In chapter 1 of The Second Sex, Simone De Beauvoir explores the sex lives of ants and termites and others in an attempt to understand the complex roots of sex in biology. Ultimately she (and it is very nice to finally refer to a "she" in this class) concludes that while there are indisputable differences between the sexes, society much more so than biology accounts for the differences between men and women in most human societies. “...In truth a society is not a species,” she notes, “for it is in a society that the species attains the status of existence...the individuals that compose the society are never abandoned to the dictates of their nature... It is not merely as a body, but rather as a body subject to taboos, to laws, that the subject is conscious of himself and attains fulfilment – it is with reference to certain values that he evaluates himself. And, once again, it is not upon physiology that values can be based; rather, the facts of biology take on the values that the existent bestows upon them.” The society we are born into, as well as the values and norms of that society, always precede us. Both men and women have a somewhat difficult time creating their own essence, but women have far many more hurdles, particularly during the time that DeBeauvoir lived. DeBeauvoir believes that society can likewise value women in spite of men’s tendency for more (physical) strength: “If the respect or the fear inspired by woman prevents the use of violence towards her, then the muscular superiority of the male is no source of power. If custom decrees – as in certain Indian tribes – that the young girls are to choose their husbands, or if the father dictates the marriage choice, then the sexual aggressiveness of the male gives him no power of initiative, no advantage.” In the latter case, of course, it is still a male figure who makes the choice for the woman, and it is an unfortunate fact that in many civilized societies a woman remained the “property” of her father until either she married (whereupon she became the “property” of her husband) or her father died (whereupon her brothers or closest male relatives assumed responsibility for her).
Marriage itself is an interesting social construct, and the way marriage is viewed in a particular society is arguably a microcosm of sex relations in that society. In any society that mandates sexual abstinence for women before marriage (one cannot technically prove a man’s virginity), and a woman is considered “used” if she is not a virgin, clearly women are viewed as object rather than subject; one cannot “use” a subject. There are cultures where women traditionally propose marriage (and the men aren’t allowed to refuse). Many societies in sub-Saharan Africa have practiced woman-to-woman marriages in the past (some still do), although even then there is usually a “female husband” who is considered to have ownership over the other woman and the offspring. In at least one culture (the Mosuo of China) where marriage itself is nonexistent; brothers live with their sisters, men visit women for a night without any formal permanent attachments, and any children resulting from these unions are the responsibility of a woman and her brothers to raise together. Thus neither men nor women are considered the “property” of the other. In many modern societies we are at least getting closer to this ideal, but many customs in weddings themselves reflect the patriarchal history of marriage in our society (the father of the bride “giving her away,” for example).
It is true that we define ourselves in relationship to the “other,” just as we often define what is true in relationship to what is untrue. The problem is when we begin to put these mutually reinforcing categories into a fixed hierarchy, especially when many ostensibly “opposite” concepts -- particularly male and female -- are not in fact opposing, but are rather two sides of the same proverbial coin. Because the feminine is viewed to be inferior to the masculine, an effeminate man or boy is seen as “lowering” himself. (I do believe that that is why people who hate non-heterosexuals generally have a stronger visceral reaction to gay and bisexual men than they do to gay or bisexual women, and why it is more socially acceptable for a female to dress in a “masculine” fashion than it is for a man to dress in “women’s” clothes.) This is not limited to the interaction between men and women; we also see it in “dominant” societies colonizing “weaker” cultures, in race relations, and I would argue in the destruction of the environment. (Nature when personified is almost invariably referred to as a female -- e.g. "Mother Nature" -- which might reflect an interesting psychological phenomena when we consider that many societies perceive nature as something which must be subdued and conquered, but I also refer to the perception of humans being something separate and in opposition to nature.) Many men are still afraid to express their “feminine side” because this means exposing so-called “weaknesses,” because the feminine, after all, is opposite of the masculine, which is associated with (physical) power. In Spanish, whenever one refers to a group of people, unless the group is composed entirely of women, they must be referred to in the masculine plural. Even in a group of ninety-nine men and one man, the masculine form must be used, lest the one man in the group be insulted by being referred to as a female. Whenever I write my representatives in Congress, for example, even when I specifically sign the letter MS. Evan K___, the reply letter will invariably be addressed to MR. K___. I suppose that might also reflect that in our society, a man is more inclined to be insulted by being mistaken for a woman than vice versa, and whoever pens the representatives’ reply letters is catering to that.
