“The revolution of 1800 was as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776 was in its form” (qtd. in Adams 141). Several years after the election of 1800, Thomas Jefferson reflected upon the significance of his inauguration into the Presidency of the United States. Indeed, the electoral defeat of John Adams and the subsequent election of Thomas Jefferson marked the first complete transition of power from one “party” to another, a transition that was both peaceful and comprehensive. The cliche out with the old and in with the new accurately describes this period of change. The administration of President Adams, much of which was originally appointed by George Washington, was quickly replaced by the Democratic-Republicans that sought the realization of Jefferson’s ideals. This new administration fathered a revolution in principles that often conflicted with the interests of the Federalists (Cunningham 11). They endeavored to protect states’ rights, to restrict the power of the federal government, to encourage agriculture, and to avoid entangling alliances with foreign nations (Adams 138-139). In the words of Jefferson: “We should put her [United States] on a Republican track, and she will now show by the beauty of her motion the skill of her builders” (qtd. in Adams 141). He continued, “Let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety” (qtd. in Adams 139).
On March 4, 1801, Thomas Jefferson, a native of Virginia, began his quest to resurrect America’s fundamental ideals of democracy and justice and to redirect the nation back onto the path originally paved by its founders. He later claimed that this process of redirection constituted a revolution in principles. However, Jefferson’s actions while in office were less than revolutionary. In fact, while Jefferson may have pursued his primary interests of states’ rights and limited government, his actions demonstrated his willingness to compromise in the name of progress. Under his leadership, the party of small government presided over a partisan attack on the Federalist- dominated judicial branch, the Louisiana Purchase, the most extensive use of executive power the country had yet seen, and an entanglement with foreign nations that led America into the Tripolitan War (Tindall & Shi 365, 368; Risjord 255). Although Jefferson’s inaugural address articulated a desire to deviate from the monarchical overtones of Federalist policies, his actions while in office often failed in achieving this end.
To begin with, Jefferson’s successes, although limited in number, as an advocate of restricted government deserve mention. During his first term as president he oversaw the expiration of the Alien and Sedition Acts and actively pursued a reduction in taxes, government spending, and the public debt (Koch & Peden XXXV). Together, these achievements add credibility to Jefferson’s claim that the election of 1800 invited a revolution in principles.
First of all, Jefferson’s installation as president was complimented by the expiration of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The previous Federalist administration, led by Adams, had imposed the restrictive Alien and Sedition Acts to minimize public disagreement with government officials. Adams claimed that such legislation was necessary to prevent subversion during the nation’s short-lived quasi-war with France, a development the Democratic-Republicans openly criticized. The Democratic-Republicans suspected that the acts were merely means by which the Federalists could eliminate domestic opposition to their polices and actions. Regardless, the Alien and Sedition Acts prohibited the publication of anything of a false, malicious, or scandalous nature against the government or any public official. Mysteriously, though, the only public official exempt from this protection was none other than Thomas Jefferson, the vice president at the time (Risjord 232).
Upon implementation, the Alien and Sedition Acts effectively limited the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and the liberty of aliens (Tindall & Shi 354). Guarding his own actions, Jefferson attempted to avoid possible arrest under these new acts by suspending his correspondence with friends for seven weeks. When he finally commenced writing letters, he relied exclusively on messengers, rather than the government post (Risjord 233).
Jefferson deeply resented this infringement upon the constitutional freedoms of the American people. In a letter to republican theorist John Taylor of Caroline, Jefferson wrote, “. . . we shall see the reign of witches pass over, their spells dissolved, and the people recovering their true sight, restoring their government to its true principles” (qtd in Risjord 233). Thankfully, this “reign of witches” came to an end with the presidential election of Jefferson. By the time he took the oath of office, the Alien and Sedition Acts, originally limited to a two-year lifetime, had expired (Channing 25). However, the numerous citizens, including ten newspaper editors, convicted under the oppressive acts remained in jail (Risjord 233). In an effort to remedy this injustice, Jefferson freed these victims of Federalist ambition and further sought to prevent similar acts from passing through Congress again (Koch & Peden XXXV).
