H. B. Paksoy 

          Published in NATIONALITIES PAPERS

     Vol. 23, No 2. June 1995.  Pp. 373-399.



        J. V. Stalin, in his denunciation of Sultan Galiev, 

   formerly Stalin's own assistant in Narkomnats, stated:   

        ....I accused him (Sultan Galiev) of creating an 

        organization of the Validov type... despite 

        that, a week later, he sent... a secret 

        letter... to establish contact with the Basmachi 

        and with their leader Validov...1 


        Ahmet Zeki (Validov) Velidi Togan (1890-1970), a 

   Bashkurt Turk,2 published his own comprehensive account of 

   the Basmachi movement3 on two separate occasions.  

   According to Togan, these were based on the field diaries 

   he kept during his involvement in the movement.  The said 

   diary was smuggled out of Turkistan in segments, via 

   various persons and routes, before and after Togan's own 

   departure from Turkistan in 1923.4   Both accounts 

   complement each other and contain ample material to aid 

   the reader in reconstructing the events surrounding 

   Stalin's references and putting all in historical 


        In completing the final versions of these works for 

   publication, Togan indicates, in addition to his own field 

   notes, he had also utilized secondary sources to refresh 

   his memory.  These included the materials deposited with 

   the Hoover Institution Library, which he consulted during 

   1958, as well as the newspaper collections pertaining to 

   the time period which he chronicles.  Togan recalled: 

        Kerensky (1881-1970) and I sat down at the 

        microfilm machine and together read the 

        newspapers dating back to the times when we knew 

        each other. 


        Togan also cites various histories written in the 

   Soviet union after his departure, containing references to 

   his own activities.  The first section of this study 

   contains Togan's brief biography, educational and personal 

   background.  The second, the events leading to his 

   Basmachi period, due to space limitations, in a highly 

   compressed form.6   The last section is largely translated 

   directly from his pen, both from Turkili and Hatiralar. 

        At the outset, two points must be made.  The first 

   one pertains to the term Basmachi, as described by Togan: 

        Basmachi is derived from "baskinji," meaning 

        attacker, and was first applied to bands of 

        brigands.  During the tsarist times, these 

        brigands existed when (Turkistan) independence 

        was lost and Russian occupation began in 

        Turkmenistan, Bashkurdistan and Crimea.  

        Bashkurts (in Russian language sources: Bashkir) 

        called the ayyar, by the Khorasan term.  In 

        Crimea (and, borrowed from there, in Ukraine) 

        haydamak was used.  Among Bashkurts such heroes 

        as Buranbay; in Crimea, Halim; in Samarkand, 

        Namaz became famous.  These did not bother the 

        local indigenous population but sacked the 

        Russians and the Russian flour-mills, 

        distributing their booty to the population.  In 

        Ferghana, these elements were also active during 

        the tsarist times.... After the proliferation of 

        cotton planting in Ferghana [with the forced the 

        tsarist policy of replacing grain production] 

        the economic conditions deteriorated.  This 

        increased the brigandage.  Among earlier 

        Basmachi, as was the case among the Western 

        Turks, the spiritual leader of the Ozbek and 

        Turkmen bands was Koroglu.7  Basmachi of 

        Bukhara, Samarkand, Jizzakh and Turkmen gathered 

        at nights to read Koroglu and other dastans.  

        What has the external appearance of brigandage 

        is actually a reflection and representation of 

        the thoughts and spirit of a wide segment of the 

        populace.  Akchuraoglu Yusuf Bey8 reminds us 

        that during the independence movements of the 

        Serbians, the Hoduk; the Kleft and Palikarya of 

        the Greeks comprised half nationalist 

        revolutionaries and half brigands... The 

        majority and the most influential of the 

        Basmachi groups founded after 1918 did not 

        follow the Koroglu tradition; they were composed 

        of serious village leadership and sometimes the 

        educated.  Despite that, all were labelled 

        Basmachi.  Consequently, in Turkistan, these 

        groups were regarded as 'partisans;' more 

        especially representing the guerilla groups 

        fighting against the colonial power.  Nowadays, 

        in Ozbek and Kazakh press, one reads about 

        Chinese, Algerian and Indian Basmachi.9 


        Second is the language issue.  Togan was fluent in 

   quite a number of dialects used in Turkistan; historical 

   and modern.  At times he writes in an amalgam of those, 

   not only while he is quoting from manuscripts, but also 

   when he mentally travels to a particular location, 

   recalling an incident.  Togan gives the impression that 

   the memory was etched in his mind in that particular 

   dialect.  He was sufficiently concerned about his 

   propensities in that regard, and the readability of his 

   writing dialect to ask a scholar-poet friend to review the 

   manuscript of at least one of his books.   

        Togan was very sensitive to the matter and details 

   his own views of the "language and dialects" issue (i.e.   

   Bolshevik claims that the dialects of Central Asia are 

   "languages"), as well as the Bolshevik political stance.  

   He even confronted the Bolshevik leadership on the matter, 

   with a letter, which is translated below.  Togan supplies 

   additional observations on the politics of language in a 

   special section of his Turkili.  It must be noted that 

   Togan's references to Turk is in accordance with the 

   normal usage in all dialects of Turke; Turki, Turkistani.  

   The terms "Turkic" and "Turkish"  are only introduced into 

   non-Turk languages in much more recent times10  and do not 

   reflect the actual, native usage. 

        Togan's own writing style also has to be considered 

   separately.  It is not always an easy task to unpack his 

   highly elaborate, detailed, information-laden and lengthy 

   sentences.  At times it has been necessary to break his 

   paragraph-long statements into a number of smaller ones.  

   Furthermore, he sometimes provides the consequences of an 

   event he is narrating before fully recounting the event 

   itself.  Thus he may interrupt his narrative to report an 

   eventual outcome in a single sentence or page and then 

   continue with the remaining sequence of the event.11 

        That might be one reason holding back potential 

   translators and publishers of Togan's works.  Indeed, 

   several attempts have been made to translate his Turkili 

   into English and German over the past decades.  Almost all 

   of those remain in manuscript form, some complete.  Togan 

   reports that one draft English translation of Turkili was 

   distilled by Olaf Caroe and incorporated into one of his 






        Togan was born 10 December 1890, in Bashkurt-Eli, the 

   Kuzen aul near Isterlitamak.13  His family, like their 

   ancestors, was involved most aspects of agriculture, most 

   prominently apiculture and animal husbandry.  Togan 

   observes that in areas surrounding his ancestral lands, 

   there were localities named "Uris Olgen" (Russian died) 

   and "Uris Kirilgan" (Russian was "broken") indicating 

   previous battles, since the 17th century, when the 

   Russians first invaded the Bashkurt lands.  

        Togan received his elementary education from his 

   parents, both of whom were literate in several languages 

   in addition to the Bashkurt dialect and well-read in 

   related literatures.  Togan also studied in the village 

   medrese14 of his own father and of his maternal uncle at 

   Utek, a few miles away from his home.  Consequently, by 

   age 18, Togan had a command of his native Bashkurt, 

   Chaghatay, Persian, Arabic and Russian.  He accompanied 

   his father on travels, on yearly extended social calls, to 

   Troitsk and neighboring cities, and became familiar with a 

   wide geographic region.  This was to prove beneficial    

   after 1916, when he became the Chairman of the Bashkurt 

   Autonomous Region. 

        During the summer of 1908, he unceremoniously left 

   his home to further his education and to gain a wider 

   world perspective.  At Kazan, he met several prominent 

   Orientalists including N. Katanov (1862-1922) and N. 

   Ashmarin,15 and attended lectures at the Kazan university 

   and the Kasimiye Medrese.  He notes that in Kazan, 

   Merjani's (1818-1889) circle was very much alive.16  By 

   1911, Togan published in Kazan his Turk ve Tatar Tarihi 

   (Turk and Tatar History), meant to be a textbook for the 

   course he began teaching at Kas miye. 

        During the summer months of ensuing years Togan 

   returned to Utek, on the way stopping at various cities, 

   such as Orenburg, Astrakhan, Kemelik to visit historical 

   sights and meet with individuals with whom he was 

   corresponding.  He began learning German and French, and 

   Latin.  His aim was to sit for the necessary examinations 

   to qualify as a teacher in higher institutions of learning 

   within the Russian empire.  He was reading voraciously, 

   both Eastern and Western authors, especially works on the 

   history of the Turks. 

        His Turk ve Tatar Tarihi was well received, and he 

   was therefore elected a member of the Kazan university 

   Historical and Archeological Society.  He also received 

   invitations from a number of medreses to teach, with 

   offers of "satisfactory stipends."  In 1913, the Kazan 

   university Historical and Archeological Society officially 

   charged him with the task of collecting primary documents 

   pertaining to the indigenous history, language and 

   literature from the Ferghana region.  Once in Tashkent, he 

   was invited to join the Turkistan Military Governor's 

   administration.  He declined. 

        The following year, the Imperial Academy of Sciences 

   (St. Petersburg) and the International Central Asian 

   Historical Society, with the recommendation of Katanov and 

   Bartold (1869-1930), jointly sponsored Togan to conduct a 

   similar study and collection tour in the Bukhara Khanate.  

   Upon his return to St. Petersburg with Bartold's urging he 

   began publishing the results of these missions in related 


        Bartold also introduced Togan to General Pisarev, the 

   director of School of Oriental Languages.  The Tsarina was 

   the patron of this institution and Bartold was attempting 

   to secure a position for Togan as an instructor.  Again on 

   the advice of Bartold, Togan went to Kazan, sat for the 

   examinations to qualify as a Russian language teacher at 

   the "non-Russian Seminaries."  Although he passed the 

   test, the schedule of which was expedited by Ashmarin, 

   Togan dryly notes that "since I did not have an 

   appointment, the diploma was useless."  He continues:  

        Bartold did not approve of the war efforts of 

        the Tsardom.  He told me: 'to be cannon fodder 

        is unsuitable for you.'  But the efforts of    

        Bartold, who had lost a number of his students 

        at the front during the first months of the war, 

        and of Samaylovich,17 bore no fruit.  I was 

        inducted into the Army.  Fifteen days after I 

        settled into the barracks as a soldier, a law 

        was passed to exempt the teachers of the non- 

        Russian schools.  I returned to Ufa. 


        At the end of 1914, Togan started teaching at Ufa.  

