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JULY 6-7, 2000


Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] 3 Articles from The Economist
Date: 7/7/00 5:21:21 PM Central Daylight Time

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The Economist
July 8th - 14th 2000
SURVEY INDONESIA: ...and, of course, order
-- Indonesia is bringing its army under discipline. Now it needs a
serious police force

THERE is a half-satisfactory explanation of how Indonesia's armed
forces came to be the way they are. If you are a poor, new-born
country consisting of 17,000 islands spread over 1.9m square
kilometres, with a huge population of assorted ethnic origin and
religious belief, how are you going to guard yourself against your
potential enemies? Indonesia's answer, when it had broken free from
the Dutch empire after 1945, was the concept its leaders called
"total people's defence".

Since Indonesia's navy could not possibly be expected to protect all
those wriggling coastlines, the armed forces were divided into a
number of separate territorial commands or Kodams (there are
currently 11 of them), each responsible for a different chunk of the
archipelago. Each command was told to build its own supply chain,
which fitted in nicely with the soldiers' taste—common among Asian
armies at the time—for enhancing a slim official budget by running
businesses of their own. So arose a system of regional "profit
centres". One officer who excelled at running his profit centre was
a young colonel in Java called Suharto; he set up partnerships with
two ethnic-Chinese businessmen, Bob Hasan and Liem Sioe Liong,
founder of the Salim Group.

The command structure made a certain amount of sense. Unfortunately,
Indonesia's officers added to it the idea of dwifungsi ("dual
function"), which inserted the armed forces into the government. A
large block of seats in parliament was reserved for military people,
and active or retired generals were given powerful places in the
cabinet. Even more perniciously, dwifungsi was applied to the
territorial-command hierarchy. This allowed the army to place
members of its "socio-political wing" alongside government officials
right down to village level. The idea was to keep in touch with
local communities, explain to folks how great it was to be
Indonesian—and deprive potential rebels of a base.

"Total people's defence" was not a bad way for a country of
Indonesia's special nature to try to face up to its enemies. It had,
however, one obvious flaw. It ignored the high risk that the enemy
would turn out to be the army itself. And this is what duly
happened. By the time Mr Suharto fell from power, his armed forces
were to a dismaying degree corrupt, calculating and divorced from
the people. They turned rape, torture, death and disappearance into
standard tools of administration. They terrorised the provinces of
Aceh, East Timor and West Papua. They shot demonstrators in Jakarta
during the anti-Suharto upheaval of 1998. They remained the most
potent threat to Indonesian democracy almost up to the moment of Mr
Wahid's election.

Kickin' brass
The generals stayed neutral in last year's parliamentary election.
But the armed forces' 38 reserved seats gave them plenty of leverage
in the fragmented new parliament, and hence in the choice of a new
president. General Wiranto, Suharto's former adjutant and his last
armed forces' commander, plainly had his eye on the vice-presidency.
Even after the army brought international criticism down on itself
by trying to block East Timor's independence, he could assemble the
various parties' leaders almost at will. In the end, though, the
generals chose not to risk causing a revolution. They decided to
back Mr Wahid and Miss Megawati for the presidency and
vice-presidency, and General Wiranto settled for a humbler job as
minister for security and politics.
The new President Wahid promptly exploited his victory. He made a
civilian, Juwono Sudarsono, the minister of defence. He gave some
new powers to the long-neglected navy and air force, thereby
demoting the army. After a couple of months he removed General
Wiranto from his ministry, citing a report on human-rights
violations in East Timor, and confounded experts in military coups
by boldly doing this when he himself was out of the country. Having
got General Wiranto out of the way, Mr Wahid then promoted some
reformist soldiers.

The other generals are falling into line. The forthcoming meeting of
the Consultative Assembly will probably strip them of their
remaining seats in parliament after the next election. They are also
talking more seriously about a reform of the territorial-command
system. The dangers of this have been seen: several well-known
generals have now brought themselves to criticise it publicly.

Mr Wahid is not yet fully in control of the armed forces. There will
be resistance if he puts any high-ranking officers on trial for the
brutalities they have authorised. The government has promised the
IMF that the generals' off-budget business activities will be
properly audited, but has so far done little about it. And the new
defence minister, Mr Juwono, points out that the generals are only
part of the problem. Middle-ranking officers must also be persuaded
to abandon their hopes of stockpiling wealth. He is even more
worried about the rank-and-file, describing them as "underfed,
underpaid, under-trained and under-loved". If the army is to clean
up the off-budget activities the soldiers live on, and stop using
postings to local government as a sort of pension scheme, it will
need more money from the budget—and the competition for that is

The missing policeman's lot
The country's even bigger security problem, though, is the absence
of anything that resembles a genuine police force. The existing
force, such as it is, has been put directly under the control of Mr
Juwono, the defence minister, which may help to get things moving in
the right direction. A new national police chief has been appointed,
to widespread nods of approval. But most policemen have no proper
training and no idea how they should respond to what is happening
around them. The result, in many parts of the country, is something
close to anarchy.
When a student was arrested in Medan recently for gambling, his
friends went to the police barracks and kidnapped several of the
policemen inside it. Elsewhere the police have stopped playing any
role whatsoever in the business of law and order. The current
procedure goes something like this. A theft is committed; a mob
forms; a suspect is nominated; the supposed culprit runs for his
life. There have been dozens of such episodes in Jakarta alone so
far this year. Some of those caught have been stabbed or beaten to
death; others burned alive.

The absence of anything like a proper police force has had its
grisliest consequences in the Moluccas, where fights between
Christians and Muslims have killed more than 2,500 people in 18
months. The hatred that causes this bloodshed is not just a matter
of religion. Some of it is the result of land disputes, some of
rivalry between sultanates; some is chiefly ethnic in origin, some
pure gang-warfare. Muslims in other parts of Indonesia who believe
that a Christian conspiracy is at work, and outsiders who claim to
see an anti-Christian jihad, are both grossly oversimplifying. What
they should join in lamenting is the virtual disappearance of
anything that can be called impartial law-enforcement. In its
absence, local people have had to arm themselves. Among the crude
home-made weapons found in one recent episode, according to the
Jakarta Post, were bombs, a bazooka, some pistols and rifles,
machetes and, just as fatal, 18 arrows.

The central government in Jakarta can be equally limp-wristed. In
April, angered by reports of Christians killing Muslims in the
Moluccas, a Muslim group called the Jihad Force assembled outside
the presidential palace with machetes and swords. A couple of
thousand of them spent a few days training themselves to use their
weapons. They then sailed from Java, reaching the Moluccas in late
May. After several attacks, in which they have killed about 200
people, they have still not been stopped.

Indonesia needs a police force worthy of the name. But even that
will not work everywhere. Consider what is happening in Aceh and
West Papua, at the far western and far eastern ends of Indonesia.
That rending noise
-- Separatists are tugging at both ends of a manifestly fragile

WHEN voters in the rest of Indonesia were choosing among 48 parties
in last year's election, Ibrahim, who lives in Aceh, was offered
only two options. Rebels of the Free Aceh Movement instructed him
and his neighbours to boycott the election. Indonesian soldiers and
policemen insisted that they turn out and vote. Afraid to defy
either side, Ibrahim plumped for his equivalent of the Third Way,
and went off to stay with his relatives in a neighbouring province.

A lot of Acehnese feel equally trapped. The fight for an independent
Aceh has been in progress, on and off, for half a century. On May
12th a three-month ceasefire negotiated between Mr Wahid's
government and the rebels came into effect, after an outburst of
violence that had killed 345 people since the beginning of the year.
But it will be very hard to turn the ceasefire, even if it lasts its
due three months, into an agreed peace.

The desire for an independent Aceh grows out of a widespread feeling
that this region is different from much of the rest of Indonesia,
and especially from "imperial" Java. For centuries the sultanate of
Aceh, which sits at the entrance to the Malacca Strait, benefited
both economically and culturally from its contact with the Muslim
traders whose ships sailed past its shores. "Mecca's verandah", as
it was called, became a major trading centre in the 17th century and
one of the most devoutly Islamic states in the region. It fought off
several great powers until, at last, it fell under Dutch rule in
1903 after a fierce 30-year war. Then, starting in the early 1950s,
the Acehnese fought a ten-year rebellion against the new Indonesia
of which they found themselves a part, and rose intermittently
against President Suharto's soldiers in the years after that.

A century after they lost their independence, most Acehnese still
have several things in common. They remain devoutly Muslim, even if
their opinions vary on things like sharia law. They are straight
talkers, easily infuriated by the Javanese, who never seem to say
what they mean. And whether they want autonomy or full independence,
and whatever they feel about the use of violence, they loathe the
Indonesian army.

Since that army is determined to stay in Aceh, President Wahid is
not going to find it easy to bring peace to the region. Some
Acehnese, to be sure, are tired of the violence. But many others are
as staunch as ever in their demand for independence: a rally in
November assembled tens of thousands of people in a province with a
population of only 4.3m.

Mr Wahid's policy is basically to promise the Acehnese everything he
can short of full independence. It is not much use talking vaguely
about autonomy, since Aceh is already one of Indonesia's two
"special autonomous regions" (the other is Yogyakarta, in central
Java). Mr Wahid has to be specific. So he is offering to let Aceh
keep a much bigger share of the money it earns from its huge
supplies of oil and gas; a law passed last year has already taken a
step in that direction. He also says that the central government
will help to reinvigorate the island port of Sabang, which was
choked off by the Suharto regime in an attempt to bring Aceh to its

More money, though, will not be enough to win the Acehnese over.
They also want clear evidence that Mr Wahid is willing and able to
bring the army under control. There are some signs of progress.

The new government's human-rights minister, Hasballah Saad, comes
from Aceh. He promises to hold the army accountable for past acts of
violence. The first small step came in May, when a military-civilian
court sentenced two dozen soldiers to prison terms of up to ten
years for killing an Islamic teacher and 56 students in a raid on a
boarding school in West Aceh. They said they were only following
orders. As they were driven away after their conviction, they sang
patriotic songs. The officers who gave them their orders have not
yet been tried.

The president's attempt to end the war in return for something less
than full independence is not necessarily doomed to failure. Many
Islamic teachers in the rural parts of Aceh, and their students, are
inclined to trust this scholarly Muslim. A lot of Aceh's women are
tired of the fighting. But plenty of other Acehnese are unwilling to
compromise. They say there is no basic difference between the new
Indonesia and the old one, and that Aceh is different from both.
They want a referendum on independence like East Timor's, nothing

Even if a majority of Acehnese can be persuaded to make peace now in
return for a generous ration of autonomy, many Indonesians worry
that in the end this will only increase their desire to go their own
entirely separate way. But the government has little choice. Its
best hope is to stop the killing for a decade or so, give the
Acehnese a chance to earn a decent living—and then see if they are
willing to remain at least loosely a part of Indonesia.

