Exactly what transpired in the target area is not known. Having flown backseat with Hoss, the following is a reasonable over-target scenario. Actual times are used whenever possible. Before he begins his search, he checks in with the ABCCC providing ops area location and possible target types. At about 1000 (0300Z) Hoss begins to conduct an aggressive search along the river banks and the feeder creeks searching for activity. This search is conducted at near tree top level or below tree top level if he stays over the river and looks laterally under the tree canopy. Eyes search for human activity or evidence of human activity of any kind - roads, trails, buildings, hooches, boats, bunkers, storage piles, or vehicles. If they are detected, they belong to the bad guys. He checks out several forested areas nearby. Something is located and it is lucrative enough for RAVEN 30 to contact HILLSBORO, the day ABCCC, for fighters. ABCCC has a flight of A-1s available - HOBOS from NKP. Great! They are used to working low and slow, have a long loiter time, and carry lots of stuff. A flight of 3 A-1s contact RAVEN, HOBO 40, 41, and 48.18 Hobo 41 is lead. Hoss briefs the target and rolls in to mark it with a Willy Pete rocket. RAVEN pulls away from the target as the white smoke billows. The A-1s see the smoke and start their bomb runs.
The unthinkable happens. Ground fire erupts. Bullets crash through the sheet metal side of the O-1. A single round hits Hoss, passing through the webbing in the side of his flak jacket.19 It has sufficient velocity to penetrate his body under his arm. Its angle is upward doing severe damage as it goes. Hoss knows he is hit mortally. Instinctively, he unlocks his harness to check on his observer. The FACs tried to teach the Lao observers how to engage the stick in the back seat and attempt to fly the aircraft should something like this happen. Hoss tries to get his observer to take control of the aircraft. He may have talked to the fighters, we don't know. Hoss slumps forward, his hulk pushes the stick forward. The Birddog begins to descend. The Lao observer is on the radio screaming in Lao. No one understands. The O-1 increases speed and crashes onto a sand bank in the emerald green river. At impact, Hoss is thrown against the instrument panel. The observer apparently is killed on impact as the radio frequency falls deafening silent. The O-1 rests partially submerged in the water upright with its tail showing. O-1F #885 has made its last flight. Water laps against the sides of the new river obstruction. River silt begins to fill in around the airplane. Calm returns to the river.
The A-1s observe this deadly scene and contact HlLLSBORO. The chilling message of “FAC down in river” is transmitted to the ABCCC by HOBO 41. The message was recorded at 1037 (0337Z). The A-1s continue their attacks as the search and rescue team generates. At 1040 (0340Z), the 38ARRS mission log indicates that COMPRESS, the Air Rescue Coordinating Center in Udorn, is running the mission. The HOBOs position is given as WD8404, northeast of the crash site.
“SMOKEY, SMOKEY, This is HlLLSBORO, Over”.
The receiver's message breaks the mid morning doldrums of the radio
room. l was sitting at my desk in the Intel Office about 20 feet from the
radio console. Looking through the open door to the radio room, my ears
perk up. Why is HlLLSBORO calling at this time a day for target validations?
Doesn't make sense.
Our radio operator responds. “HlLLSBORO, this is SMOKEY CONTROL, go
ahead.”
“SMOKEY, be advised that HOBO Flight reports that a RAVEN is down in
the river. Location is six zero miles on the one zero zero radial from
Channel 99.20 SAR is being initiated. HlLLSBORO out.”
For a moment, the message does not sink into my brain. The Radio Operator
turns around in his chair and stares at me, a look of terror on his face.
His look brings me back to reality. I blurt out, “Oh shit, that's McBride!”
I tell the radio operator to call HlLLSBORO and confirm this was RAVEN
30.
“HILLSBORO, HILLSBORO, this is SMOKEY CONTROL on Victor, Over”
An immediate response from the ABCCC. “SMOKEY, HILLSBORO, go ahead”
“HILLSBORO, SMOKEY, can you confirm that was Raven 30, Over”
“SMOKEY, HILLSBORO, that is affirmative.”
“HILLSBORO, SMOKEY, Roger on the confirmation. SMOKEY out”
The clock on the wall indicated about 1045.
Stunned silence filled both rooms as we tried to comprehend the message from the ABCCC. Then all hell breaks loose as we leap into action. I leap to the map board, stretch the string from Channel 99 (located at Mukdahan, Thailand - across the Mekong River from L39) to the operations area. Right in the middle of where he was going. Damn! I tell the radio operator to notify everyone that we have a SAR on our hands. The AAIRA, Jack Strobel, is notified. We contact AIRA VTN as a heads up; keep the head shed in the loop, they have the muscle. Det 4 is called because we might need some of their assets.21
Quickly we put together a plan of action once the players are assembled - the AAIRA, the other FAC, AOC commander and myself. We need to go to the crash site. Our air assets are varied but slow - the second O-1, the Lao U-17 if it works, and the AAIRA’s U-10 Helio. None are speed mongers and we need speed. I remembered that when I crossed the runway this morning there was a Continental Beech Baron parked in front of the CAS Air Ops building. I call Air Ops and get the head of Air Ops. I tell him that McBride was down and asked if we could “borrow” their Baron. Told him I had notified Tom Fosmire at Det 4 already. He said come ahead but they had to get the pilot. I grab my camera, survival vest, and emergency bag, throw them in the Jeep and roar down the road to the other end of the field. Captain Lee Gossett has the Baron “62G” in preflight when we arrive. Four of us climb aboard. I am in back behind the pilot. There is another AIRA person to my right. The right front seat is taken by a CAS case officer. We are in the air in minutes. The Baron’s twin engines are much better for speed than our single engined air fleet. We head out southeast at full throttle.
