=======================================================

Subj: SBS dateline
Date: 7/4/00 5:30:41 PM Central Daylight Time
From: iris@matra.com.au (Anne Noonan)
To: reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org

For Aussie viewers

SBS Dateline program, 5 July

Wednesdays at 8.30 pm
Repeated Thursdays at 12.30pm

This week on Dateline, a report on the militia of West Papua
(formerly
Irian Jaya) which we discover are being recruited by the
Indonesian
military.

Independent filmmaker, Mark Worth, reports on how the
pro-Jakarta
militia are waging a new campaign of violence against
independence
supporters.

In a series of interviews with victims of recent violence,
Dateline
draws disturbing parallels with East Timor.

Also, with the international whaling commission meeting in
Adelaide
this week, Dateline's Chris Hammer visits a traditional
whaling village
in Japan and hear their side of the story.

=======================================================

Subj: RT: Indon police check reports 12,000 guns smuggled into Irian
Date: 7/4/00 12:32:16 AM Central Standard Time
From: plovers@gn.apc.org (Tapol)
To: reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org, u.braun@xcc.de, slliem@xs4all.nl, taylorjb@vax.sbu.ac.uk

Received from Joyo Indonesian News

Indonesia police check reports arms sent to Irian

JAKARTA, July 3 (Reuters) - Indonesia police said on Monday they are
investigating a report that 12,000 guns were smuggled into the rebellious
province of Irian Jaya, the official news agency Antara reported.

Local media have quoted the head of Indonesia's top legislative body, Amien
Rais, as saying that sources told him weapons had been sent to the vast
province.

Rais did not name his sources.

``Is there really smuggling of firearms on a large scale? We are still
investigating the information,'' Antara quoted Irian Jaya police chief
Brigadier-General S.Y. Wenas as saying.

A low-level separatist insurgency has simmered in Irian Jaya for decades.
Indonesia fears pressure for independence in some provinces, particularly
Irian Jaya and the staunchly Moslem Aceh, could lead to the country's
disintegration.

Calls for independence have mounted since East Timor voted to break from
Indonesian rule last year.

Last month, a congress of local leaders and activists declared Irian Jaya
independent in a move that Jakarta dismissed as not representing the wishes
of the population's majority.

Irian Jaya was incorporated into Indonesia in 1963, after heavy diplomatic
pressure on the Netherlands, the country's former colonial ruler. In 1969, a
U.N.-run plebiscite was held among local leaders, which resulted in a vote to
join Indonesia.


**************************************************
Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
East Timor, 1973-2000
**************************************************

=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] A History of Contempt for Irian Jaya
Date: 7/4/00 11:14:33 PM Central Daylight Time
From: admin@irja.org
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International Herald Tribune
Paris, Tuesday, July 4, 2000
A History of Contempt for Irian Jaya
By John Saltford, International Herald Tribune

ITHACA, New York - Some 3,000 Papuan activists meeting in the
easternmost Indonesian province of Irian Jaya recently passed a
resolution declaring independence. President Abdurrahman Wahid
rejected their demand, claiming that they spoke only for a minority.
There were warnings that Jakarta would not tolerate any attempt to
secede.

Both sides refer to an act of self-determination monitored by the
United Nations in 1969 whereby 1,022 officially appointed
''representatives'' of the territory resolved to become part of
Indonesia. Jakarta says this vote was internationally recognized and
the matter is closed. But many Papuans dismiss the 1969 act as a
sham.

They contend that they have yet to exercise a right to
self-determination guaranteed by Indonesia, the Netherlands and the
United Nations in 1962.

The current demands for independence coincide with therelease of
documents by the United Nations, the Netherlands and other countries
that appear to support the Papuans' argument.

Under the 1962 terms, the Dutch agreed to hand Papua over to a
temporary UN administration on condition that self-determination
would take place, ''in accordance with international practice,''
within six years - but the United Nations could transfer power to
Indonesia beforehand. The temporary administration pulled out after
seven months, and Jakarta took over in May 1963.

When the United Nations returned in 1968 to prepare for the ''act,''
the Papuans had experienced five years of Indonesian rule. An
American diplomat noted that the Indonesians had ''tried everything
from bombing to shelling and mortaring, but a continuous state of
semi-rebellion persists.''

>From the start, Jakarta declared that a referendum was impractical
because the people were ''primitive..'' Ortiz Sanz, head of the UN
mission to Irian Jaya, agreed. He proposed a ''mixed'' system with
direct voting in the towns and some form of ''collective
consultation'' elsewhere. This, he told the authorities, was ''the
minimum requirement to satisfy world public opinion.''

Jakarta disagreed and announced that ''collective consultation''
would be adopted throughout the territory. Publicly, the UN
secretary-general, U Thant, refused to endorse the decision, but
documents indicate that senior UN and Dutch officials had privately
agreed to this as early as 1963.

There was little international sympathy for the Papuans. A British
diplomat wrote in 1968 that he could not imagine the U.S., Japanese,
Dutch or Australian governments ''putting at risk their economic and
political relations with Indonesia on a matter of principle
involving a relatively small number of very primitive people.''

In a letter to UN headquarters Mr. Sanz said that ''only a very
insignificant percentage of the population is capable of or has
interest in any political actions or even thoughts.''

In the UN secretary-general's official report on the so-called act
of self-determination, the Secretariat said the majority of Papuan
petitions sent to Mr. Sanz supported Indonesia. Declassified UN
documents now show this to be untrue.

In July and August 1969, the Papuan representatives were gathered
together to vote in front of officials, diplomats and a few foreign
journalists. Entertainment was provided as Indonesian officials were
paraded shoulder high by Papuans in a carefully rehearsed display of
loyalty. Afterward the authorities announced that the result was a
unanimous decision by the people to join Indonesia.

In November the UN secretary-general's report concluded that an act
of free choice had taken place in accordance with ''Indonesian
practice.'' The General Assembly then voted to ''take note'' of the
outcome. With that the United Nations ended its responsibilities
toward Papua.

The Dutch government recently agreed to carry out a ''historical
re-examination'' of the self-determination act in Irian Jaya. It
remains to be seen whether the United Nations will follow suit and
review a discreditable chapter in its history.
-- The writer, who recently completed a doctoral thesis at Cornell
University on the UN handover of Irian Jaya to Indonesia,
contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.








KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
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=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] More on arms smuggling to irian
Date: 7/4/00 11:13:57 PM Central Daylight Time
From: admin@irja.org
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The Straits Times Interactive
JUL 4, 2000
Arms smuggled into Irian Jaya, Jakarta warned
-- The report has sparked a police investigation, and the government
has been urged to act quickly before the province becomes
uncontrollable

JAKARTA -- Indonesian police will investigate a report that 12,000
weapons have been smuggled into Irian Jaya, which is seeking to
secede from the country.

National police chief General Rusdihardjo said he had yet to receive
information on the reported arms smuggling following a statement on
the matter by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Speaker Amien
Rais, according to the Indonesian Observer yesterday.

But he said that if arms had been smuggled illegally into the
province, he would coordinate with security officials in Irian Jaya
to take strict action against the smugglers.

Dr Amien called on the national intelligence bureau, which he
accused of tardiness, and related institutions to follow up on the
information to prevent Irian Jaya becoming an uncontrollable
problem.

The Observer said Dr Amien had received information from a pilot,
who flew regularly to Irian Jaya, that certain groups planned to
smuggle in weapons.

The MPR Speaker said he was disappointed by the stance of the
government, which seemed to be ignoring the seriousness of
secessionism in Irian Jaya because most foreign countries had
pledged their support to Indonesian unity.

""Please do not ignore this signal. I hope the Indonesian
intelligence unit will soon investigate this report. Don't be too
late,'' he said.

Dr Amien, who is chairman of the National Mandate Party, blamed the
rising tide of separatism in Irian Jaya on President Abdurrahman
Wahid, who paved the way for the Congress of Papuan People.

""Do not be too late because the situation is critical now. If it
happens to be signs of the expanding armed movement in Irian Jaya,
we do not know what will happen next,'' he said.

The Congress of Papua People, comprising local leaders and
activists, declared Irian Jaya independent last month. This was
rejected by Jakarta, which said the congress did not represent the
will of the majority in the province.

The independence call underscored the headaches confronting
President Abdurrahman Wahid, whose government also faces separatist
pressures in Aceh province, sectarian violence in several regions
and a host of political and economic woes.


KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
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=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] News from WP
Date: 7/3/00 4:26:11 PM Central Standard Time
From: admin@irja.org
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From: Papua Merdeka

>Dear all,
>
>Below is a disturbing message from Sem who spoke to John Letts in Oxford
>this morning,
>
>Paul
>
>Boa Ventura,
>
>It was good to speak to you again.
>
>I received a message from Sem Karoba in Port Numbay (Jayapura) this
>morning. He told me a person was killed in Timika on Saturday, a Lani
>person in Biak yesterday, and another person (I think in Biak) this
>morning. The situation is getting very tense, and a major conflict is
>about to begin. The security services want to interrogate them about their
>activities in West Papua (Sam is involved in the new Papua Council which
>hosted the Papuan Congress a few weeks ago). Sem is also the spokesperson
>for the Students movement. He sounded very nervous and he is in danger. I
>have not been able to call him back this morning as the telephone lines do
>not seem to be working. I am not sure if email messages can get through.
>
>that is all he had time to say to me.
>
>I will be home most f the day if you need to contact me.
>
>Sem wanted TAPOL to know about the situation, and to inform others of the
>situation.
>
>John Letts
>
>
>
>**************************************************
>Paul Barber
>TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
>25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
>Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
>Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
>Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
>Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
>East Timor, 1973-2000
>**************************************************
>

________________________________________________________________________
Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com


KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
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=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Weapons being smuggled into Irian Jaya?
Date: 7/3/00 12:07:56 AM Central Daylight Time
From: admin@irja.org
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Indonesian Observer
Monday, July 03 2000
Police to investigate smuggling of 12,000 weapons into Papua

JAKARTA (IO) National Police Chief General Rusdihardjo said he is
yet to receive information on the smuggling of 12,000 weapons into
the province of Irian Jaya, adding that his office will launch
investigation into the reports.

I have yet to receive information on the weapons smuggling into
Irian Jaya, Rusdihardjo told the press on the sidelines of the
Singing Bird Contest in Ancol, North Jakarta, yesterday.

