ISSN: 0898-6827
      A   A   C   A   R     B   U   L   L   E   T   I   N
         of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research,Inc.
         Editor: H. B. PAKSOY                  Vol. IV  No. 1,  Spring 1991
Executive Council: Thomas  Allsen (Trenton State  College) (Ex-
Officio;  Secretary  of the  AACAR  Monograph  Series Editorial
Board); Audrey  L. Altstadt (U of Massachusetts-Amherst); Peter
Golden (Rutgers U); H. B. Paksoy  (U of Massachusetts-Amherst &
Harvard U-CMES)  (Ex-Officio; Editor,  AACAR BULLETIN);  Azade-
Ayse  Rorlich (U of Southern California); Uli Schamiloglu (U of
Wisconsin-Madison); Maria Subtelny (U of Toronto)
                         IN THIS ISSUE
--  HELSINKI  WATCH Report: "Conflict in  the Soviet Union--The
Untold Story of the Clashes in Kazakhstan."
Congress of the United States) Report: "Azerbaijan Elections."
--   SUMMARY of  Discussions at  the Conference  "The Aral  Sea
Crisis: Environmental Issues  in Central Asia" held  at INDIANA
UNIVERSITY, Bloomington, Indiana, July 14-18, 1990
(Chairman of the Moslem Religious  Board for the Transcaucasus;
People's  Deputy  of  the USSR),  to  the  Fourth International
Conference  on  Central   Asia,  held  at  the   UNIVERSITY  OF
WISCONSIN-MADISON, September 27-30, 1990
--  Audrey L. Altstadt, BAKU 1991: ONE YEAR AFTER BLACK JANUARY
--  News of the Profession
--  Book Reviews
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2       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
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(Helsinki  Watch  is  a member  of  the  International Helsinki
Federation for Human  Rights. The  following is reprinted  from
the Helsinki Watch releases)
17 October 1990
Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev
President of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow, USSR
Dear President Gorbachev:
     Helsinki  Watch appeals  to  you, as  head  of the  Soviet
government, to end the long standing official policy of denying
3       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
access to  foreigners, including  journalists, to  most of  the
territory of  the Soviet Union. This  policy seems to  us to be
out  of  step with  the reform  program  you have  initiated in
Soviet life.
     We are also concerned about the veil of officially imposed
secrecy that has shrouded recent instances of unrest in Central
Asia and  the Caucasus.  Foreign journalists  have been  denied
access to those  areas for  several months (Alma-Ata,  Sukhumi,
Ferghana, Baku, Dushanbe,  Osh, etc.) for several  months after
the violent incidents have  ended. By the time these  areas are
open  to  journalists, it  is  hard  to arrive  at  an accurate
picture of  the events that occurred. Journalists traditionally
travel to places of unrest; surely they can judge the safety of
a situation without government interference.
     Local  attempts  --both   official  and  unofficial--   to
investigate  incidents of violence have frequently been stymied
by governmental interference  at various  levels. We hope  that
Soviet  officials   at  all   levels  will   now  allow   these
investigations to proceed  and will  permit the publication  of
the results. Efforts at obfuscation  do not serve the interests
of the peoples of the Soviet Union.
     Restrictions   on  freedom   of   internal  movement,   on
journalists' access, and  on investigations of local  unrest by
independent,  non-governmental organizations  also  fly in  the
face of Soviet  commitments under  the Helsinki process.  After
all,  the  main  aim of  the  Helsinki  process  is to  promote
openness not  only between states but also between citizens and
their governments.
     In an effort to bridge the  gaps in public knowledge about
the disorders in Alma-Ata in December 1986, Helsinki Watch sent
a  mission   to  Kazakhstan   in  May   1990.  We   interviewed
participants  in  the  demonstrations and  produced  a  report,
IN KAZAKHSTAN, We enclose a copy of this  report and a Russian-
language summary.  Since our report is the first in-depth study
of  the Alma-Ata events of December 1986, we hope you will find
it of interest.
     We are also  sending this  report to President  Nazarbaev,
and to the Soviet and Kazakhstan press with the  hope that they
will publish our findings,  thus taking a positive step  in the
interests of true glasnost.
     Sincerely (Jeri Laber, Executive Director).
The following is  excerpted from  the above referenced  report,
Pp. 22-23:
4       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
     --  Beatings  were  probably  the  most frequent  form  of
attack,  primarily by  the militia  and soldiers,  but also  by
demonstrators. One protestor  described her  efforts to save  a
young demonstrator from a severe beating:
     I was badly beaten.  I was warned by a  soldier: "Leave on
the orders of  Moscow." I  tried to  help a young  man who  was
being held by his hair; he  was beaten and bleeding. So I  took
the soldier by  the hair. It  was three  soldiers to one  young
man. Then they took  my arm and pulled behind me.  I started to
scream and one soldier put my hat in my mouth. I was then taken
away  and  later released.  I  saw  many young  women  who were
beaten, with blood on their hair and from their noses.
     -- The beatings  sometimes led to severe injuries  or even
     I  saw a  guy  who was  carried  away by  the  students. A
medical student measured  his pulse. It  was unclear if he  was
alive  or  dead  or  if  he   had  been  badly  beaten.  (Erlan
Initiation of Violence:
     --  Witnesses gave  Helsinki Watch conflicting  reports on
which side had  initiated violence.  Several sources  indicated
the armed forces reacted with  force (hitting people with metal
rods or sappers' spades, or beatings) to demonstrators throwing
rocks (at  the militia/military,  at  the tribunal  , or  state
property such as fire engines or cars). A Man said the violence
began  when  Kazakh protestors  threw  stones at  the tribunal:
"Kazakhs began breaking off parts of  the building and throwing
stones at  the tribunal. Then,  fire trucks were  summoned. One
car was overturned,  a second  car escaped. The  first car  was
burned  and  pushed toward  the  soldiers." Participant  gave a
somewhat  different version  of  events,  saying that  violence
began after demonstrators threw rocks at fire  engines -- after
they  had  been drenched  with cold  water  on a  winter night:
"About  8  pm that  evening, fire  engines  were brought  in to
dampen the  crowds. The demonstrators  threw rocks at  the fire
engines. Also about  8 pm, at the  two far ends of  the square,
two big  military cars were blown  up at the same  time." Early
on,  the  KGB  student  border  guards started  using  sappers'
shovels. A  witness  said  his sources  told  him:  "They  then
summoned students from the KGB border guard academy who carried
short  spades.   These  students  fought   with  demonstrators.
Authorities said  they didn't  hurt anyone  with shovels,  they
just pushed people away. The kazakh say people were hit."
Copies  of  the 100  Pp.  Report  may be  obtained  by writing:
Helsinki  Watch, 485  Fifth  Avenue, New  York,  NY 10017;  or,
5       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
Helsinki  Watch, 1522 K  Street, NW,  Suite 910,  Washington DC
(CSCE; also referred to as the "US Helsinki Commission") by law
monitors and encourages progress in implementing the provisions
of the Helsinki  human rights accords. The  Commission, created
in  1976,  is  made  up  of   nine  U.S.  Senators,  nine  U.S.
Representatives and one official each from the U.S. Departments
of State, Commerce  and Defense. The  publications of the  CSCE
may  be  obtained  by  writing:   Commission  on  Security  and
Cooperation in Europe, Congress of the United States, 237 House
Office Building Annex 2, Washington, DC 20515.
     The  following  are  excerpted  from  the "REPORT  ON  THE
of the U.S. Commission on CSCE, 25  October 1990. A copy of the
full report is available from the above address.
     -- On September 30, 1990,  the first multi-party elections
to the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan took place. There was never
any  doubt, given the  circumstances of the  election, that the
communists would gain control of  the legislature; the question
was whether non-communist  groups, many of whom  had joined the
"Democratic Azerbaijan" coalition, would win any  seats. Though
the final figures are  not yet in, non-communist forces  led by
the Azerbaijan Popular Front  have for the first time  won some
representation in parliament.
     -- The elections took place in a state of emergency, which
has been in effect since January 1990, when the Soviet military
entered Baku in force. Non-Communist groups argued that holding
free and fair  elections under  such conditions was  impossible
and  claimed  that  the  authorities  maintained the  state  of
emergency  in  order  to  facilitate  rigging  the   election's
     -- Colonel  Valery Buniatov,  the  military commandant  of
Baku [who replaced Lt. General V. S. Dubiniak], closed the city
from September 26 to  October 2 to non-residents in  an attempt
to keep out election observers invited by non-communist groups.
Soviet troops met would-be election monitors, including members
of the Moscow  and Leningrad city  soviets, at the airport  and
sent them home.  Nevertheless, Helsinki Commission staff  and a
representative of the US Embassy in Moscow were permitted to go
to  Baku.  They  encountered no  difficulties  in  meeting with
Communist  Party  and  government officials,  as  well  as with
representatives of non-communist organizations.
