
Globalization:
Towards a new perspective on political economy
Prof. drs. R.F.M. Lubbers
Delivered at the University of Tilburg, The Netherlands
Political economy
Political economy is concerned with the significance of
the economy for society. The subject of political
economy is the economic order. It is the study of what
economic activity means for society in terms of fact.
Further, it aims at an analysis for the future. It
endeavors to delineate objective forces and developments
and claims to develop a vision of the future concerning
the impact of the economy on society. Both in its
description of economic activity as it is here and now
and in its analysis for the future political economy
treats economic activity as a subject for normative
considerations, and it does so whilst respecting
analytical discipline.
Political economy derives its own profile from the three
aspects of the economy: the economy as it stands at the
moment, as the analysis for the future and as a subject
for normative consideration. It is largely concerned
with history and society, and is closely related to the
traditions of the moral philosophers. It thus knowingly
places itself in the context of other disciplines such
as sociology and provides the cultural philosopher with
food for thought.
The word 'political' refers to the significance of the
economy for society. It stems from the Greek word
'polis', meaning an organized human community - the
Greek city-states of the time. Historical considerations
of economics as a discipline often start with Adam
Smith. In his day it was already the 'Nation' which had
become the relevant expression of human society. At the
same time there was a breakthrough towards recognizing
the economy as a determinant factor for the functioning
and further evolution of society. Of course, economic
history had begun much earlier. But so long as it was
embedded in a feudal society, social relations - the
social order - did not spring from economic relations.
This changed from Adam Smith onwards. Smith noted the
emergence of the economic aspect of life as an
independent order and showed how the economy,
functioning through the market, could lead to greater
prosperity for the Nation as a whole.
Since Adam Smith there have been many generations of
political economists. When we compare Marx with Smith,
we are struck by the extent to which Marx chose capital
- the accumulative aspect of purchasing power - as the
angle from which to consider the functioning of an
economy and thus its impact on social developments.
Much later Schumpeter was to gain fame for his view that
the combination of technological developments and
markets calls for creative innovations which, in
connection with the desire for continuity, he believed
to be the hallmark of economics. Whilst Schumpeter
described this from the macroeconomic point of view of
the enterprise, Marx had preceded him with an analysis
of macroeconomic relations. Along these lines he
described developments that were, in his view,
inevitable on the basis of economic patterns. Both
attached great importance to dynamism. For Marx it was
macroeconomic dynamism which would so fundamentally
change social relations that it would alter the very
framework of the economy. Schumpeter was more concerned
with technology and innovation, the 'neue Kombinationen'
(new combinations) as the agents of change. In this way
Marx represented the pessimistic and Schumpeter the
optimistic point of view.
When in the thirties of this century Keynes produced his
well-known analysis, this was again all about the
phenomenon of the under-use of the factors of production
in a macroeconomic context. Keynes's analysis was
inspired by the striking under-use of manpower, as was
expressed in mass unemployment.
The fact that Keynes fits so well into the tradition of
political economy as a moral philosopher is shown by
what he thought of the Treaty of Versailles after the
end of the First World War. This chapter must be one of
pessimism. The Treaty includes no provisions for the
economic rehabilitation of Europe, nothing to make the
defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to
stabilize the new states of Europe, nor does it promote
in any way a compact of economic solidarity amongst the
Allies themselves.
Tinbergen, too, fits perfectly well into this tradition.
A natural scientist by training, he proved himself a
master of logical analysis with regard to economics as a
separate discipline, which he then applied to the social
realities of his time. In this way he built upon the
factual, international input-output analyses of
Leontief, but added his views on international
socioeconomic developments. So doing he could, of
course, not avoid considering the economic order, and
revealed himself as a moral philosopher. The fact that
he then came to plead for a theory of convergence -
i.e., the convergence of various types of economic order
- is one more example of the phenomenon that the
specific subject of study for political economists at
any time always flows from new factual developments in
the relationship between the economy and society.
Especially after the Second World War Tinbergen's
thinking was greatly influenced by his view of the
'Third World': the problem of the poor and the rich.
Although his theory of convergence can be considered to
be a contribution to thinking about the best economic
order for each country - i.e., the choice between a
social market economy or a planned economy, Tinbergen
also made in-depth studies of the social aspects of the
world economy. In this respect, he warned against
large-scale migration and advocated generous development
aid.