He said he will check the validity of the news. He vowed that if the
news is correct, he would coordinate with security officials in
Irian Jaya to take strict action against the weapons smugglers.

Rusdihardjo made the comment in response to a statement from the
Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR) Speaker Amien Rais that he had
received information on attempts by certain group to smuggle 12,000
weapons into Irian Jaya.

Rais regretted the tardiness of the national intelligence bureau who
cannot smell the activities of the weapon smugglers. He called on
related institutions to follow up the information so that the Irian
Jaya issue will not become an uncontrollable problem.

Rais himself got the information from a pilot while he was on a
flight. According to the pilot who serves flights from and to Irian
Jaya, certain groups plan to smuggle weapons.

Rais lamented that the condition of Irian Jaya is now critical
enough. Thousands of armed civilian groups are well-organized to
support the secession of Irian Jaya from Indonesia.

He reiterated his disappointment over the governments stance which
seems to ignore the serious problems in Irian Jaya. The government
seems to ignore Irian Jayas calls for secession because most
foreign countries have expressed their support to Indonesian unity.

Please do not ignore this signal. I hope the Indonesian
intelligence unit will soon investigate this report. Dont be too
late, he said.

Rais, who chairs the National Mandate Party (PAN), said that the
causes of the expanding separatism in Irian Jaya are the attitude of
President Abdurrahman Wahid who paved the way for the Congress of
Papuan People. Do not be too late because the situation is critical
now. If it happens to be signs of the expanding armed movement in
Irian Jaya, we do not know what will happen next, he added.

The MPR Speaker said there are three key factors that will be the
key to solving the problems in Irian Jaya. The three factors are
speed, wisdom, and firmness. We must not be late because the
situation is worsening, he said.

He added that the government should be able to find out the causes
of the separatist movement in Irian Jaya province. We must find out
the causes and resolve the problem completely. We must eliminate all
the causes of the separatist movement, he said.

He emphasized that the government must be strict in managing the
conflict in Irian Jaya. Without firmness a small problem will easily
expand into an uncontrollable one.

Although he is yet to receive first hand information on the weapons
smuggling, Rusdihardjo said it is possible for the MPR Speaker to
get information. It could be. Seeing that the distance between
Panimo-Papua is very small, it could be, he said, adding that he
will soon check the validity of the information.



KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
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=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Wahid denies planned quizzing of MPs a revenge for
Date: 7/3/00 4:32:45 PM Central Standard Time
From: admin@irja.org

interpellation move
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Monday, July 3 2:55 PM SGT
Wahid denies planned quizzing of MPs a revenge for interpellation
move
JAKARTA, July 3 (AFP)

Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid has denied accusations that
he was motivated by revenge in ordering the investigation of several
MPs over unrest in the country, Cabinet Secretary Marsilam
Simanjuntak said Monday.

Wahid's claim that several MPs were behind the unrest and other
problems to beset Indonesia has led to widespread speculation that
he was retaliating against the legislature's plan to question him
over the recent sacking of ministers.

"The president needs to deny suspicion and accusations from several
sides ... regarding the possibilities of the arrest of several
members of the DPR (the People's Representative Council) as have
been reported in the press," Simanjuntak told a press conference at
the presidential office.

Newspapers have been carrying commentaries from analysts,
politicians and MPs speculating that Wahid's claim of MP involvement
in the unrest was linked to the legislature plan to question him.

The DPR last week voted overwhelmingly to exercise of its
interpellation rights and summong the president for questioning over
the sacking of two economic ministers in April.

"The president said there is no link (with the interpellation), no
revenge, or terror to counter terror, because an interpellation is
not a threat to the presidency," Simanjuntak said.

The 500-seat DPR is the country's lower house while the 700-seat
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) is the country's highest
legislative body. Its membership includes DPR members.

Wahid told a private "national dialogue" of intellectuals and
politicians in Bali on Saturday that the government had enough
evidence of criminal violations to nail the legislators concerned.
He did not name names nor give further details.

Simanjuntak said the number of legislators to be questioned numbered
"less than 10." The interrogation would last four to five weeks
"because this involves several cases, not a single case." He did not
elaborate.

Wahid and several of his senior officials have repeatedly accused
unidentified people who were influential during the government of
former president Suharto of being behind the communal violence which
has wracked several areas of Indonesia, including the Malukus.

Rumors in the capital in past months have named at least three
former ministers who served in the Suharto government and are now
legislators in the current adminsitration.

Indonesia, a vast archipelago of more than 17,000 islands, has been
plagued by rising communal violence that has killed thousands of
people and displaces hundreds of thousands more.

In the Maluku islands, a trivial dispute between a Christian public
transport driver and a Muslim migrant in Ambon in January 1999
quickly degenerated into bloody sectarian violence between Muslims
and Christians in which 4,000 people have since been killed.

Separatism has also been growing in the two extremities of the
archipelago, Aceh in the west and Irian Jaya in the east, as well as
in the oil-rich province of Riau in Sumatra.





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=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Twenty warships deployed to nab foreign fishermen
Date: 7/3/00 12:08:02 AM Central Daylight Time
From: admin@irja.org
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Indonesian Observer
Monday, July 3 2000
Twenty warships deployed to nab foreign fishermen

JAKARTA (IO) The Navy is currently operating 20 warships in
eastern Indonesian waters in a bid to prevent the entry of foreign
fishing vessels. Waters around Maluku and Irian Jaya (West Papua)
contain plentiful numbers of tuna and shrimps, attracting many
foreign vessels from Taiwan, Thailand and Singapore.

Due to an insufficient number of ships, the Navy has been unable to
detect many of the incursions.

Head of the naval Base in Jayapura, West Papua, First Admiral
Franklin W. Kayhattu, yesterday told Antara the 20 patrol boats in
the region are only there to keep out foreign vessels.

The biggest warship in the region is the KRI Multa Tuli, which has a
crew of almost 200, while the smaller vessels, called Fast
Patrolling Boats, have from 60 to 90 men.

No political motive
Franklin denied the Navy had deployed the vessels to be near West
Papua and Maluku for political reasons, even though rumor has it
that weapons are being smuggled from Papua New Guinea into Irian
Jaya. Rumor also has it that weapons have been smuggled into Maluku
and North Maluku, to exacerbate the clashes between Christians and
Muslims in the bloodied spice islands.

The Navy personnel will not attack or arrest people. Theyre just
patrolling around Maluku and Irian Jaya, especially Kaimana Bay,
Sorong, Timika and Biak, said Franklin.

He said the Navy has frequently arrested fishing boats from Thailand
and the Philippines, mainly near West Papua. There are no plans to
invade Irian, despite their resolution to be independent, he
asserted.At a congress of tribal leaders and separatists in West
Papua last month, the province declared its independence from
Indonesia. The independence movement has received virtually no
official foreign support.

Franklin said patrols around West Papua are becoming more frequent
because of orders from Maritime Exploration and Fisheries Minister
Sarwono Kusumaatmadja and President Abdurrahman Wahid to boost the
nations income from the marine sector.

We hope that local fishermen will be cooperative and notify us if
they see any foreign ships catching fish with trawler nets, as such
an activity inflicts big losses on the locals and the state.

Last year there were several incidents during which foreign ships
were spotted by local fishing boats, but refused to leave Indonesian
waters.

Instead they would usually ram into the local boats and then
peacefully sail away.



KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
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=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Papuan rebels to meet Wahid today
Date: 7/3/00 12:07:57 AM Central Daylight Time
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Indonesian Observer
Monday, July 03 2000
Papuan rebels to meet Wahid today

JAKARTA (IO) Executives of the Papua Council Presidium (PCP) are
scheduled to meet President Abdurrahman Wahid today to report on the
result of the Papua Peoples Congress which adopted a resolution
urging the provinces separatation from Indonesia.

PCP Secretary General Thaha Alhamid told Antara yesterday that he
had received confirmation from an official of the presidential
protocol that the president wished to meet with the Papuan leaders
today.

President Wahid said the government did not recognize the results of
the congress, saying that it did not represent the wishes of the
majority of the Irian Jaya people.

The government contributed Rp1 billion to the organizing committee
of the congress.

Wahid also expressed his disappointment because the organizing
committee had violated an agreement that it would not include
foreign parties during the congress.

We are ready to hand over the aspirations of the people to Wahid .
We are responsible for the money contributed by the government,
Thaha added.

Members of the Presidium who will meet with the president are
Presidium Chairman Theys Hiyo Eluay, Presidium Deputy Chairman Thom
Beanal, Thaha, Chairman of the Congress organizing committee August
Alua, Mediator of the Irian Jaya Peoples Reconciliation Forum
(Foreri) Willy Mandown, and Presidium member John Mambor.

Thaha said that he had met with a number of figures in Jakarta to
discuss the results of the Papuas Peoples Congress although the
events were attended by only a limited number of participants.

He said that those who attended the meeting included members of
non-governmental organizations, government officials, officials of
the National Defense Forces, students and other youth activists.



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Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Papuans renew drive for freedom
Date: 7/3/00 4:26:51 PM Central Standard Time
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Received from Joyo Indonesian News

The Guardian [UK]
Monday July 3, 2000
Papuans renew their drive for freedom
-- Indonesian province determined to secede by peaceful means
John Aglionby in Jayapura

The independence movement in Papua, Indonesia's eastern-most
province, is holding talks with President Abdurrahman Wahid after a
year of reorganisation and consensus-building in which it has
already won the right to call the area by its old name.

Members of the Papuan Praesidium Council are in Jakarta for their
first round of negotiations with the president, knowing that the
vast majority of the 2.3m people in the province Indonesia used to
call Irian Jaya are fully behind their renewed call for secession.

That was made abundantly clear at a colourful congress in the
provincial capital, Jayapura, last month. Thousands of people from
all the 254 indigenous tribes and representatives of the migrants
who live in the province, which shares the island of New Guinea with
the independent state of Papua New Guinea, decided unanimously to
campaign for their own immediate independence.

Many of the delegates, dressed only in penis sheaths and feathered
headdresses, trekked for more than a week across glacier-covered
mountains and barely penetrable virgin rainforest to call for an end
to 31 years of Indonesian rule.

"It is not just me but all Papuans who are satisfied by the result
of the congress," the praesidium chairman, Theys Eluay, said.

