"Plato thinks that the Republic is just because among other reasons, it treats all persons equally in that each is given a social and vocational place exactly suited to his talents. Do you agree with Plato that this arrangement constitutes 'equality of opportunity?" -an essay topic from an obscure university that I shamefully call mine

Based on what I have read so far (not far) of Plato's Republic, it is probable that I would disagree with everything Plato stands for. Through the mouth of Socrates, Plato tries to discover the just state by building it from scratch. He builds his state using a series of logical reasoning about the nature of human beings, but disregards the notion that human beings are not always logical. His attempt to fit these synthetic human beings into a mathematical equation results in numerous black holes in his arguments, which he then covers with a huge leap of faith. Even though the foundation of psychology has been attributed to Plato, in my opinion, it is just another overrated aspect of Plato's understandings. Had he, indeed, possessed some base knowledge of human behaviour, he would not have laid the foundation of his state upon the fact that its citizens are made of wood! By wood I mean they do not think for themselves, if Plato believes they think at all! His conception of humans is that God (Plato) made these hallow wooden puppets in which are implanted some mechanical devices with which they will perform their sole function in life. He does not see them as individuals, but it is obvious that he wouldn't; he is oblivious to the notion of individualism because he is oblivious to the notion of will. And because each person in Plato's ideal society is deprived of will, they are assumed to be these sublime, nay, lobotomised, creatures, glued to their stations in life regardless of any other possibilities for them. This makes Plato's republic one that deprives its people of choice and equality of opportunity.
The most outrageous of all claims from Plato is his allegory of the metals. In this fable, he describes each person as having one of three metals mixed in their composition. This alloy would determine whether he would be a worker, an auxiliary, or a ruler. So speaking, Plato is saying that a person's destiny is set at birth by the metal he contains in him. He is also saying that a person is born with capabilities that he cannot alter in the course of his life. Even though Plato did include the possibility of two parents giving birth to a child of a different alloy, or capability, he did not consider, or at least he did not include the fact that some people, in reality, could ultimately change the nature of the metal in them. By this, I am saying that an individual could be born with a metal like brass, and by exercise and hard work, he could change that brass into silver or even gold. Plato would say that is impossible. A person is born with many paths available to him, he may choose to go down one, or several at different times. Plato is saying a person is born with one path that he will definitely follow because there are no other paths that he is suited for. This divine metal inside him has written his life in stone, and deprived him of any choice he has! This is not equality of opportunity. Of course, Plato would argue that this person, born with brass or iron in him, would only want to be a farmer or a potter, without the desire to be anything else. Now, is that plausible? It is if this person is singularly simple or lived among nothing but potters, and thus has no comparison. Otherwise, following Plato's logic, if our first ambition is our only ambition in life to be realised, then we'd all be astronauts and movie stars, and basketball players. It is ridiculous to think that a person has a one-track mind with only one assigned purpose in life, which coincidentally, is what he wants. When Plato said that his republic is just because it treats all persons equally because they are given a vocational place in life suited to their talents, he actually means they are given a job that society needs them to do regardless of what they actually want.
Looking further into Plato's argument, a person is born to practice one profession, and this profession is to be his proper work and he shall do it without interfering with any other professions, because that would cause harm to the society and thus be unjust.
That is a mighty heavy load Plato just dropped on all the single mothers in our society working multiple jobs to feed her children! So, Plato's people, deathly afraid of being unjust or just totally brainwashed, will stick to their profession. This logic is good so long as someone doesn't think outside the boundaries. By that I mean breaking free from the bonds of society's orders, and taking a radical look at things. If a potter was somehow capable of thinking that, perhaps, he could do something other than pottery, and acted on that thought, and somehow succeeded, wouldn't Plato's argument sink? Would it mean that a person could have many talents suited for many professions? But because this poor potter is repressed by the republic's philosophies, and since youth, taught to think that going outside of one's destined profession would be injustice to the state, and thus wicked, he would be frightened to do such a thing. But this does not mean he cannot think of it, or that he does not want it. Coincidentally, doesn't the allegory of the cave suggest breaking free from the bonds and turning one's head to take a radical look, take a look at reality? Of course, Plato suggests that those would only be the philosopher kings. And if these rulers are capable of breaking free, and looking at the reality of things, they must know that the notion of one person suited only for one specific job is a total hoax! If this were the case, knowing that a person could ultimately learn many different practices but not telling them this fact for the sake of a "just" society, would be unjust because the philosopher kings are denying these people of the truth, their right, and their choice! So how does this use of deception by the rulers constitute a just society with equality of opportunity? I'm not even going to argue the point that Plato decides, after seeing a huge flaw in his argument, that deception can sometimes be use as a good sort of medicine for unity. What is that? That is clearly elitism without a foundation! Let me make a wild suggestion here. Maybe the people in the cave, everyone from worker to auxiliary to ruler, are all capable of perceiving this reality, but they are too afraid to turn around and look because the rulers in Plato's republic is the equivalent of the Big Nurse in One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest!
In the Republic, Plato is describing the early stages of a communist regime development. The idea that the state is a whole and everyone works towards the perfect state is in itself a denial of equality of opportunity. The equality of opportunity is based on the individual, what the individual can do. But the "individuals" in Plato's state aren't individuals at all! They are stamped pieces of machinery inside one giant machine, oh let's call that the republic, and they perform their "destined" function to make that machine run smooth. For clocks, that's okay because we know that the parts of a clock are made in a certain way and shape just to do what it does inside the clock -it is not versatile. And that is why if that part of the clock is broken, there is nothing else to be done with it but throwing it away. That is also what Plato is saying about his people in this republic. That they are made to do one thing and one thing only, and it is suppose to be just because they are doing the only thing they can do, if not, they should be thrown away.
Is Plato not the most unfeeling man ever? If by this account, Plato's destined profession being a logical political philosopher, should just die because he is failing to make any sense! This is not our current conception of human beings. We don't think of our human beings as each designed or born a certain way because they are born to do a certain job. According to this, a potter should have bigger, more developed hands, whereas the rulers would have bigger and more developed brains because they have to think to rule. So these individuals would walk around the street, and one would say, "Hey, look at that man's gigantic hands! He must be a potter!" Human beings are versatile creatures that can do many things as long as they learn it and practice it. So, if the potter was born with big hands, but wishes he could be an athlete, he could exercise his legs and other limbs so he could be an athlete as well! Plato is saying that the potter, born with big hands, will be doomed to always have these unalterable big hands and feeble underdeveloped limbs, and thus can only do what his big hands destine him to do. I don't see opportunity in that, let alone an equality of opportunity.
Arguing against Plato is like verbal constipation. One has so many things to say, but the words just come as such a powerful, solid gush that it suffocates the mind, and cease to come at all. I mean, does he honestly believe his own definition of justice?
I think Plato is playing God in a sense that he is designating an actual value to what properly belongs to a man. Just because Glaucon and Adeimantus are programmed only to agree with Socrates, just goes to show that Plato didn't even think to argue with himself. How does he know what belongs to a person and what doesn't? In that rudimentary argument is enough to show that his republic is not one of equal opportunity because Plato doesn't believe that choice is something that properly belongs to a man, and neither is will! And why not? Because He has already assigned a value to the belonging of a man, and that is his pre-destined job! How can equality of opportunity be present when choice isn't given? That is like saying here is a piece of candy, but you can't eat it because you have no teeth! What a kind of severely crippled logic is that?

1. Plato, The Republic, Francis MacDonald Cornford, (London: Oxford University Press, 1941) Pg. 129
2. Ibid. Pg. 96
3. Ibid. Pg. 128