U. S. Senate Speeches and Remarks of Carl Schurz
Mr. SCHURZ. Mr. President, this debate is now drawing to a close. I rise, not to go into a lengthy and elaborate argument on the tenure-of-office act, but merely to state in a few words the reasons which will govern my vote; and I do this, not for the purpose merely of putting myself on record, which would be a matter of very little moment, indeed, but of suggesting to those whose opinions on the tenure-of-office act are very similar to mine some points of view which, to judge from their speeches, may possibly have escaped their attention.
In the course of this discussion, to which I have listened with the intensest interest, expressions have fallen from the lips of honorable Senators on either side apparently reflecting upon the motives of those taking the opposite course. Looking at the question with the sole desire of doing what is best for the common good, I have arrived at the conclusion that an independently thinking man may well be in favor of the repeal of the tenure of office act without the least inclination of prostrating himself at the foot of the throne, or without any desire to betray the constitutional prerogatives of this branch of the national Legislature into the hands of the Executive; while, on the other hand, a Senator may well desire to preserve the most important features of the tenure-of-office act without showing a want of courtesy to or of confidence in the President, or a desire to effect an undue accumulation of powers in the hands of the Senate. For myself I emphatically disclaim each and all of these motives.
Had the question whether the tenure-of-office act shall be repealed or shall be retained upon our statute-book as a piece of permanent legislation been presented to us purely and simply on its own merits I should have felt strongly inclined to vote for its repeal, not as if I doubted the constitutionality of that act; on the contrary, I am convinced of it. But Senators who have so ably and eloquently discussed this point will pardon me for saying that I do not consider the constitutional view the only and, perhaps, not even the most important view of the question. I should have favored the repeal of the civil-tenure act for some practical reasons. One of the greatest problems which present themselves to the statesmen of this day is a thorough reform of our public service calculated to root out corruption and inefficiency which now degrade and disgrace many if not most of its branches. The main source of that demoralization and inefficiency is by no means to be found in the power of arbitrary removal as heretofore exercised by the Executive, but it is to be found in the prevailing system of appointments at random, from political and personal favoritism, upon the principle that “to the victors belong the spoils.” It is a matter of serious doubt with thinking men whether, as long as this vicious system of making appointments on the “spoils” basis is preserved, a system of removal at the pleasure of the Executive is not after all as good as and perhaps better than any we can invent; and whether the tenure-of-office act does not do more harm on the whole in preventing and impeding desirable removals by a good President than in impeding unjust removals by a bad one.
Senators who advocate the preservation of the tenure-of-office act, but now propose its suspension for the very purpose of giving the President some liberty of action to clean out our civil service, seem themselves to admit that when the body politic swallows poison every day it may be a good thing after all to have a powerful emetic ready to hand. While it is far from me to suppose that impure motives might creep even into the bosom of the Senate, as this body is at present composed, to affect the action of Senators upon removals, yet it is well worth considering — and I cannot lay too much stress upon this point — whether as long as the public service remains that nursery of demoralization which it necessarily must remain while the “spoils” system exists, it would be wise to bring either branch of the national Legislature into closer, more intimate, and more frequent contact with that nursery of demoralization than is absolutely necessary. If, therefore, the tenure-of-office act was intended as a measure of reform, permit me to say it begins decidedly at the wrong end; it fails to apply the remedy to the true seat of the disease, which is not in the system of removal, but which is in the vicious system of appointment; and it is very doubtful whether, in its ultimate effects, the good in it perhaps being outweighed by the bad, it will not rather aggravate than cure the evil.
