By AVRAHAM SELA
(December 4) - The vociferous public debate over Lebanon of
the last two weeks has revealed two main developments. The
first is the continuously descending threshold of Israeli society's
willingness to further tolerate the toll of continued military
presence in south Lebanon. The second is the unmistakable
awareness of the government that the growing public unrest can
no longer be ignored.
Indeed, the days when the IDF's presence raised no questions,
reflecting "consensus," are over. The deepening involvement of
grass-roots groups in the debate and the ever-strengthening
voices in support of a unilateral withdrawal represent a
widening consciousness of the undeniable failure of the
security zone concept in terms of cost-benefit calculations.
The public awakening came after years of denial and
hibernation. It was the disaster of last year's helicopter tragedy,
which claimed the lives of 73 soldiers, that gave birth to the
"Four Mothers" organization. Similarly, the fall of 12 more in the
abortive naval commando raid that September triggered the
establishment of The Movement for Leaving Lebanon
Peacefully, headed by MK Yossi Beilin. Yet for a society
overwhelmed by issues of national security, peacemaking with
the Palestinians, and economic depression, the attempts to
pressure the decision makers "from below" remained
ineffective.
The recent toll of seven soldiers within two weeks brought the
issue back to center stage, showing that despite long intervals
between disasters, we have grown ever more impatient with the
high military and political echelons. We are less and less
tolerant of the explanations, apologies, and promises for
reassessment and more creative tactics, all of which proved to
be empty words.
To put it bluntly, Israeli decision-makers in this government, like
their predecessors, prefer to preserve the security zone concept
regardless of its undeniable failure rather than taking the risk of
post-withdrawal attacks on Israel from south Lebanon for which
they may be held responsible.
No doubt, the preferable policy is to reach agreement with
Lebanon that would ensure Israel's security interests before
returning to the international border. In the absence of such a
possibility, however, what is the calculated risk of a unilateral
withdrawal?
The question is no longer whether the IDF should pull out of
Lebanon, but how to minimize the risks of the proposed
alternatives. In other words, should Israel withdraw without full
proof guarantees, and in their absence, how would Syria and
Hizbullah, the main actors on the other side, respond.
The opponents of a unilateral withdrawal argue that Syria would
continue to encourage guerrilla attacks on Israel, because it
would be the only way to bring its government to resume the
negotiations over the Golan Heights. In this effort, they claim,
Hizbullah would play a leading role because of its own interest
in eliminating Israel and liberating Jerusalem.
These arguments ignore Syria's interest in maintaining
Lebanon's stability, continued economic prosperity, and
rehabilitation following 15 years of civil war. That these
developments have been in force since the early 1990s was
due to Syria's efforts since the mid-1970s, during which it has
paid dearly in material and human losses. Syria would have to
consider carefully the damage that Israel could cause to
Lebanon as a Syrian asset, should there be repeated attacks on
Israel's northern territory from Lebanon.
Israel's presence on Lebanese soil makes it easy, even
legitimate for Syria to encourage guerrilla attacks on the IDF
and the South Lebanese Army. But given Syria's interest in
advancing a settlement on the Golan, it would have to consider
the impact of such attacks on the US administration, whose
involvement would be necessary for Syria in any case. And
finally, Syrian President Hafez Assad has shown impressive
prudence regarding violation of Israel's sovereign territory, even
when proxies are involved.
As to Hizbullah, the picture of a mercenary group presented by
the opponents of a unilateral withdrawal is far from accurate.
Hizbullah is deeply rooted in the social and political reality of
Lebanon, competing for power and access to resources like any
other political movement. That Iran has been its patron and
financier, and Syria is allegedly supporting it militarily or
approving its activities, does not mean that these two countries
own it.
Unlike the Palestinian guerrilla organizations that dominated
south Lebanon and were expelled by Israel in the war of 1982,
Hizbullah's intentions have never been to liberate Palestine, but
to advance domestic social and political goals, in which the
armed struggle against Israel has played a major role. Despite
occasional announcements that it intends to fight Israel until
Jerusalem is liberated, Hizbullah leaders have also said the
opposite - that their war is not with Israel as such and that they
would cease fighting once it fully withdraws from Lebanon.
Another striking piece of evidence is that in over 15 years of
fighting, Hizbullah's guerrillas have never attempted to cross the
border into Israel, even though they have repeatedly
demonstrated the permeability of the security zone by physically
reaching it.
The Lebanese political system is extremely anxious to see
Israel withdraw to the international border, but cannot
acknowledge this officially, and certainly not support it by giving
security undertakings. Yet most of the political parties and
centers of power in Lebanon would like to see Hizbullah
disarmed, which may become legitimate only when Israel
withdraws from south Lebanon.
Finally, unilateral withdrawal is not meant to create a rosy
situation in which peace prevails in the North. Given that the
security zone is unable to prevent Katyusha rockets from hitting
Israel, our northern border can be defended from inside Israeli
territory. Our continued presence in Lebanon is a liability more
than an asset, and it is about time to bring to an end the
anomaly of protecting one's own territory by occupying a
neighbor's.
The writer is a senior lecturer in the Department of International
Relations at the Hebrew University and a former member of the
Israeli delegation to the Nakoura talks.