It is also interesting, though reprehensible, that in many cases a male’s use of physical force on a woman is blamed on the woman. In all too many cases of domestic violence -- which entails a man hurting a woman in the vast majority of cases -- men will blame the woman for provoking his anger. (Satrian ideas of being able to create one’s own mental condition aside, even if we argue that the anger might have been provoked, it is still within the capacity of the man to refrain from violence, be it physical or verbal.) In the case of rape, women are often blamed for “enticing” men. A woman was dressed a certain way when she was raped; she must have been “asking for it.” This is of course absurd... if a man was dressed in an expensive before his wallet was stolen, we don’t say that HE was “asking for it.” Most of us would blame the thief, just as we ought to blame the rapist.
Objectification poses some interesting questions. To a certain extent -- but only to a cerain extent -- I think that a degree objectification is necessary. At the end of the day, humans are visual animals, and our initial attractions to another person are almost invariably to their outer appearance. (It is to be hoped that one can get past this superficiality, of course, and get to know the other person more deeply than that as the relationship unfolds; while we cannot know another completely, we can at least get to know them better than we could a tree.) In order to eat a stalk of broccoli, I have to look at it as “food” the same way that I see tofu or couscous as “food,” imposing upon it an idea which is something other than what broccoli IS at its essence. (As much as I love broccoli, its purpose in nature is not merely to serve as my meal.) But I don’t know that there is necessarily anything wrong with that; is it really possible to be demeaning to broccoli?
There are, however, some who would argue that this is definitely wrong in the case of nonhuman animals. For example, Carol J. Adams criticizes the objectification of animals and believes that the parallels between exploitation and objectification of women and that of nonhuman animals are related and mutually reinforcing. I too follow a vegetarian diet and have read portions of her book The Sexual Politics of Meat, and while I think she might be stretching it at times, she makes some very interesting points. It is worth noting, for instance, that both animals and women often are perceived as “pieces of meat,” and that when female animals are lined up for artificial insemination, the apparatus to which they are tied is called, without a trace of irony, the “rape rack.” (I would argue that this is a problem of the industrialized food industry -- which, after all, is the product of a very certain type of society -- and not of meat-eating per se.) It is also one thing to perceive a tree as a potential source of fuel or materials for building things, but another thing to think of an entire forest as being at one’s own disposal (clear-cutting is unsustainable and neglects the fact that a forest is much more than the trees contained within it). Perhaps the problem of objectification is that of degree. I am not sure what rules I would apply to say where a line ought to be drawn, but either way, once that line is crossed, objectification seems morally wrong to me no matter which way it goes (that is, women should not objectify men, either).
De Beauvoir also explores sexual relations and a Marxian take on class relations, but she does not fully accept the argument that the problems are one and the same. First she points out that “there is no biological basis for the separation of classes.” The proleteriat “has always put its condition to the test in revolt, thereby going back to essentials and constituting a threat to its exploiters. And what it has aimed at is its own disappearance as a class.” Women, on the other hand, do not desire “her own disappearance as a sex – all she asks is that certain sequels of sexual differentiation be abolished.” De Beauvoir also does not believe that a woman can “be regarded simply as a worker.” I would argue that no one, man or woman, should be regarded “simply as a worker” -- that, too, seems like a form of the wrong type of objectification, reducing people to their economic capacity -- but what she means is that in her day, women were defined primarily in terms of their ability to bear children. There is definitely something to be said for division of labor according to abilities, but while men might tend to be better at women at certain things (just as women might tend to be better than men at certain things), these are by no means hard and fast rules. Other than pregnancy and lactation, men are perfectly capable of raising children in just the same manner as women (and again going back to tendencies, I know some men who would make far better caretakers than some women). Women might tend to have less physical strength than men, but most people can name a few women they know who are stronger than some men they know, and the same could be done with just about any other tendency between the sexes. Still, I am not sure who has a more difficult time in the working world; women who take on jobs more traditionally seen as “men’s work,” or men who are engaged in so-called “women’s work.
Sometimes I wonder if my mother inadvertently gave me a slight advantage in life by naming me Evan -- technically a unisex name although today it is predominantly perceived as masculine. While the world I live in is considerably more progressive in theory than the world DeBeauvoir lived in, there unfortunately still exist many obstacles for women in practice. I am obviously female once one actually sees me, but if I were to write a book about cultural theory, and someone picked up the book and saw that the author’s first name was Evan, unconsciously, they might be more inclined to take the work seriously because they believe it was written by a man. Maybe the “advantage” would be greater if I were better at math or physics and were writing about that instead. Either way, the attitudes of society in general are often slower to change than the laws governing us.
In the end I think it’s a matter of realizing that many of differences between men and women -- or between heterosexuals and homo- or bisexuals, or between different races, and even different species -- are tendencies, and not necessarily rules. Even when the differences are present, they also do not mean that one or the other is “better” than the other. The differences are simply that -- differences.