   During 1915, he was elected a deputy from that city to the 

   St. Petersburg Duma.  Togan continued his scholarly 

   endeavors in St. Petersburg and helped Bartold with the 

   preparation and publication of Ulugh Bey.18  He became a 

   member of Radloff's (1837-1918)19 Circle, worked on the 

   corrections of Bartold's Timur's Indian Expedition and 

   worked with Samaylovich at the Imperial Geographic 

   Society. Asiatic Museum there.  He continued publishing and

   began meeting political figures, especially those belonging to

   Socialist Revolutionaries (SR's).  Kerensky was one such

   individual.  He had grown up in Tashkent as the son of

   an "Education Inspector."  With the aid of Kerensky, Togan and

   Mustafa Chokay visited the front to observe the conditions of

   the laborers conscripted from Turkistan.20 

        During this period, Togan also met Maxim Gorkii 

   (1868-1936) and the writers working at the Russkii 


        Gorkii had decided to publish the Sbornik of the 

        'nations imprisoned by the Russians.' to stress 

        their cultures.  Histories of Ukrainian, 

        Finnish, Armenian and Georgian literatures were 

        being written.  Gorkii asked me to write the 

        Sbornik of the Russian Moslems.  During the 

        winter of 1916, I devoted much time to this 

        project.  I read all pertinent publications 

        printed in Russia, such as those written by 

        Gasp ral  (1854-1914)21, Azerbaijan's Hasan Bey 

        Melikov (Zerdabi; 1842-1907), Fettah Akhundov 

        (Mirza Fath Ali Akhunzade; 1812-1878)22; also 

        those Russian works printed in Turkistan.  Old 

        Professor V. D. Smirnov, who was the Director of 

        the Oriental Section of the St. Petersburg 

        General Library, rendered spacious help.  I 

        evaluated those works written by Russian Moslems 

        but have not been published.  Smirnov was very 

        interested in the topic, from the Russian point 

        of view.  I finished the draft of this large 

        volume during winter of 1916, in Russian, and 

        gave it to Gorkii.  He gave it to Ukrainian 

        Gurevich, to read.  Then the Revolution took 

        place.  The volume was left in the hands of 

        Gurevich, who was killed after he became 

        Minister of Education in Ukraine.    

        Togan returned to full-time academic life during 

   1925.  Invited to the Turkish Republic by the Ministry of 

   Education, he was given citizenship in six weeks and began 

   teaching at Istanbul university the same year.  After a 

   disagreement on historiography in the First Turkish 

   History Conference, he resigned and went to University of 

   Vienna (1932), where he earned his doctorate (1935).  

   Togan taught at Bonn and Goettingen Universities (1935- 

   1939) before returning to his earlier post at Istanbul 

   University (1939). 

        Togan was jailed for 17 months 10 days (1944) by the 

   Turkish government "for acts against the Soviets," 

   released and later returned (1948) to his post; organized 

   and convened the XXI International Congress of 

   Orientalists (1951); appointed Director of the Islamic 

   Institute at Istanbul University (1953); became a visiting 

   professor at Columbia University (1958); was awarded an 

   honorary doctorate from Manchester University (1967); 

   remaining an historian until his death (1970) in Istanbul.  

   His life-time publications, in various languages, approach 

   400 in number.23 





        The February Revolution of 1917 found Togan living 

   across from the Preobrazhenskaia Military Barracks.  He 

   immediately plunged into the organization of the 

   forthcoming political meetings, "called to discuss the 

   legal and social status of the Turk population of Russia 

   under new developments."  These endeavors took him to 

   Tashkent, where he had to oppose the largely Russian 

   Tashkent Soviet.  He joined the Tashkent SR party, but 

   resigned in disgust, within a month, upon discovering the 

   complicity of that party in inequitable food distribution. 

        Further, Togan notes, the majority of the educated 

   Russians in Tashkent were members of the Kadets, headed by 

   the mayor of the city, Malletskii.  The Kadets planned to 

   establish two categories of municipal districts (one for 

   the local people, the other for the Russians), with the 

   Russian side ultimately wielding all power.  Togan, 

   "having read the related publications for the past few 

   years" vehemently and publicly objected, exposing the 

   hidden purposes behind it in a series of meetings:   

        I knew that the structure proposed was 

        translated into Russian and published, from the 

        (British) Indian Government laws.  The aim was 

        to have the minority rule over the majority 

        Turkistanis.  I brought the books to the 



        At that point, the SR's were supporting Togan.  

   Turkestanskaia Vedemost (published in Tashkent) carried 

   related speeches and meeting notes. 

        Togan prepared for the Moscow congress of "Moslems of 

   Russia, everywhere demanding that the Turk populations 

   should have territorial autonomy, thus forming a 

   federative system within the new regime."  He was in favor 

   of "including all Turk regions of the Russian Empire into 

   this autonomous Turkistan."  He faced opposition, not only 

   from the Bolsheviks, but also from some "unitarists" among 

   his own people who rejected Togan's federation idea and 

   instead favored a single Russian state.  Also, the 

   kadimist ulama (the orthodox clergy), in some regions a 

   part of the salaried Russian bureaucracy,24 objected to 

   the territorial autonomy or the formation of a Turkistan 

   as a part of the federated Russian state. 

        Since both the Moscow and the Tashkent Soviets were 

   opposing anything but "Russianism," especially the demands 

   of the majority population of Turkistan, Togan continued 

   his efforts among Bashkurts.  He met with success, as 

   Bashkurt autonomy was declared, after several Kurultays 

   (congresses), under the Presidency of Yunus Bekov.  Togan 

   was appointed Minister of Interior and Defense.  

   Concomitantly, Bashkurt Government affairs began to be 

   formalized, the Bashkurt Army was reestablished.25 

        On 18 January 1918 (new style) Bolsheviks occupied 

   Orenburg, where the autonomous Bashkurt Government was 

   headquartered.  For the first few days, the Bolsheviks 

   were solicitous towards the Bashkurt Government, but on 3 

   February arrested and jailed its prominent members, 

   including Togan.  It appears that Togan's rivals, 

   including the unitarists, may have contributed to this 

   event.  In the ensuing uncertainty among Bolsheviks, he 

   could easily have been executed, save for the uprising 

   staged by his followers to free him.  During the night of 

   3-4 April he was freed.  Quickly organizing his friends, 

   Togan began a guerilla movement for the purpose of 

   protecting Bashkurt population and property. 

        On 27 May 1918 the Czech Legions revolted against the 

   Bolsheviks, joining with the Whites.  Togan and his 

   Bashkurt organization established contact with the Czechs.  

   The Bashkurt government was reestablished in Cheliabinsk 

   on 7 June and Bashkurt regiments were mobilized.26 

        Furthering cooperation with Western Siberia and the 

   Kazakh Alash Orda27 Governments, Togan and his Bashkurt 

   army units began engaging Red forces and succeeded in 

   driving them out of Orenburg and traditional Bashkurt 

   lands.  An intelligence department, in collaboration with 

   the Samara government, Ural Cossacks and the Kazakhs, was 

   also established with representatives and contacts in 

   various cities around Turkistan.  One member of this 

   organization and one time secretary to Togan was OOzbek 

   Abdlhamid Suleyman, whose pen name is Cholpan, 28 often 

   touted in Soviet historiography as a loyal Bolshevik.     

        Red units began exploiting the differences between 

   Kadets and the Whites.  At that time, a French unit, under 

   the command of General Janin joined the fighting against 

   the Reds.  Reportedly, Gen. Janin simultaneously addressed 

   the Russians with "You are all Russians; one side Red, the 

   other White.  Why are you fighting?  Would it not be 

   better for you to make-up and be reconciled?" 

        On 21 November Kolchak declared himself Supreme Ruler 

   and began preparations to disband Bashkurt-Kazakh armies.  

   Samara, a principal supply point of munitions to the 

   Bashkurt army, having capitulated to Kolchak, logically 

   ended the chances of Togan's forces to resist the Reds.  

   After intercepting and reading the communications between 

   Generals Janin, Dutov and Admiral Kolchak, the conditions 

   became more clear.  Having been left facing four different 

   hostile forces from Samara and Aktbe Reds, Dutov and 

   Kolchak, without supplies, it became obvious to Togan and 

   his friends that they had to come to terms with Moscow in 

   order to save their native population from further losses. 

         Upon announcement of the Western Allies' cease fire 

   with Central Powers, Bashkurts and Kazakhs sent 

   representatives to Bolsheviks to negotiate terms.  Togan 

   asked the aid of his old friends, Chaliapin (Feodor 

   Ivanovitch, 1873-1938) and Gorkii, to establish contacts 

   for the purpose with the Bolsheviks leadership, on the way 

   to collaboration. 

        "Affiliation" with the Bolsheviks, especially after 

   vigorously fighting them, demanded special care, secrecy 

   and discipline.  During the ensuing negotiations with the 

   Bolsheviks, Mirsaid Sultangaliev29 was dispatched from 

   Moscow to Ufa, in order to expedite the matters.  

   Sultangaliev secured conditions favorable to the Bashkurt- 

   Kazakh forces and their leadership.  Finally on 18 

   February 1919, Togan officially entered into cooperation 

   with Lenin and Stalin.  This forced friendship was to last 

   15 months. 

        Lenin, Trotskii, Stalin and the rest of the Bolshevik 

   leadership sorely needed the propaganda afforded them by 

   this event, Bashkurts "joining" the Bolsheviks.  In fact, 

   Lenin immediately wrote an article on the "developments of 

   the Eastern Question," published in the 2 March 1919 issue 

   of Pravda.  Hence Togan and his colleagues were relatively 

   safe in Moscow and did not need to fear for their lives -- 

   yet.  The Bashkurt army was reconstituted under its 

   previous leadership and some of its units were sent to the 

   Western Front.  However, differences of opinion among 

   prominent Bolsheviks had already become open competition.  

   Lenin ordered arms and ammunition to be provided to the 

   Bashkurt Army.  Stalin reversed the directive.  Trotskii 

   overruled Stalin's orders and provided the Bashkurt Army 

   with ample war materiel. 

        The ensuing events concerning Togan's "collaboration" 

   with Moscow constitutes a separate chapter.  What is    

   certain is that Togan, if he had not had prior 

   reservations, quickly became disillusioned.  More and more 

   it became clear to Togan that the ethnic Russians did not 

   intend to share power, despite all the promises.  Talks 

   with Trotskii, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Preobrazhinskii, 

   Artium and a score of others did not produce a resolution 

   in the direction of maintaining the union and autonomy of 

   Bashkurt-Kazakh lands and populations.  Instead, a Russian 

   province was inserted between the Kazakhs and the 


        On 25 February 1920, Bashkurt RevKom elected Togan 

   Chairman, when the previous President of the same body, 

   Haris Yumagulov was "called to Moscow."  Shortly 

   afterward, Togan, too, was called to Moscow.  According to 

   both Lenin and Stalin, he was to undertake "Soviet State- 

   wide affairs" as opposed to "looking after such a small 

   tribal matter as the Bashkurts."  In Moscow, toward the 

   end of May 1920, Togan came into contact with Jemal and 

   Halil Pashas (of the Committee of Union and Progress),30 

   who were in Moscow.  During a dinner given in honor of 

   these individuals at the "Bashkurt House"31 in Moscow and 

   probably to force the hand of the Russians, Togan 

   suggested a Congress of the Peoples of the East of 

   "Russia."  Togan repeated that idea to Stalin and to the 

   Party Secretariat.  It was also relayed to Lenin and 

   Stalin by Jemal and Halil Pashas. 

