The Macedonian Question ? 
It is obvious that from the objective point of view there can be no 'Macedonian question' for Greece. The legal status of the country's northern borders is safeguarded by international treaties such as those of Bucharest (1913), which ended the Second Balkan War, and of Neuilly (1919) and Paris (1947) which ended the First and Second World Wars.
The ethnological composition of Greek Macedonia, which at the time of Ottoman rule was an inextricable tangle of nationalities, religions and languages, is today homogeneous to an extent rare for the Balkan peninsula. Contributions were indubitably made to this by the widespread movements of populations which occurred at the time of the Balkan Wars (1912 - 13) and of the First World War, by the large-scale exchanges of populations between Greece and Turkey and Greece and Bulgaria in the inter-war period, by the arrival of greekrefugees from Yugoslavia, Romania and Russia (apart from those who came from Bulgaria and Turkey), by the final departure of the remnants of the Slav population at the end of the German and Bulgarian occupation (1944) and the Civil War (1949) and by the overseas emigration of the 1950s. The official figures of the most recent Greek census (1981) show that the thirteen Prefectures of Macedonia contain some two million Greeks. Of the once-flourishing communities of Jews and Armenians, which were decimated by the events of the war, only a few thousand people are left, most of them resident in Thessaloniki.
The economic development and social conditions which caused mobility in the population during the post-war period attracted the agricultural population of the border areas into the urban centres. As a result, the various groups of the population -whether indigenous or of refugee origin- have now, after three generations, become members of uniform social and economic strata with a common education, religion and language. However, this process of convergence has not wiped out all trace of local cultural characteristics, which continue to be preserved and indeed developed with a sense of love and pride by the various sections of the population. In our day, this trend (which is to be encountered throughout Greece) keeps traditions alive and at the same time, by cross-fertilisation, gives birth to new creative cultural activities.
In recent years there has been a strongly growing sense of national awareness, as the impressive archaeological finds from various parts of Macedonia have confirmed in the most authentic mdnner the Greek roots of Macedonia. The fact that the area of Greek Macedonia today is identical with the Macedonia of Philip's time -with the addition of only some narrow strips which today are part of the Macedonian territories of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria- creates among Greek Maceonians a feeling of an ipso jure spatial inheritance from their forefathers. Similar testimony to the marked presence of Hellenism in Macedonia is provided by the recent evidence turned up by historical research into the Byzantine and Ottoman periods.
It is, then, necessary to investigate how Greece became involved in the 'Macedonian disputes' which manifest themselves either inside Yugoslavian Macedonia or in the traditional disagreements between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
Perhaps the most important cause can be traced to the insecurity which the Greeks have traditionally felt and which was the result of the military events of the 20th century. It should not be forgotten that in two World Wars parts of Greek Macedonia were occupied by the Bulgarian army, and that during the Civil War there was a direct danger of Greece losing Macedonia, which would have been annexed to a unified Macedonian state within the framework either of Federal Yugoslavia or of a Balkan Communist Federation. Despite the fact that the political conditions which have come into being in the Balkans, particularly in recent decades, are not favourable to the revival of such plans, it is nonethelesse the case that the flux for which Balkan relations were noted in the past and the interventions in the area of the Great Powers of the day have left behind powerful remnants of uncertaintly and suspicion. The action taken by neighbouring Yugoslavian Macedonia, moreover, has done nothing to dispel these suspicions: rather the reverse.
A second reason to which particular attention should be p4id is the sensitivity of the Greeks towards the historical continuity of their race since antiquity through medieval Byzantium down to the present. Historians are well acquainted with the storm of protest which broke out when, in the 19th century, the German scholar Fallmerayer attempted to discredit the idea of the continuity of Hellenism. The Greek historian Paparrigopoulos, of course, found serious arguments with which to rebut Fallmerayer's theories, but the reaction which the German scholar had provoked increased the nationalist zeal of the Greeks of the time and their determination to see the realization of their vision of a modern Greek state. Today, it is the historical revisionists of Skopje who have undertaken a Fallmerayertype provocation. The systematic counterfeiting of Macedonian history was initially treated by the Greeks as ludicrous and unworthy of their attention. However, constant reiteration, the monopolising of the name 'Macedonia' and the carefully-planned campaign to impose these novel theories abroad compelled the Greeks to awake. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this awakening, mutatis mutandis, of course, was in many ways similar to the reaction caused in the 19th century by Falimerayer's theories. It is quite natural that the Greeks, a historic people, should be particularly sensitive towards anything tampering with their historical heritage.
As the guardians of a creative tradition in history and culture unique in Europe, they are in no way disposed to abandon that tradition to the political expediency of those set on looting it.
