet, chaste, keepers at home, good, obedient to their own husbands, that the word of God be not blasphemed." Titus 2:5.

"Likewise ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands; that, if any obey not the word, they also may without the word be won by the conversation of the wives; While they behold your chaste conversation coupled with fear...For after this manner in the old time the holy women also, who trusted in God, adorned themselves, being in subjection unto their own husbands: Even as Sara obeyed Abraham, calling him Lord: whose daughters ye are...Likewise, ye husbands, dwell with them according to knowl-edge, giving honour unto the wife, as unto the weaker vessel, and as being heirs together of the grace of life; that your prayers be not hindered." I Peter 3:1-7.

"If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond; he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth. If a woman also vow a vow unto the Lord, and bind herself by a bond, being in her father’s house in her youth; And her father hear her vow, and her bond wherewith she hath bound her soul, and her father shall hold his peace at her: then all her vows shall stand, and every bond wherewith she hath bound her soul shall stand.

"But if her father disallow her in the day that he heareth; not any of her vows, or of her bonds wherewith she hath bound her soul, shall stand: and the Lord shall forgive her, because her father disallowed her.

"And if she had at all an husband, when she vowed, or ut-tered ought out of her lips, wherewith she bound her soul; And her husband heard it, and held his peace at her in the day that he heard it: then her vows shall stand, and her bonds wherewith she bound her soul shall stand.

"But if her husband disallowed her on the day that he heard it; then he shall make her vow which she vowed, and that which she uttered with her lips, wherewith she bound her soul of none effect: and the Lord shall forgive her.

"But every vow of a widow, and of her that is divorced, wherewith they have bound their souls, shall stand against her. And if she vowed in her husband’s house, or bound her soul by bond with an oath; And her husband heard it, and held his peace at her, and disallowed her not: then all her vows shall stand and every bond wherewith she bound her soul shall stand. But if her husband hath utterly made them void on the day he heard them; then whatsoever proceeded out of her lips concerning her vows, or concerning the bond of her soul, shall not stand: her husband hath made them void; and the Lord shall forgive her. Every vow, and every binding oath to afflict the soul, her husband may establish it, or her husband may make it void." Numbers 30:2-13.

Having reviewed a trifling of the Scriptures on the subject, what then sayeth the Courts as to the common-law? As you will see, the common-law and God’s Law are one and are in harmony on all these points.

"When a single woman marries she experiences a change in her state; she falls into the power of another, and becomes incapable of making a contract without the consent of her husband; but when the marriage is dissolved there is another change, by which she is freed from the marital restraint." Institutes of American Law, Bouvier, Vol. I, page 33.

"Let us examine the question between husband and wife. By the natural law, the superior control in a state of marriage belongs to the man rather than the woman; perfect equality is impossible, and, as the marriage is a partnership between two persons, one must have the controlling voice, when both cannot agree. The preponderating voice belongs to the husband rather than to the wife; he is stronger and more courageous, he works to support the family of which he is the head, and which he is bound to protect and defend; woman then must yield to him, whom nature and the law have provided for her as a guide and protector.

"This is the source of the prerogatives which the husband has over the wife. Hence it follows, that the wife cannot make any contract binding upon herself, without the express or implied authority of the husband, nor make a will-the existence of a mar ried woman being merged...in the being of her husband." Insti-tutes of American Law, Bouvier, Vol. I, page 34 (1872).

"At common law the husband and wife are treated as one person. Marriage operates as a suspension, in most respects, of the legal existence of the latter. All the disabilities of mar-ried women spring from the supposed unity of the husband and wife." Dietzman v. Mullin, 57 SW 247, 248.

"Blackstone says: ‘By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law, that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband, under whose wing, protection and cover she performs everything, and is therefore called in our law French, a feme covert.’ Hence, the man can make no grant directly to his wife; can enter into no contract or covenant with her-for such acts presuppose her separate existence. As they are one person, the man can not be placed in the absurd position of covenanting with himself." Hoker v. Biggs, 63 Ill. 161, 162.

"Marriage is a contract by which a social union is established; and the status of each spouse, and his or her rights in the common property, are fixed by special provisions of law applicable to that relation alone...There is in many respects a complete merger of identities and a total loss of the separate individual rights that formerly existed..." Clark v. Brown, 108 SW 421, 443.

The husband, being head of the wife, is cloaked with the right and obligation to speak for and represent her in all instances outside the family. The husband carries the burden of defending the clan and he represents the entirety of "me and mine" against all outside authority. Further, the husband’s status is shared by the wife and children of the marriage. As the head of the family, the identity, standing, and status of the husband are as a pro-tective cloak about the wife and children.