        Lenin personally entreated Togan to sit down with him 

   to discuss the issues pertaining the Eastern Question and 

   the "de-colonization" policies.  Lenin insisted on 

   receiving Togan's comments in writing.  In this last 

   meeting, Lenin rejected the requests and demands contained 

   in the joint resolutions of the Turkistan leadership, 

   submitted to him through Togan.  Seemingly, this was the 

   last of many incidents that caused Togan to break with the 

   Bolsheviks and redouble his earlier efforts to devote 

   himself to the affairs of the "Secret Organization." 


   The Break with the Bolsheviks 


        During March 1919, just after Bashkurt-Bolshevik 

   alliance, Togan and the rest of the Turkistan leadership 

   proposed to establish the Erk Party32 for  the Central 

   Asians.  This party was intended to become a member of the 

   Comintern directly [rather than through RKP(b)], to 

   prevent Turkistan from coming under the total domination 

   of the Russian Communist Party.  The idea was vetoed by 

   Stalin.  Togan and the rest of the leadership then 

   concentrated on introducing their members into the upper 

   levels of the Communist Parties already being established 

   in Central Asia.  Most probably, the Intelligence 

   Department of the Bashkurt Government was heavily involved 

   in this effort.  This amalgam must be the "Secret 

   Organization" Togan references from that point on.  

   Following the last rebuff of the national aspirations at    

   the hands of Lenin in Spring 1920, Togan moved to 

   implement his plans and to join the Basmachi movement 

   already in progress in Central Asia.  On 29 June 1920 he 

   left Moscow. 

        Togan spent the summer months on the Central Asian 

   bozkir (literally, pale pasture; the prairie), planning 

   the next phase of his group's activities.  Between 1-5 

   September 1920, he "attended" the Congress of the Toilers 

   of the East in Baku.  Though his presence was carefully 

   concealed from the organizers and majority of the 

   attendees, Togan was kept fully informed of the 

   proceedings through carefully chosen intermediaries.  He 

   "participated" through motions and resolutions he wrote 

   and relayed via the same channels. 

        During the Conference, a resolution of the Comintern, 

   meeting after Togan had left Moscow, reached him.  It was 

   prepared by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs under the 

   guidance of Middle Eastern Specialist of the Comintern, 

   Pavlovich.  Intended for the Bolshevik operatives 

   designated to work in the Middle East and Central Asia, it 

   was not distributed to the representatives of the 

   indigenous populations.  The copy in question was handed 

   to Togan's Organization by a sympathetic Polish 

   delegate.33  In summary, the resolution stated: 

        Since class differentiation among the Arab, 

        Turk, Iranian and Afghan populations of the Near 

        East are almost non-existent, as is the case 

        also with capitalism, it is necessary to exploit 

        other cleavages already in place.  It will be 

        useful to keep alive tarikat and sectarian 

        differences, competition among rival commercial 

        interests and merchants, even after elimination 

        of those among their brethren.  These rivalries 

        ought to be supplemented through the use of 

        differentiated languages, as the educated strata 

        among the target populations is a thin one and 

        that it would not be difficult to break the 

        population free of their influence. 


        This was significant, because:  a) it was being 

   addressing the Russian Bolsheviks, behind the backs of the 

   indigenous delegates;  b) outlined the same tactics 

   already used against the tsarists  c) presumed control of 

   Turkistan and now planning to expand policies toward that 

   end.  Togan arrived in Petrovsk and sent the following 

   letter to Lenin, Stalin, Trotskii and Rykov, dated 12 

   September 1920: 

        It is apparent from the policies of the Central 

        Committee of RKP(b), which is currently being 

        implemented, you, like Artium and his friends, 

        have accepted the Russian national chauvinist 

        thoughts as the basis of your policy towards 

        Eastern nationalities.  Actually comrade 

        Trotskii elaborated on this while he was    

        investigating these matters in Ufa, he 

        pronounced the activities of aforementioned as a 

        provocation sequence.  Undoubtedly, he also made 

        the same statement to the CC.  Despite that, the 

        Russian imperialism remained as the policy.  In 

        the same session held after I and Ryskulov had 

        departed, comrades Frunze and Kubyshev --like 

        Trotskii-- stressed that this policy of the CC 

        was nothing but hypocrisy and deceit.  In the 

        same Turkkomisia (Turkistan Komisia) sessions, 

        those members of the party who wish to 

        perpetuate Russian imperialism behind a mask, 

        openly stated their objectives; that of fanning 

        the fires of artificial class distinctions among 

        the Turkistan populations; to declare such 

        nationalists as Ryskulov and Validov as the 

        enemies of the laborers; to create loyal 

        servants among the local educated under the 

        category of "Octoberists," to crush us with 

        their help.  On the other hand, you must know 

        that we cannot become the artificial class 

        enemies of the local farmers and cannot allow 

        ourselves to become the target of general 

        mocking.  You can find the required sacrificial 

        lambs.  But we cannot be those victims.  The 

        Congress of the Toilers of the East has clearly 

        shown our fellow-countrymen in attendance that 

        the attacks on the rights of Turkistanis is not 

        simply the machinations of the local Russian 

        communists, but consists of the policies of the 

        CC.  The attitude of the CC representatives, 

        towards the Easterners in attendance, is the 

        same as those commissars at the beginning of the 

        1917 revolution toward the peasant congresses, 

        whose members were regarded ignorant.  The CC 

        Representatives not only prevented, by shouting 

        down, those resolutions prepared by the 

        delegates at their homelands, but also utilized 

        the Red Guard soldiers in silencing them.  The 

        delegates were forced to accept only those 

        resolutions written in Moscow and sent for the 

        purpose.  The fact that the CC regards the 

        Eastern Nationality issues principally as a 

        matter of land disputes, a peasant problem, 

        indicates that the CC has taken a wrong turn.  

        The CC can keep alive this artificial class 

        differentiation among the Eastern peasants only 

        by the force of terror.  Our comments written in 

        relation to these theses of comrade Lenin, 

        before he addressed the Comintern on the 

        colonialism issues, stressed that the social 

        revolution in the East could not be confined to 

        stratification (rassloenie); that this is a more 

        complex matter.  Since the European capitalist    

        and laborers of the East are going to act 

        jointly as the rulers of the colony, then the 

        Eastern peasant will have to join forces with 

        the wealthy Easterner.  When you determine that 

        the stratification is not taking place among the 

        indigenous population, you will blame the local 

        educated and declare a portion of the latter 

        "class enemy petty bourgeois" and the remainder 

        as left Octoberists "class enemy," and liquidate 

        them.  In their stead, you will conjure new left 

        Octoberists.  Finally, you will be left solely 

        with the illiterate peasant who is only familiar 

        with his donkey, ox and spade.  I do not believe 

        that you can alter your distrust toward the 

        native educated of Turkistan.  You can at least 

        allow the educated Turkistan elite the 

        opportunity to renovate and populate the Soviet 

        Bukhara, whose Emir has fled. 


        Togan sent another letter from Petrovsk, this time to 

   Kretinskii and Preobrazhinskii, both secretaries of the CC 

   and members of the Politburo: 

        Though you and I had our differences in our 

        understanding of socialism and nationalism, we 

        cannot reconcile our positions with regard to 

        the application of socialism in the development 

        of great nations; as a person wishing to remain 

        honorable, I have been honest with you two and 

        many other Party members.  I did not deceive you 

        while I took the path of fighting against the 

        Soviets and Communism.  Those I have deceived 

        are the likes of Stalin and other state 

        officials who have deceived me.  Those friends 

        complaining of the masked Dictator's ridiculing 

        the dignity and the self- determination of 

        humans, inform me of the severe terror that is 

        yet to come within the party.  Like them, I fear 

        that one day your heads may fly.  I did not wait 

        for my head to fall.  Even if I were to die, I 

        must do so while engaged in open struggle. 


        Togan adds, as a post script, that Kretinskii and 

   Preobrazhinskii were tortured and after making 

   "confessions" executed, during 1937. 

        Between 12 September and 31 December 1920, Togan 

   traversed the lands separating Petrovks and Bukhara.  

   Along the way, travelling incognito, he investigated 

   historical sites, made contacts with local leadership and 

   further studied the terrain and its inhabitants.  He notes 

   that up to a certain location in Karakorum, he was also 

   reading the memoirs of Babur34 and Marx's Das Kapital 

   which he carried along with his field glasses.  Prior to 

   his arrival in Kongrat, he finally had to give up those 

   items in order not to attract attention.    




        Upon arriving in Bukhara,35 Togan met with other 

   members of the Society as previously been arranged.  Their 

   first task was to establish a Bukhara National Army, to 

   bring the representatives from Khiva, Turkmenistan and 

   Kazakistan to establish the Turkistan National Union.  The 

   educated Kazakhs and individuals from other Turkistan 

   locations who have been sent to contact all groups in 

   Kazakistan, returned to join Togan after establishing 

   channels with the Japanese and the prominent Basmachi 

   leaders operating in Ferghana.  A number of the officers 

   from the Bashkurt Army were appointed to command garrisons 

   in Karshi, Shehrisebz, Nur, Guzar, Kermin.  Their 

   objective was to accomplish what the Russians were 

   preventing; i.e. autonomy. 

        In addition to these "undercover" efforts, there were 

   other officers working openly in "legal" positions known 

   to the Bolsheviks.  Although a Bukhara government was in 

   existence in name, most affairs of state were in the hands 

   of the Revolutionary Committee (presumably comprising the 

   Russians) a portion of it operating as the Central 

   Committee.  Togan describes the complexity of political 

   spectrum during the last stages of the Bukhara Emirate: 

        There were three types of Basmachi:  "Emirists;" 

        "somewhat Emirists;" and "anti-Emirists."  The 

        political spectrum of the Basmachi did not end 

        there.  Jemal Pasha wished to manage the 

        problems of Turkistan and the Basmachi from 

        Kabul.  Enver Pasha, on the other hand was 

        conducting pro-Bolshevik "Union of Islam" 

        propaganda from Moscow.  This had some effect.  

        There were also others who tried to insinuate 

        themselves, seemingly eager to join us.....  

        Further, there was necessity to establish 

        contacts with the Russian parties who were 

        struggling against the Bolsheviks.  In Bukhara 

        and Khiva the government was passing into the 

        hands of those nationalist friends whose 

        administration, though temporary, was moving 

        away from "communism" toward "populism."  It was 

        necessary to formulate the economic and social 

        theories of all.  The political spectrum had 

        earlier stratified as   a) Kadimists36  b) 

        Jadids  c) Socialists, and showed a propensity 

        to crystallize around Jadids and Socialists 

        after the disappearance of the Emir.  However, 

        thoughts were scrambled.  During the first week 

        of January 1921, the matter of the programs were 

        debated.  Primarily, individuals from "Islamic 

        Unionists" and the Bukharan Jadids were 

        involved.  Populist socialism was represented by 

        Abdulhamid Arif37 and myself.  Since there was    

        no previously prepared program before the 

        general assembly, the Socialist Party Program 

        was presented.  It was first read in 

        Bashkurdistan during 1919, then in Moscow during 

        1920 and finally in the 1920 Baku Congress.  Few 

        of those in attendance were prepared to accept 

        it.  A few days later, Mirza Abdulkadir 

        Muheddinoglu, representing the majority among 

        those present, proposed a program comprising 19 

        statutes.  These pertained to the retention of 

        the women's veil, continuation of the Sharia 

        kad s, reverence for religion, application to 

        the League of Nations.38  However, these were 

        not acceptable to the other side.   


