by Behold Newsletter

The validity, or should I say invalidity, of the Civil War Amendments is very important to reinstating the unalienable rights of free white Citizens in the United States of America. At every juncture where the government of the United States of America or the governments of the several States attempt to deprive free white Citizens of their unalienable rights the Civil War Amendments ultimately are claimed to be the authority for such deprivations of rights.

To determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment is fact or fiction, I will proceed to dissect each section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, sentence by sentence.

"Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,..."

Notice, there is no relation to race and there is no definition of person, other than the "p" in person is not capitalized, indicating the word would not mean a Natural Person, but a juristic person or artificial person. As the courts have said, the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to corporations which are juristic (artificial)
persons.

Compare this with Article 2, Section 1, Clause 4 of the Constitution for the united States of America:

"No Person except a natural born Citizen,..."

Notice the "N" in no, the "P" in Person and the "C" in Citi zen. All of the capitalization is on the object to be distin
guished as to who is a Natural Person. This is further clarified in Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. Ky. R. 326:

"Free negroes and mulattoes are, almost everywhere, considered and treated as a degraded race of people; insomuch so, that, under the constitution and laws of the United States, they can not become citizens of the United States." Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. Ky. R. 334.

In light of this, a person would be considered as a "United States Citizen", but not a "citizen of the United States"; as the
Constitution was framed to incorporate the common law, in opposition to international law. (1) common law: one race governs; (2) international law: all races govern.

"A citizen of any one of the States of the union, is held to be, and called a citizen of the United States, although technically and abstractly there is no such thing. To conceive a citizen of the United States who is not a citizen of some one of the States, is totally foreign to the idea, and inconsistent with the proper construction and common understanding of the expression as used in the Constitution, which must be deduced from its various other provisions. The object then to be attained, by the exercise of the power of naturalization, was to make citizens of the respective States." - [Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855)]

The capitalization of the words "Person" and "Citizen" could mean only one thing, the denoting of only those of one race in
compliance with the common law.

"The American colonies brought with them the common, and not the civil law; and each state at the revolution, adopted either more or less of it, and not one of them exploded the principle, that place of birth conferred citizenship." Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. Ky. R. 337-38.

Under the common-law, and under American Constitutions, Citizenship was dependent upon right of inheritance which can
only be passed by lineage (race). This is in accord with the Preamble (Constitution for the United States of America), which
states that the constitution was adopted for the protection of "We The People" and "their posterity", posterity being a racial
term.

The "p" in persons of the Fourteenth Amendment is not referring to those referred to in Article 4, Section 2, Constitution
for the United States of America.

"...and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,..."

Notice the word "subject." Those that were not of the white race, when the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed, were natural born subjects.

"Blacks, whether born or in bondage, if born under the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States, are natives, and not aliens. They are what the common law terms natural-born subjects...The better opinion, I should think, was, that negroes or other slaves, born within and under the allegiance of the United States, are natural-born subjects, but not citizens.
Citizens, under our constitution and laws, mean free inhabitants, born within the United States, or naturalized under the law of congress..." Commentaries of American Law, James Kent, 7th Ed., Vol. II, at 275-78.

Thus, we find the meaning and application of the terms "subject to the jurisdiction."

A "citizen of the United States" (that is a common-law Citizen in one of the several States), at the adoption of the Constitution for the united States of America, was considered "within" the jurisdiction of the United States. Citizens were never "subject" to the jurisdiction of the United States. Instead, the United States was subject to the jurisdiction of the Citizen, that is, under the common law. See the Tenth Article in Amendment, Constitution for the United States of America.

According to the common law principle, upon which our Constitution was founded, only the race (family) of people forming the sovereignty to adopt the Constitution (We the People) are considered Citizens; all others born inside the country and owing allegiance to "We the People" are natural born subjects. Under principles of international law, that is, inter-racial law (See definition in Webster's Dictionary, 1828), these subjects, who, by special privilege, are licensed to become something or do something normally illegal under the common-law, are said to be citizens and persons.

"But in considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind that there is no law of nations standing between the people of the United States and their Government, and interfering with their relation to each other. The powers of the government, and the rights of the citizens under it, are positive and practical regulations plainly written down. The people of the United States have delegated to it certain enumerated powers, and forbidden it to exercise others." Dred Scott v. Sanford, (1856-
1857) 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393, 452, 15 L.Ed. 691.

It is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment could not be referring to the Citizens known as those of the white race, but must be referring to those artificial citizens of the non-white races.

"...are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside..." Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.

This sentence is interesting, as it not only declares that these "persons" (small p) are "citizens" (small c) of the United
States, but also of the State they choose to reside in.

"No white person born within the limits of the United States, * * * or born without those limits, and subsequently naturalized under their laws, owes the status of citizenship to the recent amendments to the Federal Constitution." Van Valken
burg v. Brown, (1872) 43 Cal 43, 47.

"Prior to the adoption of this amendment, strictly speaking, there were no citizens of the United States, but only some one of them. Congress had the power 'to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,' but not the power to make a naturalized alien a citizen of any state. But the states generally provided that such persons might, on sufficient residence therein, become citizens thereof, and then the courts held, ab convenienti, rather than otherwise, that they became ipso facto citizens of the United States." Sharon v. Hill, (1885) 26 F 337, 343.

Notice the words "some one of them." This refers to citizenship of "some one" of the States. The national government had no
power to make citizens of its own and force them upon the States. The States could make anyone they chose to be a citizen of their State, but only those of the white race could be recognized as national citizens under the Preamble to the Constitution for the united States of America, and be treated as Citizens in any State they entered.

Thus, only white State citizens held the privileges and immunities known to Article 4, Section 2, among the several States, and no State could confer that constitutional protection on any other race. In consequence thereof they also could not authorize a non-white to be an officer of the United States government. These elements were what was referred to as national citizenship, prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, to avoid one State, or the States collectively, at the national level, from interfering in another State's sovereignty, or the sovereignty "We the People".

The Fourteenth Amendment attempts to reverse this natural common-law order of things by making State citizenship dependent upon national citizenship.

"*** By the original constitution, citizenship in the United States was a consequence of citizenship in a state. By this clause [Am 14, sec 1] this order of things is reversed. citizenship in the United States is defined; it is made independent of citizenship in a state, and citizenship in a state is a result of citizenship in the United States. So that a person born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, is, without reference to state constitutions or laws, entitled to all privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States to citizens thereof." U.S. v. Hall, (1871) 26 Fed. Case 79, 81.