The danger of changing names
It will be just as hard to appease the people of West Papua, at the
other end of the archipelago. Until last year, West Papua—annexed by
Indonesia in 1969—had been known as Irian Jaya. The word Irian is
widely, if wrongly, believed by Indonesians to be an acronym for the
phrase meaning "Join the Republic of Indonesia Against the
Netherlands". So, when Mr Wahid approved the change of name, many
people thought he was willing to recognise West Papua's
There are several differences between West Papua and Aceh. The West
Papuans have a much higher proportion of Christians, which arguably
gives them an extra reason for wanting to leave predominantly Muslim
Indonesia. They are also Melanesians, and the overt racism they
suffer at the hands of other Indonesians may also have its effect.
But many of the province's 2m people live in scattered hill
communities, far apart and separated by forbidding mountains. Given
this fragmentation, it is hard to measure the support for

It certainly has plenty of supporters in Jayapura, the capital, and
in a handful of other towns. Much of its strength comes from the
tough-minded vigour of Theys Eluay, the unelected leader of West
Papua's independence movement. A week before a long-awaited congress
to rally support for independence, Mr Eluay was sitting in a hotel
room in Jayapura, going over the passenger list of that day's Garuda
flight to Jakarta. Mr Eluay had heard that some of his people,
bribed by the army, were heading for Jakarta to lobby against the
congress. Although Garuda is Indonesia's state airline, few people
in Jayapura can resist Mr Eluay. He was able not only to lay his
hands on the passenger list, but also to send a bunch of his
security men to prevent more than a dozen people from boarding the
flight. The same thing happened the next day.

President Wahid, who had planned to address the congress, changed
his mind at the last moment. He also said that a specific
declaration of independence would not be tolerated. However, he made
a small donation to the congress, on the ground that people should
be free to discuss politics. His ambiguity left an opening. The
congress ended on June 4th by endorsing a vague commendation of
independence, but said that its main goal was to "clarify the
history" of West Papua.

The most beloved date in that history is December 1st 1961. On that
day, though they were still under Dutch rule, the West Papuans
raised a new flag and declared their independence. Among those
watching, runs the dreamy local story, was a young man from Ghana
called Kofi Annan. Unfortunately for the Papuan patriots, the world
paid no attention. In 1963 the Dutch agreed to hand over control of
their colony to Indonesia. The handover officially took place in
1969, after a promised referendum was fixed by the Indonesians in
their own favour. Three decades later, West Papua is still part of
Indonesia—and Kofi Annan is secretary-general of the United Nations.
A lot of West Papuans would love him to drop in, for real this time,
to watch their flag go up.
Devolve, but do it right
-- The middle way between forced unity and total disintegration is
filled with potholes

ACEH and West Papua, which are growling for independence, and East
Timor, which has already broken away, have felt the Indonesian army'
s boot more than most other parts of the country. But the two
remaining growlers are different in another way, too. They are among
a small group of Indonesian provinces which put far more money into
the central government's pocket than they get back from it. Many
other provinces break roughly even. Some, such as East and West Nusa
Tenggara, would be even poorer than they are without the help they
get from the centre. These economic differences have to be added to
all the other sorts of diversity that criss-cross the map of

There is an urgent political lesson to be drawn from this. A country
like Indonesia, which consists of thousands of islands spread over
an area almost the size of the United States, and whose people are a
religious, ethnic and economic jumble, cannot possibly be governed
as a single entity. If it does not devolve, it will not work. It is
no good for Indonesian politicians to argue that the place ought to
be considered a single entity because it was born out of the old
Dutch East Indies. A country assembled by imperial force will have
to go on being held together by dictatorial force unless its
different regions are given something to persuade them that it is
worth staying together. Like many other parts of the post-cold-war
world, Indonesia must look to the concept of autonomy—of devolving
power to its constituent areas—if the cracking noise is not to grow
even louder.

Even under the Suharto dictatorship, a certain degree of flexibility
was accepted as necessary. But, dictatorships being dictatorships,
the flexibility became an instrument of corruption. Development
money, for instance, was distributed through a process which
theoretically gave local areas more responsibility but then in
practice denied it to them. Each area submitted its proposed list of
projects, but the amount of money each received depended on how many
of its projects won approval in Jakarta. Mr Suharto's friends duly
made sure the Jakarta decisions served their interests, and local
officials duly shaped their proposals to fit in with the system.

The post-Suharto government, hearing the regions' clamour for more
of everything, is trying to sort matters out. Before last year's
election the outgoing parliament passed a couple of decentralisation
laws, one giving local governments more financial autonomy, the
other giving them authority to provide services which had previously
been outside their sway. Originally, the two laws were due to take
effect in 2001, but President Wahid has speeded things up; the
handover should now take place by the end of this year.

The trouble is that the bodies to which the laws devolve these
powers are not Indonesia's 27 provinces but its 350 or so kabupaten,
or districts. The outgoing Suharto parliament presumably feared that
giving the power to potentially serious political units like the
provinces might start Indonesia down the road to becoming a federal
state, thereby diminishing the power of Jakarta. Giving it to those
pipsqueaks would be much safer.

In fact, it creates two large dangers. One is that the little
districts will not have enough competent people to use their new
powers efficiently. The non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that
have come from abroad to help Indonesia say they will try to provide
the necessary training, but the task is huge and time is short. Or
some of the civil servants working in the district might be
transferred from central to local control; the local planning
agencies, or bappedas, usually have a couple of people who know what
's what. But it is the district governments that will have to decide
this, and local patronage and local resentments could get in the

The second danger is that the districts' mayors and assemblies will
try to extract a lot of new taxes from people whose votes they don't
need: meaning people from outside their districts, who just happen
to be passing through. Gary Goodpaster, the head of the Partnership
for Economic Growth, which supervises several American aid
operations, gives the example of a five-hour drive across the South
Sulawesi peninsula in the course of which lorry-drivers were
required to stop no fewer than 20 times to pay taxes to various
authorities. The Jakarta parliament has passed a measure trying to
prevent such distortions, but the rules remain unclear and many
local governments plan to test their limits.

The Wahid government, recognising these dangers, has attempted to
limit the damage. The new laws cannot take effect without
"implementing orders". Mr Wahid's minister for regional autonomy,
Ryaas Rasyid, says the president has asked him to use these orders
as a way of handing some powers over from the districts to the
provinces of which they are part. The notion is sensible. But there
are limits to what Mr Ryaas can do in this way. The risk remains of
leaving too much power in tiny hands.

The Minahasa squeeze
As an example of what could happen, look at the trouble a subsidiary
of an American mining company, Newmont, has had with the Minahasa
district in North Sulawesi. Taking advantage of a clause in Newmont'
s contract which said that it must pay tax on anything of value,
Minahasa tried to tax the company for the "overburden"—soil, stones
and other debris—it removed in the course of digging for ore. In
fact, most of the overburden was waste. The rest was used by Newmont
for building roads as part of a voluntary community-development
scheme. At first Newmont refused, and matters got worse when a local
court then ordered the mine to be shut down. Newmont eventually
settled the dispute by agreeing to pay about $500,000 in taxes for
the overburden it had used for the roads.
Richard Ness, the head of Newmont's operations in Indonesia, says
that, although the dispute took up a lot of his time and energy, it
did have some encouraging aspects. The central government followed
things closely, and offered to lend a hand. (Mr Ness asked it to
keep out because he wanted to remain on good terms with the local
government, and because he wished to carry out the full legal
process so as to limit the danger of future attempts to twist
Newmont's contract.) And, when the local court issued its order to
close the mine, the Supreme Court immediately squashed it.

But the Minahasa business suggests that, in many places, there are
not enough local means of keeping troublemaking politicians under
control. In Jakarta, the politicians have to face a newly pugnacious
press and television and some tough NGOs. Out in the sticks, there
are fewer constraints.

One local NGO that has followed the Newmont case is Wanuata Waya
("The earth belongs to us"), run by Andry Umboh and Meidy Sumerah,
an environmental scientist and a mechanical engineer in their early
30s who teach local people things such as better fishing techniques.
Having followed the Newmont dispute closely, the two men reckon the
company can have a clear conscience.

They have examined the studies of its handling of the environment,
and are satisfied that it is currently obeying international norms.
They also agree with studies which show that small-scale local
miners do far more damage to the environment (just as, in some parts
of Indonesia, coral reefs are blasted with dynamite by local
fishermen, or carved up for building materials).

Still, Mr Umboh and Mr Sumerah are depressed about the bigger NGOs
in the area, which in their opinion "don't care about the benefits
Newmont brings to the local community". They are glad that the local
government failed in its bid to get its hands on Newmont's
community-development fund. They are not convinced that Newmont
always knows what it is doing with the money; but they trust it far
more than they trust the local authorities. The two young men are
right to be wary. If devolution is going to work properly in
Indonesia, it will have to be done in a less slapdash way than this.

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News")
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Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] 244 HIV cases in Merauke
Date: 7/7/00 5:20:37 PM Central Daylight Time

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The Jakarta
Across the Archipelago
July 08, 2000
244 HIV cases in Merauke

JAYAPURA, Irian Jaya: Merauke regent Jhon Gluba Gebze disclosed on
Friday that there had been 244 recorded Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) cases in the province until July this year.

The regent said that 47 people had contracted full blown Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). He added that 65 of the HIV
victims had died of the condition.

The regent said the local government would intensify its campaign to
stop the spread of the disease.

However he refused to close down bars and prostitution centers in
the regency, saying he did not believe such a move was an effective
measure, Antara reported. (prb)

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News")
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Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] US warns citizens of security risk in RI
Date: 7/7/00 5:20:48 PM Central Daylight Time

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Indonesian Observer
Saturday, July 08 - 2000
US warns citizens of security risk in RI

JAKARTA (IO) — The United States has warned its citizens in
Indonesia to avoid places considered perilous, the Department of
State said in a statement issued in New York on Thursday.

"Political activities, demonstrations and brutality in Jakarta are
on the rise currently and may continue until the August annual
session of the People's Consultative Assembly," it said as reported
by Antara.

In October 1999, President Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president
following the first free, democratic elections in more than 40

While the new government vowed to reduce tension and unrest,
violence has continued in some regions. Security forces have also
found it increasingly difficult to maintain law and order.

In Ambon, capital of the Maluku islands, serious sectarian clashes
broke out in January 1999 and have since spread to other parts of
the province, the statement said.

Violence in the region forced the Indonesian government to declare a
state of civil emergency in Maluku and North Maluku provinces,
effective June 26.

"US citizens, therefore, should not visit Maluku and North Maluku,
and those that are still there should leave the region immediately,"
it said.

Although anti-Christian sentiments have not spread to other areas,
the religious clashes in Maluku have also led to tension between
Muslims and Christians in other regions.

In addition to Maluku, US citizens should not visit Aceh and Irian
Jaya, the statement added.

Changes in the political environment here have encouraged separatist
aspirations in Irian Jaya and Aceh, while the violence that erupted
in Aceh, also targeted US companies based in the region.

In Irian Jaya, although the frequency of violent attacks had
diminished, the Indonesian government was still barring officials
from the US as well as other foreign countries from visiting the
province, the statement said.

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News")
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Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Sea of trouble
Date: 7/7/00 5:20:55 PM Central Daylight Time

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Sydney Morning Herald
News Review
Saturday, July 8, 2000
Sea of trouble
-- The five Melanesian states and territories tie up Canberra's
diplomatic and defence resources out of all proportion to their size
and population, writes Hamish McDonald - and many critics say it's
still not enough.

If we are the deputy sheriff in this part of the Pacific, our patch
is crowded with perhaps the world's most wildly diverse and divided
peoples, intensely suspicious of outside intrusions.

Melanesia (the word comes from the ancient Greek for "black
islands") includes the independent states of Papua New Guinea, the
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and the self-governing French
territory of New Caledonia, over 1,000 language groups among just
5.9 million people, and a host of internecine disputes that can lay
dormant for decades and then erupt in savage violence.

Throw in Papua (formerly Irian Jaya), the western half of New Guinea
island now chafing under Indonesian rule, and you have another 2.3
million people and 254 languages, in land and seas containing
immense resources of oil, gas, gold, copper, timber and fish.

The basic political drives in this region are fear and attachment:
fear of being displaced by outsiders, as were the Aborigines and
Maori, or by aggressive neighbours; attachment to land.