"We succeeded in reaching a consensus on our aspirations and the
praesidium now has the legitimacy to take the struggle forward."

Mr Eluay stressed that, in contrast to its own past activity and
that of independence movements in East Timor and Aceh, the new
Papuan campaign would be peaceful.

"We want to succeed through dialogue and negotiation," he said. "We
are determined not to resort to violence."

Contrary to many reports in the Jakarta press, the congress's
resolution did not commit the treasonable offence of declaring
independence.

Rather, it stated that the Papuan people obtained their independence
on December 1 1961, when the Dutch finally left the last of the
colonies formerly known as the Dutch East Indies.

It also rejected the 1969 "Act of Free Choice", the UN-sponsored
process in which 1,025 community leaders voted unanimously to
integrate with President Suharto's Indonesia, on the grounds that it
was "conducted to the accompaniment of threats, intimidation,
sadistic killings, military violence and amoral deeds that gravely
violated humanitarian principles".

Mr Eluay, who was one of the signatories, said they had little
choice but to sign.

"If we had not voted for integration our houses would have been
burned and our families slaughtered."

In the past two years the level of oppression has declined
significantly, although armed militia supporting the Indonesian
connection are starting to operate in the far west of the territory,
just as they did in East Timor.

They have been involved in several violent incidents, particularly
in the town of Fak-fak. One day during the congress security guards
14 pistols and two homemade bombs from people trying to
enter.

"It is the army and the political elite in Jakarta trying to stir up
conflict among us so they will then have an excuse to intervene,"
said Denny Yomaki, a senior figure in several local organisations.

Mr Wahid's policy somersaults seem to show Jakarta's growing unease
at the developments in Irian Jaya. At first he supported the
congress to the extent of promising to open it, then pulled out at
the last minute, although he still gave 1bn rupiahs (=A375,400) to
help finance it.

Since the congress ended, he has led the vocal disapproval of its
resolution. But he has intensified development programmes in the
province, and agreed to let the Papuans fly their flag, the Morning
Star, in public as long as it is together with and below the
Indonesian flag.

In December he declared that the province should revert to its
original name, Papua. An independent commission will be set up to
investigate past human rights abuses. But it is doubtful whether all
this will be enough to sway Papuans from their desire for
independence.

"The basic problem here is not one of money or development," said
Yohanes Bonay, director of Jayapura office of the Institute for
Human Rights Studies and Advocacy. "It is all about the sovereignty
of the Papuan people over their own land. If the people think they
have to separate from Indonesia in order to achieve that, then they
will continue their struggle until they do. It's up to Indonesia to
come up with an alternative."

Despite Mr Wahid's concessions, he is determined to hang on to
Papua, not only because of the billions of dollars a year Jakarta
gets from the area, but also because he does not want it to
precipitate national disintegration.

But national cohesiveness holds little sway in Papua.

"We know that our cause is just and so we are prepared to take as
long as is necessary," Mr Eluay said. "But we are determined that it
will only be a matter of time before we are completely free."


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Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Training Scientists in Papua, in Biological Rapid Assessment Scientific methods
Date: 7/2/00 2:54:42 PM Central Daylight Time
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from: Indonesian Nature Conservation List

Training Scientists in Papua, in Biological Rapid Assessment Scientific
Methods

Conservation International and University of Cendrawasih (UNCEN)


BACKGROUND

Conservation International (CI) - Papua was formally established in
1995. CI's long-term goal in Papua is to promote people-based nature
conservation and sustainable economic development through the sustainable
use of Papua's resources. The strategy for the province is based on the
recognition that Papua still has large, virtually unexplored areas of high
biodiversity that are globally significant and should be targeted for
in-depth scientific study. To help meet the conservation of the province,
CI is pursuing a long-term strategy to assist Indonesian institutions and
NGOs in tackling the challenge of designing and implementing conservation
and sustainable development initiatives in Papua.

CI-Indonesia, University of Cendrawasih, and the Rapid Assessment Program
of the Center for Applied Biodiversity Science of CI proposes to host a
training course for Indonesian (particularly Papuan) scientists in rapid
biodiversity assessment in order to build local capacity for biological
inventory and monitoring. The training course will include seminars and
hands-on field experiences in surveying six taxonomic groups (vegetation,
mammals, birds, amphibians and reptiles, freshwater fish, and insects); an
expedition to the unstudied, pristine forest in Mamberamo; data entry in
the field; and data analysis and report preparation
instruction. Participants will be responsible for contributing to a
preliminary report and a final report, both of which will include species
lists and conservation recommendations.

From the course participants, a Local RAP Team will be formed to carry out
future biological assessments in Papua. In addition to increasing the
scientific capacity of Indonesia, the Local RAP Team will allow for a more
rapid and inexpensive response to the urgent needs for biological
information in Papua and Indonesia.


Conservation International and RAP

CI - Indonesia was founded in 1992 to protect and conserve biodiversity in
the hotspot regions of Indonesia. CI - Indonesia's approach is to offer
technical support to Indonesian institutions and to facilitate the
establishment of long-term field projects that promote community-based
conservation and sustainable development. CI also emphasizes the
scientific assessment of biodiversity and the documentation of economic,
cultural, and social importance of biodiversity for Indonesian
people. Through collaborations with many Indonesian institutions, CI
facilitates discussion among stakeholders at national, regional, and local
levels to make strategic decisions regarding where protected areas should
be located and to come to an understanding of the importance of conserving
biodiversity in Indonesia.


Rapid Assessment Program (RAP)

CI's Rapid Assessment Program was created in 1990 to rapidly provide
biological information needed to catalyze conservation action and improve
biodiversity protection. RAP assembles teams of host-country and
international scientists to produce rapid, first-cut assessments of the
biological value of poorly known areas that are not only potentially
important biodiversity conservation sites, but also threatened by habitat
conversion. The combined knowledge of these experts allows them to assess
in three- to four-week surveys the uniqueness and conservation value of an
area and to make recommendations about its management. So far, biological
information from twenty-three RAP expeditions of terrestrial and
freshwater ecosystems throughout the world has resulted in the protection
of thousands of hectares of tropical forest, including the creation of
national parks in Bolivia and Peru, and the identification of biodiversity
priorities in numerous countries including Papua (RAP Bulletin of
Biological Assessment No. 14, CI, 2000).


Objectives of the RAP Training and mini-Expedition to Mamberamo

- To build the capacity of Indonesian (particularly Papuan) biologists.
- To train young scientist in methods for Biological RAP, in data
analysis, and in report preparation.
- To contribute biological data, which is currently severely lacking,
about Papua and Mamberamo specifically.
- To catalyze conservation efforts in Papua and Indonesia.
- To create a framework for further conservation recommendations about
Mamberamo to decision-makers.
- To create a Local RAP Team which will continue to assess biodiversity in
Indonesia, thereby enabling sound conservation actions and decisions.


Why Papua and Mamberamo?

Papua, Indonesia - the largest province in Indonesia at 416, 000 square
kilometers - comprises the western half of New Guinea, the world's highest
and largest tropical island. Containing an estimated fifty percent of
Indonesia's biodiversity, Papua has been called the last great rainforest
wilderness in Indonesia. The province's range of altitudes (from sea level
to the highest mountains in the Asia-Pacific region) helps to create an
extraordinary array of ecosystems, biodiversity, and endemic species
(those species found nowhere else in the world). Though biological data is
severely lacking, experts at the Irian Jaya Biodiversity Conservation
Priority-Setting Workshop sited the tremendous biodiversity of the
province to include 20,000 to 25,000 plant species; 164 mammal
species; 329 reptile and amphibian species; 650 bird species; 250
freshwater fish species; 150,000 insect species; and many hundreds of
freshwater invertebrates. Largely due to Papua's biological contributions,
Indonesia now appears to be the biologically richest country in the world.

This treasure is at risk, however, from land conversion. In 1993, ninety
percent of Papua's forests were intact. As of 1997, scientists estimated
that only seventy-five percent to eighty percent remained, and that
doesn't take into account Indonesia's economic crisis and the record
forest fires of the very late 1990s. The loss of forest is ascribed to
logging, transmigration, plantation agriculture, mining, oil and gas
operations, the introduction of alien (non-native) species, and
infrastructure projects such as dams and roads.

Mamberamo, cited as an area of probable biological significance by experts
attending the Priority-Setting Workshop, is threatened by the proposed
Mamberamo Mega-Project. The project includes plans for a hydroelectric
dam, an aluminum shelter, and agro-industry in a lightly populated,
pristine wilderness area. Such a project would likely have serious
deleterious effects not only on biological resources and ecosystem
processes, but also on the indigenous population due to
transmigration. The Priority-Setting Workshop participants advised against
such a major development project in the Mamberamo area since few areas in
Indonesia (and the world) are as pristine and ecologically secure. The
participants recommended biological and social surveys for the area, which
is suspected to contain high biodiversity and endemism.


Outcomes
- An increased scientific capacity in Papua, which will positively impact
conservation efforts.
- A better understanding of ecological processes and biodiversity of
Papua, specifically the Mamberamo region.
- A Local RAP Team that will continue to study Papua, providing needed
information in a timely manner to decision-makers and stakeholders.
- Published results available to decision-makers, stakeholders,
scientists, and other interested parties.


Training Activities

The RAP training will he held in Jayapura and Yongsu (21st to 31st of
August 2000), and would be continued to the MiniRAP in Mamberamo (2 - 16
September 2000). The training will be focused in six taxonomy
groups: Plant, mammal, bird, reptile and amphibian, fish, and
insect. Several well known scientist will share their knowledge and
skills to the participants (see the list of instructors below). All the
instructors will write a standard manual and methodology of RAP and
distribute it to participants.

We will provide a training course of rapid biological assessment
methods; data analysis; and report preparation - to be achieved by the
following:

- Three-day in-class theory element of the course in Jayapura.
- Eight-day field-training element of the course at Yongsu, (Cyclops
Nature Reserve) culminating in partial preparation of a preliminary
report.
- Twelve-day to apply RAP survey method in the Mamberamo region.
- Writing preliminary report and press conference.


