Stephen R. Shalom,
Noam Chomsky, and Michael Albert 1. What was U.S. policy toward Indonesia before 1975?
In the aftermath of World War II, U.S. policy toward the Asian colonies of the European
powers followed a simple rule: where the nationalists in a territory were leftist (as in Vietnam),
Washington would support the re-imposition of European colonial rule, while in those places
where the nationalist movement was safely non-leftist (India, for example), Washington would
support their independence as a way to remove them from the exclusive jurisdiction of a rival
power. At first, Indonesian nationalists were not deemed sufficiently pliable, so U.S.-armed
British troops (assisted by Japanese soldiers) went into action against the Indonesians to
pave the way for the return of Dutch troops, also armed by the United States. In 1948,
however, moderate Indonesian nationalists under Sukarno crushed a left-wing coup attempt,
and Washington then decided that the Dutch should be encouraged to settle with Sukarno,
accepting Indonesian independence. It wasn't long, however, before the United States concluded that Sukarno was a dangerous
neutralist, and under the Eisenhower administration Washington attempted to subvert
Indonesia's fragile democratic government. These efforts -- the largest U.S. covert operation
since World War II -- were unsuccessful, so the United States shifted its strategy to building
up the Indonesian military as a counter-weight to the mass-based Indonesian Communist
Party. In 1965, this approach bore fruit when a military coup, accompanied by the slaughter of
somewhere between half a million and a million communists, suspected leftists, and ordinary
peasants, deposed Sukarno and installed General Suharto in his place. Washington cheered
the coup, rushed weapons to Jakarta, and even provided a list of Communist Party members
to the army which then rounded up and slaughtered them. According to a CIA study, "in terms
of numbers killed" the 1965-66 massacres in Indonesia "rank as one of the worst mass
murders of the 20th century." The United States established close military, economic, and
political ties with the Suharto regime.
l2. What was East Timor before Indonesia invaded?
From the 17th century, the Netherlands and Portuguese fought over Timor, a small Southeast
Asian island slightly larger than the state of Maryland located a thousand miles south of the
Philippines and about 400 miles northwest of Australia. Ultimately the two colonial powers
divided the island, with the western half going to the Netherlands and becoming part of the
Dutch East Indies and the eastern half going to Portugal. When the Dutch East Indies
became independent following World War II, under the name Indonesia, west Timor was part
of the new nation. East Timor, however, remained under Portuguese rule until the mid-1970s,
when Portugal finally moved to dismantle its colonial empire. East Timor differs from
Indonesia in terms of religion, language, and several hundred years of colonial history.
3. How did Indonesia become involved in East Timor?
As long as Portugal controlled East Timor, Indonesia did not consider attacking it, but once
Lisbon declared its intention to withdraw, the Suharto regime saw an opportunity to add to its
territory and resources. East Timor seemed like an easy target, given that in 1975 Indonesia
had a population of 136 million compared to East Timor's 700,000 people. Indonesia first
tried to block Timorese independence by backing a coup in the territory, but when this failed
it launched a full-scale invasion of East Timor in December 1975, using the pretext that it was
maintaining order.
A standard propaganda line out of Jakarta -- often repeated by the western media -- is that
the fighting in East Timor represents a "civil war." In fact, there had been a very brief civil war
before the Indonesians invaded. For the last 25 years, however, it has been as much a civil
war as the Nazi conquests in Europe.
4. What was the United States role regarding Indonesia's December 1975 invasion?
On the eve of the invasion, U.S. President Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry
Kissinger, were in Jakarta meeting with Suharto. Kissinger later claimed that East Timor
wasn't even discussed, but this claim has been exposed as a lie. In fact, Washington gave
Suharto a green light to invade. Ninety percent of the weaponry used by the Indonesian forces
in their invasion was from the United States (despite a U.S. law that bans the use of its
military aid for offensive purposes) and the flow of arms, including counterinsurgency
equipment, was secretly increased (a point that should be borne in mind in interpreting what
is going on today). The United States also lent diplomatic support to the invaders. In the
United Nations, U.S. ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan successfully worked, as he
boasted in his memoirs, to make sure that the international organization was ineffectual in
challenging Jakarta's aggression. Under the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the self-proclaimed
champion of human rights, there was a further increase in U.S. military aid to Indonesia.
Since 1975, the United States has sold Jakarta over $1 billion worth of military equipment.