This is why the Fijian psyche is still too weak to stand an ethnic
Indian prime minister, why the Isatabu warriors of Guadalcanal took
on the Malaitan settlers, why PNG has put off building a highway
from the Highlands to Port Moresby.

Melanesia's intricate problems require long and devoted negotiation
and highly creative accords, such as the Burnham meetings in New
Zealand which led to the Bougainville accord and its risky unarmed
peacekeeping mission by Australian and other regional troops, and
the 1988 Matignon accord which started reconciling New Caledonia's
Kanaks and settlers.

Canberra has 43 diplomats stationed in Melanesia, augmented by
Defence and AusAid representatives. Some 28 other officials watch
the South Pacific in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT), plus two specialists in the Office of National Assessments
(ONA), six in the Defence Intelligence Organisation, and five in the
Defence Department.

Yet constantly, it seems, we are surprised by dramatic developments
in the region: the Fiji coups in 1987 and this year, the
Bougainville war, the arrival of Sandline mercenaries in PNG in
1997, and the Solomons coup last month by the Malaitan Eagles.

Has the Federal Government, as the Opposition charges, taken its
"eye off the ball"? Seduced by the glamour of the big power games
and economic pictures of Asia, are we shirking the burden of
regulating and developing our more humble backyard?

DFAT officials point out that the department does send its top
people to regional capitals, and its missions are strongly staffed.

Then there is receptivity at home base. Regional specialists tend to
agree that DFAT and AusAid have not kept up their "institutional
memory" on this complex region.

Staff are rotated too frequently, reports buried in files, and the
practice of regular consultation with academic and other experts,
followed in the 1980s, has lapsed.

While heads of missions tend to want to avoid being labelled
pessimists and like to send good news back to Canberra, departments
have a hard job interesting their ministers until the shooting
starts. The notorious ONA brief prepared before a South Pacific
foreign and economic ministers meeting in 1997, accidentally leaked
to the press, showed the extent to which officials felt they had to
spice their reports with scandal to get them read at all.

While diplomats do report gathering malaise, the tiny, low-tech
scale on which trouble starts in the Pacific can often defy
detection by outside intelligence systems. Two months ago, George
Speight was just a blowhard at the Suva golf club.

By contrast, Sandline was an indisputable intelligence failure for
Canberra. But it was his army's revolt and a popular backlash, much
more than the jawboning by a senior DFAT mission, which got the then
PNG Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, to retreat.

Short of acting like the US in Grenada and Panama, Canberra has to
let the sovereign countries in the region reach their own solutions,
unless invited to intervene, and even then it is wary of
perpetuating dependency on its aid.

This approach has worked in PNG, at times with held breath. After
coming close to complete lawlessness a year ago, the country has
pulled out of its economic nosedive through the tough policies of
its Prime Minister, Sir Mekere Morauta, and the international
support he has regained.

The Solomons is a different case again. Prime Minister Bartholomew
Ulufa'alu, whom Canberra had welcomed to clean up the corrupt legacy
of the previous Solomon Mamaloni government, pleaded for outside
police assistance. Canberra offered money and logistics, but no
peacekeepers, and then Fiji's offer fell through with the Speight
coup. Two weeks later, Nori toppled Ulufa'alu and seized control of

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News")
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Date: 7/7/00 2:58:53 AM Central Daylight Time
From: (Anne Noonan)

from AWPA

SBS Dateline , first shown 5/7/00

MARK WORTH: In the backblocks of West Papua's capital, Jayapura, the
country's champion of independence, Chief Theys Eluay, inspects the
guard of honour that's training to deliver his country - and his people
- to freedom. Just 600km from East Timor, this, too, is a struggle to
break away from Indonesia. And just like East Timor, the push for
freedom is giving birth to violent militia gangs.

Villagers are now moving from the mountains to the city to help defend
Papuans from pro-Jakarta thugs. These highlanders in traditional dress
have come down to attend the West Papuan People's Congress. They will
return to their villages to establish their own pro-independence
militia, or 'satgas' - Indonesian for 'taskforce'. While these people
only have bows and arrows, in the cities, the movement is much more

Satgas Papua was formed in response to pro-Indonesian militia called
Satgas Merah Putih, the Red and White Taskforce. These are two members
of Satgas Merah Putih, caught and beaten up after they attacked
independence supporters.

COMMANDO JOHN, SATGAS PAPUA: These Merah Putih are being used to defend
autonomy. Wherever their militia operate, they try to obstruct ours. Not
only Papuans but non-Papuans support them in their struggle. They
obstruct us and they're provocateurs in this struggle. Just yesterday,
we burnt down their house in Weinas. These people are being used by
Indonesia, by the government and the army to block the struggle for
Papuan independence.

MARK WORTH: Both militia groups now claim thousands of members. We
travelled three hours west of Jayapura to see how Satgas Papua was
organising itself in the bush. This chief is the traditional leader of
Tami Mamberano village, in an area once patrolled by Free West Papua
rebels, known as the OPM.

COMMANDO JOHN: Every district co-ordinators has 2-3 platoons of
militia. In every district, there are 2-3 platoons. In our whole area,
we have 10,000 militia. Their job is to guard the political leaders and
keep them safe from harassment. They do drills every day, they practice
marching and practice guarding towns and people from various sorts of
harassment. Is the Satgas Papua the new OPM? It's the OPM, not the new
OPM. It is the OPM.

MARK WORTH: The OPM, or the Free West Papua Movement, has been waging
a hit-and-run war against Indonesian occupation of West Papua for
nearly 40 years. Its rebirth in the form of Satgas Papua now sees
militia cells operating to the west, in Fak Fak and Nabire; to the
south, in Merauke and Timika; and in Jayapura to the north - a total
membership of 20,000.

generation. We are mobilising people that at any time we can equip with
one man, one gun for fighting, because our struggle for independence
cannot come through without fighting and diplomacy.

MARK WORTH: It's not surprising that Indonesia wants this low-tech
rebellion put down. And to do that, the military is using the same
tactics it employed in East Timor - covertly nurturing pro-Jakarta
militia and sending them in to fight their neighbours.

Louis Kambuaya was the deputy leader of the Golkar Party in West Papua
under the Suharto regime. Now, he can speak freely about how the
Indonesian government is using the same tactics here as it did in East
Timor - even flying in the same intelligence specialists to put down
this independence movement.

LOUIS KAMBUAYA: The key person that now the leader of the Irian Jaya
province, is the Governor, General Musiran. He is known as an intel man
who can make anything happen. This governor came from East Timor.

MARK WORTH: The Indonesian military divides and conquers by paying one
side to fight the other. Pro-independence Commando John has extracted
details about Indonesian military payments to the Red and White
Taskforce, or Satgas Merah Putih. Commando John claims these two
pro-Indonesian militia were paid by ABRI, the Indonesian military.

COMMANDO JOHN: I'd like to explain a little. No-one in the Papuan
independence struggle is paid. The militia and everyone else earn their
own living. If they work for the Indonesians, these guys get a wage.
They're not paid peanuts. They get billions of rupiah for sabotaging our
struggle. But these men we're guarding are Papuans. We've brought them
here to advise them, to educate them to support the struggle, not to
give up the struggle.

MARK WORTH: Tonight, Dateline can show where some of those wages come
from. These documents - leaked from the Indonesian military - show
payment delivered in the form of inducements to lure Papuans into the
ranks of the pro-Jakarta mob.

Their reward for siding against the independence movement included
trips from West Papua to the bars and bright lights of Jakarta,
complete with a new wardrobe of clothing in classic tropical chic.

One group had 22.8 million rupiah allocated to purchase safari suits,
2 million rupiah for pocket money and 10 million rupiah to buy souvenirs
on their visit to Jakarta. The grand total for these and other expenses
on this field trip - 875,602,500 rupiah. That's more than $175,000
Australian, and all of it approved by the regional military chief for
West Papua's Trikora command, Major-General Albert Ingkiriwang.

Not only are pro-Jakarta supporters being seduced by the gifts and
riches - someone is giving them guns as well. Commando John is not
prepared to say where the guns are coming from, but if the Indonesian
Army is prepared to fork out over $175,000 for a junket to Jakarta, one
can only speculate.

COMMANDO JOHN: They're in the process of getting guns at the moment.
Right now, the Merah Putih are using people like youth leaders, tribal
leaders, traditional leaders, church leaders and people in government.
They've got people in the regional parliament, at district and
provincial level.

MARK WORTH: Do the Merah Putih work directly with the TNI?

COMMANDER JOHN: Some TNI were involved directly with the militias, but
we took care of them a couple of weeks ago. Our militia has taken care
of them.

MARK WORTH: Being "taken care of" is a euphemism for payback, and
that's the worry - as the militias grow, so does the violence.
Independence supporter Commando Paulus was travelling from Jayapura to
Santani when he was set upon by pro-Jakarta thugs.

COMMANDO PAULUS: We were stopped on the road by the Merah Putih and
they slashed me with a machete.

MARK WORTH: Where was this?

COMMANDER PAULUS: They attacked me in Weanas. They blocked our way,
then they forced us to get out of the car. One of the Merah Putih came
at me with a machete and slashed my arm and my head and here.

MARK WORTH: But these people are the victims of the worst
anti-independence militia violence so far. Four months ago, they fled
their town of Fak Fak after pro-Indonesian Merah Putih thugs went on the
attack, aided by Indonesia's mobile police brigade, Brimob.

MAN: They once broke into my house and ransacked it. They took the
flag and my files and we've never found them. This is my wife - she was
a victim. They came in through the door and the windows as if there was
a war on.

SECOND MAN: They arrived in the village and ransacked our houses. They
took our belongings and smashed all the windows. Trunks they couldn't
open they hacked at with machetes. They shot at the crucifix and our
Morning Star flag. They bundled it up, threw it on the ground and
trampled on it. And the same with the Koran. They tore the Koran up and
threw it away.

And the rice - a few tonnes of rice got... Some they wet, some they
mixed with Rinso and some with kerosene or petrol. They left it there or
threw it into the sea. They shot all the chickens and the dogs.

MARK WORTH: Pro-independence Satgas Papua wants to avenge these
wrongs. But if the struggle isn't complicated enough, now the freedom
fighters have been offered support from the most unexpected quarter of
all - a terror group that would normally be their mortal enemy, the
Permuda Pancacila.

This contingent of Permuda Pancacila tried desperately to stir up
trouble in the Indonesian Parliament at the time of the fall of
President Suharto in 1998. The group was used as a political tool by
former president Suharto to provoke riots and attack his rivals. Permuda
Pancacila's support of Satgas Papua is seen as a ploy by Jakarta to
infiltrate and control the independence movement.

Yorris Raweyai is the deputy chairman of Permuda Pancacila.

There's now talk of setting up of Satgas Merah Putih in Fak Fak and
Jayapura. Do you know where the backing is coming from for that, at all?

won't comment on that, because that's a sensitive issue about Satgas
Merah Putih and Satgas Papua. But I'll hope that our government don't
try to make a pressure situation.

MARK WORTH: There are a lot of Irianese people in Permuda Pancasila.
Do you think they will go across Satgas Papua?

YORRIS RAWEYAI: Maybe. It depends on everybody.

MARK WORTH: It depends on Papuans.

YORRIS RAWEYAI: If they think they are Papuanese, they must join in.

MARK WORTH: And how do you feel yourself, as an Indonesian? Do you
feel strong links with your Papuan background?

YORRIS RAWEYAI: Of course. I am Papuanese. (Laughs)

MARK WORTH: For many, Yorris is playing a double game, trading on his
Papuan background while trying to undermine the independence movement.
His loyalty to Jakarta has been richly rewarded, his home chock-full of
the spoils from a long career with the Indonesian regime.