        Both groups only agreed upon:  1. The necessity of 

   the Secret Organization,  2. Elimination of the Emir 

   absolutely and establishing the machinery of national 

   government  3. Establishment of central ministry of 

   defense, local defense commissariats and the formation of 

   a national army,  4. The necessity of modern education.  

   As a result of their discussions, the two sides were able 

   to agree upon the seven point platform listed below.  

   Subsequently, the two parties engaged in these talks 

   developed their own party platforms.  The contents of this 

   seven-point program was further discussed and refined at 

   the 2921 September-October Samarkand and September 1922 

   Tashkent Congresses.  These seven items are as follows: 


        1. The Society's aim is to have a free Turkistan, and 

   that the Turkistanis to take charge of their own destiny. 

        2. Free Turkistan's form of government is a 

   democratic republic. 

        3. Freedom can only be obtained through a national 

   army. National government can only be based on a national 


        4. Turkistan's freedom is dependent on economic 

   freedom. Turkistanis must have control over the decisions 

   concerning: the general outlines of the economic policy; 

   deciding the balance of vocational and agricultural 

   training and the level of importance to be accorded to 

   each; designating the locations and the directions of 

   future railroads and irrigation channels. 

        5. Contemporary and professional education must 

   prevail. The acquaintance with the European civilization 

   should be undertaken directly and not through Russians. 

        6. Nationality issues and the exploitation of the 

   nation's natural resources will be organized according to 

   census and prevailing proportions. 

        7. There will be freedom of religion. There will be 

   no mixing of religious and state affairs. 


        As it can be noted, this program is primarily non- 

   religious in character, and demonstrates religious    

   tolerance.  Shortly afterwards, the effort was expanded. 

   According to Togan, the aim was to accommodate a full 

   spectrum of political views then prevailing in Turkistan 

   under a single umbrella, which, in today's terms, would be 

   akin to a Popular Front.  During this period, the 

   Sosyalist Tde (party) was formed39, later changing its 

   name to Erk Party, and its program was shortened from 27 

   statutes to 9: 


   Erk Party Program 

        1. On the economic plane: In order to accomplish 

   socialism; land, water and mineral wealth must be 

   nationalized and village life collectivized. 

        2. To adapt, in a planned manner, the labor 

   organizations of industrial countries to Turkistan. The 

   farmers must also be regarded, from an organizational 

   point, as laborers. 

        3. Turkistan must free itself from colonizers and 

   become self-governing. This is the first and fundamental 

   step for stratification and the acquisition by the farmers 

   of means to fight for their own rights. 

        4. The government in free Turkistan will be the 

   democratic system supporting the farmers and those 

   supporting self-renewal without barriers. Turkistan 

   parliament, provincial and city councils will be 

   established and elected by the general population 


        5. Establishment of the national army will aid the 

   governance and the application of socialism. 

        6. In Turkistan, the nationality and minority affairs 

   are governed according to census figures and in 

   representative proportions. 

        7. On the educational plane: Affairs are to be 

   arranged such that, the native population will have direct 

   control of the country's governance; the national 

   government will undertake all contemporary governmental 

   services, modern transportation, railroads, post and 

   telegraph, agricultural and industrial organization. 

   Cultural affairs must be organized to reflect the strong 

   national local culture, to remove foreign, meaning Russian 

   influences. To establish business and trade schools, 

   effect general education are among the principal 

   objectives of education. 

        8. Religious affairs are kept totally separate from 

   the affairs of the government. 

        9. Turkistan Socialist Party can participate in an 

   "International," provided that such a gathering is 

   composed, in principle, of parties like itself, for the 

   purpose of fighting for the freedom of oppressed 



        Counterbalancing the socialists, there were also 

   "modernists" in Central Asia. The origins of those can be 

   traced to the movement known as "Jadidizm," from    

   Shihabaddin Marjani (1815-1889)41 and Kayyum Nasiri (1825- 

   1902),42 to Gaspirali Ismail Bey (1854-1914). Gaspirali  

   supported and spread the movement through the newspaper he 

   published, and the schools he had established.43  


   Jadid Terakkiperver Party Program44 


        1. To live as an independent nation, based on native 

   culture, is the principle precept of life. This is the 

   ideal of all nations. We aim to have an independent 

   Turkistan with a national government. Nationality is based 

   on the unity of language, religion, tradition, literature 

   and custom. 

        2. The nature of government in free Turkistan is 

   republic. Sovereignty is in the hands of the national 

   assembly, councils for the provinces and cities, elected 

   according to democratic precepts. 

        3. Members of the central government are appointed by 

   the President, with the approval of the national assembly. 

   Governors of the provinces are appointed by the central 

   government. Chairmen of the provincial and city councils 

   are elected by the members of those assemblies. The 

   regulations governing the election of the members of the 

   provincial councils are established by the first kurultay 

   (congress) of independent Turkistan. 

        4. In Turkistan, non-Turk minority communities will 

   have full civil rights. Turk elements must work rigorously 

   and collectively to preserve the Turkistan culture. 

        5. Turkistan national government will depend on its 

   national soldiers. Military service is mandatory. 

        6. Provincial governments will establish local police 

   forces, which will be under the jurisdiction of the 

   national defense organization. 

        7. There will be freedom of religion in the country. 

   The State guarantees the freedom of the performance of 

   religious rights. Foreign (religious) missions will not be 

   permitted to operate in the country. 

        8. Freedom of the press and publication and the 

   personal freedoms will be secured through the constitution. 

        9. Taxes will be proportional to income. So will the 

   inheritance taxes. In Turkistan, taxes that are the 

   remnants of medieval times will be abolished. 

        10. Principles of land ownership will be based on the 

   fact that water, land and the mineral wealth under and on 

   the land, and the forests belong to the state. Land will 

   be given to villagers as private property. 

        11. Private persons cannot engage in directly buying 

   and selling of water and land with each other. These 

   transactions can only be enacted through the state. Laws 

   pertaining to ownership are determined by local custom and 


        12. Turkistan's freedom can only be ensured with 

   economic independence. In this vein, Turkistan will strive    

   to establish and develop modern economic relations with 

   neighboring countries. 

        13. The principal issue of land in Turkistan requires 

   that the whole nation work with all its might to irrigate 

   and expand cultivation. Water management must be handled 

   with great care. 

        14. In Turkistan, especially Kazak, Kirgiz, and 

   Turkmen provinces, the most important issue is the 

   transition from nomadic to settled life. This problem can 

   be solved by irrigating regions alongside large rivers. No 

   immigrants can be brought to Turkistan other than ethnic 

   Turks and Moslems. 

        15. The solution to the problem of workers in 

   Turkistan is dependent on the development of industry. 

   Working conditions of the workers, working hours, rights 

   of child and women laborers are determined according to 

   methods prevailing in developed countries. 

        16. Equal justice for everyone shall prevail. This 

   will be accomplished, without regard to differences in 

   religion and sect, by accepting and applying modern laws. 

        17. General free education is to be striven for. 

   Citizens can establish private educational institutions, 

   provided that they are not against the interests of the 


        18. Importance shall be attached especially to the 

   establishment of trade schools and to sending students to 


        19. Turkistan being the hearth of an ancient 

   civilization, those monuments of civilization accumulated 

   throughout centuries will be preserved, organized to serve 

   the development of the national civilization. 


        Togan observed: 

        It must be categorically stated that the 

        proposed future administration of Turkistan by 

        two parties, one radical national and other 

        socialist, was not influenced by any outside 

        thought.  This developed due to local conditions 

        and in 1921 through consultations with the 

        educated leadership representing the local 

        population of Turkistan.  The Alash Orda was 

        added to others to form a three party system.  

        At the time, during deliberations, Turkistan 

        nationals were not aware of the existence of the 

        two party systems in England and in the USA. 


   The Society and the Basmachi 

        Until the establishment of the Society, and 

        while the Emirate of Bukhara was still in 

        existence, the educated Turkistani were not in 

        contact with the Basmachi.  Basmachi units 

        (parties) were largely based on the Kadimist 

        ulama and the elements of the fanatic Ozbek 

        bourgeoisie.  During the 1917 Representative    

        Council elections, the educated were on List 

        Number Four.  The ulama, opposing the educated, 

        thus labelled them dorduncu (4th) and engaged in 

        violent anti-Dorduncu propaganda.  As a result, 

        the majority of the younger generation did not 

        trust the Drdnc during 1918-1919, 

        particularly since the educated were siding with 

        the soviets.45  As the hopes of the educated 

        were dashed by the Bolsheviks during 1920, they 

        joined the ranks of the Society.  The abolition 

        of the Bukhara Emirate eliminated the reasons 

        preventing the youth from any action.  

        Collectively, these developments diminished the 

        influence of the ulama on the Basmachi.  The 

        Society established contacts without any 

        hesitation with the Basmachi in Samarkand, Khiva 

        and Ferghana.  The objective was to shape it 

        into a real national movement infused with 

        spirit, coupled with modern organization, to 

        form military units under the command of 

        educated individuals.  To this end, educated 

        advisors and some instructor officers were sent 

        to them.  The Emir of Bukhara regarded the 

        Bolsheviks as "Russia" until his last days and 

        attempted to remain "loyal."  The Emir had 

        disarmed Osipov's military unit in Shehrisebz, 

        where it had sought protection within his 

        domains.  When Shirmehmet and his friends of 

        Ferghana sent an embassy seeking a united front 

        with the Bukhara Emirate, the Bashvezir (Chief 

        Minister) Nizamettin Kushbeghi had responded 

        with : Are you not aware of our friendship with 

        the Russians," and tearing up Shirmehmet's 

        letter, trampled upon it.  The members of the 

        embassy were jailed, only to be released seven 

        months later upon intervention of the Afghans.  

        Shirmehmet relates these events in his memoirs, 

        regarding the incident as a manifestation of the 

        Emir's extraordinary ignorance and heedlessness.  

        For that reason, a portion of the Basmachi were 

        not at al  affected by the lapse of the Emirate.  

        Even some Basmachi, such as Mahkem Haji and 

        Toychi Korbashi,46  made peace with the 

        Bolsheviks, participating in the occupation of 

        Bukhara alongside the Bolshevik forces.  After 

        the Fall of Bukhara, they returned to the ranks 

        of Basmachi, but were killed by Shirmehmet.   