     -- (From P.12) AFP spokesmen and many others dismissed out
of hand the notion that free elections could be held in a state
of  emergency, when the  highest authority in  the land reposed
6       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
not in the elected representatives of  the people but rather in
a   Soviet   military   commandant    whose   frequent   public
pronouncements  stressed  the primacy  of  order and  warned of
"extremist plots." The 1:00 AM -  5:00 AM curfew did not really
impede  campaigning  but  candidates     complained  about  the
commandant's refusal  to permit  election rallies and  meetings
and their lack  of access  to the media,  despite the  election
law's provisions.
     Opposition  candidates also  pointed  to the  presence  of
Soviet  troops  in  the  city  and  the overall  atmosphere  of
intimidation, especially after  the events of January  1990, as
unconducive to the free expression  of views. Unofficial groups
did  not  always get  permission  to publish  their newspapers,
which were in any  case subject to strict  military censorship.
The APF  could not publish  its weekly  AZADLYG (Freedom)  from
January until May.  After it resumed publication,  according to
Popular  Front  Representatives,  some  editions appeared  with
large sections crossed  out or deleted. The  APF also protested
Colonel Buniatov's insistence that he approve the texts of pre-
election statements of all candidates and that these statements
not "insult" the CPA and President Mutalibov.
SUMMARY of Discussions at the Conference
"The Aral Sea Crisis: Environmental Issues in Central Asia"
INDIANA UNIVERSITY, Bloomington, Indiana, July 14-18, 1990
     Discussions at the conference revealed  a great variety of
opinions  concerning  the nature  of  the  environmental crisis
affecting  Soviet  Central  Asia,   its  origin  and   possible
solutions. It was  impossible to  reach "final" conclusions  on
the  subjects  discussed,  or  adopt  "unanimous"   resolutions
concerning recommended actions, unless such as resolution (like
the proposed  letter to  Mr.  Gorbachev and  Mr. Bush)  remains
purely formal and  symbolic. The  organizers of the  conference
believe that  solutions for  the problems  discussed should  be
worked  out  by  the  five  republics of  Soviet  Central  Asia
themselves; they  cannot be dictated  to them  by anyone  else.
However, we  believe  at the  same  time that  our  discussions
helped clarify the problem and may  help in choosing the course
of future  action. Therefore we  have tried to  summarize below
some  ideas brought up  by the participants  in the conference,
which seem to us  especially important and on which there was a
broad consensus. We would like to emphasize that we do not seek
to propose, let  alone impose,  any solutions of  our own,  and
what  follows  below is  only  a faithful  summary  of opinions
expressed  in  formal  and  informal  discussions  during   the
7       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
conference. It is up to appropriate  bodies in the Soviet Union
to take this summary into consideration.
     The  following   primary  causes  can  be  indicated:  the
"command economy" and  central planning, which not  only proved
to be bankrupt in the entire Soviet Union (and elsewhere in the
world), but, more  specifically, ignored  the needs of  Central
Asia  and  sacrificed  them  in  the  name   of  some  "higher"
priorities; in particular, this was  expressed in an inadequate
investment  by  the  central government  in  the  Central Asian
economy (both agriculture and industry), and in health care and
education,  and  in measures  dictated  from Moscow  with total
disregard of  their environmental  and human  costs in  Central
Asia (like the enforcement of cotton monoculture and the use of
defoliants). The totalitarian political  regime made impossible
any correction of these policies based on independent study and
public opinion.
     One can hope that  with the great changes that  are taking
place now in the Soviet Union the grave environmental situation
in  Central Asia can be corrected  and the damage caused by the
previous fallacious (and sometimes even criminal) policy can be
repaired. It will  require major  efforts on the  part of  both
governmental bodies and  an informed  public, and the  economic
cost of these  efforts will be very high; however,  the lack of
action  or a further  delay in taking  action may  result in an
ecological and economic catastrophe of an even greater scale.
     1.  The  study   of  various   aspects  of  the   critical
environmental situation in  Central Asia has already  continued
in the Soviet Union for quite a while. Given the urgency of the
cause, decision making cannot be delayed indefinitely under the
pretext  that  "insufficient  date"  have  been  collected.  An
authoritative  body  should   give  its  basic  recommendations
already  NOW, that is,  in the fall of  1990. For the situation
with the Aral Sea,  it should be, most probably,  the Committee
which will be  convened in  Nukus in early  October. A  similar
committee may be  URGENTLY formed  to study  other aspects  and
areas of  ecological crisis  in Central  Asia and  to give  its
     2.  The  five  republics   of  Central  Asia  (Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan, Kazakhstan) should form
a  center   coordinating  their   environmental  and   economic
policies,  whose   decisions  should   be  binding  for   their
respective  governments.  Without  such  coordination  one  can
hardly  expect  that any  measures taken  by a  single republic
unilaterally  (especially in a case like  the Aral Sea problem,
which  concerns  all five  republics)  can bring  success. This
8       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
center  should have immediate  authority  (a)  to overrule all-
union and republican agencies, many of which have impeded  even
the  delivery  of  international  humanitarian  assistance   to
environmentally stricken areas  and  (b) to  deal DIRECTLY with
agencies, organizations and corporations outside the USSR which
may  offer  technological  and  organizational  assistance   in
addressing Central Asia's environmental problems.
     3.  The  central  government  is  expected to  assist  the
Central   Asian  republics   in  solving   their  environmental
problems, and  not merely  with expertise  and technical  help:
after all, it  was the policy  of the central government  which
created the present catastrophic situation in Central Asia, and
it should be expected  that the central government will  bear a
major  portion  of  the  expenses  to correct  this  situation.
However, the branches  and agencies of the  central government,
which  are directly  responsible  for  the fallacious  policies
(like Minvodkhoz, SANIIRI,  etc.) and which, therefore,  have a
vested interest in "face saving"  measures, should be prevented
from imposing  their solutions,  and their  role should  remain
purely consultative.
     4. One should  not place  much hope on  applying to  other
countries  (USA,   Japan,  Western  Europe)   or  international
economic agencies for immediate financial help in order to deal
with  the  Central   Asian  environmental   problems;  so   far
experience  shows  that  these   countries  and  agencies   are
reluctant to provide financial help as long as the Soviet Union
has not introduced a COMPREHENSIVE AND WORKING system of market
economy (i. e. a  capitalist economy -- one should  call things
by their proper names), that is, until "perestroika" bears real
fruit.  Without  this precondition  such  assistance would  be,
according to western ideas, "throwing good money after bad."
     1. The  most urgent  measures concern  the improvement  of
health conditions in Central Asia, including:
     (a) Introducing local water purification systems.
     (b)  Building  sewage disposal  systems  and  water supply
systems, first of all in the  regions most severely affected by
ecological  crises  (Karakalpak,  Khorezm  regions),  providing
especially  hospitals,  schools  and kindergartens  with  clean
water and disposal systems.
     (c) Providing increased medical help (emergency hospitals,
pharmacies, supplies of medicines) to  the entire population of
Central Asia,  but especially to the population  of the regions
that are in the most critical environmental situation.
     (d)  Upgrading  or  introducing  prenatal  care,  improved
gynecological  and  pediatric  clinics,  monitoring of  genetic
problems, etc.
9       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
     (e) Proclaiming  --and observing-- an immediate  and total
ban on the use of defoliants  and introducing strict control on
the use of pesticides.
     (f)   Closing   the    nuclear   testing   facility   near
     2.  Other immediate measures  concern the economy insomuch
as it has a direct effect upon the environmental situation:
     (a) Abolition  of cotton monoculture  through an immediate
termination   of  the   system   of   mandatory  state   orders
("goszakaz")  for  agricultural products  and  establishing the
right of  farmers to  choose what  crops  they cultivate;  this
should  be  combined  with  a  mandatory  reduction  of  cotton
cultivation  (especially  in  the  areas  close  to  population
centers); cotton should be replaced by other crops, traditional
in Central Asia, which require less water for irrigation.
     (b) Termination  of rice  cultivation in  most regions  of
Central Asia, where it was introduced in the 1960s and later.
     (c) Introduction of  user fees  for irrigational water  in
major river basins (Amu-Darya, Syr-Darya, Zarafshan, etc.).
     (d)  Termination   of   reclamation  of   new  lands   for
agriculture  based  on  irrigation,   and  termination  of  the
cultivation  of  all saline  lands,  which produce  crops below
allowable standards.
     (e)  Closing  of  industrial enterprises  producing  large
amount  of  hazardous  waste and  located  in  major population
centers (permanently,  or temporarily  --until the construction
of appropriate filtering, treatment, etc. systems.).
     3. Establishment  of  an  inter-republican  Central  Asian
agency  with  wide  administrative  authority  to  control  the
implementation  of ecological  measures agreed upon  among five
Central Asian republics.
     1. Improvement of  irrigation systems, especially covering
the bed of  ALL active  canals with synthetic  or other  lining
(priority should be  for the Karakum  canal, which is the  most
wasteful irrigation canal in the world).
     2.  Introduction  of  modern  systems  of purification  of
drainage water.
     3. Introduction of a system of strict control over the use
of  water, with differentiated  user fees and  severe fines for
waste of water.
     4. Reconstruction  of the  system of  water reservoirs  in
Central Asia, possibly with a great  reduction of the number of
these reservoirs.