"Prior to the adoption of this amendment, strictly speaking, there were no citizens of the United States, but only some one of them. Congress had the power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization," but not the power to make a naturalized alien a citizen of any state. But the states generally provided that such persons might, on sufficient residence therein, become citizens thereof, and then the courts held, ab convenienti, rather than otherwise, that they became ipso facto citizens of the United States." Sharon v. Hill, (1885) 26 F 337, 343.

Notice the words "ab convenienti," which means after the event. This means after the constitutional convention. And the words "ipso facto," which interprets as after the sovereignty was established, composed only of members of the white race (family).

The choice of words here is interesting, as they did not use the words "nunc pro tunc," which means to do what should have
been done in the beginning. In other words, they are not saying they made a mistake by not including other races when the Constitution was framed. They are only claiming to have changed the order of things, regardless of the correctness of the original circumstance.

This section of the Fourteenth Amendment attempts to totally dissolve the State's (people of the State) right to declare its
own sovereign body, it is in violation of State sovereignty, and completely violates Article 4, Sections 2 and 4, and the Ninth
and Tenth Articles in Amendment.

"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."

"A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."

"No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due." Constitution for the united States of America, Article 4, Section 2.

"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Ninth Article in Amendment to the Constitution for the united States of America. Ninth Article in Amendment, Constitution for the United States of America."

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Tenth Article in Amendment to the Constitution for the united States of America." Tenth Article in Amendment, Constitution for the United States of America.

To understand that not only Article 4, but all other Articles, 1 through 7, were written only for the government of and for the white race, thereby barring those not of the white race from coming under their protection, you are referred to the case
of Crandall v. Connecticut, (1834) 10 Conn 340.

"The first Congress after the constitution was adopted, was composed of many of those distinguished patriots, who framed the constitution, and from that circumstance would be supposed to know what its spirit was. Some of the earliest work they performed for the country, was to establish by law a uniform rule of naturalization. The first law was by Congress in 1790, and in its precise and technical language is used: 'Any alien, being a free white person, may become a citizen, by complying with the requirements hereinafter named.' In the year 1795, a further regulation was made by law, when the same language was used: 'Any free white person may become a citizen,' &c. In 1798-1802-1813, and 1824, similar laws were passed, on the same subject, and in each of those laws, the same technical language is used. These laws were carrying into effect the constitution itself; and if the constitution in any part of it embraced coloured persons as citizens, then Congress mistook its duty, and early departed from its provisions. Congress have also marked this distinction of colour in the post-office laws 'No person of colour can be engaged in the post-office, or in the transportation of mail.' This is a right open to all but persons of colour." Crandall v. Connecticut, (1834) 10 Conn 358.

"To my mind, it would be a perversion of terms, and the well known rule of construction, to say, that slaves, free blacks, or Indians, were citizens, within the meaning of that term, as used in the constitution. God forbid that I should add to the degradation of this race of men; but I am bound, by my duty, to say, they are not citizens. I have thus shown you that this law is not contrary to the 2d section of the 4th art. of the constitution of the United States; for that embraces only citizens." Ibid, at 347.

Note the word "citizen" as it used in Crandall. For the definition of the word "citizen," I refer you to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., (1859):

"CITIZEN, persons. 3. All natives are not citizens of the United States; the descendants of the aborigines, and those of African origin, are not entitled to the rights of citizens. Anterior to the adoption of the constitution of the United States, each State had the right to make citizens of such persons as it pleased. That constitution does not authorize any but white persons to become citizens of the United States; and it must therefore be presumed that no one is a citizen who is not white." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed. (1859), Title "Citizen," p. 231.

"CITIZEN, persons. 2. Citizens are either native born or naturalized. Native citizens may fill any office; naturalized citizens may be elected or appointed to any office under the constitution of the United States, except the office of president and vice president. The constitution provides, that 'the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.' " Ibid, at p. 231.

This leaves no doubt who, under the organic law of this nation, are solely defined as Citizens (Persons), or what race is the sovereign body. No one else is included. The Fourteenth Amendment is an attempt to unseat the organic law and I would
question any and all government officials who would condone this type of deception.

Notice in your reprints of the Constitution for the united States of America, Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3:

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons." Constitution for the united States of America, Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3.

Upon checking the Constitution for the Confederate States of America, the people of the Confederacy, who knew and understood the organic law of this nation, reworded the Preamble and Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3, as follows:

"We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character, in order to form a permanent federal government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity--invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God--do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
Confederate States of America." Preamble to the Constitution for the Confederate States of America.

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, which may be included within this
Confederacy, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined, by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all slaves." Constitution for the Confederate States of America, Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3.

Notice "We, the people" and "to ourselves and our posterity" were preserved. Also, notice the substitution of the word "Per-
sons" for that of the word "slaves."

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;..." Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.

This sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, seems to make all State Constitutions which set their sovereign body as the white race only, such as Oregon's Constitution, null and void.

"In all elections not otherwise provided for by this constitution, every white male citizen of the United States,..." Oregon Constitution, (1859) Article 2, Section 2.

and others, such as:

"The electors or members of the general assembly shall be free white male citizens of the State,..." Georgia Constitu-
tion, (1865) Article 5, Section 1.

"Every free white man at the age of twenty-one years being a native or naturalized citizen of the United States,..." North Carolina Constitution, (1856) Article 1, Section 3, Clause 2.

"Every white male citizen of the commonwealth, resident therein, aged twenty-one years and upwards, being qualified to exercise the right of suffrage..." Virginia Constitution, (1830) Article 3, Section 14.

"That every white male citizen of this State, above twenty-one years of age, and no other, having resided twelve months within the State, and six months in the county,..." Maryland Constitution, (1810) Article 14.

"All elections of governor, senators, and representatives shall be by ballot. And in such elections every white free man of the age of twenty-one years,..." Delaware Constitution,
(1792) Article 4, Section 1.

See Neal v. Delaware, (1880) 103 US 370, 26 L.Ed. 567, as to nullification of State Constitutions under Article Six. of the Constitution for the United States

All of these provisions of the Constitutions for the States seem to now be null and void if the Fourteenth Amendment is con-
sidered as a valid amendment to the Constitution for the united States of America, which it certainly is not. No State legisla-
ture could change the governing class which put the legislature into being and which class was set in their own State constitution.