        Shirmehmet and Rahmankul themselves sought to 

   establish contacts with the Society.  Shirmehmet sent two 

   of his men, who were working within the Bolshevik 

   apparatus, to the Baku Congress.  Through them, Togan 


        A very interesting rumor pertaining to the 

        Bolshevik policies concerning the East began to 

        spread.  Shirmehmet relates: "The information 

        arriving from Baku suggested that the Russians 

        wished to kill fourteen and a half million of 

        the inhabitants, only to retain two million 

        under their rule.  In the Baku Congress, the 

        Turkistani decided not to lay down their arms 

        and sent word to intensify the struggle.  At the 

        end of the Baku Congress, Basmachi Movement 

        caught fire."47 


        Togan also points to the Red Army's use of the 

   Russians living in Turkistan: 

        On 12 September Bolsheviks began serious attacks 

        from all directions.  This was an 

        extraordinarily difficult time.  Bolsheviks 

        inducted into the Red Army those Russians from 

        Central Russia who were starving, in order for 

        them to loot the population for bread (in 

        Turkistan).  Hence, volunteer Russian numbers 

        swelled.  These were fighting seriously, since 

        they would have died of starvation if discharged 

        from the army. 


   The atrocities of the Russians were increasing the resolve 

   of the Society and the Basmachi: 

        In the village of Sufiyan, near Dushanbe, 

        Russians found a Russian soldier with burns on 

        his face.  Because of that, Russians killed all 

        OOzbek villagers they found in the vicinity.  

        Meanwhile, Bolsheviks, instigated by a communist 

        woman in their army, tied up seven OOzbek 

        soldiers, mutilating them with knives and swords 

        so as not to kill them.  Afterwards, placing 

        these soldiers in the wheat heaps, set fire and 

        burnt them alive.  A Basmachi, Mustafa Shahkul 

        observed: "This communist woman was so ugly and 

        despicable that any man swearing off all women 

        because of her would not have been 



        Togan includes his discussions of the relationships 

   between Enver and Jemal Pashas and the Society: 

        Even before I became the Chairman of the Central 

        Committee of the Turkistan National Unity (The 

        Society), I was a member of that body.  

        Therefore, it is necessary to delve into the 

        relations between Enver and Jemal Pashas and the 

        Society.  They sought to join forces with the 

        Bolsheviks by forming the "Islamic Revolutionary 

        Society," for the purpose of liberating the 

        Islamic world from European imperialism.  First 

        Halil and Jemal, later Enver Pashas arrived in    

        Moscow with this aim and began their propaganda.  

        We49 spoke with Halil and Jemal during June 1920 

        in Moscow.  Jemal Pasha explained his ideas and 

        urged us to work with him, but we left Moscow.  

        On 20 August, Jemal Pasha arrived in Tashkent.  

        His aim was to secure the environs of Punjab and 

        to establish an Islamic state there.  He was 

        going to prepare in Afghanistan.  With 15-20 

        Ottoman officers in his retinue, he left for 

        Afghanistan.  In the meantime, Halil Pasha and 

        Haji Sami50 thought of establishing a truce with 

        the Bolsheviks, to cross over to Eastern 

        Turkistan via Yedisu and Narin (rivers).  But 

        neither could they trust the Bolsheviks, nor 

        could the Bolsheviks trust them.  Finally, they 

        returned to Moscow.  Jemal Pasha told the 

        Bolsheviks that he could use the Basmachi for a 

        campaign to overthrow the British regime in 

        India.  But the Bolsheviks did not believe him 

        in the least.  We knew all this and the real 

        intentions of the Russians through our friends 

        working within the Communist Central Committees 

        of Moscow and Tashkent.  The Russians thought 

        that Jemal Pasha was actually preparing an 

        organization to control Turkistan, and wanted to 

        keep the Pasha between the Indian and 

        Afghanistan borders as a last resort for their 

        own policies.  


        The personal representatives of Jemal Pasha, sent to 

   enter into discussions with various Basmachi groups, were 

   arrested by the Bolsheviks.  This event, notes Togan: 

        Showed that Jemal Pasha did not have influence 

        among the Bolsheviks....  Jemal Pasha's advice 

        to the Basmachi was rather strange: "make peace 

        with the Bolsheviks, without giving up your 

        arms, or dissolving your organizations."  

        Although the Bolsheviks had previously tried 

        that method on many occasions, we were now 

        strictly against it.  


        On 25 January 1921, Central Committee of the 

   Turkistan National Unity (TNU) sent a letter to Jemal 

   Pasha, then at Kabul, via a courier of the Bukhara Foreign 

   Ministry.  The said letter summarized the objectives (as 

   noted above) of the Organization, and continued: 

        ....We ask that your Middle East policies be 

        drawn so as not to sacrifice the future of this 

        old Turkistan to plans in preparation for the 

        deliverance of the Islamic world.  It is to the 

        benefit of all concerned, that all initiatives 

        concerning Turkistan be entered into via the 

        (TNU) Central Committee, including contacts with 

        the Basmachi.  Likewise, no aid should be    

        extended to the Emir of Bukhara, currently in 

        Eastern Bukhara.  Any support given to the Emir 

        (by the Afghan government) will be taken as 

        enmity towards our Committee.  Even if we were 

        to accept, for a moment, that the Bolsheviks 

        remain sincere to their avowed position of 

        liberating the colonies from European 

        imperialists, Turkistan cannot subsume its 

        future to the as yet unknown outcome of 

        forthcoming struggle between capitalism and 

        socialism.  Thus, policies pertaining to 

        Turkistan must be based on these principles.   


    Togan comments on this letter: 

        With these words, it was requested from Jemal 

        Pasha that he not seek to utilize the political 

        and military resources of Turkistan for the 

        dreamed of purpose of liberating India from the 

        English.  The Pasha did not like this.  

        [Meanwhile] the Society steadily worked towards 

        its goals, despite the paucity of politically 

        experienced personnel among its ranks.  Active 

        elements of the Moslem communists were channeled 

        into the activities of the Society.  In all of 

        these provinces, members of the Society entered 

        into the Soviet Congresses, Communist Party 

        meetings.  Everywhere, the police (militsia) 

        organizations and administrative organs were 

        under the influence of the Society.  The labor 

        organizations of Bukhara, Tashkent, Samarkand 

        and Kokand were under the influence of the 

        members of the Socialist Tde (the Erk Party?) 

        branch of the Society.   This was a monumental 

        success and promise for the future of Turkistan 

        and her inhabitants, who were relatively 

        inexperienced in such matters.  Although the 

        individuals working within the government and 

        party machinery of Khiva, Tashkent and Orenburg 

        were not members of the Society, they were 

        completely cooperating.  For that matter, they 

        were not aware of the details.  Such success of 

        the Secret Organization could not have been 

        dreamed, for example, during 1917. 


   Togan relates details of other matters weighing on 

   the minds of the Central Committee members: 

        The national Flag was decided upon, having been 

        earlier debated and reconstructed from 

        historical elements, emblems and colors, at the 

        Samarkand sessions... teachers were sent in the 

        retinue of each Korbashi... ten mounted troops 

        were requested from in each Korbashi in 

        Ferghana, Samarkand; to be sent to the Ferghana 

        and Samarkand Commands.  The purpose was to    

        conduct preliminary preparations for the 

        formation of a Turkistan-wide unified military 

        command; experiment with military operations...  

        All existing disagreements between tribal units 

        were resolved... those battalions in the 

        barracks of the Bolsheviks were arriving the 

        order to emerge as the units of the Turkistan 

        forces.  The Society was in constant contact 

        with those high-level Russians who were against 

        the Bolsheviks, supplying the Society with 

        critical intelligence, thus preventing Bolshevik 

        surprise attacks.  In sum, the Central Committee 

        of the Turkistan National Unity was taking all 

        precautions for a Turkistan-wide general and 

        final assault.  The final stage would have been 

        accomplished by establishing military 

        superiority, through disrupting traffic and 

        communications of the opposition with their 

        center.  The Moslem reactionaries (mrteci- 

        recidivist),51 as usual, were those Emirists and 

        the ulama that have not yet lost complete 

        credibility.  These were still propagandizing 

        against all our efforts.  The hope was to reform 

        them in a year or two.  The arrival of Enver 

        Pasha in Turkistan at year's end and the 

        attitude of the Emirists recidivists toward him 

        turned all precautions upside-down. 


   Togan and Enver Pasha 52 

        Enver Pasha arrived in Bukhara and sent word 

        that he wished to speak with me.  On 2 October 

        1921, I met him for the first time, and upon his 

        request provided him with the details of the 

        circumstances in Turkistan, especially the 

        status of the Society.  Since he was 

        particularly concerned with the conditions in 

        Eastern Bukhara, I related to him the 

        difficulties we were facing there, and the lack 

        of progress due to the remnants of the Emirists.  

        He indicated that he was aware of those 

        conditions, that it would take an inordinate 

        time to standardize the general organization 

        through the Society, and this would be a waste 

        of time.  He stated that he was directly going 

        to Eastern Bukhara and then to Ferghana with the 

        intention of giving a different form to the 

        Basmachi movement; he had made preparations to 

        that end, had obtained horses and equipment, and 

        had brought officers with him for the purpose; 

        he would be leaving Bukhara on the pretext of a 

        hunting expedition.  Enver Pasha's arrival in 

        Bukhara, especially his plans, were a totally 

        unexpected development for us.  A few months ago 

        this person was engaged in propaganda through    

        the pamphlets of "Union of Islam" and others, in 

        connection with Jemal Pasha, advocating 

        cooperation with the Bolsheviks against 

        imperialism.  He was now not only taking a 

        position against the Bolsheviks, but actually 

        had brought plans to attack them...  Enver Pasha 

        told me that he had been in Soviet Russia for 

        over a year now; [he had seen] that the 

        Bolsheviks were despicable people and he had 

        come to the conclusion that it was necessary to 

        liberate the Moslems from Red Imperialism before 

        any other Imperialism....  But his joining the 

        Basmachi or even his going to Eastern Bukhara 

        was not acceptable.  I stressed that point 

        during our first meeting.  He asked me what he 

        could do to be of service to Turkistan.  

        Truthfully, he appeared bewildered.  We could 

        not meet every day, since he was under Bolshevik 

        surveillance.  I wrote down 14 reasons why he 

        should not join the Basmachi, and sent it to 

        him.  Main points were:  The Russians are about 

        to wash their hands of external matters.  

        Henceforth they can concentrate all their 

        resources in Turkistan.  Our organization, in 

        proportion to its duties, is very weak.  This 

        year Turkistan is suffering from a great famine.  