While attending to the injustices evoked by the Alien and Sedition Acts, Jefferson and his Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, addressed the financial status of the nation. Gallatin, a Swiss economic expert, acted to devise a program for retiring the overwhelming debt ($80 million by 1802) accumulated under his predecessor, Alexander Hamilton (Channing 28). The plan called for a gradual reduction of the debt over a period of sixteen years at a rate of $7 million a year. Gallatin estimated his annual receipts would decrease to a mere $9 million a year once the Federalists’ internal taxes were repealed. Therefore, in order to implement his program, Gallatin planned to reserve 80 percent of the revenue for debt repayment, leaving only $2 million annually for government expenditures. Such a dent in federal spending was unheard of and frightening to those that feared its ramifications (Risjord 245).
The military was a primary target for this reduction in expenditures. Jefferson led the attack by decommissioning all of the navy’s ships, except for a small force sent to battle the Barbary pirates. Congress matched Jefferson’s efforts in 1802. The House and Senate worked cooperatively to limit the army to one regiment of artillery, two regiments of infantry, and a corps of engineers, totaling 3,312 officers and men. These measures enabled Congress to effectively repeal a large percentage of Federalist excises; thereafter, the government relied almost exclusively on the revenue from customs and duties and the sale of public lands (Risjord 245).
Gallatin’s skillfully crafted financial policy proved effective: from 1803 to 1810 the debt steadily diminished. By 1810, the national debt had been reduced to $53 million, $27.5 million less than its total just eight years previous. Remarkably, this reduction occurred despite the $15 million Louisiana Purchase in 1803 (Channing 28-29).
Indeed, Jefferson, with the help of Gallatin and Congress, was able to redress some of the damage done by the previous Federalist administration. By freeing the victims of the Alien and Sedition Acts, the president demonstrated his devotion to the preservation of Constitutional liberties (Risjord 232). Furthermore, by inviting the expertise of Gallatin, Jefferson oversaw a reduction in the national debt and superfluous federal spending (Risjord 245). These two successes provide evidence of Jefferson’s apparent deviation from Federalist policies as contributed by the former administrations.
This deviation from “monarchical” policies, however, was not reflected in all of Jefferson’s actions. In fact, over the course of his first term, the Virginia native willingly compromised his original goals and, at times, conveniently discarded principles he had once held so dear. He emphasized, instead, the need for unity among leaders, despite political differences.
In his inaugural address, Jefferson commanded, “Let us unite with one heart and one mind . . . every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We are all Republicans; we are all Federalists” (qtd. in Adams 136). He continued by complementing the Federalists for keeping the nation alive “in the full tide of successful experiment” (qtd. in Adams 137). Undoubtedly, the new president intended to soothe the great body of his opponents and, if possible, to win them over. A number of his actions reflected this hidden preoccupation.
Simultaneously, though, Jefferson, a self-proclaimed advocate of limited government, exercised his authority to extend the powers traditionally reserved to the executive branch. His attack on the Federalist-dominated judicial branch, his encouragement of westward expansion, and his entanglement with foreign nations provide evidence of his attempts to cripple the influence of his Federalist adversaries and to secure a nation more sympathetic to Republican policies (Tindall & Shi 365, 368; Risjord 255).
Jefferson jump-started his first term with an attack on the judiciary. The judicial branch was dominated by Federalists, courtesy of the Judiciary Act of 1801 and, more specifically, Adams’s “midnight appointments.” Implemented only months before Jefferson’s inauguration, the Judiciary Act of 1801 opened up a multitude of positions in the nation’s court system. The act created a host of new circuit and district courts and a number of judicial offices for the District of Columbia. As Adams was well aware, this piece of legislation would provide an opportunity to install Federalists in posts not subject to removal by the president (Risjord 248). In his most obnoxious abuse of power, Adams, on his last day in office, transmitted the names of three circuit court judges and three judges for the District of Columbia. His signing of commissions on the eve of Jefferson’s inauguration gave rise to the expression “midnight judges” (Malone 113).