Here we must also note the difference between the Fourteenth Amendment's "privileges and immunities" clause and the "privi-
leges and immunities" clause of Article 4, Section 2. Maxwell v Dow, (1900) 176 US 581, 592-93, 20 S.Ct. 448, 44 L.Ed. 445.

"...nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.

Notice how close the wording of this sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is to the wording of the Fifth Article in Amend-
ment:

"...nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Fifth Article in Amendment, Constitution for the united States of America.

Notice the Fourteenth Amendment deviates from the Fifth Article in Amendment on the issue of compensation. The Fourteenth Amendment says, "equal protection," where the Fifth Article in Amendment says, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

The problem, as I see it, in this change of wording, is to give martial law properties to the Fifth Article in Amendment,
thereby converting the common-law remedial effect of the Fifth Article in Amendment, to a martial law remedy. This could be why the courts use the word "purview" when referencing the Articles in Amendment One through Eight in relation to the Fourteenth Amendment.

"Purview. Enacting part of a statute, in contradistinction to the preamble. The part of a statute commencing with the words 'Be it enacted,' and continuing as far as the repealing clause; and hence, the design, contemplation, purpose, or scope of the act." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. (1979).

As I see it, when the judges speak of any common-law remedy, principle or maxim as being within "purview" of the Fourteenth Amendment they are converting a common-law remedy, principle or maxim, to martial law remedy, principle or maxim of law. In such cases the common-law remedy, principle or maxim is eliminated and, of course, the unalienable rights of the Citizen are also eliminated, in favor of martial rule.

This conversion of the common law to properties of martial law nature is obvious. The Fourteenth Amendment with military
force to enforce it, allows all races to govern, a maxim which violates the common-law with the power (force) of martial law.

According to these principles, we must take another look at this portion of the 14th Amendment. What is "due process" under
the Fourteenth Amendment? Amazingly enough, "due process" is completely defined within the amendment by the integral words that follow those very terms, "equal protection of the laws."

Nothing more than "equal protection of the law" is required to satisfy the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, equal tyranny and deprivation of common-law rights to all meets the equal protection principle. So, what protection is
given? Answer: As much as the national government wishes to give, and no more. Congress protection can be enlarged and contracted as much as Congress and administrative agencies wish, provided, only that these changes affect all equally. If everyone is chained to a post for their own protection then they have "equal protection of the law," under Martial Rule.

To see the clear and inherent weakness of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we look below to find that
the common-law principles clearly known to the Bill of Rights do not apply to the Fourteenth Amendment and Due Process.

[9, 10] "The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth Amendment protects very few rights because it neither incorporates any of the Bill of Rights nor protects all rights of individual citizens...Instead this provision protects only those rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal government; it does not protect those rights which relate to state citizenship..." Jones v. Temmer (Aug. 1993) 829 F. Supp. 1226.

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
SPRING 1979
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO COMMEMORATIVE ISSUE

TITLED
"ORDERED LIBERTY"
by John T. Noonan Jr, professor of LAW, UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA.

"...Cardozo read the decisions he cited expansively, making it clear that in his view the corresponding provision of the Bill of Rights were no part of fourteenth amendment due process.' Here the law review cites Twining v. New Jersey:

"The right of trial by jury in civil cases, guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment (Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 US 90), and the
right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment (Presser v. Illinois, 116 US 252), have been distinctly held not to be privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by the States, and in effect the same decision was made in respect of the guarantee against prosecution, except by indictment by grand jury, contained in the Fifth Amendment (Hurtado v. California, 110 US 516), and in respect of the right to be confronted with witness es, contained in the Sixth Amendment. West v. Louisiana, 194 US 258. In Maxwell v. Dow, supra, where the plaintiff in error had been convicted in a state court of a felony upon information and by a jury of eight persons, it was held that the indictment, made indispensable by the Fifth Amendment, and the trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, were not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as those words were used in the Fourteenth Amendment... the decision rested upon the ground that this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid the States to abridge the personal rights enumerated in the first eight Amendments, because these rights were not within the meaning of the clause 'privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.' ...We conclude, therefore, that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of National citizenship guaranteed by this clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by the States...

"...it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against State action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law... If this is so, it
is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are
included in the conception of due process of law." Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98-99, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97.

The Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights in the State Constitutions are bound by the principals
of the Common-Law. Courts were bound to include these Common-Law Principals in all of their desisions:

"No position can be more clear than that all the federal judges are bound by the solemn obligation of religion to regulate their decisions agreeably to the Constitution of the United States, and that it is the standard of their determination in all cases that come before them." U.S. v. Callender, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,709.

But the Due Process of the 14th Amendment is not part of the Bill of Rights therefore the due Process of the 14th Amendment is not bound by the principals of the Common-Law. Therefore, any reference to Amendments One through Eight, when applied to the State, or through purview of the Fourteenth Amendment in any way, replaces the common law thereof with Martial Rule. This is pure theft of our God given common law birthright.

The purpose of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is to:

1. Convert common-law citizens to statutory citizens and statutory persons under martial rule; and,

2. Convert common-law remedies, principles and maxims in Articles One through Ten in Amendment to martial law remedies, principles and maxims through the Fourteenth Amendment; and,

3. Convert common-law rights to property to martial law confiscation of property, in which a private citizen is not capable of
protecting his property under the common-law; and,

4. Completely remove the common-law jurisdiction from the original people and their posterity and convert them to statutory
persons who can be brought within purview of the Fourteenth Amendment under national international martial rule; and,

5. Completely destroy the restrictions on those not of the white race to enter our nation and dislodge the people mention in the Preamble as the governing body of this white nation; and,

6. Completely destroy the ability of the said people to govern by allowing those not of our race to hold elected office, both State and National.

All this is done with the intention of breaking down State sovereignty by an increased power of the national side of the United States government with a corresponding loss of power for State sovereignty on the federal side of the United States. This
leaves the existence of the United States government less dependent, or not dependent at all, upon the existence of the
Several States.

The Fourteenth Amendment set the stage for the destruction of white rule under Christian doctrine in the United States of
America.

Ultimately, they will not succeed, as God has designated this land for the regathering of the twelve tribes of Israel to become a mighty nation again, and so it will be as God has proclaimed.

The nation is awakening slow but sure, and the day is not far off when this nation will arise and cast out from their midst all of the legislation that is in contradistinction to her organ ic God given laws.