10       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
     5.  Renewal and  restoration of  stock-breeding, based  on
private ownership of herds and pastures and improved use of dry
and irrigated pasture lands.
     6.  Increased  investment   in  the  development  of   the
infrastructure,  especially  roads  and communication  systems,
including the communication of Central Asia with outside world.
     7.  Increased  investment  in  the  construction  of small
industrial enterprises  utilizing local raw material  and human
     8. Increased investment in new housing in Central Asia.
Professor Randall Baker                   Professor Yuri Bregel
al-Haj Allahsh k r Pashazade,
Chairman of the  Moslem Religious Board for  the Transcaucasus;
People's Deputy of the USSR
[The following is  extracted from the presentation made  by the
Sheik-ul-Islam  at  the  Fourth   International  Conference  on
Central Asia, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON (September 27-30,
1990). A copy  of the English  translation was provided by  Mr.
     The tradition of Islam was  already thirteen centuries old
by  the  year 1920,  a  turning  point for  my  land,  when the
invasion  of  the Red  Army resulted  in  the overthrow  of the
legitimate  government of  the Azerbaijani  Democratic Republic
and proclamation of Soviet power.
     ....We have to  recognize that the idea  of socialism, its
promising slogans  and declarations proved  attractive for  the
masses of Azerbaijan. Primarily because they responded to their
aspirations  for  social justice,  a  free and  dignified life.
Naturally,  their  hearts   could  not  but  respond   to  such
declarations  in  the  first post-revolutionary  years  as, for
instance, the  Soviet government's  Appeal "To  All Toilers  of
Russia and the East." It stated, among other things:
     "Henceforth, your beliefs and  customs, your national
     and cultural  traditions shall  be declared  free and
     inviolate.  Arrange  your  national life  freely  and
     without hindrance.  You have  a right  to this.  Know
     that your rights, just like the rights of all peoples
     of Russia  are protected by  the entire might  of the
     revolution and its organs..."
11       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
     What could be more convincing  than those words signed  by
Lenin himself?  A religion  free of  supervision, pressure  and
suspicion  of  power,  and government  free  of  anti-religious
sanctions whose  tolerance of  religion promoted  the unity  of
citizens of a  multinational state.  This could  have been  the
ideal of society, the aim of its future development.
     But the  tragedy of  historical reality  was that  neither
during  that  turning  point  nor  in  subsequent  years  could
Communist power  shed its  ideological dogmas  and thus  assess
objectively the sentiments of  believers, their aspirations for
a new life, the ideals of equality and justice.
     In noting this, however, we should  not fall into the trap
of  one-sidedness  or  lose sight  of  ambivalent  positions of
religious   authorities.  True,  there   were  cases   of  open
resistance of the  clergy, including Moslems in  Azerbaijan, to
Soviet  power and its  principles of organizing  a new society.
But  obviously, it  was  primarily  ideological, political  and
practical  considerations  rather   than  the   above-mentioned
factors that determined  the state's  negative attitude  toward
religion  and believers.  Let  us  recall  that in  1922  Lenin
invoked economic need to justify appropriation of multimillion-
ruble-worth  of   valuables  that  belonged  to   churches  and
monasteries,  demanding  the  harshest  penalty  for  resisting
     So,  on the one hand, there were declarations of religious
tolerance, freedom of  conscience, allegedly protected by  law,
and on the other, the  rights of believers and the clergy  were
cynically trampled upon:  they were  subjected to violence  and
became outcasts in society.
     Looking back at the events in those years we see: the more
the government consolidated  its position the more  obvious its
attitude  toward religion became, inexorably bringing closer an
open confrontation aimed at totally annihilating religion.
     A  specific  feature of  Azerbaijan  was that,  unlike the
country's  central  regions,  there  the  Islamic clergy  still
retained their  solid positions in  the 1920s and  continued to
exert   a  substantial   influence   on  the   population.  Any
underestimation of  that reality  could not  but aggravate  the
difficult situation  of  Soviet  power,  which  determined  its
tactic of a  temporary compromise. The influence  of some local
figures brought up in  the spirit and traditions of  the Moslem
environment such as Nariman Narimanov, had also a  certain role
to play.
     But   the  process   of   destruction  could   not  bypass
Azerbaijan. Moreover, it was  particularly devastating here, as
if it sought to make up for the time lost. The waqf lands whose
income was used  for religious needs were  confiscated, sheriat
courts were prohibited and religious educational establishments
were shutdown.
     In addition to "standard" accusations levelled against all
Soviet people, Azerbaijan Moslems were charged with Pan-Turkism
and  Pan-Islamism. The charges were made even against those who
12       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
resisted the transition  from Arabic  characters used for  more
than a millennium to Latin.
     The  cruel repressions  against the  clergy and  believers
were  determined  by  the  very  slogan  of  the  anti-religion
movement: "The struggle  against religion  is the struggle  for
     The blind fanaticism knew no  limits: clerics and ordinary
believers  were  repressed  or shot,  prayer  buildings  of the
Moslem and other confessions were barbarically destroyed. Apart
from  the  famous  Bibi-Heibat   mosque,  a  grandiose  Russian
Orthodox  church,  a  Polish Roman  Catholic  church  and other
religious buildings that were valuable  cultural monuments were
torn down in Baku. The number of mosques in Azerbaijan declined
     The religious structures lay in ruins before World War II.
The space cleared of the annihilated religions was to be filled
with the  cult of Stalin, his deification.  It was only the war
that made the dictator change his religious policy. This was no
reverence of repentance, but a forced necessity prompted, among
other reasons,  by the  desire to  please the  war allies:  the
United States and  Great Britain. 1943-1944 saw  the appearance
of  four  Moslem  Religious  Boards  which covered  the  entire
territory of the Soviet Union. Among them is the Board for  the
Transcaucasus  of  which I  have  been  the head  for  the last
     Certainly,   religion   was  totally   dependent   on  the
government which exercised unremitting control over  activities
of  communities.  It is  an  eloquent  fact that  heads  of the
Council for  Religious Affairs  were appointed  from among  the
members of  the NKVD, a  punitive organization whose  very name
causes older people shudder.
     Khrushchev's   thaw  which  has  a  beneficial  effect  on
society's  life,  did  not, however,  put  an  end  to the  old
attitude toward religion  and believers. Little was  changed in
subsequent years, albeit the wave of violence was abated.
     Until  recently Moslems  were excluded  from social  life,
restricted by the  walls of  mosques that were  in fact  turned
into reservations.  Links to  the external  world and  contacts
with  co-religionists  abroad  were allowed  only  within   the
framework of "the struggle against imperialism, for the triumph
of peace throughout the world."
     We fought  for years to have  a medrese opened in  Baku to
train clerics. But to no avail. It was only the holding  of the
representative international Islamic conference "Moslems in the
Struggle for  Peace" in  Azerbaijan that  helped to  get things
moving. For  something had to be shown to the foreign guests to
prevent  any  doubts  they  might  have  about  the  freedom of
conscience in the USSR.
     Yes, we should  be grateful to  the world public for  even
today much is being done with an eye on the external effect.
     Yes,  major  changes  have  taken  place  in  the life  of
believers  in  recent  years. Slowly  and  with  difficulty new
13       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
shoots sprout in relations between the state  and religion. But
it  seems  to  me   that  the  most  important  thing   is  the
understanding  and recognition  of the  fact that  unscrupulous
atheisation has  had the  most pernicious  effect on  society's
     The  Islamic  clergy  has warmly  welcomed  the  policy of
perestrioka  calling upon believers  to use all  means at their
disposal  to support  the renewal  of society  and  the efforts
aimed  at  its  democratization. For  their  part,  Moslems are
entitled to expect  that the state  will shed its suspicion  of
them  and their faith and will  see them as loyal citizens. For
those who think that  the Moslem religion prescribes enmity  of
Christians are mistaken,  since the Holy Quran  states: "...And
nearest  among them in Love to the  Believers are those who say
'we are Christians'" (Quran, 5-82).
     The  recently heightened  interest in  religion, primarily
from the cognitive perspective, is characteristic of the entire
Soviet Union, all confessions; and  Azerbaijan and Islam are no
exception. This is also  true of the opening of  prayer houses,
spiritual   educational   establishments,   the  expansion   of
publishing activity (though Azerbaijan lags considerably behind
other republics in this respect).
     Naturally, these  beneficial changes are  perceived by our
Moslems  as  a  result of  democratization  of  Soviet society,
legitimate realization of the freedom of conscience recorded in
the Constitution.
     It is regretted  that the revival of  religious life which
is  natural  for the  entire  country is  seen  as a  threat of
"Islamic fundamentalism" in  our case. I  see no root-cause  of
this  in  the  persistence  of  anti-Moslem  stereotypes  which
artificially model a  phenomenon out  of individual facts,  for
certain political purposes.