For these reasons, which I have merely suggested and not elaborated, I might have voted for the repeal of the act, were the question presented to us on its own merits; and I should feel inclined to vote so even now, had I reason to believe that the majority of this honorable body intended to restore the act as it now stands to force again at the next session of Congress. But it must have become evident to every one who has listened to this debate that the necessity of very important changes in the law is admitted on all hands. It may be assumed almost as a certainty that the act as it now stands will never go into operation again; and just for this very reason, paradoxical as it may seem, I shall not vote for the repeal, but for the suspension of the act until the next session of Congress; and why? Because then the subject must come up again for discussion; then the necessity of recasting the law will stand imperative before us; we cannot get out of its way; there will be no possibility of dodging it; and with that necessity hanging over us, will not there perhaps be a hope that after a failure of reform attempted in the wrong direction we may be led to attempt a true reform by putting the ax to the root of the evil; that we may substitute for the existing scandal of the “spoils” system a system of appointment on examination of candidates for office, with promotion according to merit, and then of removal only for cause, thus giving efficiency and respectability to the public service, and relieving us, in part at least, of that demoralizing curse which we euphoniously call “patronage?” This great possibility I see before me; and it is brought nearer by the very fact that we shall have to discuss and recast the tenure-of-office act at the next session of Congress, and thus be obliged to take the question of reform practically in hand.
I am indeed no longer young enough to indulge in the pleasing delusion that all we may desire will be accomplished at the first onset, and that the millennium will be brought on by an act of Congress; but I do see in the necessity of discussing and of recasting the tenure-of-office law at the next session a possibility that we may take at least one step in the right direction, and that one step may be a great blessing to the country. And I would ask honorable Senators who entertain in regard to the tenure-of-office act views similar to mine, and at the same time have the reform of the public service as earnestly at heart, whether it will not be better to bring about that compelling contingency, than to repeal the act, thus ending the matter for the present and exposing the cause of reform to the chance of being forgotten or neglected amid the good feeling and ease which will necessarily be produced by a faithful Administration, such as we expect to have?
They may object that to suspend the act, instead of either repealing or maintaining it, is after all a very illogical operation. I admit that it certainly is. I know this suspension is but a mere shift, but it is one of those shifts which in embarrassing cases legislators are very frequently obliged to resort to for the want of anything better. And such shifts have not unfrequently been resorted to during the time when the reconstruction measure were up here for discussion, and when the logic of the facts and the logic of the laws stood sometimes in glaring contrast face to face.
Can there be any serious objection on the ground that the mere suspension would not give the President of the United States the necessary freedom of action during the recess? Could that freedom possibly be greater after a repeal than it will be after a suspension?
I certainly would be the last man to hamper the President in the good work of cleaning out the Augean stable which he is now to undertake. In the course of his Administration new questions may arise which are now unforeseen. Whether we shall agree on all of them I do not know. If not, we shall express our views with the same frankness we do now. But on one thing we do certainly agree with the President: that corruption must be hunted down, that “the rings” must be broken up, that the thieves must be driven out of the public service; and for the prosecution of this great end we are certainly willing to give the President all that liberty of action which the exigency demands. But, I ask Senators again, can we possibly give him any greater liberty of action by a repeal of the act than we give him by the suspension?
It is rumored, perhaps with a view of influencing our course, that the President feels very sensitive on this point, and that he will make no removals unless the civil-tenure bill be repealed instead of suspended; while on the other hand we are told that our merely suspending instead of repealing it will be generally understood as a vote of a want of confidence and a desire on our part to put the President on probation. I must confess that I fully agree with Senators who tell us that such things are but little entitled to our regard, and yet I cannot refrain from expressing my heartfelt concern about them. Their continual reiteration is apt to bring about on either side a sharpness of feeling for which there is not the least occasion in fact.
We have gone through a hard school of late. The long and bitter struggles between Andrew Johnson and the Congress of the United States have taught us some very valuable lessons. We have learned that when the executive and the legislative departments of the Government are arrayed against one another, the representatives of the people being in the right, a President, even with the inheritance of the vast accumulation of powers which your generous confidence had piled up in the hands of Mr. Lincoln, and with that reckless intensity of self-assertion which we knew in Mr. Johnson, could not sustain himself against you. We have learned that you could break his omnipotency like a stick of wood across your knees; that you could oblige him to sneak away out of the presidential chair covered with ignominy and disgrace, a warning example for all time to come. On the other hand, we have learned also that a President, even after having made himself distasteful to the people, and bound to fall, still could imperil the effects of your best laws, still could keep the country in constant trouble and tribulation. We have learned, therefore, above all things, how much harm a war between the Executive and the Legislature can inflict upon the country, and how necessary harmony and good understanding between the great powers of the State is for the welfare of the people; and it is this great boon of harmony which the people have so long prayed for, and which by the late presidential election they so fondly hoped to achieve. Therefore it is that I feel so deep a concern in the insinuations which are flying hither and thither, tending to artificially create an acerbity of feeling where there is no reason why harmony and good understanding should not prevail.