List of Instructors

Name - Taxonomic group - Institution
Dr. Leeanne Alonso - Insect/RAP Director - Conservation International
Dr. Steve Richards - Herpetology/Course leader - James Cook University
Dr. Alfonso Alonso - Vegetation - Smithsonian Institute
Dr. Gerry Allen - Freshwater fish - Conservation International
Dr. Bruce Beehler - Bird - Counterpart International
Bas van Balen * - Bird - Birdlife International
Tanya Leary* - Mammal - WWF-PNG
Ismail Rahman - Vegetation - LIPI
Dr. Djoko Iskandar - Herpetology - ITB
Rosa Singadan - Mammal - Univ. of Papua New Guinea
Sam Renyaan - Freshwater fish - Univ. of Cendrawasih
Dr. Yance de Fretes - Conservation Biology - Conservation International
Suer Suryadi - Field Coordinator - Conservation International
Debbie Gowensmith - RAP Coordinator - Conservation International

* Being contacted


Requirement

The RAP training is eligible for advance field biologists who have been
working in Papua for at least two years. The candidates should be
interested in one of the taxonomic group mentioned above. English is an
official language during the training course and expedition. Participants
who are willing to continue his commitment to Mamberamo are preferred. CI
will select the best 20 candidates based on your resume, skills,
knowledge, and field experience.


Others

Candidate should fill in the registration form (attached) and submit all
necessary documents to CI-Papua office before the end of July 2000. The
best 20 candidates would be selected based on your resume, skills,
knowledge, and field experience. CI would provide transportation cost,
lodging, meals, and course materials for selected participants. In
returns, the participant must attend all the activities, both in the class
and fieldwork, species identification, prepare data analysis, and
preliminary report.


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE CONTACT:

Suer Suryadi, Conservation International-Papua,
Jl. Jeruk Nipis No. 154, Kotaraja, Jayapura 99225
Tel./Fax: 0967-584425
E-mail: ci-irian@jayapura.wasantara.net.id
------------------------------------------------------



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Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] After the West Papua Congress (5/6), Is West Irian Part of Indonesia
Date: 7/1/00 3:59:41 PM Central Standard Time
From: admin@irja.org
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From: Waruno Mahdi
Subject: After the West Papua Congress (5/6), Is West Irian Part of
Indonesia?

Continued from 1. A Preliminary Appraisal
2. Rectifying History
3. From West New Guinea to West Irian
4. Is West Irian an Indonesian Colony?
------------------------------------------------------

5. IS WEST IRIAN PART OF INDONESIA?

One circumstance that has been put forward is the notion, that
West New Guinea only became part of Indonesia because it got
included in Netherlands East Indies of which Indonesia is the
successor state. Assuming that Netherlands East Indies was a
colonialist construction, the inclusion of West New Guinea
into Indonesia would then at least have to be considered as
a consequence of colonialism.

In reality, however, West New Guinea became part of a cultural,
economical, and political sphere which I'll tentatively call
"Malayo-Indonesia" very long before it was included by the
Dutch into Netherlands East Indies. In fact, West New Guinea
fell into Dutch hands not in consequence of a direct conquest or
appropriation through some Dutch military or exploratory action
in any part of that territory. It fell into Dutch jurisdiction
as a result of the subjugation of the Sultanate of Tidore which
had previously held suzerainty over parts of West New Guinea.
The first Dutch military post in the entire territory dates
from the end of the 19th century, more than 200 years after
a Dutch treaty with Tidore in 1660 documented the latter's
jurisdiction over regions of New Guinea referred to as the
Papua lands.

In other words, it was not as a result of direct colonial
conquest leading to incorporation into Netherlands East Indies,
that West New Guinea became part of Indonesia when the latter
proclaimed its independence. In truth it was the other way
round: West New Guinea got to be included into Netherlands
East Indies -- hence also into Indonesia -- because relevant
parts of the territory had already been involved in the
Malayo-Indonesian culture sphere of ethnicities (by far not
only through Tidorese activity), and had already been
culturally separated from East New Guinea and the South
Pacific very long before first European contact with any of
the respective regions.

It should be stressed that the Tidorese and their neighbours,
the Ternatans, respectively inhabiting the islands Tidore and
Ternate to the west of Halmahera in North Maluku, have been
solidly integrated in the traditional Malayo-Indonesian economic
and cultural sphere since some two millennia. However, they are
not Malayo-Polynesians. Both are linguistically as well as
racially much closer to Papuans of New Guinea, than to Malays
or Javanese (linguistically, they are even more "Papuan" than
the Biaks or several other West New-Guinean ethnicities which
are also Malayo-Polynesian).

The expansion of Tidorese rule to include relevants parts of
West New Guinea represented a normal process of economically
motivated territorial consolidation which accompanied transition
to more productive economic relations and more sophisticated
political structures as could be withessed in proto-historic
times all over the world. But in contrast with the analogical
westward expansion of Ternatan influence to include North
Sulawesi, the eastward Tidorese expansion did not even involve
incorporating racially disparate populations. The ethnic diversity
involved in the Tidorese expansion thus actually resembled e.g.
that of Brits, Picts, Anglo-Saxons, Normans, etc. in the makings
of Britain. By contrast the Ternatan westward expansion involved
a greater degree of diversity -- the Minahassans of North Sulawesi
are among the lightest skinned peoples of Indonesia (considerably
lighter than Javanese and Malays), their language is generally
associated with the Philippinic group of Malayo-Polynesian
languages.

Together, the combined Tidorese-Ternatan-centred process that
promoted the beginnings of social stratification in formerly
egalitarian communities in the north of West New Guinea and of
Sulawesi covered a large swath of Central and East Indonesia
extending from the Sangir-Talaud Islands and Minahassa (before
and in the north of Sulawesi) till Cendrawasih (former Geelvink)
Bay and the Sarmi Coast (both in the north of West New Guinea).
It is remarkable, that the driving force behind this historic
development, which connected West New Guinea with other parts of
Indonesia, were peoples with Papuan/Melanesian racial features,
and not mongoloid Indonesians such as e.g. Javanese or Malays.
The war fleet of Ternate once even effectively delayed Spanish
southward advancement towards Mindanao and the Sulu Islands.

One remaining trace of the Tidorese-Ternatan joint expansion is,
that the word for king in Tidorese and Ternatan, "kolano", has been
taken up in many languages of the area in the meaning of king or
chief, e.g. Sangir "kulano", Tondano "kolano", Biak "koranu",
Sarmi "korano".

But all that was by far not the only historical development which
tied West New Guinea with the rest of Indonesia well before first
European contact.

The oldest connections associate the northwest of New Guinea
with North Maluku racially and linguistically. The Non-Malayo-
Polynesian North Halamhera peoples (including Tidorese, Ternatans,
Tobelos, Galelas, a.o.) are most closely related with a Papuan
language phylum in the Birdshead (Kepala Burung, Vogelkop) Peninsula.
Approximately 4000 years before present, Malayo-Polynesian seafaring
peoples wedged in between. Their descendents now speak a group of
mutually closely related Malayo-Polynesian languages in and around
South Halmahera (e.g. Buli, Biga) and in the Cendrawasih (former
Geelvink) Bay, e.g. Biak, Numfor, Mafor, Windesi, a.o.

Those are the two oldest links between West Irian and other parts
of Indonesia, but they do not serve to contrast the western half
of New Guinea with the eastern half, because, Malayo-Polynesians
also moved further into Oceania. However, in the Bismarck Islands
(in the north of present PNG), Malayo-Polynesians and Papuans
between 3800 and 3600 years ago developed a culture, known as the
Lapita culture, which then spread further into much of the South
Pacific. It was never represented in West New Guinea (or Maluku),
and can thus be seen as the oldest significant culture contrast
between East and West.

This was followed by three developments involving West New Guinea,
and contrasting it with East New Guinea and the South Pacific.

The first resulted from the introduction of grain agriculture (as
distinguished from the cultivation of tubers as staple) into East
Indonesia. The first grain crop was foxtail millet (in Indonesian
"jawawut", in Numfor "pokem") from mainland China via Taiwan, the
Philippines, and Sulawesi. It is evidenced archaelogically in Timor
in a layer of a bit later than 3000 years ago. This was followed by
rice (Biak, Numfor, Windesi "fas") some time after 2500 years ago
(earliest finds in the Malayan Peninsula and Sulawesi are from
c. 2500 years ago). Both crops were eventually introduced to the
Cendrawasih Bay area in the north of West Irian, perhaps already
before 1000 years ago. There is, by contrast, no evidence of grain
cultivation in East New Guinea or in the South Pacific before first
European contact.

The second development was the distribution of the "ship-of-ancestor-
spirits" (also known as "ship-of-the-dead", "spirit-ship") cult, and
of bronze kettledrums (also referred to as Dongson drums, moko drums)
on which they were depicted, from Indochina eastwards through the
length of Indonesia from around 2500 till around 1800 or less years
ago. The easternmost peoples to prominently reflect that "ship-of-
ancestor-spirits" cult in their religious beliefs and rituals are
the Asmat in the south of West Irian. And so, not only the north,
but also the south of West New Guinea exhibits ancient culture ties
with the rest of Indonesia. This religious cult is not represented
anywhere in East New Guinea or the South Pacific.

The third development, probably the most significant of the three,
was the beginning of the spice trade which brought East Indonesia
into the worldwide trade network since approximately 2200 years ago.
This is indicated by first appearance in India and China of the
clove which originally grew exclusively in the islands of Bacan,
Makian, Mutir, Ternate, and Tidore (all in North Maluku), and by
first appearance of onyx beads from the western coast of India in
Halmahera.

The importance of this development is that it signifies the
beginning of that which one could call "Malayo-Indonesia", that
is a ring of ethnic communities tied by a network of trade and
navigation that traversed the entire archipelago. The language
spoken by the sailors navigating at least the western and central
routes seems since the very beginning to have been Malay (in the
East perhaps since a bit later, around 1300 years ago). However,
judging from Chinese sources of the 3rd till 9th centuries A.D.,
these Malay-speaking sailors were apparently not nuclear (actual)
Malays, but negrito "Sea People" (Orang Laut, perhaps also
ancestors of Sama and Bajau). Although similar in skin coloration
and hair texture, Negritos are however racially distinct from
Papuans and Melanesians. It is nevertheless remarkable, that at
the beginning of the Malayo-Indonesian tradition too, the decisive
actors were not mongoloid Indonesians (i.e. not Javanese or
Malays) either.

