SHORTCOMINGS OF NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
Despite widespread
organizational enthusiasm, network-centric warfare has its critics. Most recognize that network-centric operation is the future
of warfare, but caution that it is not the panacea claimed by advocates.
Some fear that an over-reliance on the new technology will ultimately
become a vulnerability. Others believe that the high technology solution is
inappropriate for asymmetric warfare of the future.
Following are some of the specific criticisms from which developers of
network-centric warfare may benefit:
In his May 2003 paper titled “Network Centric Warfare Requires a Closer
Look,” Lt. Col. Edmund C. Blash outlines some of the basic concerns about the
rapid application of network technology to combat.
His key concern is the belief that the technology is sometimes untested
and unproven in an operational environment before being widely introduced.
He further challenges the assumption that the same success of
network-centric computing observed in business is possible for the military
which operates in a much more dynamic setting.
Finally, he worries that failure of the network system would leave
individual platforms vulnerable in the absence of information.
To read more from Blash, click here.
To see similar arguments by other authors click here.
In his paper titled “The Seven
Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare”, Thomas P.M. Barnett highlights some
additional concerns. He notes that
only the U.S. has the technology and financing to make network-centric warfare a
reality. However, if coalition
partners are unable to effectively interpret and act on the information
available then the concept fails. In
fact, partners may not even be able to communicate with individual U.S.
platforms if their systems are not compatible.
He also notes that victory by “information dominance” is perhaps not
feasible and certainly not bloodless. If
a nation’s communications infrastructure were compromised, the society’s
weakest and most vulnerable people would suffer from disruption of basic
services. Finally, he addresses
several concerns about the requirement of network-centric operations for a
shared operational picture. He
notes that the rapid flow of information is designed to allow commanders more
time in the decision loop to reach conclusions.
However, the speed of information may lead to hasty or even rash
judgments. Also, there is the
potential for the “virtual” shared reality to become a detachment from the
actual events in the field – again leading to poor judgments.
To read more from Barnett click here.
The academic debate concerning network-centric warfare is important to ensure that shortcomings in both the technology and doctrine are evaluated and corrected as the program moves forward.
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