"No one can therefore, in the correct sense of the term, be a citizen of a state, who is not entitled, upon the terms pre-scribed by the institutions of the state, to all the rights and privileges conferred by those institutions upon the highest class of society. It is true, that females and infants do not personally possess those rights and privileges, in any state in the Union; but they are generally dependent upon adult males through whom they enjoy the benefits of those rights and privileges; and it is a rule of common law, as well as of common sense, that females and infants should, in this respect, partake of the quality of those adult males who belong to the same class and condition in society, and of course they will or will not be citizens, as the adult males of the same class are or are not so." Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. (Ky) 334.

Thus, we perceive that marriage is a status and that status is determined by the husband’s identity at law. If the husband be free, then so too the wife and children. If the husband be a slave, then so too the wife and children. The wife has a vested interest in seeing to it that her husband submits not to the yoke of bondage. Slavery imposed by his acquiescence will condemn her and the children as well.

In Texas, the common-law is the rule of decision and has been so since the inception of the Republic itself in 1836. The common-law of England, as adopted by the Republic of Texas, was that which was declared by different States of the United States. When the Constitution of the Republic of Texas (1836) provided for the adoption of the common-law, the legislature enacted a statute that substituted the common-law of England, in place of the civil law, as the "rule of decision" in Texas. There has been no depar-ture in this State from that first legislative declaration and the common-law is the foundation upon which the State is ground-ed.

"The public policy of this state is to be found in the unwritten or common-law restrictions, as well as in its statutory limitations. The common law, except where altered by statutes, is just as much a part of our local jurisprudence as are the enactments of the legislature. It is, of course, conceded that under the common law, as recognized in this state, Mrs. Taylor could not be held personally upon her contracts." Taylor v. Leonard, 275 SW 134, 135 (1925).

It is a fundamental maxim of law that, that which is of the common-law, and adheres thereto, is governed by the common-law and none other. The common law and the Martial Law jurisdiction cannot be mixed and cannot, simultaneously, occupy the same ground or adhere to the same person.

"It is difficult for us to see how the courts of this state are to ignore the common law as a rule of decision, when it is made so by statute, and adopt the civil law, even though it have the merit of superior equity." Diamond v. Harris, 33 Tex 634, 638 (1870).

The English common law has been adopted as the basis of American jurisprudence in all the states of the Union, except the state of Louisiana, where the civil law prevails as to civil matters, the common law governing therein as a basic system only in criminal matters. The English-speaking people brought the common law to America with them, on the first settlement of the colonies, a system claimed by them, it has been said, as their birthright, and, prior to the war of the Revolution, it continued in full force in all the colonies." Ruling Case Law, Vol. 5, pg. 808, citing Phillips v. Harding, 70 Fed. 468; Patillo v. Alexan-der, 96 Ga. 60; State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan 523; 22 LRA 502; Hark-ness v. Sears, 26 Ala 493; Gatton v. Chicago, 95 Ia. 112; etc.

"The common law in its truest and most comprehensive sense is a heritage of the race, not limited either in its sources or benefits to any age or country. It is the embodiment of useage-the customs common to all mankind and the principles of action which are evolved therefrom by reason and experience. In this general sense, this, in common with all law, is contemporaneous with history itself-in fact it is history; and the sources of both are lost in the same mystery that characterizes all origins. In various ages the laws were given concrete form, and that system which was developed in England and which represents one phase of the genius of the Anglo-Saxon race is now, in its spe-cific sense, generally regarded as the common law." Ruling Case Law, Vol. 5, pg. 806.

"I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and will be their God, and they shall be my people." Jeremiah 31:33.

What, then, has Martial Rule to do with a man and his wife? Consider that the 14^th Amendment, and everything pertaining to and derived from it are Martial Rule. All regulatory and licensing power exercised by the Federal and State governments is derived from the 14^th Amendment and is enforced in a legislative venue and jurisdiction. If a man and his wife adhere to the common-law, and are of the race and status necessary thereto, then neither they, the marriage, nor the fruits of the marriage will be subject to regulation by the State. However, the marriage must be by the common-law and not by permission or license of the State, via statute. A common-law wife is the true de jure wife and not a de facto one. She is capable of claiming the protection afforded her by the common-law.

"Where the proof is sufficient to establish a common-law marriage, the wife is a true de jure wife, and not a mere de facto one. See Melton v. State, 71 Tex Cr R 130, 158 SW 550." McMillian v. Sims, 112 SW2d 793, 797.

Marriage is the very foundation of society and culture:

Indeed, it lies at the foundation of good society. In Sheffield v. Sheffield, 3 Texas 86, our first Chief Justice Hemphill said:

" ‘The nature, object and important purposes of the contract should have their just influence upon the mind. The parties have pledged themselves, not only for their own happiness, but for purposes important to society, to live together during the term of their natural lives. This engagement is the most solemn and important of human transactions. It is regarded by all Christian nations as the basis of civilized society, of sound morals, and of the domestic affections; and the relations, duties, obligations and consequences flowing from the contract are so important to the peace and welfare of society as to have placed it under the control of special municipal regulations, independent of the will of the parties. The mutual comfort and happiness of the parties are the principal, but not the only, objects of the engagement. It is intended also, for the benefit of their common offspring, and is an important element in the moral order, security, and tranquility of civilized society.’