Political economy as a mirror of its time
Whether we look at Smith, Marx, Keynes, or Tinbergen,
their common denominator is the fact that they always
reflected new, factual developments with regard to the
relationship between the economy and society. The
combination of analysis, its extrapolations and the
value judgments to which they gave rise characterizes
them as typical political economists. They entered, as
it were, into a dialogue with reality. Their strength
lay in their sharp analyses and the ability to point out
important developments and the laws which govern them.
At the same time their relevance is limited because time
and time again it becomes clear that history is more
than the extrapolation of what has gone before. That is
why economic laws, however accurately analyzed and
however relevant at a certain stage, are always followed
by new, complementary considerations based on new
circumstances.
If this assumption is correct, it takes us to the
central question of what, by the end of this century,
the significance of globalization will be for political
economy.
In the present circumstances, and so far as they differ
from the past, what can political economy offer by way
of a new interpretation of the economy in order to help
us understand the economy in its factual significance in
society?
Subsequently, what inherent trends can be brought to
light by way of analysis which will determine the future
relationship between the economy and society?
To what normative considerations on what is desirable
and what causes concern does this give rise? And what
correctives, if any, are at our disposal?
Economics after the Second World War
Before I go into this, I shall make a few comments on
economics after the Second World War.
After the turbulent developments in the first half of
this century, characterized by two world wars, mass
unemployment, the clear rift between the economic
systems of the so-called First and Second Worlds, and
the end of colonialism, it took a while before economics
started responding to an excess of qualitative
treatises. Economics developed a laudable desire to
become more precise, more exact. Thus, economics became
a more mathematical discipline; it forced itself to
engage in logic. This rigor undoubtedly enhanced the
scientific character of economics as a separate
discipline. With the aid of mathematics economists
learned to write and to analyze logically. Formal
analysis gained importance. Presumptions were made
clearer and more explicit. Economics claims to be a
logical science and, thus, needs a mathematical
character - but it also wants to be empirical. Well
then, this aspect was taken care of by paying more
attention to statistical data and, subsequently, to
techniques for the measurement of correlations. No doubt
the emergence of the computer has been an enormous help
in this. So, apart from mathematics, the logical aspect,
econometrics were introduced to the benefit of
empiricism.
The two aspects were soon to reinforce each other and so
formed a powerful counterbalance to too much verbosity
and imprecise qualitative considerations on the part of
economists who were too tittle concerned with scientific
discipline for themselves.
In brief, the postwar development of more mathematics
and more econometrics - reinforcing each other - have
led to many useful results for the analysis and testing
of economic phenomena. Yet it also led to hesitation.
Re-reading what I wrote about this in 1963, I found:
Nowadays one sometimes gets the feeling that verbal
economists reject quantification because they do not
master mathematical techniques, whereas quantitative
economists reject verbal economics because they believe
that they can regard as irrelevant anything that does
not fit into their formal approach on these grounds
alone. Economics as a science may well fall victim to
this dichotomy.
In fact, economics was seeking its isolation, as it were
it wished to become a discipline in its own right, away
from all other branches of science, and especially away
from history and historical developments. This was to
become its strength and weakness at the same time.
We should not forget the dialogue with reality. This,
whilst respecting analytical discipline, requires an eye
for social developments in a multidisciplinary way and
not turning one's back to political or administrative
issues. This is one of the reasons why many people
nowadays think in terms of scenarios, why uncertainties
are admitted and the term 'no regret' has become
fashionable in policy options.
The relationship between the economy and politics
Having reached this point, it is proper to go somewhat
more deeply into the relationship between the economy
and politics. When we speak of economic politics, we
generally do so on the basis of a certain
presupposition. Here, I mean the choice for a market
economy. This is more than purely a question of choice
of economic system. The choice was historically
determined by a view of life which attached great
significance to the rights of citizens, to freedom. It
was assumed that, complementary to the market economy,
it was possible to develop sufficient government policy
to ensure that society as such was to enjoy sufficient
prosperity and welfare. It then turned out that
pluralism and freedom were the conditions for creativity
and societal adaptability. This made the choice for a
market economy seem the more justifiable. Historically,
there seemed to be a close connection between democracy
and the success of market economies. The fact that the
planned-economy variant was defeated - and that thus
Tinbergen's theory of convergence did not go very far -
has a great deal to do with this. The difference between
the two seemed to lie in the degree of creativity from
the bottom upward -creativity encouraged by pluralism,
freedom, and space for man's own economic initiative.