     By calling for  reason, peace  and good neighborliness  in
the  midst  of  the hard  interethnic  conflict,  both peoples,
Moslems proved their unfailing commitment  to the sacred ideals
of Islam.  We acted  on the  conviction that  both Moslems  and
Christians believed in one Creator. And they  must realize that
the commitment to religious ideals admits no veneration or  the
fanning  up  of interethnic  enmity.  That  it is  the  duty of
preachers  of  all  religions to  prevent  and  overcome ethnic
strife. But, to  our profound regret,  the calls of Moslems  to
unite the efforts of  the two religions were unheeded.  Yet, in
spite of the  very difficult situation,  in our region and  the
country as  a whole, we  still hope for the  better. We believe
that what unites  and bids us together as  members of one human
family is  immeasurably more  profound, solid  and strong  than
that which separates us.
     Let us not spare our efforts  in the name of sacred ideals
of Good, Justice and Brotherhood. May the Most  High help us in
our endeavors.
14       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
by Iraj Bashiri  [Acting Chair, Department of  Russian and East
European Studies, University of Minnesota]
     In  one  of  the  sessions  of  the  Fourth  International
Conference  on  Central Asia  at  the University  of Wisconsin-
Madison (September 27-30, 1990), it was suggested that we might
have underestimated  the intensity  and the  importance of  the
inter-ethnic  rivalries  and struggles  current  in the  Moslem
republics of the Soviet  Union. What follows is an  affirmation
and illustration of that remark.
     I  arrived in Dushanbe on April 19,  1990 as a delegate to
the International Symposium and Music  Festival of East Peoples
devoted to the  1400th anniversary of Borbad. I  found Dushanbe
to  be  a   delightful  city  surrounded  by   the  snow-topped
elevations of Hisar.  The authorities and the  inhabitants were
equally  charming. I was  to participate in  the proceedings of
the Symposium for the next ten days; I hoped to visit Samarkand
and the Noble Bukhara before returning to Minneapolis.
     When at the Tajikistan hotel the authorities collected the
passports as they handed the keys, all hopes for visiting other
places were dashed. Upon expressing my concern to my friend and
guide, however, I discovered that a  trip to Samarkand had been
scheduled as part  of the program  of the Symposium. This  trip
would be realized we were told, if the authorities in Samarkand
kept their promise.
     Meanwhile,  I  had realized  that  a trip  to  Bukhara was
absolutely out  of the question.  Three things seemed  to creep
into my  conversations with the  Tajiks and with  my colleagues
familiar with the Soviet scene. One was the Tajiks' fear of the
Uzbeks. The  UZbeks, the Tajiks  said, would  gladly take  over
Dushanbe just as  wrested Samarkand and Bukhara from  them. The
other  was  the  Tajik's  contention  that both  Samarkand  and
Bukhara,  contrary to  the Uzbeks'  claims, are  Tajik-speaking
urban centers. In order to  prevent the world from  recognizing
these cities  as Tajik centers, the Tajiks  claimed, the Uzbeks
have  restricted access  to them.  The Uzbeks, of  course, deny
this. Finally, a  major stumbling  block to a  trip to  Bukhara
was, I was told, that the monuments of Bukhara, unlike those of
Samarkand, were still  not renovated to  the scale of those  of
Samarkand  and  thus  were not  ready  to  be  presented to  an
international body.
     Fortunately, the Samarkandis came through and on the 27th,
those who  had been allowed to  make the trip  assembled in the
lobby  of  the  hotel. Buses  were  ready  to take  all  to the
airport.  But 8:00  gave way  to 9:00  and 10:00  and still  no
movement. It was rumored that the  Samarkandis had, at the last
moment,  reneged  on their  promise  to allow  their neighbors'
guests a visit to their republic. While these rumors were still
15       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
circulating, however, we were asked to board the buses and soon
after we headed for the airport.
     On  the plane,  before take-off,  the authorities  checked
every name and  eventually asked  the only two  Afghans in  the
group to disembark. This we, the  members of the Symposium, did
not allow.
     In  Samarkand, the visitors were met by the usual offering
of  bread  and  flowers.  A  troop  of  musicians  and  dancers
entertained the visitors.  The guests danced and  talked to the
welcoming  party for about  ten minutes before  heading for the
buses waiting to take us to the monuments.
     At the gate of the airport,  the buses were stopped. After
a few minutes, the drivers and group leaders went to the office
at the gate to find out the reason for the delay. The Tajik and
Uzbek authorities, they said when  they returned, were deciding
which language, Tajik or Uzbek, should be the main language for
describing Samarkand to  the guests. The  Uzbeks felt, we  were
told, that the language of the Republic of Uzbekistan should be
used. They offered to provide translators for Tajik. The Tajiks
were adamant that since all guests knew Tajik there was no need
for Uzbek at all. Meanwhile the  clock was ticking towards 5:00
p.m. when the party was scheduled to return to  the airport for
take-off for Dushanbe.
     This haggling went on for a while longer before the "elder
brother,"  to  use  Stalin's  interpretation,  stepped  in  and
resolved the problem.  Both the Tajiks  and the Uzbeks  quickly
pulled their horns in.  Russian, it was decided, should  be the
language  used to describe  the sights  and the  monuments. The
group leaders would  then translate the  Russian into Tajik  or
Uzbek as needed.
     Once  the  dispute  was over,  the  buses  speeded through
Samarkand and stopped in front of  the Opera and Ballet Theater
where the  guests were entertained  with the Tajik  composer F.
Bakhor's "Maqam-i  Ishq" and  the rest of  the visit  proceeded
smoothly from there.
     The seemingly simple incident at the gate, however, played
a  major role in  bringing home to  me the depth  of the inter-
ethnic tensions not only between the  Tajiks and the Uzbeks but
among the  Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens. I noted thereafter that
in most speeches in Dushanbe  there were distinct references to
the  recovery  of  the Tajik  speaking  cities  of Bukhara  and
Samarkand.  Indeed,  the integrity  of  the Tajik  language and
efforts at keeping it  safe from Russian, placed me in  a tough
spot  in  a   bookstore  in  Dushanbe.  When   speaking  Tajik,
apparently I used  ruble instead  of sym [s m].  A tajik  youth
standing  next to me  protested vehemently. You  should not use
Russian equivalents, my  guide explained. Either speak  Russian
of Tajik. Do not mix languages!
     Language, of course,  is a system  of symbols. The use  of
these symbols invokes a different reaction by different people.
But  there were  other  symbols. While  helping me  buy several
postcards at the  hotel, my guide got into an argument with the
16       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
hotel clerk  who was  a Russian. After  we were  alone I  asked
about the  incident, he told me  that the clerk  was angry with
him because he wore  a beard. Further discussion made  it clear
that he was  identified with a group  of Dushanbe intellectuals
who  were anti-Russian and  who wore beards as  a sign of their
by Audrey L. Altstadt
The use of Soviet armed forces in Baku last January solved none
of the long-standing  problems which  plagued that republic  --
economic disadvantage, ecological  damage, political  struggle,
the threat to the NKAO or fighting along the border. Nor did it
root  out  support for  the  democratic movement.  Intervention
allowed the communist  party apparatus in Azerbaijan  (AzCP) to
reassert itself,  but it was  the power  "from the barrel  of a
gun" not of public support. "They can  kill us, but cannot make
us bend..."  wrote one  newspaper.1 Before  the arrival  of the
Soviet Armed forces last January, the  (AzCP) was in the throes
of a  crisis. The AzCP (like  CPs in many  other republics) had
always had to perform a "balancing  act" between the demands of
Moscow and those  of the population  of the republic. CP  power
depended  on Moscow,  but a  party organization  that lost  all
popular  support  and   confidence  would  be  useless   as  an
instrument  of  central  policies.  As  long  as  there  was no
organized "voice"  to express popular will, the AzCP had little
difficulty in dealing with isolated opposition and could retain
its  "balance."  The   growth of   informal  groups, the   most
influential of which  was the  Azerbaijan Popular Front  (APF),
changed that. The growth  of the APF coincided with  the tenure
of  Moscow  appointee  A.  Vezirov  as First  Secretary.  Under
Vezirov, the AzCP had leaned too far to Moscow's side, ignoring
both the popular  will on vital issues of the  day and refusing
to recognize  the "informal" groups who articulated  it. By the
end of 1989,  the party  had apparently lost  authority in  the
popular mind and had lost control of several towns --Jalilabad,
Lenkoran--  and  several  points  of  the  republican  borders.