In addition to these last minute appointments, Adams reduced the number of Supreme Court justices from six to five, a modification that was to be implemented upon the death or retirement of the next justice. This reform, included in the Judiciary Act, ensured that when any one of the six Federalist judges died or retired, Jefferson would be unable to appoint a Republican to the Supreme Court (Risjord 248).
Delivering the final blow to Jefferson, Adams appointed John Marshall to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Marshall, determined to enlarge the powers of government in the interests of justice and nationality, was antipathetic to the themes of Jefferson’s presidency. His appointment to the head of the judicial branch undoubtedly secured a tremendous barrier for the new president and his administration (Adams 130-131).
Jefferson and his Republican followers responded to Adams’s last minute judicial reforms by initiating an attack on the only remaining Federalist-dominated branch of government. On March 8, 1802, Congress repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801. The Republican interpretation of this measure was advertised in a headline in the Aurora, “Midnight Law Repealed” (Malone 130). Jefferson declared, “We have restored our judiciary to what it was while justice and not [partisan] federalism was its object” (qtd. in Dumas & Malone 130).
Federalists, not surprisingly, were ungrateful to those Congressmen that had labored to repeal the act. They argued that the repeal violated the life tenure of judges as guaranteed by the Constitution. Republicans responded, in kind, by claiming that they were not dismissing judges, they were abolishing courts; if a judge lost his job, that was incidental. Federalists, unsatisfied with this retort, warned that the Supreme Court would find the new law, the Judiciary Act of 1802, unconstitutional. The Republicans answered by denying the Supreme Court the power of judicial review; they argued that this was a power restricted exclusively to the states as assigned in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. At this juncture, John Marshall, himself a last-minute appointment, contributed his two cents with his decision in the Marbury vs. Madison case (Risjord 248).
Adams, in the midst of his “midnight appointments,” named William Marbury justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. Marbury’s commission, signed by the Federalist president two days before the end of his term, remained undelivered when Jefferson was sworn into office. In an attempt to block the appointment, Jefferson directed James Madison, his Secretary of State, to withhold the commission. Marbury subsequently sued for a writ of mandamus, demanding that Madison deliver his commission. The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice John Marshall, heard the case. Upon reviewing the testimony, the justices unanimously agreed that Marbury deserved his commission. However, they denied that the Court had jurisdiction in the case. The Court ruled that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave the Court original jurisdiction in mandamus proceedings, was unconstitutional because the Constitution specified that the Court should have original jurisdictions only in cases involving ambassadors or states. Therefore, the Court could not issue an order in the Marbury vs. Madison case (Tindall & Shi 364).
Ironically, while the Court had denied itself one source of power, it had secured a far more important basin of influence. With their Marbury vs. Madison decision, the justices had declared a federal law invalid on the grounds that it violated provisions of the Constitution and, in doing so, added judicial review to the Court’s palette of powers (Tindall & Shi 364).
In refusing to deliver Marbury’s commission, Jefferson had empowered Marshall to exercise his authority by securing in the hands of the Supreme Court the power of judicial review. Consequently, Jefferson’s attempt to weaken the Federalists’ stronghold actually enhanced the authority of the only remaining Federalist-dominated branch of government, a consequence the advocate for limited government had not anticipated (Risjord 248-249).
In a second attempt to debilitate the Federalists’ control of the judiciary, Jefferson and his Republican followers applied the power of impeachment against two of the most partisan Federalist judges, and actually succeeded in ousting one of them. The House of Representatives formulated impeachment charges against District Judge John Pickering of New Hampshire and Justice Samuel Chase. Evidence showed that Pickering was clearly insane and was given to profane and drunken harangues from the bench, both clear indications of his incompetence. Congress, upon reviewing his record, impeached the “loose-tongued Federalist” (Tindall & Shi 365).
The case against Justice Chase, however, was far more complicated. Chase was famous for his high-handed and intemperate behavior and his relentless attacks on Republican principles. But several senators questioned if Chase’s vindictive partisanship constituted “high crimes and misdemeanors.” Despite pressure from Jefferson and John Randolph of Roanoke, the Senate failed to produce the two-thirds majority needed to convict Chase. His resulting acquittal discouraged further efforts at impeachment by the Republican administration (Tindall & Shi 365).