In brief, Greek policy over the 'Macedonian question' could be summarised as follows.
Greece has no territorial or even minority claims against her neighbouring states. She believes that the borders established by international treaties and ratified by the Helsinki Final Act are inviolable. As for Greek Macedonia ' Greece is convinced that the ethnological homogeneity of the area makes it impervious to the various demands upon it which, in the past, have been advanced in the form of territorial or minority claims. On the dispute between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Greece believes, as one would expect, that in the long term the existence of such a problem could create a danger of the sensitive Balkan area becoming involved in fresh misadventures. For that reason, Greece is positively disposed towards any effont which may defuse what at times has been an acute dispute. For the same reason, Greece welcomes Bulgarian policy towards her, a policy which successive Greek governments have repaid in an equally positive manner.The Greek attitude towards the 'Macedonian problem' in Yugoslavia has frequently been misunderstood. Greece sees Yugoslavia as a basic factor in safeguarding peace and security in the Balkans. For that reason Greece hopes that the internal disputes and conflict in Yugoslavia, which to a considerable extent are the result of disagreements amongst the various nationalities, will not have unpleasant consequences for the cohesion and stability of the Yugoslavian Federation. It follows that even when Greece is provoked by the nationalist extremists of Skopje she avoids aggravating the situation still further, in the hope that a more prudent attitude will prevail in the sensitive area of Yugoslavian Macedonia as well. Skopje, however -whether deliberately or out of ignorance- regularly misinterprets the Greek position. Greece is accused of denying the existence of a people, of a language and of a literature and thus of intervening in Yugoslavia's internal affairs, in breach of the ethnic and human rights of an entire nation.
This simplistic interpretation of Greek policy is self-evidently mistaken. Greece has no intention whatever of becoming involved in Yugoslavia's internal affairs, in the same way as she is not desirous of Yugoslavia becoming involved in hers. Consequently, Greece does not take up any position towards the process of definition, in one way or another, of the national groups living in Yugoslavia. If Yugoslavia managed after the Second World War to transform the populations which live in the southern part of the country and give them a new ethnic orientation, then that is a matter for those populations alone. The problem thus lies not in whether Greece acknowledges or fails to acknowledge a new ly formed nation, the language which that nation speaks and the literature in creates, but in the name which that nation uses to define itself. As we have noted above, the name 'Macedonian' -an Ancient Greek name- is used even in Greece as a geographical attribute in order to refer to the inhabitants of the geographical area of Greek Macedonia. Any establishment of the monopolisation of that name by the Yugoslavian Macedonians will create tremendous confusion, in Greece and abroad, for the Greek Macedonians, who use the term in its geographical sense. Apart from its practical aspect, of course, the dispute over the name also contains another element: that of the cultural heritage of the name, which the Greeks are not disposed to put up for auction to the highest bidder. It follows that the question is not one of failure to acknowledge the existence of a nation, but one of abandoning the monopolisation of the Macedonian name.
Various approaches to this question have been formulated on the Greek side. The most traditional proclaims that the only true Macedonians are the Greek inhabitants of Macedonia, who are the only people entitled the make use of the name. This approach has strong foundations in history. However, the political problem which has come into existence -particularly since 1944- has lead to the formulation of different positions. Some scholars believe that there ought to be a clearer definition of the Macedonians (that is, of the various national groups which live in the broader area of Macedonia, and particularly when they find themselves abroad) as Slav or Yugoslavian - Macedonians, Greek - Macedonians or Bulgarian - Macedonians. In this way the name will continue to have its traditional geographical nature while each of the national groups originating in Macedonia will have a clearer and more honest definition of itself. If a solution can be found to this question, the way will undoubtedly be open for the resolution of the myriad misunderstandings which have accumulated and which stem from the appropriation of the name 'Macedonia' and from the distortion of the Greek historical tradition in Macedonia.
The various tendencies which can be observed within the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, as well as in some parts of the Macedonian diaspora lead one to conclude that the process of 'Macedonisation' which began in 1944 has not solved the problem. The phenomena of acute neo-nationalism in its most extreme form indicate that more time is still needed for the consolidation of this experiment in ethnic transformation. Until then, one should not perhaps expect the responsible officials of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia to accept solutions such as those proposed by the Bulgarians or expressed on some sides in Greece. Until then, the disputes will continue to exist. It will be up to the responsible leaders of each of the Balkan countries to avoid giving existential dimensions to these problems ', since they have before them much greater interests capable of leading them to closer rapprochement, to mutual understanding and to cooperation for the good of peace in their countries and in the Balkans as a whole.