"In this work on the conflict of laws Judge Story said: ‘The contract of marriage is the most important of all human transactions. It is the very basis of the whole fabric of civilized society. The status of marriage is juris gentium, and the foundation of it, like that of all other contracts, rests on the con-sent of the parties. But it differs from other contracts in this, that the rights, obligations, or duties arising from it are not left entirely to be regulated by the agreements of the parties, but are, to a certain extent, matters of municipal regulation, over which the parties have no control by any declaration of their will. It confers the status of legitimacy of children born in wedlock, with all the consequential rights, duties, and privi-leges thence arising; it gives rise to the relations of consanguinity and affinity; in short, it pervades the whole system of civil society.’ (Sec. 109, pp 185-6.)

"Appreciating the importance of the issue we have devoted much time, thought and research to its solution. As we have stated above, the question must be decided according to the common law as we may find it applicable to this State." Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex 597 (1913).

Marriage is a status:

"The fallacy of the phrase so frequently quoted is in fact that it ignores the correct definition of marriage, that it is a status-the relation of husband and wife. A status cannot be created by contract.

"The logical mind of the author of the opinion in the last above named case reached the correct result and demonstrated the absurdity of the doctrine that marriage is a contract by showing that the rights of the parties arise out of the status of husband and wife in fact, not in theory.

"Marriage was not originated by human law. When God created Eve, she was a wife to Adam; they then and there occupied the status of husband to wife and wife to husband. When God created the first pair, He gave the command: ‘multiply and replenish (people) the earth,’ which was enjoined upon their expulsion from the garden. When Noah was selected for salvation from the flood, he and his wife and his three sons and their wives were placed in the Ark, and when the flood waters had subsided and the families came forth, it was Noah and his wife and each son and his wife, and God repeated to them the command: ‘Multiply.’ All of the duties and obligations that have existed at any time between husband and wife existed between those husbands and wives before civil government was formed. The truth is that civil government has grown out of marriage; marriage by cohabitation, not by contract, and society, from which government became necessary to settle differences in matters of private interest, to protect the weak and to conserve the moral forces of society, to the support of religion and free government. In what respect does the con-tract of marriage of B and C contribute to their happiness? How does that marriage benefit society? (note: a marriage without issue contracted for carnal or superficial purposes) It will contribute nothing to sustaining the dignity of the State, nor add to its citizenship. Such a contract, if it be regarded as such, is worse than a nudum pactum, for it is without consideration or obligation to or from either party. Such life is in defiance of the commands of God, and in disregard of every obligation to society and State. Such a transaction has but one element of a contract, mutual consent to do nothing for them-selves, their country, or their God. The abstract theory has had little influence in the determination of causes except to confuse the judicial mind. Contract marriages exist when the parties, for some pecuniary or social advantages, have desecrated the sacred status by their union, and such marriages often furnish business to the divorce courts and scandals to society.

"Marriage is not a contract, but a status created by mutual consent of one man and one woman. The method by which it is solemnized, or entered into, may be by proceedings prescribed by statute, or by mutual agreement with cohabitation, but, however contracted, having the same elements and producing the status of husband and wife. The sole difference which can legally exist is in the method of expressing consent, and the only particular in which a marriage as at common law can differ from the statutory method is the absence of license and ceremony. The cohabitation must be professedly as husband and wife, and public, so that their conduct towards each other may be known as husband and wife. Such marriages may be equally the consummation of a mutual affection which will produce a home and family that will contribute to good society, to free and just government and to the support of Christianity-to the common weal. It would be sacrilegious to apply the designation ‘a civil contract’ to such a marriage. It is that and more; a status ordained by God, the foundation and support of good government, and absolutely necessary to the purity and preservation of good society. When the ‘wedding day’ of the parent ceases to be revered by the offspring there will be a weakening of the family ties and a lowering of the standard of marriage and home." Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex 597 (1913).

As set forth in the foregoing, marriage is the basis upon which the citizenship of the State and the purity of society is maintained. It is this aspect, and it alone, which gives the State an interest in the institution of marriage. Now I ask you, will a racially mixed marriage contribute to the de jure citizenship of the State? Will a child of a mixed union have any right or claim to a citizenship and a body of law that is entirely predicated upon one race?

"And Isaac called Jacob, and blessed him, and charged him, and said unto him, thou shalt not take a wife of the daughters of Canaan...And Jacob obeyed his father and his mother..." Genesis 28:1-8.

"Neither shalt thou make marriages with them; thy daughter shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son." Deuteronomy 7:3.