The next section of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:

"Sec. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-president of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis for representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State." Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2.

The purpose of the initial sentence of section two is clear by its own terms, Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,

..." The intention is to give those persons, previously known as chattels, a whole character and to give that character representation as a citizen; accordingly, allowing the States to claim those persons for purposes of representation in the United States government. Elk v. Wilkins, (1884) 112 US 94, 102, 5 S.Ct. 41, 28 L.Ed. 643.

What does the original Constitution say on the subject?

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons." Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3, Constitution for the united States of America.

Under Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3, we can see that the Framers understood that they would not allow the direct taxation
of property in the several States, by the United States, by excluding those persons held in servitude as property from apportionment for direct taxes. The only exception made was that of counting those persons at three-fifths of their actual enumeration and adding that to the whole number of free persons.

At the time of adoption of the Constitution for the united States of America, the southern States feared that they would be
powerless in the new government due to low population of free persons in those States. A compromise was struck which allowed additional representation for the populace held as slaves, with a corresponding increase in taxation for the additional representation. This carried two benefits with the new government; (1) more revenue would be generated by the United States from these States; and, (2) these States would be more likely to ratify the Constitution, having more equal authority in the central government. But even here, representation and direct taxes were not considered on the same level. See, 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 195 (1906).

The first sentence of section two of the Fourteenth Amendment is wholly in conflict with, and in contradiction to, Article
1, Section 2, Clause 3, as well as the Preamble. The only reason these persons (Slaves) were even given a three-fifths character in the United States Census was for the purpose of taxation, which, incidentally, prevented the slave States from suffering a lack of sufficient representation in the United States House of Representatives. By no means was this three-fifths character to imply any direct representation of the persons to whom it related. See 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 107 (1906).

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, if any State refuses to give this class suffrage in State elections, by the terms of section
two (14th Am.), a disability is imposed. When this disability is imposed the State subjected to the disability loses the three
fifths representation it had based upon the number of such "persons" and for that reason is repugnant to the organic law.

Rather than returning a State to its original standing or representation under Article 1 by counting non-whites as three
fifths for purposes of taxation and incidental representation, the uncooperative State is forced into the very condition the
Framers of the Constitution intended to prevent by the compromise struck at the Constitutional Convention. And since section two of the Fourteenth Amendment makes no mention of taxation, it is presumable that the State would still be taxed according to at least three-fifths apportionment for the number of those persons inhabiting the State, an unequal taxation never intended. See The Federalist, No. 34.

Moreover, without the three-fifths disability place upon non-whites, the people mentioned in the Preamble to the Constitu
tion for the united States of America, or, rather, their posterity, no longer can maintain their superior character over their
own governmental affairs as the founders and sovereignty of the government. This amounts to no less than allowance of a foreign invasion into the several States of the Union, sanctioned by Congressional (State and Federal) legislation against the people of the States in violation of their respective sovereignties.

One thing that must be noted: although this disability would be imposed upon the States that were uncooperative, they could
still deny suffrage to the Subjects of the United States.

In section two of the Fourteenth Amendment, Indians not taxed were still excluded as they are in Article 1, Section 2,
Clause 3. The reason "Indians not Taxed" (taken) were still excluded is because of their allegiance to, and membership in, a
separate racial sovereignty, that is, the Indian nations. See, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 626.

Elk v. Wilkins, (1884) 112 US 94, 102, later determined that holding Indians outside the consideration for representation was
wholly inconsistent with destruction of racial distinction proposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is speculated by this
commentator that this decision was made, because, to decide otherwise would reveal the racial sovereignty principles of the
Constitution in Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 and the Preamble. The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to destroy the common-law ideal that each race (enlarged family) constituted a separate sovereignty in their own governments. It should be noted that this principle (destruction of racial recognition) has now been extended to all races including artificial juristic persons (corporations etc.) even though the Fourteenth Amendment initially was put into existence on the proposition that it was only intended to benefit the African race.

"The Fourteenth Amendment is to be liberally construed to carry out the purpose of its framers, but it is not to be restricted in its application because designed originally to rectify an existing wrong. The amendment was adopted soon after the close of the civil war, and undoubtedly had its origin in a purpose to secure the newly-made citizens in the full enjoyment of their freedom. But it is in no respect limited in its operation to them. It is universal in its application, extending its protective force over all men, of every race and color, within the jurisdiction of the States throughout the broad domain of the Republic." 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 256; See also, authorities cited therein.

It is no wonder that this amendment has been held to apply to artificial (juristic) citizens , since its purpose was to artificially, by operation or fiction of law to, confer citizen ship on classes never recognized as Citizens under common-law principles that are based upon the natural law of our Heavenly Father. See the Seventh Commandment, Deuteronomy 5:18
(adultery), Luke 18:20 (adultery)

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:

"Sec. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability." Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3.

This provision, at first glance, was obviously intended to punish the active southern participants in the Civil War. But
this section, like the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment later proved to deprive the rights of Citizens in the so-called north-
ern States as well. For instance, under this section Congress enacted legislation requiring Citizens to take an oath of alle-
giance before being allowed to vote (thus interfering with their right of suffrage and exercise of sovereignty) and before obtain-
ing judgments in the courts of the United States (thus interfering with the Citizens right to obtain remedy).

The oath spoken of was created during the civil war and continued thereafter under the martial law of this section of the
Fourteenth amendment. It was created with the intent to circumvent any exercise of State sovereignty, either by conventions of the people of the State or by acts of their legislature which could interfere with the unauthorized superiority exercised by
the United States government through the force of martial law.

"...it shall be the duty of the heads of the several departments to cause to be administered to each and every officer, clerk, or employee, now in their respective departments, or in any way connected therewith, or who shall hereafter in any way become connected therewith, to following oath, viz.: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign, and that I will bear true faith, allegiance, and loyalty to the same, any ordinance, resolution, or law of any State Convention or Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding; and, further, that I do this with a full determination, pledge, and purpose, without any mental reservation or evasion whatsoever; and, further, that I will well and faithfully perform all the duties which may be required of me by law. So help me God." And that each and every such civil officer and employe, in the departments aforesaid, or in any way connected therewith, in the service or employment of the United States, who shall refuse to take the oath or affirmation herein provided, shall be immediately dismissed and discharged from such service or employment." An Act requiring an Oath of Allegiance, and to support the Constitution of the United States, to be administered to certain Persons in the Civil Service of the United States. Approved August 6, 1861, Ch. 64, Section 1, 12 Stat. 326.