Four weeks ago, the people of West Papua gathered in Jayapura for the
Papuan People's Congress. It was an act of defiance against Indonesia's
rule and a reaffirmation of Chief Theys Eluay's leadership of the
freedom struggle. These people believe Indonesia's annexation of West
Papua in the UN-sponsored Act of Free Choice was fraudulent and should
be overturned.

In 1969, just 1,025 men - hand-picked by Indonesia - voted for
Indonesia's annexation of West Papua. The other 800,000 West Papuans
went unheard - now, they've been given a voice.

The Congress formed a West Papuan government-in-waiting, frightening
Australia into declaring its continued recognition of Papua's
integration with Indonesia. But it did nothing to dampen friction
between the warring West Papua militia. And even here, the
pro-Indonesian thugs were hard at work.

BROTHER THEO, HUMAN RIGHTS WORKER: They caught eight people who tried
to bring their bombs and guns into the Congress venue. We are very
angry, because we heard that it's very dangerous about their condition.
Maybe they are dead or full of wounds in their body, we don't know what.
The Satgas Papua don't like people of West Papua trying to make militia

MARK WORTH: Brother Theo is a volunteer with the West Papua human
rights group ELSHAM. For the past 12 months, he's been documenting
militia activity from both sides.

BROTHER THEO: I think it's dangerous because of these two kinds of
satgas. You know the Satgas Papua is made by local people. Their
background of life is very different than Satgas Merah Putih.

MARK WORTH: The day after the People's Congress, the pro-Jakarta Merah
Putih ran rampant through the Jayapura suburb of Waenas. Mr Sakom is a
Christian Sumatran who has lived in West Papua for the past 25 years.
During the militia rampage, his shops were doused in petrol and set

MR SAKOM, RESIDENT: 450 million rupiah is gone. I've scrimped and
saved and put money in the bank. But I like living in Irian. I like the
people here. I don't know why it happened, but I think it was
differences of opinion. I think the Papuans were very angry when they
did this.

BROTHER THEO: We can see the case in Fak Fak. From there, we can see
that there is something like the militia in East Timor trying to be
created in West Papua.

MARK WORTH: Many believe the split between Indonesia and West Papua
can be resolved by restaging the so-called Act of Free Choice'.

LOUIS KAMBUAYA: We are really fighting based on ideology. That we are
Melanesian by origin and Indonesian by an expansionism is an accident.
The Act of Free choice is totally no choice, and it is at a point where
West Papua will win. If necessary, we'll do the Act of Free Choice
again, but one man, one vote.

MARK WORTH: Just how long Indonesia can tolerate these scenes of civil
disobedience, these acts of free choice, is still not clear. The drive
for an independent West Papua has already claimed many lives, and the
footsoldiers in this battle are prepared to sacrifice even more to keep
their symbol of independence aloft and their dreams of a free land

Australia West Papua Association
Millers Point
Australia 2000


Subj: Papua
Date: 7/7/00 4:37:12 PM Central Daylight Time
From: (Anne Noonan)

>From AWPA

Sydney Morning Herald 8/07/00

Lindsay Murdoch

Seven Papuan leaders ushered into the presidential palace this week were
surprised with the reception they received
from Abdurrahman Wahid.

"The President welcomed us," said Tom Beanal, a co-leader of the
delegation that had travelled from Indonesia's
far-eastern province, formerly called Irian Jaya.

Wahid listened intently as the men reported on a landmark congress in
the province's capital, Jayapura, in late May,
where 2,700 delegates renewed calls for secession. But the delegates
were careful not to tell the President that
Papuans had declared their independence, an act regarded as treason in

Instead they spelt out how the congress rejected a 1969 United
Nations-supervised "act of free choice" and restated
that Papuans obtained their freedom on December 1, 1961. Splitting
hairs, maybe, but their presentation was
conciliatory enough for Wahid to agree to ongoing talks on the
province's future.

"The President committed to holding a dialogue for the best solution of
Papua," said Willy Mandowen, one of the
delegates from the Papuan presidium council.

But agreeing to talk appears to be the only point of agreement between
Wahid's administration and the majority of
Papuans from 254 indigenous tribes which the council represents.

Only swift and decisive action by Wahid will avoid trouble in Papua.

The congress decided unanimously to campaign internationally and in
Indonesia for the province's independence.
This lifted already high expectations among a majority of the 2.5
million people in the province that independence
was imminent.

But the Government, struggling to maintain stability amid a series of
crises, knows it would be committing political
suicide if it were to allow Papua to break away.

Most observers believe that if an East Timor-style referendum were held
in Papua, the majority would support
independence. Papuans hold deep-seated resentment at the arrival of
non-indigenous newcomers who now dominate
business and hold the best jobs in the regional government.

After decades of the central government's ripping off the province's
rich natural resources and its repressive rule,
people at the congress made it clear they wanted independence and would
fight for it.

Indonesian military-backed militias similar to those that caused mayhem
in East Timor last year are starting to
operate in the west of the province.

Among many of Papua's tribal people a cargo-cult-like thinking exists
that independence arrives with the raising of
the Morning Star, the flag of the province's independence movement.

Wahid is treading warily. He has ordered the stepping up of development
programs, replaced hardline military and
police commanders, allowed the province to be officially called Papua
and agreed to let the people fly the Morning
Star as long as it is together with and below the Indonesian flag.

Wahid is right in keeping the lines of communication open with the
Papuan leaders. One of the most immediate
challenges for the Government is the successful implementation of
radical laws providing wide regional autonomy to
the provinces.

Under the laws introduced last year by former president B.J. Habibie,
the regions will be permitted to keep most of
the revenue from natural resources such as forestry and mining.

But the extent to which autonomy will satisfy the demands of the Papuans
will not be known until after it is
introduced next year. In the meantime, Papua will remain one of the
country's flashpoints.


Australia West Papua Association
Millers Point
Australia 2000


Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] LNG sale to China, India to begin soon
Date: 7/7/00 5:20:57 PM Central Daylight Time

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Indonesian Observer
Saturday, July 8 - 2000
LNG sale to China, India to begin soon

JAKARTA (IO) — President Abdurrahman Wahid yesterday announced two
foreign countries would soon be importing natural gas from

President Wahid, mor popularly as Gus Dur, said India would be
supplied with natural gas produced in East Kalimantan, while China
would draw its supplies from the Tangguh field in Irian Jaya.

Speaking at a function marking the inauguration of a PT Pupuk Kaltim
urea fertilizer factory in Bontang, the president said that while
importers in both countries could make direct contact with the
Indonesian companies concerned, they should also consult the Mines
and Energy Minister and Pertamina, the state-owned oil and gas

Gus Dur was accompanied by Investment and State Enterprises Minister
Rozy Munir and East Kalimantan Governor Suwarna Abdul Fatah, Antara
reported from Bontang.

On the same occasion, the president also inaugurated a new
ammonia-based fertilizer factory belonging to PT Kaltim Pacific

PT Pupuk Kaltim President Director Syaiful Amir said the new
urea-based fertilizer factory had an annual production capacity of
570,000 tons, bringing the company's total annual output to 2.4
million tons.

Gus Dur later asked the state-run fertilizer company to step up its
research and development activities to find a new fertilizer formula
capable of providing a significant increase in the country's rice

Gresik-based PT Petrokimia in East Java recently created a new
fertilizer capable of lifting rice production from five to nine tons
per hectare, he explained.

If Indonesia failed to pursue research into high-yield rice
varieties, it would lose its competitive edge to other countries
when it came meeting the domestic need for rice, he said.

Timber smuggling
President Wahid also called on local authorities in East Kalimantan
to heed the development of areas bordering the Malaysian states of
Sarawak and Sabah to prevent an increase in timber smuggling.

The smuggling of logs from the region has seen Indonesia sustain
losses of more than Rp5 billion over the last ten years, with the
latest case constituting a major controversy with neighbor,

Loggers detained recently by Indonesian police claim they were
backed by Malaysian military personnel.

The Malaysian government has denied the allegation.

Meanwhile East Kalimantan Governor Suwarna Abdul Fatah in his report
to the president said the provincial administration would apply
resort if approach in which security of forests is carried out by
security authorities in conjunction with locals.

"We have reached agreement with the provincial office of the
Forestry and Plantation ministry to deal with log theft using a
"resortif" approach," Gov. Suwarna said.

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News")
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Subj: Indonesia repeats warning to Papuan freedom leaders
Date: 7/7/00 4:25:34 PM Central Daylight Time
From: (Anne Noonan)

from AWPA

Radio Australia 8/7/00

Indonesia repeats warning to Papuan freedom leaders

The Indonesian government has again warned it will take stern measures
against any
attempt at secession by pro-independence leaders in the eastern-most
province of West Papua.

Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Alwi Shihab, says Jakarta will not
tolerate a separatist movement stemming from a resolution of
independence, issued last month by Papuan leaders.

Mr Shihab warned that any effort to subvert Indonesia's sovereignty over
West Papua and to
instigate separatism would face stern action by the government.

The Papuan People's congress, which ended in Jayapura on June 4th,
passed a resolution saying West Papua was a sovereign state. Indonesia's
President Abdurrahman Wahid says his government does not recognize the
congress, calling it illegitimate.

Australia West Papua Association
Millers Point
Australia 2000


Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Dutch Historical Research 'Act of Free Choice'
Date: 7/7/00 10:44:54 AM Central Daylight Time

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From: Grace Roembiak
To: Kabar Irian
Subject: Dutch Historical Research 'Act of Free Choice'

Translated from Dutch and abridged by Foundation Papuan Peoples (PaVo)
in Utrecht

Outline of Dutch Historical Research 'Act of Free Choice' (1969)

To: From:
The Chairman of the Lower House Ministry for Foreign Affairs
The Hague
Directorate Asia and Oceania
Department South-East Asia and Oceania
The Hague - Netherlands

Date: 29 June 2000

Dear Chairperson,

In reply to the request from your members Van Middelkoop and Van den
Berg (Lower House, deliberation on the budget for the Foreign Ministry,
9 December 1999) you herewith find the terms of reference for the
historical research into the (inter)national events surrounding the 'act
of free choice'. The research will be contracted to the Institute for
Dutch History.
>From these terms of reference it appears that parallel to the main
research, an additional project will be carried out, "Governing New
Once again, I want to emphasise that the aim of the research mentioned
is to give a historical overview of the events, not to discuss the
territorial integrity of Indonesia.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs

J. Van Aartsen

Proposal for a further study of the events around the 'act of free
choice' as articulated in the motion-Van Middelkoop.

A. The Official Documents Regarding The Dutch-Indonesian Relationship:
Current and Finalised Projects
[$B)(Jalmost 2 pages describe the on-going publication of sources regarding
the post-war situation in relation to the Dutch East Indies, the
Dutch-Indonesian Relationship - DIR]

B. Additional Project
Till so far the current and finalised parts of the DIR-project. By the
looks of it, it is likely that they answer to a high decree the issues
targeted by Van Middelkoop and others. They broadly document the
decolonisation-process in Indonesia and, as part of this, cover
developments in and relating to New Guinea.
A limitation of this approach is of course the fact that the
resource-publications and archive-guides have only a minor analytical
It maybe desirable for there to be a summarised overview which would
come to some conclusion and, if desired, outline new policy-decisions.
>From the conversation which took place between the Minister and the
Lower House one may conclude that for the moment not only a documentary
report but also a structured overview, and thereby a historical
judgement, is required regarding the developments around the transfer of
administration in New Guinea. Also, that it is hoped to obtain all this
in a reasonable short period of time.
In the light of this request, it should be possible, in the course of
the research, to do a study into the theme The Netherlands, the UN and
the right to self-determination of the Papuans.
[$B)(Jdescription of basic assumptions]

These basic assumptions lead to the following scheme:

The act of free choice: The Netherlands, the United Nations and the
right to self-determination of the Papuans.