In summary, Jefferson’s presidential inauguration was followed by a three-pronged attack on the judicial branch. First of all, Congress repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801 and replaced it with the Judiciary Act of 1802. Secondly, Madison refused to deliver a commission authored by Adams, a stance that allowed Chief Justice Marshall to secure the Supreme Court the power of judicial review. And finally, Republicans in the House and Senate brought impeachment charges against two partisan Federalist judges, and succeeded in ousting only one of them. All three of these attempts to minimize Federalist influence illustrated the ways in which Jefferson was willing to inflate his executive powers to weaken his political opponents (Tindall & Shi 364-365). Such evidence leads me to question Jefferson’s devotion to limited government. Perhaps he was only willing to restrict federal power when it was convenient for him, but was otherwise determined to exploit his position to cripple the surviving Federalist party.
In addition to attacking the judicial branch, Jefferson broadened his executive powers to include territorial expansion. In 1803 he doubled the size of the United States by signing the Louisiana Purchase. Oddly enough, the leading critic of federal abuses of power single-handedly expended $15 million of federal monies without the expressed approval of Congress and, in doing so, expelled foreign occupation from much of the western frontier (Risjord 255).
Jefferson attempted to justify this break from his campaign promise to trim government expenses. In his defensive argument entitled “The Louisiana Purchase Should Be Approved,” the president proposed that best use of the newly acquired territory would “be to give establishments in it to the Indians on the east side of the Mississippi in exchange for their present country” (Jefferson 156). Furthermore, he claimed that the purchase would promote peaceful and friendly relations with France while awarding sovereignty to Louisiana. Lastly, Jefferson appealed to the interests of traders by noting that “the property and sovereignty of the Mississippi and its waters secure an independent outlet for the produce of the western States and an uncontrolled navigation through their whole course, free from collision with other powers . . .” (Jefferson 157).
Samuel White, a senator from Delaware, challenged Jefferson’s justifications by submitting his viewpoint “The Louisiana Purchase Should Be Opposed.” He articulated the Federalists’ fear that such a large territorial expansion and subsequent westward migration would weaken the political influence of the New England states, their political stronghold. Additionally, White questioned the nation’s ability to absorb such a large expanse of territory and diverse population of people without also jeopardizing national unity. And finally, the Senator challenged the constitutionality of the purchase (White 157-159). In an ironic twist of fate, Federalists found themselves arguing strict construction of the Constitution while Republicans brushed aside such scruples in favor of implied power (Tindall & Shi 368).
Again, the crusader for states’ rights and limited government managed to conveniently discard his fundamental principles in pursuit of a nation sympathetic to Republicanism. He knew that the possession of western territories would dilute Federalists’ influence concentrated in the New England region. To secure this end, Jefferson performed the most extensive use of executive power the country had yet seen (Tindall & Shi 368).
As if westward expansion and attacks on the judiciary weren’t enough to discredit the claim that the election of 1800 was truly a revolution in principles, Jefferson provided yet another reason to question his devotion to Republican aspirations: the Tripolitan War. Issues of foreign relations disrupted Jefferson’s presidency early in his term, causing him to reassess the need for a strong navy. On the Barbary Coast of North Africa the Muslim city-states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli persistently practiced piracy and extortion. After the Revolution, American shipping in the Mediterranean became fair game, no longer sheltered by British payments of tribute. Initially, the American government complied with Barbary demands and purchased protection for its ships. But in May, 1801, the pasha of Tripoli increased the price of tributes and declared war on the United States by cutting down the flagpole of the American consulate. Enraged by the pasha’s arrogance, Jefferson sought to demonstrate the brawn of his infant nation. He sent American warships to blockade Tripoli (Tindall & Shi 366). For the second time in three years the nation found itself on the edge of a fight without a formal declaration of war by Congress. A pressing question resurfaced: how extensive was the president’s authority in matters requiring military action. The Cabinet answered this question by supporting a cruise to the Mediterranean and authorizing the search for and destruction of enemy vessels. Indeed, the Republicans proved willing to exploit executive power to defend the nation’s reputation abroad (Risjord 252).