If marriage is a natural right and natural status, then by what means would the State presume to regulate the marriage? Marriage licenses act as an attachment to Fourteenth Amendment citizenship or other statutory personage and the regulation and control integral thereto. Free white "Citizens" cannot, strictly speak-ing become Fourteenth Amendment "citizens". But, by application for license they can obtain the status of statutory "persons" which are treated the same, because both status’ exist by statute under the law martial of the United States, or the State, or the provisional government of a so-called state, as the case may be.

Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Ed., defines a "marriage license" as follows:

"A license or permission granted by public authority to persons who intend to intermarry..." Blacks Law Dictionary, 4^th Ed., p. 1124, title "marriage."

Black’s 4^th Ed. further defines "intermarriage" as follows"

"In the popular sense, this term denoted the contracting of a marriage relation between two persons considered as members of different nations, tribes, families, etc..." Blacks Law Diction-ary, 4^th Ed., p. 952, title "Intermarriage."

Black’s, 4^th Ed. defines "nation" as follows:

"A people, or aggregation of men, existing...and distinguished from other like groups by their racial origin and characteristics..." Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Ed., p. 1175, title "Nation."

Likewise, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines "nation" as:

"Nation...birth, race, nation..." Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 758, title "Nation."

Thus, we see that a marriage license is, in its fundamental reality, permission granted by the State, under State law martial jurisdiction, to miscegenate...to do something that is constitu-tionally unlawful. The existence of a marriage license implies a status of the marriage subject to the law martial imposed through the Fourteenth Amendment for the parties to the marriage. Webster’s defines "miscegenation" as follows:

"Miscegenation...a mixture of races; esp: marriage or cohabitation between a white person and a member of another race."

A license is permission to do that which is normally illegal. It is permission by some competent authority to do some act which, without such permission, would be illegal. See State ex rel. Zugravu v. O’Brien, 130 Ohio St. 23, 196 NE 664; Solberg v. Davenport, 211 Iowa 612, 232 NW 477k; Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. State Board of Equalization, 110 Mont 5, 99 P2d 229, 234. A license is permission to do something which, without the license, would not be allowable. City of Shreveport v. Brister, 194 La 615, 194 So 566, 567; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Lexington, 256 Ky 595, 76 SW2d 894, 896.

"I am the Lord your God, which have separated you from other people." Leviticus 20:24.

"And, behold, one of the children of Israel came and brought unto his brethren a Midianitish woman in the sight of Moses, and in the sight of all the congregation of the children of Israel, who were weeping before the door of the tabernacle of the congre-gation. And when Phineas, the son of Eleazar, the son of Aaron the priest, saw it, he rose up from among the congregation, and took a javelin in his hand; And he went after the man of Israel into the tent, and thrust both of them through, the man of Is-rael, and the woman through her belly. So the plague was stayed from the children of Israel..." Numbers 25:6-13.

"...So shall we be separated, I and thy people, from all the people that are upon the face of the earth." Exodus 33:16.

"Now it came to pass, when they had heard the law, that they separated from Israel all the mixed multitude." Nehemiah 13:3.

"Now therefore give not your daughters unto their sons, neither take their daughters unto your sons, nor seek their peace or their wealth for ever: that ye may be strong, and eat the good of the land, and leave it for an inheritance to your children for ever." Ezra 9:12.

"We have trespassed against our God, and have taken strange wives of the people of the land: yet now there is hope in Israel concerning this thing. Now therefore let us make a covenant with our God to put away all the wives, and such as are born of them, according to the counsel of my Lord, and of those that tremble at the commandments of our God; and let it be done according to the law...And Ezra the priest stood up, and said unto them, Ye have transgressed, and have taken strange wives, to increase the tres pass of Israel. Now therefore make confession unto the Lord God of your fathers, and do his pleasure: and separate yourselves from the people of the land, and from the strange wives..." Ezra 10:3-12.

Thus, we see that miscegenation is unlawful. Both the common-law and the Bible condemns it. Miscegenation is an act of war against the Constitution, for it serves to destroy those who were designated by the Preamble, by Article I, section 2, clause 2, and by Article I, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution for the united States of America to be the common-law citizenry of the States and the rightful sovereignty thereof. Miscegenation is destroying the nation and serves to render the Constitution, in its original organic content, a moot instrument...for those who were its originators and sole intended benefactors, id est, free white persons. The mongrelized offspring of mixed statutory marriages can never claim the de jure citizenship of the Constitution, but, rather, only de facto citizenship of the artificial statutory class created by the 14^th Amendment...who are one and all wards and subjects of their creator and can never attain to the "ruling body sovereign."

The sole legitimate and constitutional interest that the State has in the institution of marriage is to preserve the race that is the foundation and single essence of the nation:

"While ‘marriage’ is in essential respects a civil contract, it is something more. From it results a status of profound importance not only to the parties, but also to society and to the State. Upon it largely depends the procreation of succeeding generations, and public policy is concerned with the preservation of the purity and virility of the race." Winders v. Powers, 9 SE2d 131, 132, 217 NC 580.