5. What was the effect of Indonesia's invasion?
The Indonesian invasion and subsequent ruthless pacification campaign led to the deaths --
by massacre, forced starvation, and disease -- of some 200,000 East Timorese, more than a
quarter of the territory's people, making it one of the greatest bloodlettings in modern history
compared to total population. In addition, Indonesian forces have engaged in torture, rape,
and forced relocation on a massive scale.
6. How did the international community respond to the 1975 Indonesian invasion?
On the one hand, the Indonesian aggression so clearly violated international law and the right
of self-determination that the United Nations Security Council condemned the invasion,
calling upon Indonesia to withdraw its armed forces from East Timor, and the General
Assembly rejected Indonesia's annexation of East Timor as its 27th province, demanding that
the people of East Timor be allowed to determine their own fate. With a single exception,
Australia, no country has legally recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.
On the other hand, for many countries considerations of morality and decency were
outweighed by the profits to be had from close economic ties with Indonesia and its huge
population ("When I think of Indonesia -- a country on the equator with 180 million people, a
median age of 18, and a Muslim ban on alcohol -- I feel like I know what heaven looks like,"
gushed the president of Coca-Cola in 1992), by the prospects of selling arms to the
Indonesian armed forces, and by the geopolitical advantages of allying with the largest nation
in Southeast Asia, instead of one of the smallest. Washington's support for Jakarta has
already been noted. Australia has provided military aid to Indonesia and formally recognized
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, the only country to do so, hoping to divide up East
Timor's off-shore oil resources. Britain recently was Indonesia's largest arms supplier, and
Japan its largest source of economic aid and foreign investment. Canada has provided
Jakarta with both economic and military aid, while the Netherlands and Germany have also
been major weapons suppliers.
7. How have the Timorese resisted over the years?
The people of East Timor have waged a truly inspiring and courageous struggle. They have
undertaken guerrilla warfare against overwhelming odds, organized non-violent protests, and
carried out passive resistance. Students, the Catholic church, and many others have been
involved in the struggle in one way or another: whether taking up arms, providing food for
guerrillas, participating in demonstrations, or hiding organizers. Remarkably, despite the
horrendous repression, and despite Jakarta's importation of large numbers of Indonesian
settlers into the territory, the East Timorese have retained their passionate commitment to
self-determination and freedom.
8. What solidarity has there been outside East Timor, over the years?
For a while, only a few lone voices spoke up. Arnold Kohen, for example, has been at the
center of East Timor activism since the beginning. There were small groups in Australia and
in England trying to draw attention to the issue. Through the 1980s, the numbers and activism
increased. There was a considerable upsurge following the Dili massacre in 1991 -- when
Indonesian troops attacked a peaceful funeral procession, slaughtering more than 270 -- the
massacre was publicized by U.S. free-lance journalists Amy Goodman and Alan Nairn (who
were nearly killed by Indonesian troops) and a British TV photojournalist who secretly filmed
the atrocities. Church and human rights groups became active, and the East Timor Action
Network was formed by Charlie Scheiner.
By the mid-1990s there were substantial organizations in many countries, and they were
beginning to have an impact. The issue was finally being covered in the mainstream media, if
not always accurately. Intensely lobbied by East Timor activists, the U.S. Congress was
increasingly placing restrictions on U.S. military aid to Indonesia, often evaded, however, by
the administration. In 1996, Jose Ramos Horta, East Timor's chief foreign representative,
and Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, East Timor's spiritual leader, were awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize, focusing further attention on the situation.
9. How did the recent referendum come about and what were its results?
Mass demonstrations in Indonesia, financial crisis, and massive corruption combined in
1998 to force Suharto from office. His successor, B. J. Habibie agreed to call elections for
Indonesia and to hold a referendum on the future of East Timor. The Indonesian election was
won by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the main opposition leader, but even if she is allowed to
become president in November it is doubtful that she will move to dismantle the national
security apparatus which dominates the state.
In the negotiations over the terms of the referendum on the future of East Timor, the
international community essentially accepted Indonesia's ground rules. The referendum would
be run by Indonesia, the occupying power. The UN was permitted to send a few hundred
unarmed monitors, but they had no means of stopping the paramilitary forces ("militias") that
had been organized by the Indonesian army and were carrying out large-scale terror under its
direction and with its direct involvement, particularly by its special forces (Kopassus), trained
by the United States and Australia, and noted for their extreme violence and brutality. Rather
than pressing for a more substantial UN presence, the Clinton Administration actually
delayed the dispatch of the monitors. The referendum was postponed several times by the
UN because of the ongoing terror, which was clearly intended by the army to intimidate the
population into voting for incorporation within Indonesia. On Aug. 30, 1999, in an astonishing
display of courage, virtually the entire population of East Timor went to the polls, about four
out of five voting for independence.