Also see the oath prescribed for West Point cadets in An Act providing for the better Organization of the Military Establishment. Approved August 3, 1861, Ch. 42, Section 8, 12 Stat. 287, 288.

The Oath of Allegiance was also used in many other relations. To obtain a judgment in the Courts of the United States and to raise claims in its departments and bureaus, for instance, Congress enacted:

"...the commanders of all American vessels sailing from ports in the United States to foreign ports, during the continuance of the present rebellion, and all persons prosecuting claims either as attorney or on his own account, before any of the departments or bureaus of the United States, shall be require to take the oath of allegiance, and to support the Constitution of the United States (or affirm, as the case may be,) as required of persons in the civil service of the United States, by the provisions of the act of Congress approved August Sixth, eighteen hundred and sixty one...." An Act requiring the commanders of American Vessels sailing to foreign ports and Persons prosecuting Claims, to take the Oath of Allegiance. Approved July 17, 1862, Ch. 205, Section 1, 12 Stat. 610.

"....Provided, however, That in order to authorize the said court to render a judgment in favor of any claimant, if a citizen of the United States, it shall be set forth in the petition that the claimant, and the original and every prior owner thereof where the claim has been assigned, has at all times borne true allegiance to the Government of the United States, and whether a citizen or not, that he has not in any way voluntarily aided, abetted, or given encouragement to rebellion against the said Government, which allegations may be traversed by the Government, and if on the trial such issue shall be decided against the claimant, his petition shall be dismissed. An Act to amend "An Act to establish for Investigation of Claims against the United States," approved February twenty-fourth, eighteen hundred and fifty-five. Approved March 3, 1863, Ch. 152, Section 12, 12 Stat. 765, 767.

"...Whenever it shall be material in any suit or claim before any court to ascertain whether any person or party asserting the loyalty of any such person to the United States during such rebellion, shall be required to prove affirmatively that such person did, during said rebellion, consistently adhere to the United States and did give no aid or comfort to persons engaged in said rebellion; and the voluntary residence of any such person in any place where, at any time during such residence, the rebel force or organization held sway, shall be prima facie evidence that such person did give aid and comfort to said rebellion and to the persons engaged therein." An Act to provide for Appeals from the Court of Claims, and for other Purposes, Approved June 25, 1868, Ch. 71, Section 3, 15 Stat. 75.

Also see An Act making Appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial Expenses of the Government for the Year
ending the thirteenth of June, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, Approved July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235.

All of these acts of martial law that require an oath of allegiance from people who are already Citizens within the original meaning of the constitution, are given a continuing affect through section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under these acts
under section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Citizens are or could be treated as being guilty of insurrection or rebellion
until they prove themselves innocent. This is again a reversal of the common-law maxim that one is innocent until proven guilty
and contrary to the intent of the Fifth Article in Amendment, Constitution for the United States of America.

For those of you that take offense to the use of the terms "Civil War," as opposed to "the war between the states," as one
party has already pointed out to me, upon due consideration I continue to use those terms for a reason. The cause of this war
was the attempt of the national government to interfere in the sovereignty of the several States through national civil law;
thus, the actual controversy, political as well as military, is known as the "Civil War."

This was a war over the intrusion of civil law upon the common law. Diamond v. Harris, (1830) 33 Tex 634, 638, calls the civil law (statutory law) superior equity.

"It is difficult to see how the courts of this State are to ignore the common law as a rule of decision, when it is made so by statute, and adopt the civil law, even though it have the merit of superior equity." Diamond v. Harris, (1830) 33 Tex 634, 638.

In the meantime civil law was the form of law imposed in the Roman Empire which was largely, if not wholly, governed by martial rule.

Equity has always been understood to follow the law; to have superior equity, is to turn things on their head. This is exactly
what happens when martial law is imposed. If equity is the law, then it follows its own course rather than following the common law, thereby destroying the common law and leaving what is called equity in its place. I can't even begin to count the number of times judges, lawyers and statesmen have said, "There isn't any common law anymore. It has been replaced by statutes." They would be more truthful if they said, "There isn't any common-law any more it has been replaced by martial law."

The 1789 Judiciary Act, Section 16 (1 Stat. 82) prevented the courts of the United States from entertaining a suit in
equity where there was an adequate remedy at law.

"Sec. 16. And be it further enacted, That suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law." An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, Approved September 24, 1789, Ch. 20, Section 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82.

This statute was taken from a principle well known to the common law and was made by men who participated in the creation of our Constitution. The civil law that followed the Civil War is found to be this so-called "Superior Equity" instituted under the police power created in the Fourteenth and related Amendments. This so-called "superior equity" can only be imposed under condi tions of martial rule where the law is in suspension.

If the judiciary has no right to proceed in equity when the law provides adequate remedy, how does the Congress propose to
statutize principles of equity, and then claim to have made law? It would seem that such a practice is wholly unlawful, in light
of legal principles known to the Constitution and to the several States at the time of its adoption.

As well, it must be noted that martial law is known, for the most part, to follow the course set by men rather that the course
set by law, its jurisdiction being based on force and coerced consent. It must be justified by those imposing it or they eventually will be held liable for damages caused by its imposition.

What is called proclaiming martial law is no law at all; but merely for the sake of public safety, in circumstances of great emergency, setting aside all law, and acting under military power; a proceeding which requires to be followed by an act of indemnity when the disturbances are at an end. 8 Atty. Gen. Op. 365, 367, February 3, 1857.

The Framers understood common-law to be superior law in all areas where it could be given effect. In fact the Constitution
for the United States of America incorporates the common-law in many of its provisions by using common-law terms which only the common-law can define.

It should not be forgotten, that the first laws of the United States carry great weight in construction of the powers given in the Constitution for the united States of America, as well as the lawful manner of instituting those powers. 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 264-265 (1906).

"To all this mass of proof we have still to add, that Congress has repeatedly legislated upon the same construction of the Constitution that we have given. Three laws, two of which were passed almost immediately after the Government went into operation, will be abundantly sufficient to show this. The two first are particularly worthy of notice, because many of the men who assisted in framing the Constitution, and took an active part in procuring its adoption, were then in the halls of legislation, and certainly understood what they meant when they used the words 'people of the United States' and 'citizen' in that well considered instrument." Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1856 - 1857), 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393, 419, 15 L.Ed. 691.