"Marriage is a civil contract founded in the social nature of man, and intended to regulate, chasten, and refine the inter-course between the sexes, and to multiply, preserve, and improve the species." Town of Milford v. Town of Worcester, 7 Mass 48, 52.

The anti-miscegenation statutes of the States were in force in Texas and many other southern States right up to the late 60’s. Even with the presence of the 14^th Amendment they were never found to be unconstitutional. These anti-miscegenation statutes were constitutional and rightly served to prevent the destruction of the designated sovereigns. Miscegenation was a felony in Texas for over 100 years. See Frasher v. State, 3 Tex App 263, 30 Am Rep 131; Flores v. State, 129 SW 1111, 60 Tex Cr R 416; Brown v. State, 266 SW 152, 98 Tex Cr R 416; and Francois v. State, 9 Tex App 144. Thus, we may readily see that licensing to marry is contrary to the Preamble of the Constitution for the united States of America (...to ourselves and our posterity) and is unlawful because it implies miscegenation of the parties taking the license.

"The African race, even when free, are essentially a degraded caste, of inferior rank and condition in society. See the judicial sense of their inferior condition, as declared in the cases of the State v. Harden, and the State v. Hill, 2 Spear’s S.C. Rep 150, 152. Marriages between them and whites are forbid-den in some of the States where slavery does not exist, and they are prohibited in all the slaveholding States; and when not absolutely contrary to law, they are revolting, and regarded as an offence against public decorum. The Statute of North Carolina, prohibiting marriages between whites and people of colour, includes in the later class all who are descended from negro ancestors, to the fourth generation inclusive, though one ancestor of each generation may have been a white person. State v. Watters, 3 Iredell 455. By the Revised Statutes of Illinois, published in 1829, marriages between whites and negroes, or mulattoes, are declared void, and the persons so married are liable to be whipped, fined and imprisoned. By an old statute of Massachusettes, in 1705, such marriages were declared void, and they were so under the statute of 1786. And the prohibition was continued under the Mass.R.S. of 1835, which declared that no white person shall intermarry with a negro, indian, or mulatto. This prohibition, however, has since been repealed. A similar provision exists in Virginia and North Carolina. Marriages of whites with blacks were forbidden in Virginia, from the first introduction of blacks, under ignominious penalties. Hening’s Statutes, vol.i.p.146. Such connections, in France and Germany, constitute the degraded state of concubinage, which was known in the civil law as lecita consuetudo semimatrimonium, but they are not legal marriages, because the parties want that equality of status, or condition, which is essential to the contract." Commentaries on American Law, James Kent, Vol.II, 7^th Ed., p. 276.

Long antecedent to the formation of the Union and the advent of the Constitution, miscegenation was held, in all Christian nations, to be abhorrent, sinful, and destructive of the social order.

The foregoing are essential points necessary to dispel the taint of a marriage license and its l4th Amendment connections via the legislative jurisdiction of the law martial. In order to claim protection of the common-law for the wife, the marriage must be according to the common-law (God’s law), and both parties must be free white persons. From all the foregoing, it is apparent that a governmental agency can only maintain an attack on the marriage by implying the existence of a license that would make the marriage and the offspring thereof susceptible to the law martial jurisdiction. As we shall see shortly, no fabrication of a liability can be maintained against a common-law wife who neither works outside the home nor is engaged in any commercial activity. There are other far reaching implications of the marriage license when considered in conjunction with the Social Security Account Number. The license serves to remove the wife’s cloak of coverture; her absolute immunity from suit which is part and parcel of her common-law status and protections. The license serves, in conjunction with the Social Security Number, to de-stroy the authority of the husband and assures the destruction of the family via collateral attack from without. Taken together they remove the husband as head of the family and head of the woman. They have the effect of separating the legal personality of the woman from that of her husband, thereby rendering her susceptible to personal attack. The husband is no longer her shield and protector.

At common-law, however, a married woman has no control of community property and she has no general capacity to contract. By this provision then she is rendered absolutely immune from suit and personal liability and the husband, in whose hands all responsibility and authority are placed, stands as an impenetrable wall between her and the world external to the family. As previously related, when married the wife takes on the identity of her husband and that identity includes his status in the community. His capacity or class of citizenship is automatically hers. That is her covering and the children’s as well. Hence, the term from the Bible, coverture... a shield or covering. The husband is absolute head of the household and has the power to repudiate and annul any binding agreement or utterance his wife may make... including the Social Security franchise.

A new twist to women’s social security numbers is when women get married the Social Security Administration wants them to apply for a new number. I don’t know where or in what case this came up. But when a woman marries she is no longer the same "person" she was before the marriage. One thing is certain, the Social Security Administration and the I.R.S. are worried about it when a woman does not reapply after marriage.

"Every vow, and every binding oath to afflict her soul, her husband may establish it, or her husband may make it void."