I The Netherlands and the right to self-determination of the Papuans:
from Malino to the Bot-note.

II The role of America, Australia and the United Nations in the
Dutch-Indonesian conflict; the right to self-determination as bargaining
theme. The New York Agreement.

III The execution of the New York Agreement: the UNTEA administration,
mainly reconstructed form UN documents.

IV Reactions from the field: observations from Papuans and Dutch on the
spot about the transfer of administration and the UNTEA-administration.
Dutch involvement with Western New Guinea afterwards (development

V The 'Act of Free Choice': its implementation and the role of the UN
and of other directly involved powers. Position Dutch government and

VI Conclusion. Analyses of the role of all involved parties during the
course of the conflict, with emphasis on their appreciation of the right
to self-determination of the Papuans. The Netherlands, and the United
Nations the guardians of the right to self-determination?


The right to self-determination of the Papuans is the guide-line for
this proposal, yet it is embedded in its historical context. The final
realisation in the form of the 'act of free choice' was the result of
Dutch efforts for the right to self-determination within the
decolonisation-process, the Indonesian pursuit of a maximum unity, and
the attempts by the UN to come to a reconciliation of both positions
within the framework of its own idealistic basic assumptions, as laid
down in the Charter of the United Nations.
The framework for this 'act of free choice' is laid down in the New York
Agreement of 1962. The negotiations are described in Chapter II on the
basis of archive-research in the Netherlands, the United States/UN and
Australia. The developments leading up to it (chapter I) can be dealt
with rather roughly and are based upon the finalised
sources-publications and on the internal availability of data from the
current project (by the Institute of Dutch History) concerning the
Dutch-Indonesian relationship 1950-1963.
In this proposal the UNTEA administration (62/63) takes an important
position, because through UNTEA the United Nations took the
responsibility for the transfer of administration from the Dutch into
Indonesian hands, and thereby also for the further implementation of the
'act of free choice'. The flow of events during this interim
administration illustrates how far Indonesia and the UN were prepared
(and able) to transform agreements reached in New York into realistic
policy. In Chapter III this will be discussed from a UN-perspective. The
main source for this will be the UN archive. Chapter IV will deal with
the same question, but seen from the perspective of the Papuans and
direct involved Dutch civil servants. Next to archive-research,
interviews with those involved will present relevant source materials.
Chapter V deals with the way in which the Indonesian government in 1969
used the leeway given by the New York Agreement, the role of the UN in
this and the reactions from the Netherlands. Chapter VI (Conclusion)
contains an evaluation of the meaning of the right to self-determination
for the Papuans for all parties involved.

A study as indicated above should be written by one single researcher
since in this way the unity of questioning and analyses will be best
guaranteed. Therefore, from the Institute for Dutch History, Dr. P.J.
Drooglever is available on the basis of a half-time assignment for a
period of 3 years. For the other part he will remain in charge of the
supervision of the project resources-publication NIR 50-63 and the
execution of other affairs of the institute. Within these secondary
conditions it is possible to produce a summarised study, based on new
facts or rarely used materials, with a volume of ca.250 pages.
For quality control, IDH will from its side establish a monitoring
commission. Furthermore, there will ofcourse be a check after the
finalisation of the manuscript. This can be advanced by organising a
seminar at the time of the publication, in which aspects of the work
will be critically discussed by a diverse group of researchers.
The majority of the budget for this project will be used to pay the
salary of the post (1 scientific researcher for three years on the basis
of a half-time position). For archive research and the recording of
interviews, visits to the United States (UN), Indonesia and Australia
are necessary.


Foundation Study & Information Papuan Peoples - PaVo
P.O. Box 801, 3500 AV Utrecht, The Netherlands
phone:**31.30 2763088,fax.:**31.30 2321379

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News")
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Subj: After the West Papua Congress (6/6), Prospects for the Future
Date: 7/6/00 1:37:36 PM Central Daylight Time
From: mahdi@FHI-Berlin.MPG.DE (Waruno Mahdi)

Continued from 1. A Preliminary Appraisal
2. Rectifying History
3. From West New Guinea to West Irian
4. Is West Irian an Indonesian Colony?
5. Is West Irian Part of Indonesia?


The preceding sections have been principally concerned with investigating
all the verious circumstances that have a bearing on the central question
which one must answer first, before one can seriously consider any further
line of procedure or action. That question is, whether the oppressive regime
under which the West Papuans have been suffereing in for three and a half
decades was a colonialist one, or whether it was a military dictatorship.
The question is important, not from the point of view of purely academic
interest, but because the determination of a correst future policy for West
Papuans depends entirely upon correctly answering that question.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, all indications seem to lead to
the conclusion that West Irian cannot under reasonable considerations be
classified as a colony of Indonesia. But, like the rest of Indonesia, it
has suffered for three and a half centuries under a particularly vicious
military dictatorship. Nevertheless, due to some specific conditions,
particularly the delayed reunification into Indonesia in 1963 instead of
1949-1950, the subjective impression made by the brutalities of the regime
upon West Papuans was not one of military dicatorship, but of colonialist

It should be noted, however, that even if West Irian had been a colony of
Indonesia, it would not necessarily have had to secede as separate state.
Theoretically, there would still have been the (under the circumstances
perhaps rather unlikely) option of joining Indonesia as an equal.

On the other hand, the fact that it is actually not a colony of Indonesia
does not automatically exclude secession through a democratic and lawful
procedure as a viable option. So, even having answered the question, of
whether it is a colony or not, does not save us from also having to
decide between either secession from or continued integration in the
Republic of Indonesia. However, not being colonial dependents, West
Papuans as formally equal citizens have more rights and hence also more
bargaining leverage in negotiating a satisfactory solution with the
government, whether either secession or continued integration.

There are many factors which would let continued integration within the
Republic of Indonesia appear the most recommendable option. But most of
them are not so simply explained as that which was discussed in the
previous sections, firstly because I myself am less qualified to attempt
such explanations, and secondly because they involve matters on which
established views are even more diversified. So I will only concentrate
on a few more general macro-scale problems.

Before I do that, however, there is one point which one must bear in
mind, and that is the main factor that lets separation from Indonesia
appear imperative. The New Order regime has treated indigenous culture
of the West Papuans with the arrogance of conquistadores, pressuring
the population which they insultingly classified as "primitive" into
adopting the regime's notion of "civilisation". The military regime's
quite general contempt for human dignity in all its dealings with
civilian society had a particularly antagonising effect on West Papuans.

The main motive behind the West Papuan drive for separate independence
is therefore that of regaining their human dignity and salvaging the
individuality of their culture. Sufficient rationality to cope with
something like this in a politically pragmtic or balanced assessment
of relative priorities of interests can only be demanded from the
urban population with middle class associations. But egalitarian
communities of the interior with recent or partial hunter-gatherer
backgrounds have tradiitional ideologies based on the experience of
complete dependence on the for them magical, i.e. not rationally
fathomable providence of the natural environment. They will therefore
be predictably susceptible to messianistic cults of magical providence
like that of Cargo in East New Guinea (contrasted to more personality-
orientated messianistic cults in peasant movements in West Indonesia
or the world in general). The notion of "independence" has posibly
acquired for them such a magic quality as icon of deliverance from the
"pestilence" embodied by the regime.

Therefore, as a whole, the spiritual force of the idea of independence
is stronger than any rational arguments that may favour continued
adherrence to the Republic of Indonesia, so any concepts of retaining
West Irian in Indonesia based on these latter arguments will only have
a chance for realisation if they also adequately fulfill expectations
on sustainment of ethnic dignity and cultural individuality that underly
the drive for separate independence.

Now, let us consider some of those arguments.

Economically, West Irian is not only quite thoroughly integrated within
Indonesia with its entire infrastructure, but, for historical reasons,
it is still one of the least economically developed provinces (beside
perhaps East Nusa Tenggara). It may seem simple to separate West Irian
from the rest of Indonesia politically, but economically it would remain
substantially dependent on Indonesia. Just like Indonesia in the 1950s,
which discovered that independence merely meant transition from colonial
to neo-colonial dependence because key industries and vital elements of
the infastructure remained in Dutch hands, so also would a separated
West Papua remain economically dependent of Indonesia considerably more
than e.g. dependence of PNG in certain technical matters from Australia.

Integrated in a democratic Indonesia, West Papuans would retain various
political means of influencing central executive and legislative decisions,
particularly in view of increased autonomy of provinces presently being
developed. After all, as we have seen, West Irian is not a colony, but a
province, and its population can claim equal rights as normal citizens.
But as a separate state, it would have to lead all attempts at influencing
Jakarta's decisions having a bearing on West Papuan economic dependence
through conventional diplomatic channels.

Indonesia in the 1950s decided to free itself of its economic dependency
by nationalising Dutch companies. But unfortunately, Indonesia did not
yet have sufficiently trained specialists to run the companies, so that
the economic situation deteriorated even further, finally ending in
the political crisis which allowed Soeharto to usurp power. Analogical
problems will also hound a separate West Papua.

There is of course no law that reqires an independent West Papuan political
establishment to fall into the same pitfalls into which the Indonesians
had once blundered. But already the coexistence of an indigenous and a
culturally divergent immigrant population creates the potentials of
antagonisms we find for example in Fiji. Culture diversity not only
exists in comparison to immigrants. The range of indigenous diversity
alone, between northcoast mercantile traditions and egalitarian
hunter-gatherer communities, greatly exceeds that e.g. in PNG. And in
combination with influencing of local politicians by prosperous foreign
companies, this leads to a potentially even more explosive situation
than in the Solomons. What exploitation of rich resources can do one
could also see in Zaire (copper), Nigeria (oil), Sierra Leone (diamonds).
Being part of a large national formation like Indonesia would, under
conditions of a democratic state, provide greater security in dealing
with large companies.

So what? Does not everyone have a sovereign right to make their own
mistakes in their own fair chance for success or failure in pursuit of
happiness and prosperity?

Indeed, but, firstly, the West Papuans probably will not get a fair
chance. In view of international guarantees and reassurances supporting
continued integration within Indonesia, separation would have to be
fought out in a purely domestic political showdown with the government.
Even if that succeeds, and the military does not go on a rampage, a
fledgling West Papuan government would have to fulfill expectations
of almost messianistic dimensions from an extremely traumatised
population under conditions of total economic dependence.
One succeeded in sustaining unity at the West Papua Congress because
all were facing a common outside challenge. Once West Papua is
independent, that unifying factor would be gone. The point will come,
when the political class will see no other way than recourse to an
authoritarian regime (this happened just about everywhere in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, sometimes under far less compelling

Secondly, the West Papuans have actually already paid their entrance
fees, and should not be required to pay it a second time at a probably
even stiffer price. It is indeed "unfair", that West Papuans joined the
rest of Indonesia too late to take part in the "making of mistakes" in
the process of coming of age of Indonesia's political class. But it
came just in time to take a sizable share of the punishments for those
mistakes: the economic crisis of the 1960s, the brutalities of Soeharto's
military regime, ending in the economic crisis of the outgoing 1990s
still not yet ended till now. So it is actually entitled to share all
future dividends of the joint venture "Republic of Indonesia".