As a consequence of the use of Malay by the sailors, local dialects
of Malay gradually formed spontaneously in the various ports of call.
At arrival of Europeans 500 years ago, a form of Malay was already
established as contact language as far east as North Maluku. These
colloquial or contact Malay dialects thus developed to a substantial
extent without direct involvement of the actual Malays themselves,
becoming a shared or common linguistic feature of the Malayo-Indonesian
community quite detached from the neclear Malay ethnicity. Therefore,
being a Malay-speaker did not mean being a nuclear/actual Malay.

Although activity of Malay-speakers were already reported in West
New Guinea before establishment of Dutch posts there, a local dialect
of Malay apparently only gained prominence as a result of immediate
Dutch administration in the 20th century (no local contact Malay
dialect existed in East New Guinea or the South Pacific). But the
circumstance that colloquial forms of Malay finally also became
widespread in West New Guinea was perhaps one of the factors that
motivated West Papuans to feel sufficiently part of Indonesia to
join the struggle for Indonesian independence in the 1940s, and to
even keep it up in the 1950s, in the face of stiff repressions, in
isolation after the rest of the country was already enjoying
independence.

Other effects of the inclusion of West New Guinea into the Malay-
Indonesian culture sphere nevertheless already became apparent long
before first European contact.

One important effect is the introduction of metals (copper/bronze,
iron, silver, gold) and of metallurgy (bronze, iron). It should
be stressed, that some West Papuan communities were acquainted
with metal not just as a ready product introduced from outside,
but produced and processed it themselves. No knowledge of metal,
much less of metallurgy, is reported for East New Guinea before
first European contact. In other words, at European contact, East
New Guinea and the South Pacific were still in the stone age,
while West New Guinea was like other parts of Indonesia already
in the iron age.

For West New Guinea, closer studies into the concrete technology,
the accompanying rituals, and corresponding vocabulary indicate,
that metallurgy was apparently introduced through contact with
peoples of Central Maluku. This is significant in two respects:
firstly, that it seems not to have been a result of the Tidorese
expansion, but probably preceded it; secondly, that it was
certainly not the result of any sort of "civilisation-bringing"
activities of Malays or Javanese.

Another important effect is participation in metal-money mediated
trade. Chinese sources confirm that the metal used as money in
Malayo-Indonesia was silver (in the West Indonesia occasionally
also tin). Originally, leaf silver was simply cut to size to meet
a payment. The word used for money silver was initially "salaka",
a loan from India. A bit over 1700 years ago, Funan situated in
presentday Cambodia gained supremacy over the perimeter of the
Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea, causing Malay-speaking
navigation to China to take a roundabout route via the Strait of
Makassar and the Philippines. At the same time, "salaka" as word
for money silver seems to have been replaced in Malay by "perak"
(also probably pronounced "pirak") taken from Khmer (the language
of Funan).

Consequently the word for silver or money in many languages of
the Philippines reflect the newer Malay word "perak/pirak".
However, in East Indonesia which had been already involved in
the spice trade since much earlier, the word for silver more
often reflects the old word "salaka", confirming that introduction
of metal-money mediated trade here predates the period of Funan
supremacy. It is therefore quite remarkable, that the words for
silver in languages of the Cendrawasih Bay region reflect "salaka",
for example: Biak "sarah", Numfor "sarah", Mafor "sarak", Windesi
"serak".

However, as local contact-forms of Malay only developed here very
late, it seems probable that the words were not obtained directly
from Malay-speakers, but perhaps from some Central Maluku language
which had acquired the word from Malay at an earlier time (cf.
Haruku "salaka", Masarete "eslaka", Bonfia "sela'a", etc.). So,
introduction of metal-money mediated trade in West New Guinea
perhaps took place at about the same time as that of metallurgy
which had also been acquired through contact with Central Maluku.
Albeit, the word could theoretically also have been obtained later
from Tidorese which had also acquired "salaka" for silver.

In East New Guinea before European contact we do not find any
form of free money-mediated trade, and of course also no metal
money. There were certain forms of money made of stone or shell,
but they were not used in free trade, but only in certain ritual
forms of exchange with traditionally determined participants,
roles, and objects. In the Kiriwina (Trobriand) Islands it was
called the "Kula", in the Gulf of Papua it was the "Hiri". So, on
this point too, West New Guinea resembled the rest of Indonesia,
rather than East New Guinea.

It is of course quite within the nature of such ethno-geographic
complexes, in which a great number of countries and ethnicities
are brought together by economic ties as in the Malayo-Indonesian
community, that there would be continuous efforts to also unite
the whole, or considerable portions of it, politically under a
single power centre. The earliest Malay empire of Yawadwipa
probably only involved the westernmost part of Malayo-Indonesia.
The Malay empire of Sri Wijaya which rose to power a bit over
1300 years ago apparently extended its hegemony as far east as
Sulawesi, perhaps even till parts of Maluku, and northwards to
include parts of the Philippines, at some time also Cambodia.

During the following period up to around 700 years ago, hegemony in
the region gradually moved to Central Java, ending in the emergence
of the Central Javanese empire of Majapahit. At the peak of its
power, it held suzerainty over a region more or less coinciding
with the territories of Malaysia and Indonesia in the west and
centre (in the north perhaps including some southern parts of the
Philippines), and extending to the east to include North Maluku and
the Onin area around Fakfak on the westcoast of West New Guinea.

The notation of Onin (spelled "Wwanin", cf. also the spelling
"Ambwan" for Ambon) in the 14th-century Old Javanese Nagarakrtagama
is the first reference to any part of New Guinea in any historio-
graphic source. Although it was obviously not the first part of
West New Guinea for which involvement in the Malayo-Indonesian
community can be inferred, it provides further indication that
that involvement was not restricted to the north coast.

On the other hand, there is one persistent notion connected with
inclusion of Onin among the vassal territories of Majapahit which
needs to be corrected. It is the assumption that it serves as proof
that West New Guinea belongs to Indonesia. If that were true, then
Malaysia, Brunei, East Timor, and parts of the Philippines would
"belong" to Indonesia as well, whereas the greater part of West Irian
actually would not. The absurdity of the former line of argumentation
is actually clear when one tries to decide, whether Malaysia and part
of Indonesia "belong" to Cambodia (considering the situation under
Funan), or whether Cambodia "belongs" to Indonesia (refering to the
situation under Sri Wijaya). In reality, Indonesia is neither the
successor state of Sri Wijaya nor that of Majapahit. It is that of
Netherlands East Indies. But it is the third major Malayo-Indonesian
archipelagean state formation, after Majapahit and Netherlands East
Indies, to have included a western part of New Guinea in its territory
(the fourth if one includes the Sultanate of Tidore; I am not informed
about whether the Makassarese Sultanate of Gowa had spread its
activity as far east as New Guinea).

One important feature of the Majapahit period was the development
of cities as emerging centres of a mercantile and craftsmenly middle
class. The mercantile centres throughout Malayo-Indonesia converted
to Islam, and finally strove to free themself from the ovelordship
of Hindu Majapahit. This led around 500 years ago to the defeat of
Majapahit by the Sultanate of Demak.

The expected logical continuation of this process would actually
have been another political unification of Malayo-Indonesia, this
time under an Islamic central power. But the decisive victory of
the Islamic party over Hindu Majapahit coincided with the loss of
Malayo-Indonesian monopoly on the spice trade that had been based
on the closely kept secret of the navigation route to Maluku. This
been the economic basis of the wealth and power of the Islamic
polities. With entrance of the Portuguese, and subsuquently also
of other European into the spice trade, the Islamic revolution came
to a halt. Demak fell, and feudal relations of the Majapahit period
were restored in Mataram.

This left Malayo-Indonesia in a dualistic Islamic/non-Islamic
state. Practically, only Java was almost entirely islamicised
(the Tenggerese and Baduis are non-Islamic). most of the Bataks
in Sumatra, Dayaks in Kalimantan, Torajas in Sulawesi, etc.,
remained not islamicised. The further to the east, the smaller
the share of Islamic ethnicities. Nevertheless, West New Guinea
was also included in that whole process. Thus, for example, the
Kowiai in West Irian are Muslims. As far as I am informed, there
are no indigenous Muslim ethnic groups in East New Guinea or the
South Pacific. That is to say, they have no experience with the
kind of problems so typical for all of Indonesia, and with which
the organisers of the West Papua Congress had coped so masterfully,
i.e. cooperation between Muslims and Christians, and with other
religious communities.

Instead of a reunification under Islamic Demak, Malayo-Indonesia
began to undergo renewed political unification by the Christian
Netherlands instead, but with some restrictions. Already before
that, the Northern and Central Philippines had been extracted by
Spain, and later, Mindanao and the Sulu Islands also came under
Spanish rule. What was left of Malayo-Indonesia was then finally
divided between Great Britain and the Netherlands by the Treaty
of London. All this is the main reason why I use the term Malayo-
Indonesia for the previous periods. The processes of those times
not only concerned what is now Indonesia, but also Malaysia and
at least part of the Philippines.

The subsequent development in the subdivisions of Malayo-Indonesia
were characterised on one hand by the fact, that they proceeded
under totally different conditions of colonial rule by the Dutch,
British, and Spaniards (later replaced by the Americans). On the
other hand, the development of the urban middle class and economic
relations based on commodity exchange and production with hired
labour have a vital role in the formation of modern national
identities. The borders that separated territories of the three
different colonial powers therefore much more effectively delimited
national formations from each other, than all former divisions.
For it was during this latter period, that those social and
economic relations underwent a particularly intensive development.

Hence, distinctions in national identities between modern urbanised
Malays of Indonesia and modern urbanised Malays of Malaysia are much
more significant, than differences between the former and e.g. modern
urbanised Javanese, Banjarese, Buginese, or Ambonese. By contrast,
such distinctions among egalitarian ethnic communities on alternating
sides of e.g. the border between Indonesian West Kalimantan and
Malaysian Sarawak may remain quite negligible, until they get
absorbed into the respective national commodity-economies.

So too, at the border between West Irian and PNG, there may be quite
significant distinctions between urban Papuans e.g. in Numbai or
Manokwari and urban Papuas in Port Moresby. But, for egalitarian
communities in the hinterland the national border has little
significance. It is however the urban population, particularly the
urban middle class, which plays a determining role in the formation
of national identity.

