Hasting Rashdall’s The Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy (1907) is an investigation of the meaning of moral rightness and goodness and of how these terms may be applied to human conduct. Rashdall defines moral philosophy as a science of the rightness of human conduct, and as an investigation of what should, or should not, be the aim of moral conduct. Moral philosophy is a study of the nature, origin, and meaning of our ideas concerning what is morally right or wrong, and is a scientific method of determining what is morally right or wrong for us to do in particular situations.
Rashdall presents an anti-hedonistic and teleological view of ethics which he terms 'Ideal Utilitarianism.' He rejects the claim of Psychological Hedonism that the desire for pleasure is the only rational motive of human conduct, and he rejects the claim of Ethical Hedonism that pleasure is the ultimate good toward which all human actions should be aimed. He argues that the consequences, as opposed to the motives, of human actions are what determine their moral rightness or wrongness, and that the moral rightness or wrongness of human actions may de determined by whether or not they tend to promote universal well-being or the general good of society.
Rashdall criticizes deontological or formalistic ethics (in which the moral rightness or wrongness of human actions is judged by whether or not these actions conform to principles of duty or to formal rules of conduct) for not considering the consequences of human actions in judging whether these actions are morally right or wrong. He also rejects Ethical Intuitionism, arguing that if it asserts that the moral rightness of wrongness of some actions may be known intuitively, then the consequences of these actions may mistakenly be ignored when these actions are judged as morally right or wrong.
Rashdall criticizes Hedonistic Utilitarianism for arguing that the only valid criterion of whether actions are morally right or wrong is whether they tend to promote pleasure or pain, and declares that Rationalistic Utilitarianism must consider not only pleasure or happiness but also knowledge or virtue as part of the ultimate good which is to be promoted.
Rashdall explains that questions which need to be answered by moral philosophy include the question of whether or not pleasure is the only possible object of desire and the question of whether or not pleasure is the only rational object of desire. If pleasure is considered to be the only possible object of desire, then we cannot explain why we do not always choose to perform those actions which will produce the greatest amount of pleasure. If in some cases we willingly choose to perform actions which we know will not produce the greatest possible amount of pleasure, or which we know will not produce the least possible amount of pain, then there must be some object which we desire other than the enjoyment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain.
Rashdall describes the desire for an object other than pleasure as 'disinterested desire.' 'Disinterested desire' may include any form of desire which is not purely a desire for pleasure, and may be a more common form of desire than 'interested desire' (which is purely a desire for pleasure).
Rashdall explains that if pleasure is regarded as the only rational object of desire, then the most rational actions are those which produce the greatest amount of pleasure or which produce the least amount of pain. If a greater amount of pleasure can be produced by actions which promote the happiness of many individuals than by actions which promote the happiness of only a few individuals, then actions which promote the happiness of many individuals may be the more rational actions to perform. However, if it is reasonable in some cases for an individual not to act merely in his or her own self-interest but to act in the interest of many individuals, then there may in these cases be a conflict between reason and self-interest. Egoistic Hedonism asserts that the best action for an individual to perform is that which produces the greatest amount of pleasure or the least amount of pain for that individual, while Universalistic Hedonism asserts that the best action for an individual to perform is that which produces the greatest amount of pleasure or the least amount of pain for the greatest number of individuals.
Rashdall defines Ethical Intuitionism as a theory that actions may be judged as morally right or wrong a priori and without regard for their consequences.1 He strongly disagrees with Intuitionism insofar as it disregards the consequences of the actions which it judges to be morally right or wrong, but he also admits that moral judgments concerning the nature of what is intrinsically good, or concerning the nature of what ought to be promoted by human conduct, may have to made intuitively. For example, the judgment that eudaimonia or universal well-being is intrinsically good, and that it should be the ultimate goal of human conduct, may have to be made intuitively. However, Rashdall also argues that judgments about whether actions are morally right or wrong must always involve some consideration of the consequences of these actions.2
At the same time, Rashdall does not believe that the moral value of an action depends totally on the consequences of the action. He recognizes that the moral value of an action may depend on the motives and aims, as well as the consequences, of the action. He also recognizes that the moral value of an action may be determined by whether the action is better or worse than some other action which could be performed to achieve the same end or goal.
According to Rashdall, intuitive judgments that human actions are morally right or wrong are always subject to revision if the actions which are under consideration are found to have unanticipated consequences. Intuitionism can never provide definitive or final answers concerning the moral rightness or wrongness of human conduct.
Rashdall criticizes Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics for attempting to reconcile Ethical Intuitionism and Rationalistic Utilitarianism, and for attempting to reconcile Rationalistic Utilitarianism and Universalistic Hedonism. Rashdall contends that Sidgwick’s attempt to reconcile rationalistic and hedonistic ethics is unsuccessful, because rationalistic conceptions of duty must inevitably come into conflict with hedonistic conceptions of the ultimate good. Contrary to the arguments of Psychological Hedonism, pleasure may not be the only rational object of desire, and pleasure may not be the most rational aim of human conduct. Virtue may be viewed by rationalistic ethics as an end in itself, but pleasure is the only object which is viewed by hedonistic ethics as an end in itself.