Now the West Papuans stand before a fork in the road. They can take the
long road to a future of stability which takes them once more through
all the perils they have actually already gone through, with no guarantee
that it will lead to success, or they can take the short road that is
open to them, where they also have no guarantee for success, but where
they are at least part of a much larger community with which to share
the risk. In case they decide to follow the first road, and insist on
secession, they would stand alone, facing the joint opposition of the
government and the remnants fo the old regime in the military and
burocracy. But in case they decide to take the short road to democracy
and stability, they would suddenly find a lot of allies: the government
and all reform and pro-democracy forces and particularly all other
ethnic groups with comparable problems in the country, all of which
would collectively face only one oponent: the remnants of the former
regime or so-called "status quo" faction. Which of the roads would be
more likely to lead to success?

To be able to take advantage of this shorter road, one has to solve
two problems.

Problem No. 1: The resolution of the West Papua Congress called for
secession of West Papua from Indonesia, and this was quite inevitable
for two reasons. The first, it was correct from a tactical point of
view, because anything less would not have sufficiently impressed the
political establishment in Jakarta to take the West Papuans seriously.
The second, even if the moderate leaders of the West Papuans may have
been tempted to touch a more comprimistic tone in the resolution,
the expectations of the hardliners in the Congress and of the tribesmen
from the mountains in the streets left no other choice, if unity was
to be maintained.

If one were to meet the government half way in future negotiations, one
would then have to sell this to those hardliners and tribesmen. For
this one must understand the reason for the adamant position of these
latter, it is that matter of human dignity and cultural individuality
already touched upon above. West Papuan middle class moderates are
culturally more adapted to national All-Indonesian modalities of life,
but it is the proples from the interior who have suffered particularly
badly from the inhuman culture policy of the regime.

Therefore, whether or not West Papuan moderates could agree to continued
integration in Indonesia depends not on their own will (which is probably
there). It depends on the government's capability of creating conditions
that would also make such a decission acceptable to the peoples of the
interior. These must be convinced of sustained future respect for their
dignity and cultural individuality.

An important step has already been done in this direction, and that is
the drive towards so-called "Papuanisation" of the administration and
services in the province. All government offices and resorts should be
encouraged to consult West Papuan personalities, activists, organisations
when seeking solutions for concrete problems. And finally, West Papuans
should also be more frequently employed in various services outside
Irian Jaya, and particularly in Jakarta.

Another absolutely imperative step should be rapid enactment of a law
against racism, tribalism, and religious sectarianism. Racial and
ethnic equality is guaranteed by the constitution, and all Indonesian
administrations since 1945 have abided by this at least with regard to
indigenous ethnic groups (unfortunately not also with regard to
non-indigenous ones) as something quite self-evident and not needing
any further debate. But this has proven not to be enough, because there
have been frequent acts of racism, tribalism, and religious intolerance.
We therefore need a law which criminalises each individual outbreak of
such acts, and determines sufficiently deterent punishments. Attacks
on West Papuan communities outside West Irian should face determined
official reprisal.

No officer or burocrat may in future insult a Papuan as "a primitive"
with impunity, but must be assured of immediate dishonourable discharge.
Every participation of any member of the apparatus in sectarian violence
of any kind should likewise lead to swift and inexorable punishment.
Commanding officers seeking to escape responsibility for systematic or
substantial transgressions of subordinates by claiming to have had no
knowledge of the developments should face inevitable demotion by two or
more ranks for reason of obvious incompetence and failure in duty.

In places where activities of foreign companies have led to clashes
with local ethnic groups, it must be guaranteed that the apparatus
will not function as the political or military arm of that company,
but will uphold the law and help the population in reaching reasonable
understanding with the company. In this, one must anticipate that local
officials will predictably face highly tempting pecunary incentives
from rich companies, and precautionary measures must become effective
before rather than after damage has been done, or at least swiftly
enough to avoid the even temporary public impression of their impunity.
Although this of course does not only concern West Irian, but precautions
are particularly important in this province.

Problem No. 2: Just as important as that care should be taken that the
West Papuan side will be in a situation that realistically encapacitates
it to reach an adequate political solution, so too must the government
attain such a situation. At present, this is not at all the case yet.

To be able to guarantee the conditions which would make it possible
for West Papuans to feel at home within an Indonesian unitary state,
the government must gain sufficient control over the state apparatus
to exclude further sabotage by so-called "rogue" structures of the
former military regime, but these are unfortunately still very much
intact, and in possession of ample resources and logistical networks.
This situation is creating a kind of vicious circle.

The most ridiculous aspect of the present constellation is that West
Papuans are standing face-to-face against the government that appears
to be on the same side of the fence as the rogue military, rather than
that West Papuans and the government were in the same boat facing up
to their common foe, the rogue military.

On one side, the rogue military is the collective foe of civil
government and of West Papuans, Acehnese, ethnic groups and peasants
reclaiming unlawfully expropriated lands, etc., etc. The most obvious
solution would be for all these to join forces and gang up against
that rogue military. Democracy and government by rule of the law
could then be erected quite efficiently. On the other side, the
government is the hostage of a state apparatus which is still
controlled to a significant extent by the rogue military and other
elements of the former regime. It is in certain sense like a mind
caught in the wrong body, or more exactly like a person whose hands
and feet have an adverse mind of their own.

The president has been remarkably successful in encroaching step by
step upon the influence of the rogue military, compelling them to
retreat ever further. He has now been stopped in his further advance
by the rogue military which suddenly regained some strength through
a strategy it already once successfully employed in 1965-1967.
It has found "useful suckers" to pull out the hot chestnuts out of
the fire for it. The rogue military has been able to incite some
opportunistic minor Muslim parties to block President Abdurrahman
Wahid (Gus Dur) from further steps towards democracy and generally
weakening his position. This is also seriously endangering prospects
of sustainment of territorial integrity of a unitary Indonesia.

Above I touched upon the coming of age of the Indonesian political
class. But Indonesia is large and non-homogenous in its state of
development. The New Order regime had disenfrachised broad layers
of society. The reopening of democratic opportunities of representation
also brought some immature political elements, mainly in some minor
Muslim parties, which have continuously been the source of disruptive
interferences into the reform process.

Already right after the elections of 1998, they tried to blackmail the
establishment into conceding them a larger number of parliamentary seats
than their share of the vote, by threatening not to endorse the results
of the elections (which required a unanimous vote). Subsequently, they
almost caused a crisis in the presidential elections, when the most
promising candidate of the democratic reform wing was a woman (Megawati
Soekarnoputri), by arbitrarily claiming that a woman as president was
in conflict with Islamic law. But beside the fact that the gender of
the president of a secular republic is not regulated by Islamic law,
the attempt to bar women from the office of president violates the
Indonesian Constitution.

With such opportunistic antics, those minority Muslim parties are
only demonstrating their immaturity, because they are actually sawing
away the very branch on which they are sitting.

In 1965-1967, the military did not risk openly moving forwards
itself to undermine and then topple the then President Sukarno.
In the countryside, they incited followers of national and muslim
parties to massacre communists and other leftists. In the cities
they got intellectuals and students to demonstrate against Sukarno
and to purge ministries and other government agencies, etc. But
when the dirty work had been done for them, and the military regime
felt securely in power, it in turn purged its recent allies it no
longer needed, to deprive them of a share in the new power structure.

The Muslim minority parties which are presently lending themselves as
the same kind of "useful suckers" to the rogue military and Soeharto's
crony circle should not believe that they will somehow fare better if
these latter should come to power again. The small parties owe their
existence to the process of democratisation, and will be the first to
succumb in case of a renewal of military dictatorship, because they
cannot mobilize the kind of mass followings that back the major
political parties. Their erratic behaviour is not getting any
appreciation abroad, so they can hardly count on help from there
when the military decides it no longer needs them.

Already now, the rogue military has managed to upset investigations
into the Tanjung Priok massacre of Muslim activists. This has only
been possible because of continuous efforts by the small Muslim parties
to destabilise Gus Dur's government. One can hardly wish for a more
convincing demonstration of how counterproductive this opportunistic
politicking is for own Muslim interests.

More important than perspectives for opportunist party functionaries
are the business interests that stand behind them. These are partly
aggressive expansionist local business interests that speculate on
short term windfall advantages from the opportunistic manoeuvres
that are making life difficult for the president. These are very
shortsighted schemes, because even illegal profits of the mafia
finally want to be invested in a legal established market in a stabile
legal financial environment, and this is not different for windfall
profits. Business in general, whether local or national-scaled, new
or well established, require democratic government with dependable
legal institutions. The opportunistic business circles behind
political manoeuvres aimed at destabilising the government are
therefore actually shooting their very selves in the foot.

Another part of those opportunistic business circles are apparently
tied either with economic enterprises of the army, or with businesses
of Soeharto's crony circle. This rogue capital is particularly difficult
to deal with, because they do not necessarily stand to lose in case of
a restoration of military dictatorship. But if they continue to cause
trouble to the government and thus sabotage the reform to democracy and
restoration of peace in the provinces, they leave the government no
other choice than to expropriate the wealth of the Soeharto clan and
crony circle, and to privatise army-owned businesses.

Already in the 1970s, army officers gained control of lands and businesses
in the provinces, greatly to the disadvantage of already established
local businesses and traditional landowners. Privatisation of military
businesses and investigations into illegally ammassed firtunes by army
officers could be channelled to bring advantage to local businesses,
which would bring good pointsd for the government. Clan and crony-owned
enterprises could be reappropriated in an analogical fashion if it
becomes evident that they are serving as means to undermine peace,
stability, and restoration of democracy.

One must bear in mind, that the democratic government has not yet been
finally established, but that the former regime is still far from having
been entirely liquidated. Political parties will only be able to take
full advantage of a free competition of opinions and policies when
democracy is fully established. Before that, many oppositional policies
would automatically benefit antidemocratic interests of restoring the
old regime and thus be subversive to democracy. It is for this reason,
that the government was formed as a coalition of all parties represented
in parliament. One must therefore constantly remember, that breaking out
of the coalition at this stage is "counter-reformation".

So far, the military as well as clan and crony circles have been
tenaciously resisting inverstigations into their involvement in past
crimes of corruption and violation of human rights. But there still is
another category of crimes that has not yet been even touched upon.
Continuous violations of human rights and corruption of local resources
has led to the acute danger of the country falling apart, and presently
still continuing incitement of violence in the provinces, particularly
in Maluku, is severly aggravating the situation. Therefore, the next
step for government investigations can already be based on charges of
treason. Rogue elements in the military will probably not be able to
rally inner solidarity from the ranks when charged with treason.

Success of the reform to democracy is a vital condition for the
preservation of national unity and continued integration of West Irian
and Aceh in the Republic of Indonesia. If the president does not succeed,
these two provinces will have no other choice than to force a separation
from the Republic. Because, however dubious their perspectives in case
of a separate development might be, remaining within an Indonesia in
which the army retains its extraordinary prerogatives and in which
democratic rules of government are not guaranteed would be for them
even more disastrous.

This series of discussions on the problems raised by the West Papua
Congress began with an appraisal of the organisation and immediate
results of that congress, in which the exceptionally high skill of
the organisers and their very valuable contribution to the general
process of democratisation as well as to the preservation of national
unity were noted. In the time between the writing of that first section
and the present sixth and last one (the delay in outputing this section
was due to my attending a conference these last three days on conflict
and violence in Indonesia), there have been new developments which can
only serve to confirm that first appraisal.

After yesterday's meeting with the president, the official representatives
of the Papuan Council stated their trust in and support of the president,
and at the same time warned that any attempt to topple the president
would automatically lead to secession of West Irian.