Although emphasizing the defensive nature of the naval mission, Jefferson prosecuted the war with vigor. He recommissioned several of the recently completed frigates, and by 1803, a well-armed squadron was blockading the port of Tripoli. The nation’s presence in the Mediterranean cut off the pasha’s sources of revenue, piracy and ransom. Unable to withstand this naval blockade, the pasha signed a treaty on June 3, 1805, agreeing to terminate the war and the tribute. In return, the United States paid $60,000 ransom for the crew of the Philadelphia, a frigate that had run aground and was subsequently captured by pirates in 1804 (Risjord 252-253).
Ultimately, the United States, ironically under the leadership of a Republican, demonstrated its military strength, even at the expense of naval expansion and “entanglement” with foreign nations. Jefferson starved his allegiance to neutrality to feed his country’s hunger for respectability in the international playing field. His actions again challenged the claim that his inauguration marked a deviation from the power-hungry policies of his Federalist adversaries (Risjord 253).
In reviewing Jefferson’s leadership during the Tripolitan War, his purchase of Louisiana territory with government funds, and his three-pronged attack on the judiciary, I can’t help but question the Virginian’s devotion to the principles of neutrality and limited government. His first term in office was mysteriously colored by the Federalist overtones of naval expansion, conspicuous government spending, and partisan domination. In consideration of these developments, how can one wholeheartedly believe that the election of 1800 was coupled with a “revolution in principles”?
To assign credit where it is due, Jefferson did display his devotion to Republican interests in the realm of Constitutional liberties and financial policy. First of all, he set out to redress the crimes of his predecessors by freeing the victims of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Embittered by the “reign of witches,” Jefferson aspired to reestablish the necessary freedoms of his people that had been denied under previous administrations (Channing 25). Additionally, with the applied expertise of Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin, the president oversaw a reduction in the national debt and a repeal of Federalist excises. Jefferson fought for his ideal: “a wise and frugal government” (Tindall and Shi 365).
However, in weighing these accomplishments in Republican policy with the outgrowths of Federalist tendencies, I again question Jefferson’s loyalty to the substance of his inaugural address. In the afternoon of March 4, 1801, Jefferson committed himself to “honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none”; “honest repayment of our debts”; “the preservation of general government in its whole Constitutional vigor,” and “the freedom of the press, and freedom of person” (qtd. in Adams 138-139). How successful was Jefferson in achieving these ends? With regard to the retirement of debts and the restoration of Constitutional liberties, he was unquestionably effective (Channing 25; Tindall & Shi 365). Conversely, though, his involvement in the Tripolitan War, purchase of Louisiana Territory, and attacks on the judiciary perpetuated Federalist undercurrents (Tindall & Shi 365, 368; Risjord 255). While his inauguration into the office of the President was originally expected to initiate a “revolution in principles,” his actions painted a distasteful reality: the Virginia native was less than a revolutionary. As the chief executive of his nation, Jefferson was willing to compromise his principles and exploit his position to pursue ends that were not always congruent with Republican interests. Therefore, his term in office failed to exhibit a radical deviation from Federalist predecessors, but rather provided a compromising transition to a more democratic form of government.
Works Cited:
Adams, Henry. History of the United States of America During the Administration of Thomas Jefferson. Cambridge: The Library of America, 1986.
Channing, Edward. The Jeffersonian System 1801-1811. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1906.
Cunningham, Noble E. The Process of Government Under Jefferson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978.
Jefferson, Thomas. “The Louisiana Purchase Should Be Approved.” Opposing Viewpoints in American History. Ed. Bruno Leone. vol. 1. San Diego, CA: 1996.
Koch, Adrienne and William Peden. eds. The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson. New York: Random House, 1944.
Malone, Dumas. Jefferson the President: First Term, 1801-1805. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1970.
Risjord, Norman K. Jefferson’s American: 1760-1815. Madison: Madison House, 1991.
Tindall, George Brown and David E. Shi. America: Narrative History. 4th ed. vol. 1. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996.
White, Samuel. “The Louisiana Purchase Should Be Opposed.” Opposing Viewpoints in American History. Ed. Bruno Leone. vol. 1. San Diego, CA: 1996.