However superfluous it may seem, it also needs to be
said that the economy itself cannot create the
conditions required for its functioning, nor can it
arrive at satisfactory results for a nation's welfare
without the aid of politics.
What then are the permanent tasks of politics in
economic performance however much the details may change
over a period of time? The outlines are clear. The tasks
of politics are:
* to safeguard the legal system upon which the
economy is based and within which it functions;
this includes a minimum of public expenditure
needed for stability, and the;
* guarantee of a stable currency;
* to engage in activities geared towards removing or
neutralizing imperfections in the market, including
the internalizing of public values such as the
environment into the economy;
* to allocate public expenditure for, e.g., physical
or social infrastructures aimed at stimulating
economic growth;
* to fully use the productive potential available,
particularly labor - i.e., providing full
employment;
* and to establish a fair distribution of incomes.
These tasks can be observed in the various phases of
economic history and development. What we are concerned
with here, however, is a new perspective on political
economy. For administrators the important question is:
What is the relationship between economics and politics
now that the world has become the economy's sphere of
activity?
A closer look at globalization
The phenomena of our present age can be subsumed under
the term globalization. Three aspects can be
distinguished:
First, the speeding-up of worldwide economic integration
caused by the choice for a market economy and free
trade, plus an extraordinary phenomenon, the sharply
increasing freedom of capital movements. AU this
provides ample room for the rapid growth not only of
trade but also of transnational enterprises. In this
climate the application of new technologies spreads
rapidly around the world, whilst miniaturization and
electronics have reduced transport costs and stimulated
new types of a global division of labor.
Apart from economic globalization, we also have the
globalization of communications and information.
Electronics has taken on a role that goes beyond the
economy. 'The bits provoke one world'. The linkage
between modem telecommunications technology and computer
development has brought about what Toffler called the
'Third Wave'. For 24 hours each day we are connected
with the entire world in real time and there is an
abundance of electronic information readily available to
anyone who wishes to have it. AU this has an enormous
impact on the economy and on society.
Third, there is the globalization of politics. After the
Second World War people thought for a long time in terms
of the First, the Second, and the Third Worlds. This was
in line with the ideas about socioeconomic systems:
there was the free-market economy (social or otherwise);
there was the socialist planned economy; and there was
the post-colonial or nationalist economy. Now that
communism has collapsed and a large number of developing
countries - especially in Asia - have definitely managed
to 'take off, there is little left of this traditional
division.
On the contrary, with regard to economic order we are
increasingly facing one world, although the comity of
countries and peoples is heterogeneous.
However much practice and theory may differ, there is a
worldwide choice for a market economy coupled with
pluralism and democracy. And an entire network of
intergovernmental organizations has grown, the members
of which have increasingly based themselves upon the
choice for democracy plus a market economy.
Is there something new in the air at all?
These three types of globalization reinforce one
another. Yet there are quite a number of people who
question their relevance. They say that this process has
been going on for quite some time and, when confronted
with the question whether the process has speeded up,
they ask for figures. When statistics on trade, capital
movements, transnational enterprises or investment
protection agreements are presented to them, their
answer is, understandably, Yes, but does this really
mean anything?
The answer can, in my view, best be given by taking a
good look at the frictions and countereffects that are
brought about by globalization. These will confirm that
globalization is a rapid, inevitable, and significant
development.
First, there are frictions in the functioning of the
global economy and global politics. After the Second
World War much effort was put into intergovernmental
organizations for cooperation. These initiatives, such
as the Bretton Woods institutions, GATT, and the OECD,
should be seen in the context of memories of the
economic crisis and the desire to work towards a free
world with a social market economy.
This approach turned out to be a resounding success, as
is shown by the end of the Cold War and the takeoff of
so many developing countries. Thus we were in a euphoric
mood when we entered the final decade of this century.