If we now inspect more closely the border between Indonesia and PNG
on one side, and the border between Indonesia and Malaysia on the
other, then at a first glance, the border to Malaysia may seem
more "nationally delimiting" than the border to PNG. This is
because contrastive Dutch and British administrative conditions
in the west existed since at least a century earlier than in the east,
and urbanisation in Malaysia and West Indonesia was more advanced
than in New Guinea. At a second glance, however, one will have to
admit, that it is actually the other way round. For, the border to
Malaysia was a totally novel boundary introduced as a result of the
Treaty of London, cutting off Johore from the Sultanate of Riau, and
cutting off peninsular vassal territories of the Sumatran kingdom
of Minangkabau from the liege lord they secretly continued to revere
out of religious tradition even for many years after the Treaty came
into force.

In New Guinea, by contrast, the arbitrarily drawn colonial border
line happened to separate that part of the island, which had
already long been included in the Malayo-Indonesian community,
from the other part that still remained completely outside that
community. This was because Dutch access to the island was mediated
along existing Malayo-Indonesian lines of communication. The
contrast between West and East New Guinea was thus not exclusively
a product of colonialism, as was the contrast between Malaysia and
West Indonesia. Here, colonialism merely consolidated already
existing delimitations. Only in the interior, still inhabitted by
egalitarian groups, are the national borders in New Guinea and in
Kalimantan still quite arbitrarily imposed imaginary lines. This is
probably also true e.g. for the borders of Brasil to its neighbours
in the upper Amazon region.

In summary, it is important to realise, that as a consequence of the
historical inclusion of West New Guinea within Malayo-Indonesia, and
its having been part of Netherlands East Indies and of Indonesia,
a sudden separation would lead to all kinds of "unexpected" problems.

The most obvious of these would be the problem of language. This was
already demonstrated at the West Papua Congress itself in projections
of a future separate West Papuan state. Delegates were apparently at
a loss, trying to decide on a national language, and named three:
English, Dutch, and Tok Pisin. The problem is, that the only language
of interethnic communication in West Irian is Malay: Bahasa Indonesia
in education and formal discourse, and Irian Malay in colloquial
communication. Hoping to change this per legislative decision is
quite illusionary, as has recently been demonstrated in East Timor.
There, just 24 years of Indonesian administration led to a really
tragic linguistic schism between the younger Indonesian-speaking
generation of intellectuals and the elder Portuguese speaking one.
In West Irian, even if one leaves aside the century-old Irian Malay
tradition and whatever School Malay might have been taught under
Dutch administration, Indonesian administration alone now covers a
period of 37 years.

Just as serious would be problems arising if one would try to unite
West New guinea with PNG instead of with Indonesia. West Papuans
probably do not realise that the very sympathetic and cordial
solidarisation which they experience from peoples of PNG and the
South Pacific in their present predicament do not actually serve as
demonstration of some sort of common ethno-cultural basic national
identity. It should be remembered, that a similar emotional warmth
existed between peoples of Southeast Asia in the 1940s and 1950s.
This kind of solidarity between various nationalities with some
conspicuous but skin-deep common features remains stabile as long
as concrete national borders tacitly safeguard disparate fundamental
interests of each nation from interference by the respective other.

Should one unite West New Guinea with PNG, deeply rooted culture
features of e.g. West Papuan ethnicities of the north coast with
centuries of mercantile tradition would clash quite sharply with
established cultural inclinations of East Papuans. In West and
Central Europe, efforts towards a united Europe still are in the
stage of cautious projections of a future federation, although
intensive mutual economic infiltration in a common market has been
preparing the grounds for almost half a century now.

Against this, of course, there is the much lamented contrast between
"Papuans" and "Javanese". In truth, however, the whole of Indonesia
is rife with interethnic contrasts, and this is not different within
each individual island, West Irian not excluded. But many observers
are simply blinded by external distinctions of race, which lets
West Papuans appear much more "naturally" grouped with East Papuans,
and just as "unnaturally" with "Javanese". Nevertheless, there is
no distinct boundary between the distribution areas of australoids
(i.e. Negritos, Papuas, Melanesians taken together) and mongoloids
in Indonesia, and such a boundary most certainly does not run
between West Irian and the remaining Indonesian provinces. One finds
australoids as far west as in Sumatra and in the island of Enggano
to the west of it. Communities with mixed racial features are spread
throughout Maluku and Nusa Tenggara, but also occur e.g. in Sumatra
or Sulawesi.

Javanese however form the largest ethnic group in Indoensia, and so,
even in case of strict proportionality, one would expectably find
more Javanese in all fields of activity, thus creating the optical
impression of dominance. Of course, variant ethnic preferences leads
to even overproportional representation of Javanese in some walks
of life -- e.g. among civil servants -- and an underproportional one
in others -- e.g. among merchants and traders. Buginese, Makassarese
and Minangkabaus, by contrast, seem to exhibit the opposite preference.
The probably most expansionist ethnic group in Indonesia has however
since some centuries been the Buginese, and not the Javanese. And
Madurese, also more expansionist than the Javanese, have even for
some centuries been expanding into originally Javanese territory in
East Java.

But one circumstance may have contributed to particular apprehension
of West Papuans towards Javanese. Already since the 1950s, it had
been standard military policy in Indonesia to deal with local unrests
using troops of divergent ethnic origin. I personally know of Muslim
Sundanese in West Java who had an aversion towards Bataks (from
Sumatra). It just so happened that the troops implemented to fight
the DI/TII rebellion in the part of West Java where they lived were
Bataks. It seems probable that the greater part of troops that were
set in against the OPM and the population in West Irian were from
Java.

Considering the extent of the brutalities that were committed against
the population in West Irian, one will probably have to bear with
prolonged and intense anti-Javanese sentiments in parts of the
population, if the greater part of the troops involved in the
repressions had been Javanese. The circumstance, that Javanese
probably also make up the greaster part of NGO activists working for
human rights, medical and economic relief, and invironmental
protection in West Irian, and also make up a substantial part of
members of church organisations operating in the province, does
help of course. But they cannot fully neutralise the intensive shock
effect and traumas occasioned by the military.

(to be continued)

...6. Prospects for the Future.







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Subj: After the West Papua Congress (5/6), Is Irian Jaya an Indonesian Colony?
Date: 7/1/00 10:07:42 AM Central Standard Time
From: mahdi@FHI-Berlin.MPG.DE (Waruno Mahdi)
To: indonesia-act@igc.apc.org, tapol@gn.apc.org, reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org

Continued from 1. A Preliminary Appraisal
2. Rectifying History
3. From West New Guinea to West Irian
4. Is West Irian an Indonesian Colony?
------------------------------------------------------

5. IS WEST IRIAN PART OF INDONESIA?

One circumstance that has been put forward is the notion, that
West New Guinea only became part of Indonesia because it got
included in Netherlands East Indies of which Indonesia is the
successor state. Assuming that Netherlands East Indies was a
colonialist construction, the inclusion of West New Guinea
into Indonesia would then at least have to be considered as
a consequence of colonialism.

In reality, however, West New Guinea became part of a cultural,
economical, and political sphere which I'll tentatively call
"Malayo-Indonesia" very long before it was included by the
Dutch into Netherlands East Indies. In fact, West New Guinea
fell into Dutch hands not in consequence of a direct conquest or
appropriation through some Dutch military or exploratory action
in any part of that territory. It fell into Dutch jurisdiction
as a result of the subjugation of the Sultanate of Tidore which
had previously held suzerainty over parts of West New Guinea.
The first Dutch military post in the entire territory dates
from the end of the 19th century, more than 200 years after
a Dutch treaty with Tidore in 1660 documented the latter's
jurisdiction over regions of New Guinea referred to as the
Papua lands.

In other words, it was not as a result of direct colonial
conquest leading to incorporation into Netherlands East Indies,
that West New Guinea became part of Indonesia when the latter
proclaimed its independence. In truth it was the other way
round: West New Guinea got to be included into Netherlands
East Indies -- hence also into Indonesia -- because relevant
parts of the territory had already been involved in the
Malayo-Indonesian culture sphere of ethnicities (by far not
only through Tidorese activity), and had already been
culturally separated from East New Guinea and the South
Pacific very long before first European contact with any of
the respective regions.

It should be stressed that the Tidorese and their neighbours,
the Ternatans, respectively inhabiting the islands Tidore and
Ternate to the west of Halmahera in North Maluku, have been
solidly integrated in the traditional Malayo-Indonesian economic
and cultural sphere since some two millennia. However, they are
not Malayo-Polynesians. Both are linguistically as well as
racially much closer to Papuans of New Guinea, than to Malays
or Javanese (linguistically, they are even more "Papuan" than
the Biaks or several other West New-Guinean ethnicities which
are also Malayo-Polynesian).

The expansion of Tidorese rule to include relevants parts of
West New Guinea represented a normal process of economically
motivated territorial consolidation which accompanied transition
to more productive economic relations and more sophisticated
political structures as could be withessed in proto-historic
times all over the world. But in contrast with the analogical
westward expansion of Ternatan influence to include North
Sulawesi, the eastward Tidorese expansion did not even involve
incorporating racially disparate populations. The ethnic diversity
involved in the Tidorese expansion thus actually resembled e.g.
that of Brits, Picts, Anglo-Saxons, Normans, etc. in the makings
of Britain. By contrast the Ternatan westward expansion involved
a greater degree of diversity -- the Minahassans of North Sulawesi
are among the lightest skinned peoples of Indonesia (considerably
lighter than Javanese and Malays), their language is generally
associated with the Philippinic group of Malayo-Polynesian
languages.

Together, the combined Tidorese-Ternatan-centred process that
promoted the beginnings of social stratification in formerly
egalitarian communities in the north of West New Guinea and of
Sulawesi covered a large swath of Central and East Indonesia
extending from the Sangir-Talaud Islands and Minahassa (before
and in the north of Sulawesi) till Cendrawasih (former Geelvink)
Bay and the Sarmi Coast (both in the north of West New Guinea).
It is remarkable, that the driving force behind this historic
development, which connected West New Guinea with other parts of
Indonesia, were peoples with Papuan/Melanesian racial features,
and not mongoloid Indonesians such as e.g. Javanese or Malays.
The war fleet of Ternate once even effectively delayed Spanish
southward advancement towards Mindanao and the Sulu Islands.