Unbeknownst to us, at 1057 (0357Z) the JOLLY GREENs are cleared to launch and then are held. The reason for the hold is not clear from the logs; however it reports were that the O-1’s cockpit was underwater. Approximately 20 minutes later at 1120 (0420Z), General H [NFI] authorizes the SAR forces to launch to check out RAVEN 30. This may have been at the intercession of the Embassy. At the same time HOBO 41 reports possible small arms ground fire in the operations area. Approximately 10 minutes later at 1132 (0432Z) JOLLY GREEN 16 and 17 are airborne, followed in close order by four SANDY (A-1) escorts.
When the Baron arrives in the operations area the pilot checks in with the ABCCC to alert it of our presence and to advise the Skyraiders we are nearby and don’t run over us. The HOBO A-1s are east of the crash site attacking like angry hornets. The SAR log reports that aircraft 62G noted that green sea dye was coming from the aircraft at 1142 (0442Z). I’m not sure this was true because neither Lee Gossett or I remember it when we talked thirty years later. It may have been a remark concerning the color of the river which looks like the color of marker dye. My first impression is how small the aircraft wreck looks in comparison to the river and surrounding land. It is a wonder that the HOBOs saw it unless they were in contact at the time of the crash and knew where to look. Although the metallic reflection was eyecatching at low level, at higher levels the wreck just looks like a blob in the river. We begin a number of passes over the crash site at various altitudes, being wary of possible ground fire. Each pass I try to take a 35 mm photo of the crash site. The weather is good; 4000 scattered to broken with good visibility - perfect Northeast Monsoon weather. We make passes over the site for about an hour. We go bingo fuel and turn north for L39 at about 1230 (0530Z). As we depart the crash site we can just see the SAR forces approaching from the north.22
The crash site is located at WD750030. The O-1 is in the river approximately 50 feet from the south bank of the Se Bang Hiang. It is facing generally upriver or east. At this point the river is nearly 600 feet wide meandering west to the Mekong River. The aircraft appears to be on a submerged sand or mud bar. The left wing and fuselage aft of the canopy are out of the water. The right wing appears to be sheered off and lying perpendicular to the wreckage at the two o'clock position. It looks to be underwater lying on the shallow bottom. There is no activity, survivor or otherwise, around the aircraft during our reconnaissance of the crash. The nearest village is Ban Thapayi about two and a half nautical miles down river.23
In the vicinity of the crash site, both sides of the river have vertical banks that rise up to the prevailing ground level forming a bluff of what appears to be sandy loam. The bank nearest the crash site is estimated to be 15-20 feet high. The higher ground is covered by open and closed foliage of various types. The main river bank is cut periodically by small feeder creeks. One of these creeks is near the crash site, the effluence from which contributes to the sand or mud bar in the river. One of the photos shows what appears to be a gossamer layer of smoke west of the crash site. It was not readily apparent on the color slide until I made a print of it years later. This could be one of several things. First, it could have been residual smoke from an earlier airstrike nearby. Second it could have been smoke from morning camp fires caught in a temperature inversion that kept it from dissipating. We had seen this phenomenon before. It was a dead give-away that people were present. Or three, it could have been a patch of ground fog that had not burned off which was typical during this time of year. This remains to be investigated but I favor the first. If Hoss was checking on bomb damage assessment (BDA) from an earlier strike, this might answer why he was separated from the fighters by a number of miles.
Meanwhile, other aircraft are checking out the site. At 1148 (0448Z) NAIL 45 reported via CR-1 that there was no movement at the crash site. Both Lee Gossett and I do not remember seeing this aircraft, probably an O-2, in the area. CR-2 advises at 1235 (0535Z) that aircraft PCL said that the aircraft “must have blew (sic) up for there were alot of holes in it.” To the south, Air America Captain Ed Reid hears the commotion on the radio and heads north in his Bell 205 helicopter (a civilian UH-1D). Over a number of beers at the Club in Savannakhet one night Hoss and I had made a pact with Ed that if we ever went down we wanted him to come get us. True to his pledge, he was on his way.
The flight back to Savannakhet was subdued. We all knew the truth but
nobody wanted to accept it. Our friend was in that crumpled aircraft in
the river. We hurt, and hurt bad because all of us knew Hoss McBride. The
adrenalin rush was wearing off, replaced by anger and despair. We landed
at L39, thanked our hosts for the morning flight, and drove back to the
AlRA site. We were met at the door by anxious questions. There were no
hopeful answers. I walked back through the radio room to the intel shop,
took off my survival vest and slumped in the chair, physically and mentally
exhausted. The clock on the wall showed a little after 1330.