        Ferghana is experiencing a crisis in its 

        attempts to feed the Basmachi .  After joining 

        the Basmachi, you would want to fight with 

        regular fronts.  At present, it is not feasible 

        to keep a standing army larger than five-six 

        thousand strong.  It is only possible to conduct 

        guerilla warfare.  As for the Basmachi in 

        Eastern Bukhara, it is not possible to cooperate 

        with them unless agreements are entered into 

        with the Afghans and the Emir will not allow you 

        to be recognized (as a leader).  Hence, they 

        (Eastern Bukhara Basmachi) will not accept you 

        as such.  Until today, the Turkistan question, 

        Basmachi movement and the secret political 

        activity has remained an internal issue of 

        Russia...   If you join this struggle, the 

        Turkistan movement may assume a Pan-Islamist 

        character... This can cause the Russians 

        resident in Turkistan to unite with the 

        Bolsheviks, for their national objectives, 

        against us.  The best course of action available 

        for you to cross over to Afghanistan and aid the 

        Turkistan movement from there...  Pasha was 

        consulting with others on the topic.  Some 

        individuals, whose names it would not be prudent 

        to reveal as yet, received Pasha's joining the 

        Basmachi with a positive attitude.  Haji Sami 

        was another who was advocating this course.    


   Togan describes Enver's consultations and vacillation 

   over many days, and finally his decision (possibly on 28 


        On the night of the following day, he sent word 

        asking me to meet him.  He indicated that he was 

        going to Eastern Bukhara, to convene a congress 

        of the Basmachi and the educated.  He asked me 

        to send men to Khiva, the Kazakhs, Ferghana, 

        Turkmen for the purpose of relaying his 

        decisions in the name of the Society and invite 

        representatives.  I again objected and reminded 

        him that his crossing over to Afghanistan would 

        be the most suitable path.  He was most annoyed.  

        I gathered that Enver Pasha was not at all fond 

        of objections.  Apparently he was not going to 

        change his mind.  The next night five or ten of 

        us met in someone's home.  Enver Pasha related 

        his decision in careful phrases.  Tears were 

        streaming down his face.  Others were somber as 

        well...  He was wearing German-made sports 

        boots.  He was giving the impression of a 

        sportsman ready to jump into competition.  He 

        related his most sincere thoughts...  That day I 

        learned that this person was a great idealist, 

        who had not squared himself with events and 

        life, and he had not equipped himself with the 

        geography and the statistics of Turkistan even 

        from the Russian and the European 

        publications...  Ten days later a special 

        courier brought a verbal message from Enver 

        Pasha in Bukhara:  "Decided to go to Eastern 

        Bukhara.  we will be Ghazi if we win, martyr if 

        we do not.  Let the Turkmens (of Burdal k) not 

        await our arrival." 


        Togan records Enver's imprisonment by the 

   "frighteningly bigoted" Ibrahim53 of the Emirist Lakay 

   clan.  The hasty attack induced by Ibrahim of the Lakays 

   upset carefully laid plans by the Society.  Further, Enver 

   caused the premature emergence of a Turkistan army unit, 

   an orderly force of 600 rifles, that has been under 

   "Bolshevik" cover.   The skirmish was lost to the 

   Bolsheviks, who were openly aided by the Emirist Lakays.  

   Enver Pasha and a few of his followers crossed over to 

   Afghanistan.  By May, Enver Pasha had 7000 troops.  

   Volunteers from Afghanistan had turned the tide.  But, he 

   was not without opposition.  Togan relates an assessment 

   meeting after the latest event: 

        Enver Pasha was a fait accompli to the Society.  

        The Central Committee met in the vicinity of 

        Samarkand, discussing the state of affairs.  It 

        was decided to regard this development as 

        specific to Bukhara border regions, not to 

        change the rest of the plans, not to declare    

        uprising in the name of the Society, to continue 

        guerilla warfare as before, to provide support 

        for Enver Pasha.  But the early failures of 

        Enver's each initiative had a negative effect.  

        This was also true of Enver's propaganda.   


        Togan proceeds with the details of his war 

   preparations, listing the units, commands, commanders, 

   troop strengths, armaments under the Society auspices.  He 

   quotes from the memoirs of other combatants, members of 

   the Society and participants in compiling this section.54  

   Togan also states that between April and July of the same 

   year he participated in the battles against the 


        Between April-June, people and combatants of 

        Turkistan were cheerful and the Bolsheviks were 

        unable to leave the railroad lines.  Comrades of 

        Stalin, Ilvaya and Ordzhonikidze, arrived from 

        Moscow in May.  They could visit the Ulugh Bey 

        observatory55, two kilometers from Samarkand, 

        only in the company of a strong Bolshevik 

        military detachment.  For that matter, if they 

        had not taken extreme precautions, they could 

        have been thrashed by the Basmachi who were 

        waiting in ambush.   


   The Beginning of the End 

        During mid-March, Feyzullah Hoja brought a 

        secret order from Moscow Communist Party 

        headquarters, consisting of a few articles, 

        about "serious struggle against Enver Pasha and 

        Validov (Togan) Group."  Stalin himself 

        published an article in Pravda, under the title 

        of "Validovshchina," seeking to mobilize the 

        nationalist youth against us.  The Red Army's 

        first action, after settling in Bukhara, was to 

        employ the Emirists.  The Red Army charged a 

        high level official of the Emir, one Nusreddin 

        Aghal k, who had killed Mahmud Hoja Behbubi on 

        25 March 1919, with the administration of the 

        Karshi province.  Since this man was also in 

        contact with the Emirist rebels, he was in a 

        position competently to quash all our 

        undertakings.  As soon as he arrived in Karshi, 

        Aghal k detained some individuals who would have 

        been instrumental in carrying out the rebellion 

        of Shehrisebz, Guzar and Karshi garrisons.  

        These preparations were set and prepared for 23 

        March, by War Commissar Abdlmamid Arif.  Those 

        of our essentially lax Jadid friends of Bukhara, 

        who were in contact with the military 

        organization in Karshi, became needlessly 

        frightened and stated: Nureddin Aghal k has 

        heard of our intentions...  I personally    

        travelled for two weeks between Karshi, 

        Shehrisebz, Katta Kurgan, but was unable to 

        break the "Nureddin Aghal k" bands.  In Kashan 

        and other regions, some troops, fourteen 

        educated Tatars and officers, Kashanl  Behram 

        Bek, Jure Ishan and others were able to join the 

        Basmachi, but they could not carry with them the 

        stockpiled rifles and the ammunition.  Molla 

        Mushtak, a chieftain under Molla Kahhar, 

        approached the Bashkurt army officers who were 

        under the direction of Heybetullah Suyunduk.  

        Disguised as Basmachi, Mushtak killed twelve men 

        during a rest period on 10 April. 


        Togan proceeds to answer a question oft misunderstood 

   both in and out of the region: 

        Now, let me illustrate the complexity of the 

        Turkistan question and the impossibility of 

        conducting these affairs only on the basis of 

        Turkism or of Islam, as Enver sought to, by way 

        of an incident in Samarkand:  A group of 

        Russians, SR's, working in the cooperatives and 

        food distribution administration, and some 

        officers under their influence, were in contact 

        with the society, providing us with ammunition.  

        One individual, occupying the highest positions 

        in the General Staff (in the Turkistan Military 

        District) rendering us help.  On 10 May, I met 

        with an officer representing this group in Bag-i 

        Bala of Samarkand.  This group was seriously 

        frightened of Enver Pasha's operations.  A 

        friend accompanying me stressed that Enver Pasha 

        was in Turkistan temporarily, but the officer 

        could not be persuaded.  On that day I spoke 

        with an educated local Turk who had arrived from 

        Tashkent, in a garden near Ab-  Rahmet.  

        Although an intellectually committed communist, 

        he was rendering important aid to the national 

        movement through the agency in which he was 

        employed.  He and his friends were frightened by 

        the documents reaching their hands, signed by 

        Enver Pasha as "Deputy of Bukhara Emir, Son-in- 

        Law of the Caliph of Moslems, Seyyid Enver" and 

        the news that Enver was cooperating with the 

        Emir.  I told this man: "Enver Pasha cannot 

        serve the Emir.  He is not a monarchist either.  

        No one in the Society will be permitted to lean 

        towards monarchy.  You can relay this to your 

        friends.  The same day, Yusuf Ziya Bey of 

        Azerbaijan arrived from the side of Enver Pasha 

        with the title of "Commander-in-Chief of the 

        Northwest Front."  He further claimed to bring a 

        verbal order from Enver Pasha, to the effect 

        that: "The Society should not be involved in    

        military affairs, but ought to confine its 

        efforts to propaganda.  Yusuf had the seeming 

        intention of derailing the Zarafshan Basmachi 

        movement, which had been reorganized only by the 

        efforts of the Society.  The next day, the young 

        man from Tashkent (I referred to above) saw 

        Yusuf Ziya Bey in Kanigul.  Though Yusuf Ziya 

        Bey continued at length on the necessity of 

        having an autocrat for the martially inclined 

        Turks and that it would be very beneficial for 

        such a person also to be a "seyyid."  Next, he 

        related that he had heard from Enver Pasha that 

        there were 30 million Turks in Western Turkistan 

        and another 25 million in Eastern Turkistan.  On 

        the issue of Kazakistan, Yusuf Ziya Bey rejected 

        the proposals we put before him, which were done 

        in cooperation with the young man.  Yusuf Ziya's 

        words and behavior entirely negated the  

        guarantees I gave to this young man the day 

        before.  The young man was seriously grieved.  

        In the letters we received from Enver Pasha 

        after that incident, we found no confirmation of 

        the words spoken by Yusuf Ziya.  Nonetheless, it 

        was clear that the statement of Yusuf Ziya, who 

        had no idea of the spirit of this generation 

        educated in the colonial psychology of Russian 

        schools, was going to leave a negative 

        impression on this young man and his cohorts.  

        And so it was. 


        Those of us noting the actions of the Emirists 

        and their intentions thought that the Society 

        was in a difficult position.  Two days later, we 

        convened the Central Committee at a location 

        outside the city to discuss the developments in 

        detail.  We regretfully observed that some 

        Basmachi groups were attempting to enter into 

        separate peace agreements with the Bolsheviks 

        due to the crisis at hand.  To prevent the 

        united front from dissolving and to preserve the 

        Society, we decided to take immediate action.  

        In our opinion, the only solution to save the 

        national armies from being routed and 

        exterminated was to gather those Basmachi 

        leaders in difficulty and Enver Pasha in 

        Bukhara, to have them cross over to Afghanistan 

        freely.  Troops were to give their arms to those 

        going to Afghanistan and they were to be sent 

        back to their villages.  To this end, we decided 

        to write two letters:  one to Enver Pasha, to 

        persuade him to cross over to Afghanistan and to 

        facilitate his opening communications with the 

        Russian Commander-in-Chief, general Kamenev, who 

        was expected to arrive in Bukhara.  The other    

        was to be signed by me, as Chairman of the 

        Central Committee, to the Moscow Soviet 

        government, containing the conditions of peace, 

        on 12 May.  Both were to be sent via special 

        couriers.  The letter we sent to Moscow was 

        delayed due to the mistakes of our friends in 

        Tashkent.  Enver Pasha, rather than accepting 

        our suggestion (perhaps before our courier 

        arrived), sent an ultimatum to the Russians 

        demanding that they withdraw from Turkistan, 

        Bukhara and Khiva.  He signed it "Commander-in- 

        Chief of Turkistan, Bukhara and Khiva National 



   A disciple of Enver Pasha arrives, visiting Togan's 

   at the headquarters of Achil Bey: 

        The Akhund was a Shii theologian.  He liked to 

        talk on that topic.  Akhund lectured the new 

        arrivals on the necessity of fortifying the 

        national movement from the religious aspect, and 

        that they must provide information to the troops 

        on the politics of Islam.  He also looked 

        around, on the way to preparing for namaz, as if 

        to imply that everyone should be following him.  