While the distinction between law and equity are now claimed to be abolished by Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Combining both jurisdictions under a singular procedure could only be done outside the judicial power under martial
rule. Some courts still seem to recognize some distinctions in law and equity, possibly to avoid explaining the damage done to
the judicial power by this combination.

Getting back to the point, section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, we can see that the southern States would be disabled
from recovering their sovereignty by portions of this section, because, all that were sympathetic to their cause would be,
and were, refused office in the United States government. This was necessary for the northern revolutionaries to maintain the
results of their usurpation of the Preamble to the Constitution and their imposition of martial law.

According to McKee v. Young, 2 Bart 422, all that is necessary to constitute "aid and comfort" as known in section 3 of the
Fourteenth Amendment is giving the enemy words of encouragement, or expression of favorable opinion while occupying an influential position. 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 627. From this it is obvious that southern public officials were targeted for punishment for their attempts to maintain the power of the Preamble to the Constitution for the united States of America, as well as the principles of Federal government known to and required by that instrument.

NOTE: Secession of the southern States is not condoned, but a recognition that the south seceded due to the usurpatious acts
pursued by the national government is intended. The several States did have the right to withdraw their Senators from the
national government to suspend its operation until such time as it conform itself to the requirements of the constitution. It is
my opinion that secession was used by the northern revolutionaries as justification of for the acts of a usurpatious national
government, and that this mistake should never be repeated.

It has been said that the 13th and subsequent amendments to the Constitution bear the same authority as other provisions of
the Constitution, being amendments thereto, rather than bearing the inferior quality of statutes which may be considered void
when made without authority of the Constitution as adopted.

Not only are these amendments contrary to the original intent of the Framers, which recognized only a white sovereignty
(We the people), but even Congress has treated the Fourteenth Amendment as a mere statute. It is well known that the Constitution for the united States of America may not be amended by statute. Article 5, Constitution for the united States of America. It is presumable that Congress fully understands this fact. An Act of Congress Approved June 6, 1898, Ch. 389 (30 Stat. 432) provides "that the disability imposed by section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution heretofore incurred is hereby removed."

According to Marbury v. Madison, (1803) 5 US (2 Cranch) 137, 174, 2 L.Ed. 60, either the Constitution is the supreme and
paramount law, unchangeable by mere legislative enactment, or it is a futile attempt by the people to control their government.
Either the Fourteenth Amendment has no more standing than a statute or it violates the principles of government proposed by
the original Constitution by allowing Congress to change its provisions by its own legislative authority. See Rogers v. Bellei, (1971) 401 U.S. 815, 91 S.Ct. 1060, 28 L.Ed. 499, dissenting opinion, as to Congress changing the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment by mere legislation. This being the case, the Fourteenth Amendment must be something less than organic law.

Ironically enough, Madison (the defendant in Marbury v. Madison), in the constitutional convention, while moving for the
ratification of the Constitution by the people rather than the State legislatures, agreed that a legislature could not amend the
organic law that put it into existence.

William M. Meigs of the Philadelphia Bar, in "The Growth of the Constitution," See Vol. 8, Fed. Stat. Anno. reports Madison's views:

"Madison thought the legislatures clearly incompetent (to ratify the United States Constitution) for the very changes proposed would make essential inroads on the State Constitution, and a legislature cannot change the constitution under which it exists." 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 243.

On this, and other basis, the Constitution for the united States of America was ratified by conventions of the people of the States rather than the State legislatures. This raises another important question: Were or are the State legislatures competent to ratify amendments to the Constitution, such as the Fourteenth Amendment, which effectually change the State constitution
by the inroads made into it?

Obviously the constitutional convention thought that the State legislatures are incompetent to ratify any organic law that
adversely affected (changed) their State constitutions. Therefore, this would appear to give further validity to the proposi tion that the State legislatures may only amend the Constitution for the united States of America according to Article 5 thereof,
when the purpose of the amendment is to hold the United States government to the limits of its original powers. Ratification of
any amendment, which expands power of the United States government, beyond its original limits, must, therefore, by any theory, be ratified by conventions of the people of the class mentioned Preamble in their respective States.

NOTE: The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were not ratified by conventions of the people, and those amendments undermine the States' constitutions by depriving both the governments of the several States and the sovereign people of the several of a great deal of their powers, by purporting to transfer power to the national government.

It must also be noted:

"There is no sounder rule of interpretation (of the constitution) than that which requires us (the court) to look at the whole of an instrument, before we (the court) determine a question of construction of any particular part..." U.S. v. Morris, (1851) 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,815; See also Madison in The Federalist, No. 41 and 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 253.

Could this be why there are great efforts being put forth with the so-called "Con-Con" to call a constitutional convention
to give final validity to these usurpatious acts of American legislators?

Regardless of this fact, it is obvious that the northern usurpation of the Constitution for the united States of America favoring international [interracial] law was to be protected from southern resistance by martial law. By section 3 of the Four-
teenth Amendment Congress would be allowed to decide when the principles of the Preamble were dead and when those who maintained those principles were also dead, or when they were no longer a threat to these usurpatious acts against our Constitution.

Considering the weight of the evidence, that the Fourteenth Amendment is of martial law jurisdiction, we can begin to under-
stand why it was thought that Congress might repeal the disabilities of Section 3 without constitutional amendment, outside of
the scope of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18, Constitution for the United States of America.

Over the years the patriots have had a great deal of trouble accessing the judicial power. Since martial law suspends the
judicial power along with other regular powers of government this is quite under standable. Congress' power is, practically speaking, unlimited where the regulation of courts subjected to martial rule are concerned. Therefore, why would Congress think that their power over the martial law measures in general is limited to the Constitution?; especially since Congress claimed power under martial law with the power clauses of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Thirteenth Amendment, Section 2, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 and Fifteenth Amendment, Section 2.

A known maxim to the common law is that it supersedes the military power. The framers of our national Constitution under-
stood this principle when they limited Congress power to make military appropriations to a maximum term of two years. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 12, Constitution for the United States of America. Many constitutions of the several States also make this clear by requiring the military power to bear arms to remain subordinate to the civil power.

For example:

The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence (sic) of themselves, and the State, but the Military power shall be kept in strict subordination of the civil power. Oregon Constitution, (1859) Article 1, Section 27.

The Second Article in Amendment also makes the subordination of the military power to the will of the people clear.