Indeed, this  loss of  control appears  to have  been the  main
reason for Moscow's  use of troops  in Baku. Within the  party,
too, a split was evident. A  stunning speech by party Secretary
Hasan  Hasanov was  published in  APF organs  in early  January
1990.2 Hasanov  revealed that  many   decisions concerning  the
NKAO carried out  by Moscow ostensibly after  consultation with
the  AzCP had  actually come  as a  surprise to  Baku. Thus  it
appeared that  while the party  had been toeing  Moscow's line,
Moscow  was  ignoring  the AzCP.  The  AzCP  was  not only  not
defending  Azerbaijan's  interests,  its  sovereignty  and  its
territory,  it  was not  even  able  to represent  them  in any
17       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
meaningful way. With  the military presence and  the imposition
of martial law, the AzCP struggled  to regain its authority. As
is usual  in such crises,  the First Secretary  was immediately
sacked and  blamed for  everything. His  successor was  a local
engineer, Ayaz Niyazioglu Mutalibov. During February and March,
the party waged a campaign to restore confidence in itself both
internally and among the public. Apparently, the party realized
it had to  embrace popular  demands to reestablish  credibility
and enforce  its claim  to leadership.  The new  AzCP platform,
produced in May, was essentially  the old APF platform  couched
at  times  in  standard  party   rhetoric.3  The  platform  and
Mutalibov's first speech  as republican  President4 called  for
economic and  political  solidarity, guarantees of  territorial
integrity, and security of borders.  Among other points adopted
from the opposition was  the call for more equitable  prices of
commodities produced  by Azerbaijan and  reforming education to
foster "greater national consciousness." The NKAO and Nakhjivan
ASSR  were  affirmed  as inalienable  parts  of  Azerbaijan. In
keeping  with  their  autonomous  positions,  their  rights  to
determine  their  own  "economic  and  social  development  and
cultural construction" was  assured. But the party  pledged "to
carry  out  a decisive  and  uncompromising battle  against any
attempts at creation of unconstitutional organs of power..." in
those regions. This was still the communist party  program, and
it  affirmed  its  commitment  to  a  "Leninist  conception  of
socialism" and the  development of a materialist world view. It
claimed  political  leadership  for the  AzCP  as  guarantor of
perestroika.  Mutalibov  welcomed  "political   pluralism"  and
pledged  the AzCP  to contend in  elections with  other parties
using democratic methods, he warned that "unruliness" would not
be permitted.  We are all tired  of extremism, he said.  We can
not separate democracy  from law and  order.  The rhetoric  and
positions  of the AzCP did not  substantially change after May.
It reflected  that the  party had  been forced  to abandon  its
traditional posture and  adopt the demands of its opponents. It
was a  defeat for  AzCP. The  APF and  other opposition  groups
meanwhile continued  under the  State of  Emergency to  protest
Moscow's  actions of  January  1990:  the  use of  troops;  the
failure of the  Soviet government first  to declare a state  of
emergency  or  establish  a  curfew  which could  have  reduced
civilian  casualties;  the  use of  live  ammunition  and heavy
artillery against civilians;  and for  the resulting deaths  of
200 or more civilians (ranging in age from under 12 to  over 70
years of age) and the injury of hundreds, perhaps thousands.  A
report of July  by "Shield," a  group of military experts  from
the USSR military  procurator's office in Moscow  supported APF
statements.5  "Shield"  agreed  that   either  Soviet  "special
forces" or  the KGB  had blown  up  the television-radio  power
station  a few hours  before the entry of  troops, and that the
populace was notified  of a curfew  only on the  morning of  20
January  after troops had control of  Baku. The "Shield" report
rejected  the military's  claims  of  "returning fire,"  noting
18       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
there  was no evidence  that those manning  barricades on roads
leading  into Baku  had been armed.  The report  listed vehicle
numbers of three  ambulances crushed by tanks.  "Shield" listed
120 civilian dead and more than 700 wounded, in contrast to the
local  military  authorities' claim  of  83 dead,  including 14
military personnel. "Shield"  concluded that the army  had been
used  against the local population, not an external threat. The
Baku press and the many meetings  at the University and Academy
of Sciences led,  by the time of the September  elections, to a
new APF platform,  the basis for  a broad election bloc  called
"Democratic Azerbaijan." If the AzCP  platform had usurped many
of APF's original planks,   the new  APF platform  reflected  a
significant  evolution on  fundamental issues.  Furthermore, in
the new platform,  the Popular Front  no longer defined  itself
with  respect  to  the  communist  party  or  the   old  order,
reflecting both political maturity and its decisive  opposition
to  the regime  in Moscow and  the entire  Soviet system.   The
first item of the program stated that the Red Army had occupied
the  Azerbaijan Democratic Republic  on 28 April  1920 and that
the creation of  the Azerbaijan soviet  government had been  an
illegal act. The platform further stated that relations between
Azerbaijan  and  the   Union  must  be changed  in  accord with
Azerbaijan's constitution; provisions contrary to the interests
of   economic,  political   and  cultural   interests  of   the
Azerbaijani  people are to be eliminated; reciprocal agreements
will be rejected if they restrict the people's "right to choose
its  own  path;" the  republic  will maintain  separate foreign
policy  and diplomacy. Regarding  Domestic Policy  the platform
states the  willingness to  fight for  sovereignty, territorial
integrity  and  security   of  all   citizens;  the  need   for
self-defense and  internal security  is affirmed;  the platform
argues  the  need   for  the  development   of  a  concept   of
independence [dovlet mustegilik] and creation of an independent
state;  the state,  legal  system  and  information  structures
should  be  "de-party-cized" and  the  civil society  should be
"de-ideologized;" freedom  of speech,  conscience and  religion
should be  guaranteed; passport  regime should  be  dismantled;
the right to cultural development of all citizens regardless of
their nationality should be protected;  to protect the security
of territory, NKAO should be dissolved.   Development of a free
market  is  called  for  and  creation of  conditions  favoring
foreign  investment,  foreign  trade,  tourism.  The   platform
suggests reconsideration of the  existing social welfare system
and states the  work of  mothers raising children  is equal  to
other  social labor.  Human  rights are  to  be guaranteed  and
"democratic government (majority  government)" is to  be fought
for; in litigation,  the accused are  to be presumed  innocent;
acts not prohibited  by law are to be regarded  as legal. Under
the section on  "culture and education," the  exiting apparatus
is  to  be  destroyed and  replaced;  national-cultural  wealth
illegally taken  from  the  republic  is to  be  returned,  the
alphabet  is to be "reformed" and religious buildings seized or
19       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
damaged  by  state or  party are  to  be restored.  Finally, on
ecological issues,  the current Council  of Ministers committee
for  environmental  protection   is  to  be  dissolved   and  a
comparable commission  is to  be created  under the  parliament
[sic];   environmental   protection   measures    are   to   be
strengthened.6 It was perhaps clear that the proponents of this
program stood for nothing less than the complete destruction of
the Soviet  system in  Azerbaijan, and  could therefore not  be
permitted  to  win  any  substantial  representation.  In   the
elections   of  30   September  amid   widespread  charges   of
impropriety,  falsification,  intimidation (two  APF candidates
were murdered days before the election) and outright fraud, the
AzCP candidates  won most  seats and  the APF about  26 of  350
seats.  In  several  districts, run-offs  were  held  two weeks
later, on 14 October, but APF  candidates did apparently not do
much better. Aside from denouncing the illegal practices of the
AzCP,  there  was little  the  APF  could do.  It  continues to
discuss  the  broad  spectrum  of   issues  that  concerns  the
republic. The  major  issue (apart  from  ending the  State  of
Emergency)  that   now  confronts   the  political  forces   in
Azerbaijan is the union treaty. Any  treaty which is written by
the center not the republics, proclaimed one commentary,7  will
remain   unsatisfactory.   Power  for   protecting  territorial
integrity was  given to the center  in 1922 and  how has Moscow
fulfilled  it --by giving  bits of Azerbaijan  to its neighbors
over the last 70 years. (97,000 sq km in 1922, but 86,600 sq km
today).  Economic criticism8  has included  the  same statement
that power must  be given by  the republics to the  center (not
the  reserve),  that the  proposed  union agreement  relies too
heavily on organs of  coercion for implementation, and that  it
will  not develop  infrastructure in  the republics  "freezing"
them  at current  relative levels (detrimental  to Azerbaijan).
The  latest word  from  Baku is  that  if some  guarantees   of
"territorial  integrity" are included, Mutalibov is prepared to
accepted  the  treaty as  now  written.  The APF  will  not. Az
Azerbaijan commemorates "Black January," there are few signs of
hope  in the  Union. They  see a  replay of  Baku's horrors  in
Lithuania and  Latvia and  hear  plans for  soldiers to  patrol
cities with the  police. When  Moscow is "liberal,"  Azerbaijan
may still be crushed. When Moscow begins to talk about control,
Azerbaijan begins to talk about 1937.
1. Azerbaijan (organ of the  Karabagha Khalg Yardimi Komitesi),
24 February 1990.
2. Reported in the APF organ Azadlik 14 January 1990.
3. Bakinskii Rabochii (BR) 22 May 1990, pp. 1-2.
4. Edebiyyat ve  Injesenet 25 May  1990, pp. 1-2. Mutalibov  in
speech noted that  party program had  been accepted by CC  that
20       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
5. The commission "Shchit"  ("Shield") examined evidence during
12-22 July  1990; its report was printed  in Moskovskie novosti
12 August and  reprinted in  BR 17 August,  p.3 with the  title
"Ianvar' v Baku." References are from BR.
6. Azadlik 8 September 1990
7. Azerbaijan, 4 May 1990 by Tofik Gandilov (Moscow).
8.  Azadlik 22  November 1990,  "Ittifag  programy bize  ne vad
edir?" by Saleh Mammadov, doctor of economics.