Numbers 30:13

"At common law the husband and wife are identified and treated as one person. The legal existence of the wife, as a distinct person, is suspended, or incorporated in that of her husband, under whose protection and cover she performs every-thing. By the marriage all her rights to personal property vest in him absolutely, and a freehold estate in her realty, continuing during their joint lives, and by possibility during his life, should he survive; and the wife is incapable of contracting or acting as a feme sole, and of suing or being sued as such. (1 Bl.Comm. 443; 2 Story Eq. Sec. 1367; 8 T.R. 547; Roperr on Hus-band and wife, 2 Vol. 119.)" Cartwright v. Hollis, 5 Tex 152, 155 (1849).

"At common law the legal existence of the wife is merged, for the most part, in that of the husband. By marriage, her personal property vests in him; the right to dispose of her real property is taken from her, and its fruits given to the husband. Black v. Bryan, 18 Tex 453. Because of her subjection to and dependence upon him springs the prime duty to maintain and sup-port her; in other words, to provide her with necessaries. Involved in the duty of maintaining her while living is the duty of burying her upon death.

"By our statute, the harsh common-law rule has been somewhat ameliorated by the creation of the community estate and the vouchsafing to the wife of a separate estate... But the right to manage and dispose of community property during coverture rests exclusively in the husband, and subjects him to the corresponding duty of maintaining his wife and family, and defraying out of his property the debts contracted during marriage. 10 Tex 130." Goldberg v. Zellner, 235 SW 870, 873 (1921).

"With the adoption of the common law as the rule of decision in this state, in 1840, our married women were rendered unable to bind themselves by contract. Kavanaugh v. Brown, 1 Tex 481. And, although by statute we retained the Spanish law rule that the wife can own property, our adoption of the common law meant that she can contract with respect to it or other wise only for a purpose pointed out by law and only in such manner as our statutes permit." Tolbert v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 223 SW2d 617, 619.

"At common law a married woman’s contract is absolutely null and void ab initio, 30 C.J. 583, and it is generally held that her attempted renewal or ratification of such agreement after the removal of her disability, in the absence of a new consideration, is not binding on her. Gilbert v. Brown, 123 Ky 703, 97 SW 40... 60 SW 650... 74 SW 220... 89 SW 548...in the absence of modifica-tion by statute, we adhere to the common-law rule with reference to a married woman’s disability to contract. Red River Nat. Bank v. Ferguson, 109 Tex 287, 206 SW 923, Par. 8...’It is settled by the decisions in this state that married women have no power, except such as is affirmatively given by statute, to bind them-selves personally by contracts.’" Saunders v. Powell, 67 SW 402, 403 (1933).

"A married woman, at common law, had no capacity to enter into a contract. Her right to contract in this state is conferred by statute (Rev St 1925, art. 4613 et seq), and such right is limited to contracts for necessaries furnished herself and children, con tracts incident to her power of exclusive manage-ment, control, and disposition of her separate property and of certain specified portions of the community property committed by law to her exclusive management and which are reasonably necessary to make such power effectual, and to contracts of suretyship for another in which she is joined by her husband. Whitney Hdw. Co. v. McMahan, 111 Tex 242, 231 SW 694, 695,...

"A mere allegation that a contract was executed by a mar-ried woman does not import liability on her part to a personal judgment thereon. There must be further allegations in order to show liability. A petition in a suit upon a promissory note which shows on its face that the sole maker thereof was a married woman at the time she executed and delivered the same, and does not further show that the same was executed in pursuance of authority conferred upon her by the statutes and for a purpose contemplated thereby, is sufficient to support a judgment by default. Trimble v. Miller, 24 Tex 214; Covington v. Burleson, 28 Tex 368, 371;... Graham v. Carmany, 2 SW2d 467, 468 (1927).

"Our courts have uniformly held that this disability still exists for the protection of married women. Dickinson v. Griffith Lumber Co. (Tex Civ App) 213 SW 341; Haded v. Ellison (Tex Civ App) 283 SW 193;..." Jones & Co. v. Black, 42 SW2d 151, 153 (1931).

A common-law wife, having no specific capacity or ability to enter into a contract, cannot be prosecuted to enforce such a contract even if she made it. The Social Security Insurance policy being the basis for liability under the Internal Revenue Code, a common-law wife has no capacity to enter the contract, she is without liability for the tax, and she is immune from suit by the IRS. In community property States it is a favorite tactic to allege a tax liability on the part of the husband and then sue the wife as well claiming half the debt is hers. Common-law coverture will protect her, that is, if her husband has revoked the Social Security franchise. (See Behold Vol. 7, No. 2, February, 1993, pp. 1-16, Arizona Citizen Discovers the Power of Coverture.)

"In order for a contract of this character to be valid, it must be made by one with the legal capacity to make it. Under the statutes of this state, a married woman is not vested with the authority to execute a contract, with out a joinder of her husband, in the absence of an affirmative showing that it is such a contract as she is authorized by statute to make... and where, as in the instant case, coverture is pled and is established as a defense to the suit on said note, neither she nor her husband are liable thereon." Grant Lumber Co. v. Jones, 151 SW2d 944, 945, 946 (1941).