Some say we did not adopt the whole of the common law of England. This is true to a certain extent. We did not adopt the
monarchy and the feudal law of England. We did adopt so much of the common law as was intended by the Framers of the Constitution and those who ratified it. By the Ninth Article in Amendment it is clear that all rights known to Englishmen were adopted, were to be retained by the people. In addition, "the people" also assumed unto themselves the powers of sovereignty, and the rights related thereto as clearly indicated by the Tenth Article in Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This is the American common-law.

In the Declaration of Rights and Resolves (1774), as well as the Declaration of Independence (1776), some of the men who
framed the Constitution, complained of the force used by the King of England that resulted in the loss of trial by jury and violation of other many rights now known to be protected by the Bill of Rights. At that time of American history the King of England was already using military force (martial law) to govern the colonies to deprive Americans of their rights.

Therefore, it cannot be presumed that Congress was ever given power to use martial law of any form to govern within the
several States.

Next is Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

"The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void." Fourteenth Amendment, Section 4, United States Constitution.

As previously in this article, we will continue to dissect the Fourteenth Amendment, with a view to its legal effects sentence by sentence, continuing with the remaining portion of Section 4 and going on through section 5.

The first sentence of section 4 provides:

"The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned." Fourteenth Amendment, Section 4.

For years, as patriots, we have been questioning the issue and use of paper money by the national government. Of course we
know that the main medium which plagues us is the Federal Reserve Note. In our zeal to uphold the original intent and purpose of our Constitution we have made a fatal error, we have ignored this provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The arguments that have been used against these Bills of Credit have always focused on Article 1, section 8, Constitution for the United States of America. For instance, we know that Congress is empowered to Coin money, not print it.

"The Congress shall have Power * * * To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;" Article 1, section 8, Clause 5, Const. for the U.S. of A.

Under this clause Congress fixed the unit of measure for money coined by the United States at 416 grains of standard silver (Legal Tender Cases, (1870) 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 593, 20 L.Ed 287), calling the unit of measure a dollar. This made the
dollar's silver a standard by which all other money, foreign as well as domestic, would be measured. As a result, there is no
such thing as a gold standard in the United States. Congress has the power to change the weight of a gold dollar without affecting the standard in silver. In fact, Congress is duty bound to change the gold coin when it no longer reflects a true comparative value to the standard (a dollar's silver).

Consequently legislation can be found, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, changing the amount of gold contained in a gold dollar. Don't forget the term dollar reflects a unit of silver. When the term dollar is used with respect to gold it becomes a comparative term between the value of gold and silver, with silver being the constant and gold, in a sense,
being given a respective value according to true economic conditions.

The only way that one could avoid being compelled to accept a gold dollar of lessor weight for the completion of contracts
was to make specific reference to the weight of gold to be transferred for payment, thus treating the gold as a commodity rather than a monetary unit for purposes of the specific contract. Legal Tender_Cases, (1884) 110 US 421, 449, 4 S.Ct. 122, 28 L.Ed. 204.

Although Congress had this power, concerning gold currency, Congress cannot be deemed to have power to pass legislation which intended to reflect other than the parity between the standard of measure (dollars silver) and the gold dollar. To do so would be to deprive those contracting in gold dollars of property, without due process of law, in that they could not recover the true intrinsic value of their contracts. This would violate the Fourth Article in Amendment by seizing property without warrant or probable cause upon oath or affirmation, and would violate the Fifth Article in Amendment by either taking private property for public use without just compensation or by depriving property without due process of law.

The question is, can Congress issue paper and declare it to have an unrelated value in gold or silver, or can it issue the same without redemption and force these Bills of Credit to circulate among private Citizens by operation of law? There is sufficient authority in the original Constitution to show Congress was never intended to exercise such a power, or at least not to
exercise its power in such a way.

In the constitutional convention Sherman, in relation to Article 1, section 10, (Const. for the U.S. of A. said that "he thought this was a favorable moment for crushing paper money." 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 177. This was an extension of the convention's
"determination to prevent the evils of paper money, already manifested by striking out from the powers of Congress the power to 'emit bills on the credit of the United States'." 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 178.

It should be noted that only the States were directly prohibited from interfering in the obligation of contracts. During the house and senate debates on H.J.R. 192 this prohibition was brought into view, and it was answered that the prohibition did not apply to the federal government. While this may be true, the Fourth and Fifth Articles in Amendment of the Bill of Rights accomplish the same thing by prohibiting the seizure of property without warrant or the deprivation of property without due process of law. A man has property in his contracts and if the obligations of contract are interfered with, then that property is
deprived of the parties to the contract. If this deprivation takes place without proper judicial proceedings conducted within
the limitations of the Bill of Rights the taking of property is without authority of law.

When the question of Bills of Credit, in relation to the powers of Congress, was raised in the convention, the power was offered with the clause "to borrow money" on the credit of the United States. Governor Morris moved to strike out the words "and emit bills on the credit of the United States." Madison thought it would be enough to prohibit them from being made a tender. Ellsworth thought this a favorable moment to bar the door against paper money; Read, that the words, if not struck out, would be "as alarming as the mark of the beast in Revelation". On this basis, the words were struck out by nine States to two. See 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 148, 149.

It is obvious from the convention, as well as the powers granted to Congress concerning coinage of money and borrowing of
money on the credit of the United States, that no direct or implied power was given Congress to force circulation of its
evidences of debt as a currency. While Congress has power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, Congress has no power to force any one to lend to the government, much less the power to spend debt into circulation, without the intention of repayment whatsoever, as in the case of Federal Reserve Notes. Promises to pay are not payment.

As a result of the money (credit) question, raised by the fourth section of the Fourteenth Amendment, I have found it necessary to review the Legal Tender Cases. For the most part those cases were decided during and after the Civil War reconstruction period of the Civil War era when Martial Law was in full bloom in the United States. By looking at these cases in this new light, much can be gained in the way of understanding the money issue, as well as the Constitution in general.

From the Legal Tender Cases we first see that the supreme court of the United States initially declared the legal tender
statutes of February 25th, 1862, July 11th, 1862, and March 3rd, 1863 be upheld as "war measures, exceptional in their character, not authorized by any express grant of the power to Congress contained in the Constitution, but as not prohibited by its terms, and as justified in view of the great public exigencies which required their adoption". Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 20 L.Ed. 287. In other words paper money was declared legitimate as martial law money, i.e. Military Scrip, an emergency war measure.