Having failed to cow the Timorese people into accepting Indonesian rule, the army and its
militias then proceeded to unleash a ferocious attack on the civilian population, displacing
hundreds of thousands, killing an unknown number, but certainly thousands, burning, and
looting.
10. What are the likely motives of Indonesia and the militias now, after the referendum?
For the Indonesian army the motives are probably to demonstrate to people within Indonesia
who may raise their heads that the cost will be extremely severe. The army demonstrated this
same point during the massacres of 1965-66 when Suharto came to power, intimidating the
country for years, and many times subsequently -- and always with enthusiastic support from
the United States and the West generally. There are now secessionist movements in several
parts of Indonesia (though of course while the East Timorese independence movement is
commonly called "separatist," that makes as much sense as calling the French resistance to
the Nazi occupation "separatist"), and the army presumably fears that independence for East
Timor may encourage other break-away movements.
Other motives probably include undermining civilian authority in Jakarta and placing the
military in the dominant position in the post-Suharto succession. Pure revenge is also a likely
motive: the East Timorese have resisted with enormous courage and integrity for 25 years
and so they are being punished by massacre and destruction. It is also worth bearing in mind
that the military, and the Suharto family, have taken over most of the resources of East Timor,
and do not want to relinquish them. And in the background is the important question of the oil
wealth of the Timor Gap, and who will control it.
11. What is the role of the United Nations?
It is a little misleading to speak of the role of the UN. The UN is nearly powerless as an
abstract entity or even as a representative of the world's nations. It can act, instead, only
insofar as it is given authorization by the great powers, which means primarily the United
States.
The UN has no standing peacekeeping force and thus is dependent on finding countries
willing to contribute troops for any particular mission. The organization suffers as well from an
extreme shortage of funds because of the continual U.S. refusal to pay its dues. Any
peacekeepers sent to East Timor will probably not be a UN force because the U.S.
Congress has required that there be a 15-day delay before the U.S. government can approve
any UN peacekeeping operation and has forbidden Washington from paying its authorized
share of the costs of any such operation.
U.S. influence is greatest in the Security Council, but some organs of the UN, such as the
General Assembly or bodies dealing with economic and social issues have had a Third
World majority ever since the era of decolonization. Accordingly, U.S. policy has been to
undermine and marginalize the UN. The United Nations should have an important role in
world affairs, but U.S. policy and the policies of other leading states, severely limit the
international organization. From the point of view of U.S. policymakers, however, there is one
crucial role played by the UN: it serves as a convenient scapegoat when something goes
wrong. For example, the current catastrophe in East Timor is directly attributable to the
refusal of the United States and other Western powers to deter the atrocities there over a
period of a quarter century, yet the UN will probably take the blame.
12. What are the likely motives of the United States now, after the referendum?
U.S. motives now are the same as always: to pursue those policies that will enhance the
power and economic returns of U.S. corporate and political elites with as few dangers of
disrupting existing relations of power as possible, and especially as few disturbing effects in
the form of enlarging public awareness and dissidence.
The United States has a long history of cozying up to ruthless dictators, being indifferent to if
not enthusiastic about their atrocities, and disengaging only when Washington concludes that
the dictator has provoked so much instability and dissidence that U.S. interests are
threatened. Thus, President Jimmy Carter backed the Shah of Iran until it seemed as if the
army would fall apart in trying to suppress mass demonstrations; President Reagan
embraced Marcos in the Philippines until splits in the armed forces and huge numbers of
people in the streets put U.S. interests at risk. So in Indonesia, the United States supported
Suharto until a popular explosion seemed like it might imperil U.S. economic and geopolitical
interests.
And the United States supported Indonesian policy in East Timor -- with weapons, training,
and diplomatic support -- as long as doing so seemed to further U.S. interests. As long as
East Timor could be kept off the front page, Washington was happy to give Jakarta a free
hand. But news of the latest atrocities could not be suppressed. Some courageous journalists
and independent observers, some UN workers who refused to abandon the Timorese, and
networks of activists have all spread the word. This has raised the costs to the U.S.