However, many frictions soon made themselves felt. One
example is the World Trade Organization with all its
infant diseases and also some structural problems
arising from the heterogeneous nature of its membership.
Another example can be found in the way the Security
Council of the United Nations functions; which, after
the end of the Cold War, and thus after the age of the
veto, does not seem to be very sure what to do. We do
not have a global tradition yet.
Apart from these frictions on the way towards a global
economy and a global political concept there are the
countereffects. The speed of globalization has led to
the phenomenon that people feel a greater need for their
own identity, a desire to be masters in their own homes,
and increasingly turn to religion, also in new forms. In
brief, there are many countereffects.
In fact, about a generation ago sociologists were the
first to draw attention to the phenomenon of
globalization through concepts such as the 'global
village'. At that time, the phenomenon was mainly looked
at in its cultural dimension. Since then, many
sociological studies have been undertaken and theories
have been formulated. They claim that the pressure
exerted by worldwide information and the availability of
goods and services all over the world will in general
reinforce individual identities. One of the reasons why
the countereffects seem to be as strong as, if not
stronger than primary globalization lies in the fact
that a 'global culture' has neither history nor
tradition, nor has roots in the past. Precisely this is
often the very characteristic of culture. A human being
wants to be aware of his roots. In brief, things global
suffer from a lack of history. Therefore, non-economists
claim that globalization through technology and
economics is clearly a rational phenomenon, though very
superficial whereas the 'counterforces' are more deeply
rooted and permeated by emotion.
This is also the key to the answer to the question as to
where the emphasis of globalization lies: is it on the
practical globalization of economics and technology, or
on its countereffects, such as the stronger need for
one's own culture and the remarkable upsurge of
religion, particularly in novel forms (for example, the
Adventists and the emergence of sects and
fundamentalism)?
Environmental problems
After the sociologists, the economists took up the
subject of globalization. It became topical not only
because of global economic integration. It was the Club
of Rome which, twenty-five years ago, placed the world's
environmental problems on the agenda. They spoke of a
future overshadowed by ever more acute relative and even
absolute shortages. Of course this attracted the
attention of the economists. The teaching of the Club of
Rome is that economic development has been so successful
and worldwide that growth in itself cannot be sustained
not as a matter of principle, but as a simple fact.
If one cannot solve the problem of shortages, then
relative shortages may soon come to look like absolute
scarcity - and that spells the end of growth. Stated in
this simple way, the report of the Club of Rome is
largely outdated now because of the technological
improvements that turned out to be possible and, in all
probability, will still be possible in future. Perhaps,
in fact, the report was significant in that it
stimulated technological improvements.
Gradually, the concern about scarcity became concern
about the deterioration of the environment. The report
of the Brundtland Commission gave us the concept of
'sustainable development', which took a positive view of
technology. Technology, it stated, could do much to
ensure the integrity of the environment; thus, that
growth could be made sustainable.
But that is not the end of the matter, as the Brundtland
Commission itself stated. There is a fair degree of
optimism with regard to the incorporation of external
environmental costs by the economy. The question is,
however, whether this can be done sufficiently; whether
its price can be determined, given the different stages
of development in the various countries and the
importance which, taking account of this, is attached to
environmental matters in each of them.
The differences between countries - depending on their
phase of development - are so great that it is very
difficult to work out a global environmental policy. On
the other hand, it is a fact that the spread of
up-to-date technology - i.e., that the technology
developed in countries with a high GDP - does in reality
make for less environmentally harmful production through
multinational enterprises. As globalization advances,
the question is whether this will remain the dominant
phenomenon or whether competition will be based on
lowered environmental protection standards.
Environmental values which cannot be expressed in price
on the basis of the theory of external effects,
constitute a problem of their own; for example, there is
biodiversity or, in more general terms, the conviction
that we are bound to protect the whole diversity of
nature. Not everything has a price: there are also
absolute values, such as the wrongfullness of affecting
the integrity of nature. Some people call this the
concept of 'ecological values'.
Finally, it should be mentioned that, apart from the
incorporation of environmental concerns into economic
considerations, much emphasis is now being placed upon
the promotion and restoration of environmental and
ecological values as an integral part of our culture and
civilization.