Those, it seems to me, are rendering the President of the United States a very bad service who represent him as indulging in a fit of temper about what we cannot but regard as the plain discharge of our duty. If they really want to make us believe, and believe themselves, that the President, against his better judgment, will not make any removals if we suspend instead of repealing the tenure-of-office act, they must place, indeed, a very low estimate upon the soundness of his understanding or upon the honesty of his purpose. I solemnly declare that I could never for a moment believe in any of these stories. I am certainly not one of those who would avail themselves of every possible opportunity to fly into a paroxysm of adulation, but I am glad to say that I have a better opinion of the President. I esteem him highly, so highly, indeed, as to believe that those laudatory superlatives and those gushing professions of transcendent and everlasting and unconditional confidence which are continually inflicted upon him without mercy, must by this time have become a little suspicious to his good sense, obnoxious to his feelings as a Republican, and nauseating to his stomach; and that when such laudations are even seasoned with suggestions as to the design of legislators to insult him, the President understands the dignity of his office well enough to repel them as unworthy of those against whom they are directed and unworthy of him who is to be influenced by them.
I believe him to possess an understanding altogether too sound and a purpose altogether too honest not to avail himself with gladness, nay, even with avidity, of every possibility to do that which the country expects and has a right to expect of him, no matter whether that possibility be offered to him in the shape of the suspension or of the repeal of the tenure-of-office act. This is the confidence I repose in him, a confidence which does honor to him on whom it is placed and honor to those who entertain it. While thus a bad service is rendered to the President by presenting him in a questionable attitude before Congress and the people, an equally bad service is rendered to the country by representing the Senate as engaged in a movement of factious opposition. What, then, are we doing? We are calmly deliberating upon constitutional questions and measures of public utility, as it is our plain right and duty to do. It is thought necessary that, for the purpose of purifying the machinery of the public service, the President should have a certain liberty of action. We all agree to grant him all that is necessary without hesitation. Not a single Senator on this floor has declared himself in the least unwilling to do so. Whether by suspension or by repeal, the necessary freedom of action is certainly to be granted. Where, then, is the factious opposition? Where is even the least symptom of it?
Look at the situation as it is. On all the
great questions of policy the President and
Congress heartily agree. As to all that is most
essential, there is not the shadow of a discrepancy
between them. We have a President who
is willing to do what we and the country desire
him to do. We have a Congress willing to give
him all that measure of power which is
necessary for him that he should do it. all the
elements of harmony, of mutual confidence,
of good understanding, of fruitful coöperation,
are therefore here. We are all working with
equally honest intentions to achieve a common
end. And when now, under circumstances so
promising, so auspicious, so hopeful, attempts
are made to sow the seeds of distrust and
discord, by throwing suspicions upon the motives
of this or that branch of the national Government,
he who makes the attempt will certainly
not earn the thanks of the Americadn people.
I have shown that, as in my case, a Senator may disapprove of the tenure of office act as it now stands and yet vote for its suspension only, without the least desire to hamper the Executive, merely upon views of public utility. Whether my views be correct or not they at any rate proceed from honest convictions. I earnestly hope the Senate will stand by the report of the Judiciary Committee; and if, as it is not altogether extravagant to anticipate, at the next session of Congress the necessity of reviewing the tenure-of-office act should lead us to take but one effective step in the direction of a thorough reform of the civil service, a work well worthy to crown the great achievements of the Republican party, the country, Congress, the President, we all shall have equal reason to congratulate ourselves upon the result.