One remaining trace of the Tidorese-Ternatan joint expansion is,
that the word for king in Tidorese and Ternatan, "kolano", has been
taken up in many languages of the area in the meaning of king or
chief, e.g. Sangir "kulano", Tondano "kolano", Biak "koranu",
Sarmi "korano".

But all that was by far not the only historical development which
tied West New Guinea with the rest of Indonesia well before first
European contact.

The oldest connections associate the northwest of New Guinea
with North Maluku racially and linguistically. The Non-Malayo-
Polynesian North Halamhera peoples (including Tidorese, Ternatans,
Tobelos, Galelas, a.o.) are most closely related with a Papuan
language phylum in the Birdshead (Kepala Burung, Vogelkop) Peninsula.
Approximately 4000 years before present, Malayo-Polynesian seafaring
peoples wedged in between. Their descendents now speak a group of
mutually closely related Malayo-Polynesian languages in and around
South Halmahera (e.g. Buli, Biga) and in the Cendrawasih (former
Geelvink) Bay, e.g. Biak, Numfor, Mafor, Windesi, a.o.

Those are the two oldest links between West Irian and other parts
of Indonesia, but they do not serve to contrast the western half
of New Guinea with the eastern half, because, Malayo-Polynesians
also moved further into Oceania. However, in the Bismarck Islands
(in the north of present PNG), Malayo-Polynesians and Papuans
between 3800 and 3600 years ago developed a culture, known as the
Lapita culture, which then spread further into much of the South
Pacific. It was never represented in West New Guinea (or Maluku),
and can thus be seen as the oldest significant culture contrast
between East and West.

This was followed by three developments involving West New Guinea,
and contrasting it with East New Guinea and the South Pacific.

The first resulted from the introduction of grain agriculture (as
distinguished from the cultivation of tubers as staple) into East
Indonesia. The first grain crop was foxtail millet (in Indonesian
"jawawut", in Numfor "pokem") from mainland China via Taiwan, the
Philippines, and Sulawesi. It is evidenced archaelogically in Timor
in a layer of a bit later than 3000 years ago. This was followed by
rice (Biak, Numfor, Windesi "fas") some time after 2500 years ago
(earliest finds in the Malayan Peninsula and Sulawesi are from
c. 2500 years ago). Both crops were eventually introduced to the
Cendrawasih Bay area in the north of West Irian, perhaps already
before 1000 years ago. There is, by contrast, no evidence of grain
cultivation in East New Guinea or in the South Pacific before first
European contact.

The second development was the distribution of the "ship-of-ancestor-
spirits" (also known as "ship-of-the-dead", "spirit-ship") cult, and
of bronze kettledrums (also referred to as Dongson drums, moko drums)
on which they were depicted, from Indochina eastwards through the
length of Indonesia from around 2500 till around 1800 or less years
ago. The easternmost peoples to prominently reflect that "ship-of-
ancestor-spirits" cult in their religious beliefs and rituals are
the Asmat in the south of West Irian. And so, not only the north,
but also the south of West New Guinea exhibits ancient culture ties
with the rest of Indonesia. This religious cult is not represented
anywhere in East New Guinea or the South Pacific.

The third development, probably the most significant of the three,
was the beginning of the spice trade which brought East Indonesia
into the worldwide trade network since approximately 2200 years ago.
This is indicated by first appearance in India and China of the
clove which originally grew exclusively in the islands of Bacan,
Makian, Mutir, Ternate, and Tidore (all in North Maluku), and by
first appearance of onyx beads from the western coast of India in
Halmahera.

The importance of this development is that it signifies the
beginning of that which one could call "Malayo-Indonesia", that
is a ring of ethnic communities tied by a network of trade and
navigation that traversed the entire archipelago. The language
spoken by the sailors navigating at least the western and central
routes seems since the very beginning to have been Malay (in the
East perhaps since a bit later, around 1300 years ago). However,
judging from Chinese sources of the 3rd till 9th centuries A.D.,
these Malay-speaking sailors were apparently not nuclear (actual)
Malays, but negrito "Sea People" (Orang Laut, perhaps also
ancestors of Sama and Bajau). Although similar in skin coloration
and hair texture, Negritos are however racially distinct from
Papuans and Melanesians. It is nevertheless remarkable, that at
the beginning of the Malayo-Indonesian tradition too, the decisive
actors were not mongoloid Indonesians (i.e. not Javanese or
Malays) either.

As a consequence of the use of Malay by the sailors, local dialects
of Malay gradually formed spontaneously in the various ports of call.
At arrival of Europeans 500 years ago, a form of Malay was already
established as contact language as far east as North Maluku. These
colloquial or contact Malay dialects thus developed to a substantial
extent without direct involvement of the actual Malays themselves,
becoming a shared or common linguistic feature of the Malayo-Indonesian
community quite detached from the neclear Malay ethnicity. Therefore,
being a Malay-speaker did not mean being a nuclear/actual Malay.

Although activity of Malay-speakers were already reported in West
New Guinea before establishment of Dutch posts there, a local dialect
of Malay apparently only gained prominence as a result of immediate
Dutch administration in the 20th century (no local contact Malay
dialect existed in East New Guinea or the South Pacific). But the
circumstance that colloquial forms of Malay finally also became
widespread in West New Guinea was perhaps one of the factors that
motivated West Papuans to feel sufficiently part of Indonesia to
join the struggle for Indonesian independence in the 1940s, and to
even keep it up in the 1950s, in the face of stiff repressions, in
isolation after the rest of the country was already enjoying
independence.

Other effects of the inclusion of West New Guinea into the Malay-
Indonesian culture sphere nevertheless already became apparent long
before first European contact.

One important effect is the introduction of metals (copper/bronze,
iron, silver, gold) and of metallurgy (bronze, iron). It should
be stressed, that some West Papuan communities were acquainted
with metal not just as a ready product introduced from outside,
but produced and processed it themselves. No knowledge of metal,
much less of metallurgy, is reported for East New Guinea before
first European contact. In other words, at European contact, East
New Guinea and the South Pacific were still in the stone age,
while West New Guinea was like other parts of Indonesia already
in the iron age.

For West New Guinea, closer studies into the concrete technology,
the accompanying rituals, and corresponding vocabulary indicate,
that metallurgy was apparently introduced through contact with
peoples of Central Maluku. This is significant in two respects:
firstly, that it seems not to have been a result of the Tidorese
expansion, but probably preceded it; secondly, that it was
certainly not the result of any sort of "civilisation-bringing"
activities of Malays or Javanese.

Another important effect is participation in metal-money mediated
trade. Chinese sources confirm that the metal used as money in
Malayo-Indonesia was silver (in the West Indonesia occasionally
also tin). Originally, leaf silver was simply cut to size to meet
a payment. The word used for money silver was initially "salaka",
a loan from India. A bit over 1700 years ago, Funan situated in
presentday Cambodia gained supremacy over the perimeter of the
Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea, causing Malay-speaking
navigation to China to take a roundabout route via the Strait of
Makassar and the Philippines. At the same time, "salaka" as word
for money silver seems to have been replaced in Malay by "perak"
(also probably pronounced "pirak") taken from Khmer (the language
of Funan).

Consequently the word for silver or money in many languages of
the Philippines reflect the newer Malay word "perak/pirak".
However, in East Indonesia which had been already involved in
the spice trade since much earlier, the word for silver more
often reflects the old word "salaka", confirming that introduction
of metal-money mediated trade here predates the period of Funan
supremacy. It is therefore quite remarkable, that the words for
silver in languages of the Cendrawasih Bay region reflect "salaka",
for example: Biak "sarah", Numfor "sarah", Mafor "sarak", Windesi
"serak".

However, as local contact-forms of Malay only developed here very
late, it seems probable that the words were not obtained directly
from Malay-speakers, but perhaps from some Central Maluku language
which had acquired the word from Malay at an earlier time (cf.
Haruku "salaka", Masarete "eslaka", Bonfia "sela'a", etc.). So,
introduction of metal-money mediated trade in West New Guinea
perhaps took place at about the same time as that of metallurgy
which had also been acquired through contact with Central Maluku.
Albeit, the word could theoretically also have been obtained later
from Tidorese which had also acquired "salaka" for silver.

In East New Guinea before European contact we do not find any
form of free money-mediated trade, and of course also no metal
money. There were certain forms of money made of stone or shell,
but they were not used in free trade, but only in certain ritual
forms of exchange with traditionally determined participants,
roles, and objects. In the Kiriwina (Trobriand) Islands it was
called the "Kula", in the Gulf of Papua it was the "Hiri". So, on
this point too, West New Guinea resembled the rest of Indonesia,
rather than East New Guinea.

It is of course quite within the nature of such ethno-geographic
complexes, in which a great number of countries and ethnicities
are brought together by economic ties as in the Malayo-Indonesian
community, that there would be continuous efforts to also unite
the whole, or considerable portions of it, politically under a
single power centre. The earliest Malay empire of Yawadwipa
probably only involved the westernmost part of Malayo-Indonesia.
The Malay empire of Sri Wijaya which rose to power a bit over
1300 years ago apparently extended its hegemony as far east as
Sulawesi, perhaps even till parts of Maluku, and northwards to
include parts of the Philippines, at some time also Cambodia.

During the following period up to around 700 years ago, hegemony in
the region gradually moved to Central Java, ending in the emergence
of the Central Javanese empire of Majapahit. At the peak of its
power, it held suzerainty over a region more or less coinciding
with the territories of Malaysia and Indonesia in the west and
centre (in the north perhaps including some southern parts of the
Philippines), and extending to the east to include North Maluku and
the Onin area around Fakfak on the westcoast of West New Guinea.

The notation of Onin (spelled "Wwanin", cf. also the spelling
"Ambwan" for Ambon) in the 14th-century Old Javanese Nagarakrtagama
is the first reference to any part of New Guinea in any historio-
graphic source. Although it was obviously not the first part of
West New Guinea for which involvement in the Malayo-Indonesian
community can be inferred, it provides further indication that
that involvement was not restricted to the north coast.