The widening of the environmental issues - through ever
more transboundary environmental effects and through
concern for the integrity of nature - has given a new
dimension to the economy. Because of the environmental
problems political economy has become a topical subject
again. It is, therefore, worth our while to look once
more at the characteristics of economics in relation to
modern society; next, to ask what the trends will be if
matters were allowed to run their course; and, finally,
to consider what normative conclusions can be drawn from
all this.
Justice and participation
Ecology is not alone in throwing a new light upon the
role of politics in the course of economic activities.
Another, more classic, problem presents itself in a
fundamentally new manner under the impact of
globalization: it is the problem of fairness, or social
justice, which concerns both the distribution of incomes
and nonparticipation. In the international context, the
terms equity and exclusion are used.
When we look at the distribution of incomes it is
striking that the rich are growing in number throughout
the world.
In the countries of the former First World, the
disparity in incomes tends to increase under the
pressures caused by unemployment. There are also great
disparities in incomes in the so-called takeoff
countries, but for as long as these are going through a
phase of general progress and there is a better outlook
for individuals, this is not a real problem.
The so-called transition countries are plagued by the
phenomenon of an emerging group of extremely wealthy
nouveau riches, whilst at the same time the incomes of
masses are declining. Clearly, this cannot go on for a
long time.
Sometimes the relations between present incomes and
those expected for the coming generations are discussed.
It is claimed by some that We only hold the earth and au
of creation in trust for our children. It will be clear
that such an attitude has a greater appeal in countries
with a high standard of living than in countries with a
low standard of living.
But more important even than the distribution of income
seems to be the problem of exclusion I refer to the
exclusion of people from prosperity and work. More than
in the past enterprises are now characterized by their
conviction that the ability to generate cash lies at the
heart of entrepreneurship. This culture is strengthened
by the increased interest of institutional investors;
they are only concerned with financial ratios.
Capitalism seems to be the main characteristic of the
globalized economy. Free capital movement together with
free trade, the emphasis on knowledge, and new,
far-reaching forms of geographical distribution of labor
based on electronics and telecommunications offer new
possibilities of seeking the maximum return - on a
global scale. Here, it is not only a matter of financial
and physical capital, but also of human capital. Only
people with sufficient quality - quality in terms of
modem technology and management - i.e., those who are
economically efficient in a modern sense - are employed.
Anyone who does not meet the high standards is excluded
from participation.
In a world in which available capital can seek its
highest yield at the global level high demands are made
on efficiency. Against this general background, we see
exclusion occurring at the lower end of the labor
market. In the present phase of globalization, all this
is reinforced by the total breakthrough of the market
economy in the sense that many former public
enterprises, particularly in the services sector, are
being privatized and will from now on operate according
to the laws of the market economy. Experience teaches us
that this brings a vast gain of efficiency - the same
amount of work being done by far fewer people - thus
rendering relatively low-skilled labor ever more
superfluous.
The classic concept of equity now presents itself in new
forms: a good deal of exclusion and greater disparities
in incomes. These developments have not attracted as
much attention in the world as one may have expected.
Why is that?
* In the former First-World countries, the phenomenon
of the mature, if not overripe, welfare state is
coming under closer scrutiny. Clearly, the debate
is about the need for scaling down the welfare
state for the sake of competitiveness;
* in the former communist countries, attention is
focused on the problems of transition. These have
overall priority;
* then there is the group of former developing
countries which have now entered the takeoff phase.
This means that, by the end of the day, economic
growth in itself causes enormous progress for the
factor labor;
* and finally, in the least developed countries
growth is hampered for very different reasons such
as the absence of good governance, which has,
therefore, become the central issue.
In brief, though exclusion and disparity in incomes have
become more acute, they by no means dominate the agenda
in a world in which efficiency and competition are
considered to be of paramount importance.
Despite all the euphoria about the almost complete
breakthrough of the market economy together with
democracy and pluralism, we have to note that
fundamentally new problems have arisen. The further
development towards a global market, or what may be
called efficiency, but also ecology and equity are
taking on new forms - each for itself, but also in their
interrelationships.
This leads to tensions, some within the economy itself.
True, we now have a World Trade Organization, but at the
same time there is a strong trend towards regionalism.