        But, only some individuals regularly performed 

        namaz in the retinue of Achil Bey, and none 

        could pressure the others to do so.  After the 

        event, I told the Akhund:  "Among Samarkand 

        Ozbeks, the traditions of Timur is still 

        dominant.  Beys will not consult with the ulama 

        and the sheyks, even those they greatly respect, 

        on affairs of religion and military.  The hoja 

        and the sheyks do not even think of requesting 

        such.  Beys will go to namaz once a week, on 

        Fridays.  If I and my Bashkurt officers feel 

        like it, we will perform namaz  If we do not, 

        nobody will question us.  Therefore, while you 

        are in Samarkand, in the retinue of Achil Bey, 

        it would be very commendable for you to be 

        attentive to these matters."  Akhund Yusuf 

        Talibzade, who had the objective of uniting the 

        Turks with other Moslems on the basis of Islamic 

        political plane, did not like my words.  On 

        another occasion, my friend Kaari Kamil brought 

        kimiz.56  It was plentiful.  The spirit of the 

        ensuing conversations were based on the dastans 

        of Koroglu and Yusuf Ahmet.  In the afternoon, 

        an Ozbek played the ney (a wood-wind 

        instrument), I recited a couplet in Persian.  

        Kaari Kamil and other friends repeated in Ozbek.  

        Akhund said: "There is ney but no mey (wine)" 

        and I responded "In this land of ours, kimiz is 

        consumed during summer.  Your not being 

        satisfied with kimiz and asking for wine, though    

        you are an educated Islamic scholar, will not be 

        received well in this society, because we do not 

        prefer wine to kimiz.  Akhund asked: "Do you not 

        drink wine?"  I said: "Why not? But that is not 

        the issue.  Since you are a representative of 

        Enver Pasha, there may be those in these yaylaks 

        (summer pastures) who might disapprove of your 

        drinking wine instead of kimiz.  Kaari Kamil 

        added: "We know you as a religious scholar, a 

        Koranic Commentator," and prevented wine being 

        offered to the Akhund. 


        After these events, Togan chronicles the battles in 

   which he took part.  He provides political and military 

   repercussions of each, as well as details.  He was 

   receiving intelligence from Moscow to the effect that 

   large formations of Bolshevik troops from the Western 

   front were on their way to Turkistan.  There were attempts 

   on his life.  After numerous meetings of the Central 

   Committee, a decision was made to fall back and regroup.  

   The "above ground" members of the Society were being 

   pursued by Russian military formations.  They dispersed, 

   preparing to cross the Russian unit lines incognito, to 

   meet in Tashkent.   Togan, along with two of his friends 

   chose a mountainous route.  After much difficulty, they 

   arrived in Tashkent.  According to the decisions taken in 

   a series of further meetings, Togan was to leave 

   Turkistan.  He left, after sending a final letter to 



        20 February 1923 


        Dear Vladimir Ilich, 


        Due to your illness, it is possible that you 

        might have been prevented from reading this 

        letter or it might not have reached you.  But 

        since I sent copies of it to some other friends, 

        it is now a historical document.  Comrade Stalin 

        ostensibly stated that under Comrade Rudzutak's 

        auspices I could return to the Party.  In other 

        words they (Party) would disregard the letter I 

        sent to the Central Committee from Baku in 1920, 

        outlining my opposition to and initiatives 

        against Moscow by joining the Rebellion.  

        However, who can believe that and return?  

        Especially since you have abrogated the 20 March 

        1919 agreement which was signed by you, Stalin, 

        myself and my friends; by your order of 19 May 

        1920 signed only by you and Stalin?  When I 

        personally protested that latter order, you had 

        characterized our 20 March 1919 agreement "only 

        a piece of paper."  However, that agreement 

        announced that Bashkurts would retain the right    

        of maintaining their own army and that army was 

        going to be under the command of Soviet 

        Headquarters without intermediary stages.  With 

        your 19 May 1920 order, you have deprived the 

        Bashkurt army of those provisions, assigning it 

        to the trans-Volga army, disbursing the Bashkurt 

        units as the trans-Volga Headquarters saw fit 

        among its formations.  Indeed, that is what 

        happened and today there is no physical Bashkurt 

        army.  Similarly, in the same order what was 

        deceivingly termed "attaching Ufa to 

        Bashkurdistan" turned out to be the reverse, 

        attaching Bashkurdistan to the Ufa province.  

        Consequently, what was conceded to the "Russian 

        moslems" on 20 December 1917, "the right to 

        secede from Russia," should they choose, has 

        been destroyed from its foundations by your 

        order of May 1920.  From now on, following the 

        defeat of Bashkurts, Kazakhs and the Turkistanis 

        in the South-West and my departure from Soviet 

        Russia as of tomorrow, a ne era shall begin in 

        their history; that is, rather than seeking 

        their legal equality with the Russians (in the 

        Russian context), that experimentation having 

        failed, the transition to the international 

        arena (for seeking those rights) is being made.  

        My task will be to familiarize the world with 

        the history of those struggles.57  The 

        Veklikiirus nation has already decided on the 

        specific policy to be applied to the captive 

        nations and tribes they are holding, not only in 

        economic and social matters, but also in 

        cultural affairs.  The "Eastern University" 

        which you established last year is operating as 

        a center for these policies.  A specialized 

        "eastern affairs" group, comprised of Velikiirus 

        personnel around the Central Committee has also 

        been formed.  The CC has brought in certain 

        individuals of the eastern nationalities of the 

        Soviet domains, charged with the specific duty 

        of preparing material for these "eastern 

        specialists."  Those eastern nationals even 

        published certain books and pamphlets.  But, the 

        topics they are to work on are assigned by your 

        Velikiirus.  These non-Russian intellectuals are 

        not even being admitted into the debates on the 

        "constitutions" which are being prepared to 

        govern them.  Today, the main task on which the 

        CC Eastern Affairs Specialists are working is to 

        prepare separate alphabets and literary 

        languages for each nationality and tribe, based 

        on the extant local "phonetic" differences 

        between them.  In principle, the non_russian 

        communists are said to be serving only as    

        consultants in this endeavor.  In the latest 

        issue of the journal Kizil Shark, published by 

        the members of the Eastern University, contained 

        a commentary by one mer Aliyev of Daghestan.  

        According to him, should the Cyrillic alphabet 

        be accepted for the Northern Caucasus Turkish 

        dialects, this would lead to Christianization.  

        Further, he has reportedly said, it would be 

        necessary to borrow the Latin alphabet in use in 

        Azerbaijan (sic).58 It is imperative that the 

        issues of Alphabet and literary language 

        (according to Aliyev) not require Russian help, 

        but the aid of those governments formed on the 

        basis of national political freedom, and should 

        be accomplished by native scholars.  These 

        writings and efforts of the Azerbaijanis to 

        gather the intellectual communist of the Turk 

        tribes around Kizil Shark and one literary 

        language is said to be making the Velikiirus 

        specialists nervous, angry.  When Shahtahtinskii 

        and Jelal Guliev of Azerbaijan defended a single 

        alphabet based on Latin, Prof. Polivanov and 

        other Russians are said to have stated that even 

        if the Latin alphabet is accepted, this would be 

        replaced by the cyrillic and a special sub-set 

        will be created for Turkish dialects, whose 

        number was approaching forty.  Shahtahtinskii 

        retorted that the aim of Russians was not to 

        allow standard literary language to live.  It is 

        now understood that, when you Velikiirus friends 

        begin playing with the language and the syntax 

        of a people, you will not let their collars free 

        until they, too, become complete Russians.  It 

        is not possible not to be surprised to observe 

        the differences between your current policies 

        and your writings in "Against the Tide" and in 

        your other writings, where you state that 

        ideally, the rights of nations should be placed 

        in their hands.  Your representative comrade 

        Zeretskii gave numerous conferences to our 

        people, during the summer of 1919 while we were 

        refurbishing our army in Saransk, to the effect 

        that the Soviet government was the first in 

        history to base the freedoms of captive nations 

        on their own national armies.  I myself 

        published an article in Pravda in the same vein.  

        It has not been four years since those events 

        and it appears that your policies will be 

        developing in the opposite direction.  RKP may 

        continue to claim, in Asia and the countries far 

        away from Russia, such as Africa, that it will 

        liberate them.  The truth is, your Velikiirus 

        become angry when people such as Gregori Safarov 

        display the colonial policies of the tsar in    

        Turkistan.  Those Velikiirus enjoy hearing the 

        native communists liken themselves to small fish 

        being eaten by the whale, better if that 

        argument were presented as a proverb.  When 

        comrade Artium was visiting us, he used to state 

        his belief that except for China and India, the 

        Soviet Russian culture would become dominant in 

        all of Asia.  Those native languages and 

        cultures attempting to prevent this would not be 

        worth dwelling upon, since they are only going 

        to be used to spread communism.  These and 

        similar words were repeated elsewhere.  Without 

        a doubt, this will be carried-out and as a 

        result all those nations who wish to retain 

        their independence but have become your 

        prisoners will view Soviet Russia as their 

        foremost enemy.  I mentioned these matters to 

        you while you and I were discussing your theses 

        on "Colonialism and the Nationality Question."  

        Later, I read your aforementioned theses in 

        Kommunisticheskii Internatsional journal (No. 

        11) once more.  You have suggested that even 

        after the establishment of the worldwide 

        dictatorship of the proletariat, "it would be 

        obligatory for the vanguard nationalities to 

        actively participate in the establishment of 

        socialist regimes in the less developed 

        countries."  This translates into perpetuating 

        the colonial regimes in India by the British, in 

        Turkistan by Russia, in Africa by French and the 

        Belgium through their labor organizations.  When 

        I spoke with you and your friends in Ufa during 

        1919, never was there a mention of the use of 

        terror to destroy the human self-determination.  

        What happened?  Wa that the object of those 

        revolutions?  Piatokov was correct when he 

        directed this question to you while debating the 

        "labor unions" issues.  You were beseeched not 

        to take away those revolutions from the labor 

        unions whose sweat and blood were spilled for 

        it.  It is said that even Rosa Luxembourg was of 

        the opinion that no good would come of 

        socialism, should it become a prisoner of 

        imperialist traditions serving great nations.  

        If Russia has not descended into the lows of 

        becoming the prisoner of imperial traditions, 

        what business did it have concocting literary 

        languages and alphabets from the regional 

        vernaculars?  If you are alive, perhaps you can 

        personally correct some of these errors.  I have 

        but one request: I ask that permission be given 

        to my wife Nefise to meet me in Germany; she 

        could not accompany me tomorrow on the way to 

        Iran, due to her pregnancy.   