                     NEWS OF THE PROFESSION
During Spring 1990 AACAR By-Laws were drafted, and submitted to
the membership at  the end of  June for comments. By  September
the By-Laws were accepted. Under  its provisions, AACAR members
were invited  to submit  candidates for  the Executive  Council
elections. The Nominations Committee [Profs.  John C. Street (U
Wisconsin-Madison) (Chairman), Brian  Spooner (U  Pennsylvania)
and Robert Jones (U  Massachusetts-Amherst)] compiled the slate
of fourteen names for five Executive Council positions from the
responses received.  After consultations with  those nominated,
to secure consent, the Ballot was  prepared and mailed by Prof.
John C. Street [incurring considerable personal cost, for which
AACAR is grateful]. The Ballots were returned to the members of
the    AACAR  Elections  Committee   [Profs.  Iraj  Bashiri  (U
Minnesota)  (Chairman),  Devin  DeWeese  (Indiana  U)  and  Uli
Schamiloglu (U Wisconsin-Madison)] by the date specified. Prof.
Bashiri  announced  the  winners:  Audrey  L.  Altstadt  (U  of
Massachusetts-Amherst);  Peter  Golden (Rutgers  U); Azade-Ayse
Rorlich  (U  of  Southern California);  Uli  Schamiloglu  (U of
Wisconsin-Madison);  Maria  Subtelny  (U of  Toronto).  The Ex-
Officio Members (who  were ineligible at this time for election
to additional office, as  stipulated by the By-Laws) of  the EC
are: Thomas Allsen  (Trenton State  College) (Secretary of  the
AACAR  Monograph Series  Editorial Board); H.  B. Paksoy  (U of
Massachusetts-Amherst   &   Harvard   U-CMES)  (Editor,   AACAR
BULLETIN).  Executive  Council  held  its   first  meeting  via
conference  call  and  elected AACAR  Officers  from  among its
members  as required:  Uli  Schamiloglu (Treasurer)  Azade-Ayse
Rorlich (Secretary), Audrey L. Altstadt (President).
Muriel Atkin  (George Washington  U) has  joined Thomas  Allsen
(Trenton State  College),  Peter  Golden  (Rutgers  U),  Thomas
Noonan (U of  Minnesota) and Omeljan  Pritsak (Harvard U) as  a
member of the AACAR Monograph Series Editorial Board.
The   AACAR  Monograph  Series   Editorial  Board  invites  the
submission of high quality manuscripts in  the field of Central
Asian Studies for publication.   AACAR has negotiated contracts
with  a number of  publishing houses for  the purpose. Contact:
21       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
Prof. Thomas Allsen,  Secretary of  the AACAR Monograph  Series
Editorial  Board,  History Department,  Trenton  State College,
Trenton, NJ 08650.
Dr. Jeffery  J. Roberts,  Chairman of  AACAR Panels  Committee,
request that AACAR  membership contact  him with proposals  for
AACAR panels. As each area studies organization, such as AAASS,
AAS,  MESA,  require  that  proposals  be  made  early,  it  is
particularly important to  act immediately for the  1992 round.
Please  forward  your suggestions  to  Dr. Jeffery  J. Roberts,
AACAR  Panels,   Middle  East   Studies   Center,  Ohio   State
University, 308 Dulles Hall,  230 W. 17th Avenue, Columbus,  OH
AACAR  Executive  Council voted  to  hold the  AACAR Membership
Meeting in conjunction  with the  American Association for  the
Advancement of Slavic Studies annual convention, 22-25 November
1991 in Miami. The AACAR Meeting  will be restricted to members
in  good  standing.   AACAR  Members  are  requested   to  make
reservations  directly   with  the   providers  of   convention
facilities: Intercontinental  & Hyatt  Hotels, Miami,  Florida;
and register for the AAASS Convention.
CONFERENCE (PIAC)  will  convene  in  Berlin-Germany,  July  21
(arrival date) - 26 (departure date), 1991. The second circular
giving    details    on   accommodation,    registration   fee,
transportation,  visa  requirements,  etc,  will  be   sent  in
February  to  all  who  request  it  from  Prof.  Denis  Sinor,
Secretary General, PIAC, Indiana University, 101 Goodbody Hall,
Bloomington, IN 47405. Telefax: 812-855-7500.
Ingeborg  Baldauf,  Bert G.  Fragner,  Klaus Kreiser  and Semih
ASIAN STUDIES will  be held at BAMBERG UNIVERSITY, Institute of
Oriental Studies, from  8 to  12 October 1991.  Six panels  are
envisioned, each covering a half-day session. There  will be no
parallel sessions. The number of papers  in each panel may vary
from  four to  six. Papers are  expected to  be short so  as to
allow maximum time  for discussions.  The final decision  about
panels,  speakers  and  discussants will  be  announced  in the
second circular.  Contact the  above organizers  at: ESCAS  IV,
Institut f r Orientalistik, Universitat Bamberg, Postfach 1549,
D-8600 Bamberg, Germany.
Research  Institute for  Inner Asian Studies  (RIFIAS), INDIANA
UNIVERSITY   announces    Rockefeller   Foundation    Residency
Fellowships aimed  at exploring  indigenous primary sources  on
the  history  and civilization  of  Inner Asia.  The Fellowship
program is intended  to support the  study of indigenous  Inner
Asian  sources  by  specialists  who   are  equipped  with  the
necessary  philological  and  disciplinary skills.  The  RIFIAS
22       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
library, in addition  to its  general collections, and  current
journal subscriptions, also houses several special collections.
The Tibetan collection, housed  separately, consists of several
hundred volumes of Tibetan texts reprinted in India, as well as
350 original Tibetan  blockprints. The most recently  developed
special collection, the Central Asian Archives, comprises (1) a
collection  of microfilms  and photocopies  (obtained primarily
from  Soviet  libraries) of  out-of-print  publications dealing
with Central  Asia (2) a  collection of microfilms  of Persian,
Turkic   and   Arabic   manuscripts    containing   historical,
biographical and geographic works on Islamic Central Asia. This
collection  currently   comprises  nearly  750   microfilms  of
manuscripts  and  over  800   microfilms  and  photocopies   of
published works. Details  may be  obtained from Professor  Yuri
Bregel, Director,  RIFIAS, Indiana  University, Goodbody  Hall,
Bloomington, IN 47405. Phone: 812/855-1605.
The UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON announces the establishment
of  an  annual   summer  workshop  in  Central   Asian  Studies
consisting of the following courses for 1991:
     Central Asian  503, Civilization of Central Asia (3 cr.) -
Intensive 3-week  course May 28-June 16.  (Prerequisite: Junior
Pending funding, the  following course will also be  offered on
the Madison campus:
     First  Year  Kazakh  I-II   (8  cr.  undergraduate/6   cr.
graduate)  -  intensive 8-week  course  June 17-August  11. (No
Fellowship support may  be available  through a Social  Science
research  Council  "Grant for  Summer  Language Institutes  for
Soviet  Languages  Other  than  Russian."   The  University  of
Wisconsin-Madison  will also  offer  other  summer  courses  in
Central  Asian  Studies, pending  funding,  including Intensive
Kazan Tatar, Third Year Uzbek, Russian language. Other subjects
Summer  Sessions  Office,   University  of   Wisconsin-Madison,
Madison, WI 53706. Estimated  summer 1991 tuition and fees  for
6-9  cr. for  undergraduate and  special students  is $530  for
residents and 1736 for non  residents. Estimated summer tuition
and  fees  for  4-7  cr.  for  graduate students  is  $728  for
residents and $2236  for non-residents.  For the 8-week  summer
session  estimated  room  is  $431   double  ($565  single)  in
Elizabeth Waters Hall and estimated  board is $400. FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION  CONTACT:  Prof.  Uli  Schamiloglu,  Department  of
Slavic  Languages,  720  Van  Hise  Hall,  1220  Linden  Drive,
University of  Wisconsin-Madison,  Madison,  WI  53706.  Phone:
The Soviet Cultural Studies Group, Department of  Anthropology,
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY announces  a  symposium  for students  and
23       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
interested scholars planning  or conducting research on,  in or
related  to the  Soviet Union. The  aim of the  symposium is to
allow  scholars with  an  interest the  cultural  study of  the
Soviet Union to present their  work, share ideas, develop areas
of  cooperation  and keep  up  to  date on  latest  changes and
developments. Working  sessions being  considered include:  (1)
Coordinating  Research   Efforts:  examining  ways   to  foster
cooperation  and  sharing  of   information  among  researchers
working in  different areas. Strategies  for complementary data
collection,  textual  standardization   for  ease  in  sharing,
consistency  in  translation, communication  in  the field  and
after.    (2)  Issues in  Nationalities  Research:  culture and
discourses  of  ethnic/national  identity; uses  of  history in
nation building; culture  creation in  literature and art;  the
ethnographer as  implicated observer.   (3)  Cultural study  of
Complex  States:  understanding  and  keeping  up  with  Soviet
"policy"; the bureaucratic  legacy; the use and abuse of models
under revolutionary  circumstances.  Inquiries  and  ideas  for
workshops should  be sent  to: Soviet  Cultural Studies  Group,
Department of Anthropology, Columbia  University, New York,  NY
10027.  E-mail:    The  Symposium,
sponsored by the  Nationality and  Siberian Studies Program  of
the Harriman Institute  for the  Advanced Study  of the  Soviet
Union,  will  be  held:  Friday  April  19, 1990,  at  the  501
Schermerhorn Hall, Columbia University.
