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Justification of Hypothetical Knowledge

Fallibilism

In recognizing that scientific knowledge is always perfectible, we should never consider our theories as definitively established, that we can always discover some error in them and even should look for errors if we desire to progress towards better theories.

Popper asserts that we test our theories by using empirical statements. It relies on a logical basis, but it refers mainly to a methodological attitude. This kind of conjecturalism does not preclude our attaining some kind of certainty which can be sufficient for many purposes, even in science. However, he does expound on this issue with this statement:

“It merely means, quite simply, that we can always err in our choice – that we can always miss the truth, or fall short of the truth; that certainty is not for us (or even knowledge that is highly probable, as we are fallible. This for all we know, is no more than the plain truth. There are few fields of human endeavour, if any, which seem to be exempt from human fallibility. What we once thought to be well-established, or even certain, may later turn out ot be not quite correct (but this means false), and in need of correction.”

Absolute knowledge, or truth, is seen here as an unattainable goal in Popper’s eyes. Quite simply, he is a realist who believes that absolute exist but, due to man’s fallibility, we are unable to realize absolute truth. He said, “We are denied of true knowledge. Our knowledge consists of critical guesswork; a network of hypotheses; a web of assumptions.” (Popper, 1989, S, XXV).

Falsification

Falsificationism is the method with which Popper proposes to sweep aside other methods such as psychologism, naturalism, inductionism, and logical positivism. Falsificationism is the idea that science advances by unjustified, exaggerated guesses followed by unstinting criticism.

Popper’s endorsement of falsificationism has its roots in Einstein’s own clear statement that he would regard his theory as untenable if it should fail in certain tests. Popper noted the totally different attitude from those of Marx, Freud, Adler, and their followers. He felt that Einstein’s attitude was the true scientific attitude, and arrived, by the end of 1919, at the conclusion that the scientific attitude was the critical attitude which did not look for verifications but for crucial tests which could refute the theory tested, though they could never publish it.

(Artigas http://www.nd.edu/departments/maritain/ti/artigas.htm

Popper was initially uneasy with the concept of truth. If every theory is an open-ended one, as he says then it has to be at least potentially false. For this reason Popper restricted himself to the fact that a theory which is falsified is false. A theory which can replace a falsified theory, (due to the fact that it contains a higher empirical content than the latter and explains what has falsified it) is a better theory than the earlier theory.

Later he accepted Tarski’s reformulation of the correspondence theory of truth. He incorporated the concept of truth into his theory of demarcation. He called this versimilitude and stated that a good scientific theory, has a higher level of versimilitude, than the other theories. Popper explains this concept by reference to the logical consequences of theories. There are two classes: the truth content and the falsity content of a theory. The truth content of a theory is the class of prepositions which may be derived from it. The falsity content is the class of prepositions deduceable from it.

Popper defines versimilitude of statement “a” by means of a formula:

Vs(a) = CtT(a) – CtF(a)

Where CtT(a)

Vs(a) represents the versimilitude of ‘a’ and CtT(a) is a measure of truth content of ‘a’, and CtF(a) is a measure of the falsity content.

http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/archives/fall1998/entries/popper/#grow

According to many of Popper’s peers, his central epistemological thesis can be labeled as “conjecturalism” as he concludes that all scientific knowledge is conjectural. He stresses that science will progress insofar as we propose bold conjectures which are audacious guesses and have a precise formulation.


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