        Ahmet Zeki Validov. 




            1. Speech at the Fourth Conference of the Central

Committee of the RKP(b) with the responsible Workers of the

National Republics and Regions, 10 June 1923.   "The Sultan

Galiev Case."  J. V.  Stalin, Works. (Moscow: Foreign Languages

Publishing House,  1953).  Vol. 5, 1921-1923.  Pp. 308-319.   For

a reprint of this  speech, see A. Bennigsen and S. E. Wimbush,

Moslem National Communism (Chicago, 1979). 


           2.  As he refers to himself in his writings. 

           3. H. B. Paksoy, "Basmachi"  Modern Encyclopedia of

Religions in Russia and the Soviet Union  (FL: Academic

International Press,  1991).  Vol 4, Pp. 5-20. 


           4. Z. V. Togan, Hatiralar.  (Istanbul, 1969).



           5. Z. V. Togan's Turkili Turkistan was first printed

in Cairo  1928-1939, although it was not widely distributed due

to the prevailing conditions.  The first Latin alphabet printing

was effected during 1947 in Istanbul.  It was reprinted,

effectively the third time, in Istanbul, in 1981 (696 Pp.),

although it carries the designation of 2nd Edition.  Turkili is

primarily a history text.  Togan's Hatiralar, on the other hand,

contains more personal observations on his involvement. 


           6. Most of the quotations are taken from Pp. 399-474

of Turkili (1981 edition) and Pp. 365-463 of Hatiralar. 

Biographical material is primarily from the earlier pages of the

latter work. Therefore, extensive page references shall not be



           7. See H. B. Paksoy, Central Asian Monuments.

(Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992). Introduction, for a bibliography of

readily accessible versions.  According to Ottoman archival

material (in Bashbakanlik Arshivi), it appears that Kro lu was a

real person living in the c. 16th century, around Bolu province

in Asia Minor.


           8. See the short biography of Akchura by David S.

Thomas in H. B. Paksoy, Central Asian Monuments.


           9. Given the date of original writing, these

references are to the respective liberation movements. 


           10. Turkili, Pp. 486-526. 


           11. Although Togan's Memoirs cover the period up to

and including the year 1925, as a consummate professional

historian, he often provides information on the resolution of

many an event, down to the days during which he was writing the

memoirs themselves.  On the other hand, Togan does not introduce

new issues after 1925. 


           12. Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire and the Turks of Central

Asia (London, 1953).  Indeed, Caroe acknowledges his indebtedness

to Togan. 


           13. Togan's spellings. 


           14. For discussion of religious terms, see M. G. S.

Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (Chicago, 1974). 3 Vols. 


           15. Despite their names, neither was Russian, but both

had been Baptized.  Togan calls Katanov a Sagay-Turk from the

Altai region and Ashmarin, a Chuvash-Turk. 


           16. See Uli Schamiloglu, "The Formation of a Tatar

Historical Consciousness: Shihabeddin Marcani and the Image of

the Golden Horde" Central Asian Survey. Vol. 9, No. 2; 1990. Pp.



           17. Another prominent Orientalist of the era. 


           18. It was translated into English: V. V. Barthold,

Four Studies on the History of Central Asia (Leiden: E. J. Brill,

1963).  Volume II, Ulugh-Beg. 


           19. A German born and trained compiler of Turkish



           20. See H. B. Paksoy, "Basmachi" Modern Encyclopedia

of Religions in Russia and Soviet Union (FL: Academic

International Press, 1991). Vol. 4, Pp. 5-20. 


           21. See Edward J. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's

Perevodchik/Tercman: A Clarion of Modernism. H. B. Paksoy, 

Editor, Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul, Isis Press, 1992) and 

the sources quoted. 


           22. For the last two, see Audrey L. Altstadt, The

Azerbaijani Turks (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992). 


           23. See Fen-Edebiyat Fakultesi Arastirma Dergisi,

Ataturk Universitesi, Erzurum.  Say  13, 1985.  This source

contains some biographical material, especially on the post 1925

period, not found in Turkili or Hatiralar. 

           24. Ulama in the khanates of Bukhara or Khiva were not

part of this official structure, The Spiritual Board.  As Togan

describes however, the Kadimist/Emirist ulama in these khanates

were also siding with the Russians.  The ulama hoped to eliminate

the challenge to their own authority, presented by the reformist 

Jadids, by liquidating the latter with the aid of the Russians.  


           25. According to the handlist of his papers, Togan

also completed a history of the Bashkurts and the Bashkurt Army. 

This work remains unpublished.  In Hatiralar there are extended

references to the past of the Bashkurt Army and its operations. 

R. Baumann, in his "Subject Nationalities in the Military Service

of Imperial Russia: The Case of Bashkirs" Slavic Review

Fall/Winter 1987, argues that "...Bashkirs have parallels among

Apache Scouts in the US, the Gurkhas in India, the Philippine

Scouts, or the Natal Native Contingent in Africa."  Baumann's

account ends at 1914. 


           26. Togan relates that secret agents of Bolsheviks,

trying to win over the Bashkurt troops, were being killed by the

latter on the spot.  As a result, he reports "such elements

stopped coming even near the barracks." 


           27. See Society for Central Asian Studies, Programmnie

dokumenti musulmanskih politicheskih partii 1917-1920 gg. Reprint

Series, No. 2. (Oxford, 1985). 


           28. A biography is published:  Naim Karimov, Cholpan

(Tashkent: Fan, 1991).  Cf. Naim Karimov, "Exposing the Murderer

of Alpamysh;" translated by Shawn T. Lyons, from Shark Yulduzi 

(Tashkent) 12:1992, in H. B. Paksoy, Ed., Central Asia Reader

(NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994). 


           29. In Russian language Sources "Sultan Galiev."  For

his and other Central Asians referenced by Togan, see Moslem

National Communism.  For a more recent treatment, see Masayuki

YAMAUCHI, The Dream of Sultangaliev (Tokyo, 1986), in Japanese. 

Also the sources cited by YAMAUCHI in his "One Aspect of

Democratization in Tatarstan: The Dream of Sultangaliev

Revisited" presented to the Conference on Islam and

Democratization in Central Asia, held at the University of

Massachusetts-Amherst, 26-27 September 1992.

           30. For the two personages and the organization, See

S. Shaw & E. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern

Turkey (Cambridge University Press, 1977). 


           31. Provided to the Bashkurt RevKom by the Bolsheviks,

along with several automobiles; confiscated from foreign



           32. Translation of its platform is below. 


           33. Togan notes that a copy of this letter was later

brought to Berlin in 1923. 


           34. Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Padishah Ghazi was a

direct descendant of Timur (d. 1405), and the founder of the

Moghul dynasty in India.  Babur's memoirs were widely known. 

They were published in facsimile under the title Babar-Nama by

Anette S. Beveridge (Leiden-London, 1905).  An English

translation was also made by Beveridge (London, 1922); reprinted

at least once, in 1969. 

          35. For the Russian/Bolshevik period, see Seymour

Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and

Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, MA., 1968).  For the earlier period,

see R. N. Frye, The History of Bukhara (Cambridge, MA., 1954). 


           36. See the Kadimist ulama above. 


           37. Who was the first Minister of Interior, and later,

of Defense.  Earlier, Arif was Togan's military aide in the

Bashkurt Movement. 


           38. Togan provides the details of intellectual

currents "that might have effected the thoughts of the

individuals preparing this program" in Turkili Pp. 415-416. 


           39. Program in Togan, Turkili Turkistan, Pp. 410-411. 


           40. Togan notes that this program was expanded and

republished in Prague during 1926 in a bilingual edition. See

Togan, Turkili Turkistan, Pp. 411-414. 


           41. Uli Schamiloglu, "The Formation of a Tatar

Historical Consciousness: Shihabeddin Marcani and the Image of

the Golden Horde" Central Asian Survey (London) Vol. 9, No. 2,



           42. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Abdul Kayum

Al-Nasyri: A Tatar Reformer of the 19th Century" Central Asian

Survey (Oxford) Vol. 1, No. 4, 1983. 


           43. See Edward J. Lazzerini, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's 

 Perevodchik/Tercuman: A Clarion of Modernism" H. B. Paksoy, 

 Editor, Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992) and

 the sources cited therein.  


           44. Togan, Turkili Turkistan, Pp. 416-418.  


           45. A particular perspective on the Drdnc, from the

Kirghiz side, can be found in H. B. Paksoy, "Observations Among

Kirghiz Refugees from the Pamirs of Afghanistan Settled in the

Turkish Republic" Journal of the Anthropological Society of

Oxford Vol. XVI, No. 1, Hilary, 1985. 


           46. Korbashi is the title of preference of the

Basmachi leaders, origins of which explained as "Commander of

Defense Troops" in Mahmut Kashgarli's 11th c. work Compendium of

Turkic Dialects. 


           47. Togan, Turkili, Pp. 419-421. 


           48. Togan, Turkili P. 427. 


           49. The Bashkurt Movement leadership.  See above.   


           50. Glenda Fraser, in her "Haci Sami and the Turkestan

Federation 1922-3" Asian Affairs (London). Vol. XVII (Old Series

Vol. 74) Part I, February 1987, follows Haji Sami tied to Enver's



           51. It must be remembered that Murteci has a much

stronger meaning than just "reactionary."  Togan is remarkably

restrained in his reference. 


           52. See S. S. Aydemir for a biography of Enver,

Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Pa a (Istanbul, 1972) 3 Vols. 

Aydemir himself was one of the early students at KUTVA, in

Moscow.  He met Enver in the Caucasus during the First World War,

and later in Moscow.  Aydemir subsequently worked to propagate

Bolshevism in the newly established Turkish Republic (which had

waged a similar and successful war of independence, 1919-1924, in

Asia Minor), was jailed.  After his release, Aydemir entered the

Turkish Republic government service.  See also Azade-Ayse

Rorlich, "Fellow Travelers: Enver Pasha and the Bolshevik

Government 1918-1920)"  Asian Affairs (London) Vol. XIII (old

Series Vol. 69) Part III.  October 1982). 


           53. Togan knew this individual well, having met him

during his earlier trip sponsored by the Imperial Academy of



           54. It appears that the referenced memoirs were kept

very much in the tradition of the bitikchi of earlier eras.  It

is well known that military units of the Turks always employed

such recorders on the battlefields for the purpose of keeping

tabs on the performance of individual troops.  After the

termination of fighting, rewards and promotions or punishment and

demotions were dispensed accordingly. 


           55. See Kevin Krisciunas, "Legacy of Ulugh Beg."  H.

B. Paksoy, Editor, Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul: Isis Press,



           56. See H. B. Paksoy, "Sun is also Fire" Central Asian

Monuments, footnote 106.  


           57. The text in the rest of this paragraph is garbled

at the typesetter, Hatiralar, P. 461. 


           58. See Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks for the

alphabet issues in Azerbaijan. 

This counter has been placed here on 25 February 1999

Site hosted by Build your free website today!