"Further, it has been uniformly held that one seeking to bind a married woman on a note or contract must bring his cause strictly within the statutes making her liable, and that the burden is upon him to establish the particular facts authorizing her to create the liability in question, for the reason that such facts cannot be presumed by reason of the fact that she did so contract. Martin v. Hays, (Tex Civ App) 36 SW2d 796; Womack et ux v. First National Bank of Anson, (Tex Civ App) 81 SW2d 99...

"While other questions are raised by appellant in his brief, as we view the record, appellee’s plea of coverture presents a complete defense to appellant’s cause of action and renders the remaining assignments immaterial." Kieth v. Allen, 153 SW2d 638 (1941).

"It is elementary that a married woman can contract only in the manner and under the conditions prescribed by law; save, of course, in certain instances not applicable here. Lee v. Hall Music Co., 119 Tex 547, 35 SW2d 685;... There is no provision of law which permits a married woman to execute contracts of insurance and thereby bind herself or her separate estate, unless it be said that under Article 4626 she might be authorized to engage in writing insurance. There is no claim that said article was complied with in this instance.

"It appears, therefore, that the purported contract created no enforceable liability as to Mrs. Harris when contested by her..." Harris v. Prince, 121 SW2d 983, 985.

In a common-law jurisdiction the Plaintiff has the burden of proving that a wife has the capacity at law to create an alleged liability. Coverture is a complete common-law defense to an action brought in any other jurisdiction.

"Now a married woman had no right at common law to contract, and in Texas any authority of a married woman to contract must be given by the Constitution or statute, expressly or by implication.

"The undisputed facts clearly show that the cause of action asserted does not come within the provision of any statute of this state, under, or by the provision of which a married woman, not joined by her husband, or not having her disability as a married woman removed, can be made liable. It is not necessary to refer to the many cases holding that, where the law has undertak-en to define or state the purposes and methods by which a married woman may charge herself or her property, or any community property in her control, the party seeking to bind her or make her liable must bring such cause strictly within the statute which makes her liable...

"One asserting the wife’s liability must show the particular facts authorizing her to create such liability, such presumption does not arise by reason of the fact that she did so contract. Speer on Law of Marital Rights (3d Ed.) par. 210, and cases cited." Martin v. Hays, 36 SW2d 799.

The husband is vested with full possession and control of all community property in a marriage.

"Was the property owned or claimed by her before marriage, acquired afterwards by gift, devise, or bequest? It is well settled in this state that all other property acquired after marriage than that acquired as here stated is community proper-ty." Bell v. Phillips Petroleum Co, 278 SW2d 407, 408 (1954).

"Of course, all property acquired by either the husband or the wife during marriage, except that which is the separate property of either, is deemed the community of the husband and wife...

"We think that it is the settled law of this State that property acquired during marriage takes its status as separate or community property at the very time of its acquisition. Also, such status is fixed by the facts of its acquisition at the time there of..." Smith v. Buss, 144 SW2d 531.

"The statute, Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Art. 4619, provides that the community property ‘may be disposed of by the husband only’. Such right of the husband to manage, control, and dispose of the community property is absolute so long as it is not exer

cised for the purpose of defrauding the wife. Jones v. Jones, Tex Civ App, 146 SW 265. And, barring disposition or dissipation of the property made with intent to defraud the wife, the husband may sell or even give it away. Shaw v. Shaw, Tex Civ App, 28 SW2d 173." Locke v. Locke, 143 SW2d 637, 638 (1940).

"Under the law of this state, during coverture, the husband is the head of the family, the manager of the community estate of himself and wife, and, barring certain exceptions not necessary to mention in this connection, is alone authorized to contract community debts and dispose of community property." Dallas Plumb-ing Co v. Harrington, 275 SW 190, 191 (1925).

In a suit on community property, the wife is neither a proper nor a necessary party thereto.

"It is not necessary to cite authority upon the now elemen-tary proposition that the wife is not a necessary party to an action against the husband to try title to, affect an interest in, or foreclose a lien upon community real estate." Cooley v. Miller, 228 SW 1085, 1086 (1921).

"There being no allegation that the property sold was the separate estate of Mrs. Kelly, nor that the contract sued upon was for the benefit of her separate estate, she could not be held liable on the contract and was not a proper party to the suit. No judgment was rendered against her, and appellee insists that no injury was done. Inasmuch, however, as the case must be reversed on other grounds, Mrs. Kelly should be dismissed as a party defendant upon another trial." Kelly v. Rozelle, 294 SW 699, 701 (1927).

"It is well settled that in actions involving community property the wife is not a necessary party, and judgment against the husband will conclude her even if she is not a party..." Starr v. Schoellkopf, 113 SW2d 1227, 1228 (1838).