On the other hand, there is one persistent notion connected with
inclusion of Onin among the vassal territories of Majapahit which
needs to be corrected. It is the assumption that it serves as proof
that West New Guinea belongs to Indonesia. If that were true, then
Malaysia, Brunei, East Timor, and parts of the Philippines would
"belong" to Indonesia as well, whereas the greater part of West Irian
actually would not. The absurdity of the former line of argumentation
is actually clear when one tries to decide, whether Malaysia and part
of Indonesia "belong" to Cambodia (considering the situation under
Funan), or whether Cambodia "belongs" to Indonesia (refering to the
situation under Sri Wijaya). In reality, Indonesia is neither the
successor state of Sri Wijaya nor that of Majapahit. It is that of
Netherlands East Indies. But it is the third major Malayo-Indonesian
archipelagean state formation, after Majapahit and Netherlands East
Indies, to have included a western part of New Guinea in its territory
(the fourth if one includes the Sultanate of Tidore; I am not informed
about whether the Makassarese Sultanate of Gowa had spread its
activity as far east as New Guinea).

One important feature of the Majapahit period was the development
of cities as emerging centres of a mercantile and craftsmenly middle
class. The mercantile centres throughout Malayo-Indonesia converted
to Islam, and finally strove to free themself from the ovelordship
of Hindu Majapahit. This led around 500 years ago to the defeat of
Majapahit by the Sultanate of Demak.

The expected logical continuation of this process would actually
have been another political unification of Malayo-Indonesia, this
time under an Islamic central power. But the decisive victory of
the Islamic party over Hindu Majapahit coincided with the loss of
Malayo-Indonesian monopoly on the spice trade that had been based
on the closely kept secret of the navigation route to Maluku. This
had been the economic basis of the wealth and power of the Islamic
polities. With entrance of the Portuguese, and subsuquently also
of other European into the spice trade, the Islamic revolution came
to a halt. Demak fell, and feudal relations of the Majapahit period
were restored in Mataram.

This left Malayo-Indonesia in a dualistic Islamic/non-Islamic
state. Practically, only Java was almost entirely islamicised
(the Tenggerese and Baduis are non-Islamic). most of the Bataks
in Sumatra, Dayaks in Kalimantan, Torajas in Sulawesi, etc.,
remained not islamicised. The further to the east, the smaller
the share of Islamic ethnicities. Nevertheless, West New Guinea
was also included in that whole process. Thus, for example, the
Kowiai in West Irian are Muslims. As far as I am informed, there
are no indigenous Muslim ethnic groups in East New Guinea or the
South Pacific. That is to say, they have no experience with the
kind of problems so typical for all of Indonesia, and with which
the organisers of the West Papua Congress had coped so masterfully,
i.e. cooperation between Muslims and Christians, and with other
religious communities.

Instead of a reunification under Islamic Demak, Malayo-Indonesia
began to undergo renewed political unification by the Christian
Netherlands instead, but with some restrictions. Already before
that, the Northern and Central Philippines had been extracted by
Spain, and later, Mindanao and the Sulu Islands also came under
Spanish rule. What was left of Malayo-Indonesia was then finally
divided between Great Britain and the Netherlands by the Treaty
of London. All this is the main reason why I use the term Malayo-
Indonesia for the previous periods. The processes of those times
not only concerned what is now Indonesia, but also Malaysia and
at least part of the Philippines.

The subsequent development in the subdivisions of Malayo-Indonesia
were characterised on one hand by the fact, that they proceeded
under totally different conditions of colonial rule by the Dutch,
British, and Spaniards (later replaced by the Americans). On the
other hand, the development of the urban middle class and economic
relations based on commodity exchange and production with hired
labour have a vital role in the formation of modern national
identities. The borders that separated territories of the three
different colonial powers therefore much more effectively delimited
national formations from each other, than all former divisions.
For it was during this latter period, that those social and
economic relations underwent a particularly intensive development.

Hence, distinctions in national identities between modern urbanised
Malays of Indonesia and modern urbanised Malays of Malaysia are much
more significant, than differences between the former and e.g. modern
urbanised Javanese, Banjarese, Buginese, or Ambonese. By contrast,
such distinctions among egalitarian ethnic communities on alternating
sides of e.g. the border between Indonesian West Kalimantan and
Malaysian Sarawak may remain quite negligible, until they get
absorbed into the respective national commodity-economies.

So too, at the border between West Irian and PNG, there may be quite
significant distinctions between urban Papuans e.g. in Numbai or
Manokwari and urban Papuas in Port Moresby. But, for egalitarian
communities in the hinterland the national border has little
significance. It is however the urban population, particularly the
urban middle class, which plays a determining role in the formation
of national identity.

If we now inspect more closely the border between Indonesia and PNG
on one side, and the border between Indonesia and Malaysia on the
other, then at a first glance, the border to Malaysia may seem
more "nationally delimiting" than the border to PNG. This is
because contrastive Dutch and British administrative conditions
in the west existed since at least a century earlier than in the east,
and urbanisation in Malaysia and West Indonesia was more advanced
than in New Guinea. At a second glance, however, one will have to
admit, that it is actually the other way round. For, the border to
Malaysia was a totally novel boundary introduced as a result of the
Treaty of London, cutting off Johore from the Sultanate of Riau, and
cutting off peninsular vassal territories of the Sumatran kingdom
of Minangkabau from the liege lord they secretly continued to revere
out of religious tradition even for many years after the Treaty came
into force.

In New Guinea, by contrast, the arbitrarily drawn colonial border
line happened to separate that part of the island, which had
already long been included in the Malayo-Indonesian community,
from the other part that still remained completely outside that
community. This was because Dutch access to the island was mediated
along existing Malayo-Indonesian lines of communication. The
contrast between West and East New Guinea was thus not exclusively
a product of colonialism, as was the contrast between Malaysia and
West Indonesia. Here, colonialism merely consolidated already
existing delimitations. Only in the interior, still inhabitted by
egalitarian groups, are the national borders in New Guinea and in
Kalimantan still quite arbitrarily imposed imaginary lines. This is
probably also true e.g. for the borders of Brasil to its neighbours
in the upper Amazon region.

In summary, it is important to realise, that as a consequence of the
historical inclusion of West New Guinea within Malayo-Indonesia, and
its having been part of Netherlands East Indies and of Indonesia,
a sudden separation would lead to all kinds of "unexpected" problems.

The most obvious of these would be the problem of language. This was
already demonstrated at the West Papua Congress itself in projections
of a future separate West Papuan state. Delegates were apparently at
a loss, trying to decide on a national language, and named three:
English, Dutch, and Tok Pisin. The problem is, that the only language
of interethnic communication in West Irian is Malay: Bahasa Indonesia
in education and formal discourse, and Irian Malay in colloquial
communication. Hoping to change this per legislative decision is
quite illusionary, as has recently been demonstrated in East Timor.
There, just 24 years of Indonesian administration led to a really
tragic linguistic schism between the younger Indonesian-speaking
generation of intellectuals and the elder Portuguese speaking one.
In West Irian, even if one leaves aside the century-old Irian Malay
tradition and whatever School Malay might have been taught under
Dutch administration, Indonesian administration alone now covers a
period of 37 years.

Just as serious would be problems arising if one would try to unite
West New guinea with PNG instead of with Indonesia. West Papuans
probably do not realise that the very sympathetic and cordial
solidarisation which they experience from peoples of PNG and the
South Pacific in their present predicament do not actually serve as
demonstration of some sort of common ethno-cultural basic national
identity. It should be remembered, that a similar emotional warmth
existed between peoples of Southeast Asia in the 1940s and 1950s.
This kind of solidarity between various nationalities with some
conspicuous but skin-deep common features remains stabile as long
as concrete national borders tacitly safeguard disparate fundamental
interests of each nation from interference by the respective other.

Should one unite West New Guinea with PNG, deeply rooted culture
features of e.g. West Papuan ethnicities of the north coast with
centuries of mercantile tradition would clash quite sharply with
established cultural inclinations of East Papuans. In West and
Central Europe, efforts towards a united Europe still are in the
stage of cautious projections of a future federation, although
intensive mutual economic infiltration in a common market has been
preparing the grounds for almost half a century now.

Against this, of course, there is the much lamented contrast between
"Papuans" and "Javanese". In truth, however, the whole of Indonesia
is rife with interethnic contrasts, and this is not different within
each individual island, West Irian not excluded. But many observers
are simply blinded by external distinctions of race, which lets
West Papuans appear much more "naturally" grouped with East Papuans,
and just as "unnaturally" with "Javanese". Nevertheless, there is
no distinct boundary between the distribution areas of australoids
(i.e. Negritos, Papuas, Melanesians taken together) and mongoloids
in Indonesia, and such a boundary most certainly does not run
between West Irian and the remaining Indonesian provinces. One finds
australoids as far west as in Sumatra and in the island of Enggano
to the west of it. Communities with mixed racial features are spread
throughout Maluku and Nusa Tenggara, but also occur e.g. in Sumatra
or Sulawesi.

Javanese however form the largest ethnic group in Indoensia, and so,
even in case of strict proportionality, one would expectably find
more Javanese in all fields of activity, thus creating the optical
impression of dominance. Of course, variant ethnic preferences leads
to even overproportional representation of Javanese in some walks
of life -- e.g. among civil servants -- and an underproportional one
in others -- e.g. among merchants and traders. Buginese, Makassarese
and Minangkabaus, by contrast, seem to exhibit the opposite preference.
The probably most expansionist ethnic group in Indonesia has however
since some centuries been the Buginese, and not the Javanese. And
Madurese, also more expansionist than the Javanese, have even for
some centuries been expanding into originally Javanese territory in
East Java.

But one circumstance may have contributed to particular apprehension
of West Papuans towards Javanese. Already since the 1950s, it had
been standard military policy in Indonesia to deal with local unrests
using troops of divergent ethnic origin. I personally know of Muslim
Sundanese in West Java who had an aversion towards Bataks (from
Sumatra). It just so happened that the troops implemented to fight
the DI/TII rebellion in the part of West Java where they lived were
Bataks. It seems probable that the greater part of troops that were
set in against the OPM and the population in West Irian were from
Java.

Considering the extent of the brutalities that were committed against
the population in West Irian, one will probably have to bear with
prolonged and intense anti-Javanese sentiments in parts of the
population, if the greater part of the troops involved in the
repressions had been Javanese. The circumstance, that Javanese
probably also make up the greaster part of NGO activists working for
human rights, medical and economic relief, and invironmental
protection in West Irian, and also make up a substantial part of
members of church organisations operating in the province, does
help of course. But they cannot fully neutralise the intensive shock
effect and traumas occasioned by the military.

(to be continued)

...6. Prospects for the Future.

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