Again, like in the results of the West Papua Congress, the West Papuans
have given an important lesson to all Indonesias: the president and all
national reform and pro-democracy forces on one side, and West Papuans,
Acehnese, and other ethnic groups that have becom victims of the regime
on the other side, are each other's natural allies, and must join forces
with each other as the one and only chance for reform to democracy in
Indonesia to be successful.

As long as each of them fights for themselves, and even against each
other, they are making it very easy for the enemies of democracy. Now
too, just like during the struggle for independence from colonialism,
the most effective strategy of the enemy of the nation is "divide et
impera". In fact, the easiest way to dertermine who is a true enemey of
the nation is to observe who is trying to divide rather to unite. The
only chance for the nation to succeed in overcoming the crisis is to
restore and maintain unity.



Subj: JP: Huge Asian market awaits Irian's Tangguh gas: BP Amoco
Date: 7/6/00 6:24:42 AM Central Daylight Time
From: (Tapol)

[note: for the past several days, the online edition of JP has been posted
18+ hours later than usual]

Jakarta Post
July 05, 2000

Huge Asian market awaits Tangguh gas: BP Amoco

JAKARTA (JP): Oil and gas company BP Amoco Plc said on Tuesday growing gas
consumption in the Asian region gave its Tangguh LNG gas project in Irian
Jaya vast potential markets.

The head of energy analysis at BP Amoco, Andrew Barton, said that along with
China's huge gas market, the Asian region led the world's liquefied natural
gas (LNG) market, which grew by 7 percent to 8 percent last year.

"There is a tremendous potential for natural gas consumption in Asia, because
it's such a small percentage of the overall energy mix (energy types in
use)," Barton said following his presentation of a statistical review of the
global energy industry.

The Tangguh LNG project, located in Berau Bay in Irian Jaya, is being jointly
developed by BP Amoco and state oil and gas company Pertamina.

However, construction on the project awaits the signing of a contract, which
Pertamina and BP Amoco expect to come from China by the end of this year.

Pertamina expects gas demand in China to reach four to five million tons per

But Barton said that aside from the Chinese market, Indonesia could sell its
Tangguh gas to Taiwan, South Korea and India, as well to Japan, its
traditional market.

According to him, improving economies in several Asian countries was boosting
energy consumption, which in turn required more power plants to meet demand.

He said the current energy mix in Asia -- the energy types used to power
electricity plants -- comprised mostly oil and coal.

"As economies grow they will tend to build power gas stations rather than
coal," Barton said, adding as an example that 95 percent of new power plants
in the United States use gas.

Gas, he said, was not only environmentally cleaner but also cheaper compared
to other energy sources. "Gas is the cheapest way of generating power."

He said natural gas was Asia's fastest growing fuel, driven mostly by major
infrastructure projects linking gas in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and
Russia, with Asian urban centers.

In Japan, he said, the arrival of newly contracted gas from Qatar had
stimulated gas use for power and industrial cogeneration power plants.

Whereas gas consumption in Korea and China, he said, had outstripped their
10-year average annual growth rates of 20 percent and 5 percent,

Barton attributed the growing gas demand in Korea to the increasing use of
gas for power plants and household use.

He said that in China gas was increasingly used to replace coal for power
generation in a bid to cut air pollution in urban centers.

He added that the completion of the gas separation project in Vung Tau,
Vietnam, had caused gas consumption to grow rapidly from a low base.

He said that gas consumption in the world grew by at least 2.4 percent in
1999, as compared to the annual average of 1.8 percent growth over the last
10 years.

He cited Asia, South America and Europe as among the regions with the
strongest consumption growths in 1999.

Barton said key changes in LNG trade throughout 1999 were the emergence of
Trinidad and Nigeria as major exporters, the 70 percent increase in Qatar gas
exports and the increase in gas exports from Indonesia and Malaysia, which
showed 7.5 percent and 6 percent growth, respectively.

Meanwhile, BP Amoco senior external affairs officer John O'Reilly expressed
optimism that Indonesia would be able to sell its Tangguh gas to China.

However, he stated Asia had numerous alternative markets for the sale of the
Tangguh gas, saying BP Amoco and Pertamina also were considering seeking
contracts with Korea, Japan and possibly India.

"But China is clearly a very attractive option," he said, adding that
Minister of Mines and Energy Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was currently in China
seeking a gas contract.

O'Reilly further estimated the Tangguh gas project would bring in some US$60
billion over a period of about 30 years.

Pertamina expects construction of the project to begin by 2001, with its
completion by 2005.

The project was first developed by Pertamina and oil and gas company Arco,
before the latter's recent merger with BP Amoco.

The Tangguh project has a proven reserve of 14.4 trillion cubic feet. It will
have an initial yearly production capacity of two trains, the equivalent of
six million tons of gas, which will come from the Wiriager, Berau and Muturi

Pertamina and its partners will invest some $1.5 billion to develop the two

Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
East Timor, 1973-2000


Subj: Catholic World News Features for Jul. 06, 2000
Date: 7/6/00 4:17:48 PM Central Daylight Time

Catholic World News
[JUL. 06, 2000]




AMBON, Indonesia (FIDES/ -- After consulting with the
residents of the violence-torn island of Ambon, a Catholic bishop is flying to
Geneva to ask for immediate UN intervention to end the fighting there, the
Vatican news service FIDES has revealed.

Bishop Petrus Canisius Mandagi of the Amboina diocese will ask for
international assistance to end the fighting in the Mollucan islands, where
Ambon is located. He will be accompanied on his trip to Rome by two
Protestant leaders from the region: the chairmen of the Molluccan Protestant
and Evangelical church bodies.

As the Christian leaders head for Europe in search of international aid, the
crisis in the Mollucas continues to grow. In the early days of July, an
estimated 2,000 Muslim zealots, many of them carrying automatic weapons,
have arrived in the Mollucas to pursue the "jihad" against Christians which
their leaders have proclaimed.

o On the morning of July 6, the village of Waai was attacked. Residents
begged for help from the nearby Maranatha Crisis Center, operated by a
Protestant group. The Indonesian army and navy ignored their requests to
be evacuated from the area.

o In the city of Amboina, the Keuskupan Christian Crisis Center reports that
the tension is mounting. Residents fear that a large-scale attack will be
launched on their community; many of them have packed their few
belongings and are ready for flight.

o Local sources have reported to FIDES that the Muslim "jihad" warriors now
gathering in the Mollucas are of Achenese, Dayak, Madurese, and Javanese
ethnic origin. Although the Indonesian government has announced a formal
policy prohibiting Muslim zealots from entering the troubled region, local
police and military officials are doing nothing to prevent their arrival or
protect the local Christian population.

o After a visit to a refugee camp located on the Halong naval base, one aid
worker told Fides that the refugees living there-- numbering more than
10,000, most of them Christians-- are receiving only a scant ration of rice
every week. Moreover, the refugees are still living in fear of a military
assault on their camp.

Throughout the Mollucas, tens of thousands of Christians are waiting to be
evacuated-- especially from Ambon.

Bishop J. Tethool, acting together with the secretary general of the Protestant
Church of the Mollucas, Max. M. Siahaya, has issued a public appeal on behalf
of all Christians. Their statement warns: "In this first week of civil
emergency, there has been no improvement; on the contrary the situation
gets worse. Thousands of Christians are under tremendous pressure, they
urgently call on their Church leaders to help them evacuate to safe locations

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] BP Amoco Eyes Chinese Market for Papuan LNG
Date: 7/6/00 10:27:51 AM Central Daylight Time

Too much mail? Try our digest version. Info available at

Wednesday, July 5 2:12 PM SGT
BP Amoco Eyes Chinese Market for Papuan LNG
JAKARTA, July 5 Asia Pulse

BP-Amoco Co. Plc, the largest gas production sharing contractor in
the country said it would make China the largest buyer for liquefied
natural gas (LNG) it would produce from a gas field in Papua.

The company is building an LNG plant at a cost of US$3 billion in
Tangguh, Papua, formerly Irian Jaya.

A company official, Andrew Barton, said the Tangguh plant would be
the largest LNG processing facility in the country. Indonesia, the
world's largest supplier of LNG, already has LNG plants in Arun of
Aceh and in Bontang of East Kalimantan.

"Chinese market is highly prospective, and Indonesia will still the
world's largest exporter of LNG," Barton was quoted as saying by the
newspaper Bisnis Indonesia.

Mines and Energy Minister S. B. Yudhoyono is leading a team
including Bill Schrader, President of BP Amoco Indonesia, in a visit
to China to promote sales of Tangguh LNG in China.

Considering the geographical position, China would buy LNG from
Indonesia rather than from Middle East, Barton said.

He said China, which is building a number of large cities would need
LNG as a clean energy source.

China has built LNG terminal in the southern part of that country,
he added.

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News")
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not necessarily the views of or subscribers. "

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Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Irian Jaya lacks 1,673 teachers
Date: 7/6/00 5:21:20 PM Central Daylight Time

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The Jakarta
Across the Archipelago
July 07, 2000
Irian Jaya lacks 1,673 teachers

JAYAPURA, Irian Jaya: The province needs 1,673 more teachers to
improve the quality of education and develop human resources in the
province, Deputy Governor JGR. Djopari said.

Speaking to The Jakarta Post on Thursday Djopari said the province
falls short of teachers for junior high schools. There are only 666
teachers for that school grade, far from the actual need of 1,744.

In junior high schools, the deficit of teachers reaches 1,078, while
in vocational schools 595 more teachers are needed, Djopari said.

He said that if the province managed to produce 400 new teachers
annually, it could meet the teachers needed in five years.(eba/dja)

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News")
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Subj: JP: 2,000 Mobile Brigade troops to be sent to Irian Jaya
Date: 7/6/00 6:24:55 AM Central Daylight Time
From: (Tapol)

Received from Joyo Indonesian News

Jakarta Post
July 06, 2000

2,000 Mobile Brigade troops to be sent to Irian Jaya

JAYAPURA, Irian Jaya (JP): Some 2,000 of the police's mobile brigade (Brimob)
troops will soon be sent to Irian Jaya to maintain security and order in the
whole area of the easternmost province, Irian Jaya police chief Brig. Gen. SY
Wenas said here on Wednesday.

"They will be deployed in all regencies in the province," Wenas said, adding
that the dispatch was scheduled to take place on July 12.

Responding to the plan, Don Flassy, a leading proindependence figure for West
Papua, said that sending new Brimob troops would not guarantee people's

"However, it is the Irian Jaya Police chief SY Wenas and Military chief Maj.
Gen. Albert Inkiriwang who have the right to add to the number of troops. We,
the Papuans, have no say in that," Flassy said.

"They know the situation in the area, but the plan would probably result in

He criticized the speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly Amien Rais
and House of Representatives speaker Akbar Tandjung who announced the
smuggling of 12,000 guns to the province.

"They (Amien and Akbar) will just mess up Papua and make the soil like Maluku
or Poso in Central Sulawesi, because they knew about the illegal shipping of
the guns, while we Papuans did not," he said.

The second Papuan Congress, which took place from May 29 to June 4,
recommended that any political case be settled through dialog, negotiation
and other non-violent means, said Flassy, who also chairs the Independent
Committee of Papua.

"Even the members of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) have pledged since 1997
not to use violence in struggling for West Papuan independence," he said.

Meanwhile, in the West Java capital of Bandung, the Army chief of staff Gen.
Tyasno Sudarto said that the government must pay more attention to the
development of Irian Jaya.

"Wise, careful, prompt and appropriate action must be taken to deal with the
Papuans' demand for independence. The integrity of the nation is at stake,"
Tyasno said.