"The Pleading of appellees shows on its face that the property in controversy was community property and not the sepa-rate property of a married woman. In such a suit, by the vendor holding the superior title, it is not necessary to make the wife a party to the suit to secure a valid judgment for the recovery of the land. Jackson v. Bradshaw, 28 Tex Civ App 394, 67 SW 438;

Childress v. Robinson, 161 SW 78, 82; and Gabb v. Boston (Sup) 193 SW 137; Evans v. Marlow, 149 SW 347; Breath v. Flowers, 43 Tex Civ App 516, 95 SW 26." Lewright v. Reese, 223 SW 270, 271 (1920).

No tort is possible where the capacity to contract does not exist in a party.

"The rule is thus stated in Texas: ‘But while it is true that the person who is capacitated to contract may commit a tort in connection therewith, the person incapable of making the contract cannot be bound on a tort dependent on the contract. If a married woman could be held liable for a tort growing out of, and dependent on, a contract which she could not lawfully make, it would amount to making her liable on the illegal contract, and what could not be reached directly would be accomplished indi-rectly. Brazile v. Scott (Tex Civ App) 273 SW 1013, 1015. See also Sandoval v. Eagle Pass Lumber Co. Tex Civ App 248 SW 132.

"It is no answer to say that the contract is not one made by the parties, but is one implied by law. The law will not imply a contract where from the nature of the case the parties cannot legally make an express contract. Simpson v. Bowden, 33 Me 549. Bishop says, ‘When the law lays on one a duty to another, it creates a promise from the former to the latter to discharge the duty. The limit of the doctrine is that where, from the nature of the case, not merely from inability of the party, there could not be a contract in fact, the law does not undertake to create the impossible.’ Bishop on Contracts (2d Ed.) sec. 182-186...

"At common law a married woman is incapable of making a contract, and consequently incapable of becoming a partner or of sustaining the relation of principal to agent, or master to servant, so as to be charged with the legal consequences of these relations..." Potter v. Florida Motor Lines, 57 F2d 313 (1932).

The Federal Courts are bound to follow the common-law of the States as to these matters. However, if a party is a federal "citizen", or statutory "person," via attachment to the 14^th Amendment or the franchises (i.e. Social Security, license, etc.) making him so are unchallenged, then he will plead a common-law defense in vain.

"Thus Texas’ community property law is embodied in and forms a part of the State policy of Texas. Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 US 122, 51 S.Ct 62, 75 L.Ed 249. And this State law establishes a rule of property which the Federal Court is bound to follow. Warburton v. White, 176 US 484, 496...Tyler v. United States, 281 US 497, 501,... It is neither a contractual nor a consensual system, but an ancient body of law forming an important and integral part of the fundamental law of Texas, and results, not from the voluntary agreements of the parties, but by operation of law, as a vital incident of the marriage relation." Rompel v. U.S., 59 F.Supp 483, 486 (1945).

Thus, marriage, property, and status are fundamentally inter-twined and the facts of each, when considered cumulatively, will determine rights.

"It is universally held that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the law of the country or State in which it is situated, and no interference with it by the law of any other sovereignty is permitted. 11 Am Jur, Conflict of Laws, sec 30... These rules apply to the questions of marital rights of spouses in property." CIR v. Skaggs, 122 F2d 721, 723 (1941).

Many of the cases cited in support of all the foregoing points were from Texas. For further cases from all States in the Union on these points and the topic of "coverture" see Corpus Juris Secundum, Volumes 41 and 42, under the heading "Husband and Wife". See also, Bishop on Contracts as to these topics. Most law libraries will have both these references.

There is one point I never see reported on the subject of mar-riage. Review Genesis 2:24 again.

"Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh." Genesis 2:24.

Examine a few facts. When a man and a woman consummate marriage and the wife is with child, it is a well known fact that the baby’s blood is formed by the man’s blood not the woman’s. It is the blood of the Husband that mixes with the blood of his wife, as she nourished the child in her womb. It is the husbands genes and chromosomes that mix with his wife’s blood and she physically becomes one flesh with her husband. It was not Mary’s blood that was shed by Jesus the Christ on the cross. It was his Father’s blood that was shed.

I believe the Father meant the term (one flesh) as a physical and not spiritual term. This, under Christian law (common-law), is why divorces were rare. Under Christian law you cannot divorce yourself. But under the Law Martial jurisdiction of the state, by statutes enacted under the Law Martial, you can divorce as often as you change your socks; you can miscegenate (race mix) as often as you want. Under the State’s common-law, of course, you rarely could divorce and you could never miscegenate. It is a fact that the genes and chromosomes between races are distinctly different, which is what makes races different from each other. Think about it.

Researchers around the country are also encouraged to look up "Adultery" and "Miscegenation" in every old reference that can be found. May Yahweh guide, strengthen, and encourage thee. Shrink not from the light of truth.

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