Suitland Reference Branch of the  NATIONAL ARCHIVES has custody
of the US Department of State's Foreign  Service Posts records,
covering  the period from the  mid 1930s to  the mid 1950s. The
Branch also has custody of the records of US Foreign Assistance
Agencies for the 1948-1961 period.  Contact: Dr. Greg Bradsher,
Suitland   Reference   Branch   (NNRR),    NATIONAL   ARCHIVES,
Washington, DC 20409.
Center for  Near  Eastern  and North  African  Studies  at  the
UNIVERSITY  OF MICHIGAN  announces  two Rockefeller  Foundation
Residency Fellowships in the Humanities  for 1991-1992, for the
study of Middle Eastern literatures. The program is designed to
enable writers  and scholars  of Middle  Eastern literature  to
produce English translations  and commentaries. For application
package, contact Ernest  N. McCarus, Director, Center  for Near
Eastern and North African Studies,  The University of Michigan,
144 Lane Hall, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1290. Fax: 313-936-2948.
KAZAKH/AMERICAN  RESEARCH PROJECT  is sponsoring  a Travel  and
Research trip to Kazakhstan, May 20-June 30, 1991. For details,
please  contact  Dr.  Jeannine  Davis-Kimball,  Director,  2424
Spaulding Avenue, Berkeley, CA 94703. Phone: 415-549-3708.
has been  informing scholars  about developments,  conferences,
publications and ongoing fieldwork relating  to folklore of the
24       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
Middle East and  South Asia. Volume 7, No.  2 has recently been
issued.  The  Newsletter   is  published  at  the   Center  for
Comparative  Studies  in  the  Humanities  at  the  OHIO  STATE
UNIVERSITY and appears  tri-annually. Subscriptions: $6  for US
residents;  $10  for  institutions   and  foreign  subscribers.
Center for Comparative  Studies in  the Humanities, 306  Dulles
Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210.
CITIZEN  EXCHANGE COUNCIL  announces two  joint programs,  both
involving visits to Moscow, Samarkand, Tashkent, Leningrad: (1)
In association with the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS. This
program includes a  three day conference hosted  by the English
language  department  of Samarkand  State  University;   (2) In
association   with   the  FAIRFIELD   UNIVERSITY,  Connecticut.
Contact: Stephany Dickey, Citizen Exchange  Council, 12 W. 31st
Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY, 10001. Phone: 212-643-1985.
UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS,  Program  in  Comparative  Literature
publishes  ALUMNI  NEWSLETTER.  Spring-Summer   1990  issue  is
available  from:  2070  Foreign  Language  Building, 707  South
Mathews, Urbana, IL 68101.
EASTERN ART REPORT  is published by  the Centre for Near  East,
Asia and Africa  Research (NEAR), covering  the arts of Near  &
Middle  East,   South  &   Southeast  Asia,   China  &   Japan.
Subscription infromation from: Eastern Art Report, P O Box 571,
172 Castelnau, London SW13 9DH, UK.
BIBLIOGRAPHY--  The following  items  were kindly  provided  by
Prof. Geng Shimin of Beijing: Ji Xianlin, "Translation from the
Tokharian Maitreyasamitinataka-- Two  leaves (1.3, 1.9)  of the
Xingjiang Museum Version," Collection of  Papers on the Studies
of Dunhuang-Turfan  Manuscripts. Vol. 2. Beijing, 1985.     *
Idem,  "Translation  from the  Tokharian Maitreyasamitinataka--
the 39th Leaf  of the Xingjiang Museum  Version," Tocharian and
Indo-European Studies.  Vol.  1, Reykjavik.       *       Idem,
"Translation from the Tokharian  Maitreyasamitinataka-- the two
leaves (1.15, 1.16)  of the  Xingjiang Museum Version,"  Studia
Indo-Germanica  et  Slavica.  Festgabe f r  W.  Thomas  zum 65.
Geburtstag. M nchen, 1988.     *    Idem, "Translation from the
Tokharian  Maitreyasamitinataka-- the two  leaves (1.2, 1.4) of
the Xingjiang  Museum Version,"  Studies of  Dunhuang LAnguages
and Literatures. Beijing, 1988.    *     Idem, "Tokharian A and
the Dvatrimsadvaralaksana," Languages  of Nationalities.  1982.
No. 4.       *       Idem,  "On the  Maitreyasamitininataka  in
Tokharian A of  the Xingjiang  Museum," Cultural Relics.  1983.
No. 1.     *     Idem, "Maitreya and Mile," Social  Sciences of
China. 1990,  No. 1.      *      Geng  Shimin und  Hans-Joachim
Klimkeit,  Das  Zusammentreffen  mit  Maitreya--Die  erst  f nf
Kapitel  der  Hami-Version  des  Maitrisimit,  Teil  I:   Text,
 bersetzung und  Kommentar, Teil  II: Faksimilies  und Indices.
25       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
Wiesbaden, 1988.      *      Idem, "Fragmentary  Manuscripts of
Abhidharmanasasatra,     Avatamsaka-Sutra,"     Languages    of
Nationalities, 1985, No, 1.; Bulletin  of the Central Institute
for Nationalities. 1987, No, 1.; Central Asiatic Journal. 1989,
Vol.  33.    *    Geng Shimin, H. J. Klimkleit, P. Laut, "Manis
Wettkampf   mit  dem   Prinzen."   Zeitschrift  der   Deutschen
Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft. Bd.  137, 1987.     *      Idem,
"Die Geschichte der Prinzen--Weitere neue manichaisch-t rkische
Fragmente aus  Turfan." ZDMG. Bd.  139, 1989.      *      Jiang
Zhongxin, "On  the Remains  of the  Sanskrit Saddharmapundarika
kept in the Museum of L snun  (Port Arthur)," Researches on the
Unearthed Manuscripts. Beijing, 1985.      *     Idem, "On  the
Transition of  Suffix -am into -o in the Kashgar Version of the
Sanskrit Saddharmapundarika." Studies  on Southasia. 1986,  No.
                          BOOK REVIEWS
RESISTANCE. (Hoover  Institution Press,  1986). XVI  + 288  Pp.
Appendix, glossary.
     In the current era of rapid change within the Soviet Union
any volume that  sheds light on  the traditions and culture  of
one of  the non-Russian peoples of that  country and elucidates
its historical  political roles and  aspirations is  important.
This  is  especially true  for  Azade-Ayse Rorlich's  THE VOLGA
TATARS. The Volga Tatars are, perhaps, not as well known to the
Western world as some other Turkic peoples of the USSR. But, as
Rorlich informs  us, it  was precisely this  people, which  now
occupies  the Tatar Autonomous  Soviet Socialist Republic, that
often   took  the   lead  in   formulating  and   articulating,
disseminating and implementing  cultural and political programs
not only for themselves, but for the extended Moslem population
in the  Russian empire  and later  the Soviet  Union. To  learn
about the Volga Tatars is then  to become better informed about
a minority population contained in  the various incarnations of
the  Russian  state,  about  Russian  policy  toward  it,  and,
importantly, something  about the responses of  that population
to  those policies, i.e., how  it survived and developed within
an alien political and cultural context.
     In presenting their story, Rorlich  divides the history of
the Volga Tatars into three main sections. The first deals with
the formation of a  Kazan principality in the aftermath  of the
13th-century  Mongol  invasion  of  the  mid-Volga region,  its
transformation into the Kazan Khanate, and  the conquest of the
latter by the Russian state of Muscovy in 1552. Her coverage of
this early period is  relatively brief; it is also  the weakest
26       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
portion  of  the  book. The  information  presented  is largely
derivative  of  other  literature  and, unfortunately,  Rorlich
reproduces some of the findings drawn from that literature in a
confused and/or misleading manner.
     Bur  the  author is  on  firmer  ground and  is  much more
authoritative  in the remainder of the  book. Her account there
rests on her own  research and analysis of an  impressive array
of sources, including primary materials in Russian, Turkish and
Tatar  languages,  as well  as  secondary sources  published in
Western languages as  well. Her linguistic skills  alone enable
Rorlich  to  provide unusual,  if  not unique,  insights  to an
English-reading audience.  It is  on this  foundation that  she
explores  the Volga  Tatars'  development  under  the  cultural
influences  and  political  pressures  resulting  from  Russian
political dominance during the Russian imperial period (section
II) and the Soviet era (section III).
     Sections II and  III are organized primarily  around major
policy initiatives undertaken by the Russians and, secondarily,
the  Tatar responses to  them. In conjunction  with this schema
Russian policy becomes the chief determinant of the events  and
time  periods  emphasized.  There  are  resultant gaps  in  the
narrative, between the time of the Russian conquest of 1552 and
the era of  Catherine the  Great (late 18th  century), for  one
example, and  between 1932 and the  post World War  II era, for
another.  Questions   do  arise   about   the  experience   and
development  of  Volga Tatar  society  during those  periods of
stability,  between the  historical pressure  points,  when the
society was able  to develop  on its own  momentum rather  than
reacting to external forces.