The lingering problems relating to welfare, justice and human rights provoked
Papuans to separate from the Republic of Indonesia, he added. "Years of
ignorance must be compensated soon."

Separately in Jakarta on Tuesday night, President Abdurrahman Wahid met with
members of the Papua Presidium at a private residence on Jl. Irian, Central

The head of the presidium Theys Eluay told journalists that he and other
presidium members briefed the President on the results of the recent Papuan
People's Congress.

"The meeting went well, in an open and honest fashion," he added.

Secretary general of the presidium, Thaha Alhamid, claimed that the two sides
had agreed to establish an independent team to peacefully mediate the
interests of the two parties.(25/sur)

Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
East Timor, 1973-2000


Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Editorial: Island Troubles
Date: 7/6/00 5:20:59 PM Central Daylight Time

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Far Eastern Economic Review
Island Troubles
-- Jakarta's hope is to fix the economy. Can it?
Issue cover-dated July 13, 2000

LAST MONTH, violence in the Moluccas reached new heights, tolling
over 150 lives in about a week, sparking a declaration of civil
emergency. And in Aceh, Jakarta's influence diminishes by the day,
while unhappiness with the capital broods in Irian Jaya and Riau.
Indonesia's provinces are spinning even more out of control.

To an extent, the turbulent eddies at the margins of the Indonesian
state owe their momentum to the vacuum at the centre as represented
by President Abdurrahman Wahid. For though the various troubles have
disparate historical antecedents--from Dutch colonial policies to
religious mistrust to the migration policy of the Suharto
regime--they have an economic overlay. And it is here that Mr. Wahid
has failed to live up to even a shadow of expectations.

While the president can't realistically by now have reversed the
corruption and nepotism that marked the Suharto years, it is
nevertheless clear that he is unable even to slow these forces.
Instead, new players have emerged to seek their turn at the trough.
While this threatens to mire Indonesia further in the morass, it
also means that the implicit contract between the centre and the
periphery cannot be expected to be fulfilled--that by remaining part
of the unitary state, Jakarta guarantees conditions for economic
well-being. It is this then that prompts the spurning of anything to
do with Jakarta.

The centre's best hope for peace is to allow the provinces a larger
say over the exploitation of their natural wealth--and a larger
slice of profits. It also needs to expand the national wealth if
others aren't to be marginalized as a result. But with Mr. Wahid's
abilities to deliver on this questionable, observers cannot be
sanguine over the prospects for Indonesia.

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News")
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Subj: AFP: Irian Jaya separatists claim Wahid open minded on independence
Date: 7/6/00 6:24:19 AM Central Daylight Time
From: (Tapol)

Received from Joyo Indonesian News

Irian Jaya separatists claim Wahid open minded on independence

JAKARTA, July 5 (AFP) - Leaders of the pro-independence movement in
Indonesia's easternmost province of Irian Jaya said Wednesday that President
Abdurrahman Wahid had not objected to their bid for independence.

Theys Eluay, the president of the Presidium of the Papuan People, told a
press conference here that Wahid "did not reject" a call for independence
issued at the end of a week-long Papuan People's Congress last month.

Eluay said that several Papuan leaders, including himself, had met with Wahid
late on Tuesday night to report on the results of the congress.

"We came (to see him) simply just to convey the results of the Papuan
congress. He (Wahid) said 'fine, I will study it further ... let us build the
steps ahead through constant dialogue'," Eluay told AFP on the sidelines of
the press conference.

"He (Wahid) did not reject it, he said he would further study the results of
the congress," Eluay added.

At the press briefing, Eluay also said that Wahid did not show "any cynical
tone, or reject the result" of the congress.

The congress ended in Jayapura on June 4 with a resolution saying that West
Papua -- as the pro-independence lobby refers to Irian Jaya -- had been a
sovereign state since it was proclaimed on December 1, 1961, and that its
incorporation into Indonesia in 1969 was legally flawed and therefore null
and void.

The congress has also called on Jakarta to recognize the sovereignty of West

However Wahid has since said publicly that his goverment did "not recognize
the congress," and called it "illegitimate", saying that it had failed to
represent the entire spectrum of society in Irian Jaya.

Eluay refused to comment on a police summons for the congress organizers to
be questioned on treason charges for advocating separatism, saying that the
press briefing was only to discuss the meeting with Wahid.

He said that his group would "always be ready to support Wahid's "leadership
as president of the Republic of Indonesia," because "through him we have
reached a degree of progress."

He cited Wahid's donation of one billion rupiah (111,000 dollars) for the
congress, and his promise (later retracted) to open the congress, as the
group's reasons for supporting the president.

The presidium's mediator, Willy Mandowen, said Wahid was "the only one who
still regards Papuans as his people while others have forsaken us."

Mandowen also said his group would intiate a campaign to raise the
independence "Morning Star" flag throughout the province, starting from July
14 to August 2.

Meanwhile, the group's vice president, Tom Beanal, warned Wahid's political
opponents in Jakarta against trying to topple the president.

"No matter what, we are going to fight alongside him, but if anyone tries to
rise to power, the first thing that we will do is to separate ourselves from
Indonesia," he said.

But Eluay said that people of Papua "will not rely on Gus Dur (Wahid's
popular nickname) as the person who will grant independence" for the
mineral-rich province.

"We are fighting without weapons ... every Papuan is fighting for
independence through prayers to Jesus Christ," he said.

"He is God's greatest gift for this country," Eluay added.

Since the congress ended, calls have mounted in Jakarta for the government to
take a firmer stance against separatists in regions such as Irian Jaya and
Aceh, another province where there is strong pressure for self-rule.

Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
East Timor, 1973-2000


Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Suharto stooges fomenting Indonesian unrest: defense
Date: 7/6/00 5:21:13 PM Central Daylight Time

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Thursday, July 6 4:45 PM SGT
Suharto stooges fomenting Indonesian unrest: defense minister

Indonesian Defense Minister Yuwono Sudarsono said Thursday that
stooges of former president Suharto are fomenting unrest in
Indonesia to escape justice and destabilize the government.

"We believe that the unrest is being created by people who are
supplying arms and people to areas afflicted by conflict,
particularly in the Malukus, some parts of East Timor, West Irian
and certainly in Aceh," Sudarsono told a seminar here.

He said they fear they will be implicated in "investigations now
being undertaken by the attorney general's office" into Suharto's
alleged corruption.

The allegation followed claims by President Abdurrahman Wahid has
also blamed the violence on Suharto loyalists.

Sudarsono said a similar pattern was seen during the rule of
president B.J. Habibie, who succeded Suharto after the former
strongman resigned amid widespread protests and riots.

Habibie was destabilized by "former president Suharto's followers,
both in the military as well as civilians," Sudarsono said.

"I think the pattern is now being repeated in a different form in
different places, but my hunch suggests that this is a grudge.

But the minister admitted it was difficult to find evidence of
people and arms being funnelled to create unrest because the stooges
provided money without written instructions.

"I leave it to the police to find legal evidence of how the money,
the people, the arms are being supplied to the Malukus, to try to
identify the networking and links of how these arms and supplies are
being sent from places in Java to the outer islands," he said.

The minister said he believed the same people were involved in the
bomb explosions in Medan, North Sumatra province in May, and the
1998 killing spree of suspected sorcerers in East Java.

"But I'm sure in time the police and military intelligence will have
adequate information and adequate legal evidence to bring to trial
at least the public figures and then hopefully will get the
agitators in Jakarta," he said.

Parts of Indonesia, the world's largest archipelagic nation, have
erupted in communal and sectarian violence since Suharto's
resignation, leaving thousands of dead and hundreds of thousands of
people displaced.

Separatism is on the rise on both sides of the country, Aceh in the
West and West Papua in East.

Last week Wahid announced sparked a controversy by saying he had
ordered the police to arrest several lawmakers, who he did not name,
for allegedly fuelling the recent violence and problems besetting
the country.

Many saw Wahid's statement as an act of retaliation for the
legislators' move to formally question him over the recent dismissal
of two ministers.

But in an apparent bid to avoid a showdown with angry legislators,
Wahid later backtracked and said the MPs would be questioned as
witnesses not as suspects.

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News")
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Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] West Papuan refugees to return home soon
Date: 7/6/00 5:21:02 PM Central Daylight Time

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Indonesian Observer
Friday, July 7 - 2000
West Papuan refugees to return home soon

JAKARTA (IO) — An estimated 680 of the 900 people who fled across
the border from West Papua (Irian Jaya) into Papua New Guinea (PNG)
in the 1980s after being terrorized by the Indonesian military will
soon return home, an official said yesterday.

Secretary of Border Crossing Affairs in West Papua, F.X. Suryanto,
told Antara in Jayapura that following the signing of a memorandum
of understanding between West Papua and PNG, the refugees should
start arriving home next week.

"In line with the first stage of the plan, they will be back here
between July 10-14. But if there is bad weather, such as heavy
rainfall, the plan will have to be carried out in August," he said.

Suryanto said the returnees will be relocated in Oksibil, Kwirok,
Wamena and Jayapura.

"They will receive the same facilities as transmigrants, which means
they [each family] will get 2.5 hectares of land, a house and basic
commodities for one or more years."

The refugees, which Indonesian authorities prefer to describe as
"border crossers" had been accused of being members of the Free
Papua Movement, which the military used to refer to as a "security
disturbance group".

Local government officials in West Papua have expressed hope that
the people who fled to PNG will not be punished by the central
government when they return.

Freedom flag
A West Papuan leader yesterday claimed that President Abdurrahman
'Gus Dur' Wahid has given the green light for the hoisting of the
territory's Morning Star flag.

Executive Secretary of the Forum for Reconciliation Among Irian Jaya
People (Foreri), Willy Mandowen, told Antara that Wahid gave his
consent during a meeting with the Papua Council Presidium, led by
Theys Hiyo Eluay, at the presidential palace in Jakarta on July 4.

During the meeting, the Presidium reported the results of the Second
Papua National Congress, held in Jayapura over late May and early
June, and submitted a report of accountability on the use of the Rp1
billion (US$106,950) contributed by the government to help finance
the congress.

According to Mandowen, after Wahid heard the results of the congress
and listened to some recommendations, he gave his consent for the
hoisting of the Morning Star flag all over West Papua as of July 14.

However, the president stipulated that the West Papuan flag must be
smaller and flown lower than Indonesia's red-and-white flag.

"The Papua Council Presidium welcomes the president's requirement,
and praises Gus Dur as a statesman and true democrat," Mandowen

He said Gus Dur also backed a decision to hold a meeting at which
West Papua's history will be rewritten without the usual hokum and
propaganda from Jakarta.

Theys Eluay is scheduled to open the three-week meeting in Merauke
on July 14.

"President Wahid has made it clear that he raises no objection to
any aspiration by the people, as long as it is still within the
lawful corridor," said Mandowen.

The Papua Council Presidium which met with Gus Dur consists of Theys
(chairman), Thom Beanal (deputy chairman), Mandowen, Thaha Alhamid
(secretary general), Reverend Herman Awom (moderator), Zadrak Taime
and John Mambor (members).

Cabinet Secretary Marsilam Simanjuntak, during a press conference at
the Bina Graha presidential office on Wednesday, did not confirm or
deny that Wahid had met with some West Papuan leaders on Tuesday

"No comment," Simanjuntak told curious reporters.

The government has flatly ruled out independence for the
mineral-rich province of some 2.5 million people — formerly Dutch
New Guinea — which was officially incorporated into Indonesia with
the help of the United Nations in 1969.

Wahid, who asked parliament to rename the province Papua in
deference to local sentiment, insists that Irian Jaya remains a part
of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News")
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