Government of continuing to tolerate Indonesian terrorism in East Timor. Washington still
hopes, however, to protect its economic stake in Indonesia and maintain close ties with that
country's military.
13. What could the United States do that would be positive in East Timor?
The United States and its major allies have tremendous leverage over the Indonesian
government. Indonesia doesn't have much of a military industry, and relies heavily on its
suppliers: the United States, Britain, Australia, and others. Indonesian troops receive training
and participate in joint exercises with U.S. troops, the most recent just a week before the
August 30, 1999, referendum. Indonesia's economy is also totally dependent on financial aid
from the United States and other rich nations and from the International Monetary Fund whose
policies are controlled by these same rich nations. Without funds from these sources,
Indonesia will find foreign investment drying up and domestic capital flight as well. In short,
Indonesia cannot act without the approval of Washington and the leading Western nations.
The same sort of pressure that seems in the past few days to have forced Jakarta to accept
international peacekeeping troops could have been used -- and could still be used -- to
compel the Indonesians to call off the slaughter and destruction in East Timor, something that
would have a far more critical and immediate effect on the lives of East Timorese than the
dispatch of peacekeepers. (It will be a while before peacekeepers arrive and in any event
they are unlikely to be able to do much for those East Timorese who have been driven into
West Timor where they are still subject to Indonesian terror.) Peacekeepers can play a useful
role in facilitating the distribution of humanitarian aid (which, however, needs to be flown in
immediately to reach the several hundred thousand people in the mountains in danger of
starvation) and in restraining any of the militias that refuse an Indonesian order to disband.
Of course, the same pressure that got Jakarta to buckle today could have been employed a
week ago or two weeks ago to stop the atrocities. And it could have been used six months
ago to force Indonesia to disband the militias and call off its terror forces. And it could have
been used at any point over the past quarter century to get Indonesia to withdraw from East
Timor. And it could have been used in December 1975 to forestall the Indonesia invasion in
the first place.
14. Will the United States do something positive in East Timor?
The United States government does not act out of humanitarian concern. U.S. political and
economic elites pursue their own interests and are willing to tolerate -- and even welcome --
incredible brutality in the furtherance of those interests.
Sometimes, however, U.S. elites can be pressured into following a positive course of action
if the social costs of their not doing so can be significantly raised. The U.S. government didn't
wind down the Vietnam War because a burst of humanitarianism entered the calculation of
policymakers. Rather, it ended the war because the resistance of the Vietnamese and the
social disruptions at home made the costs of continuing the war too high.
The U.S. government will do something positive -- more accurately, it will stop doing
something horribly negative -- with regard to East Timor only if public pressure makes it
essential to do so by raising the social costs of continuing to abet the massacre.
The strategy, then, for those who wish to change U.S. policy on East Timor is the same as for
those who want to change U.S. policy more generally. U.S. elites respond not to moral
persuasion but, instead, to a calculus of interests. When one wants to influence their choices,
therefore, it is necessary to create conditions that change the calculus they confront. The only
way to do that is to raise consciousness of true conditions and organize dissent that
threatens things they hold dear. If pursuing or permitting genocidal activity in Timor
strengthens elite positions and enriches their coffers, and if there is no offsetting cost to the
behavior, it will continue. If popular activism that is aroused by these policies begins to
threaten on-going calm and business as usual, if it threatens to grow and expand and not only
address Timor, but as time proceeds basic institutions behind events like these -- that is a
real and dangerous cost that elites very well understand.
So what does a morally concerned person do? Try to become knowledgeable, try to educate
others, try to facilitate efforts to make dissent visible -- whether financially, via supporting
worthy projects and institutions with donations, or with one's time and labors given to
organizing. It is not complicated. It is the same answer for Timor as for Kosovo as for the Gulf
War as for Nicaragua as for Vietnam. It is the same answer for foreign policy pursuits as it is
for trying to win strikes against corporations, reverse NAFTA, preserve affirmative action (or
win it in the first place). To impact elites it is necessary to raise social costs of their actions
that you want terminated so high that the elites have no choice but to relent.
East Timor
By Noam Chomsky The events of the past weeks in East Timor should elicit shame as well as horror. The crimes
could easily have been stopped. That has been true since Indonesia invaded in December 1975,
relying on U.S. arms and diplomatic support. It would have sufficed for the U.S. and its allies to
withdraw their active participation, and to inform the Indonesian military command that the
territory must be granted the right of self-determination that has been upheld by the United
Nations and the World Court.