Free trade is a good thing, but nevertheless solutions
will have to be found for issues of equity and ecology.
This calls for political choices in favor of normative
policy; for example, environmental standards and social
dumping. In turn, this means that it will be easier to
find solutions of a regional type between countries of a
similar cast of mind. Moreover, the model according to
which the United States and a small group of highly
developed countries (the G7) are able to give their
interpretation of a fair and balanced further
development of the concept of free trade, meets with
fierce resistances.
So far, then, a brief sketch of the problems faced by
politics and economics given the fact of globalization.
The problems concern the environment, justice,
participation and regionalism.
Less authority for the State
More important than all this is the fact that there is a
real problem concerning 'the state' as a form of
organization of political power. The symbiosis of the
market economy and politics, which is sometimes referred
to as the social market economy, might grind to a halt
because of the very phenomenon of globalization if the
latter were to lead to states becoming weaker. In this
respect it is important to note that the democratic
state not only has been - and is - the framework holding
together all kinds of different interests, but also
guarantees freedom, pluralism, public access,
transparency and accountability. All these make such a
symbiosis attractive and a free-market economy
acceptable. But it will only work if the state can
convince its citizens of its legitimacy. This is
precisely where the problem ties.
Government efficacy appears to be on the wane because
many problems are of a transboundary nature so that
national governments simply cannot cope with them on
their own. This undermines the legitimacy of government.
Then there is the disappearance of external threat. It
has always been important to defend one's own against an
enemy. Now this seems to be less necessary. There is,
indeed, a great deal of violence in the world, but this
is far away for most people and in so far as they take
an interest in it at all, they realize that their
government, and all governments together, can do nothing
about it.
Further, there is the desire to leave matters in the
hands of the citizens and to keep politics within one's
parish: the well-known trend towards decentralization.
To top it all administrative integrity and corruption
are much in the limelight.
Finally, it has been pointed out quite rightly that
democracy fans short in cases where, with regard to
transboundary problems, governments are supposed to be
prepared to reach intergovernmental agreements and to
create institutions. International relations are
generally controlled by the rules of diplomacy, not by
those of a public sphere of government. It is difficult
to achieve political accountability with regard to
international treaties and agreements, let alone for the
operation of international bodies. Thus, the fact that
the state fails in playing its role amounts to much more
than a technical problem for which an administrative
solutions need to be found.
To sum up, from the point of view of political economy
there are the new phenomena of ecology and equity -
particularly in the form of exclusion or inadequate
participation. The overriding problem, however, is the
loss of authority on the part of the state itself, and
with it the declining clout of international
organizations and agreements.
A weaker social fabric but a revival of values none the
less?
To an economist with administrative experience this
seems to be more or less what is happening. However,
attention needs to be drawn to something else.
Modem times are marked by much greater individualism and
by globalization. These two phenomena rather reinforce
each other than compete with each other. Whilst in most
countries the social fabric (the church, family, clubs)
is weakening and politics cannot make up for the loss of
conveyance of values or the way in which values are
perceived, citizens are showing their own, new, way of
motivation and the acceptance of values. They are often
attracted by global values, judging by the enormous
interest in Amnesty International, human rights,
M*decins sans frontiers, and also in a number of
environmental organizations. There seems to be a revival
of a value awareness - only in a new way.
Alongside the tremendous increase in the number of
nongovernmental, so-called one-issue organizations, we
have the phenomenon of networks; they arrived upon the
scene later but are no less expansive. They represent a
new form of the 'we-culture' and exist alongside the
culture of individualism. Neither of these new phenomena
- the nongovernmental organizations (with a very
normative tendency) and the networks (with a strongly
utilitarian tendency) - meets a need which the older
forms of the social fabric generally did provide for. I
refer to standing up for people who are at the risk of
living on the margin of society or of being excluded
from work. This may well be the reason why this
'we-culture' is also manifesting itself in other ways
which give rise to greater concern. I refer to the
revival of nationalism, the emergence of sects, and
growing fundamentalism. The desire to 'belong' thus has
a positive aspect - preserving the cores of old values
by giving them new shapes - and a negative one - by
clinging to ossified ideals. The latter may take several
forms:
* anti-pluralism, as is shown by fundamentalists;
* withdrawal from everyday life or a destructive
approach to it, as is demonstrated by the sects;
* and isolationism vis-a-vis other countries.