The supreme court in Thorington_v_Smith, (1868) 75 U.S. (8 Wall). 1, 9, 19 L.Ed. 361, in an opinion dealing with judgments of the Confederate courts relating to property in dispute in that case, made a statement that is applicable to this early decision favoring legal tender laws, made during the hostilities of the civil war. The court said in Thorington:

"But such a judgment, in such a time, has little authority."

Although this was said in relation to Confederate judgments the principle still applies. In times of war, during imposition of martial law, the will to win and martial law may override all true logic, even down to the principles of the organic law.

It appears that the supreme court held to this principle in the case of Hepburn v_Griswald, (1870) 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 603, 19
L.Ed 513 . In Hepburn, supra, the supreme court reasoned that the exigency which allowed the legal tender character to be accorded to the civil war Greenbacks was over, thus the conditions which implied the power, to make them legal tender, had ended. Thus the law could no longer be held constitutional as in the past.

The dissenting opinion of the chief justice in a later legal tender case reports the holding of the Hepburn court:

"The majority of the court as then constituted, five judges to eight, felt 'obliged to conclude that an act making mere promises to pay dollars a legal tender in payments of debts previously contracted is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated to carry into effect any express power vested in Congress, is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution, and is prohibited by the Constitution." Legal_Tender_Case, (1870) 12 Wall. 571, supra.

The opinion of Hepburn was ordered to be published on January 29th, 1870, and was decided in conference on November 27th, 1870.

"The action of Congress in passage of the first legal Tender Act was * * * placed distinctly upon the ground of the existing imperative need of government, and the legal tender clause was urged and adopted as a war measure." [martial law] Julliard v. Greenman, (1884) 110 U.S. 421, 425, 4 S.Ct. 122, 28 L.Ed. 204.

As many of us know, this is not the first time that the government has claimed certain implied powers as an expedient of war or some other emergency. Martial law measures have consistently been imposed under the guise of "emergencies" of all
kinds, Roosevelt being the greatest offender since Lincoln. The Hepburn court, without directly overruling its previous judgment upholding the legal tender acts, merely declared that the exigency no longer existed and that continued enforcement of the statute must be declared unconstitutional.

After the Hepburn ruling of the supreme court, the United States Attorney General in the cases of Knox v. Lee, and Parker
v. Davis, 12 Wall 457, moved to be heard on the Hepburn question. Julliard v. Greenman, supra, 110 US at 425. These cases were heard almost a year after the Hepburn case, with the court reconstituted. Congress had passed an act allowing for an additional justice and one of the justices concurring in the Hepburn case had retired. These are the conditions under which the question was reheard.

Although the concurring justices in the Hepburn case had not changed their opinion, the legal tender clauses were upheld 5
justices to 4, thus, overturning Hepburn v. Griswald, directly. Many have said this was a packed court, and this may be true.
But, I don't believe it (the court) was packed merely to overturn Hepburn, rather, it was packed to assure that the recent,
and most controversial, Fourteenth Amendment would be upheld in its entirety. The legal tender question, as we will see, was
merely an incident of the Fourteenth Amendment, because of the words of section 4.

In 1870 (December) the reconstituted court, for the most part, claimed to base its ruling overturning Hepburn on the grounds laid out in the dissenting opinion of the Hepburn case. The only real difference in the opinions of the Hepburn court and
this later legal tender case (Knox and Parker, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457) was that the dissenting opinion of Hepburn became the concurring opinion of Knox and Parker, and the concurring opinion of Hepburn became the dissenting opinion of Knox and Parker.

It was noted by the dissenting opinion of Justice Field, 12 Wall. 634, that the court failed to give any reason for overturning Hepburn. The question arises, with the turmoil and flat disloyalty and usurpations involved in adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment still remaining vivid in 1870, did the court dare go to the 4th section of the Fourteenth Amendment for the additional law it needed to justify such an upset in the supreme court. Note that the Fourteenth Amendment was never touted as an amendment that would allow Congress a legal tender power to force paper money on American Citizens.

Justice Field begins his dissent:

"Nothing has been heard from counsel in these cases, and nothing from the present majority of the court, which has created a doubt in the mind of the correctness of the judgment rendered in the case of Hepburn v. Griswold, or of the conclusions expressed in the opinion of the majority of the court as then constituted. That judgment was reached only after repeated
arguments were heard from able and eminent counsel, and after every point raised on either side had been the subject of extend ed deliberation." Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 634.

Obviously, no one had the guts to directly raise the Fourteenth Amendment in defense of the legal tender statutes. And in
fact, you will not find any direct reference to it in the arguments of counsel or the majority opinion of Knox and Parker,
supra. Had the case turned on this point there may have been another civil war spilling more blood than the last.

While I do not wish to go into a great deal of detail about the concurring and dissenting opinions in these cases, the court
did say some things that we will find important to this discussion.

A study of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly reveals the injustice done by the amendment, as well as the
injustice done to obtain assent of the states to adopt it.

The court in Knox and Parker admits that Congress, by its legal tender laws, if declared unconstitutional, has done a
disastrous thing:

"Indeed, legal tender treasury notes have become the universal measure of values. If now, by our decision, it be established that these debts and obligations can be discharged only by gold coin; it, contrary to the expectations of the parties to these contracts, legal tender notes are rendered unavailable, the government has become an instrument of the grossest injustice." Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 530.

By the legal tender law itself the government had become the instrument of gross injustice to the rights of parties who had
contracted for specie payments, now the court is worried that the injustice really done will be revealed. Congress also was worried about this, and that is why we have a provision in the Fourteenth Amendment disallowing any question of the "validity of the public debt", that is, the validity of Congress' action. If no one can question this action then how can the injustice be revealed?

It is further said by the court:

"It is incumbent upon those who affirm the unconstitutionality of an act of Congress to show clearly that it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution." Legal Tender Cases 12 Wall. 531.

It must be noted that the litigants against paper money never addressed the validity of the fourth section of the 14th Amendment. No one contested the constitutionality of the fourth Section, and while the court alluded to its principles, direct
reference to it is avoided like the plague.

Throughout all the legal tender cases the justices in oppo sition to legal tender present a most compelling legal argument,
as well as historical facts and motives of the framers and the people of the States, as references to show that Congress had no
power to enact a legal tender law making paper acceptable as money, as ruled in Hepburn v. Griswald.

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