Rashdall also criticizes Immanuel Kant for arguing that the desire to comply with moral duty is the only morally right motive of human conduct. Rashdall argues that the true motive of morally right conduct is an ideal love of humankind, and that this ideal love of humankind includes a desire to promote the well-being of all members of society. Rashdall criticizes Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative (which may be summarized by the command to "act only in such a way that you can will that the maxim of your action should become a universal law of morality"3) for providing no specific information as to which action should be performed in any particular situation. Rashdall contends that the moral criterion which Kant proposes has no content, and that it provides no practical information as to what kind of good should be promoted by human conduct. Rashdall also argues that there may be exceptions to any general principle of moral conduct, and that there may always be a particular situation to which a general principle of moral conduct may not apply.
Rashdall explains that the idea of what is morally right presupposes the idea of what is morally good, and that actions may be judged as morally right if they tend to promote what is morally good. Actions cannot be judged as morally right if they do not tend to promote some form of moral good. Without any idea of what is morally good, the idea of what is morally right has no meaning.
Rashdall also explains that the importance of the relation between moral reasoning and moral feeling must be recognized when we evaluate the rationality of any moral philosophy. Both reason and emotion may be involved in moral judgments, and moral reasoning may never be completely separated from moral feeling. Moral consciousness may include not only a rational capacity to make moral judgments but an emotional capacity to experience instincts, desires, and feelings. Rashdall maintains, however, that the capacity to make moral judgements is primarily a rational capacity, and that the emotional capacity to experience instinct, desires, and feelings can never be an adequate explanation of the nature of our moral judgments. Nevertheless, Rashdall explains that the importance of emotions, desires, and feelings should not be underestimated in evaluating the motives for morally right conduct.
Rashdall argues that if good is to be allocated to any particular group of individuals, then the principles of justice require that every individual in the group be given equal consideration. However, Rashdall also contends that the principles of justice do not necessarily require that an equal amount of good be allocated to every individual. If an individual or a particular group of individuals is more in need of, or more deserving of, good than other individuals in the larger group or society, then that fact must be taken into consideration in allocating good to all the individuals in the larger group or society. However, if every individual in the larger group or society is given equal consideration, then the well-being of any particular individual in the larger group or society is considered to be of the same importance as the well-being of any other individual. If an individual has previously received less than his or her fair share of good, then justice may require that a greater amount of good be subsequently allocated to that individual than to other individuals who have already received their fair share of good.
Rashdall also argues that if we judge whether or not an action is for the general good of all individuals, then the principles of justice require that we give equal consideration to the well-being of every individual who will be affected by that action. However, Rashdall contradicts his own argument when he says that the amount of good which may be enjoyed by some kinds of individuals is of greater importance than the amount of good which may be enjoyed by other kinds of individuals, and that the social condition of the "higher races of mankind" is of greater importance than the social condition of the "lower races" of humankind.4 Rashdall argues that a better quality of life for the "higher races of mankind" will ultimately require that the "lower races" be excluded from that better quality of life, and he thus attempts to justify a systematic and methodical form of racism.
Rashdall also contradicts his own principle of equal consideration for all individuals by arguing that some "individuals, or races" are capable of enjoying a higher kind of well-being than others, and that this supposedly higher moral capability of some "individuals, or races" should be considered in determining how good is to be allocated to each individual in society.5 Rashdall attempts to justify the use of racial or sociocultural preferences in the allocation of wealth, property, and basic rights to particular groups of individuals, and he thus attempts to justify the establishment of a system of institutionalized racism.
Rashdall argues that whether an action is morally right or wrong may be judged by whether the action tends to promote or prevent the greatest possible amount of eudaimonia or well-being for the greatest number of individuals. Thus, the 'hedonistic calculus' is a method of calculating the amount of good which may be produced by an action, and is a method of comparing that amount of good with the amount of good which could be produced by some other action. According to hedonistic calculation, the best action will be that which produces the greatest possible amount of pleasure or good. Rashdall explains that to scientifically use the 'hedonistic calculus' as a method of judging the moral rightness of wrongness of human actions may be to assume that various kinds of good (such as pleasure, virtue, or knowledge) can be compared quantitatively. He argues that all these various kinds of good may be constituents of the ultimate good, and that they may be elements of the general well-being of society.
Rashdall also argues that the greatest amount of pleasure may be produced by the satisfaction of desires other than the desire for pleasure (for example, by the satisfaction of the desire for virtue). Although pleasure may be an aspect of any state of consciousness to which we assign value, the value of some states of consciousness may not be determined by whether they produce pleasure.6 Thus, Ideal Utilitarianism as defined by Rashdall is a moral philosophy which recognizes that pleasure may not be the only rational aim of human conduct and that virtue and other moral ideals may be constituents of eudaimonia or universal well-being.
1Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy, Volume I (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1907), p. 80.
2Ibid., p. 87.
3Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by H.J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 70.
4Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Volume I, p. 238.
5Ibid., p. 242.
6Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Volume II, p. 38.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Translated by H.J. Paton. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
Sidgwick, Henry. The Methods of Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981.
Rashdall, Hastings. The Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy, Volumes I and II. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1907.