     But by  presenting her  account in  this fashion,  Rorlich
also offers  important lessons  to students  of the  history of
Russia and the  USSR as  well as  those of  Moslem society.  In
designing their responses  to Russian  policy the Volga  Tatars
drew upon Islamic traditions and  cultural factors intrinsic to
a  community that transcended  political boundaries and spanned
(in the  18th-19th centuries)  the Ottoman  Empire and  Central
Asia  as  well as  territories  politically within  the Russian
Empire.  Volga  Tatar  society was  also  complex,  and Rorlich
demonstrates how diverse elements within  it reacted to Russian
influences differently, some adopting, others adapting, and yet
others  wholly  rejecting aspects  of  Russian culture.  In the
process,  some  Tatars  became  estranged  from   their  Moslem
heritage, while others reinforced their commitment to it. Tatar
society engaged in its own debates and internal conflicts as it
attempted to cope with the challenges presented by the policies
of their Russian rulers.
     The result,  however, was  that  by the  19th century  the
Tatars  were   developing  their   own  reform  movements   and
contributing  to the transformation  of the  traditional Moslem
community  into  a  modern, secular  society.  These  movements
constitute  the core  of  Rorlich's study.  In  section II  she
examines their  different stages, principles, and  leaders from
27       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
the early 19th  century to  1917. Her narrative  spans a  broad
spectrum, ranging  from religious reformers,  whose concerns to
revitalize  Islam and  make  it more  accessible  to a  broader
Moslem public led  them to  challenge the scholastic  religious
authorities entrenched in theological capitals of Central Asia,
to  figures  who  represent  various  facets  of  the  secular,
political  reform  movement that  was  active by  the 1905-1917
period.  In  the process  she  discusses programs  and policies
relating to  an array  of topics  such as  language, alphabets,
education, and  the  press, and  reveals how  they defined  and
reflected broader social and political concerns.
     The reform movements  thus also  contributed to a  dynamic
process  within  the larger  Islamic  community, as  it juggled
pressures  of  conservative  religious  scholastics with  those
emanating  from proponents of pan-Turkism on  the one hand and,
on the other, from an  exclusive nationalism that distinguished
Volga TAtars  from  Russians  and also  from  other  Turks  and
Moslems.  The dilemmas  of the  reformers of  this period  were
complicated by  their simultaneous and  sometimes contradictory
yearnings for the preservation of  their unique national and/or
religious  identity  as  well  as  for  secular  knowledge  and
material progress,  which logically encouraged the  mastery and
use of Russian language and  emulation of Russian institutions,
such as schools and cultural media.
     The   continuing  evolution   of  Volga   Tatar  political
movements during the revolutions of 1917  and the Soviet era is
the subject of section III. In it Rorlich focuses on one of the
most significant,  from  the perspective  of creative  cultural
adaptation,  Volga Tatar  achievements    --the Tatar  national
communist movement.  Led by Mirsaid Sultangaliev and based on a
perceived  "compatibility  of  some of  the  basic  fundamental
precepts of MArxism and Islam" (p. 148), this movement sought a
"Moslem road to communism" during the unsettled years following
the Bolshevik  revolution. Although  its demand for  autonomous
political  organs  became  incompatible  with  the  centralized
structures created  by the  Soviet authorities,  who eventually
crushed it, the movement reflected an attempt  to merge foreign
or Russian communist principles  with indigenous traditions and
provides an illustration of  how the Volga Tatars were  able to
adapt an alien political ideology and creatively graft it to at
least one branch of the reform  movements that had emerged from
their own  multi-faceted  society. It  thus constitutes  strong
evidence for  Rorlich's basic  message: The  Volga Tatars  have
been  and remain a dynamic,  resilient people with the capacity
to adapt to and develop  in changing conditions while retaining
essential qualities, perspectives, values,  and characteristics
unique to their own culture, history, and traditions.
     THE  VOLGA   TATARS  is   somewhat  flawed  by   editorial
carelessness  (the   birthdate  of  Abu-Nasr   al-Kursavi,  for
example, is  identified as 1776 and 1726  on page 49). But such
inconsistencies in detail do not detract from the overall value
of this study. On the contrary, Rorlich has not only brought to
28       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
light  the history and  accomplishments of the  Volga Tatars in
particular; she has also sensitively  focused attention on more
universal social  dilemmas  arising  from  competition  between
pressures  to  preserve national  identity  and to  assimilate,
tendencies to modernize  and to  maintain national  traditions,
temptations  to seek  independence  and  remain  within  larger
political  units,  i.  e., dilemmas  with  which  many minority
peoples  have  grappled in  the  past  and  which  continue  to
challenge multinational societies in the modern world.
Janet Martin
University of Miami-Coral Gables
Alexander R.  Alexiev and  S. Enders  Wimbush (Eds.)  (Westview
Press, 1988).
     This is  an excellent  introduction to  the political  and
military  issues  surrounding  the  use  of non-Russian  ethnic
groups  in  the  Soviet  military.  It  is  also  very  timely,
considering the  current ferment in  the non-Russian  republics
and the attempt by the military leadership to enforce the draft
laws by force, if necessary. The different chapters in the book
cover the historical  background of Soviet policies  toward the
different ethnic  groups in  the military, current  demographic
trends and their possible effects on Soviet military policy and
performance, and inter-ethnic relations in  today's Red Army, a
discussion that was  based on extensive interviews  with Soviet
emigres. The basic  theme of  the book is  that throughout  the
Soviet  period,  different  regimes  have employed  non-Russian
minorities  for  varying  purposes  in  the military  and  that
different nationalities  were employed in different ways, based
on  the  leadership's  view of  the  political  reliability and
racial  characteristics   of   each   particular   group.   The
nationalities of Central Asia have consistently been considered
the least politically  reliable and militarily capable  of all,
and thus have  consistently received  the lowest positions  and
the worst treatment.
     Part one  of this  book, written  by Susan  L. Curran  and
Dmitry Ponomareff, deals with the  historical background of the
use  of non-Russian nationalities in the military from the time
of Ivan IV  through the post-World  War II period. The  authors
show the similarities  in the attitude toward  and treatment of
different  nationalities during the imperial and Soviet periods
and  point  out that  during  the  tsarist period,  it  was the
Central Asian  nationality groups who were considered to be the
least politically reliable.  The authors also discuss  the ways
that the Soviets utilized  non-Russian nationalities during the
Civil  War  in  their  campaign  to recapture  the  non-Russian
territories and during World  WAr II, when the large  scale use
29       AACAR BULLETIN  VOL. IV, NO. 1 (Spring 1991)
of  non-Russian troops  alleviated military  manpower shortages
but also raised further doubts about the loyalty of non-Russian
troops.  Part two,  written  by  Alexander  R.  Alexiev,  is  a
companion   study  of   German   policies  toward   non-Russian
nationalities in the occupied territories  during World War II.
Alexiev points  out how widespread  was the willingness  of the
nationalities to  support  the Germans  and  how  short-sighted
German policies led to the erosion of this support.
     Part three  is the most  interesting section of  the book.
Written by the book's co-editors, this chapter  is a discussion
of  the  results  of  their   interviews  with  Soviet  emigres
concerning   the   role  and   treatment  of   the  non-Russian
nationalities in  the military  and the inter-ethnic  relations
among the different groups. As a result of these interviews the
authors have  concluded that there  probably continues to  be a
policy of strictly controlling the ethnic composition of combat
units to ensure the dominance of  Slavic elements and that non-
Slavic troops  are  most  heavily  concentrated  in  non-combat
units, such as construction battalions. It is also unsurprising
that the  Soviet officer  corps  is heavily  Russian. Based  on
perceived  reliability,  intelligence,  and  language  ability,
there is an apparent hierarchy of ethnic groups in the military
with the Russians, Ukrainians, and the  Belorussians at the top
and the peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia at the bottom.
The  authors  also  discuss the  prevalence  of  tensions among
different  ethnic  groups  in  military  units, with  the  most
frequent  conflict occurring  between  Russian and  non-Russian
troops.   The  occurrence   of  conflict   between  non-Russian
nationalities is apparently much lower. Based on the data  they
collected, the authors  have concluded that there  is potential
for  a  lessening  of  Soviet  military capability,  given  the
reliability  problems and inter-ethnic tensions and the growing
percentage  of  non-Russian troops  due  to  Soviet demographic
trends. However, Gorbachev's stated goal of reducing the Soviet
military establishment  may  help alleviate  this  problem,  by
allowing for the continued dominance  of Slavic groups within a
smaller force structure.
     The last two  chapters deal with demographic  trends among
the draft-age population and with the use of Muslim soldiers in
Afghanistan.   This  book   is   well-written  and   documented
throughout and should  be read by  anyone interested in  Soviet
nationality  policies  or  with  Soviet  military   policy  and
Philip Bayer
SRI International

This counter has been placed here on 31 March 1999