The latest chapter in this sordid tale opened after the referendum of August 30, when the
population voted overwhelmingly for independence. At once, atrocities mounted sharply,
organized and directed by the Indonesian military, who reduced the capital city of Dili to ashes
and subjected virtually the entire population to terror and expulsion. The UN Mission (UNAMET)
reported on September 11 that the "direct link between the militia and the military is beyond
any dispute and has been overwhelmingly documented by UNAMET over the last four months,"
warning that "the worst may be yet to come," even a "genocidal campaign to stamp out the
East Timorese problem by force."
Indonesia historian John Roosa, an official observer of the vote, described the situation starkly
on September 15 in the New York Times: "Given that the pogrom was so predictable, it was
easily preventable... But in the weeks before the ballot, the Clinton Administration refused to
discuss with Australia and other countries the formation of [an international force]. Even after
the violence erupted, the Administration dithered for days," until compelled by international
(primarily Australian) and domestic pressure to make some gestures. These sufficed to induce
the Indonesian generals to reverse course, illustrating the latent power that has always been
at hand.
The latest events evoke bitter memories from 20 years ago. After carrying out a huge slaughter
in 1977-78, Indonesia permitted a brief visit by members of the Jakarta diplomatic corps, among
them U.S. Ambassador Edward Masters. They witnessed an enormous humanitarian
catastrophe. The aftermath was described by the pre-eminent Indonesia scholar Benedict
Anderson, in testimony at the United Nations: "For nine long months" of starvation and terror,
"Ambassador Masters deliberately refrained, even within the walls of the State Department,
from proposing humanitarian aid to East Timor," waiting "until the generals in Jakarta gave him
the green light" -- until they felt "secure enough to permit foreign visitors," as an internal State
Department document recorded. Only then did Washington consider taking some steps to deal
with the consequences of its actions.
The reasons have sometimes been honestly recognized. During the latest phase of atrocities, a
senior diplomat in Jakarta described "the dilemma" faced by the great powers: "Indonesia
matters and East Timor doesn't." The reasoning was spelled out more fully by two Asia
specialists of the New York Times: the Clinton Administration, they wrote on September 14,
"has made the calculation that the United States must put its relationship with Indonesia, a
mineral-rich nation of more than 200 million people, ahead of its concern over the political fate
of East Timor, a tiny impoverished territory of 800,000 people that is seeking independence."
The operative principles had been articulated years earlier by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
who was UN Ambassador at the time of the U.S.-backed Indonesian invasion. The Security
Council ordered Indonesia to withdraw, but to no avail. In his 1978 memoirs, Moynihan explains
why: "The United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about.
The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever
measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no
inconsiderable success."
In the next few months, Moynihan reports, 60,000 people were killed, ten percent of the
population. Atrocities peaked as his memoirs appeared. Relying on a new flow of advanced
weapons from the Carter Administration, the Indonesian military carried out a devastating
attack against the hundreds of thousands who had fled to the mountains, driving the survivors
to army control. It was then that Church sources in East Timor sought to make public the
estimates of 200,000 deaths that came to be accepted years later, after constant denial.
Washington's reaction has already been described.
As the slaughter approached genocidal levels, Britain and France joined in with arms and
diplomatic support. Other powers too sought to participate, always following the principles that
have been lucidly enunciated.
This year opened with a moment of hope. Indonesia's interim president Habibie called for a
referendum with a choice between incorporation within Indonesia ("autonomy") or
independence. The army moved at once to control the outcome by terror. In the months
leading to the August referendum, 3-5000 were killed according to highly credible Church
sources -- twice the number of deaths prior to the NATO bombing in Kosovo, with more than
twice the population of East Timor. The terror was widespread and sadistic, intended as a
warning of the consequences of refusal to obey the orders of the army of occupation, which
announced that "if the pro-independents do win, all will be destroyed" -- the grim words of the
Indonesian commander in Dili.
In an awe-inspiring display of courage and dedication, almost the entire population voted, many
emerging from hiding to do so, choosing independence. Then followed the latest phase of army
atrocities -- exactly as had been proclaimed, loud and clear. Within two weeks, more than
10,000 might have been killed, according to Nobel Laureate Bishop Belo, who fled under a hail of
bullets. Hundreds of thousands have