It is as if we can perceive these phenomena, both the
positive and the negative ones, but are bothered by a
curtain of fog. It is all not very clear or sharply
outlined. However, this does not mean that it is
irrelevant. On the contrary, it may well be that
individualism, which has been with us for some time, and
globalization, which is now accompanying individualism,
together give rise to some structural reaction.
Looked at from this angle, mankind is going to appear
fundamentally different because people will, at the same
time become more aware of their individuality and be
more involved in globalization. These two developments
which, taken together, represent progress and are the
fruit of the Enlightenment could well ring in a new
phase in our civilization and history. After the primacy
of faith and religion, after the primacy of the
Enlightenment, people now need a new direction which
will balance the objective trends towards
individualization and globalization with an adequate
degree of 'we'. This thinking in terms of 'we' is tied
up with a set of common standards, or rather with common
values, such as standing up for what is considered to be
valuable. Thus it is important to belong somewhere for
the sake of an ideal. As explained earlier, the feeling
of belonging is much strengthened by an awareness of
one's roots, or by an understanding of one's history and
religious involvement. The 'we-sentiment' is strongly
motivated by emotion and is complementary to individual
consciousness and rationality which have so much
increased throughout the world.
The desirability Of a new perspective on Political
Economy
Our analysis has shown that:
* in view of the level of global economic growth and
its global nature, environmental and ecological
problems call for broadening and cross-border
answers;
* equity, both with regard to exclusion and the
disparity of incomes, will create new problems;
* the state, and with it intergovernmental
cooperation, remains the most appropriate
instrument to work out practical policies to deal
with these issues, but that, in the eyes of the
citizens, the state as such has lost some of its
legitimacy and relevance. The relationship between
regional and global intergovernmental cooperation
is still far from clearly defined;
* and that individualization has been so successful
that spontaneously a new need came up for thinking
in socio-normative categories and for 'belonging'
somewhere (the 'we-culture').
Whilst, so far, political economy has always been
concerned with the analysis of economic events, with the
extrapolation of the developments implied, and with the
normative considerations and actions which they called
for, we now have evidence that there is need for a new
perspective on political economy. After all, the
'polis', which in the days of Adam Smith had grown into
the nation state, has now become the 'global village'.
However, there is now a greater consciousness of
identity and not much prospect for a global government.
It is true, Stephen Toulmin speaks of 'from Polis to
Cosmopotis',' but it is not as simple as that.
I have just drawn your attention to the various new
forms of the 'we-culture' which are emerging at the very
moment when national governments are losing their
authoritativeness. It may well be that, historically,
this kind of transnational thinking needs to mature so
that a basis may be established for effective
cross-border political action.
Be that as it may, we are moving into a new age, a new
phase in history in which faith and reason,
individuality and collectivity, must each find their
place so that a sustainable and harmonious development
may be attained.
We can as yet hardly see the outline of all this, let
alone give any answers. Just because we have a long way
ahead of us, I allow myself, being a man with
administrative experience, to make one recommendation.
Against the background of globalization and the
countereffects it evokes, we must devise a mix of
concern for our immediate environment, for a sense of
responsibility in our own country and, at the same time,
paying attention to global issues. Such a mix should
include a caveat against global romanticism, against
fine words about a global sense of responsibility, which
sound very noble but cannot be put into practice.
Along these lines an administrative model might be put
to the test, which would deal with problems in, as it
were, concentric circles. In the case of the environment
this is quite evident. We have problems on our doorstep,
others are at regional, national, continental and,
finally, global levels. Of course these are linked, but
if anything is to be achieved the levels of action need
to be distinguished. Similar analyses can be made with
regard to the fight against criminality and many other
issues.
Globalization offers us a wealth of possibilities of
both a material and an immaterial nature; in terms of
well-being but also with regard to a new 'we-sentiment'
concerning collective values. The perspective would then
seem to be one of continued individualization and
globalization, complemented by the 'we-sentiment' in
many ways.
There are, however, also ugly alternatives: chaos,
instability, dispute; in brief. disharmony. It all
depends on bow our dialogue